

## From initiative to political necessity: Treaty of Riga 1921

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**Abstract:** *The international situation after the First World War is often viewed cautiously. Apart from the differences that had occurred with the fall of the four empires, action in Eastern Europe had barely begun. The Civil War in Russia and the confrontation between Warsaw and Moscow were the two key elements that shaped the next 20 years in the region. The topic of the paper will focus on the Treaty of Riga of 1921, which determined the political map of the East for the next 20 years and which brought with it quite a few questions about the complexity of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin's acceptance of the signing of such a document. The whole paper will be based on the document itself, which we will analyse closely to understand the positions of both states and the necessity of concluding such a treaty.*

### Introduction

After World War I, the map of Eastern Europe was completely reorganized. The emergence of new states, the struggle for power, and the concentration of political power in the hands of certain revisionist figures were among the many events that characterized this region.

In this paper, we will examine certain aspects of the 1921 Peace Treaty between the USSR and Poland. The document was not signed by representatives of the USSR, but rather by the government of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR)<sup>2</sup>, which also expressed the will of the government of the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic alongside that of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The aim of this article is to provide an overview of the situation in Russia at the beginning of the third decade of the last century. The information presented is entirely based on the text of the original document.

The Treaty of Riga, signed on March 18, 1921, in all its provisions, represents a series of political, economic, and social concessions granted to Warsaw by Moscow. As a result, it can be

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<sup>2</sup> The USSR was founded only in 1922.

stated from the very beginning that the treaty was necessary for both parties, and the conditions and factors that made its signing essential were not solely put forward by the Polish side, but also by the Soviets, who were willing to cede certain assets (territories, documents, jewelry, etc.).

In this paper, we will not focus on the course of the battles, but rather on the factors that led to the conflict between Poland and the Soviets, the effects of the war, and its consequences. Regarding the literature on the Polish-Soviet War and the Treaty of Riga, two monographs available in both Romanian and English are noteworthy. They describe the course of the conflict and provide the opportunity to analyze both battlefield events and negotiation processes. These works are: *The Year 1920* by Józef Piłsudski and *The Road to the Vistula* by Mikhail Tukhachevsky.

### Evolution of events

To better understand why the Treaty of Riga was signed, it is necessary to review all the events that preceded it. It should be noted that we will not consider aspects related to the Ukrainian government since, in terms of foreign policy, as it was subordinate to directives from Moscow.

The end of the conflict between Russia and Germany, and consequently of the Great War, provided Poland with the opportunity to gain independence. The period between December 1918 and the first half of January 1919 marked a time when power was concentrated in the hands of the Polish leader Józef Piłsudski. The conflict between Poland and Russia began in January 1919. According to Polish historians, the military confrontations between Polish and Soviet troops had their roots as early as November 1918<sup>3</sup> (or even 1917). Officially, the conflict escalated significantly in January 1919, but unofficially, hostilities continued at a lower scale between Poles and Bolshevik Russian troops even during World War I. It is also worth noting that Poland's borders were defined only by the Treaty of Versailles, but solely in relation to Germany.<sup>4</sup> The eastern borders of Poland were not determined due to political instability in the region and the absence of Moscow's delegation from the peace negotiations.

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<sup>3</sup> Польский культурный центр, *Что мы знаем о советско-польской войне 1919-1921 годов? К 100-летию заключения Рижского мирного договора*, 2021. [Polish Cultural Center, *What do we know about the Soviet-Polish War of 1919-1921? 100 years since the conclusion of the Riga Peace Treaty*, 2021.] - <https://shorturl.at/fmNY5>

<sup>4</sup> Ю. В. Ключникова, Андрея Сабанина, *Версальский Мирный Договор - Полный Перевод с французского подлинника*, Изд. Литиздата НКВД, Москва, 1925. [Y. V. Klyuchnikov, Andrei Sabanin, *Versailles Treaty – Complete translation from French original text*, Iz. Litizdat NKID, Moscova, 1925.] - [http://militera.org/books/pdf/docs/sb\\_versal.pdf](http://militera.org/books/pdf/docs/sb_versal.pdf).

Of course, both states had their own interests in the conflict. Speaking of Poland, the primary objective of its leader, Józef Piłsudski, was to reclaim former Polish territories and establish the so-called *Rzeczpospolita*.<sup>5</sup> However, the war between the two states can be seen not only as an attempt to reclaim territory but also as an effort to secure a stronger position at the peace negotiation table.

Regarding the Soviet side, multiple strategic explanations can be posited. The most well-known and frequently used argument by Soviet researchers is that Moscow saw Poland's independence as the resurgence of an empire that threatened its borders. However, beyond this pretext, the true stakes were the opening of a pathway to Central Europe through Poland and support for revolutionary movements in newly formed states. In our case, the best-known examples are the Hungarian Soviet Republic and the Slovak Soviet Republic, both of which had a short-lived political existence marked primarily by the promotion of Red Terror<sup>6</sup>. It is assumed that the communist government in Moscow also supported the conflict because external powers backed the White Army led by Russian Admiral Alexander Kolchak. Additionally, there was fear that some supporters of this army had taken refuge in Poland and could organize another offensive movement from outside Soviet territory.

The importance of this treaty should not be viewed solely from the perspectives of Poland or Russia. France and Great Britain could have supported Poland, which would have been a significant loss for Russia. This peace agreement benefited the Bolsheviks both internally and externally by stabilizing the country's foreign policy situation and allowing them to focus on resolving domestic problems. On the international level, it was anticipated that the Entente would not intervene as actively in Russia's internal affairs and would cease its support for the White Movement of rebellious imperial generals. Additionally, the Entente powers might provide military aid to Poland, which would further strengthen the Polish army and make Józef Piłsudski's territorial expansion plans more feasible. However, this option would have faced challenges related to Poland's internal situation, which—like interwar Romania and the USSR—was dealing with the issue of Bessarabia.

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<sup>5</sup> *Rzeczpospolita* – state in Eastern Europe during 1569 – 1795, formed from the Polish Kingdom and the Great Lithuanian Duchy.

<sup>6</sup> Red Terror, known in Russian as Красный Терор, relaying the punitive measures applied by the red army's soldiers to repress the white army. In 1919 Hungary, the term held the same meaning the state was reunified and internal stabilization was achieved.

The desire for peace and the internal reasons behind it are evident in the potential social unrest within Bolshevik Russia. The war-exhausted society could have revolted against the new leadership. For Vladimir Lenin, the main objective was to stabilize the situation in the West, with Poland, and to direct all resources toward ending the military conflicts in the Caucasus and Siberia. Additional problems caused by rebels and the construction of a new governing apparatus in a fragile situation would have delayed this process. Only after reunifying the state and achieving internal stabilization could the possibility of revising the treaty be considered. The Treaty of Riga was seen by Russia as a chance to pause amid internal challenges. Although the treaty stipulated that both states would refrain from supporting other movements or organizations, the USSR would later provide support to the Communist Party of Poland during the interwar period. Like other peace treaties of that era, this one was eventually violated with the outbreak of World War II.

### **The road to armistice – The negotiations in Riga**

The situation on the front and the beginning of political stabilization in Russia led to the start of armistice negotiations. The end of the war became the subject of retrospective analysis. Many researchers have suggested that the war itself (not just its stakes) played an important role in initiating the armistice negotiations and a final peace agreement. In reality, the possible causes are more complex. Other events influenced the peace process, such as battles in Siberia, the Caucasus, and southern Ukraine, which directly led to new social unrest.

It is also important to note that by the end of 1919, there was a period of respite between Moscow and Warsaw, and the situation on the front stabilized. It is difficult to say whether these actions were a precursor to the negotiations proposed as early as September-October 1920. However, this pause allowed the Soviets time to address the situation in the Caucasus and Siberia. The destruction of the White Army reduced the number of problems the new Bolshevik leadership had to face. Additionally, logistical challenges diminished, enabling the redeployment of troops from Siberia to the Polish front. At the same time, the signing of peace between the two states can also be attributed to social factors: the population was exhausted from the war and, even more so, from the Red Terror initiated by Lenin, Trotsky, and other Soviet leaders.

The path to negotiations began in September 1920, with discussions on starting armistice negotiations publicly announced at the ninth conference of the Communist Party of Russia (Bolsheviks) on September 22. During the plenary session, the issue of ending the war with Poland was raised, in accordance with Józef Piłsudski's proposal to place the borders along the front line as of April 26, 1920.<sup>7</sup>

However, by September, the situation had changed completely: the initiative had been taken by the Polish army, and in the following weeks, the front collapsed under the Polish offensive. According to Stalin, approximately 100,000 Russian soldiers were taken prisoners, along with 200 artillery pieces captured by the Polish army.<sup>8</sup> All of this suggests that the situation was not in Lenin's favor, and the possibility of a new revolt or another civil war would have automatically led to the downfall of the newly established Soviet regime.

Moreover, the Polish communists were also in a weak position and unable to resist Piłsudski's leadership. At the same time, peace was also desired on the Polish side. This was evident in the negotiations with the Soviets at the end of September and in Poland's acceptance of Moscow's offer.<sup>9</sup> On September 30, the chairman of the Russian-Ukrainian commission, Adolph Joffe, sent a note to the chairman of the Polish commission, Jan Dąbski, suggesting that the deadline for the armistice document was October 5.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> В.И. Ленин. Неизвестные документы. 1891—1922 / Федер. архив. агентство, Рос. гос. архив соц.-полит. истории. — 2-е изд. — М.: Политическая энциклопедия (РОССПЭН), 2017 - [V.I. Lenin, Unknown documents. 1891-1922) Federal Archive Agency, state archive for social and political history – 2nd e. - М.: Political encyclopedia (ROSSPEN), 2017].

<sup>8</sup> Большевистское руководство. Переписка. 1912-1927: Сборник документов / Ин-т гос. упр. и соц. исслед. Моск. гос. ун-та им. М.В.Ломоносова, Istituto Italiano Per Gli Studi Filosofici, Ecole Des Hautes Etudes En Sciences Sociales, Maison Des Sciences De L'Homme, сост. А.В.Квашонкин, О.В.Хлевнюк, Л.П.Кошелева, Л.А.Роговая. — М.: Российская политическая энциклопедия (РОССПЭН), 1996 – [Bolshevik ruling. Corespondence. 1912-1927: Colection of documents/ State Administration and Social Sciences Institute. A.V.Kvaşonkin, O.V.Khlevniuk, L.P.Kosheleva, L.A.Rogovaya. - Moscow: Russian Political Encyclopedia (ROSSPEN), 1996.].

<sup>9</sup> Декреты Советской власти. Т. X. Август – сентябрь 1920 г. / Ин-т марксизма-ленинизма при ЦК КПСС, Ин-т истории СССР АН СССР. – М. : Политиздат, 1980 – [Decrees of soviet power. Vol. X. August - September 1920 / Marixism-Leninism Institute of the Central Comittee, USSR Institute of History, USSR Science Academy Moscow: Politizdat, 1980].

<sup>10</sup> Документы и материалы по истории советско-польских отношений. Т. III. Апрель 1920 г.-март 1921 г. / Ин-т славяноведения АН СССР, Ин-т истории польско-сов. отношений Польской АН; Отв.ред. И.А. Хренов, Н. Гонсеровская-Грабовская. — М.: Наука, 1965 – [Documents and materials pertaining to the history of Soviet-Polish relations. Vol. III. April 1920-March 1921 / Slavic Studies Institute, USSR Science Academy, Institute for the history Soviet-Polish relations, Polish Academy of Sciences; Edited by I.A. Khrenov, N. Gonserovskaia-Grabovskaia. I.A. Khrenov, N. Gonserovskaia-Grabovskaia. - Moscow: Nauka, 1965].

The Polish commission did not express a desire to convene another conference and sign an armistice. For this reason, Adolph Joffe implied that if the armistice was not accepted and the war continued, the Polish state would have to bear the blame for delaying negotiations. Consequently, on October 5, following a conference, the chairmen of both commissions reached a consensus to sign and conclude a provisional armistice by no later than October 8.<sup>11</sup>

According to telegrams exchanged between A. Joffe and Georgy Chicherin, there is an indication that the Polish side was satisfied with the Soviet proposal regarding border demarcation.<sup>12</sup> However, Poland received all the occupied territories, conceding only small areas and the city of Minsk. Therefore, Moscow's position cannot be considered a victory; moreover, this hypothesis was later confirmed by the final document signed in Riga. The armistice between the two sides was signed on October 12, 1920.

### **Analysis of the armistice document and additional acts**

The document contained 17 points that ended the hostilities and ordered the withdrawal of military forces from the confrontation line by 25 versts<sup>13</sup> (approximately 26.67 km)<sup>14</sup>. The document also outlined the new borders that would delimit the two states. Additionally, Article VI stipulated that both states would mutually prohibit any organizations, groups, or governments operating within their territories that aimed to incite conflict against the other contracting party.<sup>15</sup>

Other provisions addressed the exchange of prisoners, social commitments to advocate for the contracting parties, and the right to choose citizenship. If this preliminary document had been signed on the spot, both parties would have had to agree to create and sign formal conventions, which would involve ratifying the document and establishing a final peace agreement between the two sides.

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<sup>11</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>12</sup> В.И. Ленин, *op. cit.*

<sup>13</sup> 1 Verst = 1066,8 meters.

<sup>14</sup> Документы и материалы по истории советско-польских отношений. Т. III. Апрель 1920 г.-март 1921 г. / Ин-т славяноведения АН СССР, Ин-т истории польско-сов. отношений Польской АН; Отв.ред. И.А. Хренов, Н. Гонсеровская-Грабовская. — М.: Наука, 1965 – [Documents and materials pertaining to the history of Soviet-Polish relations. Vol. III. April 1920-March 1921 / Slavic Studies Institute, USSR Science Academy, Institute for the history of Soviet-Polish relations, Polish Academy of Sciences; Edited by I.A. Khrenov, N. Gonserovskaia-Grabovskaia. I.A. Khrenov, N. Gonserovskaia-Grabovskaia. - Moscow: Nauka, 1965].

<sup>15</sup> *Ibidem.*

Jan Dąbski, the chairman of the Polish commission, faced harsh criticism from Poland's Foreign Minister, Eustachy Sapieha.<sup>16</sup> There were three main reasons for this criticism. According to the Foreign Minister:

1. Poland sought greater compensation from Russia.
2. All discussions between the commissions should have taken place under the Entente's supervision.
3. Maintaining relations with the Entente states was a priority over the armistice, which was considered secondary.

The signing of the armistice agreement took place on October 12. The document largely retained all the provisions of the preliminary agreement, with some additions. The main subject was the definition of the final borders between the two states (Article I)<sup>17</sup>. The delineation of these borders largely corresponded to the existing geographical boundaries at that time.

The signing of the additional act took place on February 24; it contained four sections, comprising a total of 38 articles<sup>18</sup>. This additional act addressed the method of repatriating prisoners of war and civilians; its signing had been stipulated in Article VII of the preliminary armistice agreement. Attention was also given to the development of joint commissions and their working methods. This additional act was accompanied by another supplementary protocol, consisting of four paragraphs, which specified that, in principle, there would be a personal exchange of individuals in whom the state had a common interest.<sup>19</sup>

In this context, all the maneuvers carried out by the Russian delegates in drafting the final document were nothing more than attempts to gain ground in the socio-political scene. Internal issues within the Soviet state were already becoming increasingly pressing and required a more focused approach than external matters. The international community, in turn, no longer wanted to see the outbreak of major conflicts. Additionally, Moscow had to present itself on the international

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<sup>16</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>17</sup> Документы и материалы по истории советско-польских отношений. Т. III. Апрель 1920 г.-март 1921 г. / Ин-т славяноведения АН СССР, Ин-т истории польско-сов. отношений Польской АН; Отв.ред. И.А. Хренов, Н. Гонсеровская-Грабовская. — М.: Наука, 1965 – [Documents and materials pertaining to the history of Soviet-Polish relations. Vol. III. April 1920–March 1921 / Slavic Studies Institute, USSR Science Academy, Institute for the history Soviet-Polish relations, Polish Academy of Sciences; Edited by I.A. Khrenov, N. Gonserovskaia-Grabovskaia. I.A. Khrenov, N. Gonserovskaia-Grabovskaia. - Moscow: Nauka, 1965].

<sup>18</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibidem*.

stage as a peacemaker state, which led to the acceptance of the conditions proposed by the leadership in Warsaw.

### **Analysis of the final document**

The Treaty of Riga is a peace document between the newly formed states of Eastern Europe: on one side, the government of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), together with the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR) and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (Ukrainian SSR); on the other side, the government of Poland. The treaty was signed on March 18, 1921, in Riga, Latvia.

The signatories of the treaty on behalf of the RSFSR, including the BSSR and the Ukrainian SSR, were Adolph Joffe, Yakov Ganetsky, Emanuel Kviring, Yuriy Kotsiubynsky (Ukrainian SSR), and Leonid Obolensky. On behalf of Poland, the signatories were Jan Dąbski, Stanisław Kauzik, Edward Lechowicz, Henryk Strasburger, and Leon Wasilewski. With the signing of the treaty, the war between Moscow and Warsaw was definitively brought to an end.

Article XXVI stipulates that the ratification of the document should have been carried out within 30 days of signing.<sup>20</sup> The ratifications took place as follows: the Russian leadership on April 14, the Polish leadership on April 15, and the Ukrainian leadership on April 17. It is noteworthy that the Belarusian side did not ratify the document. Russia signed the treaty on behalf of the Belarusian government.

Regarding the document, its signing and ratification not only marked the end of the war but also, in accordance with Article III, the signatories renounced all rights and claims to territories beyond the demarcated borders.<sup>21</sup> The second paragraph of this article contains an interesting provision stating that the territories ceded to Poland: "*... are a subject of dispute between Poland and Lithuania, and the issue of ownership of these territories by either of the mentioned states shall be resolved*

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<sup>20</sup> Documents, Treaty of Riga, *Treaty of Riga between Russia and Poland 18 March 1921*, <https://brestobl.com/nasel/naselen/dok/1921/80.html>

<sup>21</sup> Documents, Treaty of Riga, *Treaty of Riga between Russia and Poland 18 March 1921*.

*exclusively between Poland and Lithuania.*"<sup>22</sup> Russia renounced its claims to Lithuania, thereby allowing Lithuania, in case of accusations, to resolve its issues with Poland independently.

Another noteworthy article is Article VII, which states that persons of "deported" nationality (Polish, Russian, Ukrainian) have the right to their own language, religion, and culture<sup>23</sup>. Clearly, this article provides protection for foreign communities within another state, which not only facilitates social comfort for individuals but also regulates bilateral interests between states.

Article IX of the treaty outlines the repatriation procedures for soldiers and civilians, as previously stipulated in the preliminary and additional documents. It can be observed that to improve and facilitate relations, all signatory parties agreed not to demand war reparations from one another and to grant amnesty for political crimes and offenses. This approach and understanding directly demonstrate a willingness to improve relations.

The most interesting article of this treaty, in my opinion, is Article XI, which states the following: "*Russia and Ukraine shall return to Poland the following objects taken to Russia or Ukraine from January 1, 1772, from the territory of the Polish Republic.*"<sup>24</sup> This also applied to Poland. This date was not chosen randomly—July 1772 marked the First Partition of Poland (Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth); under this partition, the Russian Empire annexed the following territories: eastern Belarus, including the cities of Gomel, Mogilev, Vitebsk, Polotsk, and part of Livonia.<sup>25</sup> Additionally, it is specified that only forcibly taken objects would be returned, whereas other valuable items, whether donated, purchased, or gifted, would not be subject to restitution.

Essentially, the entire Article XI refers to the mutual restitution of all objects considered part of the national treasury (not just jewelry, gold, or luxury items), but also official documents such as: "*books, archives, artworks, catalogs, antiquities, bibliographic materials, scientific and educational works, collections, etc.*"<sup>26</sup> Furthermore, there were still deficiencies in returning the listed items. Significant objects such as archival documents or records concerning Polish revolutionary movements from

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<sup>22</sup> Originally: „[...] спорные между Польшей и Литвой, — вопрос о принадлежности этих территорий к одному или другому из названных государств подлежит разрешению исключительно между Польшей и Литвой” – excerpt from *Рижский договор между Россией и Польшей 18 марта 1921 года*.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>24</sup> Originally: „Россия и Украина возвращают Польше следующие предметы, вывезенные в Россию или Украину со времени 1 января 1772 года с территории Польской Республики ...” – excerpt from *Рижский договор между Россией и Польшей 18 марта 1921 года*.

<sup>25</sup> A. Oțetea, *History of the World in Data*, Bucharest, Ed. Enciclopedia Română, 1969, p. 192.

<sup>26</sup> Documents, *Treaty of Riga, Treaty of Riga between Russia and Poland 18 March 1921*.

1876 or military secrets after 1870 were not returned: "Archives, registers, etc., related to the struggle waged after 1876 by the former Tsarist authorities against the revolutionary movement in Poland, until a special agreement is reached between the contracting parties regarding their return to Poland; military secret articles concerning the period after 1870."<sup>27</sup>

Article XIII is equally important and was included in the preliminary peace document, stipulating the reimbursement of approximately 30 million gold rubles in coins or bullion. This payment was justified as follows: "The active participation of the territories of the Polish Republic in the economic life of the former Russian Empire."<sup>28</sup> In today's equivalent, this sum would be approximately 256 million U.S. dollars or around 17 billion Russian rubles.

Additionally, Article XVI stipulated that Russia and Ukraine were to make payments to both individuals and legal entities that had deposited money in banks during the empire. This reimbursement applied to all deposits made after January 1, 1916.<sup>29</sup> The document also provided for compensation in various fields, as honored by the Russian and Ukrainian sides, for Polish citizens. The transfer and acquisition of certain industrial assets were also specified in the treaty. It is noteworthy that the transport of objects to be returned to one of the parties was to be carried out by the state returning them, up to its own border.

The treaty also included four annexes detailing interventions regarding possible goods that individuals wishing to change their country of residence could take with them, how various commissions established after the treaty's ratification would function, and their support. Additionally, it was emphasized that Russia and Ukraine were to return a specified number of locomotives and wagons, as well as certain architectural documents, sketches, and models. It was also noted that 13 million gold rubles should be provided in exchange for the locomotives and wagons, and an additional 5 million gold rubles were to be paid by Poland for railway assets.<sup>30</sup>

It is worth noting that Polish railways were divided into two gauges: the first followed the Russian model, built during the rule of the Russian Empire, while the second was the standard (European) gauge, located in territories granted to Poland after the defeat of the German Empire.

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<sup>27</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>28</sup> Originally: „активного участия земель Польской Республики в хозяйственной жизни бывшей Российской Империи” excerpt from *Рижский договор между Россией и Польшей 18 марта 1921 года.*

<sup>29</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>30</sup> Documents, Treaty of Riga, *Treaty of Riga between Russia and Poland 18 March 1921.*

## Conclusion

In this paper, I attempted to present and interpret the 1921 Treaty of Riga between Poland and Bolshevik Russia. I focused on a brief overview of military events to make room for illustrating the political framework before and after the war.

As a result, I tried to cover as much as possible the actions that influenced both parties—especially Bolshevik Russia—to move toward signing the armistice and, eventually, peace. It can be observed that the turning points on the battlefield, as well as socio-political aspects internally and externally, led to significant premises regarding the approach to national interest issues.

The already dire situation of the Russian people, in this case, is determined by three aspects discussed in this paper: I. World War I, II. The Civil War, III. Repression under the new system (the Red Terror). All these factors influenced the perception of the issue and the grave situation that Lenin's Kremlin leadership and his associates faced. Moreover, to strengthen their own rule, a process that continued throughout the interwar period. Another important aspect presented in the paper is the ease with which states at that time (20th century), especially the Soviets, demanded the transfer of certain pro-Bolshevik individuals to their camp. From the Polish perspective, this helped cleanse the system of dissidents.

The final essential factor highlighted in the paper is Moscow's position. It was clearly a position of loss, evident in several key factors: Moscow ceded territories as compensation for the conflict and simultaneously renounced them voluntarily. The issue of reparations and surplus monetary payments also highlighted Moscow's assumption of former expenses incurred by Poland under the empire. All these factors, along with numerous other claims, led Moscow to harbor a desire for revenge. This would later be seen in actions regarding the division of spheres of influence between the USSR and Nazi Germany, as well as the territorial changes and mass deportations following World War II.

## Appendix

Appendix no. 1 (Front line on May 14th 1920)

ПОЛОЖЕНИЕ СТОРОН НА ПОЛЬСКОМ ФРОНТЕ К 14 МАЯ 1920 г.





Схема № 3

Appendix no. 2 (Front line on July 4th 1920)

ПОЛОЖЕНИЕ СТОРОН НА ПОЛЬСКОМ ФРОНТЕ К 4 ИЮЛЯ 1920 г.



А

Схема № 7

Appendix no. 3 (Front line on August 8th, 1920)

ПОЛОЖЕНИЕ СТОРОН НА ПОЛЬСКОМ ФРОНТЕ К 8 АВГУСТА 1920 г.  
ВЫХОД КРАСНОЙ АРМИИ НА р. ЗАП. БУГ.




Схема № 9