EURO-ATLANTIC STUDIES

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IN MEMORIAM

It is with great sadness that the Centre for Euro-Atlantic Studies announces

the passing away of Professor

CONSTANTIN BUȘE (1939-2019).

Professor Buşe was one of the pioneers of the Romanian school of international history, an outstanding researcher and an exceptional mentor for dozens of generations of students. He dedicated his life to History and opened whole avenues of research in modern and contemporary history, Latin American studies, the history of Euro-Atlantic integration and the history of international relations in the XXth century. His more than 200 scientific works stand witness to this.

His teaching career at the Faculty of History of the University of Bucharest spanning over five decades was also remarkable; his courses on the history of international relations, of international organizations and of Latin America being highly appreciated.

He was a consummate teacher, he supported the academic development of hundreds of young historians, but Professor Bușe also innovated in terms of courses and university programmes. He worked tirelessly for 14 years as Vice-Rector of the University of Bucharest, contributing massively to the transformation of our University into a democratic, modern and prestigious institution.

After the fall of communism Professor Bușe focused his attention on establishing a solid research basis for scholars in international relations and international history. The founding of the Centre for Euro-Atlantic Studies and its consequent accomplishments are a testament of his ability to create and lead teams, teams in many cases composed of young men and women. It was this extraordinary potential to inspire and guide young researchers that will be without doubt one of his enduring legacies.

It is impossible to describe, in a few lines, his contributions to Romanian historiography and the lasting impact he had on his students. We can only hope to continue on the road he followed with such dedication, rigor, decency and modesty.

Professor Constantin Bușe was an outstanding scholar, a distinguished teacher, a colleague, a friend, a great man whose loss we deeply regret. For many of us he was The Professor and he will always be remembered.

                                                                                    The editors.

Pre-State Israel.

The Evolution of Jewish Political and Institutional System in Yishuv. From Community to State: 1897-1949

Andreana Gabriela Dumitrescu[1]

Key-words: Zionism, Mandate, Legislation, Yishuv, Israel, Democracy, Congress, Great Britain, Community, State, Institutions, Independence, Elections, Knesset, Constitution.

Abstract:

The emergence of World Zionist Organization at the end of 19ᵗʰ century and the increasing sympathy of world Jewry for political Zionism have strengthened the sense of the need to obtain a Jewish national home in Palestine. In a positive way, the end of the First World War and the decision of the League of Nations to place Palestine under British mandate favored regional development, especially of the Jewish community living there. Under the foreign administration, the Jewish people borrowed the proper aspects of the British model of parliamentary democracy and adapted them to the needs of the Yishuv, at a time when Jewish ideal enjoyed support and admiration, due in particular to Zionist diplomacy in Western Europe and the United States. Trying to maintain a good relationship with the British administration in order to fulfill its interests, the Jewish community in Palestine has thrived in various areas such as: political-institutional

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[1] Master Degree, University of Bucharest.

organization, economy, defence and demography, rapidly reaching a high level of development. These factors contributed tremendously to the birth of a modern democratic Jewish state. The reality of the simultaneous operation in Palestine of the three sets of institutions, those of the Yishuv, those of the Zionist Organization and those of the British administration represented a unique and remarkable fact. After Israel gained independence, the attempt to provide continuity to pre-state institutions represented a reality that was reflected in the flawless formula of the permanent institutions, in order to meet the needs of the new state in a situation of internal and international crisis.

Among the most important challenges the Jewish people had to cope with in the period before 1948, we can enumerate the pogroms practiced in the Russian Empire, the British rule in Palestine according to the Mandate System[1] imposed by the League of Nations, the efforts of the Zionist Organization, the frictions with the Palestinians, the terror and extermination policy practiced by the Nazis, the promise of the return to Palestine of the Jewish refugees and the problem of the illegal immigration, the change of the British attitude to the Jews' immigration to Palestine, the period of transition to statehood between 1945-1948, the Independence War and the involvement of the United Nations to find a regional solution, which unintentionally leads to worsening of the Arab-Israeli relations.

Previously, the inventor of the *Judeenstaat*[2] concept, Theodor Herzl, came for the first time with the idea of establishing a global Jewish agency, towards the end of the 19th century. This idea was supported by a Jewish students organization in Vienna, called Kandimah. In Herzl's vision, the purpose of the agency was to be the investigation of the preliminary political-economics aspects and the establishment of a Jewish company headquartered in London, which was supposed to negotiate with the Ottomans in order to start the Jewish immigration

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[2]Ami Isseroff, *The Jewish State – 1896 Theodor Herzl's Program for Zionism*, Zionism and Israel Information Center, http://www.zionism-israel.com/js/Jewish_State.html.

to Palestine. Then, the leader of the *Hovevei Zion* movement („Zion Lovers", a group of organizations that came into being as an answer to the pogroms in the Russian Empire), Leon Pinsker, came with the proposal to establish a cultural centre in Palestine, that was to revive the Jewish people spiritually. The period of transition from *Yishuv* to the appearance of Israel representen a temporal segment in which traditional values were combined with the necessities imposed by the fight to obtain independence. The idea of security played a dominant part and generated a high degree of tension and social mobilization.

Thus, according to the Herzlian vision, in August 1897, in the context of the organization of the First Zionist Congress in Basel, a program was adopted by which it was decided to establish the World Zionist Organization. On the basis of this document, item II specifies the decision of „*organization and unification of the entire Jewry, by means of both local and international adequate institutions, according to the legislation of each state,*"[3] which absorbed all the *Hovevei Zion* societies, proposing the establishment of a people's bank, which was to support the financial needs of the Zionist project. In this respect, as the putting the foundations of an economy was fundamental for the future state, in 1899, according to the decision of the Second Zionist Congress, the Jewish Colonial Trust was founded, as well as the first Zionist bank and in 1901 the Jewish National Fund appeared; they were supposed to deal both with the colonization in Palestine and with the facilitation of land purchase and credit in view of the establishment of industrial and agricultural settlements. At that moment, the Zionist Organization was led by Herzl and the the secretary general, a man of letters and journalist, Nahum Sokolov.

The organization was made up of persons who had to be aged at least 18 and who paid a membership tax. It was authorized to establish autonomous

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[3] *Zionist Congress: First Zionist Congress & Basel Program (August 1897)*, Jewish Virtual Library, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/first-zionist-congress-and-basel-program-1897.

national societies in all the states where there were important Jewish communities, such as the English Jewish Federation, and if they formed together a group of minimum 400 members, they could elect a delegate in the Congress. Thus, the Congress became the core of the organization[4], being appointed its main working instrument; the Congress elected unanimously Theodor Herzl as President. The first common ethnic committee was established in 1907 and was denominated the Community Council (*Va'ad Haeda*), being constituted on religious criteria, of local committees of ashkenazims and sephards, with the main purpose to fulfill the Zion aspirations to establish an organism including all the Jews, not only the Zionism followers.[5]

Then, at the beginning of the XX century and immediately before World War I, the Labor Zionism influenced the economy of the Jewish communities in Palestine that was underdeveloped at that time, by establishing cooperative organizations, like *Hamashibir*, the forerunner of Histradut, which reunited all the workers in commercial activities. In the context of World War I and of the British interests in the Middle East, Palestine was occupied by the British Army, thus ending the Ottoman domination of four centuries, while the Jews were subjected to the Ottoman Law (*Majelle*), made up of a civil code based on social, religious and Sultanic laws and regulations, but also on a series of Western bills, mainly French, adopted in order to facilitate the commerce with Europe.

Towards the end of the year, on 2nd November 1917, the *Balfour Declaration* was issued, by which the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Arthur Balfour, confirmed for Walter Rotchild, a well known Zionist banker, the support for his intiative to establish a Jewish national home, recognizing the Zionist rights and guaranteeing the rights of all the residents in Palestine: "*it being clearly understood*

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[4] Horace Meyer Kellen, *Zionism and World Politics. A Study in History and Social Psychology*, New York, Doubleday Page & Company, 1921, p. 79.
[5] Anat Kidron, *Jewish Immigration and the Establishment of the National Hebrew Community in the 'Mixed City' of Haifa*, in "Bulletin du Centre de recherche français à Jérusalem", no. 21, 2010.

that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."[6]

The situation from Palestine was totally different from the one in the traditional British colonies; the Zionist project enjoyed support and various advantages, the circumstances placing the British at the opposite pole from the Ottoman rule. At the same time, Great Britain was to assure an efficient rule of Palestine by means of some colonial and foreign affairs offices.[7]

At the Peace Conference of Paris (1919-1920) that marked the end of the war, it was agreed that Great Britain and France were to control the former territories that used to belong to the Ottoman Empire, the League of Nations entrusted at the Conference of San Remo the administration of Palestine to Great Britain; in future, mandate power was to offer favorable conditions for the establishment of a Jewish state. Thus, from 1917 until 1920, the British exerted a regime of military occupation in Palestine, under the leadership of General Edmund Allenby. The terms of the Balfour understanding had to be found in the *League of Nations Mandate*, issued on 1st August 1922; on its basis Great Britain was to govern Palestine besides other territories that used to belong to the Ottoman Empire.

The manner in which the British had to rule Palestine was established in the text of the document, in items I-III: "*The Mandatory shall have full powers of legislation and of administration, save as they may be limited by the terms of this mandate. The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of*

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[6]*Balfour Declaration: Text of the Declaration (November 2nd, 1917)*, Jewish Virtual Library, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/text-of-the-balfour-declaration.
[7] Donna Robinson Divine, *Exiled in the Homeland. Zionism and The Return to Mandatory Palestine*, Austin, University of Texas Press, 2009, p. 57.

self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion. The Mandatory shall, so far as circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy."[8]

Practically, this Mandate System represented a compromise between annexation, based on military conquest and guarantee of the independence of the peoples that had just got out of the incidence of the rule of the Ottoman Empire,[9] being considered by the British authority „A" type mandates, that is communities that were developed enough to reach a degree of self-government at a certain time. The leadership of Palestine under the Mandate is assured by a High Commissioner, who was authorized to exercise his power in the law and administrative fields, to deal with the promulgation of ordinances regarding the domestic order, peace and good government, also having the amnesty power. The latter's prerogatives could not be limited by any repressive organ in Palestine, be it made up of Jews or of the Arab population. He was assisted by an Advisory Council appointed by himself,[10] made up of administrative officials. However, the local populations made up of Arabs and Jews are granted the right to deal with their own domestic business: "*An independent judiciary under a chief justice was empowered to protect the rights of natives and foreigners alike, and to assure solicitude for the traditions and mores of the various religious communities.*"[11]

The first to occupy this position was no other person but a Jew from the British Cabinet, Sir Herbert Samuel, who also had supported from the shadow the issuance of the *Balfour Declaration*, after he had previously proposed in 1915

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[8]League of Nations, *Communiqué au Conseil et aux Membres de la Société, Mandat pour la Palestine*, Geneva, 12th August 1922, UNISPAL,
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/2FCA2C68106F11AB05256BCF007BF3CB.
[9] Naomi Shephard, *Ploughing Sand. British Rule in Palestine 1917-1948*, New Jersey, Rutgers University Press, 2000, p. 5.
[10]   *High   Commissioner   for   Palestine*,   Jewish   Virtual   Library,
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/high-commissioner-for-palestine.
[11] Howard Sachar, *The British Mandate in Palestine*. *The emergence, structure, and function of the mandatory government from 1923-1948,* My Jewish Learning, in
https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/the-british-mandate-in-palestine/.

the placement of Palestine under British protectorate. Though he was not a member of the Zionist Organization, he sympathized with the cause of the Jews. Shortly after the Conference of San Remo of April 1920, Samuel began to exert the position of High Commissioner starting with July, focusing on laying the bases of the British administration in Palestine, until 1925. Thus, a part of *Sharia* and *Majelle* laws were replaced or amended to become modern legislation, according to the British pattern, adapted for a region which had to progress in order to become a state.

In this context, in September 1920, Samuel managed to develop the structure of the Advisory Council, that played the part of a legislative body, made up of ten British officers and ten Palestinian ones, seven of which were Arabs. This Council which functioned only for two years, having the role to approve the new legislation, most of which regarded the strengthening of the Zionist policies.[10] Serving the Jewish interests, this institution was despised by the Arabs, who did not even acknowledge its existence.

Then, on 10th August 1922, the Mandate Power issued a so-called constitution that took the shape of a document entitled *Order-in-Council*, a primary legislation issued on behalf of King George V, by which the military governing of Palestine was abolished and replaced by a system of civil administration, authorizing the High Commissioner, together with an Executive Council to exert the executive authority and to establish dispositions so that a Legislative Council shall be elected to operate reporting to the High Commissioner, which became its President, establishing a system of civil and religious courts and validating the existing British legislation.[12] The Order was officially abrogated in Great Britain at the end of the mandate, in May 1948, but parts of it remained in force after the establishment of Israel, as the Knesset and the Israeli Government exert the authority specified in the latter. Nevertheless,

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[12] King George V of United Kingdom, *The Palestine Order in Council, Buckingham Palace*, 10th August 1922, UNISPAL, http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/C7AAE196F41AA055052565F50054E656.

the Legislative Council had limited powers, as the Order contained articles that were in contradiction. For example, on the one hand, Article 18 mentions that they have full authority and power and, on the other hand, Article 28 restricts its power, forbidding its members to issue any kind of proposal, ordinance, tax, except this is done by the High Commissioner,[13] who thus holds the most power.

The Executive Council is made up of the High Commissioner, the Chief Secretary, the treasurer and the Minister of Justice; there are cases when the latter has to get involved in the legal procedure in the absence of the Legislative Council (a fact that will also be perpetuated after 1948 in Israel), in case according to a certain policy a new ordinance or amendment of an old law is necessary, in cooperation with the Advisory Council.[14] As soon as the British lawmakers in Palestine approved a law, this was published in the *Official Gazette*, in the three official languages. Not only the Ottoman legislation underwent modifications, but also the Jewish one, which could not be coded correctly, as it was very complex.[15] Thus, the mandate power decided to reorganize the legal system into one of Anglo-Saxon type of common law.

As the situation of Palestine represented a completely separate case, different from the situation in the British dominions, as it was necessary to establish a national Jewish home, the legislation was generally exceptional, to be able to confer the necessary conditions to fulfill the Jewish ideal, which made permanently the mandate power face big challenges. For example, during the period 1918-1920, any sale of land had to be approved by the head of the military administration, but any sale of land had to be approved by the head of the military administration, but as soon as the civil administration came into operation, this provision was cancelled and replaced with the *Decree of Land*

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[13] *Ibidem.*
[14] Mogannam E. Mogannam, *Palestine Legislation under the British*. in "The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science", vol. 164, 1932, p. 49.
[15] *Ibidem*, p.50.

Transfer, which allowed free land sales and land rentals, a cadastre and taxation regime being established in this respect.[16]

Practically, this moment marked the moment of dispossession of the Palestinian population of land, as the British administration did not watch closely the land transfers, the latter being bought by the Jews who arrived in Palestine. Besides this situation there was the problem of the legal power of the British Administration, which lay with the district rulers, who, most times, had no training in this respect; nor were they under the direct control of the Ministry of Justice, which led to multiple breaks of them by the officers. We must understand that there was no proper legal system, but it was a conglomerate made up of the remains of the Ottoman legislation which came into impact with the new British legislation, the regulations applicable to Palestine not being published in the Official Gazette, not even the text of the *Mandate for Palestine of the League of Nations.* It was intended to establish a Criminal Code, but at more than ten years from the debut of the civil administration there existed none;[17] till 1936, when the *Resolution of establishment of the Criminal Code,* by which only theoretically the Ottoman legislation expired and was replaced with the British one, statuting in Article 4, that "*This Code shall be interpreted in accordance with the principles of legal interpretation obtaining in England, and expressions used in it shall be presumed, so far as is consistent with their context and except as may be otherwise expressly provided, to be used with the meaning attaching to them in English law and shall be construed in accordance therewith*".[18] The Code was in a certain discrepancy with the situation in Palestine, which can be attributed to the impossibility to understand the needs of this region, where two completely different peoples lived together, which till

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[16] Dov Gavish, *A Survey of Palestine Under the British Mandate, 1920-1948*, Oxon, Routledge Curzon, 2005, p. 109.
[17] Mogannam E. Mogannam, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-54.
[18] *Criminal Code Ordinance*, in "The Palestine Gazette", no. 633, Jerusalem, Government Printing Press, Monday, 28th September 1936, p. 973, Nevo, https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law21/PG-e-0633.pdf.

not long ago had been part of an empire, there existing moments when the rights of the two were prejudiced, but the British administration favored the Jews at first, practically infringing their promise to observe and protect the rights of the two populations.

Zionism was the one which finally determined the form of the Israeli institutions by means of separate ways: the prosperous diaspora, the immigrants with a national conscience besides the traditional institutions of the Jewish residents in Palestine. The Jewish community in Palestine was called *Yishuvul* during the British mandate; it constituted an autonomous political organism, within which a political elite developed, as well as political procedures, political parties were established, public officers appeared who acquired experience and established operation procedures.[19] This Jewish concept designates the Jewish community of Palestine, starting with the Ottoman domination, until the end of the British mandate and the proclamation of independence. This was made up of the "Old Yishuv", which referred to the pre-Zionist Jewish community and "The New Yishuv", which emerged with the birth of Zionism, in the context of its adherents sponsoring immigration into Ottoman Palestine since 1882 with the aim of sets the foundations for a secular, equal and autonomous society based on productive labor and the revival of Jewish culture.[20]

The *Yishuv* had an accelerated development in the twenties, a pseudo-parliament being established, that represented the organizational frame of the Jewish community, called *Knesset Yisrael*, as an union in which even women had voting rights and were entitled to hold management positions. The responsibility for Jewish religion. Cultural and social problems were transferred to it. More explicitly, this represented the organizational structure of *Yishuvului*

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[19] Bernard Reich, David. H. Goldberg, *Historical Dictionary of Israel*, Second Edition, Lanham, The Scarecrow Press, 2008, p. 596.
[20] Claude Faure, *Dictionary of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Culture, History and Politics*, vol. 1, New York, Thomson Gale, 2005, pp. 478-480.

during the British mandate.

Yishuv functioned as a parliamentary democracy, having officially all the branches of governing, created by *Knesset Yisrael*: the parliament - *Asefat ha-Nivharim* (the Assembly of the Representatives), chosen by general vote in which all the adults in the community could participate,[21] being a self-government instrument, which used a proportional representation system determined by the direct vote, at national level, in which the whole community functioned as a single election district.

The assembly used to meet once a year and elected 36 members from its components in order to form an executive organ, *Va'ad Le'umi* (The National Council), divided into multiple sectors that dealt with public matters as social assistance, health, defence, education and religious matters being organized within it.[22] When the state was established, this structure of departments served as a base for the organization of the governmental ministries.[23]

The first council was established in 1920, and its members used to participate in the meetings of of the Zionist General Council, used to keep close connections with the Jewish Agency and to negotiate with the British Government, but the functions were focussed almost exclusively on the domestic affairs of *Yishuv*. This was managed till the establishment of the state by four presidents: David Yellin, Pinhas Rutenberg, Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, David Remez, the last two being among the signatories of the *Declaration of Independence*.

The legal system was represented by *Beit Mishpat ha-Shalom ha-Ivri* (The Jewish Court of Peace), which initially functioned deficiently, as the Jews were

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[21] Dan Horowitz, Moshe Lissak, *Authority without Sovereignty: The Case of the National Centre of the Jewish Community in Palestine*, in "Palestine. Government and Opposition, vol. 8, no. 1, Cambridge University Press, 1973, p.52.
[22] Julius Sykes, *The Jewish Athena: The Political Genesis of the State of Israel*, in "Office of the Vice President for Research", University of South Carolina, 2016.
[23] *Pre-State Israel: Va'ad Leumi (National Council)*, Jewish Virtual Library, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/va-ad-leumi-national-council

subjected to the legal system of the mandate power, but also due to the lack of means of coercion to execute decisions.[24]

This Court deals exclusively with civil cases. Then, the High Commissioner offered exclusive jurisdiction over the personal problems to the Rabbinic Courts. When we talk about Rabbinical Courts we refer, in fact, to the Rabbinic Council, the religious institution of *Yishuv*, established in 1921, headed by two Chief Rabbis, one ashkenazim and one sephardim: Abraham Isaac Kook and Ya'akov Meir, enjoying the recognition of the British Administration, by The *Order-in-Council*, where were mentioned three types of courts – tribal, civil and religious instances, this trilateral system, with the due amendments in force even today. In all the Jewish towns and settlements, there were local Rabbinical representantes, that used to deal with such matters as marriages, divorces and inheritances.[25] In 1927 the Committee for the Jewish rights and standards was established, which became the central authority of the traditional Jewish Law based on *Halakha*, a corpus of 613 religious laws (*mitzvot*) derived from *Torah*.[26] At the same time it is based on the Biblical commandments, the Talmudic and Rabbinical Law, representing rather a daily life conduct code than a proper legislation.

We can say that the sources of the *Yishuv* democracy are based on the self-government tradition of the diaspora communities, then of the Zionist Organization which was created and organized acording to democratic criteria, and then, the British leadership itself, that brought the values of parlamentary democracy, influencing the Jews to adopt this model in the future. Also, the ideal

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[24] Aviva Halamish, *The Yishuv: The Jewish Community in Mandatory Palestine*, in "Israel Studies An Anthology", September 2009, Jewish Virtual Library, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/israel-studies-an-anthology-the-yishuv.
[25] *Ibidem.*
[26] Mendy Hecht, *The 613 Commandments (Mitzvot)*, Chabad, https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/756399/jewish/The-613-Commandments-Mitzvot.htm.

of a Jewish national home itself, promoted by the Zionist movement, enjoyed political and financial support from the democratic states of the West.

The first elections for the National Assembly took place in 1920, and, though they had to be organized every four years, they took place only in 1925, 1931 and 1944. At the elections of 19th April 1920 the biggest faction, Ahdut HaAvoda (Zionist Socialist Labor Party), obtained the majority, but the elections were boycotted by the ultra-Orthodox party, Agudat Yisrael, which, for a good period of time more exactly till 1935 opposed the appearance of a centralized leadership, not wishing to be represented in the National Council. The first Assembly had 314 members, representing 20 lists elected by 22,200 electors, the second had 221 members, representing 26 lists elected by 36,437 electors, and the third one had 71 members, representing 12 lists elected by 50,436 electors, and the fourth one had 171 members, representing 18 lists elected by 202,448 electors. [27]

The Party Ahdut HaAvoda, founded in 1919 of urban and rural workers, represents the first great success of the future founder of Jewish state, David Ben-Gurion, who became the leader of the structure of reorganization of *Yishuv*. Understanding the importance of the development of the economic infrastructure supporting the needs of the immigrants, this labor party represented the basis of the labor federation established one year later, in 1920 – Histradut. Ahdut HaAvoda controlled Histradut, whose general secretary was David Ben-Gurion, who considered that a developed economy meant the possibility to strengthen the defence of the Jewish community. Within Histradut auxiliary institutions were established, such as the Workers' Society, but also building companies. In the thirties, when Ahdut HaAvoda had already become strong enough absorb a rival labor party, Hapoel Hatzair, which did not enjoy enough support in the

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[27] *Assembly of Representatives (Assefat Hanivharim)*, in "Lexicon of Terms", The Knesset, https://www.knesset.gov.il/lexicon/eng/asefat_niv_eng.htm.

urban environments, the Mapai political faction resulted by the fusion of the two, that was to determinate the political spectrum in the next two decades. These institutions could not crystalize into a real power pole, due to their fragmentation and weakness. The major action spheres of *Yishuv* included immigration, the creation and development of settlements, education, and obtaining of military and political power.

However, the Assembly and Council were not recognized initially by the British administration as representatives of *Yishuv*, lacking sovereignty, functioning without a legal statute until 1928, when they were recognized on the basis of the *Regulations of Organization of the Jewish Community in Palestine* of 1st January 1926, that offered the legal framework and mandatory support to the national institutions, both at national level, and at local level, reiterating the framework assured by the order with the value of a constitution of 1922, by which "*each Religious Community recognized by the Government shall enjoy autonomy for the internal affairs of the Community, subject to the provisions of any Ordinance or Order issued by the High Commissioner[...]. If any religious community in Palestine makes application under this Ordinance, the High Commissioner in the Executive Council may with the approval of one of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, make, and when made vary or revoke regulations for its organization as such by the Government in Palestine.*"[28]

The lack of sovereignty makes the political decisions to be taken ad-hoc, in a political system in which the balance of power between the parties was delineated according to the representativity in the quasi-parliamentary or governmental institutions. At the same time, this led to the lack of a coercive authority, outlining the existence of *Yishuv* to a voluntary democracy, where the individuals were not perceived only as holders of rights, but especially of

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[28] *Palestine Communities Ordinance: Text*, in "Jewish Daily Bulletin", section 2, vol. 3, New York, 12th March, 1926, p. 2, Jewish Telegraphic Agency.

obligations. The Members of the Assembly were the representatives of the lists elected at the general elections organized by *Knesset Yisrael*. The Assembly of the Representatives was authorized to make decisions and vote on the budgets of the National Council and of the Rabbinical Council.

At the same time, *Yishuv* was also managed by a second Jewish level leadership, controlled by the representatives appointed by the Zionist Organization. The strongest organ of *Yishuv* was the Zionist Executive, whose essence was recognized by means of the Mandate text, holding international legitimacy, dealing inclusively with the diplomatic representation in the relationship with the League of Nations. Therefore, the key of the new institutional future is to be found in Article IV of the Mandate text, where it was imposed that the British administration shall recognize a public organism of the type of a Jewish agency cooperating with it, in view of the social-economic development of the future state – meaning, in fact, the Palestinian Office of the Zionist Organization, which initially was taking the part of an agency.

This office was reorganized after an investigation of the Zionist Commission, established in 1918 by nobody else than Dr. Chaim Weizmann, President of the English Zionist Federation, together with other Zionist representatives from France and Italy, accompanied by the British officials.[29] The Zionist Commission had the role of a semi-independent authority and held as tasks the centralization of the activities in Palestine of the Zionist Organization, but, instead of keeping its role of pseudo-embassy, it took he part of a so-called first Zionist Government.[30]

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[29] *The Zionist Commission*, in "Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: 1917-1947 (Part I)", United   Nations, https://www.un.org/unispal/history/origins-and-evolution-of-the-palestine-problem/part-i-1917-1947/#The_working_of_the_Mandates_System.
[30] *The Zionist Commission (Va'ad HaTzirim)*, in "The Wayback Internet Archive", 2nd October 2006, "https://web.archive.org/web/20061002040541/http://www.jafi.org.il/education/jafi75/history/commission.html.

Thus, it was decided that the Office of Palestine shall enter under the leadership of the Commission, so that it could cover a larger range of competences, such as immigration, agriculture, industry, education, establishment of new settlements and purchase of land. Weizmann led in 1919 the Zionist delegation at the Peace Conference of Paris, being elected, a year later, the chairman of the Zionist Organization.

There also appeared the idea of establishing an Arab Agency, that was to play a similar role as the Zionist one in the relationship with the British administration, but this was impossible by the decentralization of the Palestilian population, that had neither local institutions, nor an international forum supporting their need and wish of self-determination.[31] Thus, the British decided that these shall be led by a mufti, but was to be controlled by the Mandate power, besides a supreme Muslim Council dealing with public services.

At The Twelfth Zionist Congress that took place at Karlovy Vary in Czechoslovakia, it was decided according to the mandate text, that the present Commission shall become the Zionist executive in Palestine, formally appointed as the agency mentioned in Article 4, that was to cooperate with the British administration to establish a Jewish state. Oficially, only in 1929 in Zurich, at the Sixteenth Zionist Congress of the Organization, it was decided that the executive shall get the name of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, being organized as follows: the Governmental Department (Foreign relations), the Security Departrment, the *Aliyah* Department and the Education Department, to cover the largest possible area of the immediate needs of the Jews all over the world. The organisms of the Agency were elected on the basis of the result of the elections, that took place in the Zionist Congress, whose electoral body was made up of the whole Zionist movements, affiliated or organized from the diaspora or from Palestine.

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[31] Britain Eakin, *British Policy in Mandate Palestine: Institution Building and the Thwarting of a Palestinian State*, in "Special Studies", 1st March 2011, pp. 7-8.

Both the Agency and the National Council were considered national institutions, in charge of representation before the British administration.[32]

Very many of the political and social-economic activities of the Jewish community did not take place within the central institutions, but in particular institutions established by the political movements, the strongest of which was Histradut. The need of integration of the new-comers to *Yishuv* produced both a gradual separation from the social-economic relationships with the Palestinian inhabitants, as well as a need to exert a pressure on the Mandate power, representing one of the main causes of appearance of new political parties based on the working class, leading in the thirties to the apperance of Mapai party. The main purpose of the political parties in this period was to arbitrate the relationship between the citizens and the national institutions, the most important political orientations besides Mapai were: the revisionists, conservatives, right-wing religious, liberals and center religious, ethnic groups, communists, radical Orthodox and left-wing Zionists from Histradut. The parties took over the role of local agencies of resource distribution, mainly regarding the control of the jobs in the national institutions.

Only in the thirties, the British administration conferred to the Jewish Agency, only partly authority over matters that entered in the competences of the governments of some independent states, as well as economy, immigration, and even military matters, overshadowing the local institutions of the Jews in Palestine. The general weakness that characterized these pre-state institutions was supported by the lack of coherence of the political sphere and of the public, as there was no power center to support.[33]

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[32] Dan Horowitz, Moshe Lissak, *op. cit.*, p. 52.
[33] Aviva Halamish, *Israel studies an Anthology: The Yishuv: the Jewish Community in Mandatory Palestine* in https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/israel-studies-an-anthology-the-yishuv

In spite of all these shortcomings, the Jewish society in Palestine strongly involved itself in political activities, and the political parties occupied a role of maximum importance in public life. Only in the last day of 1933, the legal officer Robert Harry Drayton, who had been appointed registrator of the Government in Palestine, in charge of collecting and editing the whole legislation in the territory, finalized a work in three volumes, that came into force as a legal framework.[34]

In 1940, the Jewish community in Palestine had already acquired an important degree of development in the economy, agriculture, industry, health and education system. Practically, the British administration gave the local populations the right to develop their own societies, but did not allow them to establish sovereign states, as a document of Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry in 1946 showed beyond doubt: "*That Jew shall not dominate Arab and Arab shall not dominate Jew in Palestine. That Palestine shall be neither a Jewish state nor an Arab state. That the form of government ultimately to be established, shall, under international guarantees, fully protect and preserve the interests in the Holy Land of Christendom and of the Moslem and Jewish faiths. Thus Palestine must ultimately become a state which guards the rights and interests of Moslems, Jews and Christians alike; and accords to the inhabitants, as a whole, the fullest measure of self-government, consistent with the three paramount principles set forth above,*"[35] thus contradicting the mandate text that referred to the responsibility of the administration to develop self-government institutions.

One should not overlook the fact that the formal legal basis for the establishment of Israel, is to be found in Resolution 181 of the UN General Assembly dated 29th November 1947, which proposed the *Partition Plan*,

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[34]Julius Sykes, *The Jewish Athena: the political genesis of the state of Israel* in https://sc.edu/about/offices_and_divisions/research/news_and_pubs/caravel/archive/2016/2016-caravel-jewish-athena.php.
[35] *Principles of Government: No Arab, No Jewish State*, in "Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry", Chapter I, Recommendation no.3, Points I-III, 1946, Yale Law School: The Avalon Project, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/angch01.asp.

supervised by a special United Nations Commission for Palestine. Here, the transition stages were specified, as well as the major directions of the political institutions, specifying the need to establish a provisional government council with advisory role in the relationships with the public organizations, but also with the political parties, during the transition period:[36]

> "*The Commission, after consultation with the democratic parties and other public organizations of The Arab and Jewish States, shall select and establish in each State as rapidly as possible a Provisional Council of Government. The activities of both the Arab and Jewish Provisional Councils of Government shall be carried out under the general direction of the Commission.*"[37]

The Assembly and the Council became the backbone of the future state. Thus, a month before the expiry of the mandate, in the period 6-12 April 1948, the General Zionist Council met in Tel Aviv and established two new institutional bodies, with temporary character, fit for the needs of a state much different from the ones of a community, in which power derives from the people: a legislative organism, *Mo'etzet ha-am* (The People's Council), made up of 37 members, who represented all that meant the Jewish population in Palestine, including the political formations, irrespective of their orientation. An executive organism *Minhelet Ha-am* (The People's Administration), made up of 13 members was also established. This temporary executive was reunited on 12 May 1948 to decide if the independence of the Jewish state would be declared. Only 10 members could participate, due to the fact that the rest were blocked in various areas, due to the state of war, only 6 voted for the declaration of independence, and two days later, the remarkable event occurred, marking the appearance of state Israel on the map of the world.

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[36] Peter Y. Medding, *The Founding of Israeli Democracy, 1948-1967*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 11.
[37] Harry Sacher, *Israel The Establishment of a State*, London, George Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1952, p. 113.

Once the *Declaration of Independence* was read and signed, *Mo'etzet Ha-Am* was converted into the Provisional State Council (*Mo'etzet Hamedinah Hazemanit*), and *Minhelet Ha-Am* became the Provisional Government (*Minhelet Hamemshalah Hazemanit*)[38]. The Provisional Council was not an elected organism and functioned only till 14th February 1949, when it was replaced by the Constituent Assembly. This was made up of 38 members, headed by President Chaim Weizmann. Given his statute, he dealt only with the matters that required immediate settlement, during 39 meetings. It had to function "*as a legislative and executive branch of the governing system until a government is formed by the Constituent Assembly, and to prepare the state for parliamentary elections.*"[39]

In this term, its main tasks included the enactment of ordinances from various fields, such as the political, administrative, defence and finances ones, as well as the organization of elections, but not later than 1st October 1948, but they were postponed till 25th January 1949. At the same time, this moment marked the revocation of all the British decisions instituted by the White Chart of 1939. But the basis of this provisional institutions was *Va'ad Le'umi* (National Council) that had functioned during the British mandate, from inside breaking into two cores, one to form the Provisional Council, that represented the forerunner of the permanent legislative, the Knesset, and the leadership of *Va'ad Le'umi,* represented the core of the Provisional Government.[40]

The Council was immediately recognized by the United States, as *de facto* authority of Israel,[41] with the promise that as soon as a permanent one was elected, this will enjoy the same treatment.[42] Its headquarters was set up in the

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[38] Aviva Halamish, *op. cit*.
[39] *Roles of the Provisional State Council*, in "The Provisional State Council, 14 May 1948-14 February 1949", The Knesset, https://knesset.gov.il/review/ReviewPage3.aspx?kns=0&lng=3.
[40] Bernard Reich, David. H. Goldberg , *op. cit*.,p. 567.
[41] *Memorandum on the De Jure Recognition of Israel*, in "Recognition of the State of Israel Documents ", ca.1948, p.2, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/israel/large/index.php.
[42] *Revised Draft Press Release*, in "Recognition of the State of Israel Research File," 31st January 1949, p. 1, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum,

North of Tel Aviv. This was made up of 14 ministries, headed by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, who also occupies the position of Minister of Defence, while the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs was held by Moshe-Sharett, the future Prime Minister. This government council dealt mainly with tax collection, while the officials of the Jewish Agency and *Va'ad Leumi* had and assumed ministerial responsibilities.

The Provisional Government was established at the same time with the Provisional Council, but it was neither elected, nor approved by the latter, therefore its authority does not derive from the legislative sphere.[43] We can characterize it as having the role of a temporary cabinet, that was to function for a period of nine months, between 14.05.1948 - 10.03.1949, till the first government was formed, following the first parliamentary elections as specified in the *Law and Administration Ordinance*: "*The Provisional Government shall act in accordance with the policy laid down by the Provisional Council of State, shall carry out its decisions, shall report to it on its activities and shall be answerable to it for its activities.*" [44] This decree had the role to fix the agenda of the Provisional Council, authorizing it as a legislative authority of the new state and stipulating the transfer of competences from the mandate authority to the new administration.

This also provided the legal basis for the declaration by the Provisional State Council of an emergency situation. This institutional conversion was provided in the text of the *Declaration of Independence* itself: "*We declare that, with effect from the moment of the termination of the Mandate being tonight, the eve of Sabbath, the 6t^h Iyar, 5708 (15th May, 1948), until the establishment of the elected, regular authorities of the State in accordance with the Constitution which shall be adopted by the Elected Constituent Assembly not later than the 1st October 1948, the*

https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/israel/large/documents/index.php?documentdate=1949-01-31&documentid=1-15&collectionid=ROI&pagenumber=1.
[43] Samuel Sager, *The Parliamentary System of Israel*, New York, Syracuse University Press, 1985, p.29.
[44] *Law and Administration Ordinance No.1 of 5708 -1948**, in "Selected ordinances of The Provisional State Council", Chapter I, Point c, 21st May 1948, p. 7, The Knesset, https://knesset.gov.il/review/data/eng/law/kns0_govt-justice_eng.pdf.

People's Council shall act as a Provisional Council of State, and its executive organ, the People's Administration, shall be the Provisional Government of the Jewish State, to be called «Israel»."[45]

For various reasons, the Provisional Council rejected the idea of conceiving immediately a fixed legislative framework and preferred the establishment of some *Basic Laws*, which, in time, could have evolved into a state constitution with full rights.[46] Among the ones who opposed the idea of a written constitution there were David Ben-Gurion and the religious parties, which argued their position by appeal to the British model: "*despite and perhaps even because of the absence of a written constitution in Great Britain, the rule of law and democracy there are solid, and civil freedoms are upheld.*"[47] However, we cannot state that the Israeli political system was fully copied after the British one, as it would have fit neither the regional realities, nor the requirements of the moment.

This situation extended up to the moment when their attributions were taken over by permanent institutions, that were to be established by the Constituent Assembly, which was under organization and to which it was intended to offer the task to issue the formal constitution. This delay can be considered in a certain way gainful, as there were no negative effects, as historians S. Ilan Troen and Noah Lucas mentioned, in one of their studies on the political situation of Israel in its incipient stage as a sovereign state: "*the whole range of institutional adaptations that followed statehood were all reached without benefit of a written constitution. In fact, it may be that avoidance of the political challenge of drafting a formal constitution made possible the successful extension of unity and*

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[45] *Declaration of Establishment of State of Israel*, 14th May 1948, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ,https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/declaration%20of%20establishment%20of%20state%20of%20israel.aspx.
[46] Clive Jones, Emma C. Murphy, *Israel Challenges to Identity, Democracy and the State*, London, Routledge, 2002, p. 32.
[47] *Arguments Against*, Jewish Virtual Library, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/constitution-of-israel.

stability throughout the whole population."[48] It was also specified the deadline of 25th January for organization of the first free elections after the arrangement of a census, whose result showed that there were half a million eligible Israeli to vote, [49] and a part of the Palestinians that remained on the territory of the state entitled to vote, as approximately 60,000 immediately received Israeli citizenship.[50] Starting from the document of the declaration, which has an incomplete character, that is it does not offer sufficient details about the drafting of a constitution or about the future elections, but these aspects remain at the option of the provisional institutions. In spite of these shortcomings, some key-aspects are mentioned however for the definition of the state, such as the functioning according to democratic principles, the observance and guarantee of the fundamental rights and   liberties. It can be noticed that the provisional institutions successfully fulfilled their assignments till the first final government came into operation. Even if we talk only about a short period of time, these conferred them continuity in the period of *Yishuv*. Instead of being removed and replaced with new ones, it was decided to improve and adapt them to the new realities.

The condition of the elections being fulfilled, on 16th February 1949, the members of the Constituent Assembly voted the change of the denomination, and thus the First Knesset in the history of Israel came into force. The reunion ceremony was opened by Chaim Weizmann, who was to become the first President of Israel. The highest position in Knesset, the one that assured a great political influence, is called *Yoshev Rosh HaKnesset*, (equivalent to a function of president, a term copied after the American formula *Speaker of the House*), being

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[48] S. lan Troen, Noah Lucas, *An Introduction To Research on Israel's First Decade*, in "Israel The First Decade of Independence", S. Ilan Troen, Noah Lucas (eds.), Albany, State University of New York Press, 1995, p. 6.
[49] *A Page from History: Israel's First National Elections*, The Israel Forever Foundation, https://israelforever.org/interact/blog/first_national_elections_israel/.
[50] Yoav Peled, *The Challenge of Ethnic Democracy. The State and Minority Groups in Israel, Poland and Northern Ireland*, London, Routledge, 2014. p. 97.

occupied in the first decade by Joseph Sprinzak. He became responsible for the affairs of Knesset internally and on foreign plans, he was the representative of the Knesset, he had the obligation to maintain the integrity of its image and ensured observance its procedure regulations.[51]

According to the *Harari Decision*, that came from the progressivist Yizhar Harari, it was stipulated that, instead of a single document, the constitution of Israel was to be made up of a series of fundamental laws that will be created in time by a special commission and approved by Knesset .

In this context, the first Israeli Government was established on 8th March 1949, by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, identifying itself with the dominant party, Mapai, that received at the elections 35% of the total number of votes, which means that it got 155,274 valid votes, obtaining 46 allocated places of the total of 120.[52] In order to come into force, its components must be approved by Knesset. At its formation, the Government is obliged to present a program to the Knesset. The Government is an institution of crucial importance, playing the part of an intermediary between Knesset and the Prime Minister. The relationship between Knesset and the Government is based on the conception according to which the duty of the parliament is to establish an efficient government.[53]

From the formation of the state up to the present, no party could form a government without depending on the smaller political formations to form coalitions. The Prime Minister is the one who appoints the ministers, but they must also receive the vote of confidence of Knesset. The executive function of the government is assured by a Prime Minister and a cabinet whose power derives

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[51] The *Knesset: The Role of the Knesset Speaker*, in "Legislative Branch (Knesset)", Jewish Virtual Library, https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-role-of-the-knesset-speaker.
[52] *Constituent Assembly (which later turned into the First Knesset) Elections to the Constituent Assembly*, in "Knesset Elections Results", 25 January 1949, The Knesset, https://knesset.gov.il/description/eng/eng_mimshal_res1.htm.
[53] Gregory S. Mahler, Asher Zidon, *The Knesset: Parliament in the Israeli Political System*, London, Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1981, p. 37.

from Knesset. On the basis of this perspective on the institutional experience of the Jewish community in Palestine in the pre-statal period, we can understand the evolution and fusion of the institutions of *Yishuv*, with the Zionist and British ones, together with the reminiscences from the Ottoman period and the aspects of the mosaic religion.

Thus we can conclude that the institutions of Israel, even if they have a modern character, are strongly connected to the fight for the survival and welfare of the Jewish people, whose sole purpose became from the moment of the proclamation of independence, the security and survival of the state. In the first decade of existence, finding a functioning formula for the Israeli society had become the main preoccupation of the leaders, but especially of Ben-Gurion, together with the protection of the state, which already involved massive expenses. The legislative efforts were concentrated around the modification, by some amendments, of the regulations that had functioned in the period of the British mandate, as that no longer suited the realities of the new state. Practically, Israel had inherited a large part of the legal system from the former mandate power. The First Knesset only continued the legislative process initiated in the interim period. In this context, the target of the policies of reorganization of the Israeli leadership included such fields as the education system, economy, organization and functioning of the army, the woman's statute, the military service, the rights of the demobilized soldiers and even the family matters, trying to motivate the actions by the necessity to get the society out of difficulty, resorting to the welfare of the jewish population.

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A newspaper on the edge of two eras, December 22, 1989

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Key-words: Romanian Revolution, Press, Communism, 1989, Nicolae Ceaușescu

Abstract

In this article I analyze how Scînteia, the official newspaper of the Romanian Communist Party, was transformed in just one day into Scînteia Poporului. The analysis will be based on interviews with journalists and the collection of the two publications. The first issue appeared in the early morning hours of December 22, the second in the evening of the same day.

The end of 1989 brought along some major changes in Romanian society, starting from a society state-directed and controlled, and reaching a free society and market economy. The effervescence of the changes that took place in the communist block also engaged Romania at the end of 1989, a moment when Nicolae Ceaușescu together with his wife, Elena, were still trying to keep a dictatorial regime, based on the cult of personality and on a suffocating supervision of the population, by means of the Security Service (Securitate in Romanian language), a body that contained alongside the secret services, domestic and external, also a network of informers that got to involve the entire population.

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In this article, I will present how *Scînteia*, official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, turned into *Scînteia poporului*, Political and Social Daily Newspaper. The first issue appeared in the early morning hours of December 22, the second in the evening of the same day. For drawing up this paper we shall mainly appeal to the study of the two foregoing issues, but we shall also use some interviews with the persons that were members of the editorial staff of *Scînteia*/*Scînteia Poporului* at that respective date, and here we will mention Mircea Bunea, Sergiu Andon and Ion Marin.

During the communist regime the press, just like other domains, was subject to censure. The shift to a valet journalist raising disputes was among one of the realities that left a mark on the evolution of the post-communist press, especially on its quality. The importance that the communist regime paid to press is evident from a Nicolae Ceaușescu speech, of 1977, in which he mentioned: "the press is an instrument of the party and needs to disseminate the party's policy in all domains of activity (…) in the domain of press (…) we need to take a number of measures against any liberal spirit (s.n.) that leaves the door open for concepts that do not serve the communist and socialist education."[2]

As one can see, the press needs to obey the regime and its ruler. In another article, this time from the year 1988, included in *Presa Noastră* it was said: "Journalists, all workers from the press place in the centre of their attention the study and the firm understanding of the activities of comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu, of his profound scientific ideas for creating a new society, having a crucial importance."[3]

Analyzing the role of the press under the soviet rule, Denis McQuail reflected the principles that led the mass media in communism ruled:

- "press is under control and serves the interests of the working class;

- press is not owned by private owners;

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[2] Marian Petcu, *Tipologia presei românești*, Iași, Institutul European, 2002, p. 18.
[3] *Ibidem,* p.18.

- press serves the positive functions of society: adherence to the desired norms, education, information, motivation, mobilization;

- in their global mission to society, the media must respond to the wishes and needs of their audience;

- the society has the right to use censorship and other legal measures to prevent or punish antisocial publications;

- press should provide a complete and objective look at society and the world in accordance with Leninist Marxist principles;

- press must support progressive moves at home and abroad."[4]

This is how the Soviet press (including the Romanian press) looked like during the communist regime. There was a harsh censorship, and the "deeds of glory" of the "beloved ruler" were reproduced in detail in the press.

During the communist period, *Scînteia*, being the largest newspaper in Romania, with a circulation estimated at 1.7 million newspapers every day, presented the point of view of the Romanian Communist Party. Given this circulation, *Scînteia* may have been deemed one of the most powerful brands in the world. Although it had such a large circulation this did not mean it was actually read by this many readers. In the last period it mainly contained speeches of Ceaușescu and of the ruling members of the party.

Mircea Bunea, a journalist in those days for *Scînteia*, declared that in such later period the newspaper basically was written on its own, since it was dominated by speeches.[5] Sergiu Andon, also a journalist for *Scînteia*, claimed that: "difficult and even more and more difficult one could write criticism and there was only a chance for punctually making things right."[6] This punctual correction of things meant writing certain articles whereby one could try to bring to the

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[4] For more information, see Denis McQuail, *Mass Communication Theory. An Introduction*, (2nd ed.), Sage Publications, Inc.,1987.
[5] Interview with Mircea Bunea of May 21, 2007.
[6] Interview with Sergiu Andon of May 31, 2007.

forefront some mistakes in the system, but it was not the system that was criticized, it was the people that made those mistakes.

In December 1989, the image of Romania reflected a society burdened by hardship, in the middle of winter, being permanently on the move for procuring food supplies, working in inhuman conditions. Thus, on December 15, 1989 the Romanian Revolution breaks out in Timișoara. It began as a protest, of little size, against the attempt to arrest the reverend of Hungarian origin, Lásló Tôkés. This protest engaged the entire city, and in Bucharest the rulers of the party requested some serious measures to be taken for punishing the culprits.

On December 18, Ceaușescu left for Iran for a visit. Also as of this date, the order forces were patrolling the streets of Timișoara, the city was actually in need.[7] On December 20, the revolution engaged the entire city. On the same day Ceaușescu returned from Iran three hours earlier. He requested some emergency measures to be taken in Timișoara, taking the army out in the streets; the army had orders to shoot the crowd if things did not improve.

In the evening of December 20, Ceaușescu held a speech on TV, whereby he strongly disagreed with the actions taking place in Timișoara. After the speech, throughout the country there were gatherings of workers from plants and factories in order to disagree with the events from Timișoara and in order to reconfirm the support towards the communist regime.

For the next day, December 21, it was established to organize a large meeting in Bucharest in order to show that the regime was largely supported. On December 21, workers from all plants and factories from Bucharest were brought to Palatului Square, currently Revoluției Square, in front of the headquarters of the Party Central Committee, in order to listen to the speech held by Ceaușescu. He wanted to reject the manifestations of protest taking place in Timișoara and to announce the increase of wages and pensions.[8]

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[7] For more details, see Peter Siani-Davies, *Revolutia română din decembrie 1989,* București, Humanitas, 2006.
[8] *Ibidem.*

Several minutes after Ceaușescu's speech began there were sharp cries heard in the square and the crowd began to overcrowd. Soon the live TV and radio transmissions were cut, but not before the surprised face of Ceaușescu was seen by the entire nation. Several minutes thereafter order was reinstated, and Ceaușescu proceeded with his speech.

After the manifestation was over, the people started gathering in three central areas of Bucharest: Universității Square, Romană Square and Unirii Square. Most were in Universității Square, where street fights began between order forces and demonstrators, who had created a barricade. This was defeated, and in the morning of December 22, all had been cleaned up and it seemed as nothing had happened. Ever since morning, people started to gather in front of the headquarters of the Central Committee. Ceaușescu came out on the balcony in order to approach this crowd. To no avail, he was interrupted by loud clamors[9]. Seeing that the situation was getting out of control, together with Elena Ceaușescu and other two communist leaders he escaped with a helicopter, which moment was caught on camera. In the evening of the same night he had been captured near Târgoviște.

Under these circumstances, *Scînteia* was issued on December 22, reflecting on the first page "the support manifestation" of December 21. As one could see from the image posted on the first page of *Scînteia* newspaper from December 22, the main title of the edition was the following: "The great gathering of the working people from the Capital provided an expression of the determination to act for the DEFENCE OF THE SOCIALIST ACHIEVEMENTS, OF THE INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ROMANIA,"[10] followed by a speech held by Nicolae Ceaușescu. In a red bolded box the following was written: "THE SIGNIFICANT LIABILITY FOR THE CALM OF THE COUNTRY, FOR THE FULL UNITY OF THE ENTIRE NATION AROUND

[9] *Ibidem.*
[10] *Scînteia*, December 22, 1989, p.1.

THE PARTY, THE DETERMINED POSITION FOR DEFENDING THE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE, FOR THE UNAFFECTED UNFOLDING OF THE SOCIALIST ACHIEVEMENTS IN OUR COUNTRY,"[11] being followed by a reference to the second page where the following messages "of working people" from the gatherings from factories and plants in the support of the regime were to be found.

In an article from page three it was demanded that a "fighting detachment" be created in order to defend the regime and the "wealth of the people". There are very many encouragements to national unity, to the "defence" of identity and independence of the socialist regime. All such encouragements were formulated given the awareness of the seriousness of the matter with which the regime was confronted. It was a last, desperate attempt to maintain Ceaușescu and the entire regime. Along with the encouragement to work, it was attempted to manipulate the readers by "great" achievements. It was in this way that the overachievements of economic tasks were presented and optimistic forecasts were made regarding the overachievement of the plans for the year 1990, which year was solidly prepared, especially in the field of agriculture. All were just a means of poisoning, attempts to manipulate the people, given the fact that Romanian agriculture in 1989 was in a critical standing, being one of the last in Europe with regards to agricultural production. It was also in this issue, but related to international matters, that the aggression of the USA against the state of Panama was reprobated. Such aggression, in the view of the communist leaders, was also intended to be directed against Romania, and by such articles they tried to mobilize the people to support the regime.

A visual manipulation was also attempted, by publishing on the first page a photograph of the meeting of December 21, in which we are presented with the "working people", holding boards with the face of the "beloved leaders"

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[11] *Ibidem.*

and messages in support of the regime and disapproval of the manifestations from Timișoara.[12]

This is how *Scînteia* was issued in the morning hours of December 22. In the evening of the same day, after the Ceaușescu couple fled and the Revolution had overturned the regime, *Scînteia* was issued in a special edition, under a different name, *Scînteia poporului*. One of the questions that was raised was how was it possible that in less than 12 hours as of the above mentioned issue a new version was issued. This question will be answered in the following lines.

After interviewing several members of the editorial staff of *Scînteia*, Sergiu Andon, Mircea Bunea, Ion Marin, they declared to me that in the morning of December 22, being at work, headquartered in Casa Scînteii, groups of people that were heading to the city centre in order to protest, passed by.[13] In front of *Scînteia* they yelled: "You cowards, join us!" It was at that moment that the secretary general of the editorial staff, Anghel Paraschiv called them in his office and told them: "Go downtown, go to the city centre and come back and share with me what you witnessed."[14] From all the editorial staff 6 to 7 persons walked out, and this is where the three interviewees disagree. But what is certain is that they were among the reporters that were out on the field. Sergiu Andon being asked why he went out he answered it was due to the "reporter instinct."[15]

After being out and having returned, the first of them being Ion Marin, who also produced a little article for that issue, has a talk with the editor in chief, Ion Mitrache made him write a statement whereby *Scînteia* joined the revolution and go at the television and read it out loud. In that statement the idea of *Scînteia poporului* already emerged. According to the three, this idea had been previously prepared. The special edition was issued in the evening of December 22,

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[12] *Ibidem.*
[13] Interview with Mircea Bunea of May 21, 2007; Interview with Sergiu Andon of May 31, 2007. Interview with Ion Marin of May 18, 2007.
[14] Interview with Sergiu Andon of May 31, 2007.
[15] Interview with Sergiu Andon of May 31, 2007.

numbering two pages, having as main title: "GLORY TO OUR FREE COUNTRY, TO ITS HERO PEOPLE! THE DICTATORSHIP HAS FALLEN, THE PEOPLE"[16].

WE ARE FREE! VICTORY OF THE TRUTH!" In a box the following was written: "OUR NEWSPAPER IS ISSUED TODAY IN A SPECIAL EDITION, AS A NEW, TRUE AND PATRIOTIC EXPRESSION, AS A NEWSPAPER OF THE PEOPLE."[17]

In the programmatic article of the new publication it was mentioned: "we address the people with the solemn reinsurance that *Scînteia* will be a newspaper of the people, of the actual truth, of the truth which sadly and, not seldom, with the inner resentment, we were not always able to utter"

International echoes of the Revolution are also presented and there was also a section with the name "Reporters of Scînteia poporului report." Following the model of *Scînteia*, where most of the articles were not signed, none of the articles of *Scînteia poporului* were signed in this first special edition. *Scînteia poporului* continued to be issued also on December 23 and December 24, than changed its name to *Adevărul.*

The communist press of Romania resembled the soviet one, which model was emulated. The changes that began taking place in this part of Europe seemed not to affect the dictatorial regime of Ceaușescu, he even believed himself to be loved by the people.

The break out of the Revolution made all the hatred, accumulated during all those hard years, to overflow and hence maybe the violent side of the occurred events. The post-December press played a significant role in informing the people and has become one of the first profitable businesses in Romania. *Scînteia poporului* and then *Adevărul* played a significant role in presenting the events from that time.

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[16] *Scînteia Poporului*, December 22, 1989, p.1.
[17] *Ibidem.*

After nearly twenty years from those events, Romanian society has changed a lot, going through a hard transition time. The evolution of the press took place in parallel with the change of the entire society. Currently, one may talk about a free press in Romania, one in which opinions may be expressed, but also one whose quality and trust of some people therein are damaged by political interests and, thus providing one reason why the circulation has diminished. Freedom of press is one of the basic elements of democracy, without it we would again be heading towards dictatorship.

Source *Scînteia*, December 22, 1989

Source: *Scînteia Poporului*, December 22, 1989

United States' new enemy: China and the conquest for world influence
A comparative study of current Chinese and US approaches to foreign assistance, investment and trade in Africa

Roxana Hanganu[1]

Key-words: China's foreign aid, US foreign assistance, China-Africa trade, US-Africa trade, Chinese FDI to Africa, US FDI to Africa, economic diplomacy, Belt and Road, the *P*rosper Africa initiative, US policy in Africa, the resource war, China threat, China's peaceful rise.

Abstract

China's new diplomacy has been a topic of heated discussions both within academic scholarship and political circles across the globe. Particularly controversial has been its economic development and its conquest for world influence, which created tensions with the US. The United States of America has been accusing China of borrowing and assisting foreign countries in order to gain more influence worldwide and especially over Africa. Both China and the US emphasise the centrality of economy in their domestic and external policies. Despite their common attachment
to economic development the US and China have diverged considerably in their respective promotion of economic and strategic interest abroad. This study compares current Chinese and US approaches to economic diplomacy, with an emphasis on their foreign assistance, investment and trade in Africa. To this end, the research outlines the

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intricacies behind US and China's implication in Africa, and delves into the specificities of their current economic diplomacy. Moreover, it measures their efficiency in engaging with the African continent through FDI, foreign assistance and trade.

Introduction

China has become a major presence on the global stage through its economic upheaval and has sparked numerous intellectual debates about the implications of its growing economic, political and security influence on the world order.

Under the rule of Xi Jinping, China developed a new approach to foreign policy, based on "win-win" cooperation, peaceful development, deepening of relations and partnerships at a regional level, in accordance with the principles of friendship, sincerity, mutual benefit and cooperation. At the same time, Beijing has improved its cooperation with other developing countries (especially with African nations) and has also promoted a major power diplomacy. [2]

Consequently, its actions have triggered a negative reaction from the United States of America, which accuses China of posing a threat to its national security. [3]

China and the US are currently confronting each other on many aspects, from intellectual property to maritime disputes. However, the economic competition between them, for gaining more influence across the globe, is by far the most visible one.

Africa has now become a major issue between China and the United States, because China has increased its influence in the region to the detriment of the US, and various Western countries. The United States has signaled the danger

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[2] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, *Forge Ahead under the Guidance of General Secretary Xi Jinping's Thought on Diplomacy*, Speech by Foreign Minister Wang Yi, 01.09.2017, https://bit.ly/2BfhQbP.

[3] National Security Strategy Archive, *Summary of the National Defense Strategy of The United States of America   2018*,   p.   1, http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.

that China poses to the future of the region in various official documents. Consequently, if we wish to understand the current competition between Washington and Beijing and to determine whose tactics are more efficient, we need to analyze the economic methods which the two actors use in the region, in order to gain more influence.

Fundamentals of China's economic diplomacy in Africa

Over the past several years, China has managed to become the world's second largest economy, overtaking Japan. Despite this major accomplishment, China has been criticized, especially by the US, for seeking to attract economically and politically fragile states in order to gain access to various markets, goods and raw materials to sustain its economic power.

Since Xi Jinping took office, Beijing has expanded its influence in developing countries that have a strategic role. China's recent foreign policy has led to an economic confrontation with the United States, as the US wants to maintain its hegemony globally.

China has often identified its interests with those of developing countries, especially with Africa, as a way to strengthen its position in the international system.[4]

China has long been involved in Africa. The famous adventures of the Chinese admiral, Zheng Ho, between 1416 to 1423, on the coasts of East Africa, constituted the first Chinese trade attempts with Africa. China's trade relations with Africa grew more intense after the creation of the People's Republic of China in 1949.

The Bandung Conference bolstered the ties between China and Africa, and Egypt was the first African state which entered into a trade agreement with

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[4] Ian Taylor, *China and Africa: Engagement and Compromise*, Routledge, New York, 2006, p. 3.

China. In the 1960s, Beijing was one of the actors who sustained the African countries 'struggle for independence.[5]

Between 1960 and 1980, China offered foreign assistance for free to African states, so they might consolidate their economic development. However, that was insufficient. Therefore, China began to explore new ways in which African nations could be assisted, such as preferential and discount loans, as well as various project partnerships in Africa.[6]

Africa has always been a major focus of China's diplomacy. Africa's strategic and economic importance to China was also seen in its first White Paper on China's foreign policy in Africa issued in 2006. The document provides insight into the Chinese objectives for Africa.

In this document, China recognizes that Africa's rich natural resources are a major factor encouraging economic development. According to the White Paper, one of the major Chinese objectives in Africa is to deepen the cooperation with Africa bilaterally and multilaterally.

In regards to foreign assistance, the RPC is seeking to increase it without political conditions. It will adopt measures to boost bilateral trade and to pursue negotiation of free trade agreements with African regional countries and organizations. At the same time, China highlights the special importance that the China-Africa Cooperation Forum (launched in 2000) is taking on the development of collective dialogue and multilateral co-operation.[7]

In 2015, China launched its second policy for Africa, which was an important step in Sino-African cooperation. China became Africa's largest trading partner in 2009 and in 2014, Chinese trade with Africa was four times higher than in 2006, when the first policy had been issued. Unlike the first

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[5] *Ibidem*, pp. 18-24.
[6] Li Anshan, *China and Africa: Policy and challenges*, in „China Security", Vol. 3, No. 3, World Security Institute, 2007, pp. 72-74,
http://www.cebri.com.br/midia/documentos/china_and_africa_policy_and_challange.pdf.
[7] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, *White Paper on China's African policy*, 2006, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/eng/zgdfzzc/t481748.htm.

Chinese policy for Africa, the current one will focus on the industrialization of the region, on the modernization of agriculture, on cooperation in resources and energy, and on financial cooperation. China will continue to cooperate with Africa through the China-Africa Cooperation Forum, but also through the PRC Mission - the African Union, which will support the implementation of the African Union's Agenda 2063.[8]

Africa is currently playing an important role on Xi Jinping's agenda. Xi Jinping said that Africa was an extension of the Belt and Road initiative and a major participant in the project. The two powers will cooperate in many projects for common prosperity, especially in infrastructure.[9]

China and Africa have also drafted Eight *Major Initiatives* to improve their economic cooperation, and also developed *The Action Plan* 2019-2021, for the same purpose.[10]

In 2019, China's Prime Minister, Wang Yi, said that Africa and Sino-African cooperation were part of the South-South cooperation policy, a model for international cooperation with Africa. Wang also reiterated that China's ultimate goal was to help Africa become economically independent and have sustainable development.[11]

Sino-African relations have sparked a lot of criticism over time. Views on China's involvement in Africa differ. Some see China as a development partner. Others see China as an economic competitor that engages in short-term access to Africa's resources. There is also a third interpretation, which sees China as a colonizing power that uses a long-term strategy to replace the pro-Western

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[8] Xinhua, *Full Text: China's second Africa policy paper*, 2015, https://bit.ly/2VODATQ.
[9] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, China supports Africa jointly building Belt and Road, speech by Xi Jinping, 2018/09/03, https://bit.ly/2J0ZDFh.
[10]Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, *Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2019-2021)*, 2018-09-12, https://www.focac.org/eng/zywx_1/zywj/t1594297.htm.
[11] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Wang Yi Talks about the African Debt Issue: *China Will Help Africa Achieve Economic Independence and Sustainable Development*, 2019/01/04, https://bit.ly/2Tnc1UG.

orientation of the continent through partnerships under the South-South cooperation policy.[12]

Fundamentals of the United States of America's economic diplomacy in Africa

Unlike China, the United States of America did not have deep historical ties with Africa, besides the slave trade. For example, the early US contacts with the African continent followed European practices, and were limited to paying tributes to pirates in exchange for free passage.[13]

During the Great War, the US shared a good relationship with the colonial powers. Therefore, US contacts with Africa were minimal.[14]

However, US foreign policy towards Africa changed during the Cold War. For example, in a Memorandum from the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Holmes) to Secretary of State Dulles, dated February 6, 1958, regarding the US policy towards Africa, it was revealed that at that time America was concerned about the Soviet Union's intentions in the region, and attempts were made to strengthen and to secure the African states' ties to the West in order to protect Africa.[15]

Another document stated that US President Dwight D. Eisenhower was very concerned about how this could be done, because it was difficult to cultivate good relations with the colonies. The policy finally adopted was to offer 500 million dollars for Africa's development, in the hope that the investments will connect it to Africa's metropolitan areas.[16]

[12] Chris Alden, *China in Africa: Partner, Competitor or Hegemon*, Zed Books, New York, 2007, pp. 5-6.

[13] Glenn Hastedt, *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy*, Facts on File, Inc., New York, 2004, p. 7.

[14] Stephen M. Magu, *Great Powers and US Foreign Policy towards Africa*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2019, pp. 55-56.

[15]*Foreign Relations of the United States* 1958-1960, Volume XIV, Africa, *General U.S. Policy Toward Africa, Memorandum from the Secretary of State's Special Assistant (Holmes) to Secretary of State Dulles*, February 6, 1958, Harriet Dashiell Schwar and Stanley Shaloff, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1992, p.1.

[16]*Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1958-1960, Volume XIV, Africa, *Memorandum of Discussion at the 375th Meeting of the National Security Council (U.S. Policy Toward Africa South of the Sahara Prior to*

During that time, American interests in Africa were related to anti-colonialism, to strategic minerals, to Africa's role in the Western European security system, and to military bases.[17]

US foreign policy in Africa has seen many stages and phases of commitment. For example, the Kennedy Administration reconsidered the American foreign policy in Africa and supported African nationalism. On the other hand, the Nixon Administration seemed to return to the old American habits of not getting very involved in Africa. [18]

Clinton's administration was more involved in African issues related to conflicts between states, to terrorism, to HIV, and to illicit arms trade.

Under Bush's leadership, America reconsidered its foreign policy towards Africa. Following the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, America began to see Africa as a strategic issue in the war on terror.[19] In the US National *Security Strategy*, 2002, it was mentioned that America was threatened by failed states. The document demonstrated America's commitment to fighting Al-Qaeda and any other terrorist group, especially cells in Africa and the Middle East where terrorists were trained. [20]

Barack Obama opted for an African policy more geared to the causes of failed states. He focused on promoting democracy for peace and security in Africa, and was convinced that a governance method based on respect rather than coercion is the key to success in Africa. [21]

America's recent approaches to Africa have undergone a number of changes. There are voices criticizing the fact that the United States, under the

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Calendar Year 1960), August 7, 1958, Harriet Dashiell Schwar and Stanley Shaloff, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1992, Document 6, pp. 19-22.

[17] Alan P. Dobson; Steve Marsh, *US foreign Policy since 1945*, Second Edition, Routledge, New York, 2006, pp.111-112.

[18] Stephen M. Magu, *op.cit*., pp. 63-64.

[19] Michael Cox; Doug Stokes, *US Foreign Policy*, Second edition, Oxford University Press, New York, 2012, pp. 301-307.

[20] U.S. Department of State, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 2002, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf , pp. 1-5.

[21] Michael Cox, *op.cit*., p. 307.

leadership of Donald Trump, is not that involved in Africa, while China's role is amplified mainly through the China-Africa Forum.[22]

In spite of recent criticism, and probably due to the Chinese threat to American interests in Africa, Donald Trump issued a new strategy for Africa in 2018. The strategy reflects America's intention to get more involved in the region. At the same time, Trump stressed that America would improve trade relations with African states, and would launch the "Prosper Africa" initiative, which would encourage open markets for US businesses, increase employment opportunities for young people, and support growth and development in Africa.[23]

In this document, the US accuses China of using bribery and non-transparent agreements in order to maintain Africa in a state of subservience. Washington also criticizes the Chinese "Belt and Road" initiative, viewing it as a plan through which China will develop commercial routes, with the ultimate goal of advancing global Chinese domination.[24]

The US deplores the fact that, although it has donated billions of dollars to Africa, money has not stopped terrorism, radicalism and violence. It has also failed to prevent countries such as China and Russia from taking advantage of this situation to increase their power and influence.[25]

Foreign aid, investments and trade between China and Africa

"Foreign aid "or "Official *Development Assistance"* (*ODA*) is a term coined by the *Development Assistance* Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to measure aid. According to

[22] Reuben Brigety, *A Post-American Africa*, August 28, 2018, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2018-08-28/post-american-africa.
[23] The White House, *President Donald J. Trump's Africa Strategy Advances Prosperity, Security, and Stability*, December 13, 2018, https://bit.ly/2LfIEwk.
[24] The White House, *Remarks by National Security Advisor Ambassador John R. Bolton on The Trump Administration's New Africa Strategy*, December 13, 2018, https://bit.ly/2rBYrg6.
[25] U.S. Department of Defence, *National Security Advisor Unveils Administration's Africa Strategy*, https://bit.ly/2LgZ9Z3.

OECD, "Official development assistance" (ODA) is defined as *government aid designed to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries. Aid may be provided bilaterally, from donor to recipient, or channelled through a multilateral development agency, such as the United Nations or the World Bank. Aid includes grants, "soft" loans and the provision of technical assistance*.[26]

Chinese foreign assistance dates back to the founding of the People's Republic of China, and has lasted for almost seven decades. At the beginning, China received economic aid from the Soviet Union. Afterwards, the Chinese government used this support for industrialization, and began to provide economic assistance to countries such as North Korea, Vietnam and Mongolia.

With the emergence of pro-independence movements in Africa, China began to offer them economic and technical assistance. Chinese aid to foreign countries became more consistent after Deng Xiaoping's reform for economic development and openness.[27]

Unlike OECD countries, China does not officially disclose information about its foreign assistance programs and does not follow the definition of official development aid set by the OECD. Therefore, China is often criticized for lack of transparency. However, there are sources which can provide valuable information on its international co-operation. China publishes annually a document named "China Statistical Yearbook", where we can find information about its internal and external expenditure in the fields of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, energy, the number of contracts China has with various countries, and the workforce. Nevertheless, this document does not specify the type of contracts, or the funding related to them. For example, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce publishes details about the major projects in which it is involved, especially those on infrastructure, so we can see the countries in which China operates and the industries in which it has chosen to get involved. Also,

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[26]Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Net ODA*, https://data.oecd.org/oda/net-oda.htm.
[27] Hong Zhou, *China's Foreign Aid: 60 Years in Retrospect*, Springer, Singapore, 2016, pp. 1-3.

valuable information comes from the media and from other government documents.

Research labs, like "SAIS China Africa Research Initiative'' (SAIS-CARI), have gathered information and constructed a solid picture of Chinese foreign aid. According to SAIS, Chinese foreign assistance has increased from 2003. If in 2003 China offered nearly $600 million in foreign aid, in 2006 it began offering billions of dollars. In 2008, when the economic crisis affected America and Europe, China offered $1.84 billion in foreign aid, while the US (hit deeply by the crisis) offered $1.76 billion.[28]

Figure 1. Chinese global foreign aid expenditure: 2003-2017.

Figure 1 shows the global Chinese foreign aid expenditure between 2003-2017, according to statistics produced by researchers from the China-Africa Research Initiative.

In addition to its increased foreign aid globally, China has committed aid to various African states.

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[28] SAIS China Africa Research Initiative, *Chinese foreign aid to the world*, https://bit.ly/2XZLQlx.

In 2000, Sino-African economic relations entered in a new era. Beijing Declaration of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum and China-Africa Economic and Social Development Cooperation Program have been a guide to Chinese cooperation with developing countries in Africa and laid the foundations for long-lasting collaboration between China and Africa on the principles of equality, cooperation and mutual benefit. For the first time in history, China proposed to write off debts worth $10 billion for 32 states in Africa.[29]

In 2014, China published a White Paper on foreign assistance, where it stated that Africa and Asia are the largest beneficiaries of Chinese foreign aid. According to this document, China has provided billions of dollars in aid, in three forms: grants, interest-free *loans,* and concessional loans.

China provides grants to beneficiary countries for social projects, in order to finance human resource development, technical cooperation and emergency humanitarian assistance. Concessional loans are offered by Exim Bank, and are mainly used to help recipient countries to carry out large and medium-sized manufacturing projects and projects with economic and social benefits. The White Paper shows that from 2010 to 2012, China provided foreign aid to 121 countries, out of which 51 were from Africa.[30]

China has actively helped African countries especially with infrastructure construction and with energy projects in countries such as Ghana and Senegal. China offered foreign assistance for agricultural projects in terms of technological development, and cancelled the debt for Tanzania, Zambia, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Mali, Togo, Benin, Ivory Coast and Sudan.[31]

Although China shed some light on its foreign assistance, it *is difficult* to make a *precise* estimate of *Chinese contributions, because (unlike the West) China*

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[29] Hong Zhou, *op.cit.*, p. 36.
[30] The State Council of the People's Republic of China, White Paper on *China's Foreign Aid (2014)*, July 2014, Beijing, https://bit.ly/2TIaPe9.
[31] *Ibidem*.

doesn't publish official data. For this reason, Beijing is often criticized for lack of transparency. For example, in the above- mentioned White Paper, China does not provide full information regarding the amount of foreign assistance it offers.

One possible reason for which China does not publish official data may be that Beijing is ruled by the Chinese Communist Party, which takes all decisions at state level. When the party decides to launch a particular project, it does not encounter any resistance regarding the budget, the funding and the destination of funds.

Furthermore, China may also provide financial support to countries with which the West does not want to associate, either because they are accused of terrorism, or they don't respect human rights.

On various occasions, Xi Jinping pointed out that the PRC would provide financial aid with "no strings attached". His statement can be interpreted as expressing a different approach from the one which characterizes the policy of the US that imposes conditions such as respect for human rights, democratization, and the rule of law to countries which request foreign aid. Venezuela's case can be seen as part of this context, because China offered a loan in 2018, although Venezuela was in deep crisis. The loan was offered in exchange for oil, but the Chinese initiative was strongly criticized, especially by the US, which accused China of trying to gain influence in Latin America.[32]

In a study by AidData, which assesses Chinese foreign assistance to Africa, the research lab reveals that seven countries included in the top 10 to which China is providing foreign aid are situated in Africa: the Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Ghana. These seven states are followed by countries from Asia, such as Sri Lanka and Cambodia, and by countries from Central America, such as Cuba.[33]

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[32]*Why some Venezuelans fear Maduro is selling them out to China*, CBS News, September 15, 2018, https://bit.ly/2IKIX17.
[33] Dreher, A., Fuchs, A., Parks, B.C., Strange, A. M., & Tierney, M. J, *Aid, China, and Growth:*

Given the fact that, in 2017, the People's Republic of China has registered a 6.9% GDP growth, and this country is the second largest economy in the world, it requires large amounts of energy to sustain its economic growth.[34] Therefore, China is looking to strengthen its ties with countries from Africa, because these states are rich in oil and in natural resources, and foreign aid can benefit all parties involved in the transaction, especially the donor country.

According to a report issued in 2015, by the U.S. Energy Information Administration, in 2011 China had become the world's largest consumer of energy, and is currently the world's second largest consumer of oil after the United States. The agency claims that in 2013 China surpassed the US and became the world's largest importer of oil and other liquids, largely due to its increased consumption of oil.[35]

Furthermore, China is currently the largest consumer of steel, coal, wheat and oleaginous fruit. Thus, its increasing dependence on this type of products will encourage closer ties with the producing countries.[36]

Now, if we break down the list of the seven African countries included in the Top 10 Recipients of Chinese ODA, we will discover an interesting link between them and the donor.

Ethiopia, for example, is among the richest countries in Africa, especially in natural gas. In 2019, the Ministry of Mines, Petroleum and Natural Gas of Ethiopia announced that China's Poly-GCL Petroleum Group Holdings Limited (Poly-GCL) would build a 767 km natural gas pipeline between Ethiopia and Djibouti. The Chinese company also announced that it had discovered eight trillion cubic meters of natural gas in Ethiopia.[37]

Evidence from a New Global Development Finance Dataset, AidData Working Paper #46, Williamsburg, 2017, VA: AidData.

[34] World Bank, *Country profile: China*, https://bit.ly/2UKsRK5.

[35] U.S. Energy Information Administration, *China: international energy analysis*, May 14, 2015, https://bit.ly/28NmW12.

[36]The new political economy of resources, Resources Futures, https://bit.ly/2u9T4FU.

[37] Xinhuanet, *Chinese firm to construct Ethiopia-Djibouti natural gas pipeline*, 2019-02-17, https://bit.ly/2ub10a8.

Nigeria, a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), has an oil reserve of 37.45 billion barrels.[38] Nigeria was accused that it was becoming dependent on Chinese loans. These were reflected in agriculture and in transportation.[39]

Ghana is also found on China's list of ODA favorite countries. Ghana's natural resources include gold and bauxite, accounting for 64.4% of the country's main exports.[40] A recent infrastructure agreement worth of $2 billion between China and Ghana has generated criticisms. It does not seem to be a real loan, but more of a bargain, because Ghana will offer bauxite to China, whereas Beijing will provide aid for infrastructure.[41]

In order to better understand the extent of China's foreign assistance in Africa, I have included a table outlining various Chinese ODA projects in Africa, using information from AidData.

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[38] Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, *OPEC share of world crude oil reserves*, 2017, https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm.

[39] Emily Feng, *Chinese investment extends its influence in Nigeria*, Financial Times, November 21, 2018, https://on.ft.com/2u9VNiC.

[40] Dave Baxter, *Ghana benefits from natural resources*, Business Reporter, https://bit.ly/2HBPVqv.

[41] Ghanaweb, *Cash for Bauxite: Parliament Okays $2bn Ghana-China barter trade*, 31 July 2018, https://bit.ly/2Ji5Gp7.

Figure 2. Chinese ODA projects in Africa: 2012-2014

Year	Donor	Funding agency	Recipient	Type of founding	Project	Amount
2012	China	Import-Export Bank	Ghana	Loan	Hidro Energy	$75,353,061
2012	China	Import-Export Bank	Nigeria	Loan	Aeroport Terminal	$500,000,000
2012	China	Import-Export Bank	Tanzania	Loan	Gas pipeline	$1,230,000,000
2012	China	Unspecified	Sudan	Grant	Technology	$1,615,428,000
2013	China	Unspecified	Djibouti	Loan	Port Ghumbaith	$70,000,000
2014	China	Unspecified	Mali	Loan	Highway	$8,000,000,000

Figure 2 shows that Beijing provides foreign assistance for massive projects in Africa, and engages in sectors such as transportation, industry and energy. In China, foreign assistance budget is made by the Ministry of Commerce, and concessional loans are provided by China's Import and Export Bank. There are some other banks involved in Chinese overseas aid, namely: the China Construction Bank, which manages the China-Africa Development Fund, and the People's Bank of China, which deals with China's participation in multilateral institutions. Although it participates in multilateral organizations, China prefers bilateral aid.[42]

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[42] Meine Pieter van Dijk, *The New presence of China in Africa*, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 2010, p. 61.

Investments

China has an increased presence in Africa through investments as well. In 2018, Xi Jinping delivered a speech at the Beijing Summit of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum, where he announced the development of eight major initiatives in Africa. Some of the most important initiatives include industry, infrastructure, investment and trade.

At the same time, China plans to expand investment in Africa, in particular by encouraging Chinese firms to increase their investment, especially in areas such as manufacturing, agriculture, financial services, trade and logistics, and digital economy. Beijing will provide assistance in agriculture, and intends to implement 50 programs of this kind which will increase the production of corn, rice, wheat and cotton in Africa. These raw materials are much needed in China.[43]

According to the 2018 China Statistical Yearbook, in 2017 the Chinese net direct investment (FDI) in Africa amounted to $4.1 billion - an increase from the $2.4 billion registered in the previous year.[44]

In the following figure, I will show the top five African destinations for China's direct investment. The table will focus on the time frame between 2015 and 2017, and the statistical data is retrieved from the China-Africa Research Initiative.

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[43] Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, *Elaboration on the Eight Major Initiatives of the FOCAC Beijing Summit*, September 19, 2018, https://bit.ly/2XR8sEK.
[44] National Bureau of Statistics of China, *Net Overseas Direct Investment, Africa*, Total Net Overseas Direct Investment, http://data.stats.gov.cn/english/easyquery.htm?cn=C01.

Figure 3. Top 5 destinations in Africa for Chinese FDI

Figure **3** shows that Beijing has increased its foreign direct investment over previous years, especially in Angola and in Guinea-Bissau. For example, in Guinea-Bissau, a country devastated by civil war in the 1990s, a possible explanation for the increased Chinese FDI may be the country's agricultural potential. Guinea-Bissau is a major exporter of cashew - a raw material where China is a major consumer.

Angola exports oil, coffee and diamonds.[45] China has become the largest oil importer in the world. As such, there is an economic connection between China and Angola. Another interesting aspect is that the *Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, has recently pointed out that Beijing will modernize its strategy in Angola, and the FDI has thus increased.*

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[45] Shelly Zhao, *The China-Angola Partnership: A Case Study of China's Oil Relations in Africa*, China Briefing, May 25, 2011, https://bit.ly/2HDGs1L.

Since 2006, China's direct investment has steadily increased in Africa. The main sectors for the Chinse FDI were construction, mining, manufacturing and IT services.

In 2017, China's gross earnings in construction amounted to $51.1 billion - double from the value registered in 2008. China's land acquisitions in Africa have also increased. For example, in Cameroon, Chinese firms have acquired 104 thousand hectares of land.[46]

Trade

In terms of China's trade with Africa, Beijing encourages African products to enter the Chinese market and to continue granting zero tariff treatment to 97% of taxable items from LDC countries. Bilateral trade has flourished over the last two decades.[47]

The ultimate goal of the PRC is to conclude free trade agreements with various African countries. Currently, China has no free trade agreements with any African country, while the US has a free trade agreement with Morocco.[48]

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[46] SAIS China Africa Research Initiative, *Chinese contracts in Africa*, http://www.sais-cari.org/data-chinese-contracts-in-africa

[47] China daily, *Full Text: China's second Africa policy paper*, 2015-12-05, https://bit.ly/2FPPdEc.

[48] Office of the United States Trade Representative, *Free Trade Agreements*, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements.

Figure 4. China-Africa trade between 2002-2017. The data is retrieved from SAIS.

In 2017, the top Chinese imports were from Angola ($ 20.69 billion), South Africa ($ 8.66 billion), Congo ($ 3.96 billion), Zambia ($ 3.12 billion), Gabon (2.29 billion US dollars), and Nigeria ($ 1.62 billion).Among the most important African products imported by China in 2017 were: oil ($ 34.9 billion), copper ($3.9 billion), wood ($ 2.2 billion), and metals worth 1.9 billion dollars. [49]

China has been accused of borrowing and assisting foreign countries in order to gain more influence on the African continent. Africa's importance to China is major, as we noticed from the figures for trade, FDI, and foreign assistance. However, despite these accusations (emanating especially from the US), China claims that Africa's cooperation is based on the "South-South" cooperation policy, and its aid to the continent is beneficial for both involved parties. Beijing explains its presence in Africa in terms of making the continent economically independent. [50]

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[49] United Nations International Trade Statistics Database, Trade Statistics, 2017, https://comtrade.un.org/data/.
[50] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Wang Yi Talks about the African Debt Issue…*

Foreign aid, investments and trade between US and Africa

The Trump Administration's National Security Strategy has indicated that the economy of the United States is the one which sustains the nation's power.[51]

This new strategy reveals that the United States will focus especially on trade, on exports and on selective use of external assistance. According to this document, these are tools which can promote stability, prosperity and political reform, and build new partnerships based on the principle of reciprocity.

In regards to trade, America will adopt new trade and investment agreements, and will modernize the existing ones. Simultaneously, the United States places emphasis on innovation and technology development.[52]

At the same time, the US will concentrate more on the developing countries, and will create profitable markets for American products and companies.

Washington warns that China is increasing its role in the developing countries through foreign assistance and investments, with the aim of expanding its influence and of gaining advantages over the United States.[53]

US foreign assistance dates back to 1947, when America used this instrument in the Cold War to stabilize the governments and the economies of Greece and Turkey - countries which were facing the pressure of communism. Its foreign assistance embarked on a bold new program, the $13 billion Marshall Plan for Western Europe.

The decolonization process, and the Cold War competition between the US and the Soviet Union (for gaining influence in the developing countries from Africa, Latin America and the Middle East) turned the US foreign aid into a means of reducing poverty and social problems in those regions.

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[51] The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, December 2017, p. 4, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.
[52] *Ibidem*, pp. 17-22
[53] *Ibidem*, pp. 33-37

In 1961, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was created in order to provide such programs. In the 1970s, US foreign assistance was a channel of peace in the Middle East, and America offered economic aid to Egypt and Israel.

After the 1990s, US foreign aid focused primarily on promoting democracy in the ex-socialist countries. Furthermore, in Africa, the United States of America promoted democratic institutions and supported the transition from African civil wars to peace in order to avoid the collapse of certain countries, such as Sudan. [54]

Currently, the US State Department and USAID have developed a strategic plan for foreign assistance. Among the most important objectives in the document are: stabilizing North Africa and the Middle East, promoting an inclusive economy, reducing extreme poverty, rebalancing the Asia-Pacific region through development and cooperation, conflict prevention and humanitarian aid , encouraging democratic governance, and promoting human rights. [55]

In 2004, the US created the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), with the aim of delivering external assistance to poorer countries. The MCC provides time-limited grants that promote economic growth, reduce poverty and strengthen institutions. The corporation has invested more than $12 billion in programs for poor countries, in areas such as agriculture and irrigation, anti-corruption, education, energy, health, and sanitation, especially in Africa.[56]

In 2018, the US offered $22.7 billion in foreign assistance globally, a decrease from $30.7 billion in 2017. This may be an effect of Trump's policy, which stressed that it would only give foreign aid to its friends.[57]

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[54] Carol Lancaster; Ann Van Dusen, *Organizing U.S. Foreign Aid: Confronting the Challenges of the Twenty-first Century*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, 2006, pp. 10-12.
[55] U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Department of State-USAID FY 2014–2017 Joint Strategic Plan*, April 2, 2014, pp. 3-4, https://bit.ly/2CpUqRE.
[56] Millennium Challenge Corporation, *About MMC*, https://www.mcc.gov/about.
[57] *Map of US Foreign Assistance Worldwide*, https://www.foreignassistance.gov/explore.

Figure 5. American foreign aid expenditure: 2005-2017

Source: Map of U.S. foreign assistance worldwide, https://www.foreignassistance.gov/explore.

Unlike China, the US is a member of the Economic Cooperation and Development Organization, and is a donor of official development assistance (ODA). The member countries of the Organization represent 78% of the world's FDI, and 95% of the official development assistance to the world.[58] According to the OECD statistical data, between 2016 and 2017 America allocated the highest ODA budget for Sub-Saharan Africa, while Latin America ranked fifth in terms of US external assistance.[59]

The top 10 recipients of US foreign aid in 2018 were: Jordan (816.2 million), Ethiopia ($803.8 million), Afghanistan ($779.1 million), South Sudan

[58] Office of the United States Trade Representatives, *Trade Organizations*: OECD, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/wto-multilateral-affairs/oecd.
[59] The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Aid at a glance charts*, https://bit.ly/2ncunbv.

($740.2 million), Nigeria ($711.2 million), Syria ($633.8 million), Kenya ($591.5 million), Yemen ($448.7 million), the Democratic Republic of the Congo ($433.1 million), and Somalia (421.6 million).[60]

We can see that the United States has offered the highest amounts of foreign aid to African countries. Africa plays one of the most important roles in the United States foreign aid system, which has identified that new changes on the African continent require a new type of partnership. There are voices criticizing the fact that, because of China, the United States is losing influence in Africa.[61] America has criticized China for expanding its political and financial influence in Africa and deliberately and aggressively targeting investment in the region to gain a competitive advantage over the United States. The US accuses China of using bribery and non-transparent agreements to keep Africa captive to Beijing's demands. [62]

Interestingly, in 2018, Donald Trump launched a new strategy for Africa. The document stresses that America will improve trade relations with African states and launch the " Prosper Africa" initiative, which will develop markets for US affairs, increase employment opportunities for young people, and support growth and development in Africa.[63]

As we noticed in the previous analysis of China's foreign aid, Ethiopia plays a major role for Beijing. At the same time, we noticed that it occupies the second position in the top 10 recipients of US aid. The US strategy for Ethiopia, issued in 2018, reveals that although Ethiopian public opinion is favorable to America, China's growing influence in the country, and certain perceptions among the Ethiopian elite that America would favor security at the expense of democracy, jeopardize the country's pro-Western orientation. Interestingly, the document also shows that America will only gain influence in the region if the

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[60] ForeignAssistance.gov, *Map of US foreign assistance worldwide*....
[61] Reuben Brigety, *A Post-American Africa* …
[62] The White House, *Remarks by National Security Advisor Ambassador John R. Bolton* …
[63] The White House, *President Donald J. Trump's Africa Strategy Advances*…

US is able to effectively communicate their assistance in improving the well-being and the rights of all Ethiopians.[64]

Both China and the US favor Nigeria in terms of foreign assistance. If the Chinese policy for Nigeria is not well known, America has a special strategy. In a document similar to that on Ethiopia, Nigeria is mentioned as being of a particular importance for the US, because it has a leading role in promoting democracy and stability on the African continent. Nigeria is the most important strategic partner for the United States in Africa.[65] Therefore, Washington wants to improve Nigeria's governance system, as well as the laws and the welfare of its people. There are currently seven US missions dealing with this activity in Nigeria.

The US's involvement in Africa through foreign aid has targeted long-term development, by funding projects that promote economic growth and prosperity across the poorest countries of Africa. ODA is also allotted to humanitarian assistance in areas affected by various factors. In addition, America offers external assistance programs to support political stability, and to reform markets.[66]

Unlike China, which provides foreign assistance for grandiose projects in Africa and at a global level, and which is particularly involved in sectors such as transportation, industry and energy, the United States is focusing its external assistance on such areas as education, health and population (33%of the ODA budget   for 2016-2017); humanitarian aid (24%), and various projects on production. While China provides external assistance and erases the debts of

[64]U.S. Department of State, *Integrated Country Strategy: Ethiopia*, 2018, p. 8, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/284882.pdf.
[65] Idem, *Integrated Country Strategy: Nigeria*, 2018, p. 9-10, https://bit.ly/2Y5RhQ8.
[66] James McBride, *How does the U.S. spend its foreign aid?*, Council on Foreign Relations, October 1, 2018, https://on.cfr.org/2O8BLye.

many African states, the US has only offered 4% of its global budget for ODA for this type of circumstance.[67]

Investments

In terms of investments, the US intends to expand its economic relations in the region through the new "Prosper Africa " strategy. The primary objective of the US is to help Africa attain economic independence.[68]

In 2017, US FDI in Africa was $50.3 billion (a decrease from $51.7 billion in 2016), while according to previous analysis China's FDI in Africa was $4.3 billion. The main sectors targeted by the US FDI in Africa were mining and food. Europe and Asia-Pacific are among the top regions for the American FDI, while for China the analysis showed that it favors Asia and Africa. [69]

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[67]The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Aid at a glance charts*, https://bit.ly/2ncunbv.
[68]The White House, *Remarks by National Security Advisor Ambassador John R. Bolton …*
[69] U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis of The U.S. Department of Commerce, *Direct Investment by Country and Industry*, 2017, https://bit.ly/2OjFrxZ.

Figure 6. American and Chinese FDI to Africa

Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis data & SAIS China Africa Research

Although the American foreign direct investment in Africa is higher, we can see that the Chinese FDI to Africa has been increasing.

Figure 6 shows that, starting from 2009 (the year which marks the arrival of a new US president, Barack Obama), the American foreign direct investment in Africa rose steadily until 2014. Since 2016, when Trump came to power, it has decreased. One possible explanation may be that Obama has African roots and wanted to increase the continent's economy, while Trump seems to focus more on Europe and Asia. However, Chinese investments in the region have made Trump change his position and give more importance to FDI in Africa, through the new African policy.

Although the American foreign direct investment in Africa is higher, we can see that the Chinese FDI to Africa has been increasing.

Trade

In regards to trade, Washington wants to expand markets for US products and services, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, and accelerate the economic development of the continent by increasing global, regional and bilateral trade. The US is currently cooperating economically with Africa through its Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFA), as well as through bilateral agreements. In 2017, US exports to Africa amounted to $21 billion dollars, and imports amounted to approximately $34 million dollars.[70]

The top five US export markets in sub-Saharan Africa, in 2017, were: South Africa ($ 5.0 billion), Nigeria ($ 2.2 billion), Ghana ($ 886 million), Ethiopia ($873 million), and Angola ($ 810 million). The US imported mainly from South Africa ($ 7.8 billion), Nigeria ($ 7.1 billion), Angola ($ 2.6 billion), Ivory Coast ($ 1.2 billion) and Botswana.

Among the most important African products imported by the US were: mineral fuels ($ 11.2 billion), precious metals and stone ($ 4.1 billion), cocoa ($ 1.2 billion), vehicles ($ 1.2 billion), iron and steel ($ 950 million).[71]

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[70] United Nations International Trade Statistics Database, *Trade Statistics* …
[71] Office of the United States Trade Representative, *Countries & Regions: Africa*, https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa .

Figure 7. China-Africa trade versus US-Africa trade

Source: SAIS China Africa Research Initiative

In 2017, Chinese exports to Africa were $ 90 billion, while US exports were $ 21 billion. According to the previous analysis, Chinese trade with Africa has been increasing since 2008. Moreover, after Xi Jinping's arrival in 2012, Africa's trade has increased, partly due to the reforms that Xi Jinping had initiated in China, and also due to Beijing's reliance on the South-South cooperation strategy. The strategy helped China increase its influence in the region and supported the Chinese peaceful rise, which concentrates on creating a peaceful and stable external environment to develop itself.

On the other side, the American trade with Africa has been declining since 2016, in large part reflecting Trump's protectionist tendencies.

In order to better understand the competition between China and the United States in Africa, I have chosen four African states, emblematic of the massive strategic Chinese and American interests in the region: Angola, Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya. I have tested the FDI and trade for these four countries.

Figure 8. Chinese and American Foreign Direct Investment and Trade with Angola, Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya in 2017

Source: data from Office of the United States Trade Representative and SAIS China Africa Research Initiative.

The chart shows that Beijing is much more involved in these African countries than the United States, both through direct investment and trade. My previous analysis of the top Chinese preference in terms of FDI showed that Angola, Kenya and South Africa were the top three.

At the same time, South Africa remains an important trading partner for the United States, and Donald Trump's approach to economic cooperation with Africa seems to continue the policy of his predecessors. If we look at the chart, these countries are enjoying not only Chinese FDI, but also intense trade with China. Trade between China and Nigeria stood at $ 12 billion, while trade with the US stood at $ 9 billion.

Interestingly, even though America has developed a new strategy for Nigeria in order to secure the country's pro- Western orientation, and even though the US stressed that Nigeria remains its most important strategic partner in the region, **Figure 8** shows that the balance of influence in Africa is increasingly favoring China.

Conclusion

The research has shown that, although Washington was accused of disengagement in Africa, leaving enough space for various Chinese maneuvers in the region, it had become aware of the danger of its minimal involvement, and tried to gain ground through a new strategy in Africa, which is designed to bring mutual benefits and to rebalance their ties with the African continent.

 The analysis has also highlighted that China's foreign assistance in Africa is following an upward trend since 2006, but the United States remains the global leader in foreign aid.

However, Africa remains a major interest for China's foreign assistance. Interestingly, most countries aided by China are rich in natural resources, especially in oil and gas. The idea that the People's Republic of China needs access to natural resources to support its economy has found a strong ground when we look at China's choices in terms of countries to which it offers foreign assistance: Ethiopia, Nigeria, Angola, Ghana.

Beijing offers external assistance for grandiose projects in Africa and engages in sectors such as transport, industry and energy, while the United States prefers to give foreign aid for sectors such as agriculture and irrigation, anti-corruption, education, energy, and health.

China continues to grow as an investor, especially in the developing countries.Beijing's FDI to Africa has been increasing since 2012. Moreover, China's favorite countries in terms of investments are those that have rich natural

resources, like Angola. The fact that the PRC has become the largest oil consumer in the world creates a direct link with oil-exporting countries.

The analysis has shown that, unlike China, the US doesn't engage in Africa just to have access to various natural resources, but intends to remain a promoter of democracy on the continent. Washington wants to improve the governance system in some African countries, as well as the laws and the welfare of the people.

In regards to trade, the analysis has shown that Beijing has surpassed the United States in Africa. Although the US wants to expand markets for American products and services, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, its trade with the African continent is low.

This study showed that China's South-South cooperation technique in Africa was much more efficient than the American approach, and the figures provided a new perspective on the relationship between a superpower and an emerging one.

The new US strategy for Africa can be regarded as a major step to become more involved in the region to strengthen African States' conviction that the US is a trusted partner. Also, through this strategy, America is clearly fighting Chinese influence in Africa, after repeatedly accusing it of undermining its interests and friendly relations with some African states.

However, to be successful, America needs to increase its trade with Africa, to improve its cooperation with the countries that have traditionally been pro-Western (such as Ethiopia), and to get involved in areas like agriculture, because China is stepping up its cooperation with many African countries, providing both developmental assistance and support for projects which improve agricultural production in the region. China is thus gaining more influence in Africa. The fact that it is more flexible than the US makes it an interesting partner for many African countries that seek to grow economically without too much pressure on the quality of their governance.

The competition between the two states is visible in many spheres, but at least for the time being, America remains the most powerful state in the world.

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The Albanian Nationalism: between the National Revival and the Security Prospects in Adriatic-Aegean Region

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Abstract

The study will address the phenomenology and the processes that marked the Albanian independence movement, concomitantly illustrating it as an integrated stage into the Balkan trend of nation-state edification during the decline of the Ottoman Empire, hence enforcing the debate over the mechanism that had been used in administrating the territorial possessions of the quasi-defunct caliphate. On this occasion, the research will highlight the external involvement in supporting the Albanian independence movement, mentioning in this way the Italian Kingdom, the actor that assumed the role of protecting independent Albania as a result of Rome`s primordial interests in assuming a predominant role in the Adriatic security architecture.

Simultaneously will be pursued Tirana`s nationalist projects and the points of tension from the relations with Greece and Yugoslavia as a result of overlapping the territorial expansionist ethnic agendas of these three states. Therefore, it will illustrate how the Albanian state`s interactions with proximity are influenced by the regional climate of state-building on ethnic backgrounds, with a major impact on the security perspectives

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over the divergent energies of militant nationalism. In this way, the paper will analyze both the Albania – Greece – Italy triangle, with Rome inoculating the moderation in the Athens – Tirana relationship and mentioning the main the Italian foreign policy objective of assuming the role of a Mediterranean power.

Last but not least, the Albanian National Revival Movement is presented from the perspective of social history and ideology, legitimizing Albania's independence, highlighting the domestic lines of rupture and the societal manifestations that could be framed in post-Ottomanism. Differentiating from the Balkan space by Albanian Kemalism eradicated by Ismail Kemal, the Albanian nationalism marked also by a modernization dichotomy: on the one hand by the desire of building a state based on the West-European model, by the agrarian reform and by overcoming the religious differences, and on the other hand the outstanding nationalist conservative revolution of returning to Albania's national values under Skanderbeg`s flag of the two-headed black eagle.

The Albanian question, part of the Balkan people` liberation movement against on background of the war Ottoman-Russian war, was brought to the attention after the League of Prizren was formed on June 10th, 1878, when the 300 representatives of all regions inhabited by Albanians gathered in Kosovo to form a genuine National Assembly. On this occasion, a government-led committee was formed and headed by Abdyl Frashëri,[2] a notorious personality throughout the Ottoman Empire. Cornel Mărculescu is the historian who appreciated that the structure created at Prizren was". The first political-military organization that represented the entire Albanian people in order to carry out a sustained political

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[2] Andreas Hemming, Gentiana Kera, Enrique Pandelejmoni, *Albania. Family, Society, and Culture in the 20th Century*, LIT VERLAG.AG GmbH & Co. KG Vienna, Münster, Vienna & Zürich, 2012, p. 193.

struggle for the recognition as a stand-alone state and against denationalization, and a cultural plea for national school system and literature".[3]

The building up of the transnational structure of the Albanian communities was determined by the fact that the formation of an Albanian state was stipulated in the *San Stefano Treaty* (1878), as it was not included on the agenda of the Berlin Congress (1878) despite the fact that there were movements in the Albanian provinces to bring them under the same flag. The economic and political decline of the Ottoman Empire, manifested by the imminence of the political fragmentation at the beginning of the twentieth century, gave the Albanians the right context for self-determination, especially since the caliphate encountered difficulties in exercising control over its sovereign territory. Practically, the revived Albanian national project represented an inseparable at that time a part of the new political configuration state of Southeast Europe.

The League of Prizren constituted in fact when the Albanian issue started as problematic on the international stage and exposing the post-caliphate succession could be achieved by creating the Levantine and Mesopotamian mandates, while the populations of the Western Balkans begun to self-manage according to the ethnic criteria. Virtually from the moment Prizren in 1878, the great powers have faced claims of the Albanian unionist parties, in addition to the requests for the inviolability of the territories lived by Albanians as well as for international recognition of the Albanian nationality. In this way, besides the union of the four Ottoman *vilâyet* structures inhabited by Albanians in one state, the agenda of the Prizren movement also provided for the emancipation of the Albanian people through a two-point plan: the establishment of Albanian schools and the stimulation of national literature.

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[3] Corneliu Mărculescu, *Unele aspecte ale cooperării albanezilor din România pentru renaşterea naţională a Albaniei* in "Studii Balcanice", no. 1, (2017), p. 56.

The collapse of the caliphate represented a veritable reverse of the Ottoman entry into Constantinople. Thus, if in the 14th century the feudal fragmentation of the Balkan states[4] facilitated the Sultan`s domination over the space between the Adriatic and the Aegean seas, five centuries later irredentism led to statehood regaining for the South-Eastern European people under a suzerainty regime. By extrapolation, there was a link between the *Eteria* movement formed by Alexander Ypsilantis and the struggle for the independence removal of the Ottoman suzerainty, Ypsilantis himself characterizing *Eteria* as a "general movement of liberation of the peoples of the Balkans".[5] Despite the modest results of Eteria, the movement was the precedent for the Prizren League, highlighting the systemic malfunctions of the Caliphate.

If at the level of the Albanian territories Constantinople`s control was an impediment to the implementation of the program agreed at Prizren, the Albanian diaspora was one of the engines of the struggle for independence, Romania being a fertile ground for the Albanian rebirth,[6] taking into account in this respect the editorial, journalistic and scientific activity of the ethnic Albanians from Romania. It was established the *Section of the Albanian Writing Society* (1880), the first Albanian school that opened in Romania, funded by the Romanian state was followed by the emergence of the subsidiary of the *Constantinople Society for Albanian Books* (1881) from Bucharest, marking the materialization of the two points related culture from the claims of the League of Prizren.

Furthermore, the Albanian community in Romania had been involved in setting up the Drita (*Light*) Cultural Society with a cultural purpose of printing the Albanian writings so that in 1895 the first Albanian newspaper called

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[4] Nicolae Ciachir, *Republica Socialistă Federativă Iugoslavia*, Bucharest, The Romanian Encyclopedic Publishing House, 1969, p. 35.
[5] Valentin Lipatti, *Balcanii de ieri și de azi: contribuții românești la cooperarea balcanică multilaterală*, Bucharest, Political Publishing House, 1988, p. 18.
[6] Cornel Mărculescu, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

Sqipetari (The Albanian) started its activity. It was followed by the Albanian – Romanian School, the Albanian printing house on Lipscani (1895) and the newspaper *Shqipëria* (*Albania*, printed since 1897). A year later, the *Ylli i shqipërisë* (*The Star of Albania*) gazette appeared, together with the newspaper *L'Indépendance Albanaise.* It was also the era when societies such as *Echo d'Albania* or *L 'Albania* were founded in Rome and Brussels.

Constantinople`s reaction to the cultural activity carried out by the Albanian diaspora in Romania consisted of the request addressed to King Carol I to expel the members of the Committee [7] who was on the Romanian territory without Romanian citizenship. At the same time, a request from the Sultan was submitted to the Prefect of Bucharest for an investigation targeting members of the Albanian Diaspora, accused of "no other purpose than to develop national sentiment through culture, the development of Albanian language, the teaching of teaching books, and by their power to contribute to the opening and assistance of existing schools for the learning of the Albanian people, aiming, to gain the independence during the game of the great powers, so to form an Albanian state with an autochthonous gentleman".[8]

Bucharest`s counter-reaction, formulated by Foreign Affairs Minister Ion Brătianu, came to defend the Albanian committees, the Romanian Foreign Minister blocking the Ottoman request under the system by evoking the asylum-seeking system. The signal given to Constantinople in Bucharest was perceived as an overcoming of benevolent neutrality to the Albanian re-awakening movement. Thus, in 1905, the *International Pan-Albanian Congress* was organized, being led by Prince Albert Ghica, ended up with the formation of

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[7] The governmental structure set up by the 300 representatives forming the League of Prizren on May 10th, 1878 in Cornel Mărculescu, *op. cit.*, p. 56.
[8] *Ibidem,* p. 67.

Kombi (*The Nation*) body, in fact, a committee to guide the movement of independence.

 In the same year, it was set the *Albanian Liberation Committee* from Monastir, followed by the formation of the cultural societies *Bashkimi* (*The Union*), *Djalëria Sqipetare* (*The Albanian Youth*) and *Dija* (*The Science*, 1906), a subsidiary of the *Albanian Society* from Bucharest. A year later appeared the *Komitet i sqipëtareve per lirin e Shqipërisë* (*The Albanian Committee for the Liberation of Albania*) from Bucharest, an organization meant to fight for Albania's independence. The Albanian diaspora`s activity from Bucharest, which made the transition from the cultural objectives to political ones, also meant an involvement by former sovereign states in the struggle for independence of the Balkan peoples still in vassalage. The Ottoman Empire was therefore in a situation of a former territory, now a state turned into a bastion of Balkan self-determination: the Kingdom of Romania.

The Albanian question had become even more worrying with the Austrian-Hungarian, German and Italian alignment in the structure of the *Triple Alliance* (1882, also known as the *Central Powers*) is counteracted by forming a blocking opponent, the Allies formed in three stages: the *Franco-Russian Agreements* (1891-1893), the *Anglo-French Agreement* (1904) and the *Anglo-Russian Agreement* (1907). The block policy has proven to antagonize positions on the continent, and accentuating the spheres of influence in the Balkans.[9] In this context, the Albanian national revival has evolved not only from a geopolitical point of view, based on the Balkan quality of the hegemonic ambitions of the powers of the times but also from a civilizational one, with South-Eastern Europe traditionally representing a space of cultural convergence.

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[9] Valentin Lipatti, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

The Balkans are thus witnessing the interaction of three European civilizations:[10] Orthodox (Eastern) civilization, Western civilization, and Islamic civilization. Historically, there were civilized differences in the European continent, according to the three cultural areas. Thus, the Eastern, Hellenized by Orthodoxy, was marked by an idealist perception of reality, thus of universal mysticism, while the West, Romanized par excellence, developed a pragmatism augmented by Protestantism, the situation leading to the myth of the two Europe. The European Islamic civilization, mainly represented by Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania, complemented the dual vision of Europe by introducing the dimension of the Third Europe, combining Jewish, Hellenistic, Arabic and Mesopotamian traditions into that its "divine correction for the differences that have been created between Judaism and Christianity".[11]

Considering the position of cultural *mélange*, the Albanian independence movement was organized around two poles: Islam and nationalism motivated by their uninterrupted possession of the space between the Adriatic and the Mediterranean, as well as by Albanians` Illyrian origin. Thus, the cultural frontier between European Christianity and European Islam, represented by the line starting with the Turkish – Bulgarian – Greek border, continuing with northern Greece, Macedonia, Albania, Kosovo and Bosnia, and Herzegovina, imprinted the Albanian awakening with a certain form of ethnic relativization, sort of amoralism. Likewise, the Albanian nationalism was also marked by the conflict between tradition and innovation, having the *Balkanization* as a subsidiary definition of the political fragmentation, the feature integration of the Albanian movement into the regional trend of self-determination.

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[10] Antoaneta Olteanu, *Homo balcanicus: trăsături ale mentalității balcanice*, Bucharest, Paideia Publishing House, 2004, p. 83.
[11] *Ibidem*, p. 83.

The support from the Eastern Balkans for the Albanian independence had materialized within the *Balkan League*, through bilateral meetings and agreements signed by the parties. On this occasion, a joint action between Bucharest and Sofia against Constantinople was outlined, both of them acting in the direction of safeguarding a newly acquired independence, as well as in strengthening its regional position. The First Balkan War (1912) brought the Balkans to the situation where the former vassals stood up against the former suzerain power, in fact the secular enemy.[12] The *Peace of London* of May 30th, 1913 demonstrated the destruction of the Ottoman domination in the Southeast Europe[13] and lead to the increase of the division among the Balkan actors, the high aspect it is power operated. Beyond the image of the Coalition of former Ottoman territories, the position of the actors during the First Balkan War also encouraged the Albanian struggle for independence.

In parallel with the First Balkan War, the first Albanian anti-Ottoman *guerilla* actions took place starting with September 1912, being carried by the mountain tribes from Kosovo and Malësia, so that in August the entire Albanian territory would be in a state of insurrection. With the insurrection movement leading the Albanian territorial claims in the foreground with direct impact on the territorial integrity of neighboring countries: Kosovo (Serbia), Scutari (Montenegro), Epirus (Greece). As a result, Albania was invaded by the Serb, Montenegrin and Greek troops, the Serbs reaching Shkumbin, and the Greeks

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[12] Nicoleta Ciachir, *Războaiele balcanice prin intermediul istoriografiei bulgare* in "BALCANIA" no. 2 (2014), University of Craiova, Faculty of Letters, Universitaria Publishing House, Craiova, 2017, p. 153.
[13] *Ibidem.*

occupying Vlorë,[14] thus alimenting the "risk Albania to be divided between the Slavic and g cold".[15]

When the balance of power in the Adriatic-Mediterranean basin risked being tilted in favor of Yugoslavia and Greece, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and Italy intervened to support an Albanian internal resistance movement headed by Ismail Kemal, bey of Vlorë.[16] With the support of the three actors' highly interested in the region, the Albanians organized a National Assembly on November 28, 1912, which proclaimed Albania's national independence. On the same day, it was decided to set up the Provisional Government led by Kemal, with the task of managing siege and territorial jurisdiction.

The Program of the Provisional Government contained points like the defense of national independence, the return to the old flag[17] adopted during Skanderbeg`s rule,[18] the modernization of the   Albanian society, the establishment of a Western-style state,[19] the overcoming of religious differences, as well as the implementation of agrarian reform. The imperative of the modernization program – practically the core of the Provisional Government –

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[14] Founded in the 6th century B.C. as Aulona, Vlora is the starting point of the Albanian Riviera; The city carries historical importance to Albania as it hosted the First National Assembly, which declared the country's independence from Ottoman rule on November 28th, 1912.

[15] Michele Rallo, *Albania (de la proclamarea independenței până la instaurarea comunismului) și Kosovo*, Bucharest, Sempre, 2004, p. 12.

[16] Rank of the Ottoman administrative hierarchy, governor of a district or province of the Ottoman Empire Almanach de Gotha, *Nobility of the World: Volume VIII – Turkey* in http://www.almanachdegotha.org/id244.html

[17] The Black bicephalous red eagle: Flags of the World, A*lbania. Shqipëria – the Republic of Albania, Republika e Shqipërisë* in https://flagspot.net/flags/al.html#ori

[18] Gjergj Skanderbeg, an Albanian national hero known for victories against the Ottoman Empire at Moker (1445) and Oranik (1447), whose mythical reputation was built around the ability to defeat a superior opponent in the battlefield: Tristan Dugdale – Pointon, *Gjergj Kastrioti Skanderbeg (1405-1468)*, February 4th, 2009 in http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/people_skanderbeg.html

[19] Michele Rallo, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

followed a principle according to "the nation must be an agency of its own historical emancipation".[20]

Independent Albania was automatically included in a protection network compounded of Rome – Vienna, the Austrian-Italian protection for a country to The Land of the Eagles[21] being perceived as a way of *blocking the Panslavism and the Serbian avant-garde.*[22] In this context, the Albanian state has become a stake in the Adriatic security, the common goal of Rome and Vienna being the control of the triangle formed by the port of Vlorë, the Sazan Island and the Otranto Strait.[23] It is the moment when the position towards Southeast Europe antagonized the European powers, France and the Russian Empire were the traditional protectors of Serbia.

The outbreak of the Second Balkan War on June 16th, less than a month after the First Balkan War ended confirmed the imbalance of forces equilibrium in the Balkans: the change of belligerents, thus the enemies from the previous war became allies and *vice versa*. The failure of Russian diplomacy to moderate Bulgaria's claims[24] led to the alignment of the previous war belligerents in the new conflict, the regional alliances being dismantled. In addition to diplomatic deadlock, the regional security architecture collapse was due to the susceptibility of the Balkan allies perceived the action of members from the cooperative structures, the mistrust in the good intentions of the proximal neighborhood escalating to the preventive war.

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[20] Antoaneta Olteanu, *op. cit.*, p. 61.
[21] Morris H. Turk, *The Land of the Eagle-People* in "The Journal of Race Development" vol. II, no. 1 (July 1911), p. 54 in https://www.jstor.org/stable/29737895?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
[22] Michele Rallo, *op. cit.*, p. 14.
[23] The Otranto Strait (Albanian: *Kanali i Otrantos*, Italian: *Canale d'Otranto*) connects the Adriatic Sea with the Ionian Sea, separating the Albanian territorial waters from the Italian ones: European   Straits   Initiative,   *Strait   of   Otranto*   in http://www.europeanstraits.eu/Partners/Strait-of-Otranto.
[24] Nicoleta Ciachir, *op. cit.,* p. 153.

The Peace of Bucharest negotiated between from July 16th to July 29th, qualified by the Romanian side as democratic and characterized by the Bulgaria one as "the dictate from Vienna",[25] practically contained the seeds of a future confrontation, basically fueling regional revanchism for the two world conflagrations. The deepening of the contradictions between the Balkan countries [26] was one of the main consequences in the medium and long-term within it the third party is presented by the Bulgarian side in the most vehement terms: "the injustice that was repaired at Craiova in 1940 [...] the robbery/invasion from Bucharest".[27] Under the circumstances, the Balkans were metamorphosed into Europe's powder barrel, becoming a case study per se through the unpredictable nature of the regional power relations, to some extent preparing the actor for the Great War that would encompass Europe one year later.

The *Treaty of London* (1913) between the Balkan League and the Ottoman Empire officially acknowledged Sultan `s withdrawal of European possessions, with the authorities from Constantinople accepting the new post-caliphate Balkan order. For Albania, the treaty *de facto* meant a recognition of the detachment from the quasi-defunct caliphate. The Recognition of the right to self-determination was, however, the shadow of Tirana losing of Kosovo in favor of Belgrade, following the Balkan wars The loss of Kosovo, virtually the only territorial gain of independent Albania, had meant a situation similar to "internationalization of the moral trauma of non-recognition",[28] similar to the failure of fulfilling the historical remembrance, thus leading to a form of public, *historical and moral invisibility.*[29] One could thus distinguish Tirana`s missionary ideology, with the liberation of the Albanian people becoming the socio-cultural leitmotif of Southeast Europe.

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[25] *Ibidem*, p. 159.

[26] Valentin Lipatti, *op. cit.,* p. 18.

[27] Nicoleta Ciachir, *op. cit.,* p. 159.

[28] Antoaneta Olteanu, *op. cit.,* p. 61.

[29] *Ibidem*.

However, the guarantee of the Albanian self-determination has been undermined by the establishment of an international protectorate status by the International Control Commission[30], consisting of representatives of the major powers with civilian control responsibilities and managing the transition to a new order patented by the Conference of Ambassadors. It is also said that Albania was a "sovereign, hereditary and neutral principality, guaranteed by the great powers",[31] the neutrality component from the message of the great powers aimed at virtually neutralizing any form of revanchism, known as Tirana's claims for reuniting the territories inhabited by Albanians from Southeast Europe. It also aimed at the exclusion of the Albanian state from any revanchist structure that would have served to change the regional *status quo*.

Considering the recurrence of regional confrontation as a tool for regulating the neighborhood relations, it was decided to assign the Carnegie Foundation for International Peace[32] with the mission to determine the causes leading to their exit Balkan war, which resulted in a report published in 1914. The document analyzed the roots of the Balkan War presented the views and aspirations of the belligerents, the economic, social and moral consequences of the wars while illustrating the relationship with international law. Basically, in the report the *Balkanization*[33] had been evoked as a particular form of political fragmentation, while at the same time revealed the "frustrations manifested politically, ideologically and culturally, stemming from the inherent tensions and contradictions".[34]

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[30] Michele Rallo, *op. cit.*, p. 14.
[31] *Ibidem*.
[32] Maria Todorova, *Imagine the Balkans*, Oxford University Press, New York & Oxford, 1999, p. 2.
[33] Antoaneta Olteanu, *op. cit.*, p.106.
[34] *Ibidem*.

The report also contained an introduction by Baron Paul-Henri-Benjamin d'Estournelles de Constant,[35] which reiterated the principle of the peace movement: "Allow us to repeat, for the benefit of those who accuse us of *whispering about peace*, which I have always advocated: War rather than slavery; Arbitration rather than war; Conciliation rather than arbitration".[36] De Constant also presented the material and moral exhaustion of the Balkans during the regional wars, stating a *manifesto* to the civilized world encouraging the actors from Southeast Europe to appeal to treaties and arbitration as a means of dispute settlement thus approaching the legal paradigm in international disputes.

If the international situation showed stability in a lesser or greater extent, the internal situation in independent Albania exposed pronounced rupture lines pronounced between the capital city and the region, mentioning in this way the discontents of the Albanian *beys* from the central and southern Albania regarding Kemal`s agrarian reform. The leader of the opposition movement against the modernization program of the Tirana Prime Minister became Essad Toptani Pasha, the representatives of this non-alignment movement that founded the Senate and Government from Durrës.[37] The situation led to the breakup of Albania, Kemal controlling the south, and Toptani controlling center, the northern being managed by three or four local councils.

The Council of Ambassadors decided on 23 November 1913 to resolve the *Albanian contentious*[38] by designating of Wilhelm de Wied,[39] the Principle of

[35] Auguste Beernaert, Paul Henri d'Estournelles de Constant, The Nobel Peace Prize 1909 in http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1909/balluet-bio.html (accessed on October 5th, 2018).

[36] Maria Todorova, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

[37] Durrës historically known as Epidamnos and Dyrrachium, is the second most populous city of the Republic of Albania.

[38] Michele Rallo, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

[39] Maria Oprea, *Un Suveran al Albaniei este înmormântat la București. Biserica Luterană, lăcașul de veci al lui Wilhelm de Wied*, the archive of the magazine "The Albanian`s Friend", History, July, 4th, 2017, The Association of the Albanian League from Romania, Craiova:

Protestant Confession. The choice for the descendant of the Bavarian prince family consisted of the hypothesis of a religious equidistance of the future monarch. Beyond the internal considerations, the choice had also a geopolitical component option being supported William of Wilhelm of Wied being supported by Austria-Hungary and prevailing the Italian proposal of Fuʾād of Egypt.[40]

Having the dynastic problem resolved, the *Protocol of Geneva* was signed on December 17th, 1913[41]: Çamëria being transferred to Greece in order to end the Greek-Albanian dispute[42] and Kosovo, the latter remaining in Serbian borders in line with the situation after the Balkan Wars. On January 22th 1914, the International Commission of Control took over the government's prerogatives, depriving the Cabinet headed by Ismail Kemal of any authority because of its proximity to Italy and to the Ottoman Empire. Kemal co-balances the nationalistic dissatisfaction of the Muslim majority with the designation of the prince of Wied as sovereign, which led to his expulsion in the context of sacking the sovereign designated in Durrës on March 7th.

On April 1st, 1913 Wilhelm de Wied became, by all means, the monarch of Albania, based on the Prince`a Status[43] approved by the International Commission for Control. Despite the measures of the protective powers to stabilize the internal climate, the intra-state conflicts continued to be an inherent component of the Albanian social-political life. The Greek uprisings from the south proved the main problem for Tirana, the Albanian sovereign planning to resolve it through an agreement with the Greek Government. In this way, the

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http://www.alar.ro/n93/istoriec681/un_suveran_al_albaniei_este_inmormantat_la_bucuresti_biserica_luterana_lacasul_de_veci_al_lui_wilhelm_de_wied-s1276.html

[40] *Fuʾād I. King of Egypt*, Encyclopædia Britannica:
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Fuad-I.

[41] Michele Rallo, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

[42] Genc Lafe, *La questione irrisolta della Çamëria nella complessità dei rapporti greco-albanesi*, Università del Salento, 2014 in
http://siba-ese.unisalento.it/index.php/palaver/article/viewFile/14277/12442

[43] Michele Rallo, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

Protocol of Corfu was signed on May 17th, 1913, legally binding the international community to recognize the borders of Albania, the Hellenic Republic engaging to comply with the Albanian territorial integrity, while Tirana granted Southern Epirus with greater autonomy.

The *Protocol* agreed on the Aegean island had a contrary effect because of the Greek guerrillas (*andartes*) set up a provisional government in the Southern Albania by the arms, which eventually led to civil war in the area. As a result of the deterioration of the internal climate, the Prince of Wied left Albania on May 23rd, 1319, then happening the uprising of the *Kemalists*[44] from Central Albania: starting from June in Tirana and from July in Elbasan. Considering the power vacuum created by the throne vacancy, the Pașa Essad of Durrës undertook a *coup d'etat* coupled with the attempts from *andartes* of uprising in order to prepare for the invasion of the Greek troops.

Franz Ferdinand`s murder at Sarajevo on June 28th, 1914 led to conflicting relations between the Austria-Hungary and Serbia, tensions stop giving a month later when Vienna declared war on Belgrade, marking the beginning of the Great War. Concerning Albania, the Austrian state of protectorate was conditioned by the active participation within the military maneuvers deployed by the Central Power. Tirana's refusal to follow the protective power in World War I led to the abolition of the Austrian imperial subsidies for Albania, otherwise poor, external funding that allows not only the subsistence but also resistance against internal and external enemies. The decision was followed by the final departure by Bavarian Prince`s final departure from Albania, who had in the meantime returned to managing the effects of the international situation that precipitated.[45]

September 1914 marked Albania`s return into the sphere of Ottoman influence, immediately after Burhan Eddin was designated by Constantinople as

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[44] The supporters of Ismail Kemali are also called *Kemalists.*
[45] Michele Rallo, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

king of Albania, whose authority was exercised exclusively over the Southern Albania, with Central Albania headed by the *Essadist* Senate, and while Scutari[46] and Vlorë were administered by local councils. In this context, Essad formed a new Provisional Government, declaring war on Central Powers, a decision that led to riots across Albania.

The loss of the Habsburg House`s protection inherently led to a vulnerable position for Tirana on the international scene, therefore on October, 14th, 1914 the Greeks invading Santi Quaranta[47], occupying Gjirokastra[48], the Italians arriving at Vlorë on October 29th, thus debuting the confrontation between the Greeks and the Italians in the Northern Epirus, followed by the Italian offensive in the Southern Epirus. The participation of *guaranteeing powers* to World War I made Italy the only actor able to defend the decisions taken at the Council of Ambassadors, the only defender of the Albanian independence.[49]

On April 25th, 1915, the *Pact of London* was signed, with Italy returning to Sazan Island and Vlorë, Albania becoming an independent state under the Italian protectorate. In fact, the new configuration of the Albanian state configuration consisted only of the central and southern Albania territories, with Epirus coming back to Greece. Rome's decision to enter the war on May 24th led to the Serbian invasion in northern Albania, with Montenegro occupying Scutari. The regional revanchism, based on the idea of Balkan belonging to the Balkan people [50], brought the area to Vienna's attention, thus witnessing the entry of the Austrian-Hungarian, German and Bulgarian troops into Serbia and Kosovo, from where they headed to Montenegro and Albania, basically, the Habsburgs

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[46] Municipality and city in northwest Albania, known as Shkodër in Albanian.

[47] Southern municipality in the district of Vlorë, known as Sarandë in Albanian.

[48] Municipality located in southern Albania, between the Gjerë mountain and the Drino watercourse.

[49] Michele Rallo, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

[50] Valentin Lipatti, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

liberating the Albanian territory from occupation between January and February 1916.

The fall of the *Essadist* Government from Durrës led to the formation of the National Council led by Ahmed Zogolli[51], *bey* of Mati[52] and a follower of the moderate anti-*Essadist* position. In this context, Paşa Essad embarked together with the Serbian Army on the Italian ships from the Adriatic Sea, leaving Albania for Corfu. Zogolli became the leader of an army that gained more and more positions that he had to the Habsburgs, then enlisted in the Austro-Hungarian Army as a colonel, then heading the Albanian delegation at Carol I's coronation festivities in Vienna.[53] The Austrians proclaimed the autonomy of the territories under Colonel Zogolli. being "tired to have him on an allied day, and another opponent day".[54]

The Proclamation of Gjirokastra from June 3rd, 1917 was the Italian reaction to the actions of the House of Habsburg at the Adriatic Sea, the General Giaconto Ferrero declaring "the unity and independence of the whole of Albania under the aegis and protection of the Kingdom of Italy",[55] the reaction of the leadership from Rome being supported by Kemal. Thus, Italy denounced the Albanian chapter of 1915 from the *Pact of London*. As a result, Paris also engaged in revitalizing the policy of spheres of influence in Southeast Europe, occupying the Korçë[56] and proclaiming the Republic of Korçë, in relation to autonomy to France.

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[51] Born Ahmed Zogu (also written Zog), the future Albanian king gave up the Ottoman-based Zogu name, taking over his father's name, Zogolli, with Italian resonance and meaning "son of Zogu."
[52] Former Albanian northern district dissolved in 2000, today a component part of the Dibër district.
[53] Charles (I). Emperor of Austria, Encyclopedia Britannica:
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Charles-I-emperor-of-Austria.
[54] Michele Rallo, *op. cit.*, p. 19.
[55] *Ibidem*, p. 19.
[56] City and municipality in Southern Albania.

On December 15th, a Provisional Government was installed at Durrës – headed by Pasha Turhan Përmeti and supported by the Italians – that later sent two memories to the Peace Conference in Paris on January 18th, 1919, requesting the following aspects: reconfirmation of Albania's independence and annexation of Kosovo, Dibër[57] and Çamëria. Under the conditions of Tirana's territorial claims, the *Tittoni-Venizelos Agreement* was signed to secure the mutual aid between Athens and Rome and targeting Albania and Aegean island possessions, a deal denounced by the Italians a year later.

The League of Nations`s decision on the Albanian independence from December 9th led to the Allied guarantee on Albania's right of self-determination: "an independent state administered by Italy under the mandate of the League of Nations".[58] The decision was followed by the convening of the Lushnjë National Assembly,[59] a caste assembly of *Kemalists* and a group of *beys*, resulting in the formation of the Government of Suleiman Delvina and in the appointment of a Regency Council, which expressed the aspiration of the agrarian reform.

Even under the League of Nations mandate for protectorate over Albania, Italy committed to the Albanian request of April 3rd, 1920 of to respect the Albanian self-determination right.[60] Signing the Agreement of Tirana from August 2nd, 1920, Italy and took the mission of withdrawing its troops from Albania and switch back to the traditional diplomatic support for the Albanian independence, mentioning the Italian lobby in Belgrade for determining the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to return to the pew-war borders.

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[57] District in northern Albania.
[58] Michele Rallo, *op. cit.*, p. 21.
[59] City and municipality in Central-Western Albania.
[60] Deona Çali Kalaja, *The admission of Albania in the League of Nations* in the "Journal of Liberty and International Affairs", volume I, number 3 (2016), Institute for Research and European Studies, p. 56 in http://e-jlia.com/papers/3_5.pdf.

On November 9th, 1919, the Ambassadors' Conference confirmed Albania's independence in the pre-war borders, Italy becoming "an agent of the League of Nations in Albania and a guarantor of the independence of this country".[61] Corroborating the situation with the *Treaty of Rapallo* of November 12th, 1920, it was recognized the direct interest of the Italian diplomacy regarding the Albanian independence, confirming at the same time Albania`s role regarding the security mechanism from the Adriatic region. The relation led to the Italian protectorate in Albania similar to the mandate in 1919, although Albania was accepted as a full member in the League of Nations under the decision of December 17th, 1920.[62]

Albania's entry into the sphere of Italian influence turned out to be an inevitable consequence of the internal protectorate at the external climate, Albania was still suffering from socio-political fractures, noting the anti-*Zoghist* revolt that debuted in Tirana and included including Durres, Zogolli assuming the mission of defending the rights of all Albanians beyond confessional particularities, under the slogan of "nationalist and European renewal".[63]

Since 1923 Zogolli launched a set of measures for the modernization of the Albanian society, consisting mainly of autonomy of confessional and public instruction. The aspirations of the European peasantry, so also Albanian, the agrarian and fiscal reform were not implemented, the Albanian leader being a representative of the landowners from Central and Southern Albania. Depending on the conservative nationalism of the bourgeoisie, Zogolli's doctrine was closer to the Italian fascism, hence the assumptions about his sympathy with the Mussolini regime. The internal frustrations over the synergies of the economic,

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[61] Michele Rallo, *op. cit.*, p. 30.
[62] Lavdosh Ahmetaj, *The Acceptance of Albania into the League of Nations on December 17th, 1920*, in "European Scientific Journal", vol. 10, no. 23, University of Vlora, 2014, p. 227 in http://eujournal.org/index.php/esj/article/view/3946.
[63] Michele Rallo, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

social and political program followed by Zogolli materialized in considerable Albanian immigration.

Rome`s geopolitical calculation led to the vision of orienting the Yugoslav dynamism towards the Aegean Sea and not to the Adriatic Sea, therefore the expansion of Italian influence in Southeastern Europe had been one of the priorities of the Mussolini regime given its desideratum of transforming Italy into a Mediterranean power. In view of this way, it was signed *The basic Italian-Albanian Trade and Navigation Treaty* of January 20th, 1924. Tirana`s alignment to the direction of the Italian foreign policy was made concrete by Albania's recognition of the USSR as part of the *Zoghist* propaganda.

At the geostrategic level, the Albanian decision to recognize the Soviet state was the beginning of the transposition phase of the Adriatic basin into an Italian lake,[64] followed by the claim of Rome's exclusive right of intervention in administrating the Albanian internal affairs. An edible example in this way is the *Non-Intervention Agreement in the Albanian Affairs* between Belgrade and Rome on June 9th, 1924.

Zogu regained the power on January 5th, 1925, assuming the office of President of the Government and having three major objectives: the election as lifelong President of the Republic, the restoration of the monarchy and the ascension to the throne. On January 19th, Zogu supported his inaugural speech, proposing a *Fundamental State* containing "strong enough innovations to allow the future president access to the dictatorship [...] inspired by reactionary-republicanism and Balkanism".[65] Zogu's project essentially involved a gradual transition to totalitarianism, based on four pillars: diminishing the

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[64] *Ibidem*, p. 41.
[65] *Ibidem*, p. 42.

authority of the Parliament, limiting the role of the political opposition, police repression, and census.

The task of modernizing Albania assumed by Zogu was practically dismantled because the project stood up from the Oriental despotism rather than from the projects of building a modern European state. Therefore, inspired by the internal power leverage, Zogu led Albania toward a form of "Oriental variation on a Balkan background".[66] George Kennan characterized the Southeast European inclination towards totalitarianism by analogy with the *immature dilettantism*[67] of Tsar Nicholas II.

The Albanian sovereignty became after 1925 an empty concept in the situation because in the late interwar period Rome and Tirana signed a number of economic understandings and conventions, with strong political implications for the Albanian state. The *Memorandum of Understanding* of February 24, 1925, between the Government of Albanian and the Italian Credit, was the first of the acts of liquidating the Albanian self-determination, in the event that, in exchange for 2 million pounds and 2 million gold francs[68], Tirana pledged to unite with Rome within a treaty of political and military alliance. The treaty was supplemented by a series of agreements mandating Italy to fully manage the Albanian economy, under some agreements for the exploitation of the Albanian mineral and oil resources by Italy.

The Italian control over the Albanian financial sector was carried out through a convention of the loan granting for public works managed by *ad-hoc* companies. In order to manage wastewater treatment of it was created *Società per lo Sviluppo Economico dell'Albania*[69] (*The Albanian Economic Development Company*)

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[66] Maria Todorova, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

[67] *Ibidem*, p. 8.

[68] Michele Rallo, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

[69] Touring Club Italiano, *Albania. Ristampa anastatica*, Studio Bibliografico Idrometra, Milano, 1940: https://books.google.ro/books?id=8J9exOJ01RcC&pg=PA57&lpg=PA57&dq=Societ%C3%A0+per+lo +Sviluppo+Economico+dell%27Albania&source=bl&ots=Nytcam9zdq&sig=UlNuw8_kO7sZT-LXIlF

and *Società per la Valorizzazione Economica dell'Albania*[70] (The Albanian Economic Growth Society), mainly funded with Italian financial capital and followed by the establishment of the *Banca Nazionale dell`Albania* (The National Bank of Albania).

On November 7th, 1925 the *Commercial Treaty* between Rome and Tirana was signed, historiographical presented as "a massive colonization work of all the Albanian economy compartments which, almost simultaneously, determined a parallel colonization of civilian life, and successive to the political scene of the Albanian nation".[71] On the other hand, the treaty was guaranteeing the protection of a great power, so guaranteed and the defense the Albanian territorial integrity against the constant threats of being dismantled and shared between the Balkan allies of France, namely the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. In counterpoint, the preeminence in managing the foreign affairs also meant to include a regional current irrelevance of the Balkan states in the struggle between the great powers.[72]

The motivation that led the Albanian political decision-makers to remove political independence from foreign policy was the result of the controversial *Francophile* trend of dividing Albania between the French, the Serb, Montenegrins and the Greeks, thus giving up the foreign policy in order to safeguard the Albanian territorial integrity. In the epoch, Tirana accepted the proposal of an *Oriental Locarno,*[73] adhering to Rome's plan of establishing the Italian protectorate

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0#%20v%20=%20onepage%20&%20q%20=%20A0%%20C3%%20Society%%2020lo%%2020Sviluppo
%%2020per%%2020Economico%%2020dell'Albania%20&%20f%20=%20fals

[70] Lorezo Iaselli, *L'espansione finanziaria dell'Italia in Albania (1925-1943). The National Bank of Albania is at SVEA*, the University of Naples "Federico II", Department of Analysis of Economic and Social Processes, Linguistics, Production and Territorial Processes, Naples, p. 65 in http://www.delpt.unina.it/stof/12_pdf/1.2.pdf .

[71] Michele Rallo, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

[72] Antoaneta Olteanu, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

[73] Michele Rallo, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

over the Danubian-Balkan nations, in return for guaranteeing the respect for the post First World War borders.

The *Treaty of Alliance* signed on November, 22nd, 1925 was followed by the *Italian-Albanian Friendship and Security Pact*[74] from November 27th, Albania`s inclusion under the Italian sphere of influence being legally established. In the given context, the Albanian foreign policy ceased *de facto* to exist by the end of November 1925, with the *Military Convention* signed next year and giving Italy the task of reorganizing and modernizing the Albanian Army.

On September 1st, 1928, the Constituent Assembly proclaimed the Kingdom of Albania, with Ahmed Zogu as a king, from now Zog I. Essentially, irrespective of the Republican or monarchical political form, until the political union achieved by the Italian intervention in Albania., the Albanian state could irrefutably be considered as an Italian quasi-colonial possession. The Kingdom began under the sign of a secular revolution inspired by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, a European-inspired modernization. The reform of the Albanian legal structure was achieved by replacing the Ottoman norms,[75] followed by the agrarian, financial and confessional reform.[76] The consequence of the reform process in line with the domestic climate was the transformation of Albania into a "Western and Western-based social and political entity in terms of their application".[77]

The final step towards the annulment of the Albanian self-determination was the subject of the secret talks between Rome and Tirana in 1932 for a custom, thus anticipating the imminent Italian occupation and the reduction of the Albanian statehood up to cancellation. In this regard, the *Indelli- Beratti Protocols*

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[74] Also known as the *Pact of Tirana*.

[75] The abandonment of the *Honorary Codes of the Mountains* (*Kanun* and *Besa*), the abolition of polygamy and the introduction of divorce.

[76] The establishment of the National Churches or the introduction of statutes guaranteeing national autonomy.

[77] Michele Rallo, *op. cit.,* p. 60.

of March, 19th, 1936 were signed, with effect on the economic relations, reiterating Albania's membership of the Italian sphere of influence. The Italian invasion of April 7th, 1939 demonstrated the counter-concession.[78] The rhetoric of the historical science demonstrated how the external performance of Tirana oscillated between being an actor and a subject of hegemony, culminating in the transformation into the object of the expansion of the fascist imperial community.

The existence of the Albanian independent state proved to be a matter of the regional geopolitical climate, especially because the region seemed to be a pressure release point as well as a buffer zone for solving the imperial and post-imperial discontents. To some extent, the evolution of the Albanian political project could be considered as being paradoxical: it had never been completely independent because of the recurrent *bandwagoning*, but without being aligned to any great power it was impossible to exist. Practically, its existence was the result of the most complicated geopolitical calculations in Constantinople, Rome or Vienna, to some extent determined by the interactions between the empires and their Republican heirs.

In essence, the Albanian self-determination could be included in the chapter of *Balkanism* manifestation in the context of the Ottoman Empire dissolution and perfectly synchronized with the Balkan people movement of national reawakening, nation-state building, and *greater states* projects. Albania remains one of the vital actors for exercising control over the Eastern Adriatic, thereby becoming an object of the Fascist foreign policy, culminating with the annexation from 1939.

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[78]Ștefan Popescu, *L'Occupation Italienne de l'Albanie (Avril 1939): Perceptions et Attitudes Français* in "Studii Balcanice", no. 1 (2017), University of Craiova, Faculty of Letters, Universitaria Publishing House, p. 128.

Italy and the *Mare Nostrum* Operation.

(October 2013-October 2014)

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Key-words: Italy, the maritime migration, refugees, NGO, Mare Nostrum, EU, migratory crisis, Search and Rescue Operations, Lampedusa.

Abstract

Migration from poor countries is constantly increasing, but at the same time it is becoming more difficult to legally enter and seek asylum in the European Union. Fences were erected in several countries, such as Hungary, Slovenia, Macedonia and Austria. Due to the lack of opportunities, thousands of desperate people are forced to embark on a dangerous journey across the Mediterranean Sea, considered one of the deadliest seas in the world.

For the past fifteen years, Italy has been increasingly affected by the phenomenon of migrants and applicants for international protection arriving by sea, departing from the coasts of Libya, Tunisia and Egypt. These flows incremented significantly in 2011 related to the political changes in the countries of North Africa (especially in Tunisia and Libya), called the "Arab Spring," and with the intensification of the conflict in Syria. Since the Arab uprisings, the Mediterranean region has been confronted with unprecedented refugee and migratory fluxes: in 2014 over 170.000 people arrived by sea, of which more than 42.000 Syrian citizens fleeing the war.

As a consequence of their geographical position and the implementation of the Dublin Regulation – which sets the procedures for asylum applications in the European Union –

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countries of first arrival such Italy, Greece, and, to a lesser extent, Spain have been most affected.

This paper analyses the Italian's center-left government decision to launch the Mare Nostrum operation, opening the path for the Search and Humanitarian missions. Mare Nostrum was a year-long naval and air operation initiated by the Italian government on October 18, 2013 after the greatly mediatized Lampedusa shipwrecks of 3rd and 11th of October 2013 near the island of Lampedusa when 636 migrants died off the Italian coast. The Italian operation aimed to identify boats in distress and to launch a proactive "Search and Rescue" operation with a policing and anti-smuggling component, covered an area of 70.000 square kilometers, and operated close to the Libyan coast.

Leading this military-humanitarian operation, Italy succeeded in raising the awareness of EU member states' governments and public opinion that the Mediterranean migration crisis affects all EU member states - not just Italy or other South-European countries.

The Mare Nostrum operation ended suddenly, after a series of harsh critics, largely because of a lack of European Union supported being considered a „pull factor" for migration, but its consequence was that it paved the way for a greater humanitarian response to this complex phenomenon that affects the economic, social and security aspects of Europe in the world of mass human movements. It was superseded by Frontex's Operation Triton, an operation which had no naval or air force of its own, instead, it had to rely on the help of the EU countries. The aim of the new European operation led by Italy as host state was not to save human lives but, basically it was a border control operation. Triton replaced also two old operations the agency used to coordinate in the South of Italy, Hermes which controlled the border along the Italian coastline, and Aeneas which controlled migrant flows from Egypt and Turkey (via Greece) to Italy. Another mission under Italian naval command and headquartered in Rome was the Sophia Operation, launched in June 2015, an anti-people smuggling mission in the Mediterranean Sea, ended in March 2019. The ending decision relates to Italy's reluctance to allow rescued people to disembark in its own ports.

Nowadays, the European Union is facing a severe migrants and refugees crisis,[2] despite its increased efforts to reduce illegal land and sea migration. The growth in the number of arrivals has created the perception of an unmanageable humanitarian crisis and made the public increasingly aware of the issue. At the same time, there is an explosion of scholarly research, there are many think-thanks and specialists of the field, migration is at the top of the global political agenda and media interest for this issue is constantly expanding.

 Despite strong evidence that migrants contribute positively to economies and cultures alike, many European governments have focused on containing and reducing migration at all costs. With a growing anti-immigration sentiment in Europe, governments are still struggling to reach a consensus on how to handle the continuing refugee crisis. Attempts to introduce quotas for the distribution of refugees among EU member states have largely failed. Conflicts in the Middle East and elsewhere show no signs coming to an end, and the death number from refugee sea crossings is on the rise.

There are three main illegal migratory routes towards the European Union, but the Central Mediterranean route has remained for a long time the primary entry point to Europe,[3] putting Italy under great pressure and reaching a

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[2] The terms refugee and migrant are often used interchangeably, but their meanings are quite different, legally speaking: The UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which took effect in 1954, defines a refugee as someone who is fleeing conflict or persecution (for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinions) and is seeking refuge across international borders. Moreover, an asylum seeker is someone who has submitted a request for asylum in a country other than his own and awaits a decision on the application for refugee status under relevant international and national instruments. If the request is denied, the person must leave the country and may be expelled. On the other hand, the migrant is someone who makes a conscious choice to leave his home country for a better life or for economic gain. It is a choice rather than a matter of life and death. An irregular migrant is someone who lacks legal status in a transit or host country because of unauthorized entry, breach of a condition of entry or an expired visa. In reality, these two groups overlap, that's why we use migrant as a generic term for all groups. For more details see https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-managing-the-eu-migration-crisis/$FILE/ey-managing-the-eu-migration-crisis.pdf

[3] Migrants and refugees reach Europe via three primary routes: Central Mediterranean route is the main migratory route into the EU, departed from North Africa (Libya, Tunisia or Egypt). It still remains an extremely dangerous route and it dominated migration flows during 2014. In

breaking point in its ability to meet the European Union standards for receiving and processing migration applications so-called Dublin Regulation.[4] (Figure 1.)

2015 this route has diminished in use partly due to increased instability in Libya, but remained the primary entry-point for sub-Saharan nationals, like Eritreans and Nigerians. In 2016, 181.376 migrants were detected on the Central Mediterranean route, which was the highest number ever recorded in the region. Most of the migrants departed from Libya, a transit country, where the smuggling and trafficking networks broke out. In 2018, Tunisia replaced Libya as the main country of departure for migrants detected on this route. Since February 2018, the EU Operation *Themis* (who replaced operation *Triton*) supports Italy with border control, surveillance and search and rescue in the Central Mediterranean. The other route is the so-called "Balkan Route" that involves Greece. The Eastern Mediterranean route became the primary maritime route in 2015, when 885.000 used it, being considered "a safer" and certainly much shorter than the much longer Central Mediterranean route. The implementation of the **EU-Turkey** statement in **March 2016** was a response to the refugee crisis created by Syrian war, providing financial resources to Turkey (two tranches of €3 billion, the first one was set up in 2016) to improve the socio-economic situation of Syrian refugees (3, 5 million people). Also this agreement played a key role in reducing irregular arrivals from Turkey to the EU. The effects were immediate, the illegal arrivals decreased significantly with 97% lower than the period before the agreement. Finally, the third route, the Western Mediterranean route (the area stretching between Spain and Morocco) is the most frequent route into Europe in 2018 with Morocco as the main departure point for migrants, willing to reach the southern coast of Spain. For more information see https://frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-borders/migratory-routes/western-mediterranean-route/

[4]   The intergovernmental cooperation between the EU member states in the area of migration and asylum was institutionalized by the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 under the third pillar on justice and home affairs. Before this date, the policy of immigration and asylum was integrated as an element of Community external policy, namely a joint approach to combat, first of all, the illegal immigration. Following that, in 1994 the European Commission emphasized the need for a comprehensive policy approach to migration on the supranational level that embraced all phases of the migration process. In 1999, with the Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force, the EU received the competences to legislate in the areas of migration and asylum, adopting the legislative instruments on visas, border control, and other policies related to the free movement of persons. On this basis, a European common migration policy was developed. In 2005, it was proclaimed the so-called Global Approach to Migration, which means cooperation with third countries on migration and asylum matters, covering three dimensions of this phenomenon: legal economic migration, irregular migration, and migration and development. In 2011, the Global Approach to Migration was transformed into the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), adding "the international protection and asylum" as a fourth dimension. The European Commission stressed the need to establish a partnership with third countries in the field of migration under the GAMM. The aim of the new policy was to outline the new aspects of migration dynamics and the links between migration trends and the search for more adequate methods of analyses of new migration trends. Until the Arab Spring, the role of the North African countries were to make up a sanitary cordon, providing security against illegal immigration along Europe's southern periphery. Moreover, the result of this policy was the emergence of new forms of "international-migration relations" between EU member states and the ten Middle Eastern and North African countries (MENA) that have entered into an agreement with the EU within what is known as the European Neighborhood Policy (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Iraq, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia). For more information about this cooperation see Andrew Geddes, *The European Union's international-migration relations toward Middle Eastern and North African countries* in Michael Bommes, Heinz Fassman, Wiebke

Therefore, Italy became, first of all, a transit country for thousands of migrants whose purpose is to reach wealthier nations, such as France, Germany, United Kingdom or Nordic countries. Faced with an emergency situation in the fall of 2015, German Chancellor Angela Merkel opted for an open Europe, but the perception of migrants in many European societies tended to be negative, and the public response seems to show that the migration from mainly Muslim countries should be stopped.

Figure 1. Routes for irregular migration through the Mediterranean Sea.

Source: Médecins sans Frontières.

The so-called Arab Spring has affected the delicate balance on which the Euro-Mediterranean border-control regime has been built. Since then the Mediterranean region has been confronted with unprecedented refugee and migratory fluxes. At the same time, the European free movement arrangements

Sievers (eds), "Migration from the Middle East and North Africa to Europe," Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2014, pp. 139-140; Furthermore, in 2013 the Dublin agreement makes member states of first entry in the Mediterranean the sole states responsible for processing asylum applications. EU Regulation no.604/2013, known as Dublin III Regulation suggests that the country where non-EU persons first enter the EU is responsible for accepting and examining their asylum applications in https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R0604&from=en.

which enable citizens to cross internal borders without being subjected to border checks are facing great challenges, and in the past several Schengen Member States temporarily reintroduced border controls. The massive maritime arrivals threaten to undermine confidence in the European legal order and the Dublin Convention. These also represented a key catalyst of the EU migration and border control regime crisis.

In April 2011, at the European Justice and Home Affairs meeting, the German Interior Minister Hans Peter Friederich accused Rome of violating the Schengen spirit because of the Italian government's unilateral decision to issue the temporary-residence permit for humanitarian reasons to the Tunisian migrants, and thus tens of thousands of migrants had the opportunity to reach other European states thanks to the European free-movement space:

> *"We cannot accept that economic migrants come through Italy. We have taken note of the fact that Italians are issuing temporary-residence permits, in effect allowing illegal immigrants to travel across Europe. The French are strengthening their border controls, Austria is thinking about it. It is not in Europe's best interest if member states are forced to resume internal border controls. We hope the Italians will fulfill their obligations.*[5]

In fact, the Italian attitude in the face of the migratory crisis was to unilaterally activate the temporary-protection instrument the European institutions were reluctant to resort to. Moreover, the European institutions rejected the humanitarian-emergency reading of the Tunisian influx on Italian shores, choosing instead to present it as an ordinary case of mixed irregular

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[5]   Giuseppe Campesi, *The Arab Spring and the crisis of the European border regime: manufacturing emergency in the Lampedusa crisis,* Florence, European University Institute, 2011, p. 15, in https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/19375/RSCAS_2011_59.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

migration[6] to be handled by way of the regular police procedure for identifying and repatriating illegal immigrants.[7] Also, the Italian request was turned down on the grounds that the inflows to Italy and Malta could not be regarded as a „massive influx" because the numbers of asylum-seekers were not large enough to meet the TPD's criteria.[8] Approximately 18. 000 humanitarian permits were issued by the Italian authorities which permitted most of the Tunisian migrants who arrived in Italy between 1 January and 6 April 2011 to get a six months temporary residence. Many of them drifted into irregularity and moved on to other European countries, as the permits granted by Italy, allowed for travel within the Schengen zone.[9]

The political tensions between the Italian government and the European partners regarding the Schengen system, and the Italian permanent request for a broader sharing solidarity and responsibility in the migratory management crisis keep going until today.

But it became obvious that the Mediterranean migration represents a global issue, connecting all Europe with sub-Saharan Africa and the MENA region (the Middle East and North Africa), with people attempting to enter

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[6]   The mixed migration flows refers to both forced migration and economic migration which follow similar migratory routes and use the same networks and routes to get to Europe.

[7]   Temporary protection (TPD) in the EC/EU has its origins in the Yugoslav wars of dissolution. The European states introduced different schemes to admit displaced people temporarily during the conflict, but there was not a common approach concerning quotas for temporary protection permitted length of stay, and the rights and entitlements to be provided to the Bosnians under temporary protection The Treaty of Amsterdam opened the way for harmonization in immigration, asylum, visas and external borders. In 2001 it was adopted as a Temporary Protection Directive (2001/55/EC), comprising 9 chapters and 34 articles. The principle of solidarity is treated under Chapter IV, in Articles 24-26. Article 24 refers to the European Refugee Fund while Article 25 notes that "The Member States shall receive persons who are eligible for temporary protection in a spirit of Community solidarity. They shall indicate [...] their capacity to receive such persons" in https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32001L0055&from=EN

[8]   H. Deniz Gençn, Asli Şirin Öner, *Why not activated? The Temporary Protection Directive and the Mystery of Temporary Protection in the European Union* in "International Journal of Political Science & Urban Studies," March 2019, p. 8.

[9]   http://website-pace.net/documents/19863/168397/20131002-RptMixedMigratoryFlows-EN.pdf/426bce45-1258-4773-b961-be69c5bb0f75

Europe, escaping from wars, persecution and poverty. The Mediterranean migration crisis involves states, international organizations, and non-state actors (especially NGO rescue vessels), deploying its effects beyond the Mediterranean region. Moreover, migration must be understood like a shared responsibility of countries of origin, transit and destination.[10]

Historically, the movements of people were and still are from overpopulated and underdeveloped world countries towards wealthier ones. In fact, the people's desire to migrate is the sum total of the push factors and pull factors, and the European Union remains one of the most desired destinations worldwide,[11] attracting potential migrants from all over the world.[12]

Wars, lack of security, lack of respect for human rights, poverty, lack of economic opportunities, poor governance, corruption and environmental factors are among the drivers of international migration. It's no doubt that there is a tight relationship between human development, economic growth and migration at the global level. Emigration generates large economic benefits for migrants, for their families and for the countries of origin (for example it can reduce

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[10] Stefania Panebianco, *The Mare Nostrum Operation and the SAR approach: the Italian response to address the Mediterranean migration crisis* in "EUMedEA Online Working Paper Series", 3-2016, p. 3.

[11] According to the United Nations statistics, the number of international migrants in 2017 reached 258 million, up from 248 million in 2015 and 220 million in 2010. The United States has far more migrants than any country, about 50 million, from less than 12 million in 1970. Saudi Arabia, Germany and Russian Federation hosted the second, third and fourth largest numbers of migrants of worldwide, followed by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United Arab Emirates in United Nations, *International Migration Report 2017* https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport2017_Highlights.pdf.

[12] The number of people residing in an EU Member State with citizenship of a non-member country on 1 January 2018 was 22.3 million, representing 4.4 % of the EU-28 population. The largest numbers of non-nationals living in the EU Member States on 1 January 2018 were found in Germany (9.7 million persons), the United Kingdom (6.3 million), Italy (5.1 million), France (4.7 million) and Spain (4.6 million). Non-nationals in these five Member States collectively represented 76 % of the total number of non-nationals living in all of the EU Member States, while the same five Member States had a 63 % share of the EU-28's population in https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics#Migrant_population:_22.3_million_non-EU_citizens_living_in_the_EU_on_1_January_2018

unemployment and it can provide significant financial capital flows). On the other hand, the immigration can have a positive effect on the guest labor market by increasing labor supply in sectors and occupations suffering from shortages of workers, and it can also help with easing pressures on pensions systems of high-income countries with rapidly aging populations.[13]

In 2011, as a result of Arabic Spring and the collapse of the political institutions in North Africa, combined with the beginning of the Syrian war, a massive wave of migration took place towards Europe, via the Mediterranean Sea, becoming the largest migrant waves known in Western Europe.

Due to its geographical location, with a coastline and frontier of over 7. 000 km at Europe's southern borders, Italy has the greatest exposure to these migratory flows. Italy alone represents about 16% of the Mediterranean coastline. (from a total of 46.000 km of coastline and with 22 coastal States). Its proximity to the North-African countries, Tunisia and Libya in particular, two main migrants' departure countries, Italy confronted a mass irregular migration. Since the 1990s, Italy, and the Trapani and Lampedusa coastlines in particular, have been landing points for thousands of African immigrants. Most of these migrants were from the Horn of Africa (mainly Somalia and Eritrea), with considerable numbers from other African countries such as Nigeria or Sudan.

It should be noted that, historically, the migration flows toward Southern Europe were favored, among others, because of the less regulated migration restrictions in these countries, unlike the countries with tradition in managing the issue of immigration where the restrictions were firmly introduced after the 1973 oil crisis. The foreign migration flows towards Italy developed in a specific economic context characterized by a benevolent attitude towards illegal

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[13] *** International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2018,* International Organization for Migration, Geneva, 2017, pp. 3-4, in https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2018_en.pdf

immigrants, increased demand for low-skilled workers, a substantial sector of the underground economy and a new demand for domestic and care services, often informally hired, so-called Mediterranean version of guest workers system.[14]

Since **2011**, Italy was confronted with serious difficulties, the boat arrivals increased due to the collapse of the government of Libya and Tunis. The number of new migrants from Tunis, Libya and Syria have increased dramatically. According to the statistics provided by the Italian Ministry of Interior, in **2011** the arrivals in the context of the Arab Spring, reached a record value with a total of **62. 692** persons landing on Italian shores compared with **2010,** the year before the start of the Arab Spring, were a mere **7.300** people.[15]

In 2011, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated, more than 1.500 people drowned or went missing while attempting to cross the Mediterranean to reach Europe. This made 2011 until then the deadliest year for this region since UNHCR started to record these statistics in 2006. The previous high point was in 2007 when 630 people were reported dead or missing. [16]

At the beginning, the response of the Italian authorities was to announce a "state of emergency" (February 2011), meaning the substantially central government funding provided for a network of reception centers in Sicily and on the Italian mainland in which migrants could be housed. In October 2011, the

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[14] Tiziana Caponio, Paolo R. Graziano, *Towards a security-oriented migration policy model? Evidence from Italian case* in Emma Carmel, Alfio Cerami, Theodoros Papadopoulos (eds.),"Migration and Welfare in the new Europe. Social protection and the challenge of integration", Bristol, The Policy Press, 2011, pp. 106-108; Running parallel to these factors, Italy experienced, among the others Southern states, but first Italy and later Spain, Greece and Portugal in this order, a consistent decline of fertility rates, from 2,4-3,1 to 1,4-1, population aging and a dramatic labor shortage in Marek Okólski, *Transition from emigration to immigration: Is it the destiny of modern European countries?* in Marek Okólski (ed), "European immigrations: trends, structures and policy implications," Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2012, pp. 33-34.

[15] ***Council of Europe, *Report Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons The arrival of mixed migratory flows to Italian coastal areas*, p.5 in http://website-pace.net/documents/19863/168397/20131002-RptMixedMigratoryFlows-EN.pdf/426bce45-1258-4773-b961-be69c5bb0f75

[16] https://www.unhcr.org/4f27e01f9.html

so-called "North African Emergency" was extended until 31 December 2012. This emergency response was in fact insufficient, for example, the receiving center in Lampedusa, the tiny island with a capacity of 800 beds, in March 2011 suffered a serious deterioration of public health conditions due to approximately 500 migrants arriving daily during that period.[17] From January to May 2011 some 30.000 migrants landed on Italian shores, many of them on Lampedusa, which for years has become a symbol of European fight against irregular migration in the Mediterranean region.

From 2003 until 2007, an increase in the arrival of migrants on the island of Lampedusa has been registered, with 8.800 people in 2003; 10. 477 in 2004; 15. 527 in 2005; 18. 047 in 2006; and 11. 749 in 2007. The peak of this immigration phenomenon was reached in 2008 with 31. 250 migrants arriving on the island (86% men and 14% women). The flow of migrants was interrupted in 2009 with a bilateral agreement between Italy and Libya. But soon after, in 2011, the political crisis affecting northern Africa has prompted very large numbers of people to migrate, initially between countries within this geographic area, and then towards the Mediterranean shores of Europe. [18]

Due to limited capacities and delays in transfers, the Italian Interior Minister Roberto Maroni faced accusations by local majors of racism and creating a "Guantanamo" prison for irregular immigrants on Lampedusa island. NGOs also complained of the very poor conditions in which many immigrants were held, but the response of the authorities was that the immigrants who arrived at Lampedusa would remain until the repatriation."[19] Moreover, the extension of the maximum period of detention (18 months) didn't resolve the issue of

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[17] Andrew Geddes, *The European Union's international-migration relations toward Middle Eastern and North African countries* in Michael Bommes, Heinz Fassman, Wiebke Sievers (eds), "Migration from the Middle East and North Africa to Europe," Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2014, pp. 139-140.

[18] http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/182137/e96761.pdf?ua=1

[19] João Carvalho, *Impact of Extreme Right Parties on Immigration Policy. Comparing Britain, France and Italy,* London and New York, Routledge, 2014, p. 166.

irregular migration management and raised serious human rights challenges, including the problem that the detention facilities were not adapted to long term detention. Only in mid-March 2011, when the situation had deteriorated to the point that it became unmanageable, the Italian authorities effectively started to regularly transfer thousands of migrants by ship or military planes to Sicily and other locations in Italy. This allowed the situation to improve.[20]

A few years later, in 2015, another exceptional year, **over one million** refugees and migrants undertook dangerous journeys across the Mediterranean Sea to enter the EU, with **140.000** people arriving in Italy.[21]

This unprecedented number caused panic among the European politicians, most of the EU Member States reacted emotionally, the right–wing parties gained significant ground almost immediately, and last but not least, in June 2016 the United Kingdom chooses to leave the European Union in the Brexit referendum. It's no doubt that the migratory crisis added more fuel to the "Leave" vote, creating the perception that immigration to the EU is unchecked and the UK must "take control of its borders."[22]

At the same time, the issue of migration has had a great influence on elections held in Austria, France, Germany, Italy, and other European countries in the past year, boosting support for populist and eurosceptic parties. Ever since coming to power in June 2018, the frictions between the new Italian cabinet, so-called the "government of change" and the European institutions, especially on the EU migration policy, it seems to be another sign of weak cohesion within the European Union, Italy becoming one of the strongest voices of

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[20] http://website-pace.net/documents/19863/168397/20131002-RptMixedMigratoryFlows-EN.pdf/426bce45-1258-4773-b961-be69c5bb0f75

[21] ***The United Nations Refugee Agency [hereafter ***UNHCR], *Operational Portal Refugee Situation* in https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean#_ga=2.4166768.1398968325.1555571129-1918985514.1555415270

[22] For more information on the link between the migration crisis and the Brexit see Karolina Follis, *Maritime migration, Brexit and the future of European Borders: Anthropological previews* in "Český lid", vol. 104, no.1, 2017, pp. 5-32.

Euroscepticism current from Western Europe. Italy's interior minister and the country's most popular politician, Matteo Salvini has closed its ports to migrant rescue boats, saying that the risk of terrorists infiltrating migrant boats is a real one and the efforts to manage the refugee crisis must be shared and financially supported by all the European member states, not only by the most exposed Southern European countries.

For many decades, Italy was primarily a country of emigration, up until the late 1970s, a large number of Italians, namely over 25 million had emigrated to work in the North and Western Europe.[23]

Relatively late, Italy became a receiving country and the migratory inflows from the non-EU countries to Italy became significant, starting with the late 1980s. Nowadays, Italy is facing with a new migratory dynamic: after having transformed from a country of emigration to a country of immigration, now finds itself at the center of complex flows of immigration, emigration and transit in an era of globalization, a moment quite different from the one that marked the experience of the north-western countries.[24]

As far as the origin of nationality in Italy, up to the early 1990s there was certain heterogeneity of presence, with the only particularly significant incidence relative to the Moroccans. At the end of the 1990s, the Moroccan presence was

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[23] Emanuela Paoletti, *The migration of power and North-South inequalities. The case of Italy and Libya*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, pp. 60-61; For more information about the migrant workers in the context of the great post- Second World War migration in Western Europe see Cheryl Benard, *Migrant workers and European Democracy* in "Political Science Quarterly", vol. 93, no.2, (Summer 1972), pp. 277-299.

[24] Actually, the field researchers consider that the old distinction between sending and receiving countries is no more applicable at the level of the European Union and it can be said that all countries are sending, receiving and transit countries at the same time. Some countries are primarily immigration-receiving ones and others are, above all, sending ones. For more information see Joaquin Arango, *Early starters and latecomers Comparing countries of immigration and immigration regimes in Europe* in Marek Okólski (ed), "European immigrations: trends, structures and policy implications," Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 2012, pp. 44-63. Only a part of the 43.000 landed in 2013 had submitted an application for international protection in Italy. Many have preferred to transit without being registered, taking advantage of the lack of various institutions in charge, to go and ask for asylum beyond the north of the Alps, in countries such as Germany, France and Sweden.

linked to the Albanian presence which, over the course of 5 years, increased by 200% to become, in 2003, the first nationality in quantitative terms. A further turning point is achieved starting with 2007 when, following the entry of Romania into the EU, the high number of foreigners from this country grew by over 300% in 5 years, thus exceeding those of the Albanians. Today, overall, Romanians, Albanians and Moroccans are over 40% of nationalities present in Italy.[25]

According to data provided by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) on January 1, 2019, 5. 144. 440 foreign residents were registered on Italian territory.[26]

For several years, Italy has been fighting irregular migration at its borders, including by implementing a push-back policy aimed to block migrants' boats on the high sea and returning them to Libya. Until the Arab Spring, the role of the North African countries, was to represent a sanitary cordon providing security against illegal immigration along Europe's southern periphery. The cooperation between Italy and North African countries in maritime border control began as early as in the 1990s. The Italian approach to the migration issue was to reinforce bilateral cooperation with African countries that were main points of migrants' departure. Italian military vessels and aircraft carrying out both rescue missions and security activities were not a novelty either when Mare Nostrum was launched in 2013. Since December 2000 it had been signed a cooperation agreement regarding irregular migration with Libya, and in 2004 an Italian unilateral mission was launched, named „Constance Vigilance Mission" in the Strait of Sicily to prevent irregular entries.

Over 2004 Libya's transformation from a destination country to a transit country received increasing visibility as it gained recognition as a key point of

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[25] ***Ministero dell'Interno, *20 di migrazioni in Italia,* p.6 in http://www.ismu.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Guida_20-anni-di-immigrazione-in-Italia_.pdf

[26] http://dati.istat.it/Index.aspx?QueryId=19103

entry to Europe by sea. In October 2004 the European Council decided to lift the EU arms embargo on Libya, in effect since 1986. The decision was taken after considerable pressure from Italy who were keen to enable Libya to acquire the necessary military equipment required for border surveillance.[27]

Then, in July 2008, the Italian center-right government led by Silvio Berlusconi presented a new agreement with Libya as a manifestation of the will of both parties to lead "a struggle against criminal organizations (...) who exploit ruthlessly illegal migrants." The cooperation agreement was heavily criticized, both internally and internationally, because of the well-founded fear that increased cooperation with the Libyan regime would result in increasing violations of migrants' human rights by authorities and smugglers alike.[28]

Due to a lack of distinction between refugees and migrants under Libyan law, the absence of an asylum policy, the denied right to seek asylum, and the lack of adequate protection and ill-treatment, Libya wasn't considered a safe country for many returnees. However, the Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation between Italy and Libya was signed in August 2008. The pact allowed Italy's coast guard to deport incoming immigrants back to Libyan shores, skipping procedures for filing potential asylum claims. In the process, Italy agreed to pay Libya $5 billion USD in 25 years, formally for colonial reparation, but in practice was a price for the illegal repatriations.[29]

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[27] Sara Hamood, *African transit migration through Libya to Europe: the human cost*, The American University in Cairo, January 2006, pp. 7, 72 in http://www.migreurop.org/IMG/pdf/hamood-libya.pdf

[28] Paolo Cuttita, *Delocalization, Humanitarianism, and Human Rights: the Mediterranean Border Between Exclusion and Inclusion* in "Antipode,"vol.50, no.3, 2018, p. 787.

[29] Fabrizio Tassinari, *The disintegration of European Security: Lessons from the refugee crisis* in "PRISM", vol.6, no.2, 2016, p. 73; https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-libya-italy-idUKLU1618820080830; The leader of the Lega Nord, Umberto Bossi, judged positively the agreement reached between Italy and Libya: "The agreement with Libya is fine because Libya will stop illegal immigrants instead of sending them here - said Bossi speaking at a Lega a Melzo demonstration - because from there all the non-EU citizens arrive. It seems to me that there is an action by Libya for the illegal immigrants who come here. This would be an unexpected and positive help, "Bossi added in *Corriere della Sera*, https://www.corriere.it/esteri/08_agosto_30/berlusconi_libia_gheddafi_bengasi_478ee3f4-767e-11dd-9747-00144f02aabc.shtml;   see also

It was added the fact that the Lisbon Treaty, adopted a few months before, allowed the EU states to conclude international agreements on terrorism with other countries and support third countries in the fight against terrorism, and the bilateral treaty was shaped exactly on this line.

During 2009 and 2010, the co-operation of border control policy reduced significantly the number of arrivals in Italy. In 2008, nearly 37. 000 people arrived on Italian shores. In 2009 and 2010, strengthened border control measures and increased co-operation with the southern Mediterranean countries to prevent departures and to return irregular migrants led to a significant decrease of arrivals to Italy and numbers went down to less than 9.600 and 4.400 respectively.[30]

In the European debate, the negotiations between the governments of Italy and Libya for the control and prevention of irregular migration and migrant smuggling networks have been one of the most frequently discussed issues at the academic and human rights levels in recent years. This issue represents a classic case of the securitization practices to externalize migration controls. In fact, the member states of the EU have continued to appeal to nearby third countries that serve as points of origin for illegal migrants, or allow them to transit through their territory, to participate in the fight against illegal immigration, with the promise of important financial assistance for doing so.[31]

While this policy has proven successful in reducing arrivals by sea, it has been questioned in terms of conformity with international human rights and refugee law. Italy's policy of returns of alleged irregular migrants to Libya,

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https://www.corriere.it/esteri/08_agosto_30/berlusconi_libia_gheddafi_bengasi_478ee3f4-767e-11dd-9747-00144f02aabc.shtml

[30] http://website-pace.net/documents/19863/168397/20131002-RptMixedMigratoryFlows-EN.pdf/426bce45-1258-4773-b961-be69c5bb0f75

[31] For more details see Olivier Clochard, Bruno Dupeyron, *The maritime borders of Europe: upstream migratory controls* in Emmanuel Brunet-Jaily (ed)„Borderlands. Comparing borders security in North America and Europe," Ottawa, University of Ottawa Press, 2007, pp. 19-40 https://books.openedition.org/uop/1596

without an adequate screening process brought it the condemned by the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Hirsi and Others versus Italy and the practices of "push-backs" to Libya were stopped in 2012.[32]

According to Amnesty International, the negotiations between the Italian and Libyan governments lasted actually until July 2013, a few months before the worst accident in the Mediterranean Sea in October 2013.[33]

The EU's operation *Mare Nostrum* was launched on 18 October 2013**,** after a series of dramatic shipwrecks that shocked the world's public opinion. Two shipwrecks on the 3rd. and on the 11th of October 2013 near the island of Lampedusa,[34] caused the death of 636 people. Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta tweeted at that time that it was "an immense tragedy" and the government of Rome has declared a day of national mourning.[35]

Initially, the EU response to these tragedies was to establish a Frontex Joint Operations. The former EU Home Affairs Commissioner Cecilia Malmström suggested this by calling for "an extensive Frontex search and rescue operation that will cover the Mediterranean from Cyprus to Spain" announcing that the member states should consider making available additional support for Frontex to carry out this operation. However, the Italian government went ahead with

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[32] The case concerned Somali and Eritrean migrants travelling from Libya who had been intercepted at sea by the Italian authorities and sent back to Libya. Returning them to Libya without examining their case exposed them to a risk of ill-treatment and amounted to a collective expulsion. Two of refugees dies soon after, but the Italian Minister of the Interior stated that the operations to intercept vessels on the high seas and to push migrants back to Libya were the consequence of the entry into force, in February 2009, of bilateral agreements concluded with Libya, and represented an important turning point in the fight against clandestine immigration.https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-109231%22]}

[33] http://www.ansamed.info/ansamed/en/news/nations/italy/2012/06/14/Immigration-Amnesty-Italy-Libya-deal-stop-migrant-flow_7033534.html

[34] The island of Lampedusa is located at 205 km from Sicily, 167 km from Tunis and 355 km from Libya.

[35] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24380247; moreover, "Barca Nostra," the wreck of the fishing boat symbol of the massacre of migrants that took place in 2015 in the Sicilian Channel, was an integrated part of the 2019 Biennale of Art-Venice, as an attempt to commemorate   the   tragedies   on   the   sea   in http://www.rainews.it/dl/rainews/media/Biennale-Arte-2019-barcone-naufragato-esposto-Arsenale-di-Venezia-784ea627-b7ef-4197-b70c-db6df01529a1.html#foto-1

the Mare Nostrum mission. It became clear from interviews that Frontex and the Commission were largely unaware of the launch of Mare Nostrum, in what they considered a clear unilateral member state action.[36]

Thus, the Centre-left coalition, led by the Democratic Party, attempted to assume a protagonist role inside the EU and to impose a "humanistic" narrative about migration, combined with an idea of efficiency guaranteed by the role of the military Navy – "military- humanitarian," launching *Mare Nostrum* operation. This rescue operation was an Italian initiative, a short military and humanitarian operation, working in the channel of Sicily.

The operation involved the units of Italian Navy and Italian Air Force, the main actor driving the entire operation was the Italian Navy under the Ministry of Defense, with more than 900 personnel dedicated to this operation. Mare Nostrum was presented by the Italian government as a "military-humanitarian" action aimed at tackling the humanitarian emergency in the Straits of Sicily, due to the increase in migration flows.

The operation ended on 31 October 2014 coinciding with the start of the new European operation called Triton (1 November 2014), and launched under the auspices of Frontex. The Italian government shut down the Mare Nostrum project after just one year, because many critics came also from the Council of Europe, Italy being accused of poorly prepared for what it seemed to be a new surge of mixed migration flows.[37]

Moreover, in October 2014, the UK Government announced, by way of a written question in the House of Lords, that it was withdrawing its support for

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[36] Sergio Carrera, Leonhard den Herog, *Whose Mare?Rule of law challenges în the field of European border surveillance in the Mediterranean* in „CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe", no.79/January 2015, p. 3 in http://aei.pitt.edu/60717/1/LSE_79.pdf

[37] ***Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, *Report on the arrival of mixed migratory flows to Italian coastal areas*, 2013 in http://website-pace.net/documents/19863/168397/20131002-RptMixedMigratoryFlows-EN.pdf/426bce45-1258-4773-b961-be69c5bb0f75

Operation Mare Nostrum, as it believed that the rescue service was a 'pull factor' for migrants.[38]

At least, at the beginning, more or less everyone was aware of the fact that something had to be done, to avoid the repetition of such disasters. Also, because just a day before the tragedy, a report from the European Committee on migration and refugees was issued in which Italy was defined as "ill-prepared" to face the migratory wave and landings on its shores.[39]

The Italian government decided to act immediately saying that "it is intolerable that the Mediterranean is a sea of death. It's our sea and we cannot tolerate what just happened." said the former Prime Minister Enrico Letta.[40]

In fact, Mare Nostrum operation was not a completely new one, but rather a serious upgrade of the ongoing naval operation "Constant Vigilance" which the Italian Navy has been conducting since 2004, permanently deploying a ship in the Strait of Sicily along with maritime patrol aircraft. The Italian government opted in 2013 less for a qualitative than for a quantitative change, by strongly increasing the already existing patrolling activities.[41]

Operation *Mare Nostrum* had, therefore, the two purposes of safeguarding human life at sea and bringing to justice human traffickers and migrant smugglers.[42] Mare Nostrum enhanced the rescue capacities and made the Italian policy of patrolling international waters not only more effective but also much more visible. At the same time, the operation was the starting point of a new

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[38]   http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2014-010564_EN.html?redirect
[39]   "Italy has, once again, shown that it is ill-prepared for what seems to be a new surge of mixed migration flows. The Government seems to have learnt few, if any, lessons from its experiences in 2011." in Parliamentary Assembly, Report Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons *The arrival of mixed migratory flows to Italian coastal areas*, p.3   in http://website-pace.net/documents/19863/168397/20131002-RptMixedMigratoryFlows-EN.pdf/426bce45-1258-4773-b961-be69c5bb0f75
[40]   https://www.vice.com/it/article/qbgavb/immigrazione-frontex-plus-mare-nostrum-429
[41]   http://www.marina.difesa.it/EN/operations/Pagine/MareNostrum.aspx
[42]   http://www.marina.difesa.it/EN/operations/Pagine/MareNostrum.aspx

strategy based on a new approach regarding immigration policy in light of humanitarian intervention.

In the beginning, because of its life-saving goal, Mare Nostrum was praised and supported by almost all Italian political parties, the only criticism coming from a part of the right-wing opposition (Lega Nord party) accusing it of attracting more migrants, and therefore also increasing the death toll-which shows that rescuing lives has become a universal argument used to support different political agendas.[43] Moreover, Matteo Salvini called the Italian mission as „insane" because it helped smugglers, and the real solution should have been the investment of the financial resources in Africa. In the same line, the party Fratelli d'Italia declared that the entire mission was an „idiocy", a „taxi for illegal persons", a „North Africa-Italy ferry."[44]

The first friction between the Italian Home Secretary, Angelino Alfano and the European Commission began in March 2014, regarding the responsibilities that should have been assumed in the migratory crisis. Since then, the high Italian official had repeatedly asked for an European intervention, threatening to interrupt the mission. Moreover, the Italian requests were to set up the humanitarian reception centers in Africa, in particular in Libya, the sea rescue operations had to be done by Europe through Frontex, the Frontex office should have to be transferred in Italy, not to remain in Warsaw, and finally, since the migrants didn't want to remain in Italy, they should have had the possibility to exercise the right of political asylum also in the rest of Europe, otherwise "we transform Italy into the prison of political refugees."[45]

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[43] Paolo Cuttita, *Delocalization, Humanitarianism….*, p.789; Umberto Bossi, the leader of the party Lega Nord declared at RaiDue „Do they say to change my law? Hopefully not, it is the only barrier against the invasion of illegal immigrants.. Italy - he added - cannot become the aircraft carrier that welcomes all illegal immigrants in the world" in https://www.ilsecoloxix.it/italia/2013/10/04/news/boldrini-a-lampedusa-nulla-sia-piu-come-prima-1.37868606

[44] https://www.vice.com/it/article/qbgavb/immigrazione-frontex-plus-mare-nostrum-429

[45] https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2014/05/13/news/immigrati_il_gelo_della_ue_italia_dica_cosa_vuole_a_marzo_non_ci_ha_risposto-86002466/

Precisely, on the question of asylum claims, Cecilia Malmström explained that "if it is true that Italy, like other European member states, has experienced an increase in migratory flow, other countries receive many more asylum requests, in particular, in 2013 Germany received 125.000, France 75.000, Sweden 54.000, the United Kingdom 30.000, and Italy 28.000. The top three countries alone receive more than 50% of all asylum applications in Europe. The Mediterranean countries are not inundated with requests. Moreover, the failure of the refugees' relocation to other countries due to the lack of European members initiative and we cannot force them to do this."[46]

Italian governmental authorities have publicly and repeatedly declared that Mare Nostrum required huge costs, and these costs were unsustainable for a single country.[47] The Italian Home Secretary, Angelino Alfano, confirmed on 31 October 2014 that the Mare Nostrum operation would definitely come to an end on 1 November. The Minister indicated also that, "Mare Nostrum has carried out its work. Responsibility for the Mediterranean frontier rests with Europe. These migrants don't want to come to Italy, want to come to Europe "[48]

The *Mare Nostrum* was costing Italy substantial amounts of money: almost 100.000 euros/day, 9, 5 million euros per month, and 114 million euros until the end.[49] The Italian financial effort was appreciated as a massively expensive one,

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[46] *Ibidem.*
[47] Maurizio Albahari, *Crimes of peace. Mediterranean migrations at the world's deadliest border,* Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015, p. 32; in fact, in October 2013, the Interior Minister Alfano said "to cover the costs of the mission, there will be no need for other funds, the Minister's money will be enough." in https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2013/10/14/news/letta_a_katainen_intollerabile_mediterraneomare_morte-68575070/?refresh_ce
[48] https://www.asylumineurope.org/news/13-10-2014/operation-mare-nostrum-end-frontex-triton-operation-will-not-ensure-rescue-sea; https://www.corriere.it/politica/14_agosto_15/alfano-l-operazione-mare-nostrum-deve-finire-subentri-l-europa-5ea53f04-246d-11e4-a121-b5affdf40fda.shtml
[49]   http://www.library.coleurop.pl/intranet/documents/ae/2014/ae11189.pdf

Italian authorities were practically abandoned by the rest of Europe and left to deal with the problem alone:[50]

> *„Italy financed the Mare Nostrum operation on its own; now it is the European budget and national contributions from every country that will finance the Triton operation. This represents a return to normality. It was not right to leave the financing of the Mare Nostrum operation to Italy alone.*[51]

The operation has been considered successful in preventing the deaths of migrants at sea, but its results were controversial. It was also critiqued because some observers, at both the national and international level, considered rescue in international waters a "facilitation" of the smuggling process. But contrary to the expectations of those who believed that Italy's Operation Mare Nostrum was encouraging refugees and migrants to attempt the dangerous crossing, their numbers continued to grow in the months that followed its termination.

Overall, in 2014, the route from Libya accounted for the majority of all detected illegal entries to the EU and the majority of the fatalities at sea. The Italian Ministry of Interior estimated a total of 170,100 irregular migrants landed in Italy in 2014, of which 18.190 were women and 13.026 were unaccompanied minors. (Figure 2).

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[50] Slovenia was the only contributor to the operation, providing a patrol vessel to integrate into the Mare Nostrum mission http://www.difesa.it/News/Pagine/Slovenia.aspx

[51] Speech by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the debate in the European Parliament on the conclusions of the Special European Council on 23 April, 2015 in https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/alynsmith/pages/1200/attachments/original/1432911016/SpeechENcrisemig.pdf?1432911016

Figure 2. Irregular migrants landed in Italy by sea, 2004-2014.

year	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Total	13,635	22,939	22,016	20,455	36,951	9,573	4,406	62,692	13,267	42,925	170,100

Source: Italian Ministry of Interior 2015

When the Italian government announced that Mare Nostrum would end because of financial constraints only a year after its launch, a series of humanitarian organizations such as Amnesty International, Médecins sans Frontières, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) called on the Italian and European institutions not to reduce the search and rescue capacity in the Mediterranean area.[52]

Amnesty International warned that FRONTEX Joint Operation Triton (Triton), set up to patrol the European Union's Southern maritime borders from 1 November 2014, was an inadequate response to the unfolding humanitarian crisis at sea, because it did not have sufficient naval resources for search and rescue, it deployed its assets too close to European shores to be able to rescue promptly boats in distress near Libyan shores, and the provision of assistance to refugees and migrants was not its primary objective.[53]

The European Commission has supported the operation financially with €1.8 million from the emergency actions under the External Borders Fund in November 2013 (support just one month operational costs of Operation Mare Nostrum), and then offered financial assistance for other urgent Italian actions (€ 25.6 million), such as the first aid and primary medical assistance on board the vessels of Operation Mare Nostrum, or internal transportation of migrants.[54]

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[52]   https://www.nextquotidiano.it/lappello-amnesty-matteo-renzi/
[53]   https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR0320592015ENGLISH.pdf;
[54]
       https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/documents/policies/legal-mig

The conclusions of the Council meeting in Luxembourg on 9-10 October 2014 stated that the new Operation *Triton* needed to be deployed without delay. It was a big success for the Italian presidency of the EU (July-December 2014), not only because *Mare Nostrum* was considered a model that should be followed, but also because the new operation **Triton** seemed like "would not cost the Italians a single Euro."[55]

Operation **Triton** was launched in **November 2014,** with a focus on border protection, but also on the provision of support to search and rescue operations. The operational area of Triton activity was within 30 miles off the Italian coasts, while migrants were in need in international waters. In fact, *Mare Nostrum* operated in international waters. But soon after the shipwreck of 19 April 2015, 238 International organizations published a joint statement underlying that EU efforts are not adequate to the current situation. In July 2015, its operational area was expanded southwards, also facilitating the provision of support in search and rescue operations further south. Officers deployed by Frontex support the Italian authorities in the registration of the arriving migrants. The operational focus of Triton has expanded to include cross border crime, such as people smuggling, drug trafficking, illegal fishing and maritime pollution. It operates under the command of the Italian Ministry of Interior. A total of 28 European countries took part in the operation by deploying either technical equipment or border guards.[56] In parallel, since late 2014, a small but growing number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has also started actively pursuing search and rescue in the Central Mediterranean.

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[55] Marco Brunazzo, David Bull, *The Italian Presidency of the Council of the European Union: a semester of contrasting outcomes* in "Italian Politics," vol. 30, The Year of Bulldozer, 2014, p. 114.

ration/general/docs/sdw_implementation_of_the_communication_on_the_work_of_the_task_force_mediterranean_part_2_en.pdf

[56] https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/20170125_migration_on_the_central_mediterraean_route_-_managing_flows_saving_lives_en.pdf

At the same time, The European Union Naval Force – Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia) was set up in record time in June 2015 to identify, capture and dispose of vessels and enabling assets used or suspected of being used by migrant smugglers or traffickers, in order to disrupt their business model in the Southern Central Mediterranean, and prevent the further loss of life at sea.

However, the Italian Navy didn't stop its patrolling activity in the Central Mediterranean immediately, but it no longer operated within the framework of Mare Nostrum operation. On Friday 5 December 2014, the Italian navy announced that seventeen migrants had tragically died while attempting to cross the Mediterranean in a small inflatable boat. The deaths on 5 December are believed to be the first since Operation Mare Nostrum began to be phased out in favor of the Triton operation.[57]

Even after Mare Nostrum was stopped, its name remained a symbol of humanitarian border management. After the shipwreck of 18 April 2015, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) requested the resumption of the Italian mission, while the UNHCR and the European Parliament called for a European Mare Nostrum-like humanitarian rescue operation.

Despite domestic and international critics, Mare Nostrum reached notable results, with more 150.000 people rescued. (Figure 3).

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[57] http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2014-010564_EN.html?redirect

The Mare Nostrum achievements:

Figure 3: Mare Nostrum Operation (18 October 2013 – 31 October 2014).[58]

Migrants rescued by the Navy	156,362
Search and rescue operations at sea	439
Smugglers arrested	366
On-board inspections	15
Captured and seized ships (including 5 mother ship)	9

We are witnessing in today's world an unprecedented level of human mobility. The challenge for the future is how the European community should best respond to the growing global phenomenon of large movements of refugees and migrants on its shores. It is very clear that combating racism, xenophobia, discrimination and intolerance towards migrants, and finally guaranteeing dignity and fundamental rights to all human life must be the answer.

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[58] ItalianNavy, http://www.marina.difesa.it/cosa-facciamo/per-la-difesa-sicurezza/operazioni-in-corso/Documents/Dati%20statistici%20Mare%20Nostrum.pdf#search=mare%20nostrum

A Brief Incursion in the Realm of Institutional Organization of the American Cultural Diplomacy from World War I to 1946

Bogdan Antoniu[1]

Abstract

The institutional organization of the American cultural diplomacy from the end of the First World War and the full engagement of the United States in the Second World War was an experimental, reactive, and unsubstantial policy. Even though the idea of using culture or arts as diplomatic tools was rejected by many governmental officials, there were many personalities like President Roosevelt, who foresaw that the power of art and culture represents an important part of states' foreign policy. In fact, since the Cold War till now, cultural diplomacy has acquired special significance becoming an important instrument that operates among the other diplomatic methods.

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The researcher's task to pinpoint the beginnings of cultural diplomacy in the United States is difficult for mainly two reasons: firstly, the concept of *cultural diplomacy* is still in debate in the academic field at large, in terms of actors and instruments, products and objectives.

The scholarly literature proposes different definitions, ranging from a wide cover of all the above-mentioned elements to narrower ones, that contain the cultural actions of a nation inside the governmental organizations and processes.

American political scientist Milton C. Cummings explained the concept of "cultural diplomacy" as one that "*(…) refers to the exchange of ideas, information, art, and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding. But "cultural diplomacy" can also be more of a one-way street than a two-way exchange, as when one nation concentrates its efforts on promoting the national language, explaining its policies and point of view, or "telling its story" to the rest of the world*"[2]. Moreover, its practice is designed "*to strengthen relationships, enhance socio-cultural cooperation* [n.n and] *promote national interests (…)*", being used by "*the public sector, private sector or civil society*"[3]. British historian Nicholas J. Cull gave it an even wider spectrum, by defining cultural diplomacy "*as an actor's attempt to manage the international environment through making its cultural resources and achievements known overseas and/or facilitating cultural transmission abroad*"[4].

On the other hand, the narrower definitions of the *cultural diplomacy* concept focus on the idea that governments have the fundamental role in instrumenting it. In his book *The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*, Richard Arndt explains that

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[2] Milton C. Cummings, *Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A Survey*, Washington, D. C., Centre for Arts and Culture, 2003 p.1.
[3] Institute for Cultural Diplomacy - USA,
http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/index.php?en_culturaldiplomacy)
[4] Nicholas J. Cull, *Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past*, Los Angeles, Figueroa Press, 2009, p. 19.

"Cultural relations grow naturally and organically, without government intervention—the transactions of trade and tourism, student flows, communications, book circulation, migration, media access, intermarriage—millions of daily cross-cultural encounters. If that is correct, cultural diplomacy can only be said to take place when formal diplomats, serving national governments, try to shape and channel this natural flow to advance national interests"[5]. On the same line, Simon Mark defines *cultural diplomacy* as *"the deployment of a state's culture in support of its foreign policy goals or diplomacy"*[6].

Secondly, the specific relation between culture and government in the United States raises a particular set of challenges. Since the United States' inception, even when Presidents like Thomas Jefferson or Andrew Jackson confessed their belief in supporting the American culture (defined mainly as "art") and the government sporadically dared to venture into the artistic field (public art, architecture), the Congress excelled in reluctance when asked to spend public money on cultural endeavors.

In 1830, when James Smithson generously left more than half a million dollars to the federal government in order to create a national cultural center in Washington, D.C. (the now famous Smithsonian Institution), his decision stirred a strong debate in the US Congress not only about the appropriate use of the money, but also on the question whether the United States has a national culture to express as such or whether the regional American cultures deserve to be supported.

A change was made in the 20th century, during the New Deal; under very specific and traumatic economical and identity conditions, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt had the chance to set out federal programs and policies

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[5] Richard Arndt, *The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*, Washington, D.C: Potomac Books Inc., 2006, p. xix.
[6] Simon Mark, *A Greater Role for Cultural Diplomacy*, The Hague, 'Clingendael' Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2009, p. 7.

designed to help various categories of artists and to subsidize works of art in an attempt to not only protect the unemployed artists, but also to promote a sense of social cohesion through art. Even then, programs such as *Public Works of Art Project* or the later *Federal Art Project*, *Federal Theater Project*, *Federal Music Project* and so on were met with skepticism and the disturbing accusation of communist propaganda by the US Congress, the conservative public and the Administration's critics.

The term 'propaganda' - applied to the US government's cultural ventures – raised another question mark with regard to the relationship between art and power in America. When the United States entered World War I, the negative meaning of the word was so strong in the American public mind that President Wilson avoided its use and ordered, in April 1917, the creation of a *Committee on Public Information* under the executive direction of journalist George Creel:

"I hereby create a Committee on Public Information, to be composed of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and a civilian who shall be charged with the executive direction of the Committee. As Civilian Chairman of this Committee, I appoint Mr. George Creel. The Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy are authorized each to detail an officer or officers to the work of the Committee."[7]

The Committee's purpose was to disseminate information about the war to the American people; yet very soon, the *CPI* was operating overseas in over a dozen of foreign countries in Europe, Latin America, and the Far East, using an impressive range of mass cultural instruments (newsprints, posters, radio, movies, even language education programs and library reading rooms) in order to influence the foreign public opinion and increase the international support for

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[7] Woodrow Wilson, Executive Order 2594—Creating Committee on Public Information Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/275417

the United States. Domestically, the *'Creel Committee'* organized a large-scale-as-never-seen-before operation of propaganda and counter-propaganda that was both praised and demonized by various public figures. The accusations of censorship, misinformation or monopolistic control over battlefield news have resulted in Congressional hearings. The US Congress abruptly stopped all funding for the *Committee* after the Armistice and the first government organization developed to promote the United States image overseas ended its activities on January 1st, 1919. George Creel contested the notion that the *CPI* had anything to do with censorship, stating in his 1920 book *How We Advertised America* that

"In no degree was the Committee an agency of censorship, a machinery of concealment or repression. [...] At no point did it seek or exercise authorities under those war laws that limited the freedom of speech and press. [...] it was a plain publicity proposition, a vast enterprise in salesmanship, the world's greatest adventures in advertising. [...] Our effort was educational and informative throughout, for we had such confidence in our case as to feel that no other argument was needed than the simple, straightforward presentation of the facts."[8]

Creel offered a similar explanation in his reports on the *CPI* activity:

"At no point were our functions negative. We dealt in the positive, and our emphasis was ever on expression, not suppression. We fought indifference and disaffection in the United States and we fought falsehood abroad. We strove for the maintenance of our own morale by every process of stimulation; we sought the verdict of mankind by truth telling. We did not call it "propaganda" for that word, in German hands, had come to be associated with lies and corruptions. Our work was educational and informative only, for we had such confidence in our case as to feel that only fair presentation of its facts was needed."[9]

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[8] George Creel, *How We Advertised America*, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1920, pp. 4–5.
[9] *Idem*, "Complete Report of the Chairman of the Committee on Public Information (1917, 1918, 1919)", Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1920, p. 1.

What is worth emphasizing is that the *CPI* was created as an independent agency of the government and it was highly distrusted by the Department of State officials. The distaste of the American public and American politicians for "propaganda" and the government usage of arts or any other form of cultural expression in foreign policy was reinforced in the 1920's by the Soviet Union's cultural activities abroad. Long before the American leaders fully understood the power of arts in foreign policy, the Soviets armed themselves with an ideologically-driven art called "social-realism" and with a very well subsidized instrument, the *All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries* (VOKS by its acronym) that was set up in 1925. Through its numerous branches overseas, *VOKS* functioned as an international propaganda organization, promoting the Soviet accomplishments through cultural instruments. In 1926, the *American Society for Cultural Relations with Russia* was established in New York, and it engaged in book exchange and promotion of specially designed "tours" of the Soviet Union for artists and intellectuals.

During the 1920's - a decade of great prosperity, pride and illusions for the American nation - the cultural diplomacy was left to private enterprises such as *The Institute of International Education* - established in 1919 and sponsored by the *Carnegie Endowment* - which covered expenses for some of the travels and exchanges between the U.S. and Latin American universities; another organization was the *American Library Association* (ALA), which by the 1930s set in place cultural programs that included visits, fellowships, library training, and exchange of publications. Moreover, in an era when the American government and the US Congress were reluctant or even hostile to be involved in supporting cultural diplomacy from the public purse, the private internationalism - as historian Ikira Arye noted - was thriving. The study of international affairs was promoted by new associations like the *Council on Foreign Relations*, the *Foreign Policy Association*, the *Foreign Affairs Forum*, the *Institute of Pacific Relations* or the

Foundation for the Advancement of the Social Sciences. American universities such as Tufts or Georgetown developed programs designed for scholars' and students' exchange, and educational resources with countries like Weimar Germany, France or China.

In the next decade, however, this course of events has changed. Firstly, the Great Economic Depression affected the funding of such private actions and the grants offered by the Carnegie Corporation, Guggenheim or Rockefeller Foundation either shrank or disappeared. Secondly, the international environment degraded and the US foreign policy makers started to perceive the threats posed by the aggressive cultural diplomacy of the totalitarian regimes, especially in the Western Hemisphere. Thirdly, after three years of economic downfall and political confusion, the new US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and, to some extent, the Congress (controlled in both Chambers by the Democrats) understood that both the crisis and the foreign threats are exceptional phenomena, to be dealt with out of the ordinary means. Fourth, as recent works on public diplomacy are pointing out, during this decade, the American foreign policy makers slowly began, for multiple reasons, to look for the "Americanization" or the spreading of American ideology, values and culture in order to protect and promote the United States foreign policy objectives.[10]

All these reasons seemed to play a part in the Roosevelt Administration' decision to establish the *Division of Cultural Relations* at the State Department on July 27th, 1938 - the first institutional step in employing culture as a foreign policy tool. It was a small response to what was perceived as a cultural offensive of the Nazi Germany in Latin America, five years after FDR proclaimed in his *Inaugural Address* his intentions to improve relations between the United States and the countries of the Western Hemisphere by political, economic and cultural means.

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[10] Justin Hart, *Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 8-9.

The architects of the 'Good Neighbor Policy' and the 1938 decision were top diplomats, such as Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Assistant Secretary Sumner Welles, Laurence Duggan (former head of the Institute of International Education) and Franklin Delano Roosevelt himself. Professor of International Relations at Denver University Ben M. Cherrington was appointed Head of Division, a man who viewed cultural diplomacy in terms of international, educational and cultural exchanges rather than propaganda.

The Division worked with an advisory committee appointed by the Secretary of State comprising other important academics, presidents of the national research councils, and the director of the Institute of International Education. In order to oversee the exchanges and administered grants, an Inter-Departmental Committee for Scientific and Cultural Cooperation was also created.

The primary function of this new office was to coordinate any ongoing and new private initiatives in cultural diplomacy. As one government official, Mr. Messersmith, explained to the Congress, the *Division* would exist to "*assist the foundations and universities in this country*"[11] in carrying out their international - cultural activities. Taking these limitations into consideration, one can see the effort of State Department officials to sidestep possible congressional criticisms about costs and avoiding the negative tag of covert propaganda. Hence the *Division of Cultural Relations*, with its global aims, was understaffed, underfunded and over-supervised.

In 1938, a cultural agenda was developed by the *Division of Cultural Relations* after a series of conferences held in Washington, D.C. At these conferences, experts in the fields of education, art, publications, libraries, and

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[11] *Second Deficiency Appropriation Bill for 1938: Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Seventy-fifth Congress, Third Session, on the Second Deficiency Appropriation Bill for 1938*, United States Congress House Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1938, p. 656.

music met to discuss how to organize the Inter-American cultural relations. In most cases, the participants recommended an expansion of private cultural initiatives while the newly established *Division* would provide some overall guiding framework. The main projects envisioned the exchange of scholars, interchange of books and translations, exportation of motion pictures and radio broadcasts, and, although were viewed as marginal activities, the presentation of visual and performing arts.

On October 11th, 1939, 125 people - including publishers, artists, art critics, and museum professionals - attended the first Conference on Inter-American Relations in the Field of Art organized by the *Division of Cultural Relations.*

The Department of State seized the moment to emphasize "*the role of the Division of Cultural Relations as an agency to cooperate with private organizations engaged in the stimulation of cultural interchange*", presenting it mainly as "*a service rather than a directive agency*"[12].

The meeting was a formal opportunity for planning exhibitions of Latin American art financed by private institutions and for debating on "*what constituted truly representative art material from the United States*".[13] As a result and under the auspices of the State Department, exhibitions of paintings representing the art of Latin American countries, in a collaborative effort of American museums, the Pan American Union, and the Hispanic Foundation of the Library of Congress toured some American cities. But this cultural enterprise coordinated by the State Department paled if compared with the monumental artistic exhibition organized by private initiative. Around the same time, in 1939, the Museum of Modern Art from New York City started its own project to promote Latin American arts to the American public and in the spring of 1940 MoMA

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[12] *Conference on Inter-American Relations in the Field of Art, Analysis and Digest of the Conference Proceeding*s, Department of State, Washington, D. C., October 11-12, 1939. pp. 2-3, https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015073412747&view=1up&seq=5
[13] *Ibidem.*

opened a Mexican art exhibition entitled "*Twenty Centuries of Mexican Art*" which was exposed on three floors and the greater part of the Museum's sculpture garden and included almost 6000 art pieces. The President of MoMA – Nelson A. Rockefeller – told the press that it was "*the largest and most comprehensive exhibition of Mexican art ever assembled*"[14] and it definitely was. Antonio Castro-Leal, one of Mexico's foremost art critics wrote that "*For the first time in the history of art exhibitions there has now been brought together in one building an authoritative and systematic collection of Mexican art, from the archaic cultures to the most recent schools of painting*".[15] Of course, in all Museum's press releases there was no mention of the State Department, or the *Division.* Moreover, one may observe that even one of the most important cultural private institutions in the country, the Museum of Modern Art from New York City, was somehow reserved to promote American artists abroad.

The outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939 changed the entire world of American diplomacy. By no means a coincidence, in 1940, just weeks after the German victory over France, President Roosevelt established a new agency <u>out</u> of the State Department, in order to address the need for a more robust cultural diplomacy in Western Hemisphere - the *Office for the Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American Republics*. The agency was to be headed by a coordinator for Commercial and Cultural Relations, namely Nelson A. Rockefeller - a Republican, an oil magnate like his grandfather, a passionate man of the Latin American art and, as he already demonstrated as president of the Museum of Modern Art, an excellent cultural manager.

In July 1941, through Executive Order 8840, President Roosevelt renamed this organization into the *Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs* (usually

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[14] "Twenty Centuries Of Mexican Art opens At Museum Of Modern Art", *The Museum of Modern Art Press Release, Wednesday, May 15, 1940*, p. 1.
https://assets.moma.org/momaorg/shared/pdfs/docs/press_archives/608/releases/MOMA_1940_0039_1940-05-11_40511-34.pdf
[15] *Ibidem.*

abbreviated OCIAA)[16]. Rockefeller engaged into a major effort destined to enhance the American cultural diplomacy toward the Central and South American republics. He developed the existing commercial and cultural projects in Latin America, established more offices and libraries, extended the network of binational centers and launched many new exchanges and lecture programs. But the major change was that under Rockefeller's command, a sort of "cultural tidal wave" (in the words of Michael Krenn)[17] from the United States engaged the Latin American public opinion. In less than two years and in a stark contrast with the cultural programs initiated in 1938, now having a sizeable budget of $ 3,5 million allocated from the President's Emergency Fund, Rockefeller and a plethora of his social and business relations plus the formidable team from the *OCIAA* sent thousands of American mass cultural products to the Southern neighbors; Hollywood movies (including Disney cartoons), radio music and newscasts, orchestral visits, publications like "En Guardia" (On Guard) in more than half a million copies reached millions of people south of Rio Grande.

American art also made its way to Latin America, in May 1941, when, with help from a consortium of New York City museums, a massive exhibit of 178 oils and 109 watercolors of some of the country's best known modern artists, travelled to 10 Latin American countries. This was the first major art project partially funded and fully organized by a United States government agency after the First World War. It is, however, ironical that it foreshadowed in many aspects the outcome of the ill-fated Advancing American Art exhibition organized by the State Department in 1947.

The plan for "Exposición de la Pintura Contemporánea Norteamericana" was conceived in December 1940 by the Advisory Committee on Art of the

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[16] Franklin D. Roosevelt, *Executive Order 8840 Establishing the Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs*. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/209811
[17] Michael L. Krenn *The History of United States Cultural Diplomacy: 1770 to the Present Day*, London, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017, p. 59.

OCIAA. The Committee included experts such as the librarian of Congress (and future Assistant Secretary of State for Cultural and Public Affairs) Archibald MacLeish and William Benton - then vice president of the University of Chicago and later MacLeish's successor in his position in the State Department. After that, the chair of the advisory committee and vice-president of the Museum of Modern Art, John E. Abbott, asked the director of the OCIAA's Cultural Relations Program to consider this large-scale exhibit.

A step further was made at the beginning of 1941, when a consultant to the committee and director of the San Francisco Museum of Art visited the capitals of ten Latin American countries in order to test the desirability of such project and returned reporting that the idea was considered *"highly desirable by most of the authorities, artists, educators, and laymen interested in the art of the various South American republics"*.[18]

In the next step, another committee of private art experts was appointed to select paintings which were given on loan by private individuals, galleries, and museums. Thus were selected the works of artists such as John Sloan, William J. Glackens, Robert Henri, George Luks, Maurice Prendergast, George Bellows, Walt Kuhn, Reginald Marsh, William Gropper, Georgia O'Keeffe, and Arshile Gorky, among others, with the obvious intention to be as comprehensive as possible.

Before circulating in the selected locations, the exhibits were shown in April, 1941 at the Metropolitan Museum in New York City and received generous reviews; even the New York Times appreciated that the *"contemporary aspect is stressed"*[19].

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[18] *Report on the Exposición de pintura contemporánea norteamericana, 1941*, Thomas J. Watson Library Digital Collections, The Metropolitan Museum of Art, p. 2, https://libmma.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p15324coll10/id/155345
[19] "Latin America To See Exhibits Of U.S. Art", *The New York Times,* Saturday, April 12, 1941, p. 18.

After that final test, the exhibitions were unveiled to the Latin American public from May to December 1941, the tours being accompanied by museums art officials, 30.000 catalogs and fifty-three complementary art books for the library of the country's choice. The impact of these simultaneous exhibits was notable. They were displayed for one month in each location and were viewed by more than 218,000 people in ten capitals of the Latin American republics.[20]

In 1941, the Department of State clipped Rockefeller's wings by pressuring President Roosevelt into issuing an order that would oblige the *OCIAA* to inform the Department on its activities and that it would also seek the Department's approval before initiating any new programs. Many of its cultural programs ender after Pearl Harbor as the governmental effort – the *war effort* – now had to be redirected[21].

By 1943, nearly all of the OCIAA's cultural programs were transferred to the Division of Cultural Relations. The work continued throughout the war. In 1944, Rockefeller moved to the Department of State as Assistant Secretary for the Latin American affairs, leaving his friend and architect Wallace Harrison as the director of *OIAA*. Under Harrison's leadership, the *OIAA* also became involved in health issues and nutrition, an area that had President Roosevelt's blessing as the economic and social conditions in the Latin American Republics were becoming dire[22].

The Office of Inter-American Affairs' existence was, however, short-lived. By the end of the war, many of its cultural programs were either transferred to the Division of Cultural Relations within the Department of State or were terminated. In May 1946, *OIAA* ceased its activity.

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[20] *Report on the Exposición …*. p. 1.
[21] United States. Office of Inter-American Affairs, *History of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs,* Washington, D.C., 1947, U.S. Government Printing Office, p. 9 https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015014125036&view=1up&seq=9
[22] *Ibidem.*

If the term had been coined during those days, the *OIAA* would surely have identified its work with the concept of 'public diplomacy'. The largest portion of its programs belonged to 'cultural diplomacy' while others involved coordination in various fields – education, agriculture, commercial and economic etc. Rockefeller managed an agency whose mission was to gain Latin Americans' hearts and minds over the United States and to prevent the region's fall under Nazi propaganda. He envisaged programs that focused on promoting the American performing arts and carried them out with help from both private citizens and institutions to which he was well-connected and public institutions or governmental agencies. In this regard, the *OIAA* established multiple connections with the American cultural and business elite that proved to be fruitful for its operating and in advancing the US interests in Latin America. Moreover, the OIAA promoted the idea that the American Republics were united by sharing the same geography and destiny in the Western Hemisphere[23].

In a very brief conclusion, the institutional organization of the American cultural diplomacy from the end of the First World War and the full engagement of the United States in the Second World War was, in our opinion, experimental, reactive and unsubstantial. Even the idea of using culture or arts as diplomatic tools was rejected by many governmental officials, mainly within the State Department, and members of Congress alike. But, the interwar years were dominated by the European ideological confrontations and the United States was dragged into the cultural competition with the other Great Powers of that time.

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Cordell Hull, Sumner Welles, Laurence Duggan, Ben M. Cherrington, Nelson Rockefeller were among the first to innovate within the traditional world of American diplomacy, experimenting

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[23] An in-depth overview of the ideological and practical reason behind the *OIAA* activities can be found in Gisela Cramer, Ursula Prutsch, "Nelson A. Rockefeller's Office of Inter-American Affairs and the Quest for Pan-American Unity: An Introductory Essay" in Gisela Cramer, Ursula Prutsch (eds*.), ¡Américas unidas! : Nelson A. Rockefeller's Office of Inter-American Affairs (1940-46)*, Madrid, Frankfurt, Iberoamericana Vervuert, 2012, pp. 15-52.

the use of cultural diplomacy. The reactive dimension of these efforts is obvious and the projection of American arts in the world (starting with the neighboring Latin America) is strongly related with the rise of international tensions and the expansion of the ideological and cultural messages of the totalitarian regimes. And still, until the entry of the United States in the Second World War, the institutionalized efforts to build a proper and effective American cultural diplomacy were lacking consistency.

Those projects were seen as costly, improper and insignificant in relation to the extraordinary challenges imposed by the new dynamics of the international environment in the 1940's.

During the Second World War, the American culture was also engaged by the government in order to mobilize the American people and to explain to the domestic and foreign audience the reasons behind the tremendous war effort of the United States.

BOOK REVIEW

Francis Fukuyama, *Identity: the Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment*, **Profile Books, 2018, 240 pp.**

Francis Fukuyama is the author of numerous writings which due to their value, but also due to their controversy (e.g. *The End of History and the Last Man* – a volume that raised significant debate among several schools of thought) might be considered a priceless legacy for the literature dedicated to the study of political sciences, international relations or political economy.

Among his most recent books, we have to mention the two volumes:*"The Origins of Political Order"* and *"Political Order and Political Decay"*. In those two volumes Fukuyama tries to explain the institutional evolution in certain areas of the globe, throughout different periods of history.

The author describes this evolutionary process of societies borrowing from sciences such as history, economy, sociology, archaeology and even biology.

The first volume starts by presenting the transition from the tribal organization to the statehood formation and ends with the causes and consequences of the French Revolution from 1787.

The second volume continues the trend, starting with the late 18th century and ending with the Obama presidency in the United States. The most captivating chapter of this second volume is the one describing the institutional decay from the US.

In the author's vision, this institutional decay is due to the fact that the institutions were "captured" by external interest groups. Fukuyama highlights the fact that most of the debates within the Congress are directed towards the activist audience (lobbyists, etc.) and not towards the fellow Congressmen[1]

We wouldn't be wrong in saying that those two volumes might be considered a treaty of political sciences/political economy, that tries to explain issues such as the origins of modern political institutions, the institutional differences between Eastern Europe and Western Europe, the causes of institutional decay, or the crisis of democracy.

The mentioning of the above volumes is important, due to a certain connection between those books and Fukuyama's latest work – "Identity: the Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment".

The volume starts with a brief presentation of those "groups from the outside" who captured the state's institutions. In fact, the book was written as a consequence of the 2016 presidential elections, as Fukuyama mentions, the incumbent president Donald Trump, being the triumph of white nationalism[2] and trying to focus on a state identity built on issues such as ethnicity, and highlighting several nonconventional enemies for the state, such as "the deep state".

Not only Donald Trump's policy stands as an example of this type of identity. Central and Eastern Europe also provides several examples. Let us take for example, Viktor Orban's Hungary. Emphasizing on a nationalist discourse built on anti EU rhetoric and identifying external enemies he managed to consolidate an authoritarian regime. Orban depicted Brussels as "the new

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[1] Francis Fukuyama, *Political Order and Political Decay*, Profile Books, 2014, p. 485.
[2] Idem, *Identity: the Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment*, Profile Books, 2018, p. 6.

Moscow," and emphasized on the idea that he builds a new model of democracy labeled "illiberal democracy" , which in fact turned out to be an autocratic regime where judiciary is under pressure and mass media, to a large extent is controlled by the politic[3].

More than that, the Hungarian P.M., identified several other foreign enemies such as the immigrants – presenting Hungary as a defender of Christianity, the billionaire George Soros – presented as an instigator of Europe's refugee crisis. The civil society came next. All those entities who received money from the West, were presented as "serving foreign interests"[4].

Jaroslaw Kaczynski's approach to politics is similar to Orban. There is an authoritarian tendency in Poland, accompanied by a Euroscepticist discourse, with the biggest controversy being the Government approach towards the judiciary law. This is considered in Brussels as a major departure from the European acquis, and a step towards the consolidation of an authoritarian regime.[5]

However, growing Euroscepticism in Poland does not mean that Warsaw will be one step closer to Russia[6]. This might be on the one hand due to the past relations between the two countries but also due to the fact that "PiS voters may secretly admire strong, Putin-like leadership and criticizing Putin's decisiveness won't win PiS as much support as it used to"[7].

The case of Romania is also similar to Poland and Hungary. The political elites from Bucharest emphasize on a nationalist discourse, with anti European

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[3] John Shattuck, "Viktor Orban's Rise and the power nationalist politics", Pacific Standard, in https://psmag.com/social-justice/orbans-rise-to-power-is-a-product-of-nationalism
[4] *Ibidem.*
[5] Dariusz Kalan," Poland's New Populism",
in https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/05/polands-new-populism-pis/
[6] *Ibidem.*
[7] *Ibidem.*

Union messages, especially in the area of justice affairs, and a strong accent on national capitalism. Besides the EU and other foreign enemies such as Soros, the political elites blame the so-called "deep state" for the bad management of public administration, as being a force who opposes government measures.

Fukuyama's theory might explain the reemergence of an old fashioned and dangerous nationalist discourse in the above mentioned cases.

The author starts his presentation, by explaining the etymology of three ancient Greek words: *thymos*, which is that part of the souls that thrives for the recognition of dignity, *isothymia* meaning the demand of being respected as an equal among other subjects, and *megalothymia* which is the desire to be recognized as being superior to others.

Furthermore, the author makes a distinction between the rational theories put forward by economists and this idea of isothymia. Building his explanation on Plato's Republic, the author concludes that there are three parts of the soul : the desiring part, the calculating part and the spirited part – thymos -, who acts completely different from the first two, being "the seat of judgments of worth", or today's seat of identity politics.

While the economists emphasize on rational choice, arguing that the individuals are interested in maximizing their material interests, the concept of isothymia puts forward the idea that non material issues, such as the desire of being respected, are more important.

> "Thymos is the seat of both anger and pride…Human beings do not want things that are just external to themselves…They also crave judgements about their worth and dignity"[8] .

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[8] Francis Fukuyama, *Identity* ..., p. 18.

Thymos therefore, is that part of the soul that yearns for dignity. Isothymia, on the other hand, might be considered a modern term connected with the evolution of democracy. One such classic example might be the American Declaration of Independence, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or even the Euromaidan movement of 2013 -2014, from Ukraine.

Megalothymia on the other hand, might be problematic. For every person recognized as superior, far more people are seen as inferior and do not receive any public recognition for their human worth[9]. The Brexit supporters or Donald Trump are examples of megalothymia, who oppose classical concepts of the western democracy such as international cooperation or multiculturalism.

The switch to identity politics might fragment the society by dividing its people in numerous groups focused on their specific identity.

In an interview for The World, Fukuyama further argues that „by identity politics (some leaders) are shifting the conversation away from economic policy to these identity issues, where essentially your identity is fixed by your birth." Moreover, the leader establishes a personal relationship between himself or herself and the people. And that makes them anti – institutional", which is a threat to democracy.

As the author argues "the fundamental defect of our modern, prosperous democratic world … was its failure to address the problem of thymos"[10]. The modern liberal democracy promised recognition of the dignity of its citizens, but frequently failed to deliver on these promises (social problems, marginalized groups). This can also be expanded to the European Union as a whole. Some states consider that they are marginalized. Nationalism for example, as it results

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[9] *Ibidem,* p. 76.
[10] Francis Fukuyama, "Identity and the End of History", *The American Interest,* 2018 in https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/08/23/identity-and-the-end-of-history/

from the book, can be described as a demand for recognition that might turn into megalothymia.

Nevertheless, as Fukuyama further argues we should not see identity politics in a bad light. The above mentioned problems are not due to identity per se, but rather to the narrow minded identity vision based on ethnicity, lack of tolerance, aggressiveness, and an interpretation of national identity in the most illiberal terms.

There are several positive aspects of a strong identity such as: the offering of a feeling of physical security; the quality of government – meaning that if the elites identify themselves with the state, the public interest will be put on the first place; the facilitation of economic development – if citizens do not feel proud about their country, they are not going to work for their development, but rather for their own enrichment, citizens will tend to trust among each other which on the long run will make liberal democracy possible.

According to Fukuyama, national identities have been created by four main paths: the first was to transfer population across the political boundaries of a particular country (by sending settlers, by forcibly evicting people who live in a certain area, or by killing them), the second path was to move borders to fit existing or cultural population, the third path was to assimilate minority population intro the culture of an existing ethnic or linguistic group, and the fourth path was to reshape national identity to fit the existing characteristics of the society in question (such as in Gandhi's India).

"Identity" is the theme that underlines many political phenomena today, from new populist nationalist movements, to Islamists fighters, to the controversies taking place on university campuses. We will not escape thinking

about politics and ourselves in identity terms"[11]. To surpass those problems, in the author's vision several measures should be taken: the promotion of a creedal national identity, build around the foundational ideas of modern liberal democracy, the jus sanguinis rules should be changed to *jus solis*, in order not to privilege an ethnical group over another (this is for the European Union case).

In conclusion, the author mentions that there is a need for a universal understanding for the term "human dignity", otherwise there is a chance for conflict among different identity groups from the society.

Bogdan Popescu

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[11] Francis Fukuyama, *Identity* ...,, p. 82.

Andrei Marga, *Schimbarea lumii: globalizare, cultură, geopolitică,* **București, Editura Academiei Române, 2013, 256 pp.**

We are the creators, followers and addicts of the product called "globalization", a complex phenomenon that puts its mark on all aspects of life, his impact being intensively studied by specialists around the world.

A book that aims to structure and analyze this far-reaching subject is the publication "The World's Change: Globalization, Culture, Geopolitics".

This volume belongs to Andrei Marga, one of the well-known romanian politicians, an eloquent philosopher, former Foreign Minister of Romania, also former Minister of Education, having other important positions in the Romanian society.

He is the author of a large number of books on political science and political philosophy, such as: *The Destiny of Europe, The Pragmatic Reconstruction of Philosophy, Challenges, Values and Vision.*

In 2005 Andrei Marga received a Herder Prize from the Alfred Toepfer Foundation (Alfred Toepfer Stiftung F. V. S.), for his contribution to the cultural understanding of European countries.

The core of this study is a topic of actuality, namely the phenomenon of globalization, presented from several angles, targeting both beneficial points and uncertain aspects of contemporary society.

The author himself is aware of the fact that "globalization must not be judged by the distinction: good – bad, because it represents a comprehensive

historical process anchored in the structure of civilization", and all this has favorable consequences or less beneficial depending on the given background.

Released in 2013 at Romanian Academy Publisher, this volume (containing 256 pages) provides a variety of changes that the increase of interdependencies has brought between states. The author is talking about a new concept - *planetization*, it means *the maximum ceiling of global interdependencies* and it is closely linked to the national principle. Everyone can see that the national concept has been reshaped, this principle was not removed but reborn.

It is remarkable how the author merges instruments in the field of economics, philosophy, sociology and history, adding the optic of discursive rationalism, which announces a complex, strongly argued analysis, an analysis that satisfies a number of criteria proper to both humanist and economic domain.

In the era of globalization there is the matter of redefining the universal notion of space, beyond the physical coordinates, this socio-cultural construct makes us reconsider now its dimensions.

The author argues that it is no longer enough for a state to hold a strictly geographically defined territory, but it becomes imperative that the state transforms it from a cultural and social point of view. So it is not about quantity, but about the quality of space, and technological advances are those that offer advantages to nations in relation to others, in brief, it matters in particular how societies manage to dominate the geographic space. Equally important is the premise of state security in the nuclear age, and constant battle for the acquirement and preservation of a key role on the international scene, which is shaped around a strategic consciousness.

Thus, these interactions between "great actors" can injuriously modify the conformation of life in societies from around the world.

The political scientist did not fail to point out that the information has high valencies in relation to the swift evolution of communications and technology, "the culture taking on the role of mediator in achieving any major performance".

At the level of metamorphosis in the political sphere, Andrei Marga opens a frequently debated discussion in the academic circles, about the new role of democracy.

It is obvious that nowadays liberal democracies are regarded by many as "the only truly and fully modern societies", those states that have adequate internal policies will maintain leading positions in the "globalization game".

All this liberalization has outlined economic growth, but there are areas where the phenomenon had a reverse direction, leading to inhibition of development, in those states in the early stages of the transition, such as countries in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia.

Quoting Amin Maalouf, the author mentions a paradox that has become problematic: "mais plus on avançait plus ou était déboussolé", it refers to the simultaneous disorders of several domains of the world in which we live: intellectual, financial, climate, geopolitical, ethical disorders. Without notes of pessimism, the author claims that it is important to take into account more possibilities in the current context. Humanity faces dangers, needing "global solutions", in the absence of which the beauty of the civilization in which we live will be lost. Europe has lost its benchmarks: she has come to question more than ever about identity, borders, institutions, her role in the world, without being able to give coherent answers. And the list of paradoxes continues: the strategic victory of the West, which should have made its supremacy comfortable, actually accelerated its decline, the triumph of capitalism precipitated him in the worst

crisis of his history, the end of the "balance of terror" led to the birth of a world obsessed with "terror".

Speaking about the challenges in this approach to the evolution of globalization, Andrei Marga points out that pluralism, rather than occasioning the mobilization of new energies, it often paralyzes decisions and anonymizes responsibility. Instead of being the tool of finding better solutions, democracy is widely practiced as a sort of periodic selection technique for representatives, which then escapes from public control. He also says that the future is colonized by fear, and the negative futurism, coagulated around the notion of "not to change what it is, for it may be worse".

In a world overwhelmed by the new purposes of life, according to which "living" is equal to "working", then "consume", the conjunction between the "high volume" rule and the "high value" rule is fundamental, the second being marginalized due to the change in the competence and quality validation milestone.

The components of the complex phenomenon of internationalization are hard to structure, given the large proportions of the subject matter, but Andrei Marga has the ability to compose a unity based on solid and comprehensive sources, which make the work acquire those attributes that fit it among the reference studies in this field. Inside the thesis, are mentioned well-known political scientists like Samuel Phillips Huntington, who brought a prophetic analysis in his work *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, but are also quoted Hilary Putnam, Larry Jay Diamond, Marc Plattner, with representative works on "world`s change".

The volume of Andrei Marga outlines visionary perceptions, especially in the final part of his study, discussing some of the changes that the world faces in

the medium term. He mentions bringing innovation in science, technology, such as: finding cures for different types of cancer, identifying alternative energies, sustaining an environment favorable to life, climate stability being very important. Metamorphosis exists especially in the collective mind, which will continue to face the reverse of the medal, namely the risks that converge from the dynamics of global interdependencies, risks in the sphere of economy, ecology, security.

The author points out the imperious need to change the human consciousness, which should be able to adapt more easily to possible transformations over time, taking into account the permanent fragmentation and decentralization of society.

In the final part of the thesis there is a particular point that is placed under the spotlight, a broad and abstract thought: the human, as the author stresses, is programmed from the very beginning to be self-seeking and aggressive. It needs to overcome this stage, because contemporary realities involve the interaction between individuals and beyond that, the ability to empathize and embrace the idea that we are different is vital. On the contrary, above all, human is a social being by its nature, despite what Andrei Marga stated. And so we can see that the old polemics about the meaning of life seem to be currently suggestive, but reshaped by the need to live in a "Plato's fortress" with updated content.

Ultimately, the relevance of "Changing the world" makes it possible to place this book in a reference spectrum of political sciences, international relations, being essential both for students and for the professionals in the named area. The author convinces us that it is necessary to observe and try to penetrate into a problem like globalization that is more than a dual phenomenon, it is the

new nature of life in which we continue to carry on our activities, an eternal war around the "trick-of-the-trade" concept.

Octavia Brînzan

Stefano Allievi, Gianpiero Dalla Zuanna, *Tutto quello che non vi hanno mai detto sull'Immigrazione,* **Roma-Bari, Editori Laterza, 2016, 152 pp.**

If in the early 2000s, almost all the Italian media presented the migratory phenomenon in alarming notes, and especially with titles that highlighted the link between immigration and crime; now, although there seems to be some prudence, the press does not miss the opportunity to put the sign equal between immigration and terrorism. No doubt, in Italy, migration has become perceived as a mass phenomenon, having been in the center of political debates for many years, as well as in the researchers' concerns.

The published papers dealing with this subject are in part the result of journalistic investigations, while the present book, although of limited size, is an exceptional sociological research done by two teachers of the Italian academic environment, one being a sociologist, the other one, a statistician.

It is an attempt of an experiment that focuses on the cause-effect relationship, namely the impact of migrants on the Italian society and economy.

Starting from the statistical data, the paper presents the reality of the phenomenon of migration in Italy, a country that in the past was perceived as a

monocultural and emigrating generation, turned into a multiethnic and multilingual state within several generations, living within five millions of foreigners (we must remember that almost 25 millions Italians left the country in the first century of national unity, and the surplus of the Italian labour force could only be solved during the "economic miracle" and the great migration that preceded it in the 1950's and 1960's, leaving the country the most important destinations the neighbor states).

The book was published in a period of extremely European uncertainty; moreover, the period elapsed since the publication of the paper and so far has shown what the authors have intuited, namely that lack of cohesion and solidarity within the European Union has not remained unanswered.

Right now, we have Brexit, a growing popularity of extremist parties, an unprecedented frequency of Islamic bomb attacks, thousands of migrants waiting inside and outside of Europe, a new approach to the immigrants issue by the government of Rome.

At the same time, the concerns of the European member states related to this phenomenon are different, Italy seems concentrated in northern Africa which sends a huge wave of economic and political emigrants across the Mediterranean Sea, while France and Belgium are rather focused on their own Muslim communities, in part radicalized and generating a dangerous and militant Islamism.

It's no doubt that the migratory waves bring new forms of conflict, such as cultural, religious, behavioral, ultimately, a structural problem of Western societies. Without being new in history, the impact with these migratory waves has changed the society as a whole, and has generated a new population, a more dynamic society, in any case, a different society. However, it should be stressed

that the term of conflict used by authors is not equivalent to that of violence and confrontation.

The book brings to the public attention the foreigner's stereotype, namely that the migrants contribute to the Italian economic decline; the invasion of the economy with large masses of foreigners who not only "steal" the jobs, but also the resources of the welfare state now directed only for their security (amounts that are certainly higher than those that they would receive in their country of origin) ultimately lead to the stagnation of the entire economy. So they become the main source of the economic crisis.

In fact, the authors say, for the most part, the Italians refuse immigration jobs, counting on alternative income, the so-called "reserve salary," a widespread situation is that of a young Italian, supported by the family.

Without being a general phenomenon, the sectors occupied by immigrants escape the fiscal control of the state, this being another aspect for which natives are unwilling to accept work done in black (in any case, much less than foreigners who perceive their stay in Italy as a temporary one and therefore the uselessness of paying contributions to the national pension system).

Then, the massive presence of foreigners in a certain sector, whose availability and flexibility is almost limitless, being permanently at the discretion of the employer, makes Italians no longer looking for employment in that area of activity.

The opinion of the authors is that the willingness of immigrants ready to do so-called *ddd jobs* (dirty, dangerous, and demeaning jobs) has allowed the Italians to focus on better paid jobs and, in this way the gender gap in the labor market to be reduced, allowing to Italian women to get jobs. At the same time, statistical data show that the income of a family whose family member is a

migrant is less than about one-third of that of an Italian family.

The statistical data presented show that in the labor market, foreigners are a complementary and not a competitive labor force to the local one, countries with high influxes of immigrants such as Great Britain, Germany or the United States have had extraordinary economic growth, compared to Italy, where the level of immigration was much lower.

A barometer showing poor integration is represented by the poor linguistic skills that in turn generate difficulties and gaps. Thus, there is a close link between the level of immigration training and its level of integration in the adoptive country (as it is integrated earlier in the local education system, the foreigner presents fewer elements of diversity and equal opportunities are thus ensured). Otherwise, there is a phenomenon with different forms of ethnic self-isolation, immigrants continuing to live in societies parallels, for example the Chinese and Moroccan communities in Italy, which translate into specific behaviors, the most visible being the religious ones (it's a new concept of European Islamism) but not only. What is important is therefore primary integration. At the same time, without finding resources to enable them to better integrate in the scholastic system, these communities could generate hostile attitudes towards the adoptive country and serious forms of self-exclusion.

At the end of the book, the authors offer a number of solutions, namely changing community legislation on refugee distribution, providing additional financial resources to those countries that receive more refugees, developing and implementing European programs to operate in countries and regions emigrating generators, such as the case of Libya and its maritime shoreline; at local level, the solutions could be to initiate mechanisms and procedures such as obtaining citizenship in a shorter time than is foreseen in current legislation,

being considered as one of the instruments that accelerate integration, the granting of residence permits for longer period of about six months and the possibility for the immigrant to benefit just almost immediately from the right to work in the labor market. Last but not least, a change in school strategy, so rather than direct enrollment in school cycles, it would be more appropriate to offer language courses to minors who arrived in Italy.

The current demographic situation in Western countries is extreme. Decreased birth rates, assistance to pensioners, along with increasing life expectancy, imbalances between new employees and new retirees on the labor market make it necessary for foreigners to contribute to the well-being of the economy. In order to steadily increase the number of workforce (20-64 years old), 325,000 potential workers should enter Italy each year, according to this study, being thus an engine of economic, cultural and social development.

Mihaela Mustățea

Tim Kirk, *Nazi Party*, (Longman Companions to History), Routledge, 1995, 286 pp.

The history of Weimar Republic and the rise of Nazi Party represent a topic of interest for both historians and people who found the twentieth century a permanent source of fascination and contradictions.

The vast topic of Nazi Germany makes almost impossible to cover it in several hundreds of pages. Moreover, it is almost impossible to present the subject's extensive historiography in an accessible manner for every reader, regardless of his/her informational background. However, the next book is a challenging reading, which combines the numerous primary sources with an adequate critical way of writing.

Tim Kirk is a professor of European History at Newcastle University and his studies offer a holistic perspective about the rise of National Socialism, the culture, society, the political system and the racial policy of Nazi Germany. Among Kirk's best known related papers we mention: *Opposition and Accommodation in Nazi Germany: An overview of perspectives*; *Film and Politics in South-East Europe: Germany as 'Leading Cultural Nation', 1933-45; The Policing of Popular Opinion in Nazi Germany, Antisemitism in the Third Reich.*

The book we are going to analyze is entitled *Nazi Germany*, published in 1995, in the *Longman Companions To History series*. The historian Tim Kirk aims at answering some of the most frequently asked questions regarding interwar Germany. Although the author gives special attention to Hitler's rise to power,

he also offers a rich introduction in order to give his readers a better understanding about the interwar German nation contrasting reality.

It is essential to say that the book's content highlights an obvious and direct link between the Weimar Republic and Nazi Germany. Even if the title establishes the chronological parameters between 1933 and 1945, Kirk provides an excellent synthesis, fixing the landmarks of the German political life and providing clear and concise arguments for the failure of parliamentarianism.

The book is organized on themes according to interwar Germany peculiarities. We distinguish five main coordinates: the Weimar Republic and the rise of Nazi Party; the Third Reich; economy, society and culture 1918-1945; diplomacy, German rearmament ant the outbreak of WWII; antisemitism.

Being an introductory study, the laconic explanations, which are mapping the most important events in German historiography, are accompanied by extensive chronologies.

Having quantitatively restricted chapters, Kirk set out to provide an overview of the topic and also a starting point for further research. Moreover, the book includes specific aspects such as: the structure and institutions of the Weimar Republic, the structure of Hitler's cabinet, the ranks and insignia of the Nazi Party and of the Schutzstaffel (SS).

The book has also a chapter which contains a succinct presentation of some of the Nazi Party leaders and economic, cultural and military officials.

The division of Kirk's book suggests the target group – the students. The concise chapters and the extended chronologies represent a starting point of a thorough study of the Third Reich period. The bibliography section incorporates further reading suggestions, according to the approached topic. Given the

scholarly apparatus, the readers can easily identify other reference books and studies.

After examining topics such as the economy, the culture or the political aspects of Nazi Germany, the author inserts tables which contain primary sources and information for a better in-depth overview. These tables should be doubled by explanatory notes, in order to assure a correct data interpretation.

To sum up, Tim Kirk's Nazi Germany is an essential synthesis for studying the Interwar period of German history, the key elements are emphasized in order to understand the political and ideological transition from the Weimar Republic to the Third Reich, as well as the main characteristics of the Nazi regime.

Alexandra Cojocaru

Dana Dumitru, *Revizuirea regulilor războiului: de la intervenția umanitară la atacul preventiv,* **București, Institutul de științe politice și relații internaționale „Ion I.C Brătianu", 2016, 355 pp.**

The field of International Relations is a complex one, with references to its historical component but also to the legal one – namely the International Law. In the Romanian dedicated literature, we can find multiple books or articles that refer to these specific fields as two independent entities without taking into account their dependence. I find this an essential topic because those two aforementioned subjects are more or less interdependent when we speak about humanitarian intervention - which must be sustained by instruments of International Law to prove their legality.

The book *Revizuirea regulilor războiului: de la intervenția umanitară la atacul preventiv (Rewriting the Rules of War: From Humanitarian Intervention to Preventive War)* focuses on the transition from normal intervention - always endorsed by the UN and the Security Council resolutions - to 'preventive war', a concept newly introduced in the international terminology after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States.

The book's author Dana Dumitru unveils the importance of mutual recognition of sovereignty by states and also the necessity of shaping the present set of rules regarding intervention according to a post - 9/11 society - when new types of threats are defined by the Security Council. On the other hand, she adds and explains the 'responsibility to protect' concept and how the sovereign states do indeed enjoy several rights yet they also must assure their citizens' security. If

this does not happen, the international community has the right to intervene to stabilize the situation.

A variety of cases are being analysed - Afghanistan, Iraq, Mali, Somalia, Rwanda, Kosovo, Bosnia, Darfur, and Libya - all being presented with a comprehensive historical background. Moreover, it has a thorough study on how the world order is maintained through resorting to military interventions in situations that can endanger the international peace and security - whether there are humanitarian or preventive ones.

Ms. Dumitru has three main objectives in her writing: the political and military context, analysing the norms that represented the legal basis of the interventions and the typology of the new wars carried out by the international community since the 1990s.

The author argues that states' practice has brought a change in mentality regarding the humanitarian and preventive military interventions, thus introducing two other terms - the idea of pluralism and solidarity.

What sparked my interest for this book was not only its uniqueness in this area of study but also the way case-studies are explained and their relevance is emphasized from the perspective of International Law.

Each case was presented within its historical context and then it was approached from the international community perspective over the situation. Moreover, the author established a well-argued parallel with international law and finally introduced legal instruments such as the UN Resolutions.

Another aspect worth noting is the substantial bibliography. The author includes links to the documents used in the research, offering the reader the opportunity to further explore them in their entirety.

The book is reminiscent of one of Anne Orford's works, "*Reading Humanitarian Intervention".* Yet Ms. Dumitru's book is more accessible to the audience for being written in Romanian and not that detail-oriented as the above-mentioned one.

While Mrs. Dumitru's book is mainly based on a quick revision of the vital cases that changed the history and the understanding of International Law, Anne Orford's book is theoretically rich and engaging.

Both authors draw freely from customary analytical fields and they soon start to be multi-dimensional, trying to comprehend so much different information in a single phrase that the parallelism sometimes may become overwhelming. Unfortunately, in her book I didn't find information about what had happened in East Timor and, unlike other writers, her approach to Kosovo wasn't as critical as expected. On the other hand, the author keeps a safe distance from Oxford's and other known authors' tendencies to reinforce the West' self-depiction as the "Great White Saviour" who arrives just in time to stop the primitive violence of underdeveloped civilizations.

After reading this book one can understand why some influential states may decide not get involved in a particular crisis and why some humanitarian interventions have done more harm than good in some communities. It also helps the reader to understand why African states such as Somalia or Sudan are considered to be failed states regardless of the involvement and aid received from the international community or why terrorism has especially spread in Arab and underdeveloped African countries.

Bianca Elena Tudor