



EURO-ATLANTIC STUDIES

NEW SERIES

5/2022



Euro-Atlantic Studies is a journal published by the Centre for Euro-Atlantic Studies "Prof. Univ. Dr. Constantin Buse", University of Bucharest.

Founded in 1998, the journal's purpose is to provide to both the scientific community and the interested public the results of recent research in the fields of International History and International Relations.

Reproducerea integrală sau parțială, multiplicarea prin orice mijloace și sub orice formă, cum ar fi xeroxarea, scanarea, transpunerea în format electronic sau audio, punerea la dispoziția publică, inclusiv prin internet sau prin rețele de calculatoare, stocarea permanentă sau temporară pe dispozitive sau sisteme cu posibilitatea recuperării informațiilor, cu scop comercial sau gratuit, precum și alte fapte similare săvârșite fără permisiunea scrisă a deținătorului copyright-ului reprezintă o încălcare a legislației cu privire la protecția proprietății intelectuale și se pedepsesc penal și/sau civil în conformitate cu legile în vigoare.

EURO-ATLANTIC STUDIES

New Series

5/2022

Editura FREE

2022

EDITORS: Bogdan Antoniu, Alin Matei, Mihaeala Mustăța

EDITORIAL ASSISTANT: Victor Nicolăescu

Teodora Vîrlan

EDITORIAL BOARD: Ioan Chiper
Constantin Hlihor
Ernest H. Latham Jr.
Marian Ștefănescu

Editura FREE

Web: free.literati.ro

Email: free@literati.ro

Republicii 202, Comarnic, 105700, ROMANIA

ISSN 1454-2153
ISSN-L 1454-2153

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Ana UȚĂ , <i>Nazi Germany's Propaganda Machine: The Rise</i>	7
2. Andrei PETRESCU , <i>Fascist Foreign Policy: Some considerations of Mussolini's Fascist Ideology</i>	45
3. Alexandra COJOCARU , <i>Ongoing Humanitarian Crisis and Peace Process in The Democratic Republic of the Congo</i>	57
4. Anis GHET , <i>Donald Trump and the Iran Nuclear Deal: what is the future of the deal? A key issue concerning worldwide security</i>	91
5. Mihaela MUSTĂȚEA , <i>Italy, the second Libyan war, and the Frontex Irini Operation</i>	119
6. Elena Andreea NĂSTASE , <i>An approach to the European Union's Energy Diplomacy</i>	141
7. Victor NICOLĂESCU , <i>The principles of international humanitarian aid - diversity and innovation</i>	173
8. BOOK REVIEW	189

Nazi Germany's Propaganda Machine: *The Rise*

Ana-Alexandra Uță*

Keywords: War, Oratory, The National Socialists, *Munich Putsch*, The German nation, Elections, Goebbels's propaganda, anti-Semite, Versailles system.

Abstract

Peculiarities in German history led to the emergence of a 'special path' (Sonderweg), which was represented by the rise and rise of Adolf Hitler. Because Hitler's 'shadow' was so large, and stretched in technique, approach, ascension, and plan, it shaped the diversity of interpretations of this phenomenon. Nazism was the product of unique features of German history and culture, of political developments different from the rest of the states on the European continent. The character of Adolf Hitler cannot be understood if we use an isolated reflection on what the demagogue, the mob agitator, and the dictator of the Third Reich meant. However, those who follow this path isolated by other means will reach a conclusion that will be false, and will lead to the "isolation" of this phenomenon from what the sphere of everyday life and unimportant elements means, such as the banal, thus losing it the meaning. Hitler's dictatorship is shaped by premises related to his life, the environment from which he came, education, aspirations, and dreams that dominated the character of the young man, then the soldier, and, finally, the leader Adolf Hitler. This paper is a guide that provides a vision that brings together the opinions and arguments of

* Master Degree, University of Bucharest.

both specialists and a reflection built from articles, and documents on one of the abnormally and historically interesting characters of the personality that in 1938 was declared by TIME magazine, Man of the Year, who was at the same time dictator, "demon" and demagogue. It is an attempt to understand the one who excited a nation and gradually came into conflict with an entire world. The creation of powerful myths, which, together with the propaganda carefully orchestrated by Joseph Goebbels, the Minister of Propaganda in the Reich, led to the animation of crowds numbering millions of Germans who were fascinated by him and the Nazi movement.

If weren't for Adolf Hitler, perhaps the collapse of the castle from playing cards that represented the international order in this great, changing, and dynamic scene of the interwar period, established by the Versailles system, would have occurred in another way - maybe a peaceful one or maybe not at the intensity that Hitler dictated, and not as catastrophic.¹

The interwar period produced a change in values. This also means a culture of personality that requires that individual to possess a magnetic influence, the ability to capture, attractiveness, domination, use of force, aggression in the way the message was communicated to the other, and special energy to mobilize the masses. These combined elements, immediately after the end of the First World War, were put in the service of a demagogue who became the leader of Germany in 1933, without restraint and with a special vocal timbre.² He didn't need to resort to sophisticated things, because power and performance, his art of

¹ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomația*, Bucharest, ALL, 2018, p. 25.

² Konrad Heiden, *Hitler: A Biography*, London, Constable & Co Publishers, 1938, p. 18.

convincing those he spoke to, was natural. It could create a wide sound, rich in unusual shades and vibrations.

Thus, the First World War generated a monstrous logic that most could not accept, and as a result appeared characters like Hitler who deceived these masses with an explanation built on lies, deception, vain promises, and terror, which caught the audience.

The rise of Adolf Hitler to power is one of the most interesting and remarkable ascents that a personality in history has been able to go through. It was a unique career in history, for the oratorical talent cultivated with an iron will represent the political capital with which Hitler set out. He wandered through Vienna with simple baggage made up of shattered dreams and a talent for which he did nothing to possess - oratory - given an accessible language, speaking in simple terms, which was understandable to all: from comrades on the front, then the people and political leaders.

He "hunted" his opponents to the point where he brought them into their weakest and most disadvantaged position. He had this characteristic of being able to feel fear and weak character, so where he could easily manipulate, and get what he wanted, using his theatrical and oratorical talent. He wanted power and did everything he could to have it.³

A brief history of the Führer's private life

Between 1928-1930 it represents the failure, the electoral disaster for the Nazi movement and, especially, for Adolf Hitler. Despite the Nazi Party's campaign and the increasingly influential figure of Adolf Hitler, the first election of 1928,

³ Karina Urbach, *Go-betweens for Hitler*, Oxford, OUP Oxford, 2015, p. 165

which took place on May 30, displeased him. They were the result of the economic recovery that the Weimar government has tried to materialize through the measures taken. The National Socialists, who had their own list of candidates, remained, however, an insignificant electoral force, with a share of only 2.6% of the total votes.⁴

After the election and this failure, Hitler spoke in front of party members, telling them that their struggle must continue, and defeat communism. In 1928, Germany was still recovering from the defeat of World War I, but dissatisfaction with the situation in the German state had arisen among the German people, with Hitler relying heavily on what he sought to exploit.

In October 1929, the Wall Street crash occurred, which gave him the opportunity to strengthen his image as the savior, the hero of the German nation. Soon after this event, which affected Germany, citizens began to lose confidence in the Weimar Republic's political system and attempts at economic recovery. Under these conditions, Hitler expected people to find him as the only way to salvation, and not the other way around. Thus, thanks to the power of a vision based on the size of information that shaped his policy in *Mein Kampf* and a speech in which the language is simplistic, but in which used a special verbal rage, he managed to gain attention and, finally, the support of millions of followers. The vote given to him by the Germans was a form of protest against the system of democracy condemned from the beginning, and so uncertain. This

⁴ Deutscher Bundestag, 'Elections in the Weimar Republic', *The Weimar Republic (1918 - 1933)*, https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/189774/7c6dd629f4aff7bf4f962a45c110b5f/elections_weimar_republic-data.pdf, p. 2.

crisis was, in fact, the factor that brought the success of the Nazi movement and, implicitly, to Hitler.⁵

Public demonstrations, and rallies had Hitler at the center, and he used these meetings to tell his listeners what they wanted to hear - that there was a political party that could solve all their problems. He has shown his constituents that he is an energetic political figure who is passionate about his cause. Despite the failure of the *Munich Putsch* in 1923, after publishing his ideas in his autobiography, *Mein Kampf*, Hitler tried to capture the political scene, becoming a national figure.

As soon as he was released from prison, Hitler realized that he could trust the trained audience with whom he had made a connection through the routine of his speeches and the sense of security they generated at the end.⁶ Depending on the audience, Hitler adapted his oratorical style, and appearance, that was, everything related to visual and sound detail: he moderated his opinion, and his speech was a little more settled in terms of the harsh message to those who had punished the German nation after the war. The speech was also moderated in the anti-Semitic direction, not emphasizing these hostilities of his crystallizing in Munich, because he was still not sure how the German people would react to this idea of his. It has become very popular.

His image, thanks to well-orchestrated propaganda techniques, came to a surprising extent at that time. This is the beginning of a cult of personality that reaches colossal dimensions. At that moment, the international scene would see an unprecedented 'spectacle' offered by the Führer of the German people: a single

⁵ Vladislav B. Sotirović, „The great economic depression in the weimar republic”, *Economics*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2014, [file:///C:/Users/g50/Downloads/10.11648.j.eco.20140301.11%20\(1\).pdf](file:///C:/Users/g50/Downloads/10.11648.j.eco.20140301.11%20(1).pdf), pp. 1-8.

⁶ Anna Maria Sigmund, *Dictator, demon și demagog - Întrebări și răspunsuri despre Adolf Hitler*, Bucharest, RAO, 2011, p. 31.

spotlight, a single light only for the speaker who spoke using timid tones, then firm, wild, vibrant, the crowd was delighted both by him and by the careful artistic arrangement made to highlight his characteristics.

The elections held on September 14, 1930 represented the effects of the Great Depression. As a result, due to poverty and the radicalization of large sections of the population, as well as the increase in political violence, the Nazi Party get a substantial number of votes, 6.5 million votes. This is because Adolf Hitler managed to draw people's attention to Nazi demagoguery and movement.⁷

This was a unique moment in Hitler's career, as it was the first time that he was truly respected as a politician. Through a biblical devotion to the "Messiah" who had come to save them, enchanted by him, the Germans began to believe in his ideological fantasy. The audience thus becomes the "ornamental" they needed. The German nation gave the floor to a certain, unknown speaker, Adolf Hitler, finally reaching to discover the savior, the "Messiah" who seemed to promise them a glorious future, coming to submit unconditionally to him.

In 1932, Hitler became the most important political figure in Germany, a success due to the interest his supporters had in his public words. To Hitler's astonishing power and influence as a speaker was added the enthusiasm sustained by his speeches, which were confined not only to the audiences of the German people, but also to those belonging to high circles in Germany. Hitler had very convincing arguments both for the German nation and for the

⁷ Deutscher Bundestag, 'Elections in the Weimar Republic', *The Weimar Republic (1918 - 1933)*, https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/189774/7c6dd629f4aff7bf4f962a45c110b5f/elections_weimar_republic-data.pdf, pp. 2-3.

neighboring countries or for those who had anything to do with the German mentality and culture.⁸

There is a big difference between the activity of the 'minor' party leader and the failed revolution of the *Munich Putsch*, to the status of Führer, being an ascent with many parts of this narrative to be questioned. He did not become a major factor in German political life until he began to gain the influence he claimed and gained access to the tools to exercise power, first as leader of Germany's largest party, then chancellor, and finally, the head of state and supreme commander of the Wehrmacht.⁹

There were a number of occasions in Adolf Hitler's career when, faced with a difficult decision, he seemed unable to think, and these elections were one of those moments. The question he faced in January 1932 was: should he run for president or not? Hindenburg looked unbeatable. The "legendary hero" Hindenburg was supported not only by many elements of the right, but also by the democratic parties that were against him in the 1925 elections, but which now saw him as the savior of the Republic. Being put in this situation, Hitler wondered whether to risk the reputation of invincibility that the Nazis had built in the 1930 elections when the Nazi Party triumphed spectacularly. At that time, there was another problem: Hitler was not eligible to run because he was not a German citizen.¹⁰

⁸ Max Domarus, *The Complete Hitler: A Digital Desktop Reference to His Speeches & Proclamations, 1932-1945*, „Volume I: 1932-1934“, Mundelein, Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, 2007, pp. 9-10.

⁹ Betty Glad, „Why Tyrants Go Too Far: Malignant Narcissism and Absolute Power“, *Political Psychology*, Vol. 23, No. 1, 2002, pp. 8-9.

¹⁰ William L. Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 2011, p. 138.

Joseph Goebbels, however, urged him to announce his candidacy. On January 19, they left for Munich together, and that evening Goebbels noted in his diary: *'I discussed the presidency with the Fuhrer. No decision has been made yet. I strongly advocated for his own candidacy'*. Next month's notes in Goebbels's diary reflected the pros and cons of Hitler's campaign. On February 2, 1932, the future Reich propaganda minister noted that Hitler had decided to run for office, but would not make any public statement *'until it was clear what the Social Democrats would do'*. One night in Munich, Hitler and Goebbels had a long discussion about their role in the Third Reich. The future leader had in mind, as Goebbels stated in his diary, the creation of a ministry of radio, culture, art, film, and propaganda. Then he talks about plans for a "grand change of capital." "The Fuehrer had all his plans completed, he spoke, acted, and felt as if we were already in power". However, he omitted only one thing: how he would defeat Hindenburg."

Hitler solved the problem of his citizenship. On February 25, Adolf Hitler obtained German citizenship by naturalization. Brunswick's Home Secretary announced that he had appointed Herr Hitler an attachment to the Brunswick legacy in Berlin. The Nazi leader automatically became a citizen of Brunswick and therefore of Germany, thus being eligible to run for president of the German Reich.¹¹ Overcoming this obstacle, Hitler pursued his ambition to become the leader of Germany. His opponent, Hindenburg, was part of the 'old guard', and Hitler was at the opposite pole, representing modern politics. Like Mussolini, Hitler believed in futuristic technologies again. He gave speeches continuously, with a strong dynamic force, and Goebbels painted his image even more pronounced, becoming a complement and indispensable for his image and the

¹¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 138-140.

Nazi movement. During this campaign, he made a gesture that no leader had dared to do before: he flew through Germany. It carried a modern campaign, abundant in innovation and nuances. This, as well as the speed and continuity with which he gave speeches, led to the transformation of the Nazi movement into a real political force that attracted millions of supporters. Goebbels's propaganda apparatus provided maximum impact on the 'Hitler' brand. And as a result, using manipulation and propaganda, public opinion eventually sided with Hitler.

Hitler became the starter of a new era with new trends, following his dramatic struggle for control of the government in 1932 which ended with the outbreak of war in 1939. His campaign in 1932 to get the votes he needed was full, of defects and weaknesses, but it has been managed in such a way that it has hidden or diverted attention from these defects. A great deal of effort has been put into this.

The effort was even greater because, in his private life as in that of a politician, those around him had to obey him. This aspect was a complicated one, shrouded in mystery because his private life became scandalous, full of all kinds of rumors. In the first phase, his niece, Angela Maria Raubal, 'Geli', with whom he appeared in public since 1925 (this to show an image of 'family man'), causes Hitler to wave a wave of suspicion: she apparently committed suicide, no one knowing the reason behind the young woman's action.

Then, in the middle of the 1932 election, a strange event took place. Eva Braun, as shocking as Geli's case, shot herself in the neck, but unlike Hitler's niece, she survived.¹²

¹² *Ibidem*, pp. 134-135.

Thus, in the spring of 1932, the Nazis found salvation from these 'accusations' in Hitler's vision of himself. In the middle of this year's elections, the National Socialists discovered the value of publicizing Adolf Hitler's private life. This new approach to advertising campaigning prompted Hitler to become the leader of Germany's second-largest political party, which wanted to defeat his political opponents, Paul von Hindenburg, and Communist leader Ernst Thalmann.¹³ But why this decision? Because the elections in the first part of 1932 were difficult.

On March 13, German voters gave Hindenburg seven million votes, but it was still not enough to get a majority. The National Socialists expected the "Hindenburg era" to end. Because a majority was not obtained, a second-round was organized the following month. Here, the Nazis adopted another strategy: they combined the campaign with the deepening economic crisis, and the vote that will be given to Hitler will amount to two million votes, a third of the electorate¹⁴. After his appeal to the German crowd paid off, Führer's image of privacy became a staple of propaganda until 1939.

The National Socialist advertising focused on Hitler's role as a mass agitator, a leader of a political movement. In this election, the need to capture as much public opinion and support as possible, the propaganda of the Nazi Party was aimed at celebrating the personal duties of the candidate: the young spirit and dynamism of Hitler, as well as the fact that he gave many speeches due to innovative air travel, the Nazis knowing how to sell to the public a leader image through propaganda. This contradicted the aristocratic aura of 84-year-old

¹³ Despina Stratigakos, *Hitler at Home*, London, Yale University Press, 2015, pp. 1-2.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 3.

Hindenburg. The Nazis offered the modernity and splendor of a candidate who flew over Germany to meet his people.

Moreover, the Nazi propaganda brought Hitler's privacy into the spotlight to emphasize his moral and human character and to win the sympathy of voters, especially women (who had previously supported Hindenburg in overwhelming numbers). However, given the circumstances of Hitler's private life, it was a bold move: a middle-aged bachelor, with little family ties, with unknown romantic relationships.¹⁵ Rumors of his private life had surfaced since 1931, after, as I mentioned before, his niece, Geli Raubel, committed suicide in the uncle's apartment in Munich, and by the 1932 election, retaliation had fallen on his image. The public's attention should, therefore, be diverted from these aspects of privacy. However, rumors continued to circulate, and the Nazis were forced to build their own version of the Führer's private life for 'public consumption'.

The image of *Hitler as a Private Man* was the leitmotif of the title of a 1932 photo album by Heinrich Hoffmann, Hitler's personal photographer, who would announce the change. The album was titled *The Hitler Nobody Knows*, which became a bestseller. The book was an element of propaganda, meant to rehabilitate his image and political life. It appeared in mid-March, shortly after the first elections in 1932. Although conceived earlier, it was an effective tool in its campaign, appealing to the general public who discovered part of the Nazi leader's privacy. The idea of the album started from the fact that Hitler decided that for his speeches to be successful, he had to build his number in time, trying different positions to capture attention, and Hoffman photographed him for this.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 2.

On the album cover is a picture of Adolf Hitler wearing a Bavarian-style jacket and wearing a floppy-brimmed hat surrounded by grass, the landscape of the mountains behind him, and one of his dogs, Blondi, sitting next to him. The image, along with the title of the book, signals to the reader from the beginning that the camera would reveal a different Hitler, fulfilling the wishes of his millions of followers who longed for more information about their leader's privacy, but also about his 'interests and abilities'.¹⁶

The text of Hoffmann's album is a 'documented truth', a statement meant to inspire confidence, but also to reject criticism and news that should not reach the public. It is an extremely distorted and narrow view of Adolf Hitler's life. The book also served as a visual supplement, thus becoming a visual addition to Hitler's *Mein Kampf* (it was like a family album, except that in this case the 'family' was represented by the German people that the leader Nazi wanted to be supported unconditionally). Hoffmann's work opens with photographs from Hitler's personal archive when he was a child, then a soldier, as well as his rise as a speaker and politician.¹⁷

Hoffmann also included photographs depicting Hitler in vulnerable poses. For example, Hitler at lunch, having lunch. There are a few that show how the Führer prepares before a speech or in which he has a simple discussion with the mechanic who checks his car. The album shows that few images have the urban landscape as a background. But why? Because Heinrich Hoffmann wanted to present this 'private life' of the Führer to the public surrounded by a picturesque landscape. This highlighted the fact that the refuge for Adolf Hitler was the

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 2-3.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 3-4.

mountain area, where his carefully thought-out image would be delivered to those who saw the album and knew the story of 'his struggle', a leader dressed in light clothes, enjoying the free time, the pleasure of taking a walk with his pets, reading outdoors, adding his gentle character towards children. All this is meant to show how Hitler delimited his political career and the rest of his activities: relaxation and recovery after the stress caused by the political struggle.¹⁸

However, the photos are not apolitical, because they contain stories about Jews, Westerners, and the French. But the real political goal is well masked by the distribution of the material in the album. It is a reformulation of Adolf Hitler's personality in such a way that he looks like a 'good man' with whom you could even talk and negotiate. This also comes from the fact that the German people wanted their leaders to have the same values in private life as those they claimed to have during their political work. Hoffmann did one more thing with this album: he used the passion that Hitler developed as a child for the history of the great emperors and conquerors, to enhance his image. Thus, it elevated him to the same rank as Frederick the Great. At the same time, Hoffmann's carefully planned image format in the book highlighted two characteristics of the Nazi leader: kindness and power.¹⁹

Baldur von Schirach, Hoffmann's son-in-law, hoped that the images depicting, in fact, Hitler's 'personal experiences' would reach an audience beyond the National Socialist circles, that those with access to the book would learn to love and adore the Führer. By learning this, the audience could discover the secret behind the images: that Hitler revealed himself not only as a politician, but

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 4.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 3.

also as a friend, an understanding, charismatic man who, when seated at the negotiating table could resonate with feelings such as empathy, diplomacy, and good intentions.²⁰

The Germans knew from the reconstruction of Hitler's past in *Mein Kampf* that he had become systemically an extreme anti-semite, the leader of a violent street paramilitary force.²¹ Schirach and Hoffmann managed this side of Hitler, reinterpreting it cleverly: they appealed to values, not ideology. To mask this, Hitler was portrayed as an individual with 'spartan' habits and great discipline: no drinking alcohol, no smoke, and a vegetarian style of life. He respected his own rules of life, having self-discipline learned from his experiences.

Hitler is the perfect host during parties held at his residence. Some photographs reconstruct, to some extent, his tour in which he gave speeches in Königsberg, Berlin, and Munich, highlighting the speaker and the agitator of the crowds. This reconstitution ended with Hitler and his relatives, exhausted from efforts to organize large-scale rallies.²² These are meant to arouse admiration for his ethics and work, compassion, but also admiration for leading a modern campaign, in which he used the latest technologies to be able to reach his people, to speak to them.²³

The photographs also gave a 'tour' of his hobbies: for example, reading, in one of the images, the audience can see Hitler and his library of more than 6,000 volumes, the dominant ones being those related to history and architecture, then

²⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 3-5.

²¹ Richard Breitman, *Nazi Germany (1933-1945)*, „Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, Volume 1 (1925)”, GHDI, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_image.cfm?image_id=1874&language=english

²² Despina Stratigakos, *Hitler at Home*, London, Yale University Press, 2015, pp. 3-4.

²³ Richard Breitman, *op. cit.*, 'Berlin *Gauleiter* Joseph Goebbels Greets Adolf Hitler at a Campaign Event in Berlin (January 20, 1933)', GHDI, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_image.cfm?image_id=2085

art, music which, as he once said, was 'a necessity for life'. Although he left school at the age of 16, the 'rehabilitation' made by the book exposes him as an educated and cultured man. In this section, a portrait of A. Hitler in a medieval castle, entitled *Hitler, the Architect*, draws attention. Here, he demonstrated his knowledge of architectural expertise in front of an army corps. Then, as an extension of this posture, it is an image painted in watercolors dating back to when he was a soldier in World War I.²⁴

The components of the 'nice Hitler' were artistically assembled to present the best to the electorate: ethics, hard work, modesty, and middle-class values. The association with the natural landscapes made it seem vibrant and popular among mountain sports lovers. As well as the images in which he appeared with his dogs, which highlighted the love for pets, the exposure had, however, another purpose, hiding a subtle distinction between two terms: master and creature.²⁵ The image in which he is with the children was introduced to win the hearts (votes, in fact) of the voters, making the aggressive image of his party less visible.²⁶

On April 4, 1932, when the campaign officially began, Joseph Goebbels (who would soon become the minister of the institution Hitler had told him he intended to establish) published an article in the National Socialist newspaper *Der Angriff* ('The Attack'), in which he resumed the themes introduced by Hoffmann's book.²⁷ Goebbels stated that his leader was artistically talented, he gave up architecture and painting to lead the Germans on the right path: '*Adolf*

²⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 5.

²⁵ Karina Urbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-166.

²⁶ Despina Stratigakos, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 5.

*Hitler is, by nature, a good man. «The special love» that Hitler has for children, to whom he is always their best friend and that 'uncle', their father's companion, is well known.*²⁸

Hitler was concerned about their welfare. Hoffmann also highlighted his relationship with his colleagues, his simple lifestyle, his modesty, his work ethic: 'he enjoys the love and devotion of all those who know him as a politician'.²⁹

Despite criticism, the book sold hundreds of thousands of copies (400,000). Until the mid-1930s, according to the German Press Association, the most sought-after images of Hitler depicted not the powerful leader of the Reich, but rather a simple-minded, animal-loving, child-loving gentleman. *The Common Man Hitler*, invented for the 1932 election, had become a global celebrity. *Hitler as a Private Man* provided a consumer image of the main features of the Führer's private life. This scenario, however, will change after 1933.

Adolf Hitler's Messianic Complex

Adolf Hitler was not just a politician. His nature as an artist had as its main purpose the materialization of his supreme art: the search for supremacy, deification, which would offer him a single guarantee, namely the deception of time, the redefinition of everything that had existed until that moment.³⁰

In July 1932, following his victory in the April elections, he became the strongest man in the state. This is when the messianic complex he had been suffering from since the 1920s intensified. Following this, Hindenburg appointed

²⁸ Joseph Goebbels, 'We are Voting for Hitler!', *Der Angriff*, Randall Bytwerk in German Propaganda Archive – Calvin University, <https://research.calvin.edu/german-propaganda-archive/angrif12.htm>

²⁹ Despina Stratigakos, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-6.

³⁰ Colin Jordan, *National Socialism: Vanguard of the Future*, Uckfield, The Historical Review Press, 2011, pp. 18-19.

Hitler vice-chancellor, the second most important position in the state, but that was not what he wanted. He wanted nothing more than absolute, discretionary power. He believed that Paul von Hindenburg's time had passed and his time had come, which is a confirmation of his complex, in which the Messiah of the German people could be seen.

He was absolutely convinced that his political destiny was to become chancellor, to have absolute power.³¹ But he had to overcome an obstacle that prevented him from fully implementing his plans. The impediment was Hindenburg. He did not want to be chancellor, saying: *'I cannot justify to God, to conscience and to the fatherland the transfer of authority to the government of a single party that disregards those who have other opinions'*.³² But Hitler ignored these statements by Hindenburg and continued on his path to political success.

The image of the Führer acquired special significance, becoming more than a public leader, and the cult of one's own personality receiving colossal dimensions. *The Führer* gained in the almost eight years since he set out on the road to political success, gradual meanings, which systematically built the 'Hitler' brand. Thus, the *Führer* was an effect that tried to make, through the equivalent of a *guide*, a connection with the past, with German history, but only with that part which Hitler perceived to be the correct one. Then, using his modest, ordinary origins, the guides become a *prophet*, who was meant to perform deeds beyond his scope. Hence the fact that Hitler perceived himself as a heroic

³¹ Guy Walters, *Hunting Evil: The dramatic true story of the Nazi war criminals who escaped and the hunt to bring them to justice*, New York, Bantam Books, 2010, p. 7.

³² Emil Georg Sold, Paul Friedhoff, *That Time Cannot Be Forgotten: A Correspondence on the Holocaust*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2002, pp. 98-99.

personality, despite the fact that those who came into contact with him during the war unanimously described him as a reserved, awkward, lonely man.

However, the two combined meanings eventually led to Hitler's ability to seize power, becoming a feared, powerful leader who, through lies, persuasion, and terror, became the most contested dictator of the twentieth century. The significance of the *Führer* is complemented by his ambition to perfect his technique and oratory, which became more and more intense, emanating a pathological enthusiasm, turning into rhetoric for the crowd. But the question is how to keep this crowd attracted to this speech which, in the end, no matter how it will display the words to the public, will become a cliché. But Hitler knew that in order to keep the interest of the Germans alive, burning in the sense of supporting the National Socialist movement, he had to attract them with something.³³

But Hitler followed his own propaganda scheme, which began with the banal, then the phantasmagoric, and the cosmeticization that meant building a strong image based on institutions, a ministry, and an indispensable personality – Joseph Goebbels – who had the necessary communication and propaganda skills for his campaigns.

His success was also due to the fact that in the 1932 campaign he exerted an influence on the women voters, who reoriented themselves to the leader of the Nazi movement. *'It was the women's vote'*, remarked Hermann Rauschning in 1939, who brought him success. This significant contribution of women in political life is due to the emancipation that took place with the establishment of

³³ A. E. Samaan, *From a 'Race of Masters' to a 'Master Race': 1948 to 1848*, „A.E. Samaan - History of Eugenics (Volume 1)“, New York, A.E. Samaan, 2013, pp. 143-144.

the Weimar Republic. Many social groups had good reason to be uneasy and resentful of the domestic situation in Germany between 1918 and 1933, but the female half of the population, newly 'equipped' with the vote and the sole eligibility of the institution enshrined in the Constitution, was certainly not among them.

However, it is a paradox why women have given in such a large number to the Nazi movement when it represented the opposite in terms of the ideal and role of women in society. The Nazi party was undoubtedly an opponent of women's emancipation, firmly committed to the vision of women as inferior beings whose main task in life was to bear children and take care of the home.³⁴

However, at least until now, this paradox has not attracted much attention from historians. Many works have paid special attention to the economic and political factors that contributed to Hitler's success during the period 1923 to 1933, neglecting the role of women.

There are many reasons for this neglected issue: one of the most important is that German society has long been dominated by men over most other industrialized societies. There was not yet a strong movement for the liberation of women in Germany that would be such an influential stimulus for rethinking the attitudes of historians towards women in German society during the aforementioned period.³⁵

Of the few attempts that have been made to explain why German women voted for Hitler in 1932-1933, the most popular, most repeated, and (probably)

³⁴ Richard J. Evans, „German Women and the Triumph of Hitler“, *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 48, No. 1, p. 123.

³⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 124.

most generally accepted is that this was a moment of irrationality, being carried away by sentiment and not by judgment.

The first to advance this interpretation was Nazi sympathizer Hermann Rauschning. Rauschning's remarks on Hitler's emotional effect on women are that: *'We must see from above, from the tribune of the speaker, the wet and veiled eyes of the listeners, so that there is no doubt about this enthusiasm'*³⁶. According to Joachim Fest, for example, the "overly emotional, distinct, and hysterical tone" that Hitler used in his encounters with the ladies stemmed primarily from the over-emotionalism of a certain type of woman in a particular setting. An age group that sought to expose its impulses in the form of strong political demonstrations before the ecstatic figure of Hitler.

Hitler had a strange fascination with women. In the National Socialist rallies organized specially for women, he was a wanted man and an admired speaker. The speeches here were not followed by the usual political discussions. But, the dictator, starting from his conception of the ideal 'German Woman and Mother', strictly rejects this. The women of the Nazi Party obeyed the will of their Führer. Those who made up Adolf Hitler's entourage accepted this wish. They were only allowed to approach quotes from National Socialist ideology and culture or to have a 'conversation of complacency'. If they did not go beyond these, say, strictly delimited sectors, the Führer addressed them in a very polite, kind, and charming tone. Hitler even said, *'the more gallantly you approach a woman, the more she will refrain from getting involved in matters that do not concern her'*.³⁷

³⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 125-126

³⁷ Anna Maria Sigmund, *op. cit.* pp. 45-46

He allowed the ladies nearby to criticize his clothes, give him advice on a medical matter, or suggest different diets. But Hitler systematically adapted to the demands of the women around him, probably due to the lack of a normal relationship with the so-called partners in his arms. The secret of Hitler's success as a speaker lay in the use of speech, so Hitler himself considered it to be the root of his success as a speaker, capturing the entire audience, both men and women³⁸.

In fact, Hitler considered that among the crowds that acclaimed him, there was a feminine component, with which, he discovered, he could juggle according to his purpose: *'in their overwhelming majority there is such a feminine characteristic by nature, and attitude, so that [...] their thoughts and actions are nothing but emotion and feeling'*³⁹. Among the female audience, the appeal to the emotional and sentimental level that Hitler makes stands out more than the use of oratory and propaganda techniques used in general. Even the harshest critics agree on this. Indeed, it is remarkable that of all the vast autobiographies, *Mein Kampf*, the passages in which he speaks of propaganda and oratory are practically the only ones that historians have considered, capitalizing on them in this regard.

Hitler was one of the most successful orators, and demagogues of all time. However, this does not mean that we should accept his words as an objective statement of the truth about the art of gaining the masses, but as a simple interesting indication of how Hitler thought he could succeed. After all, Hitler did a lot in the *Mein Kampf*, including the Treaty of Versailles, which he aimed to destroy, which he did.⁴⁰

³⁸ Richard J. Evans, *op. cit.*, pp. 126-127.

³⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 127-128.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 129.

Hitler was convinced that his oratorical talent was a natural thing, strong enough and that he did not need other artifices, such as a coach or courses in rhetoric and oratory. So he did not take oratory classes because he thought that the politicians who have such an adviser, as he said, on this issue are ridiculous and weak. But soon the Führer came to express himself with difficulty, and his words were sharp. But he hid the fact that, in his effort to speak, his skin was getting hoarse, his veins were swollen, his face was swollen and his face was congested. The ENT doctor cost a degradation of his untrained vocal cords for such an effort. As 'vocal coach' and opera singer Paul Devrient told him: *'An untrained voice will permanently violate the laws of physiology. Rare successes will more and more often lead to failure and destruction of the voice'*⁴¹.

Hitler did not believe these words until one evening when one of his speeches was scheduled to take place, a power outage occurred, and the amplifiers gave way - Hitler's voice failed to reach the entire audience. Thus, he recalled Devrient, who told him that the greatest and most skilled orators had ruled since antiquity (Demostade), the huge arenas, to the farthest corners, without technical and technological devices. Hitler reacted immediately, wanting to be independent of these fireworks. So, he studied in detail the breathing techniques and the stage play. Each appearance was orchestrated and rehearsed before the event, then analyzed down to the smallest detail. Hitler's appearances, as he liked them with pomp, were authentic theater, in its most elementary form, in which he was a talented actor, but for political purposes.⁴²

⁴¹ Anna Maria Sigmund, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-35.

⁴² *Ibidem*.

His speech came in 1932 to produce in the crowd a hard-to-understand fascination, hypnosis, and a strong and striking psychological impression for the listener. An unusual phenomenon, unheard of before him, took place in the congregations in order to 'accompany' Adolf Hitler with applause and cheers. The perception of the suggestive power of his demagogic words seized all those present, few being able to evade the effect produced by them.

In order to increase the power and persuasion on the "targets", Adolf Hitler and Joseph Goebbels sought to frequently modernize the act of giving a speech and using the word spoken with the image to help the leader of the Nazi movement to achieve the goals and, ultimately, the ultimate goal of having unconditional authority and discretionary powers.

Unlike the other revolutionary leaders, he was a lonely political adventurer who did not represent or show any inclination to represent any important school of political thought. Hitler owed his rise to power to his oratorical style and demagoguery, the essence of which was evidenced by the ability to distill and melt into a single stream the emotions and frustrations of the German nation.⁴³ Hitler became increasingly dependent on public acclaim and applause, as these factors were the vehicle that not only facilitated his ascension, but depending on how skillfully he and his Reich Propaganda Minister showed, his speech would be ordered and his words they would gain the passion needed to gain public appreciation.⁴⁴

⁴³ Victor J. Vitanza, *Negation, Subjectivity, and the History of Rhetoric (Haworth Popular Culture)*, New York, SUNY Press, 1996, pp. 328-329.

⁴⁴ Eric D. Weitz, Eric S. Roubinek, *op. cit.*, „Ernst Bloch, "Hitler's Force" (April 1924)", GHID, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=3914, pp. 1-2.

His philosophy in *Mein Kampf* ranged from the banal to the fantastic and consisted in the cosmetic popularization of the radical and conventional discourse of the right-wing political chessboard. When he saw that he could not have a successful career as a revolutionary in Munich in 1923, Adolf Hitler sought to increase his power in others, doing so in a clever way. In 1932, Adolf Hitler became well acquainted with his audience so that he would know when he emanated emotions generated by suspicions and worries about the Nazi movement and what he promised them in his speeches. In those moments when there was this feeling of tension, Hitler acted modestly and carefully. In time, this gesture that he made in such moments will become a reflex. Namely, when he noticed a distance between him and his audience, cautious and easy, in the first phase, he smiled courteously at them, then raised his hands, crossing them slowly, adding a few phrases with a humorous effect, meant to arouse laughter.

He wanted the people, his constituents, to perceive him as a leader, a leader politically, strategically, diplomatically capable, as a hero who appeared on the streets of Vienna to save them. Thus, thanks to well-orchestrated Nazi propaganda, they led the people to believe that Germany would once again be at the height of its success in the new world order it was planning.

The Image of Adolf Hitler in the International Press

Until 1933, when he took power, Adolf Hitler developed an obsession with his own image. From the Bavarian countryside gentleman to the leader of a movement that soon took over the German political scene, he became the source for numerous articles and discussions in the free press represented by famous tabloids such as *Vanity Fair* or *TIME*. In these articles, Nazi propaganda made

sure that the Führer's reputation was carefully modeled. The vain illusion that Adolf Hitler wanted to systematically deliver to different audiences (first, the German people, then the internal elite, and, finally, the leaders of the most important powers), is composed of several hypostases and sequences: Hitler along with his dogs, his entourage, the orator, the leader.⁴⁵

As a complement to his image in the international press, Adolf Hitler appeared twice on the cover of *TIME* magazine, issues on December 21, 1931, and March 13, 1933, respectively.

In the December 1931 issue on the cover of Adolf Hitler, an article entitled *GERMANY: Three against Hitler* appears, setting out the predictions for the 1932 election. The article mentions three important statesmen of Germany, who were fighting together against the aversion of the fascist Nazi movement. These were Chancellor Heinrich Brüning, President Paul von Hindenburg, and their loyal lieutenant, Minister of the Interior and War, Wilhelm Groener.⁴⁶

Every morning, foreign correspondents in Berlin expected the Brüning government to overthrow the fascist Adolf Hitler, who just eight years ago created in a brewery a platform for his ideas and shouted like Mussolini: '*Justice goes hand in hand with power!*'. But Hitler and his movement failed to achieve a satisfactory result in the 1932 elections, but he managed to use his oratory and persuasive technique in an ingenious way that built him an image that would not be overlooked in domestic policy as well in international relations.

The American magazine *Vanity Fair* added him to the list of the best speakers of the time. In March 1932, this magazine published a very interesting issue in

⁴⁵ Detlef Müheberger, *Hitler's Voice: The Völkischer Beobachter, 1920-1933*, Vol. I, New York, Peter Lang AG, 2004, pp. 125-127.

⁴⁶ *TIME*, 'GERMANY: Three Against Hitler', December, 1931, *TIME* Archives, p. 18

terms of topics covered. If we sit for a while and analyze the architecture of the skeleton of the contents of this issue, we can see the following: the audiences who have access to the magazine can assemble from the articles that make up *Vanity Fair* from March 1932, a puzzle of elements such as - art, books, stage, theater (show), people, humor, leader, innovation, communism, revolutionary.⁴⁷ All these elements are listed, if the audience that has access to the magazine, is a careful observer will realize that these elements compose a part of the ideas, experiences, objectives, and, especially, of the character to whom the last article is dedicated, Adolf Hitler.

The article is entitled *Adolf Hitler, Revolutionary*, signed by journalist George Slocombe. This was a study about the future leader of Germany who exerted such force, guiding his desperate compatriots back to the idea of restoring the German state to the title of great power he had, before the 1914-1918 war.

Adolf Hitler, Revolutionist opened with the presentation of the Führer attending a meeting of the Representatives of the Council of War, listening to the information of the lieutenants. But Hitler's attention was caught on something completely different. Behind the wall of a series of technical information, there was a tablet with all the achievements of the Nazi Party so far, as well as a series of "future achievements", the list being concluded by the construction of a new block in the Reichstag building.⁴⁸

The event also coincides with the commemoration of soldiers who fell to the front on duty in World War I and those who lost their lives in the *revolution* launched by Hitler in 1923. The names of all these "heroes" that Hitler after 1933,

⁴⁷ *Vanity Fair*, 1932, Vanity Fair Archives, <https://archive.vanityfair.com/issue/19320301>

⁴⁸ George Slocombe, 'Adolf Hitler, Revolutionist', in *Vanity Fair*, March, 1932, Vanity Fair Archives, <https://archive.vanityfair.com/article/1932/3/adolf-hitler-revolutionist>, p. 41.

used in his propaganda to arouse the feeling of compassion and revolt against the powers that humiliated Germany in 1918, were on a table.⁴⁹ At the end of this council, the lieutenants greet Hitler (the scene is reminiscent of Caesar and his legions).

Hitler, left alone, moves a few inches closer to a painting near the window. Here, the light will expose two images: that of an old oil portrait, depicting Frederick the Great, and the second image is a battle scene on the Western Front in which he gave Adolf Hitler realized, it was blurry, and harder to analyze.⁵⁰

At the same time, George Slocombe described Adolf Hitler in a parallel with the famous actor, Charlie Chaplin. The white, tormented face, the eyes framed by eggplant circles, the black clothes that accentuate the pallor of the skin, a short black mustache, the hands that move convulsively.⁵¹ This idea of comparing the two comes from the fact that over time there have been parallels between the two personalities who, however, represent totally opposite poles: *'There was something unusual about the resemblance between «Little Tramp» and Adolf Hitler representing two opposite poles of humanity'*.⁵²

Providence was ironic about this, the two being born four days apart. But Adolf Hitler was, unlike Charlie Chaplin, who hid his sadness in humor, the individual who would always cast that shadow of a contemptuous smile that threatened to break away from those white, always tense, unhappy features.⁵³ However, each of them expressed their ideas, feelings, and aspirations to millions

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 42.

⁵¹ *Ibidem*, p. 43.

⁵² *The Spectator*, „Two Birthdays“, 1939.

⁵³ *The final speech from The Great Dictator* in <https://www.charliechaplin.com/en/films/7-The-Great-Dictator/articles/29-The-Final-Speech-from-The-Great-Dictator->

of citizens, both upper and lower classes, in different ways. But they lived a common reality, experiencing the situation of the poor young man in modern society (but experienced differently). Each was a distorted mirror, but one made people laugh and another provoked a fierce war. Therefore, Charlie Chaplin was a small man, a clown, shy, clumsy, full of imagination and creativity, with a lot of humor, but always wearing a cane that gave him a certain dignity. Instead, Hitler was an image composed of authority with a few "remnants" of gentleness used only to manipulate and attract people to his side, get a side position that could be justified.⁵⁴

Adolf Hitler was a man chased by the shadows of the past, impulsive, not having the sardonic and deadly calm that his model, Mussolini, had in times of crisis. That's because he was a different figure from the Italian dictator: a sad one, dreaming of revenge.

Journalist Slocombe notes some important details about Hitler as the leader of the Nazi movement tries to question him. His gaze was fiery and dark, with a hint of suspicion, and his voice quickened with emotion, rising steadily to a shrill crescendo. The article highlights the obscurity in which he partially hides from those he speaks to. He was sweating, happening at any discussion Adolf Hitler had. His eyes are always searching for the audience in front of him, those people who have the same values as him (in this case, the "shadow" of Frederick the Great).⁵⁵ His voice, although hoarse, has a certain quality noted by G. Slocombe: its strength arouses emotion and admiration.

⁵⁴ *The Spectator*, *op. cit.*

⁵⁵ George Slocombe, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

It should be noted in the article that Hitler constantly referred to Britain and America. At one point, he even stated, with the same hoarseness and passion for his cause, but with a kind of 'boring nuance', that: *'England, instead of Germany, would not have suffered without protesting the humiliation that Germany has experienced. America would not bear the burden of defeat. Do you think that we can continue generation after generation in the slavery that the debt of repairs generates on us? Would the British or the Americans be under pressure?'*⁵⁶. Here he referred to the collapsing Weimar Republic system, but also to the *November criminals* ('*Novemberverbrecher*') who had agreed to defeat Germany.

He did not believe in violence, despite the daily number of individuals killed and wounded in street fights between supporters of the Nazi and Communist groups (which ended with the burning of the Reichstag). He also denied the military organization of the party (although it was quite obvious) - the council, the posters, the party uniform - all these, as himself suggests, in an extremely polite tone, are just the beginning of a discipline of 'rebellious spirits'. He claimed that he wanted to conquer 'opinion', to transform Germany according to his idea of national rebirth. According to Adolf Hitler, the next elections in Germany would bring the Nazi Party to power, as the previous ones brought it a place in the Reichstag.

From all this pleading, we can see that the powerful Germany that Adolf Hitler talking about it would vehemently reject the Treaty of Versailles, would include in its composition Upper Silesia, the Polish Corridor, Danzig, and other lost provinces, the banned arms at Versailles, the subjugation the great bankers who became rich after the war in 1918, the nationalization of banks, the discipline

⁵⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 45.

of socialists and trade unions. Slocombe also notes that although Hitler tried to be 'decent' in this regard, he was in fact a fanatical anti-Semite.⁵⁷

When George Slocombe looks at the portrait questioningly, and Hitler, who was suffering from an immediate emotional reaction, awakens from his disappointment, becoming animated again - he speaks of war and on behalf of the generation of young Germans who suffered and died most painful way possible. According to Hitler, they alone have the right to dictate the future of Germany (because he was among them, he had this right), and the others are, in his opinion, exploiters, profiteers, pacifists, and Jews. At that moment, his voice became harsh, fast, methodical, and incorrigible. Behind this statement in the article hides an Adolf Hitler who plays well the role of a leader who does not give up, ironically, denouncing, without mercy.

Vanity Fair also showed the image that Hitler wanted to build for the new generation, the latter having to be under the hypnotic spell of their leader: brave young men, blue-eyed, serious, emanating the style of modernity and creativity. The Führer was to give them the task of becoming the saviors of Germany.

Very well exposed is the victorious march that Hitler described in such detail in *Mein Kampf*, and that the Nazi Party achieved, not because of the waving flags and applause. The success was due to the internal disputes that Hitler himself will create and due to the fact that they have come to disrupt him, he had to do something to stop them. These were hostile views born of internal ferocity, nationalist leaders who were at odds with Hitler and difficult to reconcile, the party's resources and the privacy of its leaders, and accusations of receiving undeclared subsidies from Mussolini. As for these privacy disputes, Hitler was

⁵⁷ *Ibidem*.

not the target of these scandals, as his life from this point of view was not very revealing. In fact, he had his accounts open for inspection.

Nazism, as the article shows, became a response of young people to the despair that had gripped interwar Germany politically. German politics was 'defeated' in the Great War, and the Weimar regime only exacerbated this. And where the strategy and policies of the decision-makers in the Weimar Republic failed, Hitler, due to his oratorical talent, came out victorious⁵⁸. Hitler's force was not the flag waved as a revolutionary since 1923, but his "poem" which he exposed to the public through fiery rhetoric. For him, as a self-justification, the initiative in politics and strategy is born of instinct, not of training. The moment, he says, brings his own inspiration⁵⁹.

Like the album by Heinrich Hoffmann, this article exposes part of the Führer's privacy to the public. Namely, when he was not in front of the masses or at official meetings, Hitler locked himself in the office planning the construction of new headquarters, the change of formulas and the flag, appearances as extravagant and spectacular as possible.

Adolf Hitler was listed by *Vanity Fair* in the list of the best speakers, because he knew only one instrument, rejecting any other. The subtle music of his political oratory was a sublime and strange, strange hint, visible in 1933 when Joseph Goebbels took over as Reich's Propaganda minister and paid close attention to every detail. Hitler's power consisted of a brutally sincere discussion and his passion for his cause. Thus, through a mixture of curiosity, rhetoric, and idealism, and contempt, he incited public opinion in his favor, in his Aryan ideal.

⁵⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 68.

⁵⁹ *Ibidem*.

After the July 1932 elections, the German nation, disappointed by the policies of the Weimar Republic and seduced by Hitler's fiery and energizing rhetoric, decided that the leader of the Nazi movement should take power in the state. Six months later, Hindenburg accepted the impossible, and despite his beliefs, on January 30, 1933, he appointed him chancellor. But Hindenburg and his relatives did not understand the mechanism of Hitler's populist policy, he could not be tempered or controlled.⁶⁰

After the appointment of Adolf Hitler as Chancellor at the Berlin Sportpalast, the biggest speech of his career is taking place, preparing to address an overwhelming crowd.⁶¹ This is the time when his speech is no longer as typical as it used to be. On the political scene both internally and externally, the feeling was that a new actor had appeared. This was the moment that Adolf Hitler always dreamed of.

In this speech, the order in which things are going is interesting, which announces from the beginning that the new chancellor will change the political arrangement that was until then and after which things worked. Unlike other statesmen who do their training in front, Adolf Hitler chose to appear in front of the German nation, coming from behind, thus creating a wave of enthusiasm as he passed the crowd. Those present were waiting for him, excited and eager to hear his words. But Adolf Hitler took a break, however, emphasizing that silence was a sign of force, because those who made up the audience in that room no longer had to be convinced, and attracted. This mission had long since been accomplished. This is the moment when he presented himself as the "Messiah" of

⁶⁰ William L. Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 2011, pp. 1933-1936.

⁶¹ *Adolf Hitler – Collection of Speeches*, p. 102.

the German people, his person is deified. Hitler did nothing but absorb the applause, cheers, and adoration from the audience.

Then, in a special way, he began his plea slowly, using a low voice, slightly non-existent, with a hint of shyness, to establish a connection, the relationship with his audience (more precisely, he set a rhythm). Then he spoke, increases the cadence, and raised his voice to be clearly heard, enchanting the audience. Here we have the proof of new tendencies: Hitler did not start his speech according to the classical pattern but tried (and he succeeded) to combine various structures. And so he conquered the crowd. From his carefully directed speech, a sincere, courageous leader emerged, but who was also vulnerable to the limit. Then any trace of shyness or hesitation he had shown at first disappeared. It became more and more lively, the tone increased in intensity, and it began to gesture. He was fluent in ideas and arguments, delivering a special emotion to the audience.⁶²

The scene that Hitler presents here demonstrates that he was the kind of leader who was constantly working on his image. In addition to the natural charisma, the character hid many hours spent behind the scenes in order to correct those gestures that would arouse inappropriate reactions and perfect the right ones to be delivered to the public. The gestures and mimics of the Berlin Sportpalast illustrated the process that Adolf Hitler went through until 1933 to come to power and have the influence he had on his followers.

Despite this success and his function, Hitler still faced opposition from Hindenburg and the politicians over whom the old politician still had influence. Although his appointment as German Chancellor on January 30, 1933, was

⁶² „Hitler's First Speech As Chancellor 30 January 1933“, *Hitler's First Speech As Chancellor Aka Nazi Mass Rally - Hitler Speaking (1933)*, British Pathé, interval 0' - 1'28"

greeted by grand processions, the reality was that the Nazi Party had come to power with minority support following the failed election to form a majority government. Germany was still facing inflation and a high unemployment rate in the wake of the Great Depression, which Hitler would solve by starting an extensive program of highway construction, civilian buildings, and rearmament. Financial resources were secured through huge loans, asset confiscation, and money printing.

But Hitler needed more power, and for that, he had to eliminate his opponents. Thus, on February 27, 1933, the Reichstag building, the symbol of German democracy, was set on fire, and a Dutch communist, van der Lubbe, was arrested in incriminating circumstances. This event was a carefully planned staging to bring down the communists who wanted to take power through a coup. Hitler now had the pretext of persuading Hindenburg to make use of Article 48 of the Constitution of the Weimar Republic and signed an emergency decree, marking the birth of new political construction, namely the Third Reich. This was an extraordinary act of the Nazi movement and of Hitler's, a manipulation to get what the Nazi leader wanted, namely the freedom to act.⁶³

In handing over power, Hitler and Reich propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels 'sold' a detailed picture to those present at the event. Hitler gave the impression that power does not hurt, and that he took over this position only because he had to, that it was his duty to do so as the savior of the German nation. This image can be seen from the expression on Hitler's face, which was serious, his eyes shadowed by the 'burden' that had fallen on him, and even his clothing had something to support this. He only wore a simple black suit, with

⁶³ Geoff Layton, *Germany: Al Treilea Reich, 1933-1945*, Bucharest, ALL, 2011, pp. 46-49.

no other decorations. Let Hindenburg be in the forefront. However, everything was just a simple role that Hitler played extremely well.

On March 13, 1933, Adolf Hitler was again in the spotlight of the international press. On the cover of *TIME* magazine appeared an article on the recent events in Germany, *Germany: National Revolution*, which captured the fact that the Weimar Republic era had 'passed away' and the political scene was preparing for Adolf Hitler's grand plans. It is noted that the international opinion also took over some of the carefully written headlines from the National Socialist press, namely that Germany has been reborn, its new flag proving this. The swastika was been a cleverly chosen symbol, reminiscent of the period of the Teutonic Knights and the traditions of the race. Colors were also an important part of the history of the German state: black, white, and red. These are the imperial colors of Hohenzollern's house, which fluttered on every street corner, as well as on government buildings.⁶⁴

On March 21, 1933, the newly elected Reichstag was celebrated in front of the Potsdam Garrison Church. Hitler wanted to show the German people and the government that the threat had been removed. The public image here was extremely well constructed, but in reality, everything was part of the propaganda apparatus aimed at destroying any threats to his new dictatorship. By 1933, Germany was systematically and quietly becoming a veritable dictatorship. But even though he had gained the power he needed, he still could not express himself to the public as he wished because of Hindenburg. The same goes for his anti-Semitic ideas, which will be translated from the simple ideas presented in

⁶⁴ *TIME*, „Germany: National Revolution“, March 13, Vol. XXI, No. 11, 1933.

Mein Kampf into actual reality. In March 1933, he had increased powers in an emergency.⁶⁵

Conclusions

Adolf Hitler created a regime that was a cult of terror, lies, and demagoguery in which the emphasis is on loyalty to an ideal that belongs to a distorted reality and a leader who had a distorted vision. Hitler had a special magnetism and energy, which came to "shake" millions of people, who became his loyal supporters.

Examining the chronology of events that led to the rise of Adolf Hitler from the status of a simple Viennese street wanderer, then to the patriotic soldier enlisted in Germany and the feared and challenged the leader of the whole world, is one of the most extensive historical debates that continue in the 21st century. Research into the facts of the regime led by Adolf Hitler is vital to understanding the role that propaganda has played in the perpetuation of such a career.

Regardless of how he took power or how he painted his image and the means he used to achieve this, Hitler produced a change that no one else has been able to do. The change has been so far-reaching that it has no equivalent in history.

Adolf Hitler was a leader who was formed unusually, with a mentality based on a philosophy difficult to explain and argue in the sense of motivating his actions, and his gestures. His popularity and the propaganda that was created

⁶⁵ Richard Breitman, *op. cit.*, „Building the Nazi Regime”, GHID, http://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/chapter.cfm?subsection_id=94, pp. 3-6.

around his image were something special that helped him erase any doubt from the minds of his followers. Propaganda, conceived as a system that develops in stages, has traveled a path from the inside out. As his image as a hero, as a savior of the people, internally showed signs of becoming a strong structure, the international scene followed. Using oratorical talent, rhetoric that instills a passion for the German cause, the manipulation of the truth, the decision-makers put their armor aside and believed that they had before them a capable, honest statesman, a good strategist and diplomat, calculated in terms of risk.

You have downloaded a document from



The Central and Eastern European Online Library

The joined archive of hundreds of Central-, East- and South-East-European publishers, research institutes, and various content providers

Source: Euro-Atlantic Studies

Euro-Atlantic Studies

Location: Romania

Author(s): Andrei Petrescu

Title: The Fascist Foreign Policy: Some considerations of Mussolini's Fascist Ideology

The Fascist Foreign Policy: Some considerations of Mussolini's Fascist Ideology

Issue: 5/2022

Citation style: Andrei Petrescu. "The Fascist Foreign Policy: Some considerations of Mussolini's Fascist Ideology". Euro-Atlantic Studies 5:45-55.

<https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=1050541>

The Fascist Foreign Policy: Some considerations of Mussolini's Fascist Ideology

Andrei Petrescu*

Keywords: Fascist Italy, fascism, ideology, Mussolini, propaganda

Abstract

The current article tries to explain the origins of Mussolini's Fascism and his foreign policy doctrine, by examining the political and ideological contexts of pre-Fascist Italy. This approach offers a wider analysis of the general conditions which enabled the surge of Mussolini's Far-right movement, such as the political instability, the fear of Communism among Italian elites, and above all, a growing imperialist outlook of the Italian public opinion of that period. Thus, Italian society was characterized by a profound process of atomization, a necessary precondition for a totalitarian takeover, according to Hannah Arendt.¹ The article tries to uncover the particularities of Mussolini's Fascist, to point out the ideological differences between this doctrine and other Far-right political orientations, such as Hitler's National Socialism by stressing some of the differences, explaining why Mussolini's Fascist régime was perceived as a moderate one by Western governments for a long period. Mussolini was held in high regard by important American diplomats, like State Secretary Henry Stimson, who labeled Mussolini as a reasonable

* Master Degree, University of Bucharest

¹ Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, London, Penguin, 2017, p. 427.

gentleman in his *Post-war memoirs*². Also, President Roosevelt expressed often his admiration for Mussolini and his policies, like many of the U.S. ambassadors to Rome.³

The cause for the surge of Italian Fascism resides, primarily, in the context of a deep political instability and nationalist fervor, which stemmed from the consequences of the 1919 Peace Treaties, whose clauses were badly perceived by the Italian society, but also in the context of the Bolshevik Revolution, which galvanized the Left-wing Italian labor movement, during a post-war period of economic recession and soaring social inequalities.

The Post-War Italian nationalism, which was so well exploited politically by Mussolini's movement, was also a reaction to the principle of Self-determination, which was a hallmark of Woodrow Wilson's *Fourteen Points*. Although Italy was on the winning side during the Great War, a substantial part of the Italian ruling classes and of the general population - namely the petty-bourgeoisie and the very significant rural population - felt that the benefits of the peace treaties were relatively scarce in comparison with the downsides: the human and economic costs! Besides that, the Italian government decided to get involved in the First World War, hoping that, by these means, Italy would acquire new strategic territories, such as the port of Trieste, the South-Tirolean Region, the Dalmatian Coast, new African colonies and strategic outposts on the Turkish Coastline. All these territorial objectives were based on the agreement of

² Henry L. Stimson, McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1948, p. 173.

³ Gian Giacomo Migone, *The United States and Fascist Italy. The Rise of American Finance in Europe*, Cambridge, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 304.

the *Entente* powers and were granted by the Treaty of London of 1915 and the Agreements of Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne of April 1917.⁴

It must be added that the Italian Kingdom, so as the German Reich, was an emergent colonialist power at that time, and that circumstance enabled the Italian political elite to hold such expansionist territorial claims. Italy's first colonial expedition on the African Continent, the Abyssinian Expedition, ended by the humiliating defeat of the Italian armies in the Battle of Adwa, of 1896. Its sole colonial accomplishment, thus far, was the conquest of Libya, as a result of the Turkish-Italian War of 1912, during the Liberal government of Giovanni Giolitti.⁵

The amplitude of the Irredentist currents in Italian society was due to the nationalist propaganda, enabled by the Liberal government during the Great War, whose purpose was to galvanize the broad public, which was rather skeptical towards Rome's authority.⁶ The wartime Italian nationalist propaganda was so persuasively disseminated, as it succeeded in breaking even some preexisting party and class lines, and Mussolini's example is more than relevant in this instance: the future fascist leader abandoned his commitment to the Socialist International to join the Italian nationalist movement, led by the famous modernist poet Gabrielle D'Annunzio, and his paramilitary organization, *The Arditi*. Benito Mussolini established his own nationalist organization, the *Fasci d'Azione Rivoluzionaria*, later renamed *Fasci di Combattimento*.⁷

⁴ Stanley G. Payne, *A History of Fascism, 1914-1945*, New York, Routledge, 1995, p. 81.

⁵ Robert Mallet, *Mussolini in Ethiopia, 1919-1935, The Origins of Fascist Italy's African War*, Cambridge, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 30.

⁶ Robert O. Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2004, p. 56.

⁷ R.J.B. Bosworth, *Mussolini*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 100-112.

The downsides of the Paris Peace Treaties led to the generalization of amputated victory rhetoric (*Vittoria mutilata*), as it was called in the nationalist milieus, and all that popular dissatisfaction contributed to the expansion of the new fascist movement. The Italian state was strongly delegitimized, his authority constantly contested by the actions of the nationalists, such as Gabrielle D'Annunzio, who succeeded in his attempt to retake control over the Adriatic port of Fiume, which then was supposed to be annexed by the new state of Yugoslavia.⁸

The Italian political elites proved the same lack of authority later when they started to use the Fascist movements in suppressing the growing Left-wing parties, the Socialists and the Communists, particularly in the Northern industrial cities. Mussolini's Fascists were often used as strikebreakers.⁹ As Antonio Gramsci wrote in one of his political articles, the Fascist *squadri* served, from the very beginning, as the defenders of the upper classes, especially the landowners class (*latifondisti*), against the surging Left-wing peasant movements.¹⁰

The Left-wing was surging because of the post-war economic crisis that swept through Italy's cities and villages. The Left-Wing parties were the only which stood against any form of intervention during the Great War. After the war, the Socialist Party won the 1919 Parliamentary Elections, ushering in two years marked by a strong political mobilization of the working class, named the *Biennio Rosso*, a period characterized by the actions of the Labor Unions in the

⁸ Stanley G. Payne, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 91.

¹⁰ Antonio Gramsci, *Scritti (1914-1926)*, Iași, Adenium, pp. 203-205.

Northern industrial cities, and by a very bold campaign of collectivization, which was started in many villages.¹¹

Being concerned by the growing support of the Left-wing movements, the Giolitti government was willing to accept the violent actions of the Fascist *squadri* against the Unions and the Communists, which were considered by the authorities the Fifth column of Bolshevism.

The National Bloc, as it was named the Giolitti-Mussolini coalition lost the 1921 Parliamentary Elections, and the Socialists won again. However, the Fascists gained about 35 seats in the Italian parliament, thus obtaining ground in the highest political institution of the Italian state.¹²

The Italian government's incapacity to reinforce its authority and to maintain certain social stability led, finally, to the Fascist takeover of 1922, as a result of Mussolini's *March over Rome*.

Despite its strength as a mass movement and the efficacy of its propaganda apparatus, Mussolini's Fascism had a very volatile ideological basis, in contrast to the Left. On economic issues, the Fascists did not propose any radical change to the already existing system, and on social issues, they did not claim a reversal of the class-based system, but a contradiction of that system, by upholding the principles of ethnic unity. According to Zeev Sternhell, the so-called revolution claimed by the Fascists was only meant to oppose the moral and ethical basis of the old society, but to maintain its central incentives, namely private property, and profits.¹³ This ambiguous ideological positioning could be

¹¹ Martin Blinkhorn, *Mussolini and Fascist Italy*, London, New York, Routledge, 2001, p. 22.

¹² Stanley G. Payne, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

¹³ Zeev Sternhell, *The Birth of Fascist Ideology. From Cultural Rebellion to Political Revolution*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994, p. 7.

understood as a means to gain access to power and gain the support of the conservative forces, such as the Clergy, the industrialists, and the nationalist segment of the Italian upper classes.

The Fascists' vision on foreign policy wasn't more revolutionary either, because, in the early years of Mussolini's regime, it only claimed the territories that were supposed to be annexed by Italy after the Treaty of London of 1915. The Fascist claims became more radical later on, in the late 1920s. Before that, in the first years of Mussolini's regime, Italy undertook some military actions in their strategic region in the Mediterranean, such as the occupation of the Greek island of Corfu, in September 1923, during a Greek-Italian border conflict. However, the territorial dispute was settled and this first imperialist adventure of Mussolini was stalled¹⁴. It could be argued that this first failure could be the result of a lack of an adequate industrial capacity, necessary to support a serious war effort. But it could also be the result of inconsistency of the general strategy, meant to draw the coordinates for their future expansion.

In contrast, the Nazis didn't lack industrial capacity or theory. Nazi foreign policy had a more complex theoretical groundwork, claiming, as a leading principle, the concept of the *Lebensraum*, a concept based on the Darwinist theories. Mussolini adopted the same theory to justify the expansion of the Italian interests in the 1930s, but it used that imperialist projection just to define the Mediterranean area. The Fascist dictator was also very reluctant to

¹⁴ Alan Cassels, *Mussolini's Early Diplomacy*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1970, pp. 96-100.

support the internationalization of his doctrine, stating that the Fascist doctrine could not apply to other societies.¹⁵

On racial issues, the Fascist discourse was quite ambiguous initially, during the 20s and the early 30s, because they were not prone to support Eugenic policies, as the National-Socialists or other more extremist Far-right movements of that period did. For that reason, Mussolini was generally perceived by the Western powers as a *moderate* Fascist! However, the Italian Fascists began to radicalize their racial stances during the late 1930s, influenced by the popularization of Nazi ideology in the Far-right circles. The first explicitly Anti-Semitic legislation was implemented in 1938, inspired by the Nurnberg laws of the Third Reich, but before its ratification, the attitude of Fascist authorities and party structures regarding the Jewish community could hardly be considered hostile, and no other forms of discrimination were legally imposed on any other ethnic minority.¹⁶ The Fascist propaganda used racist language starting with the period of the Ethiopian War, to justify the Italian invasion, and the genocide committed by the Italian army, during and after the invasion had also a certain racially-motivated character.

Generally speaking, Mussolini's Fascists lacked, for a long period, any kind of theoretical basis or political literature, favoring a more direct approach, in the name of the so-called principle of *direct action*, which praised dynamism and spontaneity in political actions. Hannah Arendt considered that the specific lack of interest shown by Mussolini in theoretical matters, such as upholding a

¹⁵ Aristotle A. Kallis, *Fascist Ideology. Territory and Expansionism in Italy and Germany, 1922 -1945*, London, New York, Routledge, 2000, pp. 27-29.

¹⁶ R.J.B. Bosworth, *Mussolini's Italy. Life under the Fascist Dictatorship, 1915-1945*, New York, Penguin, 2005, p. 27.

coherent political platform, is a common characteristic of those that she labeled *the leaders of the mob*, for whom the only purpose consists in taking the control of the means of violence, not in building a radically new system.¹⁷

According to German philosopher Walter Benjamin, the Fascists tried to alleviate this theoretical vacuity and inconsistency in important fields, such as economics, by what he called the *aestheticization of politics*, a process meant to justify wars.¹⁸ In 1932, Mussolini tried to solve these ideological inconsistencies by publishing an essay titled *The Doctrine of Fascism*, co-authored with Giovanni Gentile, a Far-right Italian philosopher and the chief ideologue of the Fascist Party.

In *The Doctrine of Fascism*, Mussolini and Gentile emphasized the Fascist vision on foreign policy, reaffirming its imperialist *ethos*, legitimizing it, and evoking the memory of the Roman Empire by framing Italy's image as an oppressed nation that pursued an equal international status:

"The Fascist State expresses the will to exercise power and to command. Here the Roman tradition is embodied in a conception of strength. Imperial power, as understood by the Fascist doctrine, is not only territorial, military, or commercial; it is also spiritual and ethical. (...) Fascism sees in the imperialistic spirit — i.e., in the tendency of nations to expand — a manifestation of their vitality. In the opposite tendency, which would limit their interests to the home country, it sees a symptom of decadence. Peoples who rise or re-arise are imperialistic; renunciation is characteristic of dying peoples. The Fascist doctrine is that best suited

¹⁷ Hannah Arendt, *op.cit.*, London, Penguin, 2017, p. 425.

¹⁸ Walter Benjamin, *The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility and Other Writings on Media*, Cambridge, London, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008, p. 41.

to the tendencies and feelings of a people which, like Italians, after lying fallow during centuries of foreign servitude, are now reasserting itself in the world.”¹⁹

Just to display this so-called *vitality of Fascism* to the Italian people and to the international stage, Mussolini began a new, more aggressive approach to foreign policy. For his regime, this change of paradigm was necessary at that time, because the Italian society was still shaken by the effects inflicted on the national economy by the Great Depression, which were amplified by the austerity measures imposed by the Fascist government. For that reason, militarization was supposed to work as a contra cyclical measure, meant to stimulate the recovery of industrial production, which fell sharply during the Depression. These are some of the main reasons for Mussolini’s bellicose actions during the 1930s, such as the invasion of Abyssinia or his intervention, alongside Hitler, in the Spanish Civil War.

For the Mussolini regime, those two military campaigns were also meant to secure Italy’s prestige as the leading Far-right power in Europe, a position that was already strongly contested by Nazi Germany. The War in Ethiopia was particularly an asymmetrical one - the Italian army resorted to massive bombardments and chemical weapons, although these means were banned by international laws²⁰.

¹⁹ Benito Mussolini, *The Doctrine of Fascism*,
<https://archive.org/details/TheDoctrineOfFascismByBenitoMussolini>

²⁰ John Gooch, *Mussolini’s War. Fascist Italy from Triumph to Collapse, 1935-1943*, London, Penguin, 2020, pp. 59-71.

Later during the 30s, the hopes of some Western leaders that Mussolini could have been used to moderate Hitler turned out to be in vain, because the result was quite the opposite, namely that Hitler influenced Mussolini in pursuing a more radical path. This became clear in diplomatic matters since 1936, as Germany and Italy were closing ties, as they were actively helping the Spanish Far-right during the Civil War, in a push against a so-called expansion of Communism. In October 1936, the two reactionary powers signed a secret anti-Communist treaty in Berlin, under the guise of Galeazzo Ciano, the newly-appointed Italian Foreign Minister and a staunch pro-German. Thus, Rome and Berlin played out the groundwork for their future political-military bloc, the Axis. The next year, Mussolini's first state visit to Berlin was another significant development for the cooperation between the two Far-right powers²¹.

In the short term, by this Fascist *approchement*, Hitler obtained significant diplomatic support, which will prove to be helpful in his quest to reverse the European status-quo, as it was the case of the Munich Agreement of September 1938, where the Fascist dictator endorsed Hitler's position regarding the Sudetenland.²²

It must be emphasized that Mussolini's foreign policy was hindered by some shortcomings of objective reason, the paucity of vital natural resources, much needed for the war effort in the technical conditions of the 20th century, such as oil and ore, the deficient industrialization of Italy, and the lack of a militaristic culture in society, as it was in the case of Italy's allies, Nazi Germany

²¹ Christian Goeschel, *Mussolini și Hitler. Făurirea alianței fasciste*, Bucharest, Orizonturi, 2019, pp. 88-94.

²² *Ibidem*, p. 178.

and Imperial Japan.²³ All these shortcomings became blatant during the Second World War, as the Italian army became the Achilles' heel of the Axis, a great vulnerability for the Germans, and we can list here some important military debacles, such as the failures of the Italian troops in Greece and North Africa, or the easiness of its surrender to the Allies, during the Invasion of 1943.

Fascist ideology could be characterized as a more radical extension of the nationalist current, ushered by the *Risorgimento*. The continuity is more evident in the imperialistic aspirations of Mussolini's foreign policy. As in the case of his liberal predecessors, Mussolini's goal was to bring Italy to the status of an imperialist power, which meant supremacy in the Mediterranean Basin, and further colonial expansion in Africa. In the Nationalist specter, it was generally considered that Italy was obstructed from achieving this status by a conspiracy of the hegemonic nations, and by the provisions of the international treaties. In comparison, Nazi foreign policy had a similar purpose and similar rhetoric.

The so-called moderation of Mussolini's Fascism, a certainty for the Western diplomats of the 1920s and 1930s, was more a result of a different political architecture. Mussolini's moderation was not due to his philosophic leanings but to the constitutional constraints enabled by the existence of a monarchy, which was not the case in Hitler's Germany. Mussolini's authoritarian leaning became blatant during the 1920s, in his attempts to crush the parliamentary opposition, especially the Left-wing organizations. As Hannah Arendt and Zeev Sternhell have pointed out, the transition of Mussolini's régime to totalitarianism took place during the 1930s, influenced by the growing pressure of Hitler's more radical National Socialism.

²³ Aristotle A. Kallis, *op. cit.*, p. 197.

Ongoing Humanitarian Crisis and Peace Process in The Democratic Republic of the Congo

Alexandra Cojocaru*

Keywords

Congo Wars, Congo's peace process, humanitarian crisis, refugees, conflict resolution, peace operations.

Abstract

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has experienced a cycle of violence over time, which has taken the form of interethnic competition, and civil wars and has become one of the worst humanitarian crises.

Faced with an extremely violent peace process, especially in the eastern part of the country, sustainability and peacebuilding have been key points in the intervention plans proposed by international organizations. The peace process has made positive progress in halting regional hostilities, but the humanitarian crisis is far from being over, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimates that 27 million people will need humanitarian aid in 2022. DRC continues to face overlapping crises, extreme poverty, famine, poor governance, corruption, violence in the eastern part of the country, sexual abuse, and blatant human rights violations.

In addition to the strategies proposed by international actors (for example, South Africa, the Southern African Development Community - SADC, the African Union, the United

* PhD Student at University of Bucharest.

Nations, and the European Union), mainly having a regional approach, actions must start at a micro-level, a local intervention aimed at ending ethnic rivalries. Despite the efforts of international actors, the local approach has not yet been effectively implemented.

Starting from the demographic and socio-economic context of the DRC, we propose an analysis of the evolution of the Congolese state, focusing on the conflict situation in the late 1990s, the unfolding of conflicts, and how African states and the international community have tried to restore peace. How effective the proposed strategies have been, what are the current issues and why are there no significant results in stabilizing the internal situation of the Congolese state?

Demographic and socio-economic profile

The structural problems of the Democratic Republic of the Congo are inexorably linked to the demographic, economic, and political profile of Central Africa. It is necessary an inquiry about these peculiarities, to understand why DR Congo is considered a war-torn country.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo covers an area of about 2 million km², making it the third-largest state in Africa. At the demographic level, we speak of a total population of over 94 million, according to the latest statistics provided by *Worldometer*, for the first half of 2022.¹ An essential aspect in understanding the Congolese conflicts is the ethnic composition, there is an impressive ethnic juxtaposition of about 250 ethnic communities, which speak almost 700 different languages and dialects.²

¹ "DR Congo Population", *Worldometer*, <https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/democratic-republic-of-the-congo-population/>.

² *Ibidem*.

One of the structural causes that contributed to perpetual violence was the illicit sale of natural resources, the mineral deposits being the main economic resource of the country, which also explains the endemic corruption of the Congolese state. On the territory of the DRC, we notice the existence of a great variety of natural resources, among copper, cobalt, zinc, manganese, coal, silver, uranium and platinum. In the Kivu Lake area, there are vast reserves of methane and nitrogen natural gas. There are deposits of precious iron ore and diamonds in the southern part of the Congo, while the central regions are rich in industrial diamonds. The limestone deposits that appear throughout the country are considered to be among the richest in Africa.³

Congo's forests cover more than half of the country and are among the largest in Africa. Rivers, lakes, swamps and the ocean provide vast reserves of fish. It is estimated that the country's hydroelectric resources account for about one-eighth of global capacity and perhaps half of Africa's potential capacity. Thermal energy can be derived from forests, coal and oil fields.⁴

Despite a rich supply of mineral deposits and a huge potential for hydroelectric capacity, this state is fundamentally underdeveloped, with only 500 km of paved roads. The level of underdevelopment of the DRC is also indicated by the quality of life of the majority of the population; people live on the edge of

³ Global Witness, *Same Old Story. A background study on natural resources in the Democratic Republic of Congo*, Washington DC, Global Witness Publishing Inc., 2004.

⁴ Bernd Michael Wiese, Ntsomo Payanzo and Others, "Democratic Republic of the Congo", *Encyclopedia Britannica*, September 11, 2020, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Democratic-Republic-of-the-Congo>.

subsistence, with a GDP per capita of \$ 580 in 2019, according to data provided by the World Bank.⁵

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a semi-presidential republic since its independence in 1960, but the president's power has varied from one regime to another, which has been the main source of instability and bad governance.

RDC's structural problems

The instability of the RDC and, implicitly, the regional endemic instability, cannot be understood without a closer look at how the decolonization process was carried out and how the new independent states were organized.

After independence in June 1960, the Congolese state faced its first violent outbursts. On the one hand, the decolonization was not carried out in optimal parameters, because it never ensured the transition to national and stable leadership. Before the process of decolonization, the majority of the population did not have access to education, and the profitable economic sectors were monopolized by the colonizing state, meaning that the transition to an independent state could not be done sustainably. Given the fact that there was no local educated elite, the capacity of running effectively the state's economy was almost non-existent.⁶

Trying to manage the whole territory coherently way was an ambitious goal, without much chance of success. That is why, in the early 1960s, there was a

⁵ "GDP per capita (current US\$) - Congo, Dem. Rep.", *World Bank National Accounts Data*, 2019, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=CD>.

⁶ Kris Berwouts, *Congo's Violent Peace. Conflict and Struggle Since the Great African War*, London, Zed Books, 2017, p. 9.

succession of several governments that deepened the state's instability and created favorable conditions for the secessionist wars, which ended in 1965 with the coup led by Mobutu Sese Seko. Mobutu's regime lasted for 32 years, until 1997.

The African political leadership in recent decades has been marked by presidentialism and clientelism. By using state resources for personal gain and concentrating power in the hands of a small decision-making group, the leader secured unlimited, uncontrolled power, free from any form of opposition. Although there was a separation of powers in the state, it was a purely symbolic act, in which democratic institutions had a formal existence. Rather, public institutions were seen as tools that could facilitate the enrichment of the Congolese political elite.

Poor governance has been one of the main problems facing the Congo since its independence, with the result taking the form of a crisis of state legitimacy. After 1965, with Mobutu's dictatorship, the Congolese society was severely affected by violent political repression, flagrant human rights violations, and state resources were not used for the economic development of the DRC, but for the leader's personal interests and those close to the regime.⁷

Although Mobutu's government lacked the essence of democracy, the leadership of the DRC was backed by Western powers, as it was a regional counterweight to a possible spread of Marxism on the African continent. Western

⁷ "Ending the Deadlock: Towards a New Vision of Peace in Eastern DRC", *International Alert*, 2012, p. 16.

support (the United States, France and Belgium) has also had economic motivations in the form of concessions on mineral resources in the eastern DRC.⁸

The alternative to African socialism took the form of a large-scale campaign, a process known as Zairianisation. The new Congolese state involved a different name for the state, for the cities and for the local structures. Thus, to assert its regional authenticity, Mobutu changed the name of the state to Zaire in 1971. The Zairianisation process had multiple consequences for the Congolese state, the greatest impact being felt in the economic sphere; most of the businesses owned by westerners was expropriated and placed in the hands of those close to the regime, without any specific training.⁹

In the second period of his regime, Mobutu suffered a serious loss of legitimacy, instability spread to all sectors of public life, the national and regional opposition being one of the main reasons for its overthrow in the First Congo War.¹⁰

The rich natural resources of the DRC have been an important factor in fueling conflicts, as warring factions have competed to control the illegal flow of resources from the DRC to international markets. The result was a collapsed state and, above all, a suffering population.

The dynamics of regional conflicts and, implicitly, of civil conflicts in the Congo can be understood in the light of the combative situation with a strong identity character. Throughout the twentieth century, micro-level rivalries over land, resources, and power have progressively produced a series of fractures at

⁸ Kris Berwouts, *op.cit.*, p. 11.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 12.

¹⁰ David Renton, David Seddon, Leo Zeilig, *The Congo. Plunder & Resistance*, London, Zed Books, 2007, pp. 126-127.

both the local and national levels. The local level of rivalries is an essential element in our analysis, because it was found that most violent outbursts are small, located only in a few villages or communities, being led by local leaders.¹¹

With the Zairianisation process initiated by Mobutu, the identity problem in the eastern Congolese state (especially the provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri) intensified, creating favorable conditions for polarization between indigenous and non-indigenous Congolese, those with Rwandan origins.¹² Prior to Zairianisation, interethnic tensions were resolved through the kinship system, migrants of Rwandan origin were thus introduced into the local community, through marriage to members of the local population. After 1973, the state privatized the lands previously administered by the local communities, which led to the disappearance of the traditional system. Local leaders have become land traders, facilitating the involvement of migrants in the land purchase process.

Without the need for Rwandan migrants to be accepted into the community through the kinship system, a new level of interethnic tensions has been reached. The possibility of buying land disadvantaged the young Congolese peasants, who, due to lack of resources, could not buy land. The nationalization process has increased the frustrations of the latter and created a new class of marginalized people.¹³

Therefore, in the view of the Congolese peasants, the classification between indigenous and non-indigenous (the non-indigenous population was

¹¹ Kris Berwouts, *op.cit.*, pp. 41-42.

¹² Filip Reyntjens, *The Great African War. Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 13-14.

¹³ "Ending the Deadlock: Towards a New Vision of Peace in Eastern DRC", *International Alert*, 2012, p.20; Kris Berwouts, *op.cit.*, p. 20.

known as “Banyarwanda”) became legitimate. The identity approach of Mobutu’s regime contributed to a crisis of citizenship, with indigenous communities challenging the nationality of Rwandan Congolese.¹⁴ On the other hand, the members of Banyarwanda had distrusted of the regime. Thus, since the 1990s, new political parties have been created along ethnic lines, and politicians, wanting to gain popular support, have further exacerbated tensions based on identity criteria. Moreover, before the elections, it was conducted a census of all citizens, a process in which the Rwandan Congolese were ignored.

The Rwandan civil war (1990-1994) also fueled local antagonisms and expanded the division within the Banyarwanda community. Some Congolese Tutsis funded the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), and thousands of young Congolese Tutsis crossed the border into Uganda to join the RPF's war effort. On the other hand, Congolese Hutus perceived the Rwandan Patriotic Front as a threat to their very existence, which is why they enlisted in the Rwandan army, led by President Habyarimana. Thus, the Hutus intensified their resentment towards the Tutsis, and the rivalry between indigenous and non-indigenous Congolese worsened, with Rwandan-born Congolese being considered foreigners in terms of political loyalty to a foreign state, Rwanda.¹⁵

The struggle for power and endemic violence of the 1990s. Civil wars in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

In the 1990s, Africa experienced a climax of violence, culminating with the civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and the Central African region.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 16-18.

¹⁵ Filip Reyntjens, *op.cit.*, p. 6.

The end of the Cold War also had a fundamental impact on the dynamics of the DRC in the 1990s. Mobutu was a product of the Cold War, the new geopolitical realities were no longer in line with his dictatorial regime, and the Congolese state was facing problems on all levels (the legitimacy crisis of Mobutu's regime, growing popular dissatisfaction, and ethnic polarization).

On April 4, 1994, the President of Rwanda, Juvenal Habyarimana, was killed after his plane was shot down. The event sparked subsequent genocidal actions, killing about 800,000 Tutsis, a genocide that ended with the Rwandan Patriotic Front taking power in July 1994.¹⁶ Although there was a relative stabilization of the internal situation in Rwanda, the violence has been exported to the Congolese neighbor, a territory where ethnic rivalries between Hutus and Tutsis have previously been problematic.¹⁷ One of the first consequences of the Rwandan genocide took the form of the mass migration of ethnic Hutus to the eastern provinces of the DRC. The exodus of two million Hutu ethnics (many former members of the Rwandan Armed Forces involved in the genocide) has exacerbated instability in Kivu provinces.¹⁸ Refugees reorganized into armed groups and militias, forcing people in eastern Congo to submit to their authority. The actions of the Hutu rebels, supported by Mobutu's regime, were mainly directed against the new regime in Kigali, which provided another reason for the Rwandan government to support the change of regime in Kinshasa. Given the collaboration between Mobutu and the Rwandan forces involved in the genocide, as well as Mobutu's lack of national and international popularity, there was

¹⁶ Gérard Prunier, *Africa's world war: Congo, the Rwandan genocide, and the making of a continental catastrophe*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 5.

¹⁷ Filip Reyntjens, *op.cit.*, pp. 42-44.

¹⁸ Séverine Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo. Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 47.

almost a nonexistent opposition to the violation of Congo's sovereignty shown by the neighboring countries.¹⁹

First Congo War marked the end of Mobutu's regime. The war broke out in October 1996 with the intervention of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) - an alliance between the governments of Uganda and Rwanda, a collaboration that gave a local note by appointing Laurent-Désiré Kabila as the alliance's leader. A politician with insignificant activity on the Congolese political scene, an opponent of Mobutu, without consistent military support, Kabila was a strategic choice of the two states, as he could turn into a puppet leader, easy to manipulate.²⁰

The stated goal of the alliance was the total destruction of Hutu refugee camps.²¹ The refugee camps' dismantling was mainly aimed at neutralizing the rebel armed forces, but in reality, these actions took the form of massacres against Hutus (in 2005, three mass graves were discovered in the eastern region of DRC).²² The rebels took major cities without much resistance, but the turning point was the occupation of Kisangani, an important diamond center. The coup ended on May 20, 1997, and Kabila was sworn in as president of Zaire.

¹⁹ Herbert Weiss, "War and Peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo", *Current African Issues*, No.22, 2000, p. 3.

²⁰ Erik Kennes, "A Road not Taken? The Biography of Laurent Kabila (1939–2001)", in Klaas van Walraven (ed.), *The Individual in African History. The Importance of Biography in African Historical Studies*, Leiden, Brill, 2020, p. 288.

²¹ Gérard Prunier, *op.cit.*, pp. 143-146.

²² The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003", 2010,

https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/CD/DRC_MAPPING_REPORT_FINAL_EN.pdf.

Kabila's regime has largely retained many features of Mobutu's regime. Political activities were banned, parliament was dissolved, there was no state budget, and laws were issued by presidential decrees. Kabila, like his predecessor, encouraged favoritism and nepotism. Therefore, the internal dynamics of the state remained approximately the same. However, there was a change in the way Kabila related to his former war allies. Pressure, especially from Rwanda, through continued interference in the affairs of the Congolese state, led Kabila to demand that Rwandan and Ugandan forces leave the DRC, which was the trigger for the Second Congo War.²³

On August 2, 1998, the war has broken out in Congo, with Uganda and Rwanda starting a new military campaign in Congo, this time against the former ally, Kabila, with the help of rebel militias in the northeast Congo, one of the country's richest natural resources areas.²⁴

The most daring operation in the conflict was Kitona, which began on August 4, 1998. Rwandan and Ugandan forces tried to quickly conquer the Congolese capital through an insurrection in the western part of the country. Throughout the month, they conquered strategic points near the capital, such as the port of Matadi and the Inga hydroelectric plant, which supplied electric power to Kinshasa.

On the verge of success due to the intervention of troops from Zimbabwe and Angola, the operation failed, which led to the fall of the Western DRC front. However, until August 17, 1998, RCD (the Congolese Rally for Democracy) rebels

²³ Séverine Autesserre, *op.cit.*, p. 48.

²⁴ The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, *op. cit.*, pp. 154-155.

in eastern Congo conquered the cities of Kivu province: Goma, Bukavu, and Uvira, areas rich in tin, columbite-tantalite, and gold.²⁵

A key point in the conflict was the meeting in Harare, the capital of Zimbabwe, on August 19, 1998. Here, the member states of the South African Development Community (SADC) have decided to become militarily involved in the conflict, backing Kabila. This decision was due both to the Community's defensive treaty and to the opportunities to acquire DR Congo's resources.²⁶

Even though the conflict in the DRC turned into a regional war, with heavily military-backed countries alongside Kabila, in September 1998, RCD rebels occupied Watsa and Moba and advanced to the Congo's capital. In the previously conquered territories, in the jungles of northeastern Congo, grisly clashes were taking place between ethnic Tutsis, who formed much of the RCD, and local militias (mainly formed of the remnants of Interahamwe, the Hutu extremist organization which actively participated in the Rwandan genocide).²⁷

In October 1998, the province of Maniema was controlled by RCD rebels and so both the North and South Kivu areas came under Rwandan-Ugandan occupation.²⁸ After November 1998, following the conquests of the resource-rich areas of the Congo, especially those with diamonds, the first dissensions arose between Rwanda and Uganda. Along these lines, a new rebel group was created, Uganda's satellite. The Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) was led by Jean-Pierre Bemba, the son of a former close friend of the Mobutu regime,

²⁵ Filip Reyntjens, *op. cit.*, pp. 196-197.

²⁶ "DRC: Zimbabwe says SADC to back Kabila", *The New Humanitarian*, 19 August 1998, <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/drc-zimbabwe-says-sadc-back-kabila>.

²⁷ Thomas Turner, *The Congo Wars: conflict, myth & reality*, Zed Books, 2007, p. 199.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 200.

who had become rich because of Congo's exploitation of natural resources. MLC controlled areas in northern Congo, based in Gbadolite.²⁹

On April 5, 1999, tensions between pro-Rwandan and pro-Ugandan groups within the RCD escalated due to the desire of certain factions in the RCD to control the diamond-rich areas on their own. The Ugandan RCD troops broke away from the rest of the rebel group and moved its headquarters to Kisangani, giving birth to RCD-K. The Rwandan faction kept its center in the city of Goma. With this event, armed clashes broke out between the two factions for the conquest of the diamond-rich area, the city of Kisangani.³⁰

The nonviolent way. Negotiations and peace agreements (1999-2003)

Civil society organizations campaigned for a political dialogue long before the initiation of the actual Inter-Congolese dialogue. At the end of the Second Congo War, which many organizations saw as a threat to the integrity of the DRC, a series of meetings were held in Kinshasa, Antwerp, Montreal, and Durban, to bring all actors to the negotiation table. Kabila's regime strongly opposed these initiatives, which it sought to boycott, for example, by preventing internal opposition from participating or by arresting participants on their return from these events.

Therefore, Kabila blocked the attempts to find a negotiated solution to the military conflict. This attitude was inspired by a single consideration: the acceptance of demands for power-sharing made by the opposition forces and rebel groups would have been a major threat to his political position. As we will

²⁹ The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

³⁰ Denis Tull, *The Reconfiguration of Political Order in Africa: A Case Study of North Kivu (DR Congo)*, Hamburg African Studies, Institute of African Affairs, 2005, p. 131.

see in the evolution of the events of the late 1990s, only after Laurent Kabila's death and the coming to power of his son, the negotiated transition was implemented.³¹ In 2003, Joseph Kabila founded The People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD), sending the message that his administration refrained from his father's practices.³²

The initiation of the peace process would not have been possible without the involvement of a considerable number of external actors. International organizations have set up a discussion forum, through which they have tried to bring together all paramilitary factions and all regional actors at the negotiating table. Since 1998, it has been seen the involvement of external facilitators, who have played an active role in the peace process: the South African Development Community (SADC), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the United Nations (UN), South Africa, Libya, USA, Belgium. The interests of the actors who preferred the nonviolent way were diverse and complex, either they were guided by personal motivations, or there was a real interest in building peace.

The decision of SADC states' involvement in the Second Congo War, on Kabila's part, was a difficult decision that has not met the consensus. SADC has become the main player in a negotiated solution and South Africa has taken a clear leadership role. The day after Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola decided to intervene on Kabila's behalf under the guise of SADC, Nelson Mandela said: "Our attitude is clear. We would not worsen the position by sending in a military force. We are committed to peace."³³

³¹ Kris Berwouts, *op.cit.*, p. 25.

³² *Ibidem*, p. 48.

³³ "DRC: Zimbabwe says SADC to back Kabila", *The New Humanitarian*, 19 August 1998, <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/drc-zimbabwe-says-sadc-back-kabila>.

Although there were disagreements within SADC over the position the organization should have taken, the South African Development Community was the first entity to launch the idea of a negotiated peace. At a summit in September 1998 at Victoria Falls, a statement was issued by representatives of the states involved in the war (Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Angola, DRC, Namibia), along with Zambia and the OAU Secretary-General. Following the communiqué, the foreign interference in the internal activity of the Congolese state was denounced (paradoxically condemned by Rwanda and Uganda, which denied the presence of their troops in the DRC). Although the Victoria Falls Summit first launched the idea of a negotiated solution, it was a false start to the negotiations, an example of deceitful pseudo-diplomacy, according to Gérard Prunier.³⁴

Assuming the mediator's role during the negotiations was perceived as an opportunity to gain regional leverage. Libyan President Muammar Abu Minyar al-Gaddafi used this opportunity to shape his image as an African leader, not as a leader of the Arab world. He called himself the "coordinator of the Peace Process in the Great Lakes", which was held in Sirte on September 30, 1998. The ongoing dialogue led to a second summit on April 18, 1999. The peace agreement between Uganda, DRC, Eritrea, and Chad, under Gaddafi's coordination, had no chance of success, as the other actors involved in the civil war were not included in the process, being the main reason for negotiations' failure at that time.³⁵

Another event aimed at ending hostilities and creating a stable regional framework was the 20th Franco-African Summit, organized in November 1998 in

³⁴ Gérard Prunier, *op.cit.*, p. 203.

³⁵ Filip Reyntjens, *op.cit.*, pp. 245-246.

Paris. Concluded with the Louvre Agreement, the summit did not have notable results, key players such as rebel groups and Rwanda did not participate in the talks.

In June 1999, Zambian President Frederick Chiluba took the initiative to bring the countries involved in the Congo war and the RCD and MLC rebel movements to the negotiating table, along with representatives of the United Nations, OAU, and SADC. The Zambian president was considered a neutral regional actor, which is why he took on this mediation mission.³⁶ On July 10, an agreement was signed in Lusaka. The signatories were the leaders of six countries involved in the conflict: Angola, DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, with the agreement being assisted by Zambia, the OAU, the UN, and SADC. The parties agreed to cease hostilities in the DRC within twenty-four hours after signing the agreement. After four months, all foreign armies were to leave Congo and be replaced by a UN force. Two months later, Kinshasa and the rebels were to join the military and plan a transition to a democratic government.³⁷ The agreement was promising for building regional peace, but there was a recurring issue in the peace negotiations - the non-compliance of rebel groups with the nonviolent efforts.

Although the results of the agreement have only cursory achieved the objectives of the parties, some structural issues have been addressed, thus overcoming concerns about the cessation of hostilities. First of all, the aim was to normalize the situation in the eastern region of the DRC, regulate the illegal exploitation of natural resources, and control armed groups in the east, and arms

³⁶ Kris Berwouts, *op.cit.*, p.23.

³⁷ Lusaka Agreement (1999), *United Nations Peace Peacemaker*, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CD_030402_SunCityAgreement.pdf.

trafficking. Another key aspect of the Lusaka Agreement was accepting the intervention's legitimacy of neighboring states, Rwanda and Uganda, recognizing the DRC's inability to maintain security on its eastern borders. The diplomatic victory allowed the recognition of the claims of the armed groups financed by these two states, RCD - Rwanda, and MLC - Uganda.³⁸ The international intervention was to take the form of a UN peacekeeping force, deployed within 120 days of the conclusion of the agreement. Its mandate included peacekeeping and peacemaking operations.³⁹ Even before the RCD signed the Lusaka Agreement, the UN Security Council authorized, on August 6, 1999 "the deployment of up to 90 UN military liaison personnel, together with the necessary civilian, political, humanitarian and administrative staff", the first reconnaissance mission starting in September.⁴⁰

The former President of Botswana, Ketumile Masire, was subsequently appointed as a mediator in December 1999.⁴¹ Until Laurent Kabila's death, no considerable progress had been made in building peace, the armed conflict continued, and reconciliation was far from reality.

On January 16, 2001, President Kabila was shot in his palace by one of his bodyguards, which made Laurent Kabila's eldest son, Joseph Kabila, the new leader of DRC. His arrival eased a deep political stalemate. In this regard, his statements after he took power are significant, he insisted on "restoring peace and strengthening national communion", the relaunch of the Lusaka Agreement.

³⁸ Filip Reyntjens, *op.cit.*, p.249.

³⁹ Augusta Muchai, "Arms Proliferation and the Congo War", John F. Clark (ed.), *The African stakes of the Congo War*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 192.

⁴⁰ United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1258", 6 August 1999, *United Nations*, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/277529>.

⁴¹ Tatiana Carayannis, "The challenge of building sustainable peace in the DRC", *Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue*, July 2009, pp. 8-9.

He recanted his father's political discourse, stating the following priorities of the Congolese state: returning to democracy, organizing Inter-Congolese dialogue, and economic liberalization.⁴²

Joseph Kabila announced his intention to cooperate with Masire, which created the opportunity for the initiation of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in February 2002. From the very beginning, the peace process was marked by escalating tensions, as not all opposition parties were included, which drew criticism from the MLC and the unarmed opposition.

On April 19, 2002, an agreement was reached between the government, Bemba's MLC and most opposition parties, representatives of civil society and Mai Mai, RCD-Goma, and UDPS (Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social) - the historical party, led by Mobutu's rival, Etienne Tshisekedi.

On July 30, 2002, the DRC and Rwanda signed the Pretoria Agreement which stated the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DR Congo territory and the disarmament of Rwandan Hutu rebels operating in the DRC. The agreement largely covered the points set out in the Lusaka Agreement but accelerated the withdrawal of foreign forces from the DRC.⁴³ This was followed by a similar document, signed on September 6 between the DRC and Uganda, known as the Luanda Agreement.⁴⁴

The withdrawal of foreign troops, especially Rwandan troops, occurred without much incident, which was unexpected taking into consideration the

⁴² Filip Reyntjens, *op.cit.*, pp. 252-254.

⁴³ Pretoria Agreement (2002), *United Nations Peace Peacemaker*, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CD_021216_Global%20and%20Inclusive%20Agreement%20on%20Transition%20in%20DRC.pdf.

⁴⁴ Luanda Agreement (2002), *United Nations Peace Peacemaker*, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CD%20UG_020906_Luanda%20Agreement.pdf.

previous opposition and attempts to delay the withdrawal. International pressure was growing on the Rwandan political leadership; Rwanda was perceived as a spoiler of war, which is why it faced international isolation. Therefore, Rwanda had to show that it did not intend to obstruct the peace process.

At the end of 2002, a consensus was reached between the RDC, rebel groups and the political opposition, agreeing on the formation of a transitional national government. In 2003, the states involved in the peace process resumed talks at the Sun City meeting to address the remaining issues.⁴⁵ With the final act, the second Congo war officially ended.⁴⁶

The agreements reached between 1999 and 2003 were key points in the evolution of the peace process, addressing key issues for the reunification of the country. The official end of the war did not mean halting the hostilities in the eastern part of the DRC, where, after 2003, there was a worsening sexual violence situation, especially against women, and extended massacres of ethnic groups. The massacres in the eastern region have prompted the international community to deploy multinational emergency forces to the DRC. Being an EU-led operation, Operation Artemis has been launched under The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

In 2006, the EU conducted a second military mission, EUFOR. His mandate was to assist the Congolese police and army, as well as to the UN (MONUC) mission to democratize and make the electoral process more

⁴⁵ Sun City Final Act (2003), *United Nations Peace Peacemaker*, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CD_030402_SunCityAgreement.pdf.

⁴⁶ Kris Berwouts, *op.cit.*, pp. 47-48.

transparent.⁴⁷ Its role was to secure Kinshasa Airport, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, and carry out evacuation operations.⁴⁸

A violent peace. How viable is the peace process?

The transitional government was marked by multiple challenges, with two important processes being observed. First, there is the return of multinational companies to the DRC, with the gold and oil exploitation, especially in the northeastern part of the country. The second aspect was the incorporation of a significant number of rebel commanders into the Congolese army, the FARDC (Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo), many of whom participated in the atrocities and massacres during the war.

With the end of peace agreements, there was a threatening violence escalation, especially in the eastern Congo. In order to counterbalance this dynamic, MONUC's intervention increased considerably during the transition years, with the military force reaching a force of 11,500 soldiers. MONUC was one of the mainstays of the peace process, with UN peacekeeping and peacemaking forces fighting the structural instability in the eastern DRC, but aroused the almost unilateral animosity of groups in the area.⁴⁹

This widespread aversion against MONUC has led to the actual absence of the mission on the ground. Many times, the mission was missing when the violence took place. Another element that contributed to MONUC's negative image in the region was caused by cases of deviant behavior and criminal actions

⁴⁷ United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1736", 22 December 2006, *United Nations*, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/680/56/PDF/N0668056.pdf?OpenElement>

⁴⁸ Filip Reyntjens, *op.cit.*, pp. 272-273.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 49; Augusta Muchai, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

made by UN soldiers (sexual violence or involvement in natural resources-related illicit trade).⁵⁰

According to data provided by the UN (Conduct in UN Field Missions), between 2007 and April 2022, 1,183 complaints were registered against MONUC/MONUSCO staff regarding sexual exploitation and abuse. In more than half of the cases, the aggressors were part of the military staff of the UN mission. In terms of their nationality, most MONUC/MONUSCO soldiers accused of sexual exploitation and civilian abuse came from Cameroon, South Africa, Gabon, the DRC, Morocco, Burundi, and Tanzania.⁵¹

The lasting violence has been aggravated by the integration of various rebel groups and militias into the Congolese army. Hostilities took the form of local clashes between the FARDC and the RCD-Goma faction, hostilities in which hundreds of civilians were killed in 2003 alone – the year when the war ended. Widespread violence in the eastern DRC has created new dimensions of the culture of fear.⁵² Due to the particularly high rates of sexual violence caused by armed men, rape was perceived as a weapon or a war tactic used by various belligerents to destroy the social and psychological pillars of local communities and put an end to all forms of local resistance. Violence, massacres, and sexual abuse of civilians have had and continue to have a corrosive effect on social

⁵⁰ Marco Odello, "Tackling Criminal Acts in Peacekeeping Operations: The Accountability of Peacekeepers", *Journal of Conflict & Security Law*, Vol. 15 No. 2, 2010, pp. 350-351.

⁵¹ The data can be consulted on UN website, *Conduct in UN Field Missions*, <https://conduct.unmissions.org/sea-data-introduction>.

⁵² Chris Dolan, "War is not yet over. Community Perceptions of Sexual Violence and its Underpinnings in Eastern DRC", *International Alert*, 2010, pp. 20-23.

cohesion, directly attacking the most fundamental aspect of community life: the traditional kinship system.⁵³

Widespread violence in the East displaced 200,000 people in the villages and towns where they lived in 2004, hoping to find shelter in the forests of North and South Kivu provinces. Following the conclusion of the peace agreements, armed groups of ethnic Rwandans refused to return to Rwanda, preferring to settle in the provinces of Kivu. Ituri province in northeastern Congo continued to witness ongoing conflict.

In May 2005, the National Assembly adopted a new constitution, accepted by the former rebel groups, and the national elections were postponed until early 2006. Therefore, efforts to achieve peace and democratization have had a positive trajectory with legislative and local elections in 2006, which is, in fact, the final moment of the transition. But the end of the transition did not mean achieving inter-Congolese reconciliation but left unresolved several issues, which have continued until now.

One of the problems that the Congolese state still faces and that hinders the internal coherence of the state remains the problem of militias and rebel groups.⁵⁴ Some Mai-Mai groups continued to resist disarmament and integration into the national army. The activity of Rwandan Hutu fighters in the FDLR (The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) in Kivu provinces has had a negative impact on relations between Kinshasa and Kigali and has been a major security issue for civilians.⁵⁵ The return of thousands of the Congolese refugees

⁵³ "Ending the Deadlock...", p. 24.

⁵⁴ "Congo: bringing peace to North Kivu", *International Crisis Group*, Africa Report No. 133, 2007, pp. 2-4.

⁵⁵ "Ending the Deadlock...", p. 27.

fleeing to neighboring countries has also been problematic, acting as a catalyst for tensions between communities, especially in connection with land disputes.

In January 2008, the Congolese government signed a peace agreement in Goma with 22 armed groups, all sides agreeing to an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of forces from front positions, and the obligation to respect human rights. Following the signing, the Congolese government set up a peace program called the Amani Program, which coordinated peace efforts in eastern Congo. The agreement made no significant progress, and violence continued in the eastern provinces.⁵⁶

Following the 2006 elections, there have been multiple attempts to integrate rebel groups into the Congolese army, but as it has been seen earlier, this process has shown fundamental shortcomings, which has exacerbated the spiral of violence in the East. The integration of rebel groups has not meant a reduction in their numbers, with more than 130 active groups in eastern DRC.⁵⁷

Regarding the efforts of the UN peacekeeping mission, in 2010, MONUC was transformed into MONUSCO (the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo), to mark a new phase of the mission in the DRC, the main objectives being:

“(i) the completion of the ongoing military operations in the Kivus and Orientale Province, resulting in minimizing the threat of armed groups and restoring stability in sensitive areas,

⁵⁶ “DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: NORTH KIVU: NO END TO WAR ON WOMEN AND CHILDREN”, *Amnesty International*, 2008, p. 4.

⁵⁷ Claude Iguma Wakenge, Koen Vlassenroot, “Do Local Agreements Forge Peace? The Case of Eastern DRC”, *Congo Research Briefs*, Issue 5, 2020, p. 1.

(ii) an improved capacity of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to effectively protect the population through the establishment of sustainable security forces to progressively take over MONUSCO's security role,

(iii) the consolidation of State authority throughout the territory, through the deployment of the Congolese civil administration, in particular the police, territorial administration, and rule of law institutions in areas freed from armed groups."⁵⁸

However, the escalation of violence reached new heights in 2012, the main cause being the activity of the M-23 rebel movement. International efforts to restore peace and stability have been renewed, with peace talks initiated by SADC, and the International Brigade has been set up to neutralize several armed groups in the eastern provinces.⁵⁹ In 2013, *the Framework Agreement for Peace, Security, and Cooperation* was signed, with the signatories of the ICGLR (International Conference on the Great Lakes Region) African Union, SADC, and the United Nations. The agreement called for ending the foreign support to armed groups and encouraging a comprehensive reform of the Congolese institutions, a reform aimed primarily at the national army, police, and the judiciary.⁶⁰

In the coming years, there was a deteriorating situation in the eastern provinces of the DRC. In 2016, at least 42 mass graves were discovered in

⁵⁸ UN Security Council, "Resolution 1925", 28 May 2010, *United Nations*, [https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1925\(2010\)](https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1925(2010)).

⁵⁹ Jordi Calvo Rufanges; Josep Maria Royo Aspa, *op.cit.*, p. 8.

⁶⁰ Valerie Arnould, Koen Vlassenroot, "EU Policies in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Try and Fail?", *Security in Transition*, 2016, pp. 7-8.

Kansai,⁶¹ which has shown that interethnic reconciliation is a goal that has not yet become a reality.

Political tensions have risen since the end of President Joseph Kabila's 11-year term in 2016, making him the first democratically elected Congolese leader since independence. However, the end of Kabila's term did not mean a transfer of power to another leader, as Joseph Kabila refused to step down. Amid growing pressure, vocal opposition, and increasingly violent protests, Kabila withdrew in January 2019, followed at the leadership of the Congolese state by Félix Tshisekedi, the son of former Zaire Prime Minister Étienne Tshisekedi.

The political change of 2019 did not solve the structural problems of the DR Congo but proved to be an extension of the former ruling administrations. The fragile and apparent democracy suffered another blow with the introduction of the “congolité” law on July 8, 2021, which aimed to restrict the right to run for the presidency only for Congolese citizens with two Congolese parents.⁶² Given the ethnic mosaic in Congo, this deeply discriminatory legislative measure only sharpens identity competition, weakens the foundations of democracy, but also secures Tshisekedi's leadership from potential opponents.

The regional situation in the east continues to be extremely fragile, in 2019 being reported a rampant rate of violent incidents, especially in the provinces of North and South Kivu, Ituri and Tanganyika. According to statistics provided by *Kivu Security Tracker* for the regions of North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri, during

⁶¹ “DRC: Zeid calls for international investigation into massive human rights violations in Kasais”, *The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights*, June 9, 2017, <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21714&LangID=E>.

⁶² “Congo bill to limit presidential eligibility prompts backlash”, Reuters, July 9, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congo-bill-limit-presidential-eligibility-prompts-backlash-2021-07-09/>.

Tshisekedi's term as president, from January 2019 until April 2022, there were 6299 violent incidents and 13,714 casualties.⁶³ Comparing statistical evidence from the last few years, recent information provided by *Kivu Security Tracker* indicates an increase in violence and abuses in eastern Congo compared to previous years.

The last two years have created new humanitarian challenges. According to the *2022 Humanitarian Response Plan*, approximately 27 million people in the Democratic Republic of the Congo need humanitarian assistance in 2022.⁶⁴ The number of displaced people is close to 5.6 million, the highest number on the African continent, as a direct result of violent incidents against the civilian population. In the current context of flagrant violations of humanitarian law, the pandemic context has accelerated and aggravated the economic situation. Rising inflation and low incomes have decreased the access to basic resources.⁶⁵

As noted by UN Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights Nada Al-Nashif in her presentation on the current situation in Congo on March 29, 2022, there were some positive developments regarding the “implementation of transitional justice mechanisms throughout the DRC”, but the situation is far from being resolved. Human rights violations, widespread violence in the eastern part of the DRC, millions of civilians fleeing the affected areas, and underdeveloped infrastructure are some of the structural issues that need to be addressed to create internal stabilization.

⁶³ The data can be consulted on the *Kivu Security Tracker* website, <https://kivusecurity.org/>.

⁶⁴ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *République Démocratique du Congo Plan de Réponse Humanitaire 2022*, 2022, p. 5.

⁶⁵ „Humanitarian Crisis Analysis 2021 - Democratic Republic of Congo”, *Sida*, December 2020, <https://cdn.sida.se/app/uploads/2020/08/04090651/HCA-DRC-Crisis-2021.pdf>.

Conclusion

The provinces of the eastern DRC continue to be a battleground between various rebel groups and militias, and widespread violence remains an immediate danger. As for the civilians affected by the fighting, more than 80% of them considered in 2014 that the standard of living was the same or worse than during the wars.⁶⁶

The peace process in the DRC has made positive progress in stopping regional hostilities, but the international community is facing one of the deepest humanitarian crises today. Although during the Congolese transition, while international mediators managed to impose agreements at both regional and national levels, they failed to establish one at the sub-national level, at the local level.

Micro-rivalries in villages, cities, and provinces have not been fully understood by international actors, as these rivalries play a key role in supporting local, national, and regional violence after the official end of the conflict.

Moreover, analyzing the violent incidents of recent years, violence was the product of local actions, small groups that use tactics specific to an armed conflict, to achieve their goals (whether we are talking about the exploitation of resources or inter-community power struggle).

Another issue that should be on the international agenda for peace is the prospect of democratic governance. One year away from the 2023 presidential elections, it is essential to reform the legal system, which continues to be the

⁶⁶ Malokele Nanivazo, "Multidimensional Poverty in the Democratic Republic of Congo", *United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research*, 2014, <https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/multidimensional-poverty-democratic-republic-congo>.

victim of endemic corruption. Achieving positive results requires a political commitment to improving governance through increased economic transparency, fair taxation, decentralization, and local elections. This means abandoning illegal practices, clientelism, and widespread corruption that have profoundly marked Congolese political dynamics since independence.

The current crisis in Congo is a perfect example of the need for local intervention to treat the eastern part of the DRC as an ongoing area of conflict, destabilized and characterized by widespread violence. The mediation process ignored some of the most important actors in achieving genuine reconciliation, namely local authorities and civil society representatives. A broad dialogue between the parties involved and the relevant authorities influencing the local political dynamics underlying the land disputes in question becomes imperative. The peace process will not advance considerably, until a local consensus is reached at the level of local land management, especially concerning the return of refugees and displaced people.

Bibliography

Primary sources

Luanda Agreement (2002), United Nations Peace Peacemaker, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CD%20UG_020906_Luanda%20Agreement.pdf.

Lusaka Agreement (1999), United Nations Peace Peacemaker, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CD_030402_SunCityAgreement.pdf.

Pretoria Agreement (2002), United Nations Peace Peacemaker, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CD_021216_Global%20and%20Inclusive%20Agreement%20on%20Transition%20in%20DRC.pdf.

Sun City Final Act (2003), United Nations Peace Peacemaker, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CD_030402_SunCityAgreement.pdf.

UN Security Council, "Resolution 1925", 28 May 2010, United Nations, [https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1925\(2010\)](https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1925(2010)).

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *République Démocratique du Congo Plan de Réponse Humanitaire 2022*, 2022.

United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1258", 6 August 1999, United Nations, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/277529>.

United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1736", 22 December 2006, United Nations, <https://documentsddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/680/56/PDF/N0668056.pdf?OpenElement>.

Secondary Sources

Alessi, Christopher. "Congo's Weak Peace Process", December 6, 2012, *Council on Foreign Relations*, <https://www.cfr.org/interview/congos-weak-peace-process>.

Anthony, Gambino. "Congo: Securing Peace, Sustaining Progress", *Council on Foreign Press, Center for Preventive Action*, 2008.

Arnould, Valerie; Vlassenroot, Koen, "EU Policies in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Try and Fail?", *Security in Transition*, 2016.

Autesserre, Severine. "Dangerous Tales: Dominant Narratives on the Congo and their Unintended Consequences", *African Affairs*, 2012.

Autesserre, Séverine. *The Trouble with the Congo. Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Baregu, Mwesiga. "The Clones of 'Mr. Kurtz': Violence, War and Plunder in the DRC", *African Association of Political Science*, Vol.7, No.2, 2002.

Bernd Michael Wiese, Ntsomo Payanzo and Others, "Democratic Republic of the Congo", *Encyclopedia Britannica*, September 11, 2020, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Democratic-Republic-of-the-Congo>.

Berwouts, Kris. *Congo's Violent Peace. Conflict and Struggle Since the Great African War*, London, Zed Books, 2017.

Carayannis, Tatiana, "The challenge of building sustainable peace in the DRC", *Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue*, July 2009.

Clark, John F. (ed.) *The African Stakes of the Congo War*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

CONGO AT WAR. A Briefing on the Internal and External Players in the Central African Conflict", *International Crisis Group*, 1998.

Congo bill to limit presidential eligibility prompts backlash", Reuters, July 9, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congo-bill-limit-presidential-eligibility-prompts-backlash-2021-07-09/>.

Congo: bringing peace to North Kivu", *International Crisis Group*, Africa Report No. 133, 2007.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: NORTH KIVU: NO END TO WAR ON WOMEN AND CHILDREN", *Amnesty International*, 2008.

Dolan, Chris, "War is not yet over. Community Perceptions of Sexual Violence and its Underpinnings in Eastern DRC", *International Alert*, 2010.

DRC: Zeid calls for an international investigation into massive human rights violations in Kasais", *The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights*, June 9, 2017,

<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21714&LangID=E>.

DRC: Zimbabwe says SADC to back Kabila", *The New Humanitarian*, 19 August 1998, <https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/drc-zimbabwe-says-sadc-back-kabila>.

Ending the Deadlock: Towards a New Vision of Peace in Eastern DRC", *International Alert*, 2012.

Erik Kennes, "A Road not Taken? The Biography of Laurent Kabila (1939–2001)", in Klaas van Walraven (ed.), *The Individual in African History. The Importance of Biography in African Historical Studies*, Leiden, Brill, 2020.

Grasa, Rafael; Mateos, Oscar. *Conflict, Peace, and Security in Africa: an Assessment and New Questions After 50 Years of African Independence*, Institut Català Internacional per la Pau, 2010.

Herbert Weiss, "War and Peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo", *Current African Issues*, No.22, 2000.

Humanitarian Crisis Analysis 2021 - Democratic Republic of Congo", *Sida*, December 2020,

<https://cdn.sida.se/app/uploads/2020/08/04090651/HCA-DRC-Crisis-2021.pdf>.

Karlsrud, John. "The UN at war: examining the consequences of peace-enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.36, No.1, 2015.

Labda, Amani. "Joint evaluation of conflict prevention and peace building in the Democratic Republic of Congo", *FPS Foreign Trade and Cooperation*, 2011.

Malokele Nanivazo, "Multidimensional Poverty in the Democratic Republic of Congo", *United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research*, 2014, <https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/multidimensional-poverty-democratic-republic-congo>.

Muchai, Augusta. "Arms Proliferation and the Congo War", John F. Clark (ed.), *The African stakes of the Congo War*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p.192.

Nanivazo, Malokele. "Multidimensional Poverty in the Democratic Republic of Congo", *United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research*, 2014, <https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/multidimensional-poverty-democratic-republic-congo>.

Obala, Luke M. "The Search for Elusive Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo", *ALJAZEERA Centre for Studies*, December 30, 2015, <https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2015/12/2015123012395190687.html>.

Odello, Marco. "Tackling Criminal Acts in Peacekeeping Operations: The Accountability of Peacekeepers", *Journal of Conflict & Security Law*, Vol. 15 No. 2, 2010.

Prunier, Gérard. *Africa's world war: Congo, the Rwandan genocide, and the making of a continental catastrophe*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2008.

Renton, David; Seddon, David; Zeilig, Leo. *The Congo. Plunder & Resistance*, London, Zed Books, 2007.

Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory

- of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003”, The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2010.
- Reyntjens, Filip. *The Great African War. Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Rufanges, Jordi Calvo; Aspa, Josep Maria Royo. “DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: A REVIEW OF 20 YEARS OF WAR”, *Escola de Cultura de Pau*, 2016.
- Tull Denis, *The Reconfiguration of Political Order in Africa: A Case Study of North Kivu (DR Congo)*, Hamburg African Studies, Institute of African Affairs, 2005.
- Turner Thomas, *The Congo Wars: conflict, myth & reality*, Zed Books, 2007.
- Wakenge, Claude Iguma; Vlassenroot, Koen, “Do Local Agreements Forge Peace? The Case of Eastern DRC”, *Congo Research Briefs*, Issue 5, 2020.
- Willis, Terri. *The Democratic Republic of the Congo*, United States, Children’s Press, 2004.

Donald Trump and the Iran Nuclear Deal: what is the future of the deal? A key issue concerning worldwide security

Anis Ghet *

Keywords: United States, Donald Trump, Iran, Nuclear Deal, Middle East.

Abstract

Withdrawing from international agreements and criticizing them were perhaps the most significant aspects of former President Donald Trump's administration, as it put the international community in the middle of global dilemmas by challenging international resolutions, references, and efforts, moreover, it also reflected poorly on the global nation's confidence towards US foreign policy. This article identifies and analyzes the most critical stages of the United States' decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear agreement within the Trump era, including its current international ramifications, all of which have recognized Iran's commitment to the agreement, and thus the risk of destabilizing regional security and stability, along with increasing the pace of the nuclear race, taking into consideration the development of the Iran nuclear program since then.

Introduction

Since the mid-1980s, Israel, the United States, and other Western powers have accused Iran of pursuing the development of nuclear capabilities for

* Ph.D student at National University of Political Studies and Public Administration.

military purposes. Iranian officials have categorically denied the allegations, saying their nuclear program was designed for civilian purposes only. The spiral of accusations, on the one hand, and denials, on the other, intensified at the beginning of the 21st century with the discovery of previously unknown Iranian nuclear activities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Union (EU) have been involved in lengthy negotiations with Iran to ensure compliance with the commitments of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In short, the Iranian case was one of the most serious challenges of the NPT protocol.

For two decades, Iran has invested substantial human and financial resources in its nuclear program. In addition to relying on foreign technology, materials, and equipment, Iran has also developed indigenous nuclear expertise. This technological know-how could not only be taken from Iran. At the time, it was very likely that Iran would maintain a certain level of nuclear infrastructure. On the other hand, the decision-makers of the great powers considered that a strategy that could successfully address Iran's nuclear ambitions would have to address both supplier issues and the needs of the nuclear equation. Putting pressure on foreign governments and companies to end their cooperation with Tehran was not enough. Iran's security issues also needed to be addressed. Improving the security environment in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East would have substantially reduced Tehran's incentives to exercise its nuclear capabilities. Such an approach required close cooperation between all major global powers - the United States, the EU, Russia, and China.

Although there were differences between international intelligence agencies regarding the state of Iran's nuclear development, the fact that Iran had

not yet developed a nuclear weapon was a common denominator. Thus, despite the rhetoric, Western decision-makers considered it time to reach a compromise. A satisfactory and peaceful agreement with Tehran would have improved the security environment in the Middle East and strengthened the global non-proliferation regime.

But the road to the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed on July 14, 2015, in Vienna, would be long and difficult, with the main obstacles coming mainly from Washington, in the first stage, combined with the ambitions of ultra-conservative leaders in Tehran.

In the context of the early 21st century, the Bush administration was ready to take preemptive action against a regime considered threatening, so Iranian mullahs, who knew that the United States had significant military capability capable of destroying Iranian nuclear facilities in less than 48 hours, they had become concerned. Washington was also feeling uneasy, especially in the absence of any signs of change in Tehran's nuclear policy. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the small Gulf states, but especially Israel, were the regional players who expected certain security guarantees from the US administration. Regardless of the guarantees offered by the American security umbrella, the full development of Iran's nuclear program could have threatened Europe, Russia, and even the United States in the end.

In light of these considerations, it was becoming increasingly clear that steps needed to be taken to slow down, or even stop Iran's nuclear program. After long negotiations and an extremely difficult journey, in 2015, during the Obama administration, the JCPOA was signed in Vienna. This article presents a cursory foundation to the history of the Iranian nuclear program, continuing

with an overview of the US-Iran relationship, including the prospects for this relationship during the new administration.

Barack Obama has built a strategy for the Middle East designed to repair the damage done during George W. Bush's presidency. The United States wanted to rest a fatigued army, rebuild its diminished force, and provide political flexibility to confront long-term concerns. To that end, it has reduced troops in Iraq, avoided further large-scale military intervention, called on the Allies to take more responsibility for regional security, and for the most part sought to address diplomatic issues. He used a combination of commitment and sanctions to induce Iran to cease its nuclear weapons and sought to promote peace between Israelis and Palestinians, approaches approved by the international community - including a two-state solution, flexibility on the status of East Jerusalem, and stopping the expansion of Israeli settlements on Palestinian territory. Contrary to allies such as Saudi Arabia, Obama has also encouraged democratic reforms in the region, albeit inconsistently and with little success, and has clearly avoided favoring any part of the Sunni-Shiite division.

Donald Trump has adopted a different approach, as he pledged throughout the 2016 campaign. Certainly, there were concerns about continuity. The president encouraged allies to accept more of the regional security burden and resisted the temptation to deploy a significant amount of soldiers to Syria and other areas, as well as Obama, supporting Saudi Arabia's involvement in Yemen. From a critical standpoint, he deviated from his predecessor's policies. Relations with Riyadh have improved tremendously since the Obama administration when the US and Saudi administrations were at the edge. Similarly, improving ties with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who

suffered during Obama's tenure, was a priority. Trump withdrew from the 2015 agreement to reduce Iran's nuclear weapons - officially known as the JCPOA - and reinstated sanctions on Tehran. President Trump has refused to recognise Iran's commitment to the nuclear agreement, calling it among the worst deals in US history and emphasizing that Tehran is not honoring its commitments, and he has ordered the US Treasury to put penalties on the Revolutionary Guard. According to him, the US President has revealed a policy to deal with Iranian actions, including working with US partners to fight Tehran's disruptive and terrorist-supporting operations in the area, as well as imposing additional sanctions on the regime to eliminate its terrorist financing.¹

A summary overview of events

On July 14, 2015, Iran reached a historic agreement with six major global states to freeze the progress of its nuclear program, following a decade of constant expansion and years of negotiations. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) remarkably decreased Iran's recognized nuclear potential in exchange for embargo reassurance. Under the provisions of the deal, Iran has agreed to remove thousands of uranium-enriching centrifuges, ship tons of low-enriched uranium to Russia, demolish the core of a heavy water reactor capable of producing plutonium, and reconfigure the reactor to produce less plutonium. If Iran hadn't taken unlawful actions, it might have built the fuel for a nuclear weapon in as short as a few months before the agreement. Additionally, Iran has

¹ *OUTLAW REGIME: A CHRONICLE OF IRAN'S DESTRUCTIVE ACTIVITIES* 2020 Edition, Iran Action Group - U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, accessed January 3, 2022, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Outlaw-Regime-2020-A-Chronicle-of-Irans-Destabilizing-Activity.pdf>

claimed that it will not expand its capacity far off its contemporaneous stage for at least a decade.

Iran alongside the P5+1 (France, United Kingdom, Germany, Russia, China, and the United States) signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a 159-page agreement with five annexes.² On July 20, 2015, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 2231³, endorsing the nuclear deal. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verifies Iran's compliance with the JCPOA's nuclear-related clauses in accordance with the agreement's conditions. The agreement's main objective is to decrease Iran's nuclear program and strengthen surveillance in exchange for relief from nuclear sanctions. Prior to it, Iran had spent more than two decades attempting to obtain the technology to develop nuclear weapons. Although it was unclear if Tehran would have made the ultimate choice to manufacture nuclear weapons, it had developed several technologies, including uranium enrichment, warhead design, and delivery systems, that would allow it to do so in a relatively short period of time. Tehran insists that its nuclear program is absolutely peaceful. Years of controversy and international action around Iran's nuclear program culminated in the JCPOA. When an exiled Iranian resistance group announced the existence of two nuclear sites in the summer of 2002, international interest in Iran soared. Within a year, the world realized that Iran had created or was in the process of creating everything required to manufacture enriched uranium, which could be used to fuel nuclear weapons as well as nuclear reactors. A uranium mine in Saghand, a

² *Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action*, Vienna, 14 July 2015, accessed January 5, 2022, <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/122460/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal.pdf>

³ *Resolution 2231 on Iran Nuclear Issue*, Adopted by the Security Council at its 7488th meeting, on 20 July 2015, accessed January 5, 2022, <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2231>

yellow cake production plant near Ardakan, a prototype uranium enrichment plant at Natanz, and a commercial-scale enrichment facility on the same site were among the sites. Furthermore, Iran was continuing construction on a 1,000-megawatt nuclear reactor at Bushehr and was constructing a heavy water production plant at Arak, next to which Iran planned to construct a 40-megawatt heavy water reactor.⁴ Succeeding allegations that Iran had obscured nuclear enlargement from the Agency, the IAEA started evaluating Iranian nuclear formerly in 2003. The IAEA was in charge of monitoring and verifying the JCPOA's nuclear-related clauses.

Iran has long argued that its nuclear program is benign, legal, and sanctioned by its status as a non-nuclear-weapon state under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which grants its signatories the ability to produce nuclear energy for peaceful purposes⁵. The US, on the other hand, claimed that Iran has no need for nuclear energy and that its civilian energy program is really a cover for the development of nuclear weapons. The JCPOA deviates from this position by permitting Iran to establish a commercial-scale uranium enrichment program after the first ten years of the agreement.

The JCPOA in Trump's Era

The initial attempts made by former president Barack Obama, who took office in 2009, to alter U.S.-Iranian ties were ineffective, owing chiefly to Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's, refusal to negotiate with the US.

⁴ Congressional Research Service, *Iran's Nuclear Program*, accessed January 10, 2022, <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/nuke/RL34544.pdf>, pp. 17-20.

⁵ *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)*, accessed January 10, 2022, <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text>

Obama also formed an international coalition to counter Iran's nuclear aspirations, leading a series of multilateral and unilateral economic sanctions against the country. Meanwhile, Obama launched backchannel discussions through Omani mediators, which resulted in the signature of the nuclear deal in 2015. However, it was not until Hassan Rouhani, Iran's president since 2013, and the development of pragmatic forces in the same year that Obama discovered a pro-engagement administration in Tehran. Iranians elected Rouhani's reformist supporters to the Majlis in 2016, reinforcing his pro-engagement agenda with the West.

From 2013 to 2016, there was still a positive tone in US-Iranian relations, reminiscent of the Clinton era, when both Obama and Rouhani acknowledged the importance of direct connection. This recognition created a little window of opportunity for the nations to directly interact at the highest standards, which helped to reduce tensions between them. The significance of Rouhani's pragmatic approach toward Iran's international relations, as well as Obama's recognition that Iran could not be dismissed from regional considerations, should not be underestimated in this context. Obama's departure, on the other hand, crushed prospects for closer ties between the two capitals.

Donald Trump's presidency began at a time when Tehran and Washington were implicitly coordinating in the battle against ISIS, and the Iran nuclear agreement had reduced the risk of a regional conflict in the Middle East. Nonetheless, citing the agreement's flaws, the Trump administration withdrew unilaterally from it and re-imposed economic sanctions on Iran in pursuit of an improved deal. Thus far, the enhanced interrogation of the Iranian economy has

not only failed to achieve its intended aims, but has rather exacerbated the Middle East's instability and fueled Iran's nuclear program.

Both Republican and Democratic presidents of the United States have attempted to reach out to Tehran for a strategic opening during the previous four decades. It indicates that US-Iran relations are out of pace, in the context that American presidents seeking to build bridges with Iran have indeed been hindered by the policies of their predecessors, who advocated a more confrontational stance. Furthermore, it appears that Washington's Iran advocates, who embrace a vision of US-Iranian relations, are supporting their ideological allies in Iran in controlling the few elected bodies of the Iranian polity, making relaxation of strained relations even less probable. This helps to explain why Iran and the United States are trapped in a vicious loop of squandered opportunities.

Since the Trump administration announced its withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018, Iranian officials have persistently opposed renegotiating the agreement or adopting a new treaty. Tehran has also made its continuing commitment to the JCPOA contingent on receiving benefits from the other JCPOA parties, known as the P4+1. Mohammad Javad Zarif, an Iranian government minister, stated on May 10, 2018, that in order for the deal to proceed, the remaining JCPOA participants, and thus the international community, must completely ensure that Iran is unconditionally repaid through appropriate national, regional, and global measures.⁶ He continued by stating that Iran decided to use the JCPOA mechanism, the Joint Commission

⁶ Letter dated 11 May 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, General Assembly Security Council, accessed January 12, 2022, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2018_453.pdf

established by the agreement, to seek solutions to the United States' multiple cases of serious non-performance and illegal withdrawal, as well as to determine whether and how the remaining JCPOA participants and other economic partners can ensure that the Iranian people receive the full benefits which they are entitled to derive from this global diplomatic accomplishment. Before the JCPOA, Tehran also committed to rebuild and relaunch the country's nuclear projects. Numerous sessions of the Joint Commission convened under the JCPOA following the US pullout did not contribute to a firm Iranian commitment to the accord. Tehran claims that the other JCPOA signatories' efforts are insufficient to preserve the agreement's benefits for Iran. Iran stated in letters to the opposite JCPOA participants on May 8, 2019, that as of that day, Tehran has suspended some JCPOA actions, however, the regime stressed that it was not resigning from the accord. Iranian officials expressly said that the government will not remove low-enriched uranium (LEU) or deuterium oxide from the country in aim to maintain stockpiles below the JCPOA-mandated limitations. According to a press release published by Iran's Supreme National Security Council on May 8, 2019, Iran is no longer committed to adhering to the JCPOA-mandated constraints on LEU and moderator stocks.⁷

Beginning in July 2019, the International Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that certain of Iran's nuclear operations exceeded the JCPOA's specified limitations and the Iranian government has subsequently expanded the amount of such activities. Consistent with IAEA reports, Iran has violated JCPOA-mandated restrictions on its moderator stockpile, the amount of

⁷ *Iran Sanctions*, Congressional Research Service, accessed January 12, 2022, <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf>

centrifuges installed in Iran's pilot enrichment facility, Iran's LEU stockpile, and also the percentage of the key fissile isotope uranium within the LEU. Furthermore, Tehran is engaging in JCPOA-prohibited research and development, likewise as centrifuge manufacture, and has begun enriching uranium at its Fordow enrichment plant.⁸ Towards a January 5, 2020 announcement, the Iranian government declared the fifth and last stage in decreasing Tehran's JCPOA obligations, stating that Tehran will put aside the ultimate operational limits under the JCPOA, which is the restriction on the quantity of centrifuges. The statement made no specific adjustments to Iran's nuclear program, although the phrase restrictions might relate to the JCPOA-mandated limits on installed centrifuges at the country's commercial enrichment plan. Iran has not breached these restrictions, in keeping with a March report from the IAEA Director General consistent with the January 5 release, if that sanctions are lifted and Iran benefits from the JCPOA, Iran is able to resume its responsibilities under the deal. During a speech on May 6, Iranian President, Hassan Rouhani, described Tehran's actions as a withdrawal from the government's JCPOA commitments on an equal scale.⁹ He further said that if the US and the P5+1 can uphold their full commitments under the JCPOA, Iran would return to the agreement on the same day. According to a May 6 report, Iran's Permanent Representative to the IAEA, Kazem Gharibabdi, declared that if the US and P4+1 proceed to act in a manner that undermines the JCPOA, Iran may limit or terminate its cooperation with the IAEA.

⁸ *The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) at a Glance*, accessed January 16, 2022, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/JCPOA-at-a-glance>

⁹ *President Rouhani Warns the U.S. of 'Historic Regret' if President Trump Exits the Iran Nuclear Deal*, accessed January 16, 2022: <https://time.com/5267433/donald-trump-iran-nuclear-deal-regret-rouhani/>

According to news reports and US authorities in early December 2019, Iran was delivering short-range missiles to allied troops inside Iraq. In mid-December 2019, a series of fire assaults targeted Iraqi military installations where US soldiers are stationed. Secretary Pompeo responded by stating, "We must also use this as an opportunity to inform Iran's leaders that any assaults by them, or their proxies of any type, that hurt Americans, our friends, or our interests are going to be met with a forceful U.S. reaction."¹⁰ A rocket strike on a base in Kirkuk in northern Iraq on December 27, 2019, killed a US contractor and injured four US service personnel and two Iraqi military members. Two days later, the US launched retaliatory strikes on five facilities employed by the Iran-backed Iraqi armed organization Kata'ib Hezbollah (KH), a US-designated Foreign FTO to whom the incident was ascribed. Abu Mahdi al Muhandis, head of the KH and a key player within the Iraqi-state aligned Popular Mobilization Forces, announced dozens of fighters had been killed or injured and pledged a very harsh retaliation to US forces in Iraq.

When Trump followed through on a vow to withdraw the US from the 2015 international deal limiting Iran's uranium enrichment program in May 2018, Tehran first reacted with strategic patience. However, when European efforts to keep the agreement afloat failed to provide any relief from the US' "highest pressure" viewpoint, and as Washington's approach became progressively antagonistic, Iran reversed its manners.

Starting in early 2019, Iran progressively revealed a series of what it called reversible violations of its nuclear accord obligations, such as exceeding limits on

¹⁰ *Pompeo warns of 'decisive US response' if Iran harms US troops or allies*, accessed January 16, 2022, <https://www.militarytimes.com/newsletters/daily-news-roundup/2019/12/13/pompeo-warns-of-decisive-us-response-if-iran-harms-us-troops-or-allies/>

its enriched uranium stockpile and enrichment level. Iran recently terminated its Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency, a supplementary agreement that provided the nuclear group of inspectors with even more stringent techniques to monitor every stage of Iran's nuclear program than the agency's core supervisory agreement.

Parallel to this willingness to establish pressure on the Trump administration over the nuclear deal, Iran began to elevate military tensions with the United States in mid-2019. Following a series of raids on oil tankers in the Gulf of Oman that was blamed on Tehran, Iranian soldiers shot down a pilotless US drone that they claimed was flying on Iranian territory. Later that year, the US and Saudi Arabia accused Iran of attacking Saudi oil facilities using a drone and cruise missile.

In early January 2020, the events escalated. Following a string of violent incidents in Iraq involving Iranian-backed Shiite militias and US forces, Trump approved a drone operation that killed Iran's top military commander, General Qassem Soleimani, as he landed in Baghdad. Both parties subsequently backed down from the threat of escalation, but without settling their core disagreements.

Trump's re-imposition of US sanctions on trade with Iran spurred governments and corporations from Europe to the Asian area to divide connections with Tehran, demolishing the flood on Iranian oil exports precisely. Iran's social and political tensions have intensified as a result of the country's domestic economic decrease. However, rather than modifying the regime's behavior, greater US pressure appears to have bolstered the power of hardliners in Tehran, who emerged as the biggest winners in the February 2020 parliamentary elections.

Supporters of the Iran nuclear deal in Washington and Europe expected the Biden administration to quickly put the US back into compliance with the agreement by eliminating unilateral sanctions, while also holding follow-up dialogues to address Iran's missile program and regional behavior. However, discussions in Vienna to revive the JCPOA have been more challenging than expected, even as opponents of the accord in the US and Iran—as well as Israel, which has been embroiled in what amounts to a low-level covert war with Iran over the last year—consider their alternatives. And the outcome of Iran's presidential election in June 2020, which was won by conservative hardliner Ebrahim Raisi, has already created fresh obstacles.

The weakening of US-Iran relations corresponds with Iran and Saudi Arabia's struggle for regional domination, which includes proxy conflicts in Yemen and Syria, along with strategic competition in Lebanon and, more lately, Iraq. Both countries have recently had exploratory talks to calm tensions. Moreover, the Iranian people are increasingly trapped between the pressures of US sanctions and the persecution of an authoritarian regime in Tehran that is eager to expand its power and influence across the region at any cost to its own people.

The Nuclear Deal expectation and posterity after Trump's administration

A new Biden administration will have to confront the country's deep alienation as well as the country's position in foreign affairs. In the case of Iran, there is every reason to assume that a Biden presidency will return to a dialogue-based approach. During his time as vice president, the Iran deal was the

administration's crowning foreign policy achievement. Nevertheless, Biden has stated numerous times that the decision to abandon the agreement was a grievous mistake, and he precisely predicted in 2017 that breaking from the accord would isolate the US rather than Iran.

None of this is to imply that the route to return will be straightforward, and former President Trump has declared unambiguously that it will continue to impose sanctions in order to undermine Biden's ability to return to the deal. With Biden, though, the future of US-Iran relations may resemble the bright days of the JCPOA discussions.

The United States is at a crossroads, much as it was after 9/11, but this time with the added difficulty of an internal test of its democracy. Trump's despicable attempt to destroy the fundamental foundations of American democracy reflects his administration's efforts to weaken global diplomacy. The United States will undoubtedly play a significant part in defining this century as the world's main superpower—a status that may be embraced due to its international community's inability to maintain the US accountable for its actions.

The success or failure of the JCPOA, the framework of which is still in place and which Iran has already communicated to President-elect Biden, will define US-Iran relations in the next years. Biden is now required to choose between a path of peace and diplomacy and one of turmoil and aggression. How he decides to go with Iran might serve as a paradigm for US leadership in general, as well as the future of the global partnership.

The United States may either use its influence to lead the world into a new age of global cooperation and human relationships that acknowledge and combat existential threats such as climate change and nuclear proliferation, or it

can continue to flaunt its power and create more conflict. Without a significant adjustment in approach toward Iran, the risk of another catastrophic confrontation grows exponentially. One thing is certain: the entrance of a Biden administration brought renewed hope for political negotiations and stability.

The Biden administration took over an escalating and difficult bilateral relationship with Iran. For the past two years, Iran's military forces and affiliated militias have sought to disrupt global energy supplies, have assaulted Saudi Arabia with cruise missiles and drones, and therefore have relied on Iraqi militias to obstruct US military operations. The Biden administration has a motivation to end the cycle, it is however under pressure to impose significant costs on Iran in terms of maintaining deterrence. This strategy is founded on the premise that military strength may impose costs, preventing Tehran from using the approach to ensure its geopolitical interests.

To successfully prevent, the United States must acknowledge that its weapon of persuasive credibility, including the political restrictions placed on the use of force, are insufficient to dissuade Iran from taking coercive measures. The US will neither undertake a land war in Iran nor will it unleash the type of air attack necessary to seriously affect the Islamic Republic's military. Instead, Washington has chosen restrictions, which do inflict a cost on the Iranian government but have a poor track record of influencing Iranian activity, whether it is related to its nuclear program or domestic politics. By pursuing Soleimani for the operations of a militia he indirectly controlled, the Trump administration sought to enhance the legitimacy of US intervention by overtly associating Iran to its affiliates in Iraq. This operation definitely had an impact on Iranian authorities, however, the strike actually occurred within Iraq, and the US did

nothing after the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) fired missiles at American forces. This self-imposed restriction means that the United States will not expand its operations inside Iran. Up to this point, the Biden presidency has adopted a similar strategy: striking a target in Syria in response to an attack in Iraq that is associated to Iran and therefore does not originate in Iraq. This policy is more conservative than the ones pursued by Trump, owing to the fact that previous assaults within Iraq led in significant domestic opposition to US soldiers, and the current administration would prefer to preserve a US and allied presence to build strength Iraqi Security Forces.¹¹ This policy tries to reduce Iranian influence by establishing more professional institutions within Iraq, rather than adopting steps that would incite pro-Iranian political elements who would take any chance to encourage the civilian government to expel US soldiers from the nation.

The Iranians have not retreated particularly in the face of these attempts. Instead, its military units and militias responded to the Biden team's operation with their own military strike on an Israeli ship in the Gulf of Oman, an escalation in the launch of ballistic missiles against Saudi Arabia from Yemeni bases, and the most recent rocket attack in Iraq. Tehran has projected that Washington would not hit targets in Tehran, therefore any of that kind operation, however improbable, would be limited in scope and would not culminate in the removal of the regime's fundamental foundations. Iran can reduce this risk by acting directly, through intermediaries, or by refusing to take attribution for its military activities. Finally, this approach is two-tiered. Iran's assaults on Saudi

¹¹ *U.S. airstrikes target Iran-backed militias in Syria in Biden's 1st military action*, accessed February 15, 2022, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/syria-us-airstrikes-iranian-militia-target/>

Arabia are intended to intimidate a regional US partner in exchange for Riyadh's support for Washington, and perhaps to demonstrate to Riyadh that Washington is not a reliable ally. The goal is to separate Riyadh from Washington, granting Iran more power to drive Washington out of the region and then deal with the Gulf Arab governments from a position of strength. As Iran's confrontational conduct grows, Gulf Arab nations' ties to Washington have only grown stronger, despite the region's monarchs' dissatisfaction with the current status quo.

Given this premise, and assuming that Washington's coercive strength is inadequate to enforce a regime-threatening expense on Iran, the United States should explore an alternative solution. In the lack of genuine coercive authority, Washington should suggest to Tehran that cooperation would be beneficial. This advantage would not need to be complicated, rather, it should focus on the fundamental assumption of the nuclear deal: sanctions relief. This plan would prioritize returning to the JCPOA as a means of de-escalating tensions with Iran. It would prepare the path for Iran to comply with a succession of nuclear agreements, exploit the decrease in tensions to promote regional security and offer Iran an opportunity for positive conduct. To do this, Washington must emphasize direct, bilateral talks with Iran.

It is almost certain that in response to the current rocket attack, the desire for military action will increase, and debates will actually occur on where and whose groups to aim. These disagreements are over strategy and will not decide Iranian action in the future. A successful strategy must outline the real benefits of de-escalation, rather than attempting to prove that such action would keep the country safe from attack, as well as provide the foundation for reciprocal advantages from further cooperation. This is how to effectively discourage, and it

is essential to bring this technique in an attempt to terminate the tit-for-tat loop, which serves neither party.

Conclusions

The JCPOA is a historic deal aimed at limiting Tehran's expanding nuclear program. Iran, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China signed the agreement in 2015. The agreement was attacked by US Middle East partners, notably Gulf Arab nations and Israel, who voiced dissatisfaction with the fact that they were not contacted or included in the discussions. These states have remained staunchly opposed to the accord. The agreement focuses on important parts of Iran's nuclear program in order to limit its nuclear capabilities and cut the time it would take Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon to at least one year.

The JCPOA has three major criticisms. First, under the accord, Iran kept the freedom to pursue centrifuge research and development. Second, the agreement exempted Tehran from sanctions aimed at its missile program, regional actions, and nuclear advancement. The JCPOA exclusively addressed the nuclear program, neglecting the other two issues. Finally, various aspects of the agreement contained sunset provisions ranging from six to thirteen years, making it far from a permanent solution.

On May 8, four years ago, Donald Trump officially resigned from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also referred to as the Iran nuclear deal, while reiterating that it is US policy that Iran be refused a nuclear weapon

and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Since then, the Trump Administration has unilaterally re-imposed devastating sanctions on Iran, antagonizing our friends by requiring them to cooperate or suffer financial isolation. They have also sacrificed precious time by seeking to unravel the Iran nuclear deal rather than engaging in diplomacy to address its concerns. Currently, the United States is rushing to react to the impending expiration of a United Nations (UN) weapons embargo related to the nuclear accord.

In retribution for the Trump Administration's decision to withdraw from the JCPOA, Iran moved back from compliance one year later — beginning in May 2019 — and the allies have rejected demands to punish Iran for its genuine concerns. Because of the Trump Administration's actions, Iran's closeness to nuclear weapon capability has progressively risen, and Iran is now around six months away from possessing enough weapons-grade fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Iran was approximately a year away from reaching that milestone when President Trump entered office. Fundamentally, the Trump Administration's withdrawal from the JCPOA and "maximum pressure" campaign have not forged ahead of the US any far from its disclosed purposes.

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated during a discussion of the Trump administration's stance toward Iran that the US will "ensure Iran will have no route to a nuclear weapon - not for now, not really ever."¹² There are two methods for obtaining weapons-grade fissile material for a nuclear weapon: enriching uranium-235 to 90% purity or higher and separating plutonium. The JCPOA prohibited Iran from enriching uranium above 3.67 percent until 2030,

¹² *After the Deal: A New Iran Strategy*, accessed February 18, 2022, <https://www.heritage.org/defense/event/after-the-deal-new-iran-strategy>

but Iran is enriching uranium to higher purity and growing its stockpile in reaction to US breaches.¹³

The JCPOA also prevented Iran from accumulating plutonium. This was especially significant because plutonium is the favored fissile material of the other nuclear-armed powers. Surprisingly, the Trump Administration clearly values the JCPOA's plutonium-related constraints, since it frequently grants exemptions to the United Kingdom and China to modernize Iran's heavy water reactor at Arak. The Arak reactor, as originally planned, might have produced enough plutonium from spent fuel to power one or two nuclear weapons each year.

"Once the time on the agreement's validity conditions expires, Iran will be liberated to race to the bomb, igniting a potentially deadly armaments race in the area," Secretary Pompeo said.¹⁴ First of all, Iran will never be free to seek nuclear weapons as long as it is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT was the legal basis for the sanctions that brought Iran to the bargaining table in the first place. Second, Iran is now following the IAEA's Additional Protocol, which considerably improves international nuclear inspectors' ability to hunt for covert projects. According to the rules of the JCPOA, Iran is expected to ratify the Additional Protocol indefinitely in 2023. Furthermore, if the Trump administration was concerned about the JCPOA's fixed terms clauses, attempting to modify the deal appears to be less difficult than tearing it down and beginning again. Because Egypt, Iran, and Israel are all

¹³ IAEA Report on Iran Raises Serious Concerns About Monitoring, accessed February 18, 2022, <https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2021-09-08/iaea-report-iran-raises-serious-concerns>

¹⁴ *After the Deal: A New Iran Strategy*, accessed February 21, 2022, <https://www.heritage.org/defense/event/after-the-deal-new-iran-strategy>

parties to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Trump administration might have pushed for discussions on a testing embargo or regional accession to the treaty. Either choice would have reduced the region's proliferation dangers.

The Trump Administration's last criticism of the JCPOA served even less to address Iran's continued development of ballistic and cruise missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. While the JCPOA was mainly focused on Iran's nuclear program, UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which approves and aids in the implementation of the JCPOA, directs Iran not to engage in any activity linked to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons until 2023.¹⁵ Iran's compliance with this condition is questionable, despite the fact that it is not legally enforceable, but the Trump Administration did not pursue discussions to address its concerns.

It is significant that the first successful launch of a military satellite by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, rather than the Iranian Space Agency, occurred. As a consequence, Israel and India, both nuclear-armed states, relocated technology from civilian space projects to missiles, thus these achievements should be monitored closely. The United States' efforts to retain the UN arms embargo in place, on the other hand, enhance the deterrent logic of Iran's missile program in the first place. That shouldn't be the purpose of a regime that constantly proclaims Iran's largest and most diverse ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East.

¹⁵ *Resolution 2231 (2015)* Adopted by the Security Council at its 7488th meeting, on 20 July 2015, accessed February 21, 2022, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/unsc_resolution2231-2015.pdf

In 2018, following an extreme intensity strategy, the Trump administration announced the US departure from the JCPOA, as well as the reinstatement of secondary penalties on Iran. The strategy was to force Tehran back to the negotiating table to address US and regional allies' reservations about the JCPOA. Meanwhile, the remaining signatories have attempted to maintain the agreement afloat by pressing the US to rejoin.

Following the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA in the spring of 2019, Iran began to unilaterally reduce its compliance with key conditions. These infractions have brought Iran closer to attaining a nuclear bomb than when the agreement was reached in 2015. Furthermore, the Islamic Republic has demonstrated little willingness to comply until the US gives the sanctions relief promised in the agreement. Washington, on the other hand, has stated unequivocally that it would not rejoin the pact until Iran returns to full compliance.

The JCPOA's future has also become a key campaign concern in Iran, where voters came out to vote in the country's presidential elections on June 18, 2021. With conservative candidates favored to win, future discussions between Washington and Tehran were anticipated to become more challenging. Iran is unlikely to agree to debate its missile program or regional operations. Even more remarkable, some of the most critical restraints on the nuclear program are expected to lapse shortly. As a result, the United States and its Western allies must reach an agreement on either an extension of the JCPOA or a new framework to limit the nuclear program.

To further complicate matters, other signatories' views on what Washington should do differently. European allies want the US to return to the

agreement, with additional limits agreed upon separately. Moreover, some have claimed that the European Union may be the best contender to coordinate the restart of the JCPOA. Not only might the Union monitor both countries' compliance, but, as some in Iran think, conservative European leaders may persuade US Republicans to join in.

Even though both Russia and China's ties with Tehran have improved in recent years, both insist on keeping Iran's nuclear program under control. Iran cooperated with Russia in the Syrian civil war and opted to extend a 2001 partnership arrangement with Moscow in March 2021. Likewise, a UN arms embargo preventing China and Russia from supplying armaments to the Islamic Republic did expire in October 2020, allowing greater military collaboration.

Significantly, Iran has recently agreed to export oil to China in exchange for enormous economic investments in infrastructure, oil, gas, and petrochemicals. Since this agreement contains no precise figures or guarantees, the actual amount of the committed investment is uncertain. Estimates vary from \$400 billion to \$600 billion, indicating that Iran is striving to diversify its economic and security linkages in the face of ongoing US sanctions.¹⁶

In the Middle East, US allies' responses range from outright antagonism to grudging acceptance of any agreement. Israel is the most firmly opposed, threatening Iran with military action if the US withdraws from the JCPOA in January 2021. American Gulf partners are taking a different approach, expressing a willingness to engage in dialogue to address Tehran's regional operations and missile ambitions. The Abraham Accords also demonstrate how Israel and Arab

¹⁶ *The future of Iran's oil exports to China depends on a change in foreign policy*, accessed February 21, 2022, <https://menaaffairs.com/the-future-of-irans-oil-exports-to-china-depends-on-a-change-in-foreign-policy/>

states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, are struggling to keep the Islamic Republic isolated in the region. Normalization of Israeli-Arab relations implies a shift in perception of the region's main threat, from Israel to Iran.

Not only does Israel oppose the deal and any return to it, but it has also been conducting a "shadow war" against Iran for the previous years. In April 2021, Israel launched a naval offensive against Iranian oil tankers and commercial ships in the Red Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, establishing a new front in its campaign to destabilize Iran. Other occurrences in 2020 included a gas-tank explosion at the Parchin military facility in July and a bomb explosion six days later at the Natanz complex.

Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, an Iranian scientist widely regarded as the architect of Iran's nuclear program, was assassinated outside of Tehran in November 2020. Iran responds to Israeli strikes in a variety of methods, most of which are covert, but some of which are open, such as the March 2021 missile on an Israeli cargo ship in the Arabian Sea. In April 2021, two claimed Israeli attacks occurred. The first incidence occurred in the Red Sea when an Iranian cargo ship collided with a suspected Israeli mine. The Natanz facility lost power on April 11th as a consequence of a suspected Mossad sabotage attempt. Hundreds of thousands of centrifuges have been damaged or destroyed.

The return to the negotiation table is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to pursue a diplomatic compromise in a region rife with instability and tragedy. However, given the multiple conflicting interests and divisions between the US and Iran, as well as open resistance from domestic actors and Middle Eastern allies, it is evident that the path ahead remains as difficult as ever, if not more so.

As a result, it is critical for the Biden Administration to engage in the present and future dialogues while being fully aware of significant developments since 2015 that are likely to influence the perspectives of participants in the area and inside the US.

Mainly, some argue that, due to a lack of precision and strong pledges, the China-Iran agreement will alter very little in the medium term. However, its timing offers Tehran some leverage and confidence in the continuing Vienna discussions, and it may even embolden hardliners to reject US concessions given in exchange for complete JCPOA compliance.

Furthermore, the Abraham Accords, which formed in the aftermath of the nuclear deal's ramifications, propose to restructure regional objectives and alliances, particularly regarding the Palestine matter. In an attempt to gain importance, the Palestinian Authority announced formerly that parliamentary elections would be held in the summer of 2021. With elections in Syria and Iran, along with post-election drama in Israel and Lebanon, the battle for attention and resources, as well as regional instability, would only going to intensify. Given the transactional character of the treaties and their poor institutional underpinning, it is uncertain how long partnerships between certain Gulf states and Israel will endure and whether they can prosper in the current context.

Moreover, as some have indicated, in order for the JCPOA to survive, the US government should seek opportunities to transform it from a political issue to one viewed through the lens of national-security concerns. Recent ideas include lifting critical sanctions on Iran in order to obtain an economic windfall in Republican districts. While this is unlikely to influence the deal's ardent opponents, it may ensure bipartisan support for a revised final agreement.

Additional settlements on Tehran's missile program or regional measures should be reached independently, with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and those concerned by Iran's activities included.

Finally, one of the most corrosive features of the Trump Administration's legacy is the destruction of US credibility in the region and throughout the world. Allies are eager to give President Joe Biden another opportunity. However, outside of the United States, it is obvious that Trump's actions are not considered an exception. Allies and opponents alike are cautious of striking agreements with Washington for fear that future administrations would renege on their commitments.

Italy, the second Libyan war, and the Frontex Irini Operation

Mihaela Mustățea*

Keywords: Libya, the Libyan civil war, Arab spring, 2011, EUNAVFOR MED IRINI, Frontex, the Berlin Conference on Libya, Fayeze al-Sarraj, Khalifa Haftar, North Africa, Muammar al-Ghaddafi, illegal migration, EU.

Abstract

In 2011, Libya plunged into a civil war after the outbreak of the Arab Spring, a revolutionary movement characterized by massive civil protests which tried to build democratic societies in the Middle East and North Africa and put to an end the old repressive political regimes. After several months of civil war and bombings over Libya, longtime Muammar Ghaddafi's dictatorial regime fell. Although the U.S. did not directly intervene in Libya, it supported the overthrow of Ghaddafi through the intervention of NATO, providing aerial support and airstrikes for the opposition force (it also established a no-fly zone over Libya, authorized by the United Nations). In 2014, contested parliamentary elections led to the formation of two rival political power centers — one in the east, based in Tobruk and backed by military commander Khalifa Haftar, and another in the west of the country, an UN-supported administration in the capital of Tripoli. Each side was supported by a variety of militias and foreign powers, which competed for influence and oil resources, raising fears that oil-rich Libya could become the theater of a regional conflict. In April 2019, Haftar and his forces, backed by Russia (the Russian

* PhD in History, University of Bucharest

military contractors of the Wagner Group), Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates launched an offensive to capture the capital. His campaign collapsed after Turkey and Qatar offered their military support to the Tripoli government with hundreds of Turkish troops and thousands of Syrian mercenaries, belonging to the Free Syrian Army. The outbreak of violence in Libya in April 2019 severely affected the institutional reunification and stability of the country. Warning that the situation in Libya could become "a second Syria", with a new large wave of refugees directed towards the EU, Germany offered to call a peace conference for the conflicting sides, held on 19th January 2020 under the auspices of the United Nations. The aim was to stop the military support for the civil war parties and uphold an existing UN arms embargo, re-launching the peace process for a political settlement, after nine months of fighting over the capital.

Operation EUNAVFOR MED IRINI was launched by the European Union on 31 March 2020, as part of the European Union's contribution to the Berlin conference. The core task of the Operation is the implementation of the UN arms embargo on Libya through aerial, satellite, and maritime assets, an embargo that had been decided in 2016 by the United Nations Security Council Resolution.¹ This ongoing mission replaced the Sophia Operation, which had been in place for five years, combating the organized crime and trafficking of migrants in the Mediterranean Sea. In June 2016, the European Council decided to extend Sophia's mandate until July 2017, adding two supporting tasks: training the Libyan coastguards and contributing to the implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya.

This paper attempts to analyze the response of the European Union to the Libyan crisis by launching the Irini operation, a military-naval Joint force, setting out to secure the Berlin

¹ United Nations, Security Council, Resolution 2292 (2016), adopted by the Security Council at its 7715th meeting, June, 14, 2016, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N16/174/94/PDF/N1617494.pdf?OpenElement>

Conference's commitments. Finally, we try to explain if Italy, which seems to have preferred to stay on the sidelines, succeeded in reinserting itself into the Libyan equation, a significant diplomatic area for the Chigi Palace.

Introduction

After NATO-led intervention that helped the revolutionary forces in 2011 overthrow dictator Muammar al-Gaddafi, Libya has fallen into a civil war, involving multiple armed groups and rival factions who are competing to control access to the country's economic resources. There are multiple layers of insecurity and instability in Libya, a national level competition over political influence, the control of resources, and above all, the nature of the Libyan state itself. The presence of armed extremist groups and local-level conflicts has contributed to the fragmentation of governance in Libya, allowing space also for foreign actors. The United States and the Western countries didn't play a decisive role in Libya, allowing Russia, Turkey, and Arab states to take the lead, transforming the conflict into a *proxy war*. Still, some European countries, like France and Italy supported different rival factions in Libya, competing for oil and gas interests in the oil-rich country. For instance, Italy saw the increasing violence in Libya as a real risk that would have created severe repercussions for ENI, the main Italian energy company present in the country, being at the same time, the leading foreign energy operator in Libya. Moreover, almost all of Eni's oil and natural gas assets were located in the western half of the country, under the control of the United Nations recognized government, thus Italian government supported the Tripoli-based GNA - **Government of National Accord** - led by Prime Minister Fayed al Sarraj. There is no doubt that the Libyan dossier was

essential for Rome, in terms of security (the fight against the resurgent jihadism), migratory issues (existing the risk of the intensification of migratory waves in the case of state collapse, Libya being a major transit country for illegal migrants), and finally, the energy policy (Eni's production and prospecting, not only in Libya but into the entire region of North Africa). Thus, Italy recognized the Libyan government headed by al-Sarraj as the country's legitimate authority.

With the power vacuum and internal conflict between rival groups, Libya became a risky and ungovernable country, representing the main starting point for African refugees and illegal migrants crossing the Mediterranean and entering the EU. Italy reacted by signing in February 2017 a **Memorandum of Understanding on Migration** with Libya, a document which was extended in 2020 for another three years and endorsed by the EU. The Memorandum provided the Italian support to the Libyan maritime authorities to stop illegal vessels and return asylum-seekers to detention camps in Libya, a country that was accused of not having an adequate refugee protection system or a proactive and dedicated state-led Search and Rescue (SAR) capacity in the central Mediterranean Sea. The entire support cost about \$100 million in training, ships, and equipment financed by Italy and the EU through the Trust Fund for Africa. The MoU represents only a part of a broader defensive strategy, being pursued by the European governments. In theory, the Italian and European approaches seek to prevent illegal immigration and control migration flows. In reality, several NGOs, like Oxfam, denounced that in 2021, twenty thousand migrants have "disappeared" once they arrived in Libya. They may have ended up in dangerous "clandestine" detention centers, such as Tripoli's notorious Tobacco Factory, not having legal pathways to leave the country. The agreement between

Italy and Libya was accused of supporting the system of exploitation, extortion, and abuse in which so many migrants find themselves trapped.²

Since 2017, Italy has spent €271 million on international missions to support the Libyan Coastguard, with €10.5 million allocated only in 2021. In five years, EUNAVFOR MED SOPHIA/IRINI absorbed a total of €191,5 million from the state budget.³ Compared to the Mare Nostrum operation which cost Italy 9 million euros per month (114 million in total, being operational only one year), the financial effort accorded to both Sophia and Irini's military naval operations was significantly much lower.⁴

France's clandestine military support for Haftar, the Libyan General, known for his opposition to the Islamist groups, began in Benghazi in 2015, through some covert cooperation with Egypt. In July 2016, an Islamist militia shot down a French helicopter, being the first formal confirmation that France had sent special forces inside Libya.⁵ Thus, Paris has supported Haftar's project towards the construction of a military dictatorship, intervening with some

² *** Rai News, Silvia Rocchi, *Scomparsi nel 2021 ventimila migranti riportati in Libia. La denuncia dell'Oxfam* in

<https://www.rainews.it/articoli/2022/01/scomparsi-nel-2021-20-mila-migranti-riportati-in-libia-la-denuncia-delloxfam-6d9b5c29-fcfe-4b6a-a78f-e622cd07361b.html>; *** Amnesty International, *Libya:*

New evidence shows refugees and migrants trapped in horrific cycle of abuses, in

<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2020/09/libya-new-evidence-shows-refugees-and-migrants-trapped-in-horrific-cycle-of-abuses/>; Medecins sans frontiers, *Italy-Libya agreement: five*

years of EU-sponsored abuse in Libya and the central Mediterranean in <https://www.msf.org/italy-libya-agreement-five-years-eu-sponsored-abuse-libya-and-central-mediterranean>

³ *** Oxfam Italia, *Comunicato Stampa, Aumentano di nuovo i fondi italiani alla guardia costiera libica*,

3th July 2021, Roma, in https://www.oxfamitalia.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CS_-MIGRANTI-

[LIBICA_3_7_2021.pdf](https://www.oxfamitalia.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/CS_-MIGRANTI-OXFAM_AUMENTANO-DI-NUOVO-I-FONDI-ITALIANI-ALLA-GUARDIA-COSTIERA-LIBICA_3_7_2021.pdf)

⁴ *Ibidem.*

⁵ *** BBC, *Libya attack: French soldiers die in helicopter crash*, July 20, 2016

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36843186>

assistance for military operations, undermining the United Nations peace process for Libya.

Paris had several interests in the Libyan conflict: first of all, containing the Libyan conflict was a key part of a large counterterrorism strategy in the Sahel region (Operation Barkhane),⁶ Libyan insecurity could have threatened the stability of the entire region. Then, Islamic State's presence in Libya represented a domestic security problem for France - the series of attacks on bars, restaurants, a concert hall, and the national football stadium in Paris on November 13, 2016, where 130 people were killed, frightening the whole world. Moreover, because Libya served as a major departure point for migrants heading for Europe, France was hoping that its intervention in 2011 would control the illegal flows of migration and offer new contracts for oil purchases, with good conditions and new economic opportunities for French businesses and companies.⁷

In 2014, the outbreak of violence critically affected institutional reunification and stability in Libya. Violence escalated after the contested parliamentary elections, leading to the formation of two rival administrations: the Tripoli-based **Government of National Accord (GNA)**, led by Prime Minister Fayez al Sarraj, recognized by the United Nations (UN) and backed by several

⁶ The Barkhane operation is an ongoing anti-insurgent operation that started on 1 August 2014. Operation Barkhane is France's largest overseas operation, with a budget of nearly €600 million per year and is led by the French military against Islamist groups in Africa's Sahel region. The operation is led in cooperation with five countries, all of which are former French colonies that span the Sahel: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. The allied force, with approximately 4,500 soldiers, is spread out between Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad. Its headquarter is in N'Djamena, Chad's capital. Around 4,500 French personnel are deployed, and they work alongside the G5 Sahel joint counter-terrorism force that aims to train 5,000 troops, as well as peacekeepers deployed to the United Nations Minusma stabilization mission in Mali.

⁷ Christopher Griffin, *French interests and strategy in Libya after Qaddafi*, September 2, 2015, <https://trendsresearch.org/insight/french-interests-and-strategy-in-libya-after-qaddafi/>

armed groups, and on the other hand, the rival administration in the country's east, the **House of Representatives** (HoR), allied with General Khalifa Haftar, who commanded the so-called **Libyan National Army** (LNA). In 2016, Fayez al-Sarraj and the GNA obtained international recognition, while General Khalifa Haftar launched a military offensive that offered him control of a large territory in the Eastern part of Libya. The Islamic State terrorist group also shortly gained the east and central parts of the country – particularly in what is known as the Oil Crescent, being able to capitalize on Libya's instability but was eventually defeated.

The loyal forces of General Haftar hoped to take control of Tripoli, which further escalated the conflict and posed a persistent threat to political stability in Libya. After nine months of confrontation, the offensive resulted in a stalemate, but wrecked Libya's economy, disrupting the entire country's oil production. Public spending on services, as well as the market of work and all economic activities, are based on the oil and gas industry. This income represents about 70% of the Libyan GDP and 95% of the state's revenue, with no alternative economy, being dependent on hydrocarbons and imports. The launch of the *Operation Flood of Dignity*, with which Haftar intended to take control of the capital and, consequently, of the whole country, represented the end of the strategic plan started in May 2014 with *Operation Dignity*.⁸ The government's *Dawn operation* has inflamed the Libyan conflict, deteriorating the country's stability. The insecurity of Libya also jeopardized the European countries, which

⁸ On 16 May 2014, Khalifa Haftar, a former officer in Qaddafi's military, after an abortive coup attempt, launched *Operation Dignity* in the city of Benghazi. Haftar's campaign it was designed to eliminate Islamist factions from eastern Libya. Very soon, Haftar extended the *Operation Dignity* campaign beyond Benghazi, turning the crisis into a real civil war.

were concerned about the threat that jihadist militias caused to their domestic security.⁹

The launch of EUNAVFOR MED IRINI OPERATION

On 19th January 2020 after the Libyan peace talks in Moscow fell, mediated by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who unsuccessfully tried to get rebel commander Khalifa Haftar and Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj to sign a ceasefire,¹⁰ the German Government launched an initiative aimed to resolve the conflict within the United Nations. The focus of the meeting was to obtain a commitment from external parties that influenced the Libyan war to uphold the UN arms embargo and bring their influence on the Libyan parties to agree on an open-ended ceasefire. Moreover, the German government's long-term goal was to establish "a sovereign Libya" and an "inner-Libyan reconciliation process", according to the invitation made by the former German Chancellor, Angela Merkel.¹¹

A process of consultation on Libya was initiated in September 2019 by the German government and Ghassan Salamé, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG). The Berlin Process was step number two of a three-

⁹ For more information, see Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Nathaniel Barr, *Dignity and Dawn: Libya's Escalating Civil War*, ICCT Research Paper February 2015, in <https://www.icct.nl/app/uploads/download/file/ICCT-Gartenstein-Ross-Barr-Dignity-and-Dawn-Libyas-Escalating-Civil-War-February2015.pdf>

¹⁰ *** DW, *Libya's Haftar leaves Russia without signing cease-fire deal*, <https://www.dw.com/en/libyas-haftar-leaves-russia-without-signing-cease-fire-deal/a-51993281>

¹¹ *** DW, *Germany calls Libya conference in Berlin*, in <https://www.dw.com/en/germany-calls-libya-conference-in-berlin/a-51999875>; *** Euractiv, *Libya peace talks in Moscow fall short of ceasefire deal*, in <https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/libya-peace-talks-in-moscow-fall-short-of-ceasefire-deal/>

step initiative, announced by Salamé to the Security Council on 29th July.¹² The United Nations co-chaired the process, alongside the Government of Germany which hosted the event and gave diplomatic support to the Libyan peace process.

The Berlin conference produced a fifty-five-point conclusion paper on all relevant issues, including a ceasefire endorsement and renewed calls for respecting the long-ignored arms embargo. A special committee made up of five military officials from each side was established to monitor the truce. There were also established several working groups to unify the rival political, economic, and security institutions.¹³ In addition, the European Council reached a political agreement to launch a new operation in the Mediterranean Sea, aimed at implementing the UN arms embargo on Libya by using its aerial, satellite, and maritime assets. As secondary tasks, the operation should implement UN measures to prevent the illicit export of petroleum from Libya, build up the capacity of training of the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy, and disrupt the human smuggling and trafficking networks business that still operates in Libya.¹⁴

The origin of this mission is linked to a previous military naval mission in the Mediterranean area: in March 2020, the expiry of the mandate of the Sophia Operation has given rise to long months of negotiations between the Foreign Ministers of the EU member states, deciding whether or not to confirm a new military mission. Some countries, including Italy, had expressed concern that the

¹² *** UN, *Remarks of SRSG Ghassan Salamé to the United Nations Security Council on the situation in Libya*, July 29, 2019, <https://unsmil.unmissions.org/remarks-srsg-ghassan-salam%C3%A9-united-nations-security-council-situation-libya-29-july-2019>

¹³ *** *The Berlin Conference on Libya CONFERENCE CONCLUSIONS* in https://unsmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/berlin_conference_communique.pdf

¹⁴ *** *COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2020/472 of 31 March 2020 on a European Union military operation in the Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED IRINI)* in <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32020D0472>

continuation of the Sophia mission could act as an encouragement, a *pull factor*, rather than a deterrent, for illegal migrants. As a result, it expressed the desire to restore the presence of the European Union in the Mediterranean, but with a new naval-military mission, the Sophia Operation being a precursor for the next Irini Operation.

Another sensitive issue that decided the ending of the Sophia operation was the loss of the Italian government's support. The Sophia Operation was the first EU-wide naval military operation, in cooperation with Nato forces, showing the twist of shifting attention from the illegal migrants themselves to the smugglers/traffickers that facilitate their transit. In particular, the implementation of the arms embargo imposed by the United Nations Security Council appeared to be a primary concern for the EU, given the constant worsening of the Libyan crisis and the increasing involvement of external actors in the region, such as Turkey, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates.

On 17 February 2020, during the usual press conference at the end of the European Affairs Council, the High Representative for the European Union's foreign policy, Josep Borrell, officially decreed the end of the Sophia mission and the start of a new operation in the Mediterranean for strengthening the UN embargo. Named EUNAVFOR MED IRINI, the new naval mission is destined to change the way that the European Union operates in the Mediterranean, no longer placing the control of migration as an undisputed primary objective as it has been in recent years. It is for this reason that the announcement by the High Representative has aroused much interest in the future of the European presence

in the area. The details of the new Irini mission were cleared in the following months, after the official announcement.¹⁵

With the headquarters in Rome and commanded initially by Italian Admiral Fabio Agostini, the core task of the operation is the implementation of the UN arms embargo on Libya, using European aerial, satellite, and maritime assets. In particular, the mission is mandated to carry out inspections of vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya suspected to be carrying arms or related material to and from Libya following the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2292 (2016). Where there are reasonable grounds to believe that such vessels are carrying arms or related material to or from Libya, directly or indirectly, in violation of the arms embargo on Libya, EUNAVFOR MED IRINI could take relevant action to seize and dispose of such items, including to divert such vessels and their crews to a suitable port to facilitate such disposal, with the consent of the port State. Moreover, EUNAVFOR MED IRINI assists in the development of the capacities and in the training of the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy in law enforcement tasks at sea, in particular, to prevent human smuggling and trafficking. Finally, Italy and Greece alternate the Force Commander every six months. Avoiding that the Irini mission could become a *pull factor* for illegal migrants, the progress of the mission will be monitored and reconfirmed every 4 months by the Political and Security Committee (CSFP). In the case that the mission produced an attraction effect for migratory flows, the Member States may decide to cease their activities. Moreover, the commander has to conduct the

¹⁵ *** European Union External Action, Foreign Affairs Council: Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell at the press conference, Brussels, 17 February 2020, in https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/foreign-affairs-council-remarks-high-representativevice-president-josep-borrell-press-0_ar

naval operation in such a way as to prevent the *pull effect* by the deployment of the maritime vessels of the operation, including through the immediate repositioning of the assets if such an effect is observed or the maritime assets will be withdrawn from the relevant areas. The annual budget of the mission is about **9 million** and eight hundred thousand euros for common expenses. The European Member States, except Denmark,¹⁶ because in 2020 it wasn't part of the European common defence and security arrangements, having a derogation or so-called a defence **opt-out**, must pay for the operational expenditure of the mission.¹⁷ On 23rd September 2021, the EU Council appointed **Rear Admiral Stefano Turchetto** as EU Operation Commander for the European Union military operation in the Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED IRINI), taking command from Rear Admiral Fabio Agostini on 1 October 2021.¹⁸

In the first year of activity, from April to December 2020, the Italian Parliament authorized the participation of 517 members of personnel, 1 vessel, and 3 aircraft, for an estimated cost of approximately 21 million and 300 thousand euros granted to the Irini operation. On 31 December 2020, the naval operation had 2 ships, the Italian patrol vessel Cigala Fulgosi and the Greek frigate Adrias; 3 patrol aircraft, supplied by Luxembourg, Poland, and Germany,

¹⁶ For more information, see Ulla Neergaard & Graham Butler, *Denmark's Defence Opt-out, the Forthcoming Referendum, and the Changing Face of EU Defence and Security Arrangements* in <https://www.thedanishparliament.dk/en/eu-information-centre/the-danish-opt-outs-from-eu-cooperation>

¹⁷ *** COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2020/472 of 31 March 2020 on a European Union military operation in the Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED IRINI) in <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32020D0472>

¹⁸ *** European Council, *EUNAVFOR MED IRINI: new Operation Commander appointed*, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/09/23/eunavfor-med-irini-new-operation-commander-appointed/>

as well as 1 Italian drone. Two other aircraft (one Greek and one French) were not permanently assigned to the operation, but to support occasionally some activities. For satellite assets, Irini works with the support of the European Union Satellite Center (SATCEN) and the Intelligence and Situation Center (INTCEN). The operation doesn't have a predetermined range of action, even if its activities are more concentrated on the eastern part of the Libyan coast, especially in front of the Cyrenaica region, where the trafficking of arms is most active. The mission cannot operate within Libyan territorial waters.¹⁹

On March 17th, 2021, the EU extended the operation for two more years, until the end of March 2023. The decision to prolong the mission comes from the United Nations experts who warned that the embargo imposed on Libya in 2011 was "totally ineffective" being violated by numerous international actors.²⁰

In July 2021, many NGOs protested against the renewal of the mission and the continuation of cooperation with the Libyan authorities without concrete guarantees for protecting the human rights of migrants and refugees. They accused the European governments of ceding responsibility to Libya for overseeing rescue operations in a vast area of the Mediterranean Sea, rather than ensuring a proactive and dedicated state-led search and rescue (SAR) capacity in the central Mediterranean, encouraging a system of exploitation, extortion, and

¹⁹ *** Senato della Repubblica, *L'OPERAZIONE MILITARE DELL'UE NEL MEDITERRANEO EUNAVFOR MED IRINI*,

<https://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/01207628.pdf>

²⁰ *** Libya Alahrar, *EU to renew Operation IRINI mandate for two more years*, in

<https://libyaalahrar.net/eu-to-renew-operation-irini-mandate-for-two-more-years/>;

For more information about the Panel of Experts on Libya see United Nations Security Council, *Letter dated 8 March 2021 from the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council* in

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2021_229.pdf

abuse funded and promoted by the EU and Italy. Thus, the EU has chosen deterrence strategies and border defense over respect for human rights and protecting people's lives.²¹

Since its launch until August 2022, Operation EUNAVFOR MED IRINI has boarded and inspected 24 suspect vessels. Two vessels out of 24 were diverted to a port of an EU Member State where their cargo was seized. One flag State (Turkey) has denied access to go on board and inspect suspect vessels on 8 occasions. Operation IRINI has also investigated 7,142 merchant vessels through a request of information via radio calls (hailing) and visited 367 vessels upon their commander's consent (so-called friendly approaches). Furthermore, the Operation has investigated 972 suspect flights, 25 airports, and 16 ports, and provided 40 special reports to the UN Panel of Experts on Libya, most of which referred to violations or possible violations of the arms embargo and oil smuggling activities in the West and the East of the Country. Finally, through the embedded Crime Information Cell, the operation issued to the relevant Law Enforcement agencies 69 recommendations for inspection of suspect vessels in EU Member States' ports, 54 of which were conducted (see figure 1).²² In August 2022, Operation EUNAVFOR MED IRINI investigated 174 merchant vessels via radio calls (out of 7.142) and carried out 24 visits on ships with their commanders' consent (out of 367). The Operation also monitored 22 suspect flights (out of 972) and continued to monitor 25 airports (and landing strips) and

²¹ AP News, *Rights groups to Italy: Don't renew migrant deal with Libya*, January 31, 2020 <https://apnews.com/article/united-nations-italy-africa-europe-libya-8c3ea3d137fea4c26d5fd6fde8f444cb>; *la Repubblica, Migrazioni, Libia: "Una benda per non vedere": la società civile in piazza in occasione del voto alla Camera che rinnova le missioni internazionali*, July 14, 2021.

²² European Union, *Operation EUNAVFOR MED IRINI - August report*, in https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/operation-eunavfor-med-irini-august-report_ru

16 ports (and oil terminals). Through the Crime Information Cell, the Operation issued 2 (out of 69) recommendations for inspection of suspect vessels in EU Member States' ports.²³



Source Figure 1: European Union External Action

A sensitive aspect of the operation was the availability of the landing ports. The operation needed that a State-Member to grant its own port for the disembarkation of people who could have been probably rescued at sea. This commitment was made by Greece, which has always been among the major supporters of the operation. The other European countries, however, accepted, with two conditions: after disembarkation, the migrants have to be distributed voluntarily among the European Union countries (although some of them, including Italy, had expressed their unavailability) and the costs of welcoming migrants have to be considered "common expenses", charged to its budget. On

²³ *Ibidem.*

November 19, 2020, France declared the availability of the port of Marseille (which already in Sophia's time had played this task). Therefore, a port had been settled where the vessels engaged in illegal activities had to be directed, even if the location was not in a particularly strategic position regarding the area where the Irini mission operates. Some countries, including Italy, have instead given a generic willingness to evaluate the cases and have offered the possibility of granting a landing in its own port (possibly in addition to the French one or even according to the area of the operation), while others, for example, Romania and Netherlands decided to participate in any operations that may be necessary for destruction and disposal of seized weapons.²⁴

Turkey

In November 2019, Turkey signed two agreements on security and military cooperation and restriction of marine jurisdictions with the Tripoli-based government. De jure, the memorandum of understanding on security signed between the two countries was aimed at maintaining security in Libya and protecting the country's sovereignty with Turkish help. This document (MoU) delineates the maritime boundaries between the two countries in the Mediterranean Sea, Turkey receiving to expand the right of gas exploration in areas that Greece considers its own, triggering protests at Athens and Nicosia. Both European countries denounced the agreement, saying that it was a serious breach of international law, violating the rights of other eastern Mediterranean countries.²⁵ Egypt also dismissed the deal as "illegal", and Greece said that any

²⁴ *** Senato della Repubblica, *L'OPERAZIONE MILITARE DELL'UE NEL MEDITERRANEO EUNAVFOR MED IRINI*, <https://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/01207628.pdf>

²⁵ *** *Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of National Accord-State of Libya on delimitation of the maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean*, in

such accord would be geographically absurd because it ignored the presence of the Greek island of Crete between the coasts of Turkey and Libya.²⁶

Soon after, Turkey began illegal gas drilling in the territorial waters of Cyprus despite the European Union's repeated calls to cease the illegal activities in the Eastern Mediterranean. The European Council decided to suspend contacts with the high-level officials, as well as to reduce the pre-accession assistance to Turkey for 2020, inviting the European Investment Bank "to review" its lending activities in Turkey, in response to Ankara's gas exploration in Cypriot national waters.²⁷ Notwithstanding the international protests, in April 2021, Turkey and Libya agreed to maintain the Mediterranean Accord signed in 2019.²⁸ The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) demarcating maritime zones in the region between Turkey and the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli was the first step of international friction with Turkey.

Both Greece and Cyprus, faced with Turkish claims, immediately condemned the government of Tripoli and subsequently supported, albeit at a diplomatic level, the action of general Haftar in an anti-GNA and anti-Erdogan action.

At the same time, another Turkish controversial move was the purchase of the Russian S-400 anti-aircraft missiles, deteriorating US-Turkey relations, and making an unprecedented gesture for a Nato country. The Alliance, in its initial response to the Russian military delivery, raised concerns about the

https://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/Turkey_11122019_%28HC%29_MoU_Libya-Delimitation-areas-Mediterranean.pdf

²⁶ Reuters, *Turkey signs maritime boundaries deal with Libya amid exploration row*, November 28, 2019, in <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-libya-idUSKBN1Y213I>

²⁷ *** *Turkish drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean: Council adopts conclusions* in <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/07/15/turkish-drilling-activities-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-council-adopts-conclusions/>

²⁸ *** *Aljazeera, Turkey and Libya renew commitment to the contested maritime deal*, April 12, 2021, in <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/12/turkey-and-libya-renew-commitment-to-contested-maritime-deal>

interoperability of the Russian system with the Nato system, while trying to strike a positive note by commenting that Ankara remains interested in developing long-range air and missile defense systems with several allies. But the most pressing concern for the Americans was security. They feared that if Russian technicians operated in Turkey for training and calibrating the S-400 missiles then they could have obtained all sorts of data on the F-35 if Turkish F-35 jets were in the same air space with the Russian S-400 anti-aircraft missiles.²⁹

Turkey was also irritated about the vote in the US Senate that recognized the 1915 mass killings of Armenians by Ottoman Turks as genocide.³⁰ It followed a similar resolution approved by the House of Representatives in October 2019.³¹ Erdogan called the congressional votes "completely political" and lashed out at the West's "history of racism and colonialism". Until today, Turkey denies that there was a systematic campaign to kill Armenians as an ethnic group during World War One, contending that the number of victims is closer to 300,000 Armenians. President Erdogan moved forward with escalation, in response to the genocide resolution and potential US sanctions over his country's purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system and warned that Turkey could "if necessary" close two key military bases used by the US forces: Incirlik and Kurecik. The Incirlik base has been heavily used by US aircraft for raids against Islamic State (IS) militants in Iraq and Syria, while the Kurecik military base holds a Nato radar

²⁹ *** BBC, *Where does Turkey's S-400 missile deal with Russia leave the US?* July 12, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-48962886>

³⁰ *** CNN, *Senate passes resolution to formally 'commemorate the Armenian Genocide'*, December 12, 2019, in <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/12/12/politics/senate-armenian-genocide-resolution-passes/index.html>

³¹ *** BBC, *US House says Armenian mass killing was genocide*, October 30, 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50229787>;

installation.³² Finally, Turkey's 2020 intervention in the Libyan civil war to preserve Libya's GNA has reversed the course of the hostilities, with Ankara becoming the GNA's security main guarantor and providing arms, drones, and military equipment.

Finally, the launch of the European Irini operation provoked Ankara's criticism which considered the mission biased and accused the Europeans of seeking, through this maritime mechanism, to prevent the delivery of weapons by sea to the Tripoli government, ignoring the supply by air and land from Egypt to Haftar group.³³

There were many theaters and dossiers in which Turkey moved in contrast with the European interests, and sometimes from an undeniable position of strength. We remember, for example, the migrant flows towards Greece, a threat that Turkish President Erdogan always returns to agitate with profound political repercussions on European governments, already in serious difficulty due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Equally sensitive is the dossier of the energy exploitation of gas resources in the extension of Cyprus and in the eastern Mediterranean, where important European companies are involved, such as the Italian ENI and the French Company, Total.

In the activity of the Irini operation, there were moments of tension, some of which have also had diplomatic aftermath. These include the episode of June 10, 2020, when the Greek frigate *Spetsai*, at that moment being the only naval unit assigned to the EU Irini operation, tried to initiate checks on suspicious cargo

³² *** CNN, *Trump administration won't call mass killing of Armenians a genocide despite congressional resolutions*, December 17th, 2019, in <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/12/17/politics/trump-administration-armenian-genocide/index.html>

³³ <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/turkey-decries-illegal-search-of-vessel-by-eu-mission/2053260>

Cirkin, flying the flag of Tanzania but escorted by the Turkish military ships, which refused the inspection declaring that the ship enjoyed the immunity of Turkey. Moreover, Cirkin had previously landed Turkish M-60 tanks in Misurata on 28 May, being at that time also escorted by a Turkish military ship. Spetsai reportedly that it had been sent a warning signal to Cirkin but was unable to send a boarding team to inspect the cargo because, as European Commission spokesman Peter Stano answered journalists' questions said, Irini's ships can board and inspect suspicious vessels only with the consent of the vessels themselves.³⁴ Another similar incident with significant diplomatic repercussions involved a French military ship, operating as part of the NATO **Sea Guardian** Operation and Turkish Navy (Türk Deniz Kuvvetleri) vessels (including allegedly Barbaros-class frigate TCG *Oruçreis*). France said that the frigate *Courbet* was targeted three times by the Turkish vessel's fire control radars, which is a hostile act. The French frigate was trying to approach a Tanzanian-flagged civilian ship suspected of involvement in arms trafficking with Libya. The cargo ship was under the escort of three Turkish vessels. Turkey denied harassing the *Courbet*. As a result of this escalation, both countries being Nato members, France announced on July 1st, 2020 that suspending its involvement in NATO operation *Sea Guardian*, following tensions with Turkey.³⁵ By October 2020, the question

³⁴ ***Nessuno ferma Erdoğan nel Mediterraneo in <https://ytali.com/2020/06/15/nessuno-ferma-erdogan-nel-mediterraneo/?pdf=95776> ; la Repubblica, *Libia, incidente sfiorato tra missione Ue e navi turche*, in https://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2020/06/10/news/libia_incidente_sfiorato_tra_missione_ue_e_navi_turche-258895448/

³⁵ Il Foglio, *Macron e Erdogan fanno a schiaffi nel mezzo di un'operazione Nato*, July 3, 2020 in <https://www.ilfoglio.it/esteri/2020/07/03/news/macron-e-erdogan-fanno-a-schiaffi-nel-mezzo-di-unoperazione-nato-321742/>; Naval News, *France Pulls Out Of NATO Operation Sea Guardian Amid Tensions With Turkey*, July 3, 2020, in

Courbet was resolved. The Alliance has developed an action plan to review the behavior of the Allies at sea, particularly in the use of NATO call signs and the means associated with a NATO operation, such as the relationship between the ships of the Alliance and the European operation EUNAVFOR Med Irini.³⁶

Italy

Italy was among the main supporters of the creation of the GNA in 2015-2016 but when it started to realize the possibility that Haftar could conquer the whole country, compromising Italian interests, especially in Tripolitania and Fezzan, Rome has gone from full support to the GNA to an attempt to get closer to Haftar. This strategy did not earn the favor of the general. Indeed, Rome couldn't offer Haftar much more than what Cairo, Abu Dhabi or Moscow weren't already giving it. In trying to get closer to Haftar, the Italian government had lost some of the influence it had previously on the GNA, and Libya in turn has begun to seek support and protection from Erdogan's Turkey. Italy has had a changing Libyan policy. The current position is to maintain the distance from both antagonists parts of the Libyan crisis. However, this approach did not particularly help Italy to achieve its strategic objectives, such as the management of migratory flows or facilitating access to the energy markets. The prospect of a resolution of the crisis by Russia, which would necessarily have also involved Turkey and that it would hardly have met European and Italian interests, was considered particularly worrying in Rome. For these reasons, Italy gladly supported Berlin's action when Germany decided to take the initiative to resolve

<https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2020/07/france-pulls-out-of-nato-operation-sea-guardian-amid-tensions-with-turkey/>

³⁶ Turkey-France. The *Courbet* incident is over. NATO tries to forget, October 22, 2020, in <https://www.bruxelles2.eu/en/2020/10/Turkey-France-The-Courbet-incident-is-over-Lotan-tries-to-forget/>;

the crisis. Rome was a junior partner in Berlin's arrangement, counteracting the French historical activism in the Libyan crisis. Moreover, Italy insisted that the United States re-engage in Libya, ensuring the cease-fire and return to having a primary role. Rome would have liked to recreate a new partnership with the United States that allowed the creation of the GNA in 2015-16 and in which Italy had played an important role thanks to a political delegation that the Obama administration accorded to Rome.³⁷

Conclusions

Unfortunately, the Berlin conference was unable to produce concrete results in terms of ending hostilities and initiating an effective process of pacification. Once again, the international community found itself facing difficulties in implementing effective measures to translate the signed declarations of Berlin's intent into concrete results, starting with the necessary enforcement of the embargo on the supplies of armaments destined for opposing Libyan factions. Even the government of Tripoli has contested for a long time, more or less instrumentally, that the Irini operation favored the opposing party, due to the geographical position of the mission in the procurement of weapons.³⁸

Currently, the maximum annual amount authorized by Italy for the national contingent employed in the mission is 406 soldiers, 1 naval unit, and 2 aircraft assets. The operation is supported by 24 European countries providing an Irini force consisting of two frigates, six maritime patrol aircraft, and 600 members of staff supported by the EU Satellite Center (SatCen) in Torrejón, Spain.

³⁷ Arturo Varvelli, *Interessi mutanti: alcune ipotesi di policy per il governo italiano*, in Eugenio Dacrema, Arturo Varvelli (eds) "Le relazioni tra l'Italia e Libia: interessi e rischi", ISPI, 2020, p. 57.

³⁸ Senato della Repubblica, *L'OPERAZIONE MILITARE DELL'UE NEL MEDITERRANEO EUNAVFOR MED IRINI*, <https://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/01207628.pdf>

An approach to the European Union's Energy Diplomacy

Elena-Andreea Năstase*

Keywords: Action Plan, energy diplomacy, energy policy, foreign policy, multidimensionality

Abstract

Energy has been a concern since the creation of the European Union, as a result of which numerous studies, regulations, directives, and action plans have been developed. The interest in creating an internal energy market has always been fundamental, but over the years, energy challenges have led to the need to shape a coherent external energy policy aimed at diversifying energy sources, routes, and suppliers. The most important instrument of foreign policy is diplomacy, which is manifested even in the energy sector. And at the EU level, since 2015, the directions for action on energy diplomacy have become clear. Thus, supported by a demonstration dedicated to the meanings that can be attributed to the concept, the research will aim to provide an approach to how the EU is involved in theorizing and applying diplomacy in the energy sector.

* Elena-Andreea Năstase (Bordea) is a PhD student at the Faculty of History, University of Bucharest.

Introduction and methodology

Energy diplomacy is a concept often used in current discussions on European energy security, which is characterized by a recent appearance in the vocabulary dedicated to foreign policy despite a marked history of events involving energy resources. If we look back to the 20th century, we can find multiple actions carried out abroad for energy security: the Suez Canal crisis, the negotiations for the construction of oil and natural gas pipelines, such as those on the Druzhba oil pipeline or on the gas pipelines that would connect Austria with Italy (Trieste), the Soviet Union with Germany, Finland with Scandinavia, the Soviet Union with Japan¹ or to facilitate a constructive dialogue between consumers and energy producers: *Euro-Mediterranean Energy Forum*, consisting of 12 countries from Europe, North Africa or East Asia (Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey²) or *the Baltic Energy Cooperation*, which consists of 11 Member States (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, and Sweden³). We note that energy resources have naturally given rise to contacts between two or more actors, to the practice of foreign policy and the use of its specific tools, including dialogue, negotiation, partnership, and, agreement (diplomacy).

¹ Frank Bösch, „Energy Diplomacy: West Germany, the Soviet Union and the Oil Crises of the 1970s”, *Historical Social Research*, no. 39, (April 2014): 169-174, DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.12759/hsr.39.2014.4.165-185>

² “First Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Energy Ministers”, *CORDIS*, last modified June 7, 1996, <https://cordis.europa.eu/article/id/6277-first-euromediterranean-conference-of-energy-ministers>

³ Dalia Streimikiene, “Monitoring of energy supply sustainability in the Baltic Sea region”, *Energy Policy*, No. 35, (2007): 1658, <https://doi.org/doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2006.05.011>.

This research will be dedicated to the concept of energy diplomacy, as perceived by the literature and as reflected in European Union regulatory documents, but also in its practice, a concept that deserves special attention because it bears the characteristic of complexity springing from multidimensionality connected to the evolutions of the constantly changing energy landscape. The hypothesis of the study reflects the indissoluble link between energy, national/supranational security agenda, and foreign policy, a link that the European Union assumes with interest, both in theory and in practice. The resulting research question is: *What are the indicators that certify the EU's interest in energy diplomacy?* The verification of the stated hypothesis and the identification of the answers to the above-mentioned question will be done through *the analysis of the definitions* offered by the specialized literature, thus constituting the context of our discussion, followed by *the analysis of the official documents* adopted by the European Union which refer to external actions in the energy sector (theoretical part), supplemented by *the analysis of some statistical data*, justifying the indication of certain characteristics of energy diplomacy (multidimensionality, for example), but also by *the analysis of the effective way of conducting energy diplomatic activity* (actors involved, tools used - practical part).

Consequently, in the elaboration of the demonstration, an important role will be played by the *quantitative method* because it will try to identify multiple approaches to the concept and numerous Community documents indicating directions for action in this branch of diplomacy, but also by the *qualitative method* given the fact that a content analysis of all the available sources will be performed, either primary (treaties, regulations, reports, organizational charts, statements, press releases, etc.) or secondary (specialized literature). Last but not

least, the *comparative method* will be useful to identify similarities and differences between different attempts of definition, between regulatory documents, or between Member States' practices.

The option of dedicating this research to the concept of energy diplomacy as perceived in the European Union is due to the lack of studies dedicated exclusively to this topic, which provides a fertile ground for analysis. We are talking about a branch of diplomacy that still acquires meanings from specialists, whose opinions are often contradictory. There is no generally accepted vision, and we aim to make a synthesis of the definitions offered over time, to find them reflected at the EU level, and to identify new features, new guidelines in this regard.

I. Energy diplomacy in the existing literature

Most of the studies dedicated to energy diplomacy are characterized by a fairly recent appearance (after 2010) and address this issue from multiple points of view, so there is no generally accepted definition of our concept, as we have already mentioned in the introduction. According to *Goldthau*, the author of many types of research in the field, the term could have the following meaning: "the use of foreign policy to secure access to energy supplies abroad and to promote cooperation in the energy sector."⁴ We identify in its definition two purposes and the fact that the actors involved are the states (which he calls "primary units of analysis").⁵ The perspective of this specialist is criticized by two other authors who consider the objectives and the actors who can carry out

⁴ Andreas Goldthau, „Energy Diplomacy in Trade and Investment of Oil and Gas“, *Global energy Governance. The new rules of the game*, (London: Brookings Press, 2010), p. 27.

⁵ *Ibidem*.

this kind of diplomacy limited. *Chaban and Knodt* start from the pillars of energy security as set out by the European Union (EU): sustainability, competitiveness, and security of supply, and consider that a third, namely sustainability,⁶ must be added to the two objectives identified by Goldthau. Moreover, they underline that supranational actors or transnational companies operating in the energy sector should be added to state actors.

The following authors, *Huda and Ali*, find interesting applicability of energy diplomacy by referring to transnational pipelines, which can create a framework for solid cooperation, becoming a diplomatic tool for conflict resolution.⁷ In their approach, they relate to the perspective of two other researchers about pipelines and their role in facilitating contact between states. *Le Billon and Savage* believe that despite "the complex setting up, huge financial cost and high level of confidence involved in building a cross-border pipeline", it could contribute to "a rapprochement between neighboring countries throughout the project development stages."⁸ Thus, these pipelines become "peace pipelines" or carriers of stability in intergovernmental relations.⁹

In her attempt to identify the differences between the concept of energy diplomacy and that of energy governance, *Anna Herranz Surralles* synthetically highlights objectives, tools, and actors with competence in the field. According to

⁶ Natalia Chaban, Michèle Knodt, „Energy diplomacy in the context of multi-stakeholder diplomacy: The EU and BICS“, *Cooperation and Conflict*, 50, No. 4 (April 2015), 461, doi: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836715573541>

⁷ Mirza Sadaqat Huda, Saleem H. Ali, "Energy Diplomacy in South Asia: Beyond the security paradigm in accessing the TAPI pipeline project," *Energy Research & Social Science*, No. 34, (December 2017):205, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2017.07.013>

⁸ Philippe Le Billon, Emily Savage, "Binding pipelines? Oil, armed conflicts, and economic rationales for peace in the two Sudans", *African Geographical Review*, 35, No. 2, (February 2016): 4, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19376812.2015.1113551>

⁹ *Ibidem*.

Anna, the goal can be defined considering the national interest of securing energy resources through diversification and contact with external suppliers. The modalities indicated for the development of energy diplomacy actions are the bilateral intergovernmental agreements, but also the political, legal, and economic instruments that substantiate the energy infrastructure projects or trade agreements. The actors involved in such an activity in the energy sector listed by Anna are the public authorities and the energy companies.¹⁰

Furthermore, *Andrea Prontera* in her critique of the attempts to define the energy diplomacy of the European Union, considered to oscillate between two poles: geopolitics/market, bilateral/multilateral energy diplomacy, external governance/energy diplomacy¹¹ indicates three points of interest: *triangular diplomacy* (negotiations that led to the conclusion of energy agreements between governments, between governments and companies, or only between companies; the stated purpose is to support national companies); *multilateral or "ex-ante" diplomacy* (practiced by governments or international organizations in an attempt to create rules and negotiate treaties) and *network diplomacy* (involving a range of actors from governments, companies, international organizations to local authorities, or NGOs to facilitate political processes and project implementation).¹² We notice a rather complex categorization offered by this author, which goes further and brings into discussion other concepts such as *hexagonal energy diplomacy*, which could characterize the current dynamics of the

¹⁰ Anna Herranz-Surrallés, „An emerging EU energy diplomacy? Discursive shifts, enduring practices”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 23, No. 9, (September 2015): 4, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2015.1083044>

¹¹ Andrea Prontera, „Forms of state and European energy security: diplomacy and pipelines in Southeastern Europe”, *European Security*, 26, No. 2, (April 2017): 274, DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2017.1313233.

¹² *Ibidem*, pp. 281-282.

European energy sector (a network of mutually beneficial links between national governments, companies, local communities, and the EU institutions).

An accessible and comprehensive approach to the concept of energy diplomacy is pursued by *H. Zhao*, who sets out four ways to indicate the connection between energy and diplomacy. The first meaning is that of energy as a source of diplomacy (*energy-driven diplomacy*), used mainly by countries that benefit from such energy resources in order to achieve political and security objectives.¹³ The second category is the *energy-oriented diplomacy*, which can be carried out by both importing and exporting states to achieve energy interests (either security of supply, as is the case in the European Union, or promotion of the role played in the international energy market)¹⁴. Third, the author refers to the diplomacy carried out by states, institutions, or international organizations to encourage competition, cooperation, and energy integration.¹⁵ Here we may include negotiations on territories rich in oil and gas resources located on the border between two states or of the seas that hide important deposits by riparian states. Also, it can be added the negotiations on pricing, pipelines, and transit through certain territories, as well as on the creation of regional energy integration frameworks. The fourth category identified by Zhao is that of *multilateral energy diplomacy and global energy governance*, namely energy dialogues carried out in international organizations or multilateral energy cooperation mechanisms. He brings the example of OPEC, IEA, IEF, ECT with specific

¹³ H. Zhao, "Energy Diplomacy from Bilateral Diplomacy to Global Energy Governance" in *The Economics and Politics of China's Energy Security Transition*, (London: Academic Press, 2015), p. 122.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 126.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 129-131.

competencies, but also of the organizations that are increasingly involved in energy issues such as the G20, the UN, or the EU.¹⁶

Part of Zhao's categorization is taken up by *Steven Griffiths* in his attempt to discuss energy diplomacy in the recent context of transition to low-carbon economies. He considers that “diplomacy is one of the tools of foreign policy that can be leveraged to support a country’s energy interests during a global energy transition,”¹⁷ emphasizing both the multilateral aspect important for aligning the transitional interests of the actors involved and the bilateral one, which seeks to fulfill national interests. The debate on the importance of renewable energy in diplomatic activity is becoming increasingly consistent at the level of official speeches and the level of specialized studies.¹⁸

The fund, represented by the increase in global energy demand, but also by the common commitment to improving the quality of the environment and combating climate change, gives renewable energy sources the quality of global priority. Statistics show they have gained momentum in the energy mix of many countries, and the outlooks identify considerable long-term growth. For example, the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) stated in a 2017 report that the climate targets set out in the Paris Agreement could be met by increasing the share of renewable energy in the primary energy mix from 15% (2017) to 65% in 2050.¹⁹ In a much more recent report, conducted in April 2020, IRENA pays even

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 131.

¹⁷ Steven Griffiths, “Energy diplomacy in a time of energy transition”, *Energy Strategy Reviews*, No. 26, (November 2019), p. 1, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2019.100386>

¹⁸ *Ibidem*.

¹⁹ Adnan Z. Amin, “The Age of Renewable Energy Diplomacy”, *IRENA*, November 2017, p. 1, https://www.irena.org//media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Articles/2017/Nov/eda_reflection_age_of_renewable_energy_en.pdf?la=en&hash=0E2C03219A614C89B06AB0ADDD57939EDD738F6

more attention to renewables to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to zero given the cost reduction in the last decade and the insufficient exploration of these sources which can be quite widely used, whether we are talking about electricity, heat or synthetic fuels that can replace fossil fuels in industry and transport.²⁰ Narrowing the scope of the discussion to the European plan, the goal of climate neutrality by 2050 was recently adopted, which led to a reconsideration of the objectives, including renewable energy.

In this context, there are discussions about adapting energy diplomacy to new developments. Thus, a sub concept is derived, that of *renewable energy diplomacy*, which refers to the creation of interstate links through such resources, links understood as ways to strengthen cooperation and streamline national energy systems. According to IRENA Director-General Adnan Z. Amin, "the potential of renewables to improve energy access, spur sustainable economic growth and create jobs where they are needed means that a sustainable energy future is not only a necessity, but a common path towards peace and prosperity."²¹ Renewable energy diplomacy has even become a mainstay of foreign policy in some countries, as is the case in Japan, which aims to get involved in "global efforts against climate change through promotion and expansion of renewable energy."²²

²⁰ IRENA, *Reaching Zero with Renewables. Eliminating CO₂ emissions from industry and transport in line with the 1.5° C climate goal*, Abu Dhabi, 2020, 15, accessed December 28, 2020, https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2020/Sep/IRENA_Reaching_zero_2020.pdf

²¹ Adnan Z.Amin, *op.cit.*, p. 2.

²² ****The Age of Renewable Energy Diplomacy and Japan's Course*, Opening Remarks by Taro Kono, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, 4 April 2018, p. 3, accessed December 28, 2020, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000350974.pdf>.

The context of the Pact adopted by the European Commission raised a new concept assimilated to energy diplomacy, namely the *diplomacy of the European Green Pact*. The text of the document devotes an important section to defining the ecological transition that the European Union is planning through cooperation, both with global partners for the development of the international carbon market and with neighboring actors with whom it intends to conclude partnerships or think strategies. The future applicability of diplomacy is also visible by mentioning summits, partnerships, strategies, alliances, climate, and environmental initiatives, oriented towards China and Africa.²³ The continent in the south of Europe is at the heart of European concerns about outsourcing the European Green Pact. Vulnerability to climate change, but also the biodiversity and renewable potential that characterize African countries lead the Union to consider options to support their transition to a carbon-free future in line with the Paris Agreement. Here we can include the "Green Energy Initiative",²⁴ which would establish financial cooperation essential for sustainable economic diversification, as well as other instruments that the EU uses to support Africa's sustainable development. Consequently, this diplomacy carried out in the context of the Ecological Pact will involve dialogue, working with partner countries to bring them on the same path of sustainability, and transforming the EU into a global leader that will make the agenda known internationally.

II. Energy diplomacy and the European Union regulatory framework

²³ ***European Commission, *Pactul Ecologic European*, Brussels, December 11, 2019, pp. 23-24, https://eurlex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:b828d1651c2211ea8c1f01aa75ed71a1.0020.02/DOC_1&format=PDF.

²⁴ *Idem*, *Towards a comprehensive Strategy with Africa*, Brussels, March 9, 2020, 4, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020JC0004&from=FR>.

At the EU level, references in official documents to what we now call energy diplomacy appear when dependence on external energy resources becomes a problem. We return to the Commission's first report containing considerations on improving the Community's external relations with energy suppliers in 1972, which called for discussions with exporting countries and regions and negotiation of cooperation agreements. Less than a year later, an event precipitates the course of things in terms of energy security and determines the adoption of directions of action, which I would categorize as a precursor to what we now call energy diplomacy of the European Union. OPEC's decision to impose an embargo on states that supported Israel in the Yom Kippur War and the negative impact on some European states led to the European Community recognizing, in the context of the Copenhagen Summit in December 1973, the need to negotiate with the oil-producing states and conclude cooperation agreements with them for mutual benefit.²⁵

The 20th century has been marked by international oil and gas events in the Middle East, and the year 1979 marks the second major crisis amid the Iranian Revolution, the declining Iranian oil production, and the rising barrel prices. In this context, the Community discourse reintroduces the leitmotif "constructive dialogues with oil-producing states / establishing contacts with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council" for energy security reasons, as can be seen in the documents issued at the time. The Green Paper adopted in 2000 still emphasized the essential nature of oil for the economy despite the crises that have marked the field. The figures indicated consumption of approx. 690 mtoe,

²⁵ *** Commission of the European Communities, *Bulletin of the European Communities*, No. 12, 1973, p. 11, <http://aei.pitt.edu/57092/1/BUL104.pdf>.

production of approx. 320 mtoe, and the difference, more than half of what was needed, came from imports (Middle East - 45% and Russia - 40%).²⁶ Overall, the European Union's energy dependence was rising, forecasts were unsatisfactory as they exceeded 70% for 2020-2030, and the EU was in a position to devise a strategy for a secure energy future. In addition to the internal measures related to demand management, completion of the single energy market ideal, and orientation towards the development of new energy sources, some external measures were also required to encourage, on the one hand, the construction of new oil and gas transmission routes and on the other hand, the efforts of dialogue with the producing countries so that the European Union "makes its voice heard."²⁷ This type of dialogue was to "facilitate the improvement of pricing mechanisms, the conclusion of agreements and the use of reserve stocks for mutual benefit."²⁸ There were discussions about establishing a partnership with Russia in the energy sector, but the result was the establishment of the first strategic dialogue in the energy field with this country, identified by experts as a "diplomatic platform for maintaining the supplier-consumer relationship."²⁹

On 30th October 2000, at the initiative of the Presidents of the Russian Federation, France, and the European Commission, this mechanism for bilateral cooperation was established. It aimed to answer all the questions related to one of the strongest pillars of EU-Russia relations since the 60s: the energy pillar.

²⁶ *** Commission of the European Communities, *Green Paper. Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply*, Brussels, November 29, 2000, p.3, p. 39, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52000DC0769&from=EN>.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 87.

²⁸ *Ibidem*.

²⁹ Patrick Truffer, "The EU-Russia Energy Dialogue – or the problem of imposing sanctions", *Offiziere.ch*, 18 July 18, 2014, <https://www.offiziere.ch/?p=17272>.

According to an evaluation report for 10 years period, the dialogue between the two actors proved to be effective because it contributed to a better knowledge of the markets and to the clarification of the misunderstandings regarding the rules that guide them, but also because it opened the way to negotiate agreements (such as in the nuclear sector.)³⁰ Extremely focused discussions were also held on the energy resources that the EU imported from its eastern neighbor: natural gas, oil, coal, and uranium in order to prevent supply disruptions, improve energy efficiency, increase nuclear security or modernize energy infrastructure. An important item on the agenda was the creation of a Roadmap over a long-time horizon, respectively 2050, which became a reality in 2013. The vision of the document was extremely ambitious, so by 2050, cooperation between the European Union and Russia had to lead to the creation of a common energy market or a Pan-European Energy Area. Meanwhile, in 2014, the mechanism for bilateral cooperation was suspended at the initiative of the European Commission on account of developments in the region (crisis in Ukraine).

In period 2000-2015, numerous instruments have been adopted to create an internal energy market and a coherent external dimension of EU energy policy. Among the most important is another Green Paper, adopted in 2006 which proposed a strategy for safe, sustainable, and competitive energy. Among the key areas for action, foreign energy policy needed to be outlined in terms of internal progress and the diversification of supply sources (with a focus on the Caspian Sea region, North Africa, and the Middle East). As a tribute to the aim of

³⁰ Günther H. Oettinger, Sergey I. Shmatko, *Joint Report EU-Russia Energy Dialogue 2000-2010: Opportunities for our future Energy Partnership*, Brussels/Moscow, (November 2010): pp. 6-9, <https://russiaeu.ru/sites/default/files/user/2010-EnergyDialog%20-report11-10th%20anniversary-en.pdf>.

supporting external action in the field of energy, the European Council of June 2006 reinforced the idea of using all the available instruments (including CFSP and CSDP) and emphasized the need of drafting documents for the development and implementation of external energy policy under close coordination of Council, Commission and High Representative (an Action Plan and a Strategic Review).

The European Commission, in turn, draws up a series of communications during this period setting out principles for action to manage external energy relations (bilateral negotiations, agreements, cooperation with Russia, cooperation with third countries, supplier or transit countries, energy partnerships such as those between Africa and Europe), but keeping unchanged the idea that "the external energy policy needs to reflect the interconnectedness of the internal energy market and the interdependence of the EU Member States."³¹ However, the Union's vulnerability to shocks remained quite high given the repeated crises in Russia. It was necessary to think of a strategy to ensure resilience to shocks and, implicitly, energy security. Thus, in 2014, the *Energy Security Strategy* was adopted, and a year later the *Energy Union Strategy*, which proposed ways to secure energy policy both internally and externally. The innovative element highlighted in the last strategic document is that of energy and climate diplomacy. According to this document, "The EU will use all external policy instruments to ensure that a strong, united EU engages constructively with its partners and speaks with one voice on energy and

³¹ *** European Commission, *On security of energy supply and international cooperation – The EU Energy Policy: Engaging with Partners beyond Our Borders*, Brussels, September 7, 2011, p. 4, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0539&from=en>.

climate”, “the Commission, the HR / VP, and the Member States being responsible for the revitalization of the EU's energy and climate diplomacy.”³²

However, the year 2015 is defining for the explicit expression of the option for energy diplomacy at the level of the European Union through the adoption of the *Conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council on Energy Diplomacy*, which also included an *Action Plan* in this regard. This plan outlines the directions for an efficient energy diplomacy, as follows: “strengthen strategic guidance through regular high-level engagement, establish and further develop energy cooperation and dialogues, support efforts to enhance the global energy architecture and multilateral initiatives, strengthen common messages and energy diplomacy capacities.”³³ The plan also briefly mentions some issues related to climate, which are of great importance in the European Ecological Pact, namely the relationship with third countries based on the export of technology and know-how needed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions³⁴. Climate reporting in the Energy Diplomacy Plan is due to the fact the Council recognized climate diplomacy as an “inherent part”³⁵ of foreign policy, as a “strategic priority in diplomatic dialogues”, and energy diplomacy as “a way to support the transition to a sustainable energy mix”, which promotes renewable energy sources and

³² *** European Commission, *A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy*, Brussels, February 25, 2015, p. 21, https://eurlex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:1bd46c90bdd411e4bbe101aa75ed71a1.0001.03/DOC_1&format=PDF

³³ *** Council of the European Union, *Council conclusions on Energy Diplomacy*, Brussels, July 20, 2015, pp. 5-8, data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10995-2015-INIT/en/pdf.

³⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 6.

³⁵ *** Council of the EU, *Council conclusion on climate diplomacy*, July 20, 2015, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/07/20/fac-climate-diplomacy-conclusions/>,

energy efficiency measures.³⁶ We are talking about synergy or a complementarity between the two concepts necessary to achieve both climate goals and other energy goals such as energy security.

New climate and energy realities will naturally lead to a partial shift in diplomatic attention, from the security of fossil fuel supply and multilateral energy governance to energy transition management. Therefore, there were discussions regarding the implementation of the Energy Diplomacy Plan adopted in 2015 under these concerns, both at the official level and at the level of specialized studies. In its program for the Presidency of the Council of the European Union from 1 July to 31 December 2020, Germany proposed to endow the European Ecological Pact with an active external energy component and to update the Energy Diplomacy Plan to “attract new partners for green energy imports and raise awareness among fossil fuel exporters of the opportunities presented by a new energy world.”³⁷ In general, the intention was that through diplomacy, regional and international efforts should be directed towards the same goal of combating climate change, but in a differentiated way according to the responsibilities assumed by each actor to achieve the common goal (principle of common but differentiated responsibility).³⁸

The report on the state of the Energy Union in 2020 demonstrates the EU's mobilization before putting these proposed changes on paper. It notes, within the diplomatic dimension, ministerial meetings with China and Canada, actions of

³⁶ *Idem*, *Annex. Council Conclusions on Climate Diplomacy*, Brussels, February 26, 2018, p. 7, <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6125-2018-INIT/en/pdf>.

³⁷ *Idem*, *Together for Europe's recovery. Programme for Germany's Presidency of the Council of the European Union. 1 July to 31 December 2020*, p. 23, <https://www.eu2020.de/blob/2360248/e0312c50f910931819ab67f630d15b2f/06-30-pdf-programm-en-data.pdf>.

³⁸ *Ibidem*.

EU delegations in non-EU countries, cooperation with the G7 and G30 presidencies, and multilateral involvement in the International Renewable Energy Agency and Clean Energy Ministerial and Mission Innovation. We can conclude that the aim of this EU diplomacy in the context of climate concerns is to promote globally its position on climate transition, to create investment opportunities, and “to help its partners to translate their vision [...] in actionable policies and measures” in the field.³⁹

This redefined goal will complement for the moment the classic meaning given to energy diplomacy. The debate on the future of natural gas, for example, is intense because we are still talking about a high dependence on a single supplier, an increased interest in the EU's gas infrastructure projects (see Projects of Common Interest), but also about its quality of having the lowest CO₂ intensity among fossil fuels.⁴⁰ At least in the short term, by 2025, it is expected that there will be an increase in imports of natural gas due to the decrease in its production and the increase in consumption caused by future closures of coal and nuclear power plants.⁴¹ According to the scenarios (Stated Policies Scenario conducted by the IEA), globally, natural gas production will increase in the period 2020-2025, followed by a significant decrease in the next five years. Also, its role in generating electricity will be relegated to the background by 2030 due

³⁹ *** European Commission, *2020 report on the State of the Energy Union pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 on Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action*, Brussels, October 14, 2020, p. 16, https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/report_on_the_state_of_the_energy_union_com2020950.pdf.

⁴⁰ Schalk Cloete, *An independent Global Energy Forecast to 2050 (part 3 of 5): fossil fuels*, October 18, 2019, <https://energypost.eu/an-independent-global-energy-forecast-to-2050-part-3-of-5-fossil-fuels/>

⁴¹ Peter Zeniewski, „A long-term view of natural gas security in the European Union”, *IEA*, March 13, 2019, <https://www.iea.org/commentaries/a-long-term-view-of-natural-gas-security-in-the-european-union>.

to the boom that renewables will take. They will contribute in a proportion of 40% to the power supply as indicated in the projections.⁴²

Consequently, the current situation and short-term forecasts indicate that natural gas will remain in the energy rankings both globally and in the European Union. Thus, in addition to efforts to transform the role of natural gas in the road to de-carbonization (the transition to hydrogen, biogas, synthetic gas), of infrastructure (for the transport of new gases), and technologies (for carbon capture, storage, and use), it will continue to support the security of supply in the sense conceived over the years and, implicitly, diplomatic tools will be used in this regard.

IV. Actors involved in the practice of EU's energy diplomacy

To be able to understand the concept of "energy diplomacy", beyond the arguments offered by the literature, it is useful to turn our attention to the applied part which is reflected at the EU level. The characteristic of complexity in terms of definition is justified in European energy governance, which can also be described by the same attribute. It is well known that both the national and the supranational play an important role in the conduct of the European Union's energy policy. Member States make a significant contribution to the achievement of the Community's energy targets, but they manage their resources according to their own needs, as mentioned in the Lisbon Treaty. Therefore, in addition to the general meaning of the foreign energy policy offered by the European Union, we

⁴² IEA, *Changes in natural gas production in the Stated Policies Scenario, 2019-2030*, last updated: October 12, 2020, <https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/changes-in-natural-gas-production-in-the-stated-policies-scenario-2019-2030>.

will also find specificities at the national level according to energy needs and interests. Specialized studies include the category of those responsible for energy diplomacy at the EU level the European Commission together with its Commissioners and Directorates, the European External Action Service together with the High Representative, also with its delegations, the European Parliament, the EU Council, each Member State “with their own governments, parliaments, ministries of energy and diplomatic missions,”⁴³ but also the transnational corporations and the companies.

We will linger on the European Commission, which is actively involved in the making of the European energy policy. Since the 1960s, this institution has tried to exploit energy challenges and provide recommendations for solving various problems facing the Union: energy dependence, vulnerability to supply disruptions, environmental problems, etc. Its activity is carried out with the help of a large number of departments, directorates, and agencies. The tasks in the energy field are mainly carried out by the Directorate-General for Energy, DG Climate Action, and DG Environment. The most important Directorate for the discussion is the first mentioned, which has attributions that cover both the internal and the external dimension, both the strategic dimension and the one that refers to clean transition, energy efficiency, innovation, or the one that focuses on nuclear energy. The purpose of the Directorate is therefore a complex one, dedicated to the elaboration of energy legislative proposals, the implementation of specific policies and strategies, the proper functioning of the internal energy market, and the safe exploitation of domestic energy sources. The

⁴³ Natalia Chaban, Michèle Knodt, *op.cit.*, p. 462.

other two directions mentioned complement the activity in the energy sector given the concerns related to achieving climate neutrality by 2050.

The European Commission was also the authority that began to emphasize the need to strengthen energy security by promoting multilateralism, diversification of supply sources, suppliers, routes, energy dialogue, and negotiation on the construction of cross-border interconnection pipelines, as we have noted in the discussion related to the theoretical part. Its competence in foreign energy policy, although minor at first, has gradually progressed, receiving specific responsibilities. For example, in 2011, the Foreign Affairs Council decided to endow it with a mandate to negotiate a treaty with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan for the construction of the Trans-Caspian Pipeline. At the time, this mandate for action was considered the first "operational decision of the Union, part of a coordinated and united external energy strategy" and involved a series of diplomatic actions such as discussions between representatives of the three actors aiming to make legal commitments or to conclude bilateral agreements for the construction and operation of the pipeline.⁴⁴ The Commission's work on external energy policy is supported by the Council (external affairs and energy configurations), but also by the European Parliament through important decision-making and budgetary tasks for the implementation of energy policy.

The discussion on energy diplomacy cannot exclude the Union's diplomatic service, namely the European External Action Service, whose activity is divided between Brussels through experts, and the rest of the world through

⁴⁴ ***European Commission, "EU starts negotiations on Caspian Pipeline to bring gas to Europe", September 12, 2011, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_11_1023

embassy delegations. He is headed by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who has also been Vice-President of the Commission since 2009. He coordinates the Union's foreign policy instruments, ensures its external representation, and participates in meetings and the preparation of specific documents. This is the case of the *Energy Diplomacy Action Plan*, a plan presented to the Council by its two authors, the Commission and the High Representative. These authorities received the task „to ensure the follow-up of the EU Energy Diplomacy Action Plan, in close consultation and coordination with the Member States and in accordance with their respective roles and competencies as determined by the Treaties.”⁴⁵

Moreover, it is interesting to consider how the Member States think about diplomatic activity in this sector. According to specialized studies, energy diplomacy is the result of an important process of determining national energy priorities, carried out both at the level of experts in the field and the level of ministerial officials'.⁴⁶ Established following the cooperation and coordination of the structures responsible for foreign affairs, energy, environment, natural resources, etc., external energy priorities are to be met by the diplomatic missions of the states depending on the size of the state and the number of diplomatic representatives sent to the post. In the case of small missions, we are talking about diplomats with extensive expertise, who can manage multiple areas of cooperation, including energy, and in the case of large-scale missions, there may

⁴⁵ *** Council of the European Union, *Council Conclusions on Energy Diplomacy*, Brussels, July 20, 2015, p. 2, <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10995-2015-INIT/en/pdf>.

⁴⁶ Valentin Katrandhiev, "Energy Diplomacy Revisited" in *Foreign Affairs Research Papers*, No. 13, (June 2020) pp. 26-27.

be diplomats whose training is specifically energetic.⁴⁷ Furthermore, there are states, such as the United Kingdom, which employ professionals without diplomatic degrees but with expertise in areas of interest. For example, the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) mentions positions such as: energy policy officer in charge of strengthening energy ties with the state hosting the diplomatic mission, energy and environmental policy advisor tasked with promoting commitment to the transition to a low-carbon global economy or energy and climate policy analyst involved in preparations for one of the most important climate events, namely COP26, November 2021.⁴⁸ The picture of the actors involved in energy diplomacy specific to European countries is complemented by another function that we find, especially among the countries of Central Europe. It is the so-called “ambassador-at-large” or, in translation, the ambassador with special tasks, respectively a high-ranking personality, whose accreditation is not limited to a single state, but can cover a group of countries or even a region and whose activity is dedicated to a special mission. From a historical point of view, this diplomatic function was first introduced by the USA, in 1949, in order to replace the presence of the Secretary of State at certain international conferences or negotiations.⁴⁹

Gradually, the quality of representatives with special tasks was taken over by other actors such as the EU and its Member States. For the energy sector, we can mention:

⁴⁷ *Ibidem.*

⁴⁸ HM Government, *View Vacancy – Climate and Energy Policy Analyst*, 2020, <https://fco.tal.net/vx/mobile-0/appcentre-ext/brand-0/candidate/so/pm/4/pl/1/opp/12351-Climate-and-Energy-Policy-Analyst/en-GB>.

⁴⁹ Filip Turčinović, „Some Specificities of the Ambassador at Large Diplomatic Institute” in *American International Journal of Social Science*, 5, No. 3, (June 2016), p. 42, http://www.aijssnet.com/journals/Vol_5_No_3_June_2016/7.pdf.

1. Ambassador with special tasks for climate diplomacy (Marc Vanheukelen, European External Action Service);
2. Ambassador with special tasks for climate and energy policy (Kaja Tael, Estonia, Pál Ságvári, Hungary);
3. Ambassador with special tasks for energy security (Václav Bartu Czech Republic, Anita Orban, Hungary, Mihnea Constantinescu, Marius Cristian Bădescu, Romania);
4. Ambassador with special tasks in the nuclear sector (Darius Degutis, Lithuania, responsible for expressing regionally and internationally the Baltic's position on the Astravets nuclear power plant).

These diplomatic representatives work in their foreign ministries and are responsible for representing state energy interests abroad, supporting dialogue with various partners on energy issues, and, consequently, improving energy cooperation and connections with external partners in the field.

V. Conclusions

We can conclude that the research hypothesis mentioned at the beginning is verified based on the analysis dedicated to the concept of energy diplomacy. The functioning of society is intrinsically linked to the existence of an energy source, of an energy market characterized by several indicators: consumption, production, and distribution. Where the energy potential is lower, the interest in securing the energy supply of the citizens, respectively of bringing the energy resources through networks (electricity) or pipelines (oil, natural gas) outside the borders is bigger. This is where foreign policy and its instrument, diplomacy,

come into play because access to such external energy sources can be achieved by establishing contacts, conducting negotiations, and concluding agreements, either bilaterally (between governments) or at the multilateral level within international diplomatic forums) or at another level indicated by specialized studies (between governments, companies, institutions, etc.) This idea is found in the attempts to define the concept of energy diplomacy (as in the case of Goldthau or Anna Surralles) and applies to the European Union, which pays more and more attention to the subject both in its normative documents and at the level of application (through the way the EU works to promote its energy interests).

The research focused on these two indicators, which are important for demonstrating the EU's interest in energy diplomacy, and outlined a rather complex example of analysis, given that we are talking about an organization in which competence over energy policy is shared (between EU institutions and the Member States). The orientation towards an external dimension of energy policy has been manifested since the last century in times of crisis and awareness of dependence on external sources of supply but has found its embodiment in the many tools developed for the proper functioning of the European energy market. It is important to emphasize the EU's view that the coherence of external energy policy depends on the smooth running of things internally, and efforts have been made in both directions. Despite all these concerns expressed in documents prepared by the Commission, adopted by the Council, etc., the explicit expression of the option for energy diplomacy appears only at the presentation of the Energy Union Strategy and, subsequently, the Energy Diplomacy Action Plan, which indicates the directions in this domain. The traditional meaning

provided at that time, namely the security of fossil fuel supply, has transformed in just a few years, the foreground is taken by the energy transition, by achieving climate neutrality under the European Ecological Pact. The EU is also increasingly involved in this regard, as noted in its reports, and it is diplomatically promoting its global position in the process of reducing greenhouse gas emissions to zero. We deduce that, at least in the short term, the classic meaning of diplomacy will coexist with the new outline, given that certain fuels, such as natural gas, play a significant role in ensuring the energy security of some states. There are even gas infrastructure projects that the EU supports financially.

Once we have observed the Union's perception of this concept, it is important to understand how the theory is implemented. And here the discussion is characterized by ambivalence as we are talking about several authorities with diplomatic responsibilities at the EU level as a whole, but also about a specific organization of the Member States. The main carriers of this ability are the European Commission and the High Representative, as indicated in the documents adopted in this field, and at the Member State level, the task of energy diplomacy cannot be analyzed outside the foreign ministries and diplomatic missions in which we find various functions, sometimes dedicated exclusively to energy interests.

In conclusion, the European Union provides a fertile ground for analyzing the concept of energy diplomacy through the historical context that presents the particularity of concerns about the development of an external dimension of energy policy, through the current regulatory framework, which indicates directions for action in this field, but also through how this activity is

carried out (actors and tools). Moreover, the constant changes that are taking place in terms of energy on the European continent (see the current concern for the global transition and the shift from fossil fuels to renewable energy) are stimulating discussions on energy diplomacy, which receive so many meanings depending on so many contexts.

Bibliography

1. *The Age of Renewable Energy Diplomacy and Japan's Course*, Opening Remarks by Taro Kono, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, 4 April 2018, 3, accessed December 28, 2020, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000350974.pdf>.
2. Amin, Adnan Z., "The Age of Renewable Energy Diplomacy", *IRENA*, November 2017, 1, https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Articles/2017/Nov/eda_reflection_age_of_renewable_energy_en.pdf?la=en&hash=0E2C03219A614C89B06AB0ADDD57939EDD738F6
3. Bösch, Frank, „Energy Diplomacy: West Germany, the Soviet Union and the Oil Crises of the 1970s”, *Historical Social Research*, no. 39, (April 2014): 169-174, DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.12759/hsr.39.2014.4.165-185>
4. Chaban, Natalia, Knodt, Michèle, „Energy diplomacy in the context of multistakeholder diplomacy: The EU and BICS”, *Cooperation and Conflict*, 50, No. 4 (April 2015), 461, Doi: [10.1177/0010836715573541](https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836715573541)

5. Cloete, Schalk, "An independent Global Energy Forecast to 2050 (part 3 of 5): fossil fuels", October 18, 2019,
6. <https://energypost.eu/an-independent-global-energy-forecast-to-2050-part-3-of-5-fossil-fuels/>
7. Commission of the European Communities, *Pactul Ecologic European*, Bruxelles, December 11, 2019, 23-24,
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:b828d165-1c22-11ea-8c1f-01aa75ed71a1.0020.02/DOC_1&format=PDF.
8. Commission of the European Communities, *Bulletin of the European Communities*, No. 12, 1973, 11, <http://aei.pitt.edu/57092/1/BUL104.pdf>.
9. Commission of the European Communities, *Green Paper. Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply*, Brussels, November 29, 2000,
<https://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52000DC0769&from=EN>, 3 and 39.
10. CORDIS, "First Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Energy Ministers", last modified June 7, 1996,
<https://cordis.europa.eu/article/id/6277firsteuromediterraneanconference-of-energy-ministers>
11. Council of the EU, *Annex. Council Conclusions on Climate Diplomacy*, Brussels, February 26, 2018, 7,
<https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-61252018INIT/en/pdf>.
12. Council of the EU, *Council conclusion on climate diplomacy*, July 20, 2015,
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/07/20/fac-climate-diplomacy-conclusions/>,

13. Council of the EU, *Together for Europe's recovery. Programme for Germany's Presidency of the Council of the European Union. 1 July to 31 December 2020*, 23,
<https://www.eu2020.de/blob/2360248/e0312c50f910931819ab67f630d15b2f/06-30-pdf-programm-en-data.pdf>.
14. Council of the European Union, *Council conclusions on Energy Diplomacy*, Brussels, July 20, 2015, 5-8,
data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10995-2015-INIT/en/pdf.
15. Council of the European Union, *Council Conclusions on Energy Diplomacy*, Brussels, July 20, 2015, 2,
<https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST109952015INIT/en/pdf>.
16. European Commission, "EU starts negotiations on Caspian Pipeline to bring gas to Europe", September 12, 2011,
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_11_1023,
17. European Commission, *2020 report on the State of the Energy Union pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 on Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action*, Brussels, October 14, 2020, 16,
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/report_on_the_state_of_the_energy_union_com2020950.pdf.
18. European Commission, *A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy*, Brussels, February 25, 2015, 21,
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:1bd46c90-bdd4-11e4-bbe1-01aa75ed71a1.0001.03/DOC_1&format=PDF

19. European Commission, *On the security of energy supply and international cooperation – The EU Energy Policy: Engaging with Partners beyond Our Borders*, Brussels, September 7, 2011, 4,
<https://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0539&from=en>.
20. European Commission, *Towards a comprehensive Strategy with Africa*, Brussels, March 9, 2020, 4,
<https://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020JC0004&from=FR>.
21. Goldthau, Andreas, „Energy Diplomacy in Trade and Investment of Oil and Gas”, *Global Energy Governance. The new rules of the game*, (London: Brookings Press, 2010), 27.
22. Griffiths, Steven, “Energy diplomacy in a time of energy transition”, *Energy Strategy Reviews*, No. 26, (November 2019), 1,
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.esr.2019.100386>
23. Herranz-Surrallés, Anna, „An emerging EU energy diplomacy? Discursive shifts, enduring practices”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 23, No. 9, (September 2015): 4, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2015.1083044>
24. HM Government, *View Vacancy – Climate and Energy Policy Analyst*, 2020,
<https://fco.tal.net/vx/mobile0/appcentreext/brand0/candidate/so/pm/4/pl/1/opp/12351-Climate-and-Energy-Policy-Analyst/en-GB>.
25. International Renewable Energy Agency, *Reaching Zero with renewables*.
https://www.irena.org//media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2020/Sep/IRENA_Reaching_zero_2020.pdf

26. International Energy Agency, *Changes in natural gas production in the Stated Policies Scenario, 2019-2030*, last updated: October 12, 2020, <https://www.iea.org/dataandstatistics/charts/changesinnaturalgasproduction-in-the-stated-policies-scenario-2019-2030>.
27. International Renewable Energy Agency, *Reaching Zero with Renewables. Eliminating CO₂ emissions from industry and transport in line with the 1.5° C climate goal*, Abu Dhabi, 2020, 15, accessed December 28, 2020,
28. Le Billon, Philippe, Savage, Emily, "Binding pipelines? Oil, armed conflicts, and economic rationales for peace in the two Sudans", *African Geographical Review*, 35, No. 2, (February 2016): 4, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19376812.2015.1113551>
29. Mirza Sadaqat Huda, Saleem H. Ali, "Energy Diplomacy in South Asia: Beyond the security paradigm in accessing the TAPI pipeline project," *Energy Research & Social Science*, No. 34, (December 2017):205, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2017.07.013>
30. Oetinger, Günther H., Shmatko, Sergey I., *Joint Report EU-Russia Energy Dialogue 2000-2010: Opportunities for our future Energy Partnership*, Brussels/Moscow, (November 2010): 6-9, <https://russiaeu.ru/sites/default/files/user/2010-EnergyDialog%20-report11-10th%20anniversary-en.pdf>.
31. Prontera, Andrea, „Forms of state and European energy security: diplomacy and pipelines in Southeastern Europe”, *European Security*, 26, No. 2, (April 2017): 274, DOI: [10.1080/09662839.2017.1313233](https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2017.1313233).

32. Streimikiene, Dalia, "Monitoring of energy supply sustainability in the Baltic Sea region", *Energy Policy*, No. 35, (2007): 1658, doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2006.05.011.
33. Truffer, Patrick, "The EU-Russia Energy Dialogue – or the problem of imposing sanctions", *Offiziere.ch*, 18 July 18, 2014, <https://www.offiziere.ch/?p=17272>.
34. Turčinović, Filip, „Some Specificities of the Ambassador at Large Diplomatic Institute” în *American International Journal of Social Science*, 5, No. 3, (June 2016), 42, http://www.aijssnet.com/journals/Vol_5_No_3_June_2016/7.pdf.
35. Valentin Katrandhiev, "Energy Diplomacy Revisited" în *Foreign Affairs Research Papers*, No. 13, (June 2020) 26-27.
36. Zeniewski, Peter, „A long-term view of natural gas security in the European Union”, *IEA*, March 13, 2019, <https://www.iea.org/commentaries/a-long-term-view-of-natural-gas-security-in-the-european-union>
37. Zhao, H., "Energy Diplomacy from Bilateral Diplomacy to Global Energy Governance", *The Economics and Politics of China's Energy Security Transition*, (London: Academic Press, 2015), 122

THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AID - DIVERSITY AND INNOVATION

Victor Nicolăescu*

Keywords: principles, humanitarian assistance, humanity, conflict, humanitarian aid

Abstract

Humanitarian assistance is currently a topic frequently addressed at the European level, in the context of the conflict in Ukraine, although the European Union is the main donor at the international level. The emergence of open conflict on the European continent, considered to be the largest military deployment since the Second World War, brought on the public agenda of European countries the provision of humanitarian assistance for the population that left Ukraine on February 24, 2022, located especially at the level of European countries. The involvement of citizens in humanitarian activities represented the defining emblem of European solidarity and a unanimous orientation towards supporting the Ukrainian population was highlighted. In this context, already having the specific frameworks for the provision of humanitarian aid by governments, international institutions, and non-governmental organizations, a vibrant network of humanity has manifested itself at the level of citizens. In this context, having the integrative dimensions of humanitarian aid applied synergistically to international institutions - governments -

* PhD in Sociology, University of Bucharest, Professor at "Petre Andrei" University.

citizens, this article highlights the principles of humanitarian aid as highlighted at the level of the main operational levels active in the field.

Introduction

In the last decades, the volume of humanitarian assistance has increased significantly at the global level, and a series of instruments have been created at the level of international organizations, government institutions, and civil society structures. The perspective of applying similar work frameworks seems to be difficult to create considering first of all the diversity of challenges at the international level. Secondly, for each level of specific humanitarian aid intervention, different structures are placed that apply different work standards. Thirdly, at the level of the epicenter of humanitarian assistance interventions, different levels of expertise and applications are identified, adjusted according to the local context, the competencies of the active people, and the resources available to be used. Incidentally, the number of disaster events reported per year has increased significantly in the last two decades. Although there were relatively more disaster peak years in the decade 2000–2009 compared to 2010–2019, the overall frequency remains at a record high. Also, between 1970 and 2000, reports of medium- and large-scale disasters averaged about 90–100 per year, but between 2001 and 2020, the reported number of such events increased to 350–500 per year. These included geophysical disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis, and volcanic eruptions, climate and weather-related disasters, and outbreaks of biological hazards, including crop pests and epidemics (EM-DAT).¹

¹ Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) was launched in 1988 by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), <https://www.emdat.be/>

In demographic terms, according to the data presented in the Global Humanitarian Overview 2022, in December 2021, it is highlighted that 274 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance and protection, which indicates that 1 in 29 people worldwide are in need of humanitarian assistance – a significant increase from 1 in 33 in 2020 and 1 in 45 in 2019.² However, despite the fact that humanitarian need has grown rapidly over the past two years, overall growth in international humanitarian assistance has stagnated, as governments face increasingly difficult budget choices in view of exacerbated challenges in 2022 of the conflict in Ukraine, there are clear risks for development and humanitarian assistance.³

Historical and Legal Perspectives on Humanitarian Assistance

In the current framework, marked by unpredictability, the principles of humanitarian assistance are being discussed more and more, which, on a general level, are considered to be rooted in international humanitarian law. Also, the analyzes are approached in a narrower sense by which it is considered that the principles are designed to guide the activity of humanitarian actors (Mackintosh, 2000).⁴

At the level of historical evolution, it is considered that modern humanitarianism is appreciated as reactionary, it has evolved and adapted to

² *** OCHA, *Global Humanitarian Overview 2022*, in <https://hum-insight.info/>

³ Urquhart, Angus (2022), *Global humanitarian assistance report 2022*, Development Initiatives, Bristol, UK

⁴ Mackintosh K. (2000). *The principles of humanitarian action in international humanitarian law*, HPG Report 5. Published March 2000

new forms of suffering that people have known. Thus, Barnett (2011)⁵ identifies three eras of humanitarianism: imperial humanitarianism (1800–1945), neo-humanitarianism (1945–1989) and liberal humanitarianism (1989 to the present, seen as marked by globalization and international responses to various forms of crisis and disasters. With regard to the approach to aid for signs in distress, the approach of Stoddard (2003)⁶ can be distinguished, who appreciates that humanitarianism as a vocation has its roots in three traditions: religious, Wilsonian, and Dunantist. In the first category, religious humanitarianism is highlighted as the older form of humanitarianism, evolving from overseas missionary work. The second category includes Wilsonian humanitarianism inspired by the action of US President Woodrow Wilson, who believed that American NGOs could best help the world by providing both humanitarian aid and promoting American aspirations and values ("America's manifest destiny"), especially during the Plan Marshall after World War II. Within the third category, Dunantist humanitarianism stands out, named after the founder of the Red Cross, Henri Dunant, who adopted the fundamental humanitarian principles from which other principled frameworks, more or less close to the Dunantist model, branched out.

In the humanitarian assistance approach, it is important to integrate international law serves as a basis for humanitarian action,⁷ considering the legal

⁵ Barnett, M. (2011). *Empire of humanity: A history of humanitarianism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

⁶ Stoddard, A. (2003). *Humanitarian NGOs: Challenges and trends*. In J. Macrae & A. Harmer (Eds.), *Humanitarian action and the 'global war on terror': A review of trends and issues* (HPG report 14). London: ODI.

⁷ *Introduction to humanitarian action a brief guide for resident coordinators*, 2015, OCHA's Humanitarian Leadership Strengthening Unit,

obligations of states in their behavior with each other and their treatment of individuals, including fundamental legal standards for the protection of persons and the type of assistance that can be provided. Regarding international law, two fundamental distinctions applicable to humanitarian action stand out, which are presented below.

First of all, by recognizing that human rights are fundamental for every human being and apply at all times, the perspective of international law also aligns. Thus, it is appreciated that international human rights law identifies a limited set of rights that can be publicly restricted or suspended by a state during a serious public emergency (referred to as a "derogation"), but certain human rights, such as the prohibition of torture, they cannot be derogated from, which means they cannot be limited or limited, suspended in any way, at any time, for any reason, even during armed conflict. The three fundamental elements are placed in this category of international law: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights with its two Optional Protocols and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights with its Optional Protocol.

Second, international humanitarian law applies to situations of armed conflict with the aim of limiting the effects of hostilities on both persons and objects and protecting certain particularly vulnerable groups of people. A wide range of treaties fall under this category, the key instruments being the Hague Convention and its Regulations (1907) and the four Geneva Conventions (1949), and Additional Protocols I and II (1977), which provide protection to specific

categories of persons, establish further limitations on the means and methods of warfare and regulate the provision of humanitarian assistance to persons in need. Complementarily, other essential international instruments regarding humanitarian law are highlighted, such as the Convention on the Status of Refugees (1951); Conventions on the Status of Stateless Persons (1954) and on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961); and Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998) outline the identification, protection, and assistance of refugees, stateless persons and internally displaced persons respectively.

Humanitarian principles, developed by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement

Swiss activist Henry Dunant, marked by the bloody battle of Solferino (June 24, 1859) and inadequate treatment of wounded soldiers, published *A Memory of Solferino* (1862) and campaigned to create the Red Cross in 1863,⁸ one of the first true international aid organizations. The Red Cross received an official mandate at the first Geneva Convention in 1864 to provide neutral and impartial assistance to civilian and military victims of conflicts under the organization of national Red Cross committees (Romania ratified the Geneva Convention in 1874 and on July 4, 1876, the Romanian Red Cross Society came into existence.)⁹

The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement codified in 1965 seven Fundamental Principles which serve as the basis for its organization and actions. They are the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality.

⁸ *** ORIGINEA SI ISTORIA MISCARII DE CRUCE ROSIE SI SEMILUNA ROSIE, in <https://crucearosie.ro/cine-suntem/originea-si-istoria-miscarii-de-cruce-rosie-si-semiluna-rosie/>

⁹ *Ibidem*.

Humanitarian principles at the level of UN institutions

The United Nations, through its institutions, since its establishment in 1945, has focused its efforts on achieving international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian nature. In this sense, participation in the efforts to rebuild the devastated European continent after the Second World War was the first issue addressed by the UN at the level of humanitarian aid. Thus, through the post-war experience, the international community recognized the role of the UN to coordinate humanitarian aid for areas affected by emergencies, both natural and man-made disasters.¹⁰ Currently, when disasters occur and their effects cannot be managed only by the governments of the affected countries, the UN coordinates humanitarian aid to provide quick and effective help to those in need. Humanitarian actions are coordinated by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) of the UN Secretariat. From a normative perspective, UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 (1991) reaffirms the primary responsibility of the state to provide assistance and protection and also establishes the framework for the coordination and delivery of UN-led international humanitarian action. Humanitarian actions financed or undertaken by UN institutions are aligned with the four basic principles of humanitarian assistance: humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence.

¹⁰ ***UNICEF USA, *Global example of humanitarian aid from the UN* in <https://www.unicefusa.org/stories/global-examples-humanitarian-aid-un/38249>

The UN and partner organizations aim to assist 183 million people most in need in 30 countries and 7 regions and require a total of \$41 billion.¹¹

Humanitarian principles applied at the level of the European Union

At the EU level, humanitarian principles are enshrined in the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, signed in December 2007 by the EU Council, the European Parliament, and the European Commission. The Consensus is the basic framework guiding EU humanitarian aid policy, providing a common vision and principles as well as a practical approach. It ensures that actions carried out by the European Commission's Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) department comply with humanitarian principles and provide humanitarian assistance to those who need it most. From the perspective of the European Consensus,¹² humanitarian aid represents a fundamental expression of the universal value of solidarity between peoples and a moral imperative. EU humanitarian aid also aims to provide an urgent, needs-based response aimed at protecting life, preventing and alleviating human suffering and maintaining human dignity wherever needed, when governments and local actors are overwhelmed, unable to act, or unwilling to act.

The fundamental humanitarian principles on which the humanitarian aid offered by the EU is based are the 4 principles promoted and respected by the UN institutions - humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence.

¹¹ *** OCHA, *Global Humanitarian Overview 2022*, in <https://hum-insight.info/>

¹² Consensusul European privind Ajutorul Umanitar, *Declarație comună a Consiliului și reprezentanților guvernelor statelor membre reuniți în cadrul Consiliului, a Parlamentului European și a Comisiei Europene*, (2008/C 25/01), [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/RO/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:42008X0130\(01\)&from=EN](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/RO/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:42008X0130(01)&from=EN)

Moreover, considering the fact that the EU is the first contributor in terms of humanitarian assistance at the international level, the principled approach is considered essential for the acceptance of the EU as a partner and for the ability of the Union and humanitarian actors, in general, to act on the ground in political contexts and security often complex.

Standards applied in humanitarian assistance

Increasingly, the public and donors are looking for assurances that the resources they provide are used in the best possible way, both in terms of allocations for interventions made and programs developed with and for affected people. For this purpose, a series of clearly defined, rigorously, and innovative applied standards have been elaborated and developed that can provide these assurances and support quality and responsible humanitarian action. A variety of standards and accountability measures have been launched over the years, the most relevant being the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief, the Sphere Manual, and the Standard basic humanitarian on quality and accountability.

The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief (1994)¹³ is a voluntary code with ten principles to protect high standards of behavior in humanitarian response.

1. The humanitarian imperative comes first (1994)

¹³ The Code of Conduct Principles of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Response Programmes, <https://www.ifrc.org/sites/default/files/2021-07/code-of-conduct-movement-ngos-english.pdf>

2. The aid is granted regardless of the race, creed, or nationality of the beneficiaries and without unfavorable distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated based on need only
3. The aid will not be used to promote a particular political or religious point of view
4. We will endeavor not to act as instruments of government foreign policy
5. We will respect culture and customs
6. We will try to build disaster response on local capacities
7. Ways will be found to involve the beneficiaries of the program in aid management
8. Aid should strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disasters as well as meet basic needs
9. We hold ourselves accountable both to those we seek to help and to those from whom we accept resources
10. In our outreach, publicity, and advertising activities, we will recognize disaster victims as dignified people, not hopeless objects

These principles are accompanied by three sets of recommendations, organized at the level of annexes, on guiding principles that describe the desirable working environment to be created by donor governments, host governments, and intergovernmental organizations – mainly United Nations agencies – to facilitate the effective participation of organizations providing humanitarian aid in disaster response.

The Sphere Manual (2011)¹⁴ and accompanying standards are important technical resources for every humanitarian worker, being provided by a group created in 1997 which is made up of various non-governmental organizations and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. The Sphere Manual¹⁵ establishes common principles and internationally recognized universal minimum standards for humanitarian action, focusing on two central approaches: people affected by disaster or conflict have the right to a dignified life and therefore the right to assistance; and all possible measures should be taken to alleviate human suffering resulting from disasters or conflicts. Three distinct categories are addressed within the work; I. the protection principles that represent a practical translation of the principles and legal rights outlined in the Humanitarian Charter into the four principles that inform all humanitarian responses; II. the core humanitarian standards which refer to nine commitments that describe the essential processes and organizational responsibilities to enable quality and accountability in achieving the Minimum Standards; III. four technical chapters that include minimum standards in key response sectors: water supply, sanitation, and hygiene promotion (WASH), food security and nutrition, shelter and settlement, and health.

¹⁴ Sphere Association. *The Sphere Handbook: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response*, fourth edition, Geneva, Switzerland, 2018. www.spherestandards.org/handbook

¹⁵ The Sphere Handbook was written to develop a set of "minimum standards" for international aid to be adopted by NGOs, government and donor agencies. It was first published as a draft in 1998 and since then it had gone through several iterations with a group of international agencies and impartial observers.

3. The Humanitarian Core Standard on Quality and Accountability (2014)¹⁶ sets out nine verifiable commitments that organizations can use to improve the quality and accountability of their actions, referring to communities and people affected by crisis as related to specific action coordinates.¹⁷

Actions in the field of humanitarian assistance are closely connected to the global approach described by the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted in September by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development at the UN Development Summit. National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies around the world - including EU Red Cross Societies - actively contribute to sustainable development efforts through a range of services and programs aimed at building resilience and addressing the underlying causes of vulnerability of communities affected by various disasters.

Conclusions

The principles regarding humanitarian assistance are closely connected to international humanitarian law, and the central body of humanitarian aid principles is identified at the level of the main international actors. An important

¹⁶ ***CHS Alliance, Group URD and the Sphere Project (2014). Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability, <https://corehumanitarianstandard.org/files/files/Core%20Humanitarian%20Standard%20-%20English.pdf>

¹⁷ 1. receive assistance appropriate and relevant to their needs; 2. have access to the humanitarian assistance they need at the right time; 3. are not negatively affected and are more prepared, resilient and less at-risk as a result of humanitarian action; 4. have access to information and participate in decisions that affect them; 5. have access to safe and responsive mechanisms to handle complaints; receive coordinated, complementary assistance; can expect delivery of improved assistance as organisations learn from experience and reflection; 8. receive the assistance they require from competent and well-managed staff and volunteers; 9. can expect that the organisations assisting them are managing resources effectively, efficiently and ethically.

mention deserves to be expressed regarding the historical relevance of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in promoting and respecting humanitarian principles. Currently, considering the activities carried out at the level of the different actors of humanitarian aid, it is considered that Dunantist liberal humanitarianism is the dominant form within the international humanitarian enterprise and represents the central point of humanitarian actions.¹⁸

References

Barnett, M. (2011). *Empire of humanity: A history of humanitarianism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

CHS Alliance, Group URD and the Sphere Project (2014). *Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability*, <https://corehumanitarianstandard.org/files/files/Core%20Humanitarian%20Standard%20-%20English.pdf>

Consensul European privind Ajutorul Umanitar (2008). *Declarație comună a Consiliului și reprezentanților guvernelor statelor membre reuniți în cadrul Consiliului, a Parlamentului European și a Comisiei Europene (2008/C 25/01)*.

Mackintosh K. (2000). *The principles of humanitarian action in international humanitarian law*, HPG Report 5. Published March 2000

Pringle, John, Hunt, Matthew (2015). *Humanitarian Action*, *Encyclopedia of Global Bioethics*, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

¹⁸ Pringle, John, Hunt, Matthew (2015). *Humanitarian Action*, *Encyclopedia of Global Bioethics*, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

Sphere Association (2018). *The Sphere Handbook: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response*, fourth edition, Geneva, Switzerland, 2018. www.spherestandards.org/handbook

Stoddard, A. (2003). *Humanitarian NGOs: Challenges and trends*. In J. Macrae & A. Harmer (Eds.), *Humanitarian action and the 'global war on terror': A review of trends and issues* (HPG report 14). London: ODI.

The Code of Conduct Principles of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Response Programmes, <https://www.ifrc.org/sites/default/files/2021-07/code-of-conduct-movement-ngos-english.pdf>

United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (2022). *Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2022: Our World at Risk: Transforming Governance for a Resilient Future*. Geneva

Urquhart, Angus (2022). *Global humanitarian assistance report 2022*, Development Initiatives, Bristol, UK

Web Resources

<https://crucearosie.ro/cine-suntem/istoria-crucii-rosii-romane/>

<https://crucearosie.ro/cine-suntem/originea-si-istoria-miscarii-de-cruce-rosie-si-semiluna-rosie/>

<https://hum-insight.info/>

<https://hum-insight.info/>

<https://www.emdat.be/>, Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) was launched in 1988 by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED)

<https://www.unicefusa.org/stories/global-examples-humanitarian-aid-un/38249>,

Introduction to humanitarian action a brief guide for resident coordinators, 2015, OCHA's Humanitarian Leadership Strengthening Unit,

https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/rc_guide_31_october_2015_webversion_final.pdf

BOOK REVIEW

Ian Nish, *Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period*, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002, 212 pp.

Ian Nish is an expert on Japanese studies and a teacher at the London School of Economics and Political Science, where he teaches international history. *Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period* published by Praeger Publishers in 2002 is one of the many books the author published on Japanese history, of which several are worth mentioning: *Japan's Struggle with Internationalism: Japan, China and the League of Nations, 1931-1933* and *Studies in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902-1923)*. As can be clearly seen, Ian Nish is a significant voice in Japanese foreign policy and bilateral Anglo-Japanese relations.

Containing 212 pages and 9 chapters, with a preface and an introduction, a conclusions section, a bibliography, and separate chapters for notes, abbreviations, and index, the book follows the development of foreign Japanese policy from 1919, the end of the Great War and the birth of a new international order, up to 1943 and the Great East Asian Conference. Chapters are ordered chronologically, detailing the problems of the Paris Peace Conference, Washington Treaty negotiations, Sino-Japanese relations up to the Great Depression, implications of the economic crisis and the realignment of Japanese foreign policy, departure from internationalism, rapprochement to Nazi Germany in the anti-communist struggle and ending with the disaster that was the Second World War.

The author's intent is to shed some light on interwar Japanese foreign policy in an academic environment heavily influenced by European ideas and interpretations. The 1920s and 1930s in Japan were not marked by Europeans in any way, Ian Nish noticed that this itself is a root cause for the chain of events that were triggered in the Far East. In any case, treating the 'interwar' Japanese foreign policy is not even a correct term when it comes to Japan, as for Japanese historiography, the interwar period is defined by the Russo-Japanese war of 1904 and the China incidents in 1937, a time frame larger than what the West usually conceives as being interwar. Even so, admitting that he is a European treating the international situation from an Asian point of view, Ian Nish manages to touch on areas that were previously not so well researched.

Great Powers and their relations with the Far East in general and Japan, in particular, are a central point of Nish's historical narration, especially when it comes to some important international agreements such as the Washington Conference of 1922, the London Conferences of 1930 and 1936, the Manchurian Incident of 1931, negotiations regarding China rights throughout the 1920s, but also when it comes to the increasing international isolation, in treaties signed with Germany in 1936 (Anti-Comintern Pact) and 1940 (Tripartite Pact), but also in the non-aggression treaty with the Soviet Union in 1941. But even when discussing the Great Powers, Nish adopts a Japanese perspective, explaining the interests, hopes, and desires of the Japanese side during the negotiations.

Ian Nish does not offer a new perspective to interpreting Japanese foreign policy in the interwar period, following the classic line of thinking, which includes a weak Emperor, a Foreign Ministry incapable of imposing its will, and an increasingly stronger army. However, I consider that novelty comes in

analyzing foreign policy from the interpretations that the author gives when analyzing militaristic and expansionist policies. Unlike the critical attitude that many authors have when discussing Japan's 'active' policy, which in turn decreases the quality of analysis by adding an element of moral superiority, Nish adopts a neutral attitude, explaining rationally the line of thinking and ideals of Japanese leaders had when implementing certain politics.

Regarding bibliography, one can notice a rich Anglo-American literature regarding the subject, including a series of papers contemporary to Nish's book, from which the author took inspiration in his research, which shows his active interest in the subject. At the same time, Nish uses local sources in Japanese, enriching his book by adding a perspective that is difficult to access usually by a primarily western audience due to language barriers. This book is addressing to the large public as well as specialists willing to improve their knowledge on this particular topic. Ian Nish's book is welcomed as a much-needed counterweight to the profoundly American point of view on Japanese foreign policy. A reader may see Japanese foreign policy in a different and much more complex light than before, beyond the usually mentioned US-Japanese or British-Japanese bilateral relations. The increased importance that Nish puts on China correlates with the interest that Japanese leaders were having in this particular region. In fact, Sino-Japanese relations represent a central piece of this book because of the deep ways in which China influenced Japanese thinking and politics regarding Asia.

Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period is an extremely valuable and important book on understanding the causes of Japan's departure from internationalism in the 1930s, as well as on analyzing the complexity of factors that led to the Second World War. Offering a Japanese perspective, this book can

be linked with others regarding the history of the Asia-Pacific region, such as 'The History of US-Japan Relations from Perry to the Present' by Makoto Iokibe or 'After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921-1932' by Akira Iriye. But it can also be correlated to books regarding other aspects of Japanese politics such as 'Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941' by Michael A. Barnhart or 'The Japanese Empire: Grand Strategy from the Meiji Restoration to the Pacific War' by S.C.M. Paine.

Thanks to the access to original Japanese sources and English sources alike, Ian Nish's book masterfully explains the decisions which stood behind a course of action that the Japanese leaders well understood cannot be followed without bringing about the total destruction of Japan. It is a book recommended to all those who study the roots of the Second World War or to any study regarding the evolution of international relations in Asia-Pacific, treating in an objective and academic way the international arena from a Japanese perspective from 1919 to 1943.

Adrian Mocanu

Yael Tamir, *Why Nationalism*, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2020, 224 pp.

Yael Tamir was born in 1954 at Tel Aviv (some sources state that it was Ramat Gan, a city located east of the municipality of Tel Aviv). With a BA in Biology and an MA in Political Science from the Hebrew University, she also holds a PhD in political philosophy from the University of Oxford. She is a philosophy lecturer, joined the Labour Party, has been appointed Minister of Immigration Absorption and elected in the Knesset (Israeli Parliament) in 2003, also member of different committees. Professor Tamir is the President of Beit Berl College and an adjunct professor at the Professor is the President of Beit Berl College and an adjunct professor at the Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford University.¹

The author presents in her book „Why Nationalism“, first published in 2019, a resolution to the existing social, economic, educational and political crisis. The book’s second edition was published in 2020 and has a preface by the author herself. Here Tamir emphasizes the fact that during the current SARS 2 Covid-19 pandemic, which affected most of the spheres of our lives, extremist and nationalistic voices became louder. Her thesis is that a revised and moderate nationalism would represent the only way to balance all inequalities and to solve the current crises that are sweeping the human society.

The book is divided into four parts summing up 21 chapters. The line of argument crosses the whole book. In the first part, she is depicting how after WWI the idea of nationalism started to regain ground, while by the end of WWII

¹ <https://jewishstudies.ceu.edu/yael-tamir>

it started being replaced by liberalism and globalism, especially in the West. Once liberalism started to gain more voice on the international political scene, it also opened the door to globalism. This has caused more damage than good and widened the gap between wealthy individuals and countries and those with fewer opportunities. It also restricted state control and therefore affected individuals “without pedigree”, making their educational and social ascent more difficult.

In the second part, the author reiterates the purpose of the book and also emphasizes the benefits and positive aspects of nationalism without denying its flaws. In each chapter, she presents how individuals’ lives have been improved over time once nation-states have been created and nations formed. While admitting that this is a construct, an imperfect one, Tamir enumerates the positive changes nationalism had had from a psychological, educational, material, and cultural perspective. She states that it is important to nurture nationalism, this duty falls both on the state and its citizens.

In the chapters of the third part, the faults of globalism, of liberalism are exposed and enumerated. The author argues that once these ideologies replaced nationalism, the nation-state started falling apart and failed its citizens. Once the liberal global economy kicked off and imposed itself on the world scene, the masses of working people were constrained to draw the losing card. She explains how liberals and social democrats, once established in the seats of power, forgot their duty to constantly renew nationalism.

In the fourth part, Tamir’s vision of a “New Social Contract” is presented in detail. A reformed nation-state’s political approach should be the answer to the economic and identity crisis that affected the majority of the global

population. Solving these issues should also help mitigate the existing social problems. She proposes four guiding principles. The first is to put one's country first, bearing in mind that others have the same right and responsibilities. The second would be that given the fact that no nation-state population is homogenous, ethnically, religiously, or culturally, the place of minorities in that nation should be secured. Thirdly the author suggests equally distributing the burden or "imperfection" of any decision that has been taken democratically within the nation-state. Last but not least, a constant nurturing and reviving of the sense of political and social optimism correlated with collective pride should be practiced on a habitual basis. For this Tamir suggests a *mélange* of ideas and principles borrowed from different schools of thought.

In conclusion, the book's message is to take out all the best that can be found in the idea of nationalism and the nation-state. While keeping this in mind, we should borrow any principles and strategies from any other political agenda or ideology, in order to reform human society for the wellbeing of the majority.

Andreea Nicolau

Mary Elise Sarotte, *Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate*, London, Yale University Press, 2021, 567 pp.

„What if you let your part of Germany go, and we agree that NATO will not shift one inch eastward from its present position?“. These were the words that have been spoken in February 1990 by the American Secretary of State James Baker to the leader of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, which paved the way for a new fight for the security of post-Cold War Europe. A justified response to the challenges of the 1990s and the demands of the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, NATO enlargement provoked new animosities between the United States and Russia, which became a feature of the new international order that emerged after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Mary Elise Sarotte, a professor of history at John Hopkins University, a researcher at Harvard's Center for European Studies, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and author, among other books, of *„The Collapse: The Accidental Opening of the Berlin Wall“*, examines in his most recent book *„Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate“*, the tension between Washington and Moscow upon the backdrop of the unpredictable political landscape of the 1990s. The 1990s was a complex decade that witnessed the astonishing collapse of an empire, the birth of new Eurasian states, the rise of visionary leaders, the redefinition of the possible realm of democratization, disarmament, and a market economy, but also open the door to new expressions of authoritarianism and ethnic cleansing. It was a critical decade that set the tone for geopolitics in the post-Cold War period.

The effects of American and Russian decisions during that crucial decade influence the relations between the two superpowers even today. The verbal exchange between James Baker and Mikhail Gorbachev created a controversy in the decade that followed. According to the transcript of the meeting, Baker said: „Would you prefer to see a united Germany outside of NATO, independent and with no U.S. forces, or would you prefer a unified Germany be tied to NATO, with assurances that NATO’s jurisdiction would not shift one inch eastward?” The Soviet leader replied that any expansion of the „zone of NATO” was not acceptable. And, according to Gorbachev, Baker answered, „We agree with that.” This dialogue would be pointed out every time Russia wanted to remember to the American officials that they are part of an agreement barring NATO from expanding beyond its eastern Cold War border. In her book, Mary Elise Sarotte seeks to clarify the misunderstandings that have arisen around the moment that happened before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Based on interviews, transcripts of summits, documents, briefings, memorandums and secret recordings between the White House and the Kremlin recently declassified, Sarotte’s book uncovered new stories and write a diplomatic history from the perspective of what is happening today.

The strategic choices that American and Russian leaders have made over the years and the importance of these decisions for Euro-Atlantic security are the main themes of the book. It investigates East-West diplomacy in three parts. Part I is covering the period between 1989-1992 that opened with the fall of the Berlin Wall and ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union. A time when the reunification of Germany and the future of NATO were the biggest concerns of the leaders like Helmut Kohl and George H. W. Bush. Part II explores the years

1992 – 1994 when the U.S. – Russia relations started to develop a mutual understanding through the personal relation between President of the United States Bill Clinton and President of Russia Boris Yeltsin. At the same time, those years saw the beginnings of a resurgent and unstable Russia because of its use of military force in Chechnya and the attempted coup d'état against Yeltsin in Moscow. Finally, in part III the author analyzes the period between 1995 – 1999 when NATO began its expansion in the former communist states of Central Europe and new tensions arose in the bilateral relations.

Trying to discover why the relations between Moscow and Washington deteriorated so badly after a period of much promise, Sarotte presents with an analytical and neutral style how the new order based on cooperation after the end of the Cold War has led, a decade later, to a new demarcation line between states members of NATO and non-NATO members states. The American leadership had a determination not only to keep NATO alive but also to expand it after the end of the Cold War. At first, in 1994, they implemented a security partnership named the Partnership for Peace that would be open to the neutral and non-aligned nations as well as the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, including Russia and Ukraine. It provided a framework for enhanced political and military cooperation for joint multilateral activities, without extending NATO security guarantees, and paved the way for the states interested in becoming members of the North-Atlantic alliance. For some Clinton Administration officials, this program has been more like a waiting room until Central and Eastern European states would be accepted as full NATO members. Furthermore, as Russia became more aggressive due to its external intervention and oppression of political opponents, the US started to rethink its strategy.

The consequences of the decision to integrate the Western Alliance in Central Europe were not sufficiently considered by the American officials, according to the author of *„Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate“*. The accelerated open door policy of NATO obscured options that might have sustained cooperation in U.S. – Russia relations. The problem does not lay in the decision to enlarge NATO, but in how this enlargement happened. It seemed that Western leaders prioritized the safeguarding of Eastern Europe over the task of accommodating Russia. Although the Alliance expansion became a success, it is a success that came with a price. Now, NATO stretches from North America, Iceland, and Greenland to the United Kingdom, Europe, and the Baltics, covering nearly a billion people. But, at the same time, created animosities with a former adversary and a clearly demarcated front line, Ukraine and other post-Soviet states being in a gray zone.

That grey zone is at the moment a space where tensions and conflicts occur and where it became evident that the NATO expansion had its limits. One of those limits was Ukraine. By discovering and analyzing all the interactions from the past decades, the Russian invasion of Ukraine seems to be a sort of backlash waiting to happen. The earlier clashes between Washington and Moscow, which decreased trust and reduced both sides' openness to cooperation, created a cumulative effect of tensions ready to strike someday.

The choices that America and Russia made led the overall course of U.S. – Russian relations onto a trajectory that fell well short of post-Cold War hopes. All periods after the Cold War in which the two states saw each other as possible adversaries were followed by periods of cooperation in which a reset of relations was attempted. Now, maybe more than ever, the prospects of future cooperation

are diminished. Looking at the origins of these tensions between the U.S. – Russia that started to develop soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Mary E. Sarotte writes a well-documented book, taking into account current concerns and the legacy of these events for the dynamics of today's international relations. „Why did the United States decide to enlarge NATO after the Cold War, how did the American decision interact with contemporary Russian choices, and did that interaction yield the fateful decline in relations between the two countries?“ are the questions to which relevant answers are given in her work.

Adherent to the principle of the Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce that all history is ultimately contemporary history, Sarotte shows that the events from the early 1990s are still ongoing. The significance of what was said at that time is constantly brought up in the present debates, along with idea that the Russian was tricked by the U.S. regarding NATO enlargement. Seeking to debunk some of the myths that have been created over time, „*Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making of Post-Cold War Stalemate*“ is a book that clarifies the never-ending biases about NATO and Russia relations after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Ștefania Teodora Cocor

Nicolae Ecobescu (ed), *România: Supraviețuire și afirmare prin diplomație în anii Războiului Rece, Trei decenii de relații româno-americe, Documente II, 1973-1978*, Editura Fundația Europeană Titulescu, Bucharest, 2015, 741 pp.

Three Decades of Romanian-American Relations is one of the most important collections of diplomatic documents on the Romanian-American relationship during the communist regime in Romania. The European Titulescu Foundation has published a series of books and collections of documents, 7 volumes in number, dealing with the topic of Romania, survival, and affirmation through diplomacy during the Cold War, from 1945 to 1985. The last three collections of documents, entitled *Documents I* (1955-1972), *Documents II* (1973-1978), and *Documents III* (1979-1985), deal with the subject of Romanian-American relations throughout the period between 1955-1985.

Of the 146 sources in the collection of documents, more than 70 are transcripts of talks between various representatives of Romania, either Nicolae Ceausescu or Romanian ambassadors to Washington, and representatives of the White House, or US presidents. These are influential and particularly important personalities who played a decisive role in Romania's assertion in international relations, especially after 1968, when Nicolae Ceausescu condemned the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact troops. The collection of documents also contains 9 letters, 21 notes of talks and discussions, 14 telegrams, but also a few isolated documents, such as memoranda, joint statements signed by the President of Romania, and the Presidents of the United States, joint information, and communiqués. All these documents, which appear in the table of contents and which make up this collection, reveal to us the way in which the two states maintained good diplomatic relations.

The communist regime, a bureaucratic regime par excellence, left to posterity thousands of valuable primary sources, which disclose how the communist personalities of the time related to the national environment and to the events that took place in Romania but also to the international environment and the problems stringent from the decade 1970-1980.

Documents II (1973-1978), a collection of documents of great importance in terms of research on Romanian-American relations during the Cold War, presents documents and extracts from documents, one of the most prosperous periods of Nicolae Ceausescu in the plan of international relations, a period that culminated in obtaining the "most-favored-nation clause" (1975), granted by the United States to socialist Romania. From the most pressing issues that prevented US officials from granting this preferential economic treatment in relations with Romania, the issue of the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which is also an important point in US relations with the USSR, and which concerns the emigration of Jews from communist states, until the granting of the "most favored nation clause" for Romania, the documents presented in this volume are representative for outlining a broader perspective on the importance of the Romanian state in terms of international relations, at a time when, in Romania, democratic values were replaced by Soviet communist principles. Despite this, the collection of documents that I chose to analyze brings to the fore the importance that the representatives of the democratic world, in this case, the United States of America, gave to Romania, to this "dissident" country from the communist camp, a communist regime that did not agree with the policies dictated by Moscow.

This image of Nicolae Ceausescu appeared and developed in 1968, from the moment he condemned the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the troops of the

Warsaw Pact, until 1988 when Romania lost its preferential status in relations with the United States and implicitly the “clause to the most favored nation”. During all this time, Nicolae Ceausescu received special treatment in relation to the other democratic states, making numerous visits to France, the United Kingdom, Spain, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, and also the United States of America. In this review, the documents allocated numerous pages to the visits made by American officials to Bucharest (August 2-3, 1975, President Gerald Ford's visit), but also to the visits made by officials from Bucharest to the United States (December 4- 8, 1973, visit by Nicolae Ceaușescu, at the invitation of US President Richard Nixon, June 11, 1975, visit by Nicolae Ceaușescu, at the invitation of Gerald Ford, April 12-17, 1978, visit by Nicolae Ceaușescu, at the invitation of Jimmy Carter).

The broad topic of the collection of documents deals with very different issues, from transcripts of interviews given by Nicolae Ceausescu to representatives of US publications in Bucharest (Strobe Talbott, *Time magazine* -March 15, 1973, Nicholas Ludington, Permanent Representative in Bucharest of the *American Associated Press* -November 30, 1973, Seymour Topping, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the *New York Times* -December 1, 1973, Alvin Toffler, American Sociologist and Publicist-March 28, 1978, Khaterine Graham, coordinator of the *Washington Post* group of journalists - July 8, 1977, John Paul Wallach, journalist of the *Hearst Newspapers Press Trust* - March 28, 1978), numerous discussions with the Chairman of the Board of the Chase Manhattan Bank, David Rockefeller (January 29, 1973, December 7, 1973, August 28, 1974, April 17, 1978), talks with American senators (Edward Kennedy - December 5, 1973, Hugh Scott - April 19, 1974, Edward Kennedy, Dale Stuard de Hann, Jerry Marvin Tinker-May 4, 1977,

Harrison Williams-August 22, 1977, Adli Stevenson-January 10, 1978, Alan Cranston, Ted Stevens, Abraham Ribicoff, Jacob Javits- April 13, 1978, George McGovern -13 July 1978, Claiborne Pell- 20 November 1978), in talks with representatives of American companies (E.H. Boullioun, President of *Boeing*, March 15, 1973, Bucharest, Donald Kendall, President of *Pepsi*, June 5, 1974, Bucharest, Maurice Templesman, President of *Leon Templesman*, July 17, 1974, Mangalia, C.B. Branch, President of *Dow Chemical* - September 17, 1974, Bucharest, Robert E. Hage, Vice President of *McDonel Douglas Aircraft Corporation* - October 31, 1974, Bucharest, Leon Rubin, President of *Atlanta* - March 4, 1975, Bucharest , Albert Goore, Chairman of the Board of the *Island Creek Company* -June 27, 1975, Bucharest, Michel Friberg, President of the *Continental Grain Company* -July 16, 1975, Bucharest, Milton Rosenthal, Chairman of the *Engelhard Mienrals Company* -September 24 1975-Bucharest, George Gellet, President of *Atlanta Corporation* -February 4, 1977, Bucharest).

Another very important issue that has been the subject of numerous discussions between Nicolae Ceausescu and various representatives of the Jewish delegations in the United States and the Jewish World Congress, the issue of Jewish emigration from Romania, has been addressed, on the one hand, in the following discussions: with the US Jewish delegations, December 7, 1973, with Nahum Goldman, President of the World Jewish Council, September 24, 1974, with Israel Miller, Representative of American Jewish Organizations, June 11, 1975, with David Bloomberg, President of the Jewish Organization B'nai B'rith, 4 November 1978, with Klutznik Philip, President of the World Jewish Congress, 17 April 1978 the talks between Nicolae Ceaușescu and Charles Vanik, one of the authors of the Jackson-Vanik amendment, human rights, and Jewish activist,

talks held on different dates: October 24, 1975, and March 31, 1978, in Bucharest. The logic of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, adopted by the 1974 Trade Act, signed by US President Gerald Ford in January 1975, which extended from the issue of emigration to the issue of human rights, kept the Bucharest administration on constant alert, has been the subject of much discussion, as we have seen above.

This collection of documents also contains the texts of agreements and declarations signed between Romania and the United States of America, including the "Joint Declaration on Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation between Romania and the United States of America" (December 5, 1973).), "Romanian-American Trade Agreement" (July 25, 1975), an agreement accepting the granting of the "most-favored-nation clause" for Romania, "Declaration of the President of Romania, Nicolae Ceaușescu, and of the President of the United States, Gerald Ford, visit Romania "(August 3, 1975), and" Joint Declaration of the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu, and of the President of the United States of America, Jimmy Carter "(April 13, 1978).

Documents II (1973-1978), this collection of documents on Romanian-American relations during the Cold War, provides an overview of how Nicolae Ceausescu was perceived, and implicitly the Romanian state, internationally, by one one of the most important powers in the world, the United States of America. Documents from this collection lead me to draw the following conclusions.

First of all, the important number of documents included in this collection, as well as in the other two, leads me to conclude that the importance given by the United States of America to Romania was considerable.

Secondly, the various personalities who visited Romania, from the President of the United States to secretaries of state and senators, journalists, and presidents of American companies, increased the prestige of Nicolae Ceausescu, and implicitly of Romania, in terms of international relations.

Thirdly, the topic of discussions, from exclusively economic discussions, focused on collaboration between the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of Romania, in all fields of economics, discussions on the problems of the international system (the conversation between Nicolae Ceausescu and Henry Kissinger about the message brought by the Romanian delegation from Yasser Arafat, President of the Palestine Liberation Organization (December 5, 1973) a note of the Ceausescu-Ford discussion on the international economic crisis caused by rising oil and raw material prices (August 3, 1975), transcript of the discussion between Nicolae Ceausescu and Charles Vanik on the situation in the Middle East (October 24, 1975), on discussions on human rights issues and their observance in Romania, made Nicolae Ceausescu's opinion important and necessary in the whole context of the time. *Three Decades of Romanian-American Relations*, published by the European Titulescu Foundation, is one of the most important sources that a historian must consider in order to study Romanian-American relations during the communist regime, due to the complexity of the documents present in this report collection, but especially to the importance that the national and international academic environment offers,

in the context of the publication of this collection of documents, being published in other languages, not only in Romanian.

Dănuț Vasile

Tim Marshall, *The age of walls: How barriers between nations are changing our world*, Litera, Bucharest, 2020, 288 pp.

Over the past twenty years, boundary walls and fences have been erected worldwide, and no continent has been spared from the reinforcement of national borders. At least sixty-five countries, or more than a third of the world's nation-states, have built barriers along their borders to protect themselves. Border walls and fences have been used by the nations to separate them, protect trade routes and repel illegal migrants and refugees, defining the beginning of the 21st century. They were and still are perceived to be strategic, defensive, or demographic “filters”, erected for security purposes.

When the Berlin Wall has torn down a quarter-century ago, there were 16 border fences worldwide. Today, there are seventy-seven border walls all over the globe either completed or under construction, which means five times as many as when the Berlin Wall collapsed. The end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall appeared to be the end of an old world articulated around borders and state sovereignty territories. That new path was well-demonstrated by the European Union project of the single market, border-free travel, and the single currency, the euro.

By the end of 2015, over 1 million asylum seekers have arrived in Europe, many fleeing the civil war in Syria and being in need of international protection. The fear of massive illegal immigration has fuelled a new wave of wall-building worldwide, not only in Europe, although they have not proven wholly effective in fostering security. On the contrary, these walls don't discourage illegal migration but bring much suffering and death, the Mediterranean is considered the most deadly route to enter Europe. Many reasons such as demographic pressures, political persecution, human rights abuses, economic poverty, and food insecurity continue to push people to undertake risky journeys in search of protection and economic opportunities from their countries to neighboring countries, and further onward to countries outside their region.

Tim Marshall, BBC and Sky News foreign correspondent for thirty years, war correspondent in Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, in

the book *The age of walls: How barriers between nations are changing our world*, published in Romania for the first time in 2020 by Litera Publisher, does not limit himself to listing them and to describe its characteristics. He goes beyond, investigates in-depth, and tells the reasons that led to the construction of what Marshall calls "walls" but which are, in reality, barriers, fences, and divisions of all kinds.

Tim Marshall focused on those divisions that illustrate the best the problems of national identity in a globalized world, or the effects of mass migration on the wealthy nations (for example, the United States and the European Union), and how nationalism can be perceived as a force of unity, and at the same as a division line (China, the United Kingdom, Africa), and finally, the links between religion and politics that divided nations (Israel and the Middle East).

Nowadays, both authoritarian and democratic regimes appeal to building walls. The claim by Donald Trump shortly after assuming the U.S. presidency in 2017 that "a nation without borders is not a nation" is, therefore, no coincidence. The Trump administration insisted on the narrative of building a wall on the border with Mexico, giving more grounds for these types of constructions, thus more legitimacy. Since then, the *border wall issue* has returned to play a central role in international relations and domestic politics.

Marshall recalls that physical divisions represent a reflection of the cultural, religious, and ideological divisions - the great ideas that guided our civilizations and gave us an identity and a sense of belonging - such as the Christian schism, the splitting of Islam into two factions, or the two systems closer to our days, fascist and democratic regimes of the XX Century.

Faced with several threats, such as financial crisis, terrorism, armed conflict, refugees, illegal immigration, and the growing gap between the rich and the poor, people become more attached to their identity groups. In the era of internationalism, nationalism has not completely disappeared. The fear of everything that is or represents the other is accentuated and in the end, it all

comes down to the concept of **us** and **them** and to the "walls we build in our minds", even before making them become real, physical. Even these invisible barriers are often just as effective as the real ones. We need to become aware of what has divided us, and what continues to divide us, to understand what is happening in today's world. And that's exactly what Tim Marshall did in the book. Our ability to think and build gives us the possibility to fill the spaces divided by the walls with hope, in other words, to build bridges.

Marshall criticized the idea of "totally open borders", although it might seem a tool that could end poverty in the poorest countries. On the other side, such a theory would devastate the migrant's countries of origin, at the same time, would fuel the right-wing parties to gain significant ground almost immediately in the wealthy nations. The end of the nation-state and national borders is far. However, globalization, the emergence of federal superstructures such as the EU, the rise of city-states, and, lately, the boom in cryptocurrencies like bitcoins could tell another story.

This book places the reader in front of an undeniable reality of the human being and invites us to reflect on the great themes and the many ideologies that divided us, hoping that all will end up uniting the world although their original purpose was to divide us.

In 1989, an important barrier, the Berlin Wall, fell, ushering in what appeared to be a new era of openness and internationalism. In the wake of the enthusiasm of those moments, some intellectuals came to predict the end of history like it did Francis Fukuyama. In the summer of 1989, in the article *The end of History?* Fukuyama's argument was that, with the imminent collapse of the Soviet Union, the last ideological alternative to liberalism had been eliminated and the entire world was heading toward a liberal order. It was a misunderstanding, as Marshall himself points out, because "the history does not end". Never. The thousands of kilometers of walls and fences unfortunately built or leftover since then offend our sensitivities and demonstrate our inability to

resolve differences, representing a sad and blatant demonstration of our helplessness. As long as illegal immigration remains one of the central topics in international politics, new walls will be constructed to hamper migration flows.

Mihaela Mustăța



