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A New Beginning. The "Euro-Atlantic Studies" Journal at its 20th Anniversary

Bogdan Antoniu*

I am honored to announce the publication of the first issue of the new series of the "Euro-Atlantic Studies", the journal of the Centre for Euro-Atlantic Studies – a research body of the University of Bucharest, Department of International Relations and World History of the Faculty of History.

I strongly need to express my gratitude for the team who made this issue possible. First of all, Mrs Mihaela Mustatea's contribution was outstanding in terms of time and effort: not only that she edited the texts and patiently went back and forth with the authors, but our colleague deserves the credit and our thanks for her tremendous work of indexing the journal in the CEEOL database. Another "round of applause" must be offered to Mr. Alin Matei who kept the team together with his calm and serious attitude and whose scientific expertise was invaluable. A special mention should refer to Ms. Teodora Vîrlan, our young and enthusiastic member who was the wizard of image editing. Of course, the 'Thank you' section would not be complete without expressing our appreciation for the University of Bucharest Publishing House team (Mrs. Irina Hrițcu and Mrs. Florina Floriță) who so kindly and professionally worked with us all through this endeavors' length.

Last but not least, we do not forget that without Professor Constantin Bușe, the "Euro-Atlantic Studies" journal would not have existed at all. These pages are dedicated to our Professor.

The Centre

Looking back in time, the favorite pursuit of a historian, the year of 1996 represented for Romania another moment of political turmoil, government change and population's high expectation not only for a better life but also for a rapid accomplishment of a major national interest, the Euro-Atlantic integration. By no means a coincidence and in the same year, the academic studies of International Relations at the University of Bucharest achieved a new and more ambitious momentum when Professor Constantin Bușe, then vice-chancellor of the University, set

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up the Centre for Euro-Atlantic Studies. At that time, research and training programs in the complex domain of international relations were scarce and confined to the personal endeavours of some professors and independent researchers mainly from the Faculties of History, Political Sciences and Sociology. Taking into consideration the need for academic expertise and university courses in the field of Euro-Atlantic studies, the Centre had been designed by Professor Bușe to pursue both the goals of preparing a scientific research activity in the realm of international relations according to Romania's Euro-Atlantic integration objectives and of developing training programs and educative tools for enrolled students, experts and general public. It was, undoubtedly, an endeavour meant to reposition the University not only at the heart of the scientific debate but also as the leading provider of knowledge to the general public, thus fulfilling the dual mission of the higher education institutions.

From the beginning, the Centre was aiming to build a research and training network involving researchers and professors from the University of Bucharest and other Romanian and international leading research institutes or universities as well as senior diplomats from the Romanian Foreign Ministry. Under the guidance of Professor Bușe this goal has been achieved by promoting a think-tank type of research in the field of Euro-Atlantic security, European integration and international relations and resulted in providing a high-level expertise to the intended audience. Hundreds of articles, dozens of books, many conferences and workshops, as well as research projects won by the Centre of Euro-Atlantic testify to this scientific accomplishment.

The second main objective of the Centre, a very ambitious one, was to raise the level of education in the field of international relations and Euro-Atlantic studies not only for the University of Bucharest' students but also for governmental or non-governmental experts and decision-makers in order to achieve a much better understanding of the current trends in international relations. The effort to establish a special curriculum for the domain of international relations and Euro-Atlantic studies in the University of Bucharest was one of the main purposes of the Centre's development and a sustained preoccupation for the Director and his team. It can be said unequivocally that, in more than 20 years of activity this goal was exceptionally fulfilled.

Courses in *History of Euro-Atlantic Integration*, *Euro-Atlantic Security Institutions*, and *The Changing Pattern of International Relations in the Post-Cold War Era* were for the first time introduced to the students in 1997, the same year when the first generation of students enrolled in the Master degree program in *International Relations* offered by the Faculty of History. Since then, a Bachelor degree program in International Relations and European Studies and four other M.A. programs (*History and Practice of the International Relations*, *Politics and Society in the 20th Century*, *Diplomacy and International Politics* and *Diplomatic Techniques*) were designed, developed and sustained with the contribution of the Centre for Euro-Atlantic Studies and its members.

The two educational grants awarded to the Centre by the European Commission for the action "Jean Monnet European Module: European Integration – History, Policies and Politics" (2001-2006 and 2007-2012) deserve a special mention. More than 1000 students from different universities were introduced, by the Centre's experts, to the historical, political, economic, institutional and legal dimensions of the European

integration. Moreover, similar training courses were developed for the Romanian government' officials (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Interior) between 2001 and 2005. Not least, the students were involved within the Centre in different research programs and other activities (internships, seminars and workshops), according to their abilities and interests.

A brief review such as this one cannot cover all the accomplishments of 22 years of activity and, to be honest, it does not intend to list any of the failures or underachievement. Every institution has its bitter moments but what it really matters is that we, the members and associates of the Centre for Euro-Atlantic Studies, do not forget the mission proposed by Professor Constantin Bușe, and we strive to continue his legacy.

The Journal

In 1997, a year after the establishment of the Centre for Euro-Atlantic Studies, Professor Constantin Bușe initiated the ambitious project of a journal in history and international relations, *Euro-Atlantic Studies*, a publication designed to disseminate the Centre's members research activity results. From the start, the journal was generously opened to contributions of various national and international experts in the field. In the words of the Director:

*"The scientific contributions of the full and associate members of the Centre will be published in Romanian and in foreign languages in the Centre's magazine, Euro-Atlantic Studies, which comes into life with this very issue. The magazine will also include contributions from outside the Centre, related to our field of concern and which will be published according to their value and relevance. The magazine is meant to be the instrument of this research programme and it is opening its pages to our colleagues and friends, specialists both from Romania and from abroad."*¹

From 1998 to 2009, under the editorial guidance of Professor Bușe, there were published 14 volumes of *Euro-Atlantic Studies* comprising more than 140 essays, analyses and other academic works signed by prestigious scholars and academics from Romania, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Russia. In addition, the journal was home for a number of contributions belonging to several eminent Master and Doctoral students who had their publishing debut in the pages of *Euro-Atlantic Studies*. Unfortunately, for reasons beyond our control, the journal's publication has suffered a major set-back since 2009 but now, nine years later, the Center's team is trying to resume this project according to its initial mission.

The scientific works submitted to the journal covered topics from the history of the Cold War to the most recent events and evolutions of the political, diplomatic, military, security and economic international relations of the time. A main recurrent theme was the investigation and the assessment of the Euro-Atlantic integration process

¹ Constantin Bușe, "Director's Column", *Euro-Atlantic Studies*, Vol.1/1998, University of Bucharest, Centre for Euro-Atlantic Studies, București, 1998, p. 3

and Romania's contribution before and after the admission in NATO and in the European Union. Somehow, browsing *Euro-Atlantic Studies* volumes of that period, one historian from the present might detect which were the most important challenges coming from the international realm, imagined or perceived as such by the academic community from Romania and abroad. And the result of such a perceptions inquiry might be a concentric map (from a Euro-Atlantic core to an African or Far East periphery) of concerns and hopes, a mixture of pessimistic and optimistic expectations.

The world

In 1997, when Professor Bușe was planning the publishing of the Euro-Atlantic Studies, Romania seemed to be at some distance from the Euro-Atlantic world. The accession process of Romania in the European and Euro-Atlantic institutions (mainly EU and NATO) was running slow with a lot of question marks attached. The negotiations were unfolding without major achievements and, in the European Union's perspective, Romania had a deficit of democracy added to a low performance economy that was still in a cumbersome transition. And yet, in 1998, European Union seemed very much committed to the goals of increased integration and further enlargement. Under the United Kingdom's presidency, the European Council (after the European Commission) decided that 11 member states satisfy the conditions for adopting the single currency on 1st of January 1999 and the European Central Bank was established. As well, in March 1998, a Ministerial meeting finally launched the accession process for 11 applicant countries (Romania included) but the prospects of the full membership in the near future were uncertain. As for the accession process to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the summer of 1997 brought the first visit to Bucharest of an American President after 1989, but also a general disappointment when the same President, William Jefferson Clinton, publicly announced that the United States will support the invitation for joining NATO of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic only. The Romanian society was eager to become a full member of these institutions but the level of knowledge about the responsibilities, the hardships and the legal and administrative reforms implied was still reserved to a thin layer of professionals involved in the negotiation process. In brief, government and population alike were caught in a turmoil of hopes and fears.

And fear was somehow justified because in 1998, the year of the first issue of Euro-Atlantic Studies, the world was still as insecure as ever and the Cold War bipolar logic was replaced by multidimensional and multipolar, international and domestic challenges to the American hegemony. Even if now we are observing the deadly dangers of the present, a short reminder of some events from the past might illustrate the perils of 20 years ago. For instance, 1998 was the year of the Fatwā "Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders" issued in February by Osama Bin Laden and the leaders of Islamist groups from Bangladesh, Egypt and Pakistan requiring every Muslim to kill Americans, civilians and military alike. Six months later, in August, 200 people were killed in the bombing of United States Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and President Clinton ordered cruise missile strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan.

In the same month of February 1998 in Kosovo the clashes between Kosovo Liberation Army and the military forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (composed only by Serbia and Montenegro) escalated to a full war and into an international affairs crisis. After Resolution 1199 was adopted in September by the United Nations Security Council, requiring the parties in Kosovo to end the hostilities and establish a ceasefire and, after NATO's orders for airstrikes against Yugoslav forces issued in October, an agreement was reached. Two months later the ceasefire was broken and the killings resumed.

In May 1998, the world discovered new sources of mortal dangers when India and then Pakistan conducted multiple underground nuclear tests. Completely indifferent to the international community anger, both countries, long-standing enemies, demonstrated their will to escalate their conflict to the ultimate level.

In the Middle East the hopes of a solid step toward peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians were raising in October when, at the White House, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat signed an agreement but in December, after other confrontations, the implementation of the accord was again stopped. Meanwhile, Saddam Hussein was continuing his deadly gamble with the United Nations and the United States and after many months of refusals and half-hearted acceptances of the UN Resolutions, the United Nations Special Commission inspectors were expelled from Iraq triggering, in December 1998, a four days bombing campaign conducted by American and British airplanes which did almost nothing to de-escalate the situation and to solve the issue of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. However, the international community had also others directions to look for crisis and death because for Africa, the year 1998 meant the beginning of the Guinea-Bissau Civil War and marked the outbreak of the deadly Second Congo War which involved no less than nine African countries, a dozen of armed groups and resulted in millions of lost lives.

The same year, a glimmer of hope appeared when a decades' long bloody conflict in Northern Ireland was ended on the "Good Friday" of April 10th through the Belfast Agreement, but still, the year 1998 ended in confusion when the entire world was staring with astonishment at the United States domestic crisis. In December, the U.S. House of Representative initiated the impeachment of President Clinton (the second case in the history of the United States) and deferred the matter for trial to the U.S. Senate.

For the next twenty years the international relations were dominated by uncertainties, disputes, crisis and conflicts in the Euro-Atlantic area or in its proximity. The 9/11 terrorist attacks, the wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq, the global economic crisis of 2008, the Arab Spring, the rise and fall of ISIS, the Syrian civil war, the worsening of the United States-Russia relations, the aggressive nuclear rhetoric of North Korea or the Brexit are just a few of the disturbing political and economic events that shaped new and perilous paths for the development of international relations in the 21st century.

At the same time, the realm of international relations has continued to change impressively in terms of its very nature. The technological developments of the information age, the unprecedented interconnectivity hence interdependence between people around the globe, the explosion of social networks and the abundance of almost

free and instant knowledge available just a click away on a more powerful and cheaper device, decisively contributed to this change. New actors, ranging from international NGOs to multinational information giants as Google (founded in 1998!), Amazon or Facebook, and from transnational associations to mere individuals, are now challenging the central role played by the states and governments, forging new sources of conflict and new dimensions of cooperation.

Fast-forward to present days, one can observe the magnitude of changes for the evolution of Romania. A six-fold increase in GDP, eight times in exports and seven times for the average wage combined to a sevenfold decrease in inflation and two times in unemployment are markers of a better performance of the Romanian economy. Full membership of NATO (2004) ensured Romania's security more than ever and the accession in the European Union in 2007 undoubtedly provided development and prosperity for the Romanian people. In 2019, Romania will hold the presidency of the Council of the European Union and will bear, for six months, the responsibilities of setting the agenda and coordinating the policies of the European Union. And yet, in the year of the Centennial celebration of Romania's Great Union of 1918, this image is shaded by continuous political scandals, high-level corruption and poor administrative performances. In that domestic context, it may prove difficult for Romania to cope with the international challenges provided by an unsettled world.

A brief report on the state of the world as seen at the end of the year 2018 might emphasize some troubled features. In the last years the integrated Europe was severely tested by the economic crisis, the terrorist attacks (from ISIS militants, local jihadists or radicalized men in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Spain), the dramatic migrant crisis and the internal tensions caused by the rise of populist movements and leaders. And yet the biggest provocation of all is still to come after the British referendum of 2016 when a slim majority of the population voted for UK's withdrawal from the European Union. The Brexit is currently under negotiations and the economic and political future of the Union is subject to unprecedented risks.

The problems of Middle East in 2018 are far from a peaceful resolution and the conundrum of the Israeli-Palestinian relations was somehow eclipsed by the civil war in Syria which lead to more than half a million deaths, over five millions refugees and a very intense humanitarian, diplomatic and military international crisis. International organizations, the United States, Russia, Turkey, Iran, other countries from the region and extremist Islamic groups are engaged in various degrees and for different reasons in a deadly conflict that threatens not only the regional stability but the peace of the world at large.

Signs of peril also seem to come from Russia. The aggressive stance of President Vladimir Putin following the annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014, the military support of the brutal dictatorship of Assad regime's in Syria, the illegal involvement in the United States' elections of 2016 or the deadly subversive operations in the United Kingdom remind us of the Soviet Union's behaviour during the Cold War, a period the world thought was in the past. The use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government, the nuclear rearmament of Russia, United States and China and the possible withdrawal of the US from the INF Treaty are very palpable threats for world's peace once again. And the list of dangers may very well continue. In 2017 the entire world kept its breath

when the North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un announced new nuclear and ballistic missile tests and engaged in a rhetorical showdown with the new President of the United States, Donald Trump. International sanctions, the diplomatic involvement of China and the US' military pressure succeeded in averting the nuclear crisis and in 2018, after the meeting between the President of South Korea Moon Jae-In and the leader of the North Korea, a surprising summit was held in June in Singapore between Kim Jong-Un and President Trump. The Joint Statement signed by the two leaders expressed the commitments of both sides to build a lasting peace in the Korean Peninsula and to work for the denuclearization of the region.

As one can easily observe, the world today is still in turmoil and all these challenges must be met with a rational, intelligent and consistent resoluteness. The role of the scientific study of the international relations and the mission we are retrieving now through the new series of the "Euro-Atlantic Studies" journal is best underlined by the words of Professor Constantin Bușe:

*"It is obvious that in solving these issues the politicians and the regional or global security institutions have a decisive role but it is also not to be neglected the contribution of the analysts, the experts and of the academic and university structures in finding/suggesting some solutions. The opinions and the points of view expressed in the pages of our magazine by the researchers and the members of the universities devoted to international relations study and also by our younger friends are the sign of the Romanian society's preoccupation for analyzing and understanding the political and military events that are taking place. Observing and researching the geopolitical and geostrategic conditions in which Romania takes action today becomes more necessary as the international situation tends to be more complicated and as some differences of opinion concerning the right way in finding the solutions amplify."*²

² idem, "Director's Column", *Euro-Atlantic Studies*, Vol.5/2002, p. 3

Rethinking Nuclear Risk in the Post-Fukushima Era

Tudor B. Ionescu*

Key-words: nuclear risk, Fukushima disaster, risk society, radiation maps, emergency response.

Abstract

The paper discusses some issues concerning the different types of risks entailed by the civil uses of nuclear technology around the turn of the millennium. This discussion is meant as an introduction into a broadly studied topic revived by the Fukushima accident from 2011. As we shall see, some important theoretical strands from the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS) and elsewhere concerning nuclear risks have their roots in observations about the Chernobyl nuclear accident from 1986 and the less severe accident at Three Miles Island from 1979. These accidents, along with other technological crises have inspired scholars, including Ulrich Beck, Charles Perrow, Brian Wynne, Sheila Jasanoff, and William Kinsella – to name but a few – to shed a different light upon technological failure. The results of the work of these scholars were turned into social theories and sensitizing concepts about technological risk, expertise, and techno-political regimes, which have influenced the way we think about nuclear and other risks today. In the next section, we introduce some of these theories and concepts to set the stage for a discussion of different models for conceptualizing and communicating risk before proposing one of our own. We then briefly discuss radiation maps in light of what Jasanoff termed “technologies of hubris and humility” and provide an outlook into future topics of potential interest in relation to nuclear risk.

1. Introduction

Safety has always been one of the main concerns of the designers and the operators of nuclear power plants (NPPs). And yet the outspoken need for major improvements in this area seems to have been predominantly motivated by the occurrence of the three main nuclear accidents at Three Miles Island (TMI), USA in 1979; at Chernobyl, Ukraine (then part of the UDSSR) in 1986; and at Fukushima, Japan in 2011. Technologies for improving nuclear safety have followed a similar evolution as the concerns with safety itself, albeit with a considerable delay. While being mainly a technical concern before the TMI accident (the first to be widely mediatized), as safety

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issues increasingly became public, they became social concerns as well. After all, how is one supposed to live in the vicinity of a NPP when we know they are liable to failure? This failure liability revealed by the TMI accident meant that the safety of NPPs could no longer be regarded from a technical perspective alone. NPPs are large technical systems that operate in a given socio-cultural context. Hence, their operation implies a social contract. To make matters more complex, the Fukushima nuclear accident has been characterized as a techno-natural disaster¹ thus adding another dimension to the sociotechnical perspective on nuclear safety.

From a physics and engineering point of view nuclear safety is concerned with preventing radioactive materials from being released into the environment. Such releases happened in all three major accidents, although at different levels. In case of a radioactive release, in order to assess who is at risk of being hurt, experts in radiological protection agree that it is necessary to assess the potential dose for the affected population. Radioactive materials can contaminate environments and can irradiate people from the sky (gamma cloud radiation). Thus, decision makers are interested in precise forecasts concerning the short, medium, and long term risks for the affected population by means of measurement and estimation. Such assessments bear high uncertainty since they essentially represent assessments of an entire forward-dependent chain of risks. From a technical point of view, when a potential risk is identified, attempts are made to quantify that risk by means of statistical probabilities. In term, the uncertainty associated with some predictions also needs to be quantified. Some statisticians regard uncertainty estimations as one of the most remarkable achievements of modern science.²

Nuclear accidents have inspired scholars in risk research for decades. The very term “risk” seems to be an eternal buzzword that will never allow a unique definition. Even today high level scientific institutions like the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) use the terms “risk” and “uncertainty” in ways considered inappropriate by other well-established risk researchers.³ These tensions seem to be motivated by the fact that the term risk can also be understood in a more social than technical sense, and vice-versa. A risk expressed in technical terms by means of quantifiable probabilities may as well reflect subjective rather than computational assessments made by a wide variety of actors, notably by those considered to find themselves at the allegedly uneducated end of the deficit model.⁴ Before 1979, risk was predominantly being treated through practices and methods, which Jasanoff termed *technologies of hubris*:

“To reassure the public, and to keep the wheels of science and industry turning, governments have developed a series of predictive methods (e.g., , risk assessment, cost-

¹ Ulrike Felt, *Knowledge claims and forms of expertise in the context of a techno-natural disaster*, 25-27 Jul 2014 2nd FMU-IAEA International Academic Conference, Fukushima, Radiation Medical Science Center, Fukushima Medical University.

² David Hand, Heikki Mannila, Padhraic Smyth, *Principles of data mining*, Cambridge, MIT Press, 2001.

³ T. Aven, O. Renn, *An evaluation of the treatment of risk and uncertainties in the IPCC reports on climate change* in “Risk Analysis”, vol.35(4), 2015, pp. 701-712.

⁴ Patrick Sturgis, Nick Allum, *Science in society: re-evaluating the deficit model of public attitudes* in “Public understanding of science”, vol.13, 2004, pp. 55-74.

benefit analysis, climate modelling) that are designed, on the whole, to facilitate management and control, even in areas of high uncertainty.”⁵

This type of risk treatment did not raise too much public attention before the TMI accident. However, the two major nuclear accidents from the 20th century showed that, contrary to what nuclear experts have always claimed, when accidents occur radioactivity cannot be effectively retained within the nuclear reactor. Radioactivity reaching out of the sealed reactor containment also showed that the methods used to assess the risk of incidents and accidents systematically understated those risks. More importantly, nuclear accidents shattered the sociotechnical imaginary of containment,⁶ allowing radioactive materials and thus risk to trespass the thoroughly controlled boundaries of the reactor containment building (the imaginary of containment claimed the contrary).

Felt notes⁷ that the space contaminated by radioactivity released from NPPs into the environment is implicitly handed over to “the nuclear” for decontamination works. Public and private communal space, which might have been inhabited, farmed, and used for other purposes by laypersons before the Fukushima nuclear accident had to be forcefully handed over to experts dressed in white overalls and Geiger counters during and long after the accident. The no-entry zone around the Chernobyl reactor site, still in force 30 years after the accident, is also telling in this respect. On the occasions of the TMI, Chernobyl, and Fukushima accidents this seizure of communal space by the nuclear was more easily represented in the media than any kind of information from within the NPP – a protected corporate environment completely sealed off from the public. Thus, nuclear accidents revealed that radioactivity, nuclear risk, and the authority of “the nuclear” cannot be effectively contained within the legal and physical boundaries of the affected nuclear power plant.

As it became clear at the political level that in a nuclear emergency radioactivity and the risks associated with it cannot effectively be controlled, in some countries (including Germany) the focus shifted from *controlling* nuclear risk to *preparing* for an eventual accident. The advent of powerful computers during the 1980s enabled the development of computer programs for atmospheric dispersion forecasting and dose projections. Today, such programs, which fall into the broader class of scientific simulation software, are being used regularly by experts and decision makers in different countries to assess the risks of contamination by radioactive materials accidentally released from a NPP. In this context, it is worth noting that scientific software is known to entail a number of additional sources of uncertainty related to physical model uncertainty⁸ discretization, and

⁵ Sheila Jasanoff, *Technologies of humility: citizen participation in governing science* in “Minerva”, vol.41, september 2003, p. 238.

⁶ Sheila Jasanoff, Sang-Hyun Kim, *Containing the atom: Sociotechnical imaginaries and nuclear power in the United States and South Korea*, in “Minerva”, vol. 47, 2009, pp. 119-146.

⁷ Ulrike Felt, *Living a Real-World Experiment: Post-Fukushima Imaginaries and Spatial Practices of 'Containing the Nuclear'*, Pre-print; Published by the Department of Science and Technology Studies, University of Vienna, Vienna, 2016 in https://www.researchgate.net/publication/305471505_Living_a_Real-World_Experiment_Post-Fukushima_Imaginaries_and_Spatial_Practices_of_Containing_the_Nuclear

⁸ Riccio, A., Giunta, G. & Galmarini, S., *Seeking for the rational basis of the Median Model: the optimal combination of multi-model ensemble results* in “Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics”, vol.7, 2007, pp. 6085-6098.

other inherent errors entailed by the numerical schemes, which implement the physical models⁹; as well as pure coding errors.¹⁰

The uncertainties embedded in atmospheric dispersion forecasts and dose projections were reflected by the discrepancies between the different visual representations of the Fukushima radioactive plume (or cloud) published by various scientific, governmental, and media organizations around the world.

Figure 1 shows (in clockwise order) six different atmospheric dispersion forecasts and dose projections at different times and in different units (re)produced (1) by the French *Institut de radioprotection et de sûreté nucléaire* (IRSN, 2012) and (2) by the *Eidgenössisches Nuklearsicherheitsinspektorat* (ENSI, 2011) in their reports on the Fukushima nuclear accident; (3) by researchers from Japanese universities in a *Nature* article using the Japanese SPEEDI system (Tokonami, *et al.*, 2012); (4) by IRSN researchers using their own models (IRSN, 2012); (5) by Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT) researchers using the RODOS system¹¹; and (6) The *New York Times* reproduced by Reuters in arbitrary units.




Figure 1 – Different visualizations of the radioactive plume from the damaged Fukushima reactors.

⁹ Jon Roy Christopher, *Review of code and solution verification procedures for computational simulation in "Journal of Computational Physics"*, vol. 205, 2005, pp. 131-156.

¹⁰ Tudor B. Ionescu, Walter Scheuermann, *Improving the Reliability of Decision-Support Systems for Nuclear Emergency Management by Leveraging Software Design Diversity in CIT. Journal of Computing and Information Technology*, vol. 24, no.1, 2016, pp. 45-63.

¹¹ http://www.kit.edu/kit/english/pi_2012_9010.php (as of 23.12.2014).

While the first two forecasts published by IRSN and ENSI are mere reproductions of what the Japanese Ministry of Education (MEXT) published at different times after the onset of the accident, the other depictions exhibit major qualitative and quantitative differences. IRSN's and KIT's own simulations seem very simplistic, possibly from modelling reasons. The third forecast produced by Japanese researchers exhibits the classic method of representation of concentration maps using isopleth lines, which is harder to grasp for non-experts, as opposed to the other very colorful representations. The New York Times picture shows how infinitesimal quantities of airborne "radiation" represented in arbitrary units of measurement may cross the Pacific Ocean, reaching American shores within an unspecified amount of time but with a deadline on "Friday at 0600 GMT". The lower part of the description is inspired from the descriptions of the forecasts produced by scientists, which all specify a point in time and a measurement unit. However, the time and the units are both arbitrary and thus of no other meaning than either a purely theoretical or speculative one.

In countries having nuclear energy production facilities, including Germany and Japan, atmospheric dispersion forecasts are used as an aid in the decision-making process by government agencies in charge with taking counter-measures in case of radioactive releases. In Germany, for example, each state government has a designated task force for managing nuclear emergencies composed of experts and non-experts (often politicians). Decision-support systems for nuclear emergency management (DSNE) systems encompass emission and meteorological data measurement networks, atmospheric dispersion simulation and dose estimation programs as well as complex forecast visualization and interpretation tools in the context of a nuclear emergency. They have become non-human experts acting amidst nuclear crisis management task forces around the world.

Against this background, the paper discusses some issues concerning the different types of risks entailed by the civil uses of nuclear technology around the turn of the millennium. This discussion is meant as an introduction into a broadly studied topic revived by the Fukushima accident from 2011. As we shall see, some important theoretical strands from the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS) and elsewhere concerning nuclear risks have their roots in observations about the Chernobyl nuclear accident from 1986 and the less severe accident at Three Miles Island from 1979. These accidents, along with other technological crises have inspired scholars, including Ulrich Beck, Charles Perrow, Brian Wynne, Sheila Jasanoff, and William Kinsella – to name but a few – to shed a different light upon technological failure. The results of the work of these scholars were turned into social theories and sensitizing concepts about technological risk, expertise, and techno-political regimes, which have influenced the way we think about nuclear and other risks today. In the next section, we introduce some of these theories and concepts to set the stage for a discussion of different models for conceptualizing and communicating risk before proposing one of our own. We then briefly discuss radiation maps in light of what Jasanoff termed "technologies of hubris and humility" and provide an outlook into future topics of potential interest in relation to nuclear risk.

1.1. Conceptualizing Nuclear Risk

1.1.1. The Risk Society and Normal Accidents

Much of the public and scholarly discourse about nuclear power and accidents relates one way or another to the notion of risk. During the 1980s sociologists Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck coined the term “risk society” denoting (1) “a society increasingly preoccupied with the future (and also with safety), which generates the notion of risk”¹² and (2) “a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself” in Beck’s view.¹³ Following Beck, the risk society, which allegedly replaced industrial society, has at least two major implications. It is a society that is secured against natural catastrophes¹⁴ while social risks are considered to be tractable (or calculable), which leaves the impression of controllable security. However, Beck notes, the risk society produces numerous other risks, which are not tractable in time and space and for which there is no guaranteed form of assurance. Nuclear technology is one example of a technology that promised to solve one of the most stringent problems posed by industrialization and the exponential growth of the world population: energy consumption. Chemical plants have also led to what the nuclear industry would call “mishaps”, such as the accident at Bhopal in 1984, when 500 thousand people were intoxicated with methyl isocyanate.¹⁵ Genetically modified crops also exhibit some of the second order risks that Beck identifies.

Beck defines modernization as:

“Surges of technological rationalization and changes in work and organization, but beyond that includes much more: the change in societal characteristics and normal biographies, changes in lifestyle and forms of love, change in the structures of power and influence, in the forms of political repression and participation, in views of reality and in the norms of knowledge.”¹⁶

These surges of technological rationalization and changes in work and organization are in a sense *co-produced*,¹⁷ since technologies, such as nuclear power, are made by people working in different political structures and economic organizations deeply embedded in Western society. But these technologies start influencing the political structures and economic organizations the very moment that the possibility of their practical implementation crystallizes out of the wish or drive for modernization itself. Hence, risk can be regarded as an expression of the anguish associated with the possibility of the wish *not* being fulfilled or not without bearing a potentially high cost. Some

¹² Anthony Giddens, *Risk and Responsibility* in “The Modern Law Review,” vol.62(1), 1999, p. 3.

¹³ Ulrich Beck, *Risk society: Towards a new modernity*, London, SAGE, 1992, p. 21.

¹⁴ The Fukushima techno-natural disaster contradicts Beck’s observation on this particular matter.

¹⁵ Sheila Jasanoff, *The Bhopal disaster and the right to know* in “Social Science & Medicine”, vol. 27(10), 1988, pp. 1113-1123.

¹⁶ Ulrike Beck, *op.cit.*, p.50.

¹⁷ Sheila Jasanoff (ed.), *States of knowledge: the co-production of science and the social order*, London, Routledge, 2004, pp.1-13.

technologies may thus end up being more harmful than beneficial, in which case they become highly risky.

The duality of the term risk is also reflected by different idioms of the English language, such as *something being risky*, *risking one's life or health*, *taking risks*, *assuming a risk*, etc. While the first two examples reflect a certain anguish induced by the negative connotation of the notion of risk, the third expression also suggests the potential for an extra gain by taking certain risks. The fourth expression suggests a process of rationalization, since the assumption of a risk is the result of a process of assessment and quantification as well as one of balancing the potential benefits versus the potential losses. The term risk thus encompasses the dynamics generated by the opposite forces of the *wish* for quick and important wins and the *anguish* of potential loss, both of which are deeply embedded in human nature. Their socio-economical counterparts are benefit and cost. Nowadays, any technology may be regarded as risky by the broader public unless the contrary is proven in an irrefutable way.

The rationalization of basic material needs and natural hazards, which have typically posed existential risks for individuals living in the industrial and preindustrial societies, gave birth to second order risks, which are being addressed in a reflexive way by the risk society. Some of these second order risks were generated by the very technologies called upon to solve the problems of the industrial society itself. Interestingly, as part of this reflexive process of technology assessment and reassessment, technological risks are usually addressed through newer, often even more complex technologies aimed at quantifying, confining, and ultimately neutralizing them. Beck refers to this reflexive process as *the rationalization of rationalization*. Beck later observed¹⁸ that, “[i]n principle, the risk of nuclear power is only acknowledged when alternative energies are available. Otherwise, this risk continues to be disowned or downplayed.”

Science and technology, as pillars of the risk society, are more and more confronted with the risks created by the products of scientific and technological innovation. This allegedly leads to a generalized uncertainty and a certain resistance against hazards on the part of society. Beck also points out that this situation leads to what he calls a certain type of irresponsibility or incompetence (Germ. *Unzuständigkeit*), that is a division of responsibilities and competencies oriented towards functionally different subsystems, thus leading to the absence of a holistic responsibility for, say, an entire large technical system, such as a national nuclear energy production system. While there are experts concerned with the safety of reactors as well as experts concerned with the nuclear fuel cycle, the decommissioning of used nuclear fuel, etc. these concerns and responsibilities are rather disjoint. Beck further notes that, while the different actors in charge of the many subsystems focus their efforts upon internal affairs within the subsystems they are part of, the global appearance is in effect one of “organized irresponsibility” since the risks of modernization are not to be ascribed to singular causes. This is to say that large technical systems and the risks they entail cannot be effectively controlled by reductionist risk management technologies since these are likely to leave out different sources of hazard.

¹⁸ Ulrich Beck, *Im Dialog*, 17.02.2013: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hPPNPPSMj6c>

Considering the example of the nuclear industry, the entire process of acknowledgement, negotiation, and finally delegation of risks shows how the reflexive risk society deals with existing risks and produces new ones, since decision-support systems for nuclear emergency management clearly have their own limitations. *Normal accidents*¹⁹ thus revive the debates within research communities that reach beyond reactor safety issues. Normal accidents, which according to Perrow are caused by multiple and unexpected failures in tightly coupled large sociotechnical systems, help to better understand collateral phenomena, such as the spread of radioactive materials, as well as the social dimensions of a nuclear crisis. Perrow argued that some technologies are so complex and thus vulnerable to rapidly-developing failure modes that they reach out of the limits of human control. Accidents caused by failure in inherently complex systems, such as nuclear power plants, can be somewhat reduced in scale and frequency but never be fully eliminated. Perrow's conjecture that normal accidents are impossible to prevent and thus will keep happening in future is probably what motivates governments to use DSNE systems.

1.1.2. Lay Expertise

This type of knowledge is commonly referred to as lay expertise²⁰ – a form of expertise embedded in local practices and culture that ordinary citizens possess. As Wynne and Epstein showed, when citizens are directly concerned by issues that require or involve scientific expertise, they demonstrate the ability to identify the flaws in expert discourses and to provide alternative explanations and solutions for the issue(s) at stake by drawing on local and intuitive knowledge. Lay expertise thus consists, among others, of “important insights regarding the practical contexts that give meaning to expert discourse.”²¹ Kinsella proposes a model for enabling ordinary citizens and experts to overcome the apparent incompatibility of lay and professional perspectives:

“To counter monolithic technocratic decision making, or better yet, to engage in productive collaboration with technical specialists, members of the public must have reasonable fluency in the language(s) of science. Here, I call this fluency *public expertise*. The ideal form of public expertise is technical competency acquired and used directly by affected citizens. Such competency need not, and cannot, replace the more specialized knowledge of technical or policy professionals, but it can provide members of the public with an adequate foundation for genuine dialogue with these specialists.
[...]

¹⁹ Charles Perrow, *Normal accidents: Living with high risk technologies*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2011.

²⁰ Brian Wynne, *Misunderstood misunderstanding: Social identities and public uptake of science* in “Public understanding of science”, vol. 1(3), 1992, pp. 281-304; Steven Epstein, *The construction of lay expertise: AIDS activism and the forging of credibility in the reform of clinical trials* in “Science, Technology & Human Values”, vol. 20(4), 1995, pp. 408-437.

²¹ William J. Kinsella, *Public expertise: A foundation for citizen participation in energy and environmental decisions* in S. P. Depoe, J. W. Delicath & M. F. Aepli Elsenbeer (eds.) “Communication and public participation in environmental decision making”, Albany, SUNY Press, 2004, p. 85.

If expertise consists of understanding particular kinds of problems comprehensively, in all their relevant dimensions, then it must incorporate the local knowledge and evaluative contexts that ordinary citizens provide. In this respect, members of the public are experts, too, with their own forms of special knowledge”²²

Public expertise thus represents a participatory approach to overcoming the deficit model in public understanding of science.²³ According to Kinsella, interested members of the public need not acquire the same depth of technical knowledge as specialists because this would make them specialists themselves rather than representative members of the public. Instead, they only need to possess a working vocabulary of specialized terms and concepts as well as an overall understanding of how technical reasoning operates. This basic technical knowledge, Kinsella notes, would allow people to follow evolving policy issues in a rapidly changing contemporary society. Kinsella’s model of public expertise is compelling because it suggests that one can understand techno scientific policy issues only by understanding the expert discourse around it. This kind of discourse is often constructed around master narratives and sociotechnical imaginaries. By distilling the true intentions of all the actors who contribute to policy decisions from expert discourse, ordinary citizens would be able to better protect their own interests. However, the model of public expertise implies that ordinary citizens are, to some degree, already versed in critical analysis by the time they engage with expert discourse. Thus, it may favor more articulate people having higher lexical and analytical skills to the detriment of others who might possess genuine lay expertise as well.

1.1.3. The Limits of Representation and Technologies of Humility

As a paradigmatic normal accident, Fukushima was considered by nuclear experts²⁴ to have been triggered by a series of “beyond design basis” failures. The complications that led to these failures arose from the fact that, as Felt notes, it was a techno-natural disaster.²⁵ Such a disaster had never occurred before in the history of nuclear technology. In this context, Kinsella notes that, “[i]f Fukushima was beyond its engineering design basis, it was also beyond the ‘limits of representation’ for a sociotechnical system that has exceeded its creators’ vision of control.”²⁶ Drawing on Heidegger’s notorious essay “The Question Concerning Technology”, Kinsella justifies this statement by arguing that (*emphasis added*),

²² *Ibidem*.

²³ Patrick Sturgis, Nick Allum, *op.cit.*, pp. 55-74.

²⁴ Masashi Hirano, Taisuke Yonomoto et al., *Insights from review and analysis of the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident: Fukushima NPP accident related* in “Journal of Nuclear Science and Technology”, vol.49(1), 2012, pp. 1-17; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1975. *Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants*, Washington, D.C: NRC.

²⁵ See Ulrike Felt, *Knowledge claims and forms...*

²⁶ William J. Kinsella, *Environments, risks, and the limits of representation: Examples from nuclear energy and some implications of Fukushima* in “Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture”, vol.6(2), 2012, pp. 251-259.

"[i]t would not be true to Heidegger's argument to say that this [totalizing] scientific world picture [seeking to represent all existing phenomena] denies the reality of phenomena it cannot represent. Rather, such phenomena are fundamentally inconceivable within the scientific framework: they cannot and need not be denied, *because they cannot be imagined*".²⁷

Kinsella thus adheres to the position that it is common practice in the techno scientific community to "focus on the known at the expense of the unknown"²⁸ because the unknown cannot be imagined. Kinsella also stresses that there are limits to the calculability in quantitative risk analysis and that "computational models of physical systems are inherently incomplete and therefore insufficient for regulatory decision-making"²⁹ – a point that Jasanoff also makes with respect to what she calls "technologies of hubris".³⁰

Drawing on Beck, Perrow, and other STS scholars, Jasanoff notes that

"[r]isk ... is not a matter of simple probabilities, to be rationally calculated by experts and avoided in accordance with the cold arithmetic of cost-benefit analysis. Rather, it is part of the modern human condition, woven into the very fabric of progress."³¹

Being "part of the modern human condition", risk must be a notion for which not only experts in nuclear technology must have a feeling but also laypersons. Yet experts tend to quantify risk as if it were a tractable and additive quantity that can be dealt with by statistical methods. For example, even if the failure probabilities of specific components, such as a pipe or a pump, could be determined by probabilistic analysis, quantifying the risk of a concomitant failure of several components in a cooling system comprising hundreds of components would pose considerable difficulties. To deal with this kind of problems, in the 1970s the US Atomic Energy Commission introduced so called "subjective probabilities" which were embedded in widely used probabilistic risk analysis methods (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1975). Where failure probabilities of complex systems could not be determined because of missing data and intractable calculus, they would be replaced with experts' assessments of those probabilities.

Jasanoff further notes that, "[c]ritically important questions of risk management cannot be addressed by technical experts with conventional tools of prediction."³² Yet it seems that these tools of prediction are so appealing to both experts and (to some extent) laypersons that they are still being used as primary tools of risk management. The methods implemented by DSNE systems are either based on statistical inference about risk or are being validated using statistical methods. According to the current standards in

²⁷ *Ibidem*, p.253.

²⁸ Sheila Jasanoff, *Technologies of humility: citizen participation in governing science* in "Minerva", vol.41, september 2003, pp. 223-244.

²⁹ William J. Kinsella, *Environments, risks....*, pp. 251-259.

³⁰ Sheila Jasanoff, *Technologies of humility: citizen....*, pp. 223-244

³¹ *Ibidem*, p. 224.

³² *Ibidem*.

the scientific community, the validation of scientific simulation codes enables their authors and users to make claims of objectivity concerning the results produced by these codes, provided that the input data used is indeed reliable and accurate (*e.g.*, data from measurement experiments). From this perspective, DSNE systems, including the entire techno scientific apparatus around them, expose some of the features of what Jasanoff calls *technologies of hubris*:

“To reassure the public, and to keep the wheels of science and industry turning, governments have developed a series of predictive methods (*e.g.*, risk assessment, cost-benefit analysis, climate modelling) that are designed, on the whole, to facilitate management and control, even in areas of high uncertainty. These methods achieve their power through claims of objectivity and a disciplined approach to analysis, but they suffer from three significant limitations.”³³

DSNE systems could indeed be localized on a spectrum between technologies of hubris and technologies of humility. On the one hand, they use “[p]redictive methods [which] focus on the known at the expense of the unknown, producing overconfidence in the accuracy and completeness of the pictures they produce”. Within the community of radioprotection experts, the “peripheral blindness toward uncertainty and ambiguity”, as Jasanoff puts it, is complemented by a kind of intuitive improvisation, which is somewhat similar to subjective probabilities. The end users and creators of these systems usually have a feeling of not being able to do much more about uncertainty other than to improve the keenness of their sense for it, in addition to keeping up with the state of the art in the scientific fields of dispersion forecasting and radiological protection.

On the other hand, one of the main goals of DSNE systems can be related to the defining questions of Jasanoff’s technologies of humility: *Who will be hurt and how can we know?* Arguably, the first part of the question is being addressed by the very existence of these systems, whereas the second part is addressed by the continuous effort to improve them. Yet, there are at least two additional fundamental problems pointed out by Jasanoff with respect to predictive methods in general, which also concern the members of the community of radioprotection experts:

“*Vulnerability.* Risk analysis treats the ‘at-risk’ human being as a passive agent in the path of potentially-disastrous events. In an effort to produce policy-relevant assessments, human populations are often classified into groups (*e.g.*, most susceptible, maximally exposed, genetically predisposed, children or women) that are thought to be differently affected by the hazard in question. Based on physical and biological indicators, however, these classifications tend to overlook the social foundations of vulnerability, and to subordinate individual experiences of risk to aggregate numerical calculations.”³⁴

“*Learning.* [...] The capacity to learn is constrained by limiting features of the frame within which institutions must act. Institutions see only what their discourses and practices permit them to see. Experience, moreover, is polysemic, or subject to many interpretations, no less in policy-making than in literary texts. Even when the fact of

³³ *Ibidem*, p. 238.

³⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 241

failure in a given case is more or less unambiguous, its causes may be open to many different readings.”³⁵

The categorizations used in DSNE systems do indeed work with well-defined age groups (e.g., infants, children, minors, adults, etc.), geometrically symmetrical areas of vulnerability (e.g., monitored areas having the shape of concentric discs around the nuclear power-plants), and only a few types of countermeasures that are to be recommended and implemented for entire age groups and areas (e.g., evacuation, staying inside the house, ingesting iodine tablets). Also, due to the closed nature of the research groups that develop and maintain DSNE systems, the learning process which occurs mainly (but not only) after major incidents is not likely to lead the members of these groups to completely new perspectives upon the problems at stake. Here, a participatory approach might pave the way towards a more profound and socially-sensitive reflection upon the ambiguities of interpretation through civic deliberation. The polysemic nature of the experience of many individuals could thus be turned into useful feedback within a more flexible participatory DSNE framework.

1.1.4. Risk Communication and Expertise in Nuclear Emergencies

In the study *The social amplification of risk: A conceptual framework*³⁶ the authors note that risk events, such as nuclear accidents, undergo a series of transformations when communicated to and perceived by the public. This process resembles to some extent the transmission and amplification/attenuation of electromagnetic signals. In a similar manner, the risk perceived by ordinary people, can be amplified by the mass media, or different non-governmental organizations. Conversely, governments and local authorities tend to understate the gravity of risk events in their official communications, perhaps fearing unpredictable public reactions such as collective panic. This process can be thought of as one of attenuation and represents the counterpart of the amplification of risk. The multitude of studies about the media coverage and representations of the Fukushima accident challenge the social amplification model of risk communication, which was the product of the Chernobyl accident. With few exceptions, notably that of Germany, public opinion about nuclear energy returned to levels recorded before the Fukushima accident only a few months after the usual burst of salience of nuclear topics in the media, which is typical for every major nuclear accident and any other type of disaster.³⁷ This suggests that the social amplification of risk is a temporary side-effect of the co-production of media representations and public concern on different issues in science and technology.³⁸ Post-Fukushima accounts of risk communication in nuclear crises focus more on how risk communication is performed by the different actors

³⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 242

³⁶ R.E. Kasperson *et al.*, *The social amplification of risk: A conceptual framework* in “Risk analysis,” vol. 8(2), 1988, pp. 177-187.

³⁷ Silje Kristiansen, Heinz Bonfadelli, Marko Kovic, *Risk Perception of Nuclear Energy After Fukushima: Stability and Change in Public Opinion in Switzerland*, in “International Journal of Public Opinion Research,” vol.30 (1), 2016, pp. 24-50.

³⁸ Jack Stilgoe, *The (co-) production of public uncertainty: UK scientific advice on mobile phone health risks* in “Public Understanding of Science,” vol. 16(1), 2007, pp. 45-61.

involved in the nuclear emergency management at different times during the crisis as well as on the effects of the communication on regulatory policy, nuclear organizations, and publics in different countries.

Because the duration of a nuclear emergency is impossible to predict, risk communication in such situations is extremely challenging. Not only is it difficult to predict the duration of nuclear emergencies and to devise appropriate emergency response plans but also to classify them as mere accidents, disasters, or catastrophes, as Kinsella notes:

“Typically, we expect that we can learn from ‘accidents’ and move on, incorporating incremental improvements. ‘Disasters’ pose greater challenges and call for more extended reflection, perhaps leading to more substantial changes in policy and practice.

The term ‘catastrophe’ suggests something more profound. In the English language, and consistent with its original Greek meaning, early uses of the word linked two key ideas: fundamental, irrevocable change; and an inevitable culmination of a process that was implicit from a phenomenon’s origin and has unfolded over time.”³⁹

While being considered an accident triggered by a series of “beyond design basis” causes and failures by nuclear experts,⁴⁰ by others Fukushima is regarded as a techno-natural disaster,⁴¹ a compound disaster⁴² (Chhem, 2014), or a triple disaster from “3/11.”⁴³ At the same time, for the German nuclear industry, it is reasonable to say that *it* was a catastrophe; that is because the nuclear phase-out decision taken by the government shortly after the onset of the accident brought an irrevocable change in an entire field of science and business. This change was indeed the inevitable culmination of a lengthy process that has seen many episodes of hubris and deceit amidst the German nuclear community. Today, one can observe the entire global nuclear community “being post-Fukushima” – a state requiring a more intense preoccupation with sociotechnical risks rather than strictly technical ones.⁴⁴

Felt notes that techno-natural disasters help us to better understand how risks are socially perceived and acted upon.⁴⁵ Techno-natural disasters also represent challenges to our knowledge systems and to the authority of experts and their expertise. Here, risk communication can be seen as a mediator between risk perception and the actions taken to mitigate those perceived risks in accordance with the expertise available at the time of the unfolding disaster. In this context, Felt notes that routine expertise acquired within closed groups may not suffice to handle the dynamics of disaster and to mitigate the risks it entails.⁴⁶

³⁹ William J. Kinsella, *Being “Post-Fukushima”: Divergent Understandings of Sociotechnical Risk*, in “Fukushima Global Communication Programme Working Paper Series” no.18, 2015, Tokyo, United Nations University Institute for the Advanced Study of Sustainability, p. 2.

⁴⁰ Masashi Hirano, Taisuke Yonomoto et al., *op.cit.*, pp.1-17.

⁴¹ Ulrike Felt, *Knowledge claims and forms....*

⁴² Rethy K. Chhem, *Radiation Medical Science Center, Fukushima Medical University*. Fukushima, Radiation Medical Science Center, Fukushima Medical University, 2014.

⁴³ William J. Kinsella, *Being “Post-Fukushima....*, p. 2.

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁵ Ulrike Felt, *Knowledge claims and forms....*

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*.

Fahlquist and Roeser also observe that “[c]ommunication about nuclear risks is treacherous territory [...] requiring not only considerations about effectiveness, but also about ethical legitimacy.”⁴⁷ Experts often restore their ethos post-factum by reverting to hindsight. This process is based on the technocratic belief that, if the proper information were available in an emergency situation, appropriate solutions could undoubtedly be found.⁴⁸

In its first historical phase, which started approximately after the Chernobyl accident from 1986, nuclear risk communication was regarded as one type of education whereby the public was to be informed about risk estimates under the assumptions of a deficit model being at work in the public’s understanding of science.⁴⁹ In this phase models like the social amplification of risk (Kasperson, *et al.*, 1988) were interesting presumably because they treated risk communication as an exact science. Ulrich Beck’s redefinition of risk as a global currency⁵⁰ paved the way for more socially-sensitive approaches to understanding and modeling nuclear risk communication.

1.1.5. Maps, Emergency Plans, and Improvisation for Preparedness

Radioactivity maps are central technical artifacts used to prepare for and manage nuclear emergencies. They are visually compelling, color-coded, geospatially-bounded representations of the risks entailed by airborne radioactive particles released during nuclear accidents. Such maps have repeatedly been the subject of controversies in the wake of the Fukushima accident.⁵¹ Plantin provides a detailed analysis of the ways in which online maps facilitated a certain mode of participation in assessing the radiation situation after the tsunami and the consequent nuclear disaster at Fukushima.⁵² Several maps created by amateurs attempting to locate radiation appeared online, primarily based on the Google Maps API. These maps represented a complement for that which could not be accomplished by amateurs using other participatory media platforms such as Twitter and blogs in a general sentiment of distrust in the government and lack of standards for amateur monitoring. These maps aggregated multiple sources of data and were used to verify government measures as well as to correlate the results with alternative and crowd-sourced data. In this context, amateurs decided not to rely only on the information distributed by the government and to produce new data for verifying official radioactivity measurements. Plantin notes that two types of participation became evident during these mapping activities: (1) participation as data extraction, where laypersons either monitored data using Geiger counters or extracted and republished data from official websites and (2) participation as data aggregation, where maps were used to display and compare radiation

⁴⁷ J.Fahlquist, S. Roeser, *Nuclear energy, responsible risk communication and moral emotions: a three level framework* in “Journal of Risk Research”, vol.18(3), 2015, pp. 333-346.

⁴⁸ Ulrike Felt, *Knowledge claims and forms....*

⁴⁹ J.Fahlquist, S. Roeser, *op.cit.*, pp. 333-346

⁵⁰ See Ulrich Beck, *op.cit.*

⁵¹ Jean Cristophe Plantin, *The politics of mapping platforms: participatory radiation mapping after the Fukushima Daiichi disaster* in “Media, Culture & Society”, vol. 37(6), 2015, pp. 904-921.

⁵² *Ibidem.*

measurements from official or crowd-sourced venues. The results of this participatory work by amateurs complemented the shortcomings of TEPCO's and the Japanese government's own efforts to cope with the lack of official radiation readings. While TEPCO did not provide real-time monitoring, in Japan radiation monitoring is facilitated by a sensor network called *System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information* (SPEEDI). However, the sensors in the Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures were knocked down by the tsunami, which prevented them from reporting data. Moreover, the website of SPEEDI was barely accessible in the first days after the tsunami due to heavy load.

In this difficult context, Plantin notes, the New York Times reported in an article from August 8, 2011 that the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) did not communicate the SPEEDI data to the government, giving the poor quality of the measurements as a pretext. The same article also criticised the lack of experience by government agencies using the complex SPEEDI data and the fact that the government was also suspected of withholding information since the beginning of events. The official readings which were eventually published online were in a read-only and not machine-readable format and used a multitude of norms for radiation measurements, which generated a heterogeneous panel of readings. As a reaction to this situation, individuals attempted to address this lack of information by creating their own digital maps. In the end, these maps were created by multiple actors, including individuals as well as for-profit and non-profit organizations. Some maps were created by web-industry companies (e.g. Yahoo!), designers, scientists, hackers, and anonymous individuals.

In practical terms, the first solution to address the lack of available data was to monitor the radiation levels from scratch using Geiger counters. Several individuals and organisations possessing Geiger counters published real-time readings on their websites. As Geiger counters quickly became out of stock in stores and online, people willing to monitor the levels of radiation had to find alternative means to do so, such as creating do-it-yourself (DIY) measurement devices – something that was harshly criticized by radiation protection efforts around the world. The voluntary body Safecast played a key role in these monitoring efforts. They worked closely with the Tokyo Hackerspace to create DIY Geiger counters that would eventually scale up to create an independent radiation-sensing network. In addition to a fixed sensor network, they produced radiation readings with local teams on foot and by car in order to create an exhaustive map and to regularly update the readings. Another way in which individuals located data was by extracting the published official readings in order to generate structured data files. Such activities are more commonly referred to as “web scraping.”

For most people, an urge to prepare seems to be the reflexive response to risk situations. Consequences of the lack of preparedness are depicted in countless musical, literary, and other cultural accounts of disastrous events. However, the responsibility for organizing preparedness in society and the ways in which preparedness is to be enacted before, during, and after a risk event are still subjects of controversy and periodic reconsideration. While most nuclear emergency managers argue that preparedness should be based on detailed planning and orchestration,⁵³ some scholars suggest that

⁵³ Manpreet Sethi, *What if there's a next time? Preparedness after Chernobyl and Fukushima - an Indian response* in “Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,” vol. 72(4), 2016, pp. 262-264.

preparedness should leave room for improvisation.⁵⁴ Within a single paragraph, which talks about the ways in which the negative perceptions of nuclear power can be addressed in future, Sethi – a senior fellow of the Indian Council of Social Science Research – reveals two distinct sociotechnical imaginaries (continuous improvement and preparedness – discussed in chapters 4, 5, and 6 of this work); an instantiation of the deficit model (improvements can be communicated to the public); and one post-Fukushima narrative of the nuclear (learning from disasters):

“There are three primary ways to address this issue. First, the safety of reactor operations can continually be improved. Second, better emergency preparedness and response can be instituted. Third, improvements on both fronts can be communicated to the public. Both the Chernobyl and Fukushima disasters rendered important lessons along all three of these dimensions – but the focus here is improved disaster preparedness since the 1980s.”⁵⁵

2. An Alternative Nuclear Risk Model

We present an alternative model of nuclear risk perception that challenges the social amplification of risk model.⁵⁶ This alternative model is based on the observation that the risks of radioactivity undergo a series of transmutations, which closely follow the decay chain of radioactive nuclides. Unlike the social amplification of risk model, which assumes that risk is amplified by different agencies (*e.g.*, the media, government agencies, etc.) at different stages in the risk communication process, the proposed model builds upon a phenomenological basis of the same process. The proposed model assumes that there exists an indirect material relationship between radioactive nuclides as risk agents and nuclear experts or laypersons as risk perceivers. The perceived risk is then the product of the indirect relationships with radioactivity maintained by different actors (*i.e.*, nuclear experts, decision makers, and laypersons) in very different ways, which only become direct, and for some even material, when nuclear accidents occur. Hecht’s “nuclear janitors”⁵⁷ and the victims of evacuations⁵⁸ are the most notable exponents of those who have unwillingly experienced the direct material relationship with radioactivity. During the normal operation of NPPs, the indirect relationship of most experts and laypersons with “the nuclear” is mediated by different nuclear organizations. In this context, conscious and unconscious practices of collective and individual remembrance of different catastrophic events from the past also plays a major role.

What the TMI and Chernobyl accidents revealed, among many other things, is that, as radioactivity reaches farther out of the reactor containment building, the risks

⁵⁴ Sonya Schmid, *Chernobyl, Fukushima, and preparedness for a "next one"*, in <https://thebulletin.org/roundtable/chernobyl-fukushima-and-preparedness-for-a-next-one/> [Accessed 16 2016].

⁵⁵ Manpreet Sethi, *op.cit.*, p.262.

⁵⁶ See R.E. Kasperson *et al.*, *op.cit.*

⁵⁷ Gabrielle Hecht, *Nuclear Janitors: Contract Workers at the Fukushima Reactors and Beyond* in “Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus”, vol.11(2), 2013, pp.1-13

⁵⁸ See Ulrike Felt, *Living a Real-World Experiment: Post....*

associated with it undergo a process of transmutation, which is somewhat analogous to the decay chain of radioactive nuclides. The byproducts of an uncontrolled chain of radioactive decay are unstable radionuclides which are invisible to the eye, airborne, weather-driven, and terrifying for people and the mass media. When it happens outside the controlled environment of a nuclear reactors, this transformation implies an incommensurable amount of uncertainty. The following simplified radioactive release phases illustrate the transmutation of risk and radioactivity as it reaches out of expert control due to increasing uncertainty:

1. *There is a certain risk for a reactor incident to lead to a nuclear accident.*
 - The assessment of the probability for a nuclear accident to occur bears a high level of uncertainty and methods for computing it include subjective probabilities.⁵⁹
2. *During a nuclear accident, there is a certain risk for radioactive materials to be released into the environment.*
 - The assessment of the amount and types of released materials bears a high level of uncertainty because it depends on the exact assessment of the level of technical failure inside the reactor and the safety systems.⁶⁰
3. *Provided that radioactive materials have been released into the environment, there is a certain risk for them to reach certain populated areas in a certain amount of time.*
 - Here, the uncertainty is entailed by the need for assessing the meteorological dispersion conditions, such as wind speed and direction, temperature, turbulence conditions, etc. As a rule of thumb, the more time passes and more measurement data become available, the more accurate dose projections will be. However, most of the times, accurate dose projections can only be performed months or even years after the initial release of radioactive materials into the environment.
4. *Provided that radioactive materials have reached a populated area, there is a certain risk of exposure at different levels (i.e., some people may be in their houses, other outside on the streets or in their cars).*
 - Here, the uncertainty arises from the unpredictable behavior of people, which is likely to also depend on the degree to which they are informed about the radiological situation.
5. *Finally, there is a certain risk of developing cancer after having received a high radiation dose.*

⁵⁹ C.R. Miller, *The presumptions of expertise: The role of ethos in risk analysis* in “Configurations”, vol.11(2), 2003, pp. 163-202.

⁶⁰ W. Scheuermann *et al.*, *Modeling consequences of the accident at Fukushima* in “International Journal for Nuclear Power”, vol.56(6), 2011, pp. 325-331.

In radiation protection terms, given a certain dose of radiation there is a probability p for I in Y people to develop cancer. If $p = 1$ and $Y = 1000$, this does not necessarily mean that 1 person will definitely develop cancer and all the other ones will not. Perhaps 10 will develop cancer or none. Probabilities only add up when referring to an entire population, not a limited sample. So, there is uncertainty involved in this step as well, which is usually quantified by the statistical confidence level.

There are at least three remarkable things about this risk transmutation process:

- At a physical level, going from an earlier to a later stage (*i.e.*, point 1 to point 5 in the listing above) makes risk become more obscure and diffuse to the analyst. This leads to more uncertainty when attempting to quantify it.
- From an organizational and social point of view, going from an earlier to a later stage in the decay chain, risk tends to exit the boundaries of organization, reaching farther out into the public realm and the environment. This makes later stage risks much harder to conceal from public attention than early stage risks.
- At social level, the effects of a realized later-stage risk, such as a person becoming ill from exposure to radioactivity, have a much greater cultural impact upon people than early stage risks, such as the failure of a safety-critical system in a reactor because people can more easily relate to illness than to any other technicality of a nuclear power plant.

These three observations suggest that in the process described above, as soon as radioactive materials are being accidentally released into the environment, technical risks – such as a valve not working properly – transmute into social and individual risks – such as communities facing evacuation and individuals becoming ill from radioactivity. Due to the phenomenon of transmutation, the risks of radioactivity are not treatable using the same class of methods at every stage of the process illustrated before⁶¹ which has led to major disagreements between risk perceptions by nuclear experts and laypersons in the past. In this context, emergency preparedness is based on what Jasanoff calls “technologies of hubris”⁶², that promise command and control over technology.⁶³ Each of these technologies is tailored for one of the stages of the risk transmutation process sketched above without taking into consideration the sociotechnical phenomena that facilitate the transmutation of one type of risk into another. For this reason, the technologies of nuclear emergency preparedness, including radioactivity maps and other heuristic dose estimation methods, contribute to what Beck has identified as “organized irresponsibility” in managing nuclear risk.⁶⁴ This form of organized irresponsibility breeds disagreements between risk perceptions by nuclear experts and laypersons. Discrepancies also occur in the ways in which people exposed to nuclear organizational

⁶¹ Jasanoff makes a similar observation with respect to technical risk management more generally in Sheila Jasanoff, *Technologies of humility*: p. 224.

⁶² *Ibidem* pp. 223-244.

⁶³ See Ulrike Felt, *Living a Real-World Experiment: Post-Fukushima*.

⁶⁴ See Ulrich Beck, *op.cit.*

culture (e.g., nuclear scientists and engineers) and people living in different local communities and cultures maintain their complex indirect relationship with “the nuclear.”

3. Radiation Maps – Technologies of Hubris or Humility?

Radiation maps represent key non-human experts within the imaginary of preparedness. Their primary purpose is to help protect people and the environment against radioactive contamination. Yet, paradoxically, considering that radioactivity dispersion forecasts represent compelling visualizations of risk, the seemingly humble purpose of DSNE systems appears to be achieved by using what Jasanoff has termed *technologies of hubris*:

“To reassure the public, and to keep the wheels of science and industry turning, governments have developed a series of predictive methods (e.g., risk assessment, cost-benefit analysis, climate modelling) that are designed, on the whole, to facilitate management and control, even in areas of high uncertainty.”⁶⁵

The risk assessment methods embedded in DSNE systems require constant training and rehearsal in order to complement predictions by non-human experts with human expert opinion and interpretation. When rehearsing emergency response protocols radioprotection experts are constantly concerned with the defining question of what Jasanoff has termed “technologies of humility”: *Who will be hurt and how can we know?* The technologies used by the members of the techno scientific community formed around DSNE systems aimed at answering this question, however, appear to be based on “[p]redictive methods [which] focus on the known at the expense of the unknown, producing overconfidence in the accuracy and completeness of the pictures they produce.”⁶⁶ The multitude of atmospheric dispersion forecasts of the Fukushima radioactive plume published in the mass media and different official reports convey an image of completeness and accuracy, while differing to a great extent both qualitatively and quantitatively from one report to another. Whereas it is in the nature of individual atmospheric dispersion forecasts to leave the impression of completeness and accuracy, the comparison of different forecasts produced by different systems reveal a tendency for overconfidence in models and modeling practice and artificial consensus based on statistical aggregation. Dose projections rely on advanced statistics to narrow down the space of possible decisions that ultimately need to be taken by human actors. DSNE systems exhibit such tendencies at the expense of a participatory approach which, according to Jasanoff, would make for a more humble and possibly more effective approach to solving difficult sociotechnical problems.

⁶⁵ Sheila Jasanoff, *Technologies of humility...*, p. 238.

⁶⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 239.

4. Outlook

Up until now, Perrow's "normal accidents" prophecy has proven correct. Every few decades a new accident shatters the trust in nuclear technology. The latest accident at Fukushima happened in an era dominated by computer technologies, notably the Internet, and was caused by a series of techno-natural interactions never imagined before by reactor designers and nuclear safety experts. Simulation-based dose projections have played a significant role during the accident, while not providing clear answers to decision makers. The mass media pushed dose projections (or radiation maps) into the public realm. These visualizations of radiological risk reached an audience perhaps much broader than their creators had ever imagined. The "innovative" character of the Fukushima accident calls for rethinking current risk generation, propagation, and communication models, such as the well-known "social amplification of risk" model, in the light of new "techno-natural" actors and nuclear preparedness regimes affecting the production and communication of risk. In this sense, we proposed an alternative model for conceptualizing nuclear risk focused on the description of the different stages at which risk needs to be assessed, prevented, and mitigated. Our risk transmutation model is primarily aimed at explicating the different socio-technical boundaries at which technical risks are turned into other forms of risk, which are no longer in the control of the organizations generating them. Thinking of risk in terms of transmutation – that is, a process by which one type or risk is qualitatively transformed into another one – rather than amplification constitutes a thread worth following in nuclear risk research in the post-Fukushima era.

The role of DSNE systems in nuclear emergency management is also likely to increase with every future nuclear accident. Due to the increasing digitalization of society, more weight is likely to be put on globally-networked software-based early warning systems. The current trend in nuclear preparedness is characterized by a gradual movement from locally-flavored and loosely integrated practices towards globally integrated and coordinated systems for nuclear emergency response. In this context, by "partnering with the public"⁶⁷ and possibly more emphasis put on improvisation rather than trained preparedness,⁶⁸ people could be guided directly and more effectively towards safety in a nuclear emergency. A culture of improvisation, as Sonja Schmid notes,⁶⁹ may indeed improve on well trained "reliable" emergency response plans. But is improvisation itself a trained ability or an innate talent?⁷⁰ And can it be combined with the local expertise of ordinary citizens? These and other open questions need to be answered in order to leverage the benefits of improvisation and public participation in nuclear emergency management. The practices of nuclear preparedness can also be extended by incorporating lay expertise as an additional epistemic source. Kinsella's model of public expertise could be used to convey the lay expertise of interested citizens to the nuclear emergency response task forces on the basis of a shared understanding of the issues at

⁶⁷ Manpreet Sethi, *Partnering with the public for better preparedness*, in <https://thebulletin.org/roundtable/chernobyl-fukushima-and-preparedness-for-a-next-one/> [Accessed 16 2016].

⁶⁸ See Sonya Schmid, *op.cit.*

⁶⁹ *Ibidem.*

⁷⁰ Japanese Zen masters argue that every talent can be trained if the apprentice follows the Zen way (Hall, 1983).

stake. Also, these exchanges could be facilitated by involving members of the public in the regular trainings and drills as well as in designing more flexible decision-making processes, which should also take into consideration lay expertise.

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Legacy of two crowns: Romanians and Vlachs in contemporary Serbia

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Key words: National identity, national ideology, Romanian, Vlach, Habsburg, Austria-Hungary, Serbia, Valley of Timoc.

Abstract:

The Romanian community living in the post-post Yugoslav Republic of Serbia presents the particularity of being split between two groups self-naming themselves with different yet equivalent names: Romanians and Vlachs. Their different modernization experiences explain this particularity of self-identification. The two cases confirm the thesis that the modern nation is a construct, a build community while the primordial elements of identity, the ethnicity, the similarity of spoken idioms, and (in some cases) the confessional particularity, does not evolve into a modern national identity without the action of an agent. The role of the state is crucial: depending on its agenda it may foster or block the group's emancipation and identity conservation efforts. Assimilation programs may have different results depending on the general development degree of the cultural-ethnic community – modernized communities, with strong intelligentsia and bourgeoisie are able to resist successfully to strong pressure and repressive acts, while less modernized, traditional communities are more easily assimilated.

The Romanian community post-post¹ Yugoslav Republic of Serbia presents the particularity of being split between two groups self-naming themselves with different yet equivalent ethnonyms: *Romanians* and *Vlachs*. The two groups are locally identifiable in

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¹We considered that Yugoslavia embraced forms under three different political regimes as a multinational Kingdom, after the Second World War, than as Socialist Federal Republic and, finally after the fall of Communism, as Federal Republic. The territory of Serbia, as part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and of the Socialist Federal and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia took shape after the First World War based on the international agreement concluded at Trianon. However, the territory of the actual Republic of Serbia is smaller than the one of the pre-1929 Kingdom of Serbia, which was a component of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians. The post-Trianon Kingdom of Serbia also included the territory of actual Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Vojvodina and Kosovo. Skopje/Macedonia became a distinctive republic within the Socialist Federal Republic and proclaimed its independence in the early nineties. Vojvodina and Kosovo received administrative autonomy within the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia - based on this administrative autonomy the later claimed its independence, which is recognized by a significant part of the international community, yet not by the actual Republic of Serbia.

regions with different historical experiences, both modern and pre-modern: Voivodina/Banat and the East Serbia. While Serbia (the state of citizenship for all these individuals) considers them as part of two different communities (see Census categories) and draws institutions accordingly, a significant number of them, from both groups, acknowledge their relation with Romania (as *related state*²), formally assuming the Romanian cultural identity³. We consider that this particularity of self-identification is explained by the different experiences during modernity (from the end of the Ottoman rule to the creation of the Yugoslavia/The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians).

Romanians and Vlachs in actual Republic of Serbia – location and origins

As we mentioned above, the two groups composing the Romanian community in actual Serbia are identifiable by regions. Thus most of the self-identified *Romanian* individuals live in Voivodina (statistical region) in the three Banat districts (North Banat, Central Banat and South Banat), while the most of the self-identified *Vlach* individuals live in Eastern and Southern Serbia (statistical region) in Nis, Branicevo, Zajecar and Bor districts. An alternative approach, which takes into consideration the traditional (pre-modern) regions indicate more clearly that the two groups are located in some transborder cultural regions. These two regions are *Banat* (which includes territories that are part of actual Romania, Hungary and Serbia) and the *Valley of Timoc* (which includes territories which are part of actual Serbia and Bulgaria), both of them supporting trans-border local identities assumed by their inhabitants – (ro. *bănăţean* and *timocean*, referring both to a person which is originated in the area of Banat/Valley of Timoc and a way of saying/doing/performing which is specific to people living in the area as cultural mark⁴).

The TOPONYMES of the two historical regions⁵ reflect their pre-modern experiences. Thus, the toponyme *Banat* originates in the common noun *banat* (present in various languages in the region, a word with disputable origin⁶) which refers to a territorial unit with a defensive role within the Hungarian Kingdom in its vicinity with the Balkan Slavic states (led by Bulgarian, Serbian or Croatian rulers). The toponym *Valley*

² See the definitions given by the Venice Commission (a consultative body of the Council of Europe) within its Report regarding the preferential treatment granted to the national minorities by the related state (2001)

³ See the Declaration of the Romanian cultural identity assumption, as stipulated in the Romanian Law no.299/2007 *regarding the Romanians abroad support*, permanent link <http://legislatie.just.ro/Public/DetaliuDocument/87091>, accessed last time on February 2, 2018

⁴ On the Romanian character of both communities see the field research of scholars from the University of Timișoara, especially Otilia Hedeșeanu, *Mă razumești, fata mea...*, *Note de teren pe Valea Moravei*, București, Paideia, 2007; *Idem*, “Timocenii - documente pentru identitate, Provincia”, 2010 a series published in several monthly issues of the review

⁵ Following Sven Tagill (see *Regions in Central Europe: The Legacy of History*. West Lafayette, Ind., Purdue University Press, 1999) we assume that at the level of most local communities some may find mental structures formed in historical ages (see *la longue durée*) which shape regional identities (sometimes ignored at the level of the nation-states)

⁶ On the etymology of the noun *banat*, Vasile Docea proposes an Iranian-Avar origin (see Vasile Docea, *À la recherche du Banat disparu* in Adriana Babeți and Cécile Kovacsazy (coord.) “Le Banat: un El dorado aux confins”, Paris, Circe, 2007.

of *Timoc*, on the other hand, echoes the Greek-Latin hydronym *Timacus/Tymakos*. Both historical regions conserved their territorial unity for a significant period of time of more than half of a millennium:

Banat is bordered by the water flows of Mures, Tisa, Danube and Timis in the Western Romanian Carpathians Mountains (called locally The Mountains of Banat, see ro. *Munții Banatului*). The cultural region was shaped by several successive administrative units centred by the city of Timisoara/Temesvar/Temeschwar/ Temeschburg under the rule of the Hungarian Kingdom (between the 12th and the 16th centuries), the Ottoman Empire (between the 16th and the 18th century), and the Habsburg Empire (between the 18th and 20th centuries). The *Valley of Timoc* is encompassed by the tributaries of the Timoc River streaming from the low mountains between Vidin, Negotin, Bor and Zajecar. The region was shaped by its natural borders and the distinctive identity of its Romanian inhabitants, the beneficiaries of the privileges granted by the Bulgarian Czars of Vidin and then after by the Ottoman Pashas of Vidin referring to their traditional occupations (pastoral activities and wood exploitation).

Both *Banat* and the *Valley of Timoc* were split as the modern frontiers emerged in the larger South Eastern Europe. Thus in 1833 the *Valley of Timoc* was split as the river set an administrative-internal border within the Ottoman Empire establishing the limit of jurisdiction between the *autonomous Serbian principality* and the *Pashalik of Vidin* - later a segment of 15 km of the water flow became an international border between modern and contemporary states of Serbia and Bulgaria. *Banat* was split in 1920 between the Kingdom of Romania, the Kingdom of Serbia and Hungary.

Modernity in context – an ad hoc periodization

Each periodization is conventional and subject to debate. The marks that separate ages of time, defined by specific social, economic and cultural processes are hard to be delimited with precision. Social phenomena, like any other, yet, have a beginning and an end. For the purpose of our comparative approach and the cases we have in attention, we shall consider ad-hoc as *marks of modernity*, the *end of the Ottoman rule* (comprising, as well, the regain of the autonomy in the borders of the Ottoman Empire) as *starting point* and *the formation of the post-Versailles states* (which comprise the *unification* or the reappearance as subject on the international scene of the nations involved), as an *ending point*. We notice that for *Romanians in Banat* and *Vlachs in the Valley of Timoc* the beginning of modernity refers to moments separated by almost a century – it is rather irrelevant. At the end of the direct Ottoman rule (which is either the Hapsburg conquest or the recognition of autonomy within the Ottoman Empire, a step prior to independence), the degree of social, cultural development was very much the same. What differentiate the two groups are the experiences they have under post Ottoman states. Using the two temporal landmarks that encompass modernity, we may be able to set aside the factors, which are responsible for the differences now existing between the two groups, notably their different identification choices.

As pre-modern communities (1) both groups must be considered aboriginal (even if not exclusive) of this regions (they were there in the moment of their inclusion

within the Hungarian and Bulgarian pre-modern states), their long lasting habitation in the same areal fostering a collective sentiment of belonging, and the perception that the space represents a *cradle*;(2) both enjoyed cultural autonomy in the logic of pre-modern states (due one or more of the following factors: the localism specific to pre-modern societies, linguistic or religious barriers, accessibility of the areas and granted privilege); (3) both groups were under the Ottoman rule as the Hungarian and Bulgarian pre-modern states were subjugated, being part of Ottoman direct administered units (Pashalik of Timisoara, Pashalik of Vidin), and, finally, (4) they were both identified as Vlachs (or variants of this ethnonym in Serbian, Bulgarian, Slavonian, Hungarian, German, Academic Latin or Turkish) by their neighbours (see other cultural groups) and self-identified as Romanians (or variants). What we notice is that at the end of modernity - the formation of Yugoslavia the two groups identify themselves using different mechanisms and referring to labels of different age (pre-modern labels vs modern labels).

Vlach and Romanian - Historical Etymology

Vlach and *Romanian* are both pre-modern and equally old words. They appear at the end of Antiquity while the ethno genesis of the Neo-Latin people is completed in the larger context of the Roman Empire dissolution and of the so-called Barbarian Migrations. Each word reflects the three historical processes in a very specific way. Thus *Romanian* (ro. noun *român*) indicates the claim of a group which no longer lives under the Roman rule of being a part of the Roman culture and civilization, and is affirmed in a Latin or a Neo-Latin idiom, while *Vlach* (with its many variants) indicates the encountering of a Latinized population by a non-Latin one (a so called *Barbarian*). The origins of *Romanian* (as *român*) are to be found in the period of transformation of the Vulgar Latin into the Neo-Latin Proto Romanian, as an echo of the 212 A.D *Edict of Caracalla* (which granted the Roman citizenship to all inhabitants of the Empire), while the origins of *Vlach* are to be found in the early period of the *Great Migrations*, when the Germanic tribes entered in areas formerly controlled by the Roman Empire where they found Latinized populations⁷.

Even if the two words are about the same age, being in use uninterruptedly since their appearance, they had over time different status and referred to different social and political realities. Due its entry in the chancellery languages of the first medieval states, neighbours or suzerain powers (the Byzantine Empire, the Serbian and Bulgarian Tsardoms, the Hungarian Kingdom) but, as well, Romanian⁸, the word *Vlach* (ro. noun

⁷ According to Adolf Armbruster the roots of Vlach are to be found in the name of the Latinized Celtic tribe of *Volcae*, which in old German idioms took the form of *Walh* to designate the Romans and the Gallo-Romans. It was extended to all Latinophone people, and borrowed with this sense by Slavic populations and also by Byzantine Greeks in Adolf Armbruster, *Romanitatea românilor. Istoria unei idei*, București, Editura Enciclopedică, 2012.

⁸ Some may question why Romanian themselves have chosen the word Vlach/Walach to identify. We consider that the most certain answer is that Romanians used Slavonian and not Latin or Byzantine Greek as chancellery language under the influence of Bulgarian and Serbian Orthodox monks before and after the formation of the premodern principalities of Muntenia (Ungro-Vlahia) and Moldova.

vlah, with its many variants in Romanian and other languages) received a *political function*. Thus, the term *Vlach* is used to identify a *political subject*, including a person (see Transylvania – where it is used in both Hungarian as *olahok* and Medieval Latin as *blachus* or *vlachus*) or a *country* (*Ungro-Vlahia* in Slavonian, *Valahia Transalpina* in Chancellery Latin used at the Hungarian Court, or *Iflak* used in Ottoman Turkish texts). In first pre-modern writings Romanian (under the form *rumân*) defines generally a social reality identifying a serf.

We notice that the word *Vlach* (and its variants), as *ethnic label*, presents an atypical use in pre-modern context – while, generally, pre-modernity favours local and regional identities, most of them derived from toponyms or tribal names, in some cases are in use labels that identify related groups across different regions (see the use of Germania/Germanus nouns in Medieval Latin texts). Similarly, *Vlach* identifies different Romanian groups living in a larger area (from the South of Balkans to North of Carpathians)⁹.

Indeed, with the first medieval texts written in Romanian language, which dates from the 16th century, the noun *Romanian* identifies a national group (see *Palia de la Oraştie* 1582 – a collection of texts, including a Romanian translation of the *Genesis* and *Exodus*, under Protestant influence, which mentioned in its prolegomena for the first time the term with this use (Netea 1980). In the 17th century, the chronicles written in Romanian language start to translate the Slavonian term *Ungro-Vlahia* or the Medieval Latin term *Valahia Transalpina* with *Ţara Românească*, referring to a *political subject*, a Romanian Land/State, even if in the most of cases the inhabitants are designated as *muntean*, derived from the toponyme of the larger historical region *Muntenia*). There is no doubt that both *Vlach* and *Romanian* (as ro. *român*) were used to identify nationality in pre-modern times (see Netea 1980, Stănescu 1968, Armbruster 2012). Yet the mark of the national idea's inception, in modern sense, is the moment when *Romanian* (as standard ro. noun *român*) starts to be used as national denomination, while *Vlach* and its versions are abandoned.

The Romanian representatives of the Romanian Transylvanian Enlightenment are the intellectual fathers of the emancipation program that fostered the national ideology crystallization and the process of a modern nation building. Even so, the first two generations of Romanian Transylvanian Enlightenment, still used in their general petitions (the several *Supplex Libellus*) written in Academic Latin a term derived from *Vlach* (*Valacus* see *Supplex Libellus Valachorum* petitions, first in 1744, second in 1792¹⁰). Nonetheless, the second generation of representatives of the Romanian Transylvanian Enlightenment, grouped in the so called *Şcoala Ardeleană*, are the first that start to use the noun *Romanian* (in standard modern form as *român* and not the premodern form *rumân*, which was used in 17th and 18th centuries to indicate either social status or ethnicity or *roman* used in the same period to indicate the Latin origin. The authors of this generation

⁹ While in the case of *Germania/Germanus* the sense is clearly rooted in the geographies of Antiquity (see Ptolemy), in the case of *Vlach* we consider that the explanation resides in the special role given to the Slavonian language in the culture of the Slavic and non-Slavic (see Hungarian) populations in Eastern Europe.

¹⁰ The signatories of the second *Supplex Libellus*, in 1792 claimed to represent *Clerus, Nobilitas, Civicusque Status Universae Nationis in Transilvania Valachicae* (Ene 2016)

(active in the five decades between 1780 and 1850) which are also accountable for the creation of the modern Romanian language, coin the word *Romanian* (in standard form *român*) as national denomination and a part of the national ideology discourse¹¹.

The creation of a modern standard form of the noun *Romanian*, at the beginning of the 19th century in Romanian language, is mirrored by the appearance of its equivalents in other languages too, with the similar use and status – thus in Hungarian language *Romanians* would be named using *romanok*, in German language, *Rümanien*, while the premodern terms as *olahok* or *Wallachien*, both derived from *Vlach* would be considered as archaisms).

We may conclude that, in broad sense, while being as old, the two words distinguish between pre modernity and modernity – the use of *Vlach* and its variants indicating a *premodern level of identity development*, while the use of *Romanian*, a *modern level of identity development*, and a mark of a modern national identity.

Vlachs in the Valley of Timoc between 1833 and 1918

As we mentioned above, the historical region *Valley of Timoc* was split between the autonomous Serbian principality and the Pashalik of Vidin, as the river flow was set as a natural demarcation line in 1833. From this very moment the separation involved a change of *regime*: (1) the *Vlachs* situated on the Serbian side of the river lost all the pre-modern type privileges granted by the Ottoman rulers (which, in fact, were initially granted by Bulgarian rulers), (2) as the border became a closed one, they were separated by their relatives (see extended pre-modern type family, clans and so on) or other people of the same kin, while the economic, social and human flows supported by the natural dimension of the region were disrupted.

The recognition of the autonomy of the Serbian Principality (as a consequence of the 1826 Convention of Ackerman and the 1829 Treaty of Adrianople) was equal to full independence in what concerns internal politics. This is the start of the creation of the modern state of Serbia, which after the First World War became a pivot in the creation of Yugoslavia, the future construction that would include a part of Banat.

The Serbian modernization process favoured centralism as administrative philosophy and *Serbization* as nation building strategy. Both affected negatively the community of *Vlachs* living in the *Valley of Timoc* as the local communities lost their autonomy and their specific economic activities (pastoral activities and wood exploitation) became subject to regulation and taxation.

Serbian national ideology may be called semi-modern as it was based on two pillars of pre-modern type: one *religious* (Christian Orthodoxy) and other ethnolinguistic (Serbian-Slavic). The commissioners of this ideology were, first, the Serb priests and then after the civil servants representatives of the State - they both replaced the traditional elites of the *Vlachs*.

¹¹ See the use of *Romanian* noun, as *român* and its derivatives in Petru Maior's works (1812 - *Istoria pentru începutul românilor în Dacia*, including annexed *Disertație pentru începutul limbei românești* and *Disertație pentru literatura cea veche a românilor* or 1819, *Ortographia româna și latino-valachica* including annexed *Dialog pentru începutul limbii române întră nepot și unchiu*.)

For the Vlachs living in the Valley of Timoc, the primary form of integration within the new political community of Serbia was their inclusion within the Serbian Orthodox Church and the loss of their religious specificity – Serbian priests appointed from Belgrade replaced local born priests of Vlach descent. This opened the door of the *Slavization* process as the religious service in Romanian idiom spoken by Vlachs was replaced by one in Serbian Language. Even more, with the pretext of eliminating the risk of a hermetical translation from Romanian to Serbian, the religious books written in Romanian (most of them printed in Wallachia during the 18th century and donated to Vlach perishes and monasteries) were burnt and replaced with ones written in Serbian.

Maybe the most eloquent example of cooperation and self-enforcement between the representative of the rational bureaucracy and the one of the Church is the *Slavization* process – Thus, while the Serbian priests were choosing at the baptism of the individual a Slavic name as a Christian name (in the majority of cases a Slavic version of a Romanian name), the civil servants added the Slavic/Serbian termination *ovic* to the family name.

The first official census that takes into account ethnicity is carried in 1866 (Vuletic, 2012), at three decades (one sociological generation) after the Serbian annexation and inclusion within the Serbian Orthodox Church.

The role of the Orthodox Serbian Church is crucial in the process of assimilation, also due its role in the primary the education before the creation of the national compulsory education system. In the parish schools a clerk (usually the *cantor*) taught children to read Serbian and Slavonian and basic writing (Berend & Berend, 2013, Anscombe 2014). The elementary school became compulsory in 1882, but the attendance remained low, especially in the rural areas, until the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians and Yugoslavia. The low rates of literacy, found in the case of Vlachs living in the Valley of Timoc, as well, are explained by the inexistence of some structural incentives to follow a longer cycle of education in the case of a population that earned its means of living from traditional agriculture activities.

As the modernization and the nation building process in Serbia referred to the creation of a homogenous Serbian nation state (in terms of religion and ethnicity), there was no place for the modernization of the pre-modern ethnic identity of the *Vlachs* into a modern national Romanian identity but only for assimilation as *Serbization* and *Slavization*. Thus, while in the immediate vicinity, in the Habsburg Empire (later Austria-Hungary) and in Romania (after 1861), the national denomination for Romanians was the modern *Romanian* (standard form ro. *român*, ger. *Rumänien*, hun. *romanok*), in Serbia the pre-modern noun *Vlach* remained in use¹².

As a consequence of the many factors responsible for the general and national modernization after less than one century under the Serbian rule, the *Vlachs* had no *intelligentsia*, no notion of national modern identity (which is substantially different than perceiving of being related with speakers of other Romanian idioms spoken in the Balkans or North of Danube, including here equally Aromanian dialects and literary Romanian, developed in modern 19th century Romania and Transylvania) and presented at the end of the First World War as an ethnic group with only a pre-modern rudimentary identity.

¹² One possible explanation may reside in the national state building symbolism which echoed the Czardom of Stefan Dusan as a *Serbian Golden Ages* – in his Code of law (Law of the pious Emperor Stefan) the *Vlachs* are mentioned as subjects while *Roman* is used to designate Byzantines not Latin speaking populations of Balkans.

Romanians under the Habsburg rule between 1718¹³ and 1918

The Habsburg rule in *Banat* lasted two hundred years. We admit that this is a very long period in term of administrative and political regime changes, not to mention of what happens in terms of general development (in social, economic and cultural terms). Yet the Habsburg State, no matter if we refer to the Austrian Empire or the Austria-Hungary, had, even with local notes, a common philosophy of government and a common idea about the treatment of its subjects. The most relevant differences appear with the 1867 Compromise. Yet, we state that the processes of national modernization – socio-economical (the formation of a national *intelligentsia*, of a national *corps de cadres*, a national *bourgeoisie*) and cultural (the formation of a modern national language, of a national culture and the crystallization of a national discourse) – were concluded and irreversible at that moment, as the collective and individual political behaviour would indicate in the decades to come till 1918.

The Habsburg monarchs assumed from the beginning to the end that they ruled over a multinational political community, they struggled to mobilize and lead in a common effort by offering to each group a minimal satisfaction as incentive for the compliance of its members. This functioned even if some groups were more privileged than others (the perception of this by the subjects of the Habsburg monarchs off all nationalities, even by those belonging to the less privileged national groups is the narrative of *The Good Emperor*¹⁴).

The development program assumed by the Habsburg monarchs set further the path of national modernization of the Romanians in the Austrian Empire. The reforms of Maria Theresia and Josef II aimed to create a *power of Europe* based on an “advanced” society and economy able to support an efficient state and a strong and well-equipped army. This involved the creation of *intelligentsia*, of a *corps de cadres* (specialists in all fields) and of independent entrepreneurs. Most of all, that meant the creation of an educated *subject/citizen*, emancipated from the *darkness of prejudicism* and *chains of servitude*, able to serve his country in peacetime as taxpayer and in wartime as soldier. All this effort contributed to the national modernization through the modernization of

¹³ We take into consideration the moment when the former Pashalyk of Timișoara, comprising the geo-cultural region Banat, became a possession of Habsburg Austria. Yet, most analysis refers to realities regarding the Romanian *nationality* within the *Habsburg Empire/Austro-Hungary*

¹⁴ See the studies of several scholars on the narrative of the *Good Emperor* of Romanians under the Habsburg rule for the entire period - 18th century: Petre Din (“Mitul ‘Bunului Împărat’ în Transilvania sub Iosif al II-lea”, *Revista Bistrița*, 2001, “Românii ardeleni și împăratul Leopold al II-lea. Continuitatea mitului ‘Bunului Împărat’”, *Revista Bistrița*, 2003, “Românii transilvăneni între sentimentul identității naționale moderne și cel apartenenței la Imperiul Habsburgic în secolul al XVIII-lea”, *Revista Bistrița*, 2005), first half of the 19th century: Mirela Andrei (“Românii ardeleni și împăratul austriac- Avatarele mitului ‘Bunului Împărat’ de la sfârșitul secolului al XVIII-lea la perioada post pașoptistă”, *Revista Bistrița*, 2001), second half of the 19th century to First World War, Nicoleta Hegedus (“Imaginea Împăratului la românii ardeleni de la Memorandum la izbucnirea Primului Război Mondial”, *Revista Bistrița*, 2008) and for the general subject Pieter Judson, (*The Habsburg Empire*, Harvard University Press, 2016), Daniel Unowsky (*The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism: Imperial Celebrations in Habsburg Austria, 1848-1916*, Purdue University Press, 2005), or Daniel Unowsky and Laurence Cole (*The Limits of Loyalty: Imperial Symbolism, Popular Allegiances, and State Patriotism in the Late Habsburg Monarchy*, Berghahn Books, 2007).

nationalities while the Habsburg monarchs admitted they ruled over a multinational community and assumed to address the individual as part of a national group with its own language and specificity¹⁵.

Within the political community of the Habsburg state, Romanians in *Transylvania* and *Banat* had a lesser privileged political, social and religious status inherited since the time of the Hungarian Kingdom (see *Fraterna Unio Trio Nationem*, 1438). Orthodox confession and ethnic origin were criteria of exclusion – there were no political rights and no political representation. Yet, Habsburgs offered to Romanians the possibility of gaining political representation through their religious subordination to the Catholic Church (the so-called *Union with Rome* or the *Greek-Catholic Church*). The first Romanian Greek Catholic Bishop, Ioan Inochentie Micu-Klein, was raised to a noble rank (which was impossible for Romanians of Orthodox confession) and became the representative of his co-nationals in the *Diet of Transylvania*. The Greek Catholic Romanian clergy had access to higher education (including most prestigious theological centres and universities in Rome, Vienna and elsewhere within the Empire).

While assuming the emancipation of their *nationality*¹⁶ (meaning the recognition of political and civil rights, gaining of economic and social freedoms) these representatives of *intelligentsia* made use of arguments valid for all Romanian people, no matter where they lived, *like the common Roman-Dacian origin*, that became the core of the national Romanian ideology, trans regional and trans border.

Copping with the literacy issue, the Habsburg monarchs considered the alphabetization of their subjects in their vernacular language. The introduction of the compulsory education (enforced by the Imperial decree Ratio Educationist issued on August the 22nd, 1777) supposed in the minimal the creation of so-called *trivia* schools organized by the local churches which taught in one general class comprising all children between six and twelve years old, to read, to write in their mother language. That was crucial for the modernization of the ethnic group into a national group for several reasons – the creation of a modern language by standardization, the creation of a national narrative as a curriculum component and the creation of a mass of individuals sharing same narrative as a base of a national program and ideology. Even more the Habsburg state strengthened the importance of the national languages while emphasising their function as medium of in knowledge dissemination and formation of specialists and by the role given to various specialized units of broad sense specialists organized on nationality criteria (see only the military regiments organized on nationality criteria). As the individual was not constrain to learn a different language (Academic Latin, later German-Austrian or Hungarian) to make accessible science and technology at medium level or to interact in the performance of his institutional

¹⁵ See the case of linguistic modernization for the purpose of educating medical specialists documented by Sechel Teodora Daniela (“Medical knowledge and the improvement of vernacular languages in the Habsburg Monarchy: A case study from Transylvania (1770–1830)”, in *Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences*, 2012) september issue), R.G. Răcilă, Irena Răileanu, V. Rusu (“Influențe germane asupra terminologiei medicale românești”, *Rev. Med. Chir. Soc. Med. Nat. Iasi*, 2008).

¹⁶ Nationality – refers here to a pre-modern community distinguished by language, origin and confession.

function or social and economic role, the primordial elements¹⁷ of its national identity were able to crystallize into a modern national identity.

While this program of reforms was abandoned after the 1867 Compromise, despite the policies of uniformization and *Magyarization*, carried by the state authorities in Hungarian lead *Transleithania*, the national building process is completed and a complex modern national identity, based on a modern national language (with a standard form, studied grammar, and mechanisms of adaptation and borrowing neologisms), a national modern culture and a national political program based on a shared narrative is irreversibly acquired.

Romanians in two modernity contexts		
<i>Serbian Kingdom</i>	vs	<i>Hapsburg Empire/Austro-Hungary</i>
1833-1918		1718-1918
<p>The state assume to be mono-national and as homogenous as possible.</p> <p>The state uses the national Church as assimilation tool while there is no cultural and religious autonomy.</p> <p>The access to education and general knowledge is possible only in the state's official language.</p> <p>The state undermine collective emancipation of its national minorities.</p>		<p>The state assumed to be multinational and that all individuals and groups enjoy a notion of equality as contributors to the state's welfare and security.</p> <p>The state grants cultural and religious autonomy to the ethnic and religious groups and use their language to transfer knowledge and to emancipate them.</p> <p>The state foster the creation of a national elite which it use as an agent of its development program.</p>
<p>The individual success within the state's establishment is conditioned by his/her assimilation within the majority group and culture. He/She manifests only as a representative of his origin group within the culture of majority.</p>		<p>The individual success within the state's establishment could foster the affirmation of the group as he/she is allowed to perform as part of a national <i>intelligentsia</i> or to act as a part of a national <i>bourgeoisie</i>.</p>

¹⁷ See what C. Geertz defines as primordial elements of national identity. A se vedea Clifford Geertz (ed.), *The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States. In Old Societies and New States, The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa*, New York, Free Press, 1963.

Conclusions

The two cases confirm the thesis that the modern nation is a construct, a *build community* (see authors like Ernest Gellner (1994) and Karl Deutsch (1953)) and not a natural one (see authors like Clifford Geertz and other primordialists).

The primordial elements of identity, the ethnicity, the similarity of spoken idioms, and (in some cases) the confessional particularity, does not evolve into a modern national identity without the action of an agent. Traditional-local and religious elites cannot be the agent of modernization unless they transform in modern type *intelligentsia*. General modernization in social and economic terms offer access to education, wealth and position within the state's establishment, but the individuals does not form a national elite, an *intelligentsia* and a *bourgeoisie* unless they assume an emancipation program and do not create a national narrative. A national narrative (in our case the *myth of Dacian and Roman descent*) is in the core of a national ideology, but is a national culture (a series of intellectual works of all forms of expression) that shapes national identity as a common assumption and base of a collective action. The attitude of the state toward the group's emancipation and identity conservation efforts is crucial; the state may foster these processes or may block them according to its own political program.

Assimilation programs may have different results depending on the general development degree of the cultural-ethnic community - modernized communities, with strong *intelligentsia* and *bourgeoisie* are able to resist successfully to strong pressure and repressive acts, while traditional communities less modernized are assimilated.

The level of cultural and social sophistication of the pre-modern community is important as it defines the basis upon each the process of nation's building develops. In this respect, the existence of a national Church, with its own national organization and leadership, giving a central role to cultural production in the language of the respective group may be sufficient to foster complex and lasting modern developments. Simple religious specificity within a national Church of a different national group is insufficient to conserve identity, as it may be easily erased, while religion itself becomes a strong assimilation instrument.

National minorities may be formed of different related groups, which due their different historical experiences express different identification formulas, even if they belong to the same cultural family and acknowledge being related and affine to the same nation state.

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The Vietnam War. A multidimensional approach¹

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Key-words: the Vietnam War, the Cold War, strategy, post-traumatic stress

This article is about a very important geopolitical phenomenon of the Cold War meaning the Vietnam War between the Americans and their allies, and the North Vietnamese and Vietcong. We are going to analyze the causes of the Vietnam War, its progress and its consequences from a military, political and psychological point of view. Furthermore this article is going to analyze the impact of the war on the American culture.

The importance of the Vietnam War cannot be overstated. The Vietnam War (1963-1975) meant 50.000 American dead, over 100.000 wounded and over one and a half million Vietnamese dead².

The Vietnam War meant a new challenge for the American collective memory. It meant politics, history, war and humanity. The war meant significant changes for the American and Vietnamese society but also for Indochina as a whole. At the psychological and organization level it meant significant changes for the American army and society. The conscription was abolished and a professional army model was adopted.³

One question may arise, namely, what position the Vietnam War was occupying on the international scene and during the Cold War. We can say that the Vietnam War was somewhere in the middle, being neither at the centre of the international relations system nor at the periphery. After 1945, the Vietnam War was the largest US military intervention, but at the same time it was not at the centre of the Cold War. Despite the Vietnam War, since 1971, the United States and the People's Republic of China have begun a process of approaching, a process that has changed the Cold War power equation (according to Percy Craddock, the United States and China almost become allies in the 1980's)⁴. The Allies of the Americans in the Vietnam War were besides South Vietnam,

¹ This is an introductory study for a much broader research regarding the Vietnam wars.

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² National Archives, *Statistical Information about casualties in the Vietnam war*, <https://www.archives.gov/research/military/vietnam-war/casualty-statistics.html>, accessed on 29.08.2017, Encyclopedia Britannica, *Vietnam War* in <https://www.britannica.com/event/Vietnam-War>, accessed on 29.08.2017.

³ Richard Halloran, Issue and Debate; Plans for a military draft attract new attention in *New York Times*, 1985 in <http://www.nytimes.com/1985/08/14/us/issue-and-debate-plans-for-a-military-draft-attract-new-attention.html?pagewanted=all&mcubz=0>, accessed on 30.08.2017.

⁴ Percy Craddock, *In Pursuit of British Interests, Reflections on Foreign Policy Under Margaret Thatcher and John Major*, London, John Murray Publishing, 1997, p. 27.

New Zealand, Australia, Thailand, none of the NATO members (including Britain) taking part in this war. The Vietnam War was a limited conflict in the area of Indochina, a war whose stake is difficult to analyse even today. We are dealing with the communist pressure in South Vietnam, against which the Americans acted, with nationalist pressure (both South Vietnam and the North Vietnamese against the southern Vietnamese population), with the communist danger in South East Asia, and with the Cold War that was not greatly affected by the Vietnam War.

The main books studied include *Vietnam, The Definitive Oral History, Told From All Sides* written by G. Appy. Appy, through interviews with war participants, Americans and Vietnamese, civilians and combatants, gives us a human perspective on the war.

Antony Best (*International History of the Twentieth Century*) shows a human and political dimension to the war, pointing out that many Vietnamese considered war as an anti-colonial one.

Major James A. Bright (*A Failure in Strategy: America in the Vietnam War 1965-1968*) has a very interesting master thesis on the Vietnam War considering that the big mistake of the United States was that they have not formally declared war on North Vietnam. According to the author, if the United States had declared war, American society could have been much better mobilized against North Vietnam.

Michael C. Howard (*The My Lai Massacre, A Study of the Event, Aftermath, and Implications*) treats the My Lai massacre, a massacre committed by US troops. This unfortunate episode shows that things did not work well for US troops and that the war was a very tough one.

One of the main arguments of the paper is that the Vietnam War was (for Americans) generated by the fear of communism. Fear was not primarily referring the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, but to the emergence of the Communist movements in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos and South East Asia as a whole. Another argument is that the war was a very hard one in many ways – first of all the North Vietnamese were willing to lose a lot of human lives to conquer / unite with South Vietnam. In turn, the Americans have invested heavily human and material in this war.

On the other hand, American leaders viewed the escalation of the war as a process necessary to stop the Communist advancement in Indochina. Everyone was aware that the defeat or the winning of the Cold War against the Soviet Union did not depend on the Vietnam War.

Another argument of the paper is that in the long run war has not been lost by Americans (or more precisely – in the long run – Vietnam's geopolitical situation and Vietnam's interests have been favorable to Americans).

The paper will answer the following questions:

- Why did the United States get involved and why later did they get so much involved in the Vietnam conflict?
- What were the main military and political characteristics of this war?
- Why did the My Lai massacre happen?
- How did the combatants and civilians involved in this conflict saw the war in Vietnam?

Involvement and degree of US involvement in Vietnam.

In a certain sense the problem was not if America should get involved, but at what degree to get involved. For the American decision makers leaving South Vietnam in the hands of the communists was not acceptable (Indochina and Indonesia could have been as well in danger)⁵. On the other hand they had to decide what would be the number of troops and what kind of war had to be implemented. Northern Vietnam fought against France and through victory gained its independence. In 1964 South Vietnam was infiltrated by troops and influence agents from North Vietnam. The Americans were worried about losing South Vietnam. The problem was how to intervene. First they intervened through military advisers then the leadership of the United States chooses sending a large number of American troops.⁶

The interests were implemented through war. For the North Vietnamese it was a tough guerrilla war. The stake of Vietnam was very important. It meant controlling Indochina or at least the neutrality of this region. For the French it meant an unsuccessful try of keeping a part of the Colonial Empire and for the Americans the interest of stopping communism.⁷ The North Vietnamese proved themselves powerful adversaries, very hard to beat. The military strategies, the fighting itself but also the political decisions proved essential for the Vietnam War. Kennedy sent only some thousands of military advisers. The Johnson administration escalated the war sending hundreds of thousands of soldiers⁸, trying to implement a conventional war against the guerrilla strategy of North Vietnam.

With many sacrifices both sides managed to fulfil their interest. North Vietnam kept its communist regime and incorporated South Vietnam, and South East Asia was not conquered by the communists.

In the end Nixon managed to pull out the United States with all the afferent problems, firstly the collapse of South Vietnam. From the military point of view the war was lost by the United States, but politically, on the long term, it was a draw.⁹ The war could have been won by the United States but with enormous investments. The interests of the United States were stopping the communist advancement in South East Asia and for the Northern Vietnamese keeping the independence and incorporating South Vietnam. Northern Vietnamese had been through very hard colonial wars, first against Japan, then, France and then the United States who wanted to keep its influence of South East Asia.¹⁰

According to Clausewitz war is the supreme confrontation between two entities (then states) resembling the confrontation between two men.¹¹ The hippy generation was

⁵ Ronald E. Powaski, *The Cold War, The United States and the Soviet Union, 1917-1991*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 155.

⁶ BBC News, *Vietnam Profile-Timeline* in <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-16568035>, accessed on 30.08.2017.

⁷ Antony Best (ed.), *International History Of The Twentieth Century*, London, Routledge, 2004, pp. 288-291.

⁸ David White, Why did Lyndon Johnson escalate the War in Vietnam?, in *Open History Society*, in <http://www.openhistorysociety.org/members-articles/1699-2/>, accessed on 29.08.2017.

⁹ Nathan Thompson, How United States and Vietnam had become unlike friends, in *CNN Politics*, 2016, in <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/05/22/politics/vietnam-united-states-friends/index.html>, accessed on 31.08.2017.

¹⁰ Antony Best, *op.cit.*, pp. 288-291.

¹¹ Clausewitz, *On War*, Prahova, Antet Publishing, Filipeștii de Târg, p. 9.

perfectly aware of this fact. The question they asked was why the American soldiers had to fight in Vietnam for purposes that did not seem very justifiable.¹²

Although the realists as Hans Morgenthau opposed the war,¹³ the truth is that the balance of power from South East Asia was gravely put in danger. Retrospectively if the Americans backed down maybe the communist parties would have been more aggressive.

The war was very hard to be won by the Americans (but the peace was won by them-on long term). Because of the fear of escalation they could not invade North Vietnam which was the source of the insurrection in South Vietnam.¹⁴ In the South they had to fight with the Vietcong, with the North Vietnamese Army and with parts of the civilian population. There were not some great battles that could have been won by the Americans. There were small and numerous battles specific to the guerrilla war led by Vietcong.¹⁵

A War of Attrocities - The My Lai Massacre

Uncovering the My Lai massacre (1978) meant recognition of the atrocities committed by some American soldiers (the same can be told for the Vietcong).¹⁶ An American company killed between 100 and 500 Vietnamese civilians committing war crimes (killing and rape).¹⁷ The story of the massacre showed a complicated chain of command, whose members tried to cover up the massacre. But the American bureaucratic apparatus worked and, as a response to numerous letters from an American soldier, an enquiry begun.¹⁸ The enquiry produced a single conviction (although there were many accused), and the man convicted was released after 3 years.¹⁹

But the American did not approve this massacre. The major problem was that for many American soldiers the Vietnamese (including the civilians) were the enemy. The fighting and the treatment of civilians became very tough anyway.²⁰ Basically the American soldiers, facing mines and guerrilla attacks, got frustrated and got even with the

¹² The Vietnam War and how it empowered the Hippy movement, in *Groovy History*, in <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-16568035>, accessed on 30.08.2017.

¹³ Martin Weil, 1980, Hans Morgenthau, Vietnam War Critic, in *The Washington Post*, in https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1980/07/21/hans-morgenthau-vietnam-war-critic/94e0555e-8cba-43fd-a661-64847032f3b8/?utm_term=.3bf943385d67, accessed on 30.08.2017.

¹⁴ Major James A. Bright, *A Failure in Strategy: America in the Vietnam War 1965-1968*, Master of Military Studies, in Marine Corps University, Command and Staff College, 2076 South Street, Marine Corps Command Development Command, Quantico Virginia 22134-5068, 2000-2001, p.17 in <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a401184.pdf>, accessed on 30.08.2017.

¹⁵ Ministry of National Defence, *Operations in the US Resistance War, Memoirs of War*, Ha Noi, Vietnam, Vietnam Institute of Military History, Gioi Publishers, 2009.

¹⁶ Michael C. Howard, The My Lai Massacre, A Study of the Event, Aftermath, and Implications, A Senior Thesis in General Studies, in *College of Arts and Sciences, Texas Tech University*, 2001, in <https://ttu-ir.tdl.org/ttu-ir/bitstream/handle/2346/23276/31295017969790.pdf?sequence=2>, accessed on 29.08.2017.

¹⁷ *Ibidem.*, p. ii.

¹⁸ *Ibidem.*, pp. 7-13.

¹⁹ *Ibidem.*, pp. 18-20.

²⁰ *Ibidem.*, p. 24.

civilians. Being a rural guerrilla war, the Vietnamese population could participate but at the same time could be a collateral victim.²¹

This is the problem of this century and of the twentieth century connected with the guerrilla warfare. Basically the enemy (Vietnamese, Afghans, Iraqis) can collaborate (or threaten) the civilian population in the sense of fighting against the enemy (in this case the United States). You cannot know for sure which are your enemies (how many of the civilian population is on your side, neutral or against you).

In Vietnam, for the Americans this was extremely frustrating because along the Vietcong they had to face a part of the civilian population (the Iraqi problem was solved by General Petraeus in the sense of defending and collaborating with the civilian population).

Military and political aspects regarding the Vietnam War

Another frustrating problem for the American army was that the war did not depend on a few major battles (the United States had technical superiority and maybe even a numerical one) through which the war could be won. In the twentieth century, neither the two world wars, neither the Korean War were guerrilla wars. The American leaders decided to bomb North Vietnam in order to obtain a victory in the South. They did not succeed, the North continued to supply massively the Vietcong troops in the South.

On the other hand the American political and military leaders were calculated enough. Firstly, they did not invade North Vietnam, in order not to escalate the conflict.²² Secondly they sent many troops in Vietnam but they did not pass a certain limit and when they saw that the war could have been won only with even bigger sacrifices, they retreated.

From our point of view, in 1963/1964 the United States had two possibilities, either they could have sent military advisers to help South Vietnam, either they could have escalated the war.²³ They have chosen the second option; the confrontation was defined by a very hard guerrilla war but also characterized by powerful bombardment against North Vietnam.

We cannot know if Kennedy would have escalated the war. Lyndon Johnson and the bureaucrats of Washington feared the communist expansion in South East Asia and chose the escalation of war. From some thousands American soldiers it led to 400,000 American soldiers. It was not a survival war for the United States but it was a war which consumed more and more lives.

On the other hand, the Vietnamese including Ho Chi Minh were toughened by the wars against the Japanese and the French. North Vietnam had a more powerful ideology and organization than South Vietnam. The problem of the South Vietnam was connected

²¹ *Ibidem*, pp.30-31.

²² For example the reaction of Lyndon Johnson towards the American Military leaders in Christian G. Appy, *op.cit.*, pp. 121, 123.

²³ Major James A. Bright, *op.cit.*, pp. 5-7.

with the lack of legitimacy, the corruption and the lack of authority. A fortified and powerful South Vietnam and maybe history would have looked differently.²⁴ The problem was that in 1956, the leadership of South Vietnam refused the common and free election for Vietnam (as the United States). The South Vietnamese were probably afraid of a communist victory. The issues showed above plus the communist infiltration proved essential for the state's lack of consolidation in South Vietnam.

Another issue of the Vietnam War was the fact that the American strategy passed from containment to massive intervention. But on the long term this was not necessarily wrong. The whole Vietnamese peninsula could have been contained. What would have happened if Vietnam was to be dominated by communist bases, Soviet or Chinese? On the other hand the human costs on both sides (much more for the Vietnamese) were huge and cannot be compensated.

But, on the long term the balance of power played a more important role than the ideology - because of the fear of China, Vietnam and the United States got very close in our days.

An important problem of the Vietnam War was the degree of preparation of the American soldiers. Some are considering that this degree decreased along the pass of time.²⁵ If we are looking at the development of the war the degree of preparation was good, but some authors consider that the massacre of the My Lai was generated by the lack of preparation of the respective soldiers and officers.²⁶

The communist propaganda was very powerful (the Vietnamese propaganda referred many times to the presence of American troops on the Vietnamese territory). In fact this was a big problem, the Vietnamese had fought against the Japanese and the French, and now the Americans could have been seen as a new invader²⁷. In fact this was not true, the Americans wanted to maintain the independence of South Vietnam-and that was the only purpose.²⁸

What the realists would have wanted from the beginning was an American superpower which conserves itself and does get involved directly only when its security is threatened (as it happened in the Second World War). Many acted like that – Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan in Afghanistan, in a way even George Bush senior in Iraq – but in the 60's we had a full Cold War and the competition between the two ideologies was omnipresent.

In fact the realists wanted an American superpower (a democratic superpower which supports democracy) which through the balance of power to intervene only from time to time and not massively (or massively just when is necessary like in the Second World War).²⁹ Those who applied these principles are Roosevelt, Eisenhower, Truman,

²⁴ *Ibidem*.

²⁵ Michael C. Howard, *op.cit.*, p.32.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, pp.30-32.

²⁷ Antony Best, *op.cit.*, pp. 288,289.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 293.

²⁹ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations, The Struggle for power and the struggle for peace*, Iași, Polirom, 2013; Stephen M. Walt, *What Would a Realist World Have Looked Like? From Iraq and WMDs to Israel and Palestine to Syria and Russia, how the United States could've avoided some of its biggest mistakes*,

Kennedy, Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Bush senior. But also there were a lot of interventions (Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq). We do not know how the new president Trump will act (we know that during George W. Bush and Barak Obama the United States got very much involved). The escalation in Vietnam happened during the presidency of Lyndon Johnson. From 20.000 soldiers it got to 400.000 American soldiers. According to the realists the escalation should not have happened. North Vietnam did not present an immediate danger, neither loosing South Vietnam.³⁰

The combat experience of the American Soldiers

The battle experience was of course tough. In fact, the war in Vietnam (being the first-televised war) has something surrealistic about it. US soldiers circulated with commercial airplanes, and during the flight they wrote to their friends or parents. Interestingly, many expected the battle experience to be a very hard one.³¹ First of all, as we have shown, it was not just a few big battles; we were dealing with a rural guerilla war. At the same time, Indochina's geography was unfavorable to the Americans, and was conducive to guerrilla warfare, as evidenced by North Vietnamese construction of the Ho Shi Minh route through which the Vietcong was supplied.

The book written by Christian G. Appy, *Vietnam, The Definitive Oral History, Told from all Sides*, presents interviews with ex participants to war (leaders, soldiers, Americans, South Vietnamese and North Vietnamese).

We have the story of an adolescent girl which worked for the North Vietnamese, more specifically at the Ho Chi Minh road. This process meant minimum ten hours day work and a permanent risk represented by the American bombing.³² The character is balanced and does not seem to hate. On the other hand another North Vietnamese woman whose father has been killed by the South Vietnamese was determined to fight well against the Americans. Her stories seem exaggerated especially because the ratio of killing was clearly favorable for the Americans.³³

The stories of the American soldiers are also interesting. Till the escalation, in 1965, the so called advisers were sent (regular army or Special Forces)³⁴. Till then the war was going well for the Americans because the stakes were much lower. Essentially, for the Vietnam War were Diem's assassination, and the hardening of the fight against the communists.³⁵ In that moment the North started to send regular troops in the South, and we were witnessing the first escalation of war.

in *Foreign Policy*, 2016, in <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/08/what-would-a-realist-world-have-looked-like-iraq-syria-iran-obama-bush-clinton/>, accessed on 12.06.2018.

³⁰ Logan S. Booth, *The Vietnam and Iraq Wars: The Antithesis of Realism* in Lethbridge Undergraduate Research Journal, vol.4(1), 2009, in <https://lurj.org/issues/volume-4-number-1/iraq>, accessed on 12.06.2018.

³¹ Christian G. Appy, *op.cit.*, pp. 106-111.

³² *Ibidem*, pp. 105-106, 103,104.

³³ *Ibidem*, pp. 15-19.

³⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 35-54.

³⁵ History.Net, *The Assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem* in <http://www.historynet.com/the-assassination-of-ngo-dinh-diem.htm>, accessed on 18.09.2017.

On the other hand, the North Vietnamese had a much clearer objective and were willing to lose millions of people for the conquering/unification with South Vietnam. Giap told McNamara that the Vietnamese had no regrets – they had a purpose and they fulfilled it no matter the costs.³⁶

We can state that for the North Vietnamese the purpose was much clearer and they were assuming the loss of millions in order to conquer/unite with Southern Vietnam and to chase away the American soldiers.

For the Americans the purpose seemed simple-maintaining the independence of South Vietnam. But the problems were numerous – What kind of strategy/tactic should have been used? What kind of South Vietnam should have been supported? How could they obtain the alliance with the civilian population? How could they beat an enemy willing to lose an enormous quantity of people and material?

Unofficially, there were signals according to which Lyndon Johnson and McNamara considered that a victory in Vietnam would be very hard to achieve, if it could be achieved at all.³⁷ But there were unofficial signs. Officially things were going well. That is why even if the Tet offensive was a military victory, psychologically it was a defeat.³⁸

A possible mistake

A possible American mistake was that the United States never declared war to North Vietnam. Legally and theoretically the US were not at war. According to Major James A. Bright, a declaration of war could have mobilized the entire American society around the war efforts. This process did not happen and many did not find about the war immediately. What did happen was that only a part of the American society was mobilized for the war and after a while the antiwar movement became very powerful.³⁹

Eisenhower and Kennedy were more prudent than Lyndon Johnson. A solution could have been consisting in sending just some thousands of American soldiers for helping the South Vietnamese army.

But the big problem was that the South Vietnamese state was collapsing (Diem had not succeeded in transforming into allies the Buddhist and the peasants).

After Diem, it was even worse-there were numerous military governments and coups.

The fighting was at many levels:

- Military – against the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese Army;
- Politically – for consolidating South Vietnam;
- Psychologically – for consolidating South Vietnam but also in relation with the antiwar movement.

³⁶ Christian G. Appy, *op.cit.*, pp. 41, 43.

³⁷ Joseph A. Califano, Jr, *The Triumph and Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson, The White House Years*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1991, p.18 *apud* Christian G. Appy, *op.cit.*, p.114.

³⁸ Phillip B. Davidson, *Vietnam at War: The History 1946-1975*.

Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988, p.475 *apud* Major James A. Bright, *op.cit.*, p. 36, note 74.

³⁹ Major James A., Bright, *op.cit.*, pp. 29-30.

But Vietnam had a long history in fighting for independence firstly towards China. Starting with the year 50 AD, there were numerous guerrilla wars of Vietnam against the invaders. The war between Vietminh and France was an anticolonial one. From this point of view both wars (against France and against the US), had for the North Vietnamese two components – the communist ideology but also the anticolonial struggle.⁴⁰ In here we have the difference – the US fought firstly against communism.

A big problem was that South Vietnam and the United States opposed free elections in Vietnam in 1956.⁴¹ It was a great possibility the communists could have won. But what kind of legitimacy can have those who oppose free elections.

The Geopolitics of the Vietnam War

From a geopolitical perspective, the Vietnam War presents a very problematic case. The disputed place was firstly South Vietnam, but, indirectly, from an American perspective, also Indochina and the South East of Asia. The disputed place meant also winning the hearts and minds of the South Vietnamese. On the other hand the Americans never declared war on North Vietnam which is a problem on itself.

The interest of the United States was defeating communism in South Vietnam, meaning keeping the independence of the South Vietnamese regimes. The interest of North Vietnam and Vietcong was conquering South Vietnam.

The implementation of interest at the military level were:

- for the United States, bombing North Vietnam and the Search and Destroy Strategy in South Vietnam.

- for the North Vietnamese and Vietcong, a powerful guerilla warfare.

As we said at the beginning, the Vietnam War was not a decisive one for the Cold War, but it was a long-lasting warfare. Losing it by the Americans meant the growing in power of the communist ideology in Indochina (at the beginning) but in our days we are dealing with a tide between the United States, Vietnam and China.

The psychological impact of the Vietnam War on the American soldiers

The impact of the Vietnam War on American soldiers was manifested by the so-called post-traumatic stress of battle. This occurs at least six months after the concrete participation in the war. In general, post-traumatic stress can occur within a year or even a few years after returning home, manifested by flashbacks of war experiences and being generated by a strong experience of fear or shame.

The 70's were not good for veterans in Vietnam, they were payed worse than those of Korea or World War II. Furthermore, many times they were not well welcomed

⁴⁰ Antony Best, *op.cit.*, pp.288-289; Edgeworth Osborne, Neil L. Jamieson, William S. Turley, William J. Duiker, Gerald C. Hickey, Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam in *Encyclopedia Britannica* in <https://www.britannica.com/place/Vietnam>, accessed on 13.03.2018.

⁴¹ Antony Best *op.cit.*, p. 290.

by American society. Some of them, together with their families, still think war was useless. We do not agree with this view – the Vietnam War is quite similar to that in Korea from a geopolitical point of view.

Some authors show that Vietnam veterans did not feel understood either by society or by their own families, returning home alone, unlike WW2 soldiers being not able to share their war experiences with their comrades. They arrived home, under the conditions in which part of society despised them, as there were no military parades, as families did not understand them, and where the state did not get much involved in helping them. In the 1980s, their image changed well, many of them reintegrated. At the same time, many were confronted with alcohol and drugs consumption, their reintegration into society being much more difficult.⁴²

However, figures are not very encouraging, 18.7% of veterans suffered from post-traumatic stress, presenting a high risk of depression, alcoholism, suicide.⁴³ All this is generated by the effect of killing, basically a moral denial violated by the military doctrine.⁴⁴

Some features of posttraumatic stress

- practically relive the battle scenes;
- hard to rebuild the ties with your loved ones, and the fear of loss is very present;
- you are confronted with hyper vigilance and the inability to forget.⁴⁵

In addition, there is a very important Vietnam related issue – if, in the Second World War, the average American soldier had two battles a year, in Korea between two and three battles a year, in Vietnam we had on average a battle every three weeks, creating an addiction to alcohol and drugs. We are dealing with very much anger, and the soldiers were being taught to react immediately, not to analyse, to always be on guard and worried.

Basically there are two rules in war:

- people die;
- you cannot change rule number one.⁴⁶

Many US combatants used drugs in Vietnam, such as marijuana, amphetamines, opium, and heroin. The army seemed to accept amphetamines because the soldiers could always be alert.⁴⁷

⁴² Josh Hochgesang, Tracie Lawyer, Toby Stevenson *War & Peace: Media and War, The Psychological Effects of the Vietnam War in ethics of development in a global environment* in https://web.stanford.edu/class/e297c/war_peace/media/hpsych.html, accessed on 24.07.2018.

⁴³ Dohrenwend BP, Turner JB, Turse NA, *et al.* The psychological risks of Vietnam for US veterans: a revisit with new data and methods. *Science*.2006; 313:979–82, Tanielian TL, Jaycox L. Invisible wounds of war: psychological and cognitive injuries, their consequences, and services to assist recovery in *I. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation*; 2008., *apud.* Alexander C McFarlane, The impact of war on mental health: lest we forget in *World Psychiatry*. 2015 Oct; 14(3): 351–353., notes 5, 6,7, in <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4592659/>, accessed on 24.07.2018.

⁴⁴ Maguen S, Lucenko BA, Reger MA, *et al.* The impact of reported direct and indirect killing on mental health symptoms in Iraq war veterans, in *J Trauma Stress*. 2010;23:86–90. (PubMed), *apud* Alexander C McFarlane, *op.cit.*, note 8.

⁴⁵ Dudley Stow, 2011, The Effects of the Vietnam War on the Soldiers, *Prezi*, <https://prezi.com/xayhnqqo-bey/the-effects-of-the-vietnam-war-on-the-soldiers/>, accessed on 24.07.2018.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem.*

⁴⁷ *Ibidem.*

The Vietnam Post-traumatic stress had a great influence on the American society, 40 years after the war, 271,000 soldiers still suffered from post-traumatic stress, which shows the major importance of the Vietnam War on the American collective and individual mind.⁴⁸

Conclusion

The consequences of the Vietnam War are hard to measured. It can be said that the US lost the war for 20 years and then won it-given the good relations between the two countries. It can be said that the communist doctrine expanded in Indochina and then lost ground. In reality it was a very bloody remise – 50.000 American dead, 300.000 American wounded, 300.000 South Vietnamese soldiers dead, 900.000 North Vietnamese soldiers and over 1 million Vietnamese civilian dead.⁴⁹ (The draw meant the partial expansion of Communism in Indochina but not in Malaya and Indonesia four American presidents adhered to the Domino theory Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson).⁵⁰ The draw meant that Vietnam did not become a closed and ultra-totalitarian republic like North Korea.

But this is also because of the leadership of North Vietnam. Probably, Ho Chi Minh really wanted collaboration with the Americans, despite also wanting the implementation of a communist regime. This could not happen given the zero sum logic of the Cold War, the domino theory and the spheres of influence. Moreover, the Vietnam War has clearly influenced American society (directly through veterans' combat experiences) but also through influence on American culture (cinema) and American politics (end of conscription, fear of escalation)⁵¹.

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⁴⁸ Brian Handwerk, 2015, *Over a Quarter-Million Vietnam War Veterans Still Have PTSD*, in <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/over-quarter-million-vietnam-war-veterans-still-have-ptsd-180955997/>, accessed on 24.07.2018.

⁴⁹ Nigel Cawthorne, *Vietnam, A War Lost And Won*, London, Arcturus Publishing Limited, 2006, p. 7.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 23,25.

⁵¹ *Weighting the Geopolitics of the Vietnam War*, in <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/weighting-geopolitics-vietnam-war>, accessed on 26.07.2018.

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Alliance under Stress. Wilson's Fourteen Points and their Impact on Romania

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Key-words: the Fourteen Points, Wilson, self-determination, Romania, World War I

Abstract

The Fourteen Points have become part of a whole political narrative dealing with the birth of a new world order or more exactly with the apparent failure to deliver a functional new world order after the cataclysm of 1914 – 1918. At the same time, any discussion about Wilsonianism leads to questions debates about unilateralism or internationalism or about the acceptance or refusal of interdependence by the United States in world politics. As US policies have fluctuated so much during the recent past it is perhaps natural to return to the founding father of the US global role. This dominant version has also obscured another aspect: while Wilson may have won the battle with posterity and identified himself with the new international order, phrases such as “national rights”, “the principle of nationalities” were already in common use in April 1917. In the short term the Fourteen Points were clearly perceived by Romanian officials as a challenge to their peace program. US refusal to endorse Romanian objective was troubling and the Peace Conference in Paris would prove that Wilson was indeed a reluctant supporter of Romania's territorial agenda.

The history of the Fourteen Points as it is written nowadays goes a long way to demonstrate to what degree international history has become a sophisticated trade. Over the course of this discussion we will cover only a few aspects, but a comprehensive approach would require dealing with intellectual history/history of ideas, political biography, old-fashioned (but nonetheless satisfying for some of us) diplomatic history, transnational history/global history, etc.¹ Decision-making mechanisms are dissected in the search for the meaning or the genesis of a certain phrase. The interactions between domestic and foreign policies, between the diplomatic strategic of the many actors

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¹ For recent contributions see Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment. Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism*, Oxford, Oxford, U.P., 2007; Trygve Thrøntveit, *The Fable of the Fourteen Points: Woodrow Wilson and National self-Determination*, “Diplomatic History”, vol. 35, no. 3/2011, pp. 445-481; Lloyd E. Ambrosius, *Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations*, London, Palgrave, 2002.

involved provide us with a fascinating picture, one that is highly complex and therefore sometimes difficult to grasp. Equally important, one should not forget the tense relationships between the White House and the State Department, the role of colonel House or the political naivety of the „scientific”² peacemakers of the Inquiry.

Equally difficult, the Fourteen Points have become part of a whole political narrative dealing with the birth of a new world order or more exactly with the apparent failure to deliver a functional new world order after the cataclysm of 1914 – 1918. At the same time any discussion about Wilsonianism leads to questions debates about unilateralism or internationalism or about the acceptance or refusal of interdependence by the United States in world politics. As US policies have fluctuated so much during the recent past it is perhaps natural to return to the founding father of the US global role. This dominant version has also obscured another aspect: while Wilson may have won the battle with posterity and identified himself with the new international order, phrases such as „national rights”, „the principle of nationalities” were already in common use in April 1917.

The history of the Fourteen Points is both the history of its formulation and its worldwide impact. President Wilson obviously played a central role in formulating, in drafting and redrafting the points, but he was sometimes a simple witness to the way their impact unfolded. In a subsequent speech in the Congress in February 1918 the president did not avoid “self-determination”. Furthermore, he seemed fully aware of the impact the phrase would have on the ground:

“National aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. Self-determination is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril.”³

American policies interacted with the policies of the other Great Powers and with the local forces on the ground and the Wilsonian discourse was appropriated and given different meanings. There is no doubt that the concept of self-determination offers the best example for this global process of action and reaction. Although never used in the Fourteen Points and not very present in Wilson’s political vocabulary, self-determination became an umbrella term under which sheltered both sophisticated ideas about democracy and self-government and the countless and often conflicting political and territorial agendas in Central and Eastern Europe.

Romanian reactions to the Fourteen Points form part of a larger, regional picture. Somewhat surprisingly perhaps for some, reactions to the President’s speech were almost uniformly negative in Central and Eastern Europe.⁴ One exception was represented by the Polish although Joseph Blociszewski, one of the first diplomatic historians of Poland’s rebirth thought it surprising given that the same assurances had been previously offered

² The idea of a “scientific” peace was expressed by Wilson in a conversation with the French ambassador (A. Link, *Woodrow Wilson. Revolution, War, and Peace*, Arlington Heights, Harlan Davidson, 1979, p. 75).

³ ****President’s Wilson Policy*, London, HMSO, 1920, 54.

⁴ ****Paper Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918. Supplements 1, Volume 1. The World War*, Washington, USGPO, 1933, p. 791.

by British, French and Italian statesmen over the few weeks preceding Wilson's speech.⁵ At the same time Romania was affected in unique ways due to recent diplomatic and military developments. Romania was the beneficiary of a secret treaty of the type Point I denounced. Its main objective upon entering the war was Transylvania but the President's famous Point X was a clear step back from earlier Entente statements. For example, the Entente's reply in January 1917 to one of Wilson's peace initiatives had spoken about „the liberation of Italians, Slavs, Romanians and Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domination”⁶ while the president was clearly speaking in terms of maintaining the integrity of the Dual Monarchy.

Furthermore, Wilson's address and his point VI requiring the „evacuation of all Russian territory” came at a moment when the Romanian authorities were actually deciding to send troops into Bessarabia, a province of the Russian Empire for the past hundred years and now an autonomous republic threatened with revolutionary upheaval. The Bessarabian issue would remain a point of contention as President Wilson seemed attached to the principle of Russian territorial integrity with the exception of carefully delineated Polish territories.

In Romanian official circles especially Point X was met with scepticism, disappointment and even confusion. The latter is not in the least surprising if we understand that lack of clarity seemed to be one of the dominant features at the top of the US administration.⁷ At the beginning of December 1917 United States had finally declared war on Austria-Hungary. It was an encouraging factor in itself. But asking the Congress for the declaration of war the President stated that „we do not wish in any way to impair or to rearrange the affairs of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.”⁸ That same month, in the *New York Times*, former president Theodore Roosevelt spoke for many when insisted that „our talk about making the world safe for democracy is a sham” unless „we intend to break up Austria and Turkey”.⁹ Woodrow Wilson however wrote privately that „pushed to its extreme the principle would mean the disruption of existing governments to an undefinable extent.”¹⁰ This conservative strand was reinforced by his Secretary of State Robert Lansing. Lansing's own attitude was noticeably ambiguous. Although the impact of the principle of

⁵ Joseph Blociszewski, *La restauration de la Pologne et la diplomatie europeenne*, Paris, A. Pedonne, 1927, p. 111.

⁶ James Brown Scott (ed.), *Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals. December 1916 to November 1918*, Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1921, p.35. Interestingly, the introduction of the „the principle of nationalities” was contested by the Russians who feared the Germans might use it in the Baltic region but the Anglo-French went ahead anyway. (Sterling Kernek, *The British Government's Reactions to President's Wilson Peace Note of December 1916*, „The Historical Journal”, vol. 13, no. 4/1970, p. 762, n. 111. A short time earlier the Entente had replied to German peace initiatives stating that „no peace is possible as long as the...acknowledgment of the principle of nationalities and of the free existence of small states shall not be assured.” (James Brown Scott (ed.), *op.cit.*, p. 28).

⁷ The literature on this is vast. For an introduction and a historiographical essay see M.B.B. Biskupski, *Wilson's Policies toward Eastern and Southeastern Europe, 1917-1919*, in Ross A. Kennedy, *A Companion to Woodrow Wilson*, London, Wiley-Blackwell, 2013, pp. 406-426.

⁸ James Brown Scott (ed.), *op.cit.*, p. 196.

⁹ Victor S. Mamatey, *The United States and East Central Europe 1914-1918: A Study in Wilsonian Diplomacy and Propaganda*, Princeton NJ, Princeton U.P., 1957, pp. 161-162.

¹⁰ Wilson used the words during a conversation on January 3rd 1918 with the British ambassador in Washington, Sir Cecil Pring-Rice (George Schild, *Between Ideology and Realpolitik. Woodrow Wilson and the Russian Revolution, 1917-1921*, Westport CT, Greenwood Press, 1995, p. 58).

self-determination worried him, Lansing was privately convinced that the preservation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was not in the interest of the United States.¹¹ It is also significant that Lansing kept his criticism of the Fourteen Points to himself.

Five months later, in May 1918, after Brest-Litovsk and the treaty of Bucharest, after the German Spring Offensive and the Sixtus affair, State Secretary Lansing was still able to write to the President: „you have been, as I have, importuned by representatives of these nationalities....This importunity is increasing. What should be said to these people? ...Should we aid them or discourage them?”¹² By then peace with victory had replaced “peace without victory” and yet the President was still unwilling to commit to the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Lansing had been doubtful from the beginning concluding the only possible course of action was to help build new states in Central and Eastern Europe. From his point of view, there was no idealistic attachment to national self-determination. Instead supporting these new polities was both a way to win the war by weakening the Dual Monarchy and to prevent German domination after the war.¹³

Other contemporary observers, the British experts at the Crewe House, were right to note that „expressions such as self-government or autonomous development should be avoided because they have a sinister meaning in Austria-Hungary and tend to discourage the friends of the Allies.”¹⁴ British planners were right. Brătianu’s decision to accept an armistice can be directly related to Wilson’s speech in the Congress requesting a declaration of war against Austria.¹⁵

While admitting that the Fourteen Points might not be the last word with regard to the shape of the post-war world, Ion Gheorghe Duca, a close ally of prime-minister Brătianu, remembered that „reading Wilson’s message was for all of us one of the most painful moments of the entire war”.¹⁶ Saint-Aulaire, the French minister in Iassy in 1918, describes in great detail the impact of both Lloyd George’s speech of 5 January and Wilson’s fourteen points on Romanian decisionmakers.¹⁷ British actions for example provoked at the end of January an official demarche by the Greek, Serbian and Romanian Governments which claimed that they understood the political and military consideration which had tempered British support for the nationalities but warned that „not recognizing the right to independence for all the nationalities living in these two countries [Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire] the problems of the last century will continue into the next”.¹⁸

¹¹ George Barany, *Wilsonian Central Europe: Lansing’s Contribution*, „The Historian”, vol. 28, no. 2/1966, p. 232.

¹² ****Paper Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. The Lansing Papers. Volume II*, Washington, USGPO, p. 128 [From here on *FRUS Lansing 2*].

¹³ *Ibidem*, p.129. Victor S. Mamatey, *op.cit.*, p. 184.

¹⁴ Sir Campbell Stuart, *Secrets of the Crewe House*, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1920, p. 32.

¹⁵ Sherman David Spector, *România la Conferința de Pace de la Paris. Diplomația lui Ion C. Brătianu*, Iași, Institutul European, 1995, p. 40.

¹⁶ I.G. Duca, *Memorii. Volumul IV. Războiul. Partea a II-a (1917-1919)*, București, Editura Machiavelli, 1994, p. 70.

¹⁷ Conte de Saint-Aulaire, *Însemnările unui diplomat de altădată în România, 1916-1920*, București, Humanitas, 2016, pp. 229-231.

¹⁸ ****1918 la români. Desăvârșirea unității național-statale a poporului român. Documente externe 1916-1918*, București, Editura Științifică și Pedagogică, 1983, pp. 1054-1056. The Romanians, Greeks and Serbians were in fact paraphrasing Lloyd George’s speech and they were replacing self-government with independence.

US policy continued to be a disconcerting factor for pro-Entente politicians in Romania and the Fourteen Points came at a critical juncture in the history of the Great War in Eastern Europe. As Russian resistance was collapsing Britain and France hoped to find the means to preserve the existence of an Eastern Front. To that end London and Paris had divided their spheres of action with Britain taking over responsibility for the Caucasus while the French focused on Romania and the Ukraine. It was obvious for everyone that if such a project were to succeed the Entente needed Romania's active participation. Wilson's refusal to admit knowledge of the August 1916 secret treaty was worrying.¹⁹ A cause for concern was also his repeated refusal to go further than a simple promise to restore pre-war Romania in the case of an Allied victory or to be drawn into a discussion (as dr. Angelescu, the newly appointed Romanian minister in Washington²⁰, or the Anglo-French diplomats repeatedly tried) about the fate of the subject nationalities of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Most worrying however were the visible signs of an Austro-American dialogue and Romanian, Czechs, Italian or Serbs were all worried at the beginning of 1918 that their interests were going to be sacrificed on the altar of a separate peace with Vienna.²¹

The impact was not restricted to political elites. One French officer assigned to recruiting volunteers from the ranks of Transylvanian prisoners of war noted that the Romanian soldiers were discouraged by Wilson's utterances.

Point X played therefore an important role in undermining the morale of the Romanian decisionmakers at a time when there seemed to be no realistic alternative to a separate peace. It is unclear however whether more encouraging news from Washington would have made much of a difference in the absence of actual military assistance. Russia's defeat and revolution, coupled with the Romanian internal divisions created an atmosphere where the impact of Wilson's speeches was especially deleterious. Vopicka, the US minister in Iassy, wrote a few days after Wilson's speech:

"The President's peace programme as reported by telegraph here has made the situation a great deal more critical than ever before and now demands for immediate peace with Germany are heard on all sides."²²

At the first glance, the combined effect of Points VI, X, and XI meant that Romania would have nothing to gain if it remained in the war and nothing to lose if concluded a separate peace.

Even months later, in early October, Romanian statesmen were still unable to ascertain how much of Point X remained in force. Prime-Minister Marghiloman relates a conversation with the King:

¹⁹ ****Paper Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918. Supplements 1, Volume 1. The World War*, Washington, USGPO, 1933, pp. 752, 757, 759 [From here on *FRUS 1918 Supplement 1*]. There are numerous proofs to contradict Wilson's statements. See for example *FRUS Lansing 2*, p. 25.

²⁰ ****Paper Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917. Supplements 2, Volume 1. The World War*, Washington, USGPO, 1932, pp. 737-738.

²¹ Sterling J. Kernek, *Woodrow Wilson and National Self-Determination along Italy's Frontier: A Study of the Manipulation of Principles in the pursuit of Political Interests*, „Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society”, vol. 126, no. 4/1982, p. 246.

²² *FRUS 1918 Supplement 1*, p. 752.

“the tenth paragraph is clear: it stipulates autonomy for the different populations of Austria. The King believes that there is something more encouraging in <<the five points from another program or speech>> (!) The King tries to find them, but finds nothing.”²³

If nothing else the conversation proves just how difficult was to access reliable information from outside the Central Powers's area of influence. The ambiguous state of affairs did not help. On 29 May Secretary of State Lansing had publicly supported “the nationalistic aspirations of the Czecho-Slovaks and Jugo-Slavs” but Romania or Transylvania had not been mentioned.²⁴

The Fourteen Points must be seen as part of a larger history. The role of British and French planning and actions in Central and Eastern Europe must not be underestimated as we should not underestimate the remarkable degree of autonomy for the local actors as the war was drawing to a close. But we should also see the Fourteen Points as part of a dynamic process which means that Wilson's thinking evolved influence by the context and by the perception of what is possible and desirable to achieve. The image of an idealistic and almost naive Wilson is remarkably resilient. In reality Point X would allow everyone to read it as he wished. In that Wilson's strategy was remarkably similar to that of the British at the time. A victorious peace was uncertain and not really convinced about the merits of national self-determination Wilson refused to be drawn to a premature decision.²⁵

Only at the end of the spring 1918 Wilson began to favour the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. By then there was probably no alternative left and clear statement with regard to the Romanian objectives were made as late as October and November. All this is another argument in support of the view that the Fourteen Points laid an ambiguous foundation for the American vision of the post-war world.

US support for Romanian objectives remained hesitant until the end of the conflict but this did not stop a dramatic transformation in the way the president's program was perceived. Wilson became widely known in Romanian territories, especially in Transylvania and US support for Transylvania's union with Romania was considered essential.²⁶ It is no accident therefore that in his last speech before the Hungarian Parliament, in October 1918, Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, one of the leaders of the Romanian national movement in Transylvania invoked the Fourteen Points in order to assert the rights of the Romanian nation and used what can only be described as

²³ Alexandru Marghiloman, *Note politice. Volumul III*, București, Editura Machiavelli, 1995, pp. 193-194. The new Prime-Minister scepticism with regard to the US support for the Romanian cause is also visible in *FRUS 1918 Supplement 1*, pp. 768-769. The King was referring to Wilson's February speech in Congress when the President endorsed more clearly the idea of self-determination. Marghiloman, the pro-German prime-minister was still tempted to believe that nothing had changed and the King himself seemed resigned.

²⁴ *FRUS 1918 Supplement 1*, p. 809.

²⁵ The degree to which the political context influenced Wilson's ideas can deduced from the fact that in all probability the phrase „autonomous development” was inspired by the British report on their secret contacts with the Austro-Hungarians. The report was sent by Balfour to colonel House on January 2. (See V. Mamatey, *op.cit.*, p. 175).

²⁶ Vasile Vesa, *La réception du Wilsonianisme en Europe Centrale. Le cas de la Transylvanie*, in George Cipăianu, Vasile Vesa (eds.), *Le fin de la Première Guerre Mondiale et la nouvelle architecture géopolitique européenne*, Cluj-Napoca, Presses Universitaires de Cluj, pp. 133-141. *FRUS 1918 Supplement 1*, pp. 783-784

Wilsonian language: "By the virtue of the natural right of each nation to determine its own fate, the Romanian nation in Hungary and Transylvania demands to determine, in all liberty and outside all foreign interference, its own state institutions and the relations as equals with all the other free nations".²⁷ In the previous days Vaida-Voevod had done everything possible so that the text of the declaration reaches President Wilson.²⁸ The American President was clearly identified as the main source of international support and legitimacy for the Romanian national movement in Transylvania. It was the "Wilsonian moment" in action.

In the short term however the Fourteen Points were clearly perceived by Romanian officials as a challenge to their peace program. US refusal to endorse Romanian objective was troubling and the Peace Conference in Paris would prove that Wilson was indeed a reluctant supporter of Romania's territorial agenda.

²⁷ Text of the speech in Annex 3 of Mircea Djuvara, *La guerre roumaine 1916-1918*, Nancy, Berger-Levrault, 1919, 313-319.

²⁸ Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, *Memorii. Vol. I*, Cluj-Napoca, Editura Dacia, 1994, p. 128.

The Post-conflict Reconstruction and the Implications of Kosovo-Serbia Tensions for the Regional Security

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Key-words: Balkan, EU, geopolitics, Kosovo, nationalism, NATO, Serbia, UN, Yugoslav Wars

Abstract

The Western Balkans is an area of discontinuity in terms of European integration, the state of the affairs representing a direct effect of the civil war that led to the collapse of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The concerns about the Balkan geopolitical climate dominate the last decade of the 20th century, with the humanitarian implications that exacerbated nationalism episodes brought to the forefront, at a time when the Communist regimes were already gone, and the Euro-Atlantic integration was the goal the main post-revolutionary agenda at the East. The study case follows the security impact that the of Kosovo-Serbia binomial has, the first being the province that later became a self-governing state, at the periphery of European construction, but with the security guaranteed by NATO's permanent mission on site.

The specificity of the developments between Belgrade and Pristina is one of the issues to be considered when analyzing the European paradigm on the medium and long-term developments of the region is debated. At a time when European actors continue to develop a common identity based on secular European ideas, Kosovo is one of the exceptions that come to confirm the rule. Therefore, European integration must be doubled by redrawing intra-regional relations, with the aim of reconciling and normalizing relations.

On the other hand, the phenomenology in Yugoslavia is a complex one, practically distinguishing an overlapping of processes: the fall of communism, the collapse of federal statehood, territorial secessionism among the hereditary republics, and then a civil war between the former Yugoslavia. From a historical perspective, the Balkan space is one of the most animated spaces of the nationalist movements, movements on the basis of which we have paradoxical processes: the formation of the state entity after the First World War, and its disintegration with the end of the Cold War.

The Western Balkans is an area of discontinuity in terms of European integration, the state of the affairs representing a direct effect of the civil war that led to the collapse of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The concerns about the Balkan geopolitical

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climate dominate the last decade of the 20th century, with the humanitarian implications that exacerbated nationalism episodes brought to the forefront, at a time when the Communist regimes were already gone, and the Euro-Atlantic integration was the goal the main post-revolutionary agenda at the East. The study case follows the security impact that the of Kosovo-Serbia binomial has, the first being the province that later became a self-governing state, at the periphery of European construction, but with the security guaranteed by NATO's permanent mission on site.

The specificity of the developments between Belgrade and Pristina is one of the issues to be considered when analyzing the European paradigm on the medium and long-term developments of the region is debated. At a time when European actors continue to develop a common identity based on secular European ideas, Kosovo is one of the exceptions that come to confirm the rule. Therefore, European integration must be doubled by redrawing intra-regional relations, with the aim of reconciling and normalizing relations.

On the other hand, the phenomenology in Yugoslavia is a complex one, practically distinguishing an overlapping of processes: the fall of communism, the collapse of federal statehood, territorial secessionism among the hereditary republics, and then a civil war between the former Yugoslavia. From a historical perspective, the Balkan space is one of the most animated spaces of the nationalist movements, movements on the basis of which we have paradoxical processes: the formation of the state entity after the First World War, and its disintegration with the end of the Cold War.

Historically, the province of Kosovo is presented from the most diverse perspectives, the thesis gravitating around two poles, constructed by historical, geographical, but also ideological arguments. In this context, the theories of historical legitimacy over Kosovo, and then the right to self-determination of the province – that later became a state – are subject to tensioned intra-regional relations, where historical interpretation has become an integrated component of the debate over secessionism and irredentism. The debate on the historical right over Kosovo, and especially on the rationale for the existence of Kosovo's statehood, will amplify on the background of the war, to continue in a latent form after the conflict, including nowadays.

The first theory, belonging to the pro-Serbian lode, is that illustrating the province as "Serbian Jerusalem"¹, and Kosovo is thus presented as "the cradle of Serbian Orthodox culture and spirituality"². In this way, the province (currently a self-governing state) is presented as "the old Serbia"³, underlining the indisputable character of the Southen Slavs` ancestral presence in the region and resulting in the intransigence of the Albanians in the region. According to the theory, Albanians were colonized by the Ottomans after the defeat of the Serbs in the Battle of Kosovo Polje (Blackbird Plain) in 1389⁴.

¹ Dušan T. Bataković, *Cronica de la Kosovo*, Bucharest, Bucharest Library Publishing House, 1999, p. 4.

² Traian Valentin Pocea, Aurel I. Rogojan, *Istorie, geopolitică și spionaj în Balcanii de Vest: originile, evoluția și activitatea structurilor secrete de informații în spațiul etno-geografic al slavilor meridionali: Iugoslavia versus România în războiul din umbră*, Baia Mare, Proema Publishing House, 2009, p. 51.

³ *Ibidem*.

⁴ Madeleine Albright, *Doamna secretar de stat*, Bucharest, RAO Publishing House, 2008, p. 536.

The same theory of the Islamization of the province during the Ottoman period develops the process of population exchange, illustrating how Constantinople brought Muslim colonists from Anatolia since the 15th century. In parallel, the massive migration of the Serb population from Kosovo, Metohija, and Macedonia in the 17th century, especially to Vojvodina, lead to the re-integration of Kosovo by the Islamic Albanian population, with the mention of a certain degree of persistence of the Albanian Christian confession.

The second theory, that of the Illyrian origin of the Albanian people, is the central element of the pro-Albanian voices, the theory stating that the Albanians are the descendants of the Illyrian ancients. This ideological construction denies that the province is a "Serbian historical and spiritual territory"⁵. This theory of ethnic Albanian ethnogenesis is built as a response to the idea of Kosovo as a Serb *civilization cradle*, claiming that "Serbs who came in the 7th century after Christ at about seven centuries after the Christ, they would only be intruders on the native land"⁶. The *albanofille* side of the historic debate over Kosovo links the provinces' political developments to the great migratory waves, thus erecting the main argument of Albanian continuity of occupation of the province since antiquity.

The Titoism had built over the decades a coalition to block nationalism, given the charismatic leadership of Josip Broz Tito, by "redistributing the previously incompatible elements into a new unity of personal identity and organizational membership, as well as the reappropriation of certain groups social at such a unity"⁷. The Leninist parties' emphasis on hierarchy, collectivism, and self-sacrifice precisely lead to a reconciliation of the incompatible commitments and guidelines, thus dismantling any divergent nationalist energies.

One year after Tito's death, between March and April 1981, the first confrontations on ethnic grounds aroused between Belgrade and Pristina, protests by Kosovo's Albanians being stifled by federal authorities, as stipulated in the circular *Memorandum* sent to Nicolae Ceaușescu by a group of the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia:

"The latest information from international media agencies and Yugoslav authorities about student demonstrations in Kosovo province of Yugoslavia is only a tiny picture of the massacre committed in this unfortunate province. While it is difficult to accurately assess the number of victims killed or injured, we can declare that their number is much higher than the 11 dead and 57 officially recognized and that the brutality and the *non-discriminatory use of weapons* by the police and the army Yugoslavia was made on a large scale, is comparable only to what we saw during the Nazi occupation during the Second World War"⁸.

⁵ Anthony Tucker-James, *The Rise of Militant Islam An Insider's View of the Failure to Curb Global Jihad*, South Yorkshire, Pen and Sword Military, 2010, p. 93.

⁶ Dušan T. Bataković, *op.cit.*, p. 4.

⁷ Velko Vujačić, *Slobodan Milošević. Lider charismatic sau demagog plebiscitar?*, published in the volume "World Order after Lenin", edited by Vladimir Tismăneanu, Marc Morjé Howard, Rudra Sil, Bucharest, Curtea Veche Publishing, 2009, p. 140.

⁸ Romania's National Archives, Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party – External Relations Section, file no. 179/1980.

The Yugoslav domestic climate, during the generational exchange in Belgrade, was first of all characterized by a political vacuum after the disappearance of Marshal Tito, and then by the "reduction of the federal state to a collection of elites that acted as pseudo-representatives of the various republics and autonomous provinces"⁹, the issue of the consensus intent becoming increasingly difficult to reach, the right to veto the important federal decisions acting a reform blocker. In contrast to the policy of "brotherhood and unity" implemented during Tito's rule by "removing Croatian nationalists and recalcitrant Republican elites from Slovenia (technocrats) and Serbia (liberals)"¹⁰, the successors of the Yugoslav leadership turned to the Serbian association with the state central Yugoslavia, thus inherent in the reaffirmation of the *Greater Serbia's* hegemony.

It was the era when the Yugoslav decision-makers such as Gragoslav Marković made efforts to rebuild Kosovo's reintegration within Serbia, mentioning in this way Ivan Strambolić's strategy for the revision of the 1974 federal constitution, in order to allow Serbia to arrogate the new right of control over the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. The political process of amending the fundamental law registered a considerable slowness, in fact, the effect of increasingly tensioned relations between the republics and the autonomous regions. Serbia's institutional synergies have been aggravated by the fact that "the leaders of the new Kosovo Serb civilian movement have threatened to organize a mass exodus of the rest of the Serb population in the region"¹¹.

Under these unprecedented tensions at the level of the power relations between the Yugoslav republics, Slobodan Milošević's neo-traditionalist discourse would anticipate a redefinition of the configurations of the Balkan states by arms: "To the frustration of the Serbs, Slobodan Milošević came to power by acquiring his legitimacy through the alleged care to protect persecuted Serbs. He abused the Kosovo legend, presenting himself as a protector of the Serbs, as Lazarus had done six centuries before, on the eve of the struggle of Kosovo Polje in 1389¹², showing himself as a continuator of the struggle of Orthodoxy against aggressive Islamism"¹³.

It stands as an evidence Milošević's speech from April 24th, 1987 from Kosovo Polje, addressed to the Serbs, on the background of tensions with the Albanian cohabiting ethnicity: "All Yugoslavia is with you. There is no doubt that for Yugoslavia Kosovo is a problem, but Yugoslavia is also Kosovo. Yugoslavia does not exist without Kosovo! Yugoslavia disintegrates without Kosovo! Yugoslavia and Serbia will not allow Kosovo to quit"¹⁴. The *Milošević Revolution* began in 1988 after the solidarity marches with Serbs in Kosovo, noticing the considerable public support for the constitutional reforms meant to bring the province under the leadership of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, motivated

⁹ Velko Vujačić, *op.cit.*, pp. 105-106.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 145.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 148.

¹² Battle between Kneaz Lazar and Sultan Murad I of June 15th/28th, 1389 disputed in the province of Kosovo and resulted in the death of both leaders; the confrontation ended with the Ottoman victory, the fall of Serbia and the encirclement of the Byzantine Empire by the Ottoman armies: <https://www.britannica.com/event/Battle-of-Kosovo-1389-Balkans> (accessed on April 30th, 2018).

¹³ Dušan T. Bataković, *op.cit.*, p. 6.

¹⁴ Velko Vujačić, *op.cit.*, p. 154.

by "extreme nationalism, frustrating aspirations for justice and social reforms, as well as nostalgia for the glorious days of Yugoslavism"¹⁵.

The popular confirmation for Milošević's speech, an exponent of the Yugoslav *apparatchik*, argued a precondition for the charismatic leader, that of being *culturally recognizable*¹⁶, although the degree of charisma was questionable, given the profound crisis the Yugoslav federal system was transiting. From a certain perspective, the political agenda of the new leader from Belgrade, a philobizantine-based position impossible to deny, Serbia was presented as the "peak of the Greek-Slavic world and the bastion of Orthodoxy"¹⁷.

There are also authors who even discuss the Greek *slavofillia*, presented as motivated by a strong religious component. Without aiming at distorting the impact that the confessional component has, it should not be forgotten that Greece also faced, just like Serbia, problems with the integration of the Albanian minority, so a precedent at the Greek state's borders had the potential for inciting some secessionist energy including even the territory of the Greek state. The tensioned situation that characterized the last moments until the actual confrontation broke out showed that "the Balkan war of the 1990s is an overwhelming reminder that the old wounds in Europe can burst into new and devastating violence"¹⁸.

The situation was sharpened even more after Russian constant entered into the equation, in this case, the *dilemma of the restoring the large Euro-Asian space*¹⁹, thereby we notice Kremlin's pan-Slavic and pan-Orthodox *mission*, as well as the answer from Belgrade: the request to be part of the Russian-Belarusian Union. Complications such as "ethnic warfare that fuels the war"²⁰ overlapped with a contradictory situation regarding developments in the era and manifestations in South-Eastern Europe: "it may seem paradoxical that globalization and economic modernization nurture political nationalism, but it only if we consider nationalism a backward ideology that should be removed from the advancement of progress"²¹. After an era when the "socialist patriotism weakened the commitment of the Albanian individual to the nation"²², the *ghost of the war*²³ became once again the trend in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, with only two of the six republics remaining and losing one of the two autonomous provinces, Kosovo.

The Kosovo crisis started with the Yugoslav President's decision to abolish Kosovo's autonomy on March 28th, 1989, following the Serbian nationalist agenda the leader of the Yugoslav Federative Socialist Republic promoted after taking over the leadership. The minimization the province's status meant a return to the political order

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 145.

¹⁷ Viorel Roman, *Tranziția. De la Revoluția din România, 1989, la războiul din Iugoslavia, 1999*, Bucharest, Europa Nova Publishing House, 2000, p. 24.

¹⁸ Hillary Rodham Clinton, *Decizii dificile*, Bucharest, RAO Publishing House, 2015, p. 245.

¹⁹ Viorel Roman, *op.cit.*, p. 25.

²⁰ Hillary Rodham Clinton, *op.cit.*, p. 245.

²¹ Fareed Zakaria, *Lumea post americană*, Iași, Polirom Publishing House, 2009, p. 49.

²² Fahri Balliu, *Berisha și Albania democratică*, Bucharest, Leda Publishing House, 2011, p. 61.

²³ Slavenka Drakulic, *Balkan Express. Fața nevăzută a războiului*, Bucharest, Athena Publishing House, 1997, p. 24.

preceding the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974 when Josip Broz Tito conferred provided the province with autonomy. Albanians' to the campaign of systematic suppression of constitutional rights consisted of the *phantom institutions'* stage²⁴, in fact, the first form of rejection of the federal authority, the people from Kosovo creating in this way an informal institutional system.

At the end of the Cold War, the claims of the Albanian population would go towards the *status quo ante*²⁵, the pacifist resistance movement being led by Ibrahim Rugova. The results perceived as modest would widen the gap between Belgrade and Pristina, with a major impact on the demands of the Albanian population in Kosovo, which had completed its agenda by requesting an *update (e.n. of the status) of Kosovo*²⁶, the transformation of the region into the republic and the recognition of the Albanians as a constituent nationality of the Yugoslav federation. As a result of this objective, Kosovo's General Assembly adopted on July 2nd, 1990 a *Constitutional Declaration*²⁷ granting Kosovo a status of equality with the constituent Yugoslav republics. The inherent impact was the organization of a clandestine referendum on September 1st, 1991, when 87% of the electors declared in favor of independence.

Despite the democratic legitimacy of regional political leadership, the ethnic cleansing led to the weakening of Rugova's position, the *de facto* leadership of the resistance movement being taken over by the *Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës – UÇK)*²⁸, whose mission was to obtain the independence using the military means. The loss of the informal power by the leader of the *Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës – LDK)* was caused by the failure in building a "negotiating team consisting of a large coalition of ethnic Albanian parties"²⁹ and was also a result of the inability to obtain substantial concessions from the Yugoslav President. The most consistent external support for Kosovo's secessionism came from the Albanian Democratic Party led by Sali Berisha, who reintroduced the idea of *Greater Albania* as early as in 1992 and, particularly, the idea of a union with Kosovo, the Berisha Administration recognizing the Republic of Kosovo in a statement that reconfirmed the decision of the Albanian Parliament from 1991.

In this context, the Kosovo crisis had exponentially grown in intensity, especially alimented by the developments from the immediate neighborhood: ethnic tensions and territorial claims "frozen by bipolarity and block policy"³⁰ had been revitalizing after an

²⁴ Sabrina Ramet, *Balkan Babel: the Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the death of Tito to the fall of Milošević*, Colorado, Westview Press, 2002, p. 308.

²⁵ Madeleine Albright, *op.cit.*, p. 537.

²⁶ Stefan Wolff, *The Kosovo Conflict*, IKV Pax Christi, 1998, p. 2: <http://www.stefanwolff.com/files/kosovo.pdf> (accessed on April 30th, 2018).

²⁷ Armend R. Beka, *The KLA and the Kosovo War*, f.l., Berghof Conflict Research, 2010, p. 13: http://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Papers/Transitions_Series/transitions8_kosovo.pdf (accessed on April 30th, 2018).

²⁸ The Guerrilla Movement was founded in March 1993, with the mission of preparing the Kosovo population for armed resistance, also disseminating political information. Armend R. Bekaj, *The KLA, and the Kosovo War. From Intrastate Conflict to Independent Country*, Berlin, Berghof Conflict Research, 2010, p. 17.

²⁹ Stefan Wolff, *op.cit.*, p. 2.

³⁰ Mihail Dobre, *Romania la sfârșitul Războiului Rece*, Bucharest, Enciclopedica Publishing House, 2011, p. 222.

era in when the fear of Soviet domination suppressed interethnic disputes, based on a common discipline of resisting interest in the scenario of external intervention. The Yugoslav wars, starting with Bosnia and Herzegovina, happened in the paradigm of the *doctrine of humanitarian intervention* but preceded by diplomatic steps to avoid the opening of any new front.

As a result of the ongoing conflicts, leaders from seven Balkan countries gathered in November 1997 at a high-level meeting to discuss the point-by-point problem of migratory flows and to adopt a common position on recognizing the borders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia within the existing frontiers at that time. On this occasion, there was a discussion between the Albanian Prime Minister Fatos Nano and the Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević on the Kosovo issue. Although the talks did not end with a consensus on Kosovo's constitutional stance, the talks indicated that the new Tirana executive chose to abide by the existing borders rather than supporting the *irredentist claims of Kosovo*³¹.

As early as 1998, the United Nations began to take action for preventing a potential conflict in southern Serbia, thus deploying the U.N. Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia. The decision to organize the mission on the border of the future theater of war was determined by a geostrategic calculation, namely the nature of potential contamination by expanding the confrontation between Slavs and Albanians in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The UN decision came to confirm the pseudo-axiom of the era describing *the 1990s as an interwar period*³², and the *Balkanization*³³ as a phenomenon of political fragmentation was thus confirmed.

UN's activism on peacekeeping also demonstrated the assumption made by the former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali on "subsequently defrosting the Security Council"³⁴ with direct reference to the NATO's *New Strategic Concept*, the actions of the Western European Union, the European Union or the OSCE in this direction. The tendency to refuse strategic logic and search for even the smallest common denominator in terms of commitment is distinguished in this respect.

From the desire to retain military force as the *last arbiter*, the solution of the Kosovo crisis was initially imagined from the perspective of coercive diplomacy, the exertion of influence being augmented by international legal pressures. The economic sanctions against Milošević's regime were the first steps to dismantle the Serbian offensive in Kosovo, noting that the impact was the encouragement of black market in conjunction with destabilizing regional context, having known the trade relations between Serbia and countries like Bulgaria, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, or Romania.

At the same time, the *Contact Group* created to manage the Bosnian crisis had its mandate extended over Kosovo. By widening the scope of this action force for the Balkans, some structural adjustment was made by the inclusion of Italy, in addition to its

³¹ Stefan Wolff, *op.cit.*, p. 2.

³² Colin S. Gray, *Războiul, pacea și relațiile internaționale. O introducere în istoria strategică*, Iași, Polirom Publishing House, 2010, p. 257.

³³ Antoaneta Olteanu, *Homo Balkanicus: trăsături ale mentalității balcanice*, Bucharest, Paideia Publishing House, 2004, p. 106.

³⁴ Colin S. Gray, *op.cit.*, p. 264.

original members (France, Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America). The first initiative to realize the diplomatic moves to resolve the crisis was revealed from the *Holbrooke – Milošević Agreements* (1998), the US envoy Richard Holbrooke implementing the tactics of good offices for the reconciliation between the federal leadership and the Albanian separatists.

As a result of international community's involvement, the Serbian Parliament approved a number of conclusions on the Kosovo conflict on September 28th, 1998, which highlighted the need for a rapid resolution of the crisis. The conciliatory position of the Serbian legislature was followed by *UN Security Council Resolution 1199* (1998), which called for both the restoration of the provisions of the Yugoslavian fundamental law of 1974 and the commitment of the parties to the conflict to end the crisis peacefully³⁵.

At the same time, massacres such as that from Račak (January 1999) led to the deployment of an OSCE observation mission composed of 2,000 observers³⁶. However, the mission of observers was hampered by the *Milošević's intransigence*³⁷, whose position of refusing the international mediation was motivated by the argument that the relations between Belgrade and Pristina were a matter of internal competence, invoking the idea of sovereignty. The response to the federal President's vehement opposition against the international mediation proposals came from Kofi Annan, who stated that "state sovereignty should not be used as an excuse for humanitarian abuses"³⁸. The evolutions in the early 1999 have demonstrated the strictly declarative stance of the Belgrade Parliament, which led to a debate between the *surgical blow*³⁹ and the negotiated solution.

Given the experiences during the Slovenian, Croatian, and Bosnian stages of Yugoslav wars, the settlement of the Kosovo conflict preferred to be achieved by diplomacy, with the Rambouillet negotiations debuting on February 6th, 1999. The negotiation scheme, developed around the Secretary of State Madeleine Albright exposed the internal fragmentations of the Albanian side, with the prospects being quasi-dichotomous: on the one hand, *LDK*, led by Ibrahim Rugova, and on the other hand, *UÇK*, led by Hashim Thaçi. Ibrahim Rugova's erratic position was, however, confirmed by the fact that the leader of the Albanian delegation was the commander of the guerrilla group and not the elected president of the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo.

The agenda of the negotiations from the French resort included the following *non-negotiable basic elements*⁴⁰: political agreement, *UÇK* disarmament, keeping Kosovo

³⁵ *RESOLUTION 1199 (1998) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3930th meeting, on 23 September 1998, S/RES/1199 (1998)*: [www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1199\(1998\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1199(1998)) (accessed on April 30th, 2018).

³⁶ Madeleine Albright, *op.cit.*, p. 560.

³⁷ Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War. Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat*, Public Affairs, New York, 2001, p. 162.

³⁸ Fareed Zakaria, *op.cit.*, p. 215.

³⁹ John Nagal, Octavian Manea, *The Uncomfortable Wars of the 1990s*, published in the volume „War, Strategy and History”, edited by Daniel Marston, Tamara Leahy, ANU Press, 2016: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1dgn5sf.15> (accessed on April 30th, 2018).

⁴⁰ Anthony Wanis-St.John, *The Rambouillet Negotiations: A Precursor for Failure?*, f.l., f.e., 2014, p. 40: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/263198869_The_Rambouillet_Negotiations_A_Precursor_for_Failure (accessed on May 1st, 2018).

within Yugoslavia, a NATO peacekeeping force doubled by the guarantee of respect for the rights of the Serb minority in the region. The reaction of the Serbian side led by President Milan Milutinović was that of accepting the autonomy restoration and the democratization, but with the vehement rejection of the foreign troops' clause, the main implication of this disagreement is the *equivalent of Chechnya in the Balkans*⁴¹. As for the Albanian side, Rugova exposed a report of equality between security and independence, saying the referendum is the last solution otherwise "we will see ourselves locked forever inside Serbia"⁴². The negotiations in the proximity of the French capital were the latest diplomatic vector to avoid an escalation to the armed conflict, the *carrot-and-stick* approach being imagined, as reported by the SACEUR Clark: Threatening the Serbian delegation with military intervention in case it refuses the proposed agreement"⁴³.

The conduct of the Rambouillet talks was also hampered by the Albanian position, an evidence of a non-pudent and atomizing perception, which blew up the negotiation process, Clark believing that they had cognitive blockages both in knowing their own position and the expanded context. The cantoning of both camps in a revanchist logic led to the conclusion of the negotiations on February 23rd, 1999 without the approval of a compromise peace, the imminence of the air military campaign being a matter of weeks because, on March 24th, 1999 NATO air force bombed Yugoslavia.

The interim between Rambouillet and NATO bombing was represented by the *talks in Paris* during which the Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Drnovcek held secret negotiations with UCK's leadership. The meeting in Paris took place in the context of Hashim Thaçi leaving the Rambouillet negotiations to consult with his admirer Adem Demaçi on the basis of his instructions not to sign the text of the *Rambouillet Agreements* without prior consultation.

As the imminence of opening up of a new war theater was an increase was irrefutable, series of strategies to localize and subsidize the Kosovo crisis were drawn up, also taking into account the involvement of Romania. A first scenario was the adherence to the US strategy of supporting the Yugoslav pro-democracy forces, but with specific adaptations based on recent developments. In this way, there was a meeting that took place in Banat between Constantin Degeratu, the head of the Army's Major State and his counterpart from Yugoslavia, Momčilo Perišić, based on a strategy of "concentration of political and force institutions against the Milosevic regime"⁴⁴. The desideratum was that of avoiding NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia, but it ended with the arrest of Perišić, later placed under house arrest. Following this informal attempt to avoid the war, the presidents from Bucharest and Sofia addressed a joint letter to their counterpart from Belgrade, but the *démarche* remained unanswered by Milošević.

On March 2nd, 1999 the Kosovar delegation accepted to signing the *Agreements*, but the answer of the Serbian side was delayed until March 23rd, 1999, when the Parliament from Belgrade announced that it rejected the documentation, despite the actions of the *Contact Group* and Ambassador Richard Holbrooke for persuading the

⁴¹ Madeleine Albright, *op.cit.*, p. 564.

⁴² *Ibidem*, p. 565.

⁴³ Wesley Clark, *op.cit.*, p. 162.

⁴⁴ Laura Ganea, *Prețul demnității: o istorie altfel*, Bucharest, RAO Publishing House, 2017, p. 541.

Serb party to accept the negotiated solution. On the same day Javier Madariga Solana, NATO Secretary-General, made provision for the commencement of the air operations over the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which would last until June 10th, 1999, with the mention of military operations developed without a resolution of the UN's Security Council. From a legal point of view, the war ended after the *Military Technical Agreement*⁴⁵, also known as the *Kumanovo Agreement*⁴⁶, was signed by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Force (KFOR).

The diplomatic steps to settle the conflict in Kosovo have been patented according to the quality of the case-by-case study of the conflict in southern Serbia as the final stage of the Yugoslav secessionist wars. The confrontation between Slavs and Albanians is presented from the perspective of a war following the principles of the *doctrine of humanitarian intervention* under development with NATO's *New Strategic Concept*, with coercive diplomacy being initially preferred to the detriment of classical intervention. The UN's activism promoted by Ghali corroborated with Kosovo's *anti-strategic*⁴⁷ experience, augmented by the concept of a new war specific to the 1990s: the intrastate war, with at least one of the belligerents lacking the state authority.

The diplomacy of the last decade of the 20th century was facing a *new interwar decade*, unregulated in terms of how to deal with a predominantly intra-state confrontation, but with a pronounced transnational ascendant. The diplomatic instrument was in the process of redefinition following the Kosovo crisis in the wake of the Balkan instability and combats between factions, plus the paradigm defined by Wesley Clark as *talk-fight, talk-fight*. The policies and programs breveted for the post-conflict reconstruction, reconciliation, and the widespread international development process were weakened by the security vulnerabilities, mentioning in this way the with *the minority at risk*⁴⁸.

The amplitude of the Kosovo crisis, but especially the long-term implications of ethnic cleansing, by manipulating beliefs and inciting nationalities against each other, raised the issues of province's status, thus the post-war rehabilitation could only be achieved by maximizing the security safeguards of the former combat camps. The bilateral concessions were a *sine qua non* condition for the post-conflict pacification and reconstruction, but the condescension of both sides was caused by the fear that a more moderate position in relation to the former opponent could become a security syncope. For Belgrade, the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia was not a matter of negotiation, while for Pristina the self-determination was a road without return.

The conflict in Kosovo, like the previous one from Bosnia and Herzegovina, was a *manifestation of the great crises of history*⁴⁹, an integral part of the *great historical upheavals*⁵⁰, having the "internationalization of the moral trauma of non-recognition"⁵¹ as

⁴⁵ RESOLUTION 1244 (1999) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, on 10 June 1999, S/RES/1244 (1999): <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/sc99.htm> (accessed on May 1st, 2018).

⁴⁶ Traian Valentin Pocea, Aurel I. Rogojan, *op.cit.*, p. 157.

⁴⁷ Collin S. Gray, *op.cit.*, p. 265.

⁴⁸ Șerban Filip Cioculescu, *Războaiele civile: trenduri contemporane. Despre măsurarea dezastrului umanitar în epoca globalizării*, published in the volume "Fața întunecată a globalizării", edited by Șerban Filip Cioculescu, Șerban Manea, Silviu Petre, Bucharest, RAO Publishing House, 2016, p. 37.

⁴⁹ Emir Kusturica, *Unde sunt eu în toată povestea asta?*, Iași, Polirom Publishing House, 2012, p. 5.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*.

the main dissatisfaction with the Kosovo secessionist movement. At the same time, there is a question of mutual knowledge, at the level of interests and claims, being vehiculated some suspicions that "Kosovo Serbs and Albanians do not know who they want"⁵². The Kosovo issue was also a stake in the European crisis management mechanism, especially since its settlement was a matter for the transatlantic partner, although Jaques Poos said: "This is Europe's time. If a problem can be solved by Europeans, this is the Yugoslav problem. This is a European country and it does not depend on Americans"⁵³, so the developments showed a relationship that is basically inclined to Washington's authority in the region.

The *Myth of Europe* had even been invoked by Milošević on June 28th, 1989, when he explained how "the Serbs defend in Kosovo not only themselves but the whole of Europe"⁵⁴. The speech of the President from Belgrade was meant to contradict the accusations against his anti-Europeanism, recalling the era in which Belgrade was presented as *the keys to Central Europe*, the last bastion of resistance to the Ottoman offensive. It is demanded to add the "intellectual revival of liberalism"⁵⁵ in Serbia, doubled by nationalism, but the very rise of liberal-based criticism nature has determined the association between the maintenance of the Serbian state integrity and the idea of the *Great House of Europe* proclaimed by Mikhail Gorbachev.

The thesis stating that the preservation of Kosovo in Serbia, hence implicit Yugoslavia, was a quagmire for the *new world order*⁵⁶ announced by George H.W. Bush came to impress a state of a lull in Yugoslav society, deeply affected by divergent national perspectives. It was the stake of a head of a state whose territory had just been drastically reduced, adding the doubtful stability of the new federation made up of two republics and two autonomous republics, with one of the provinces *en route* to an international guardianship regime. This unipolar re-establishment of the post-Cold War world demonstrated, especially in the case of the Yugoslav wars, a position of US, characterized by the Secretary of State Madeleine Albright cataloging as an *indispensable nation*⁵⁷. On NATO's involvement in the Balkans, the critics of the Alliance stated that it represented "NATO expansion after the Cold War austerity"⁵⁸.

Given the tensioned situation and especially the transformations within the bilateral and multilateral relations that the Kosovo war has produced, in this case, the divergences between UN members regarding the legitimacy of NATO bombing, the completion of military operations in southern Yugoslavia represented the real challenge of unipolar order. The fall of Communism was not *the end of the history* as claimed by Francis Fukuyama, but the building of a new international society, *the rise of the rest* that Fareed Zakaria evoked, but above all a turbulent dynamic that would characterize *the*

⁵¹ Antoaneta Olteanu, *op.cit.*, p. 61.

⁵² Sabrina P. Ramet, *Thinking about Yugoslavia. Scholarly Debates about the Yugoslav Breakup and the Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 221.

⁵³ Fareed Zakaria, *op.cit.*, p. 195.

⁵⁴ Velko Vujačić, *op.cit.*, p. 157.

⁵⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 147.

⁵⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 52.

⁵⁷ Fareed Zakaria, *op.cit.*, p. 197.

⁵⁸ *Ibidem*.

*post-Cold War studies*⁵⁹. The Kosovo problem has made an overwhelming complication to an international system in the middle of a transition, which had transcended a *new interwar decade* with the disappearance of one of the bipolar actors, thus inherently having Washington in the position of the only actor possessing of the capabilities for managing international security and peace.

The status of Kosovo was likely to strain the fragile relations between *United Europe* and the Western Balkans, as witnesses of Croatian journalist Slavenka Drakulić during the Yugoslav wars: "You are not European, not even East European. You are just Balkan, primitive, savage and dangerous. Kill yourself if you like it. We do not understand what is happening there, and we have no clear political interest in the area"⁶⁰. The statement of Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General in the era, came to demonstrate Drakulić's vision, while providing justification for NATO's intervention in Kosovo⁶¹: "state sovereignty should not be used as an excuse for humanitarian abuses"⁶². However, a legitimacy conferred exclusively on power, namely by what Hubert Védrine characterized as *hyperpower*⁶³, could not lead to contestation, despite "intellectual and moral justifications"⁶⁴.

Milosevic's assumptions about the convergence of the interests between the West and Yugoslavia in the Balkans was demonstrated by the first peace plans, the Western vision being similar to those elaborate during the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the great European empires: obstructing political fragmentation or limiting as far as possible the magnitude of the process. In this respect, case studies such as Trentino (South Tyrol), Catalonia, the Basque Country or Tatarstan have been considered as "capable of providing solutions to Kosovo's problems"⁶⁵. In fact, the international community's vision for Yugoslavia's post-conflict reconstruction was to preserve Kosovo within national borders, and therefore the thesis of the subsidiary settlement was evident, expressing at the same time the guarantees for Yugoslavia's territorial integrity, together with those for Kosovo's autonomy.

The crisis management from in Kosovo became more and more difficult as *the Russian factor*⁶⁶ manifested a flagrant opposition to NATO's involvement in South-Eastern Europe, even if the Soviet Union's successor state was going through a period of internal transition and instability. Although the new regime from Moscow, assumed to be

⁵⁹ George Cristian Maior, *Incertitudine. Gândire strategică și Relații Internaționale în secolul XXI*, Bucharest, Rao International Publishing, 2009, p. 35.

⁶⁰ Slavenka Drakulić, *op.cit.*, p. 9.

⁶¹ NATO's intervention in Kosovo was not mandated by the Security Council, but the texts of the resolutions issued on Kosovo provided a *carte blanche* to the Alliance, noting that if the parties did not implement the organization's requests, other means could be resumed; the deduction indicates that if the peaceful mechanisms for resolving the crisis did not yield the expected results, the use of force remained the only option, as done against Yugoslavia in 1999.

⁶² Fareed Zakaria, *op.cit.*, p. 215.

⁶³ *Ibidem*, p. 196.

⁶⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 215.

⁶⁵ Sabrina Ramet, *Thinking about Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debates about the Yugoslav Breakup and the Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 215.

⁶⁶ Ioan Mircea Pașcu, *Bătălia pentru NATO. Raport personal*, Bucharest, Rao Publishing House, 2nd edition, 2014, p. 13.

democratic, was going through a process of redefining its relations with the West, from the perspective of dialogue and sectoral cooperation, the traditional strategic interests remained a constant, ultimately the Kremlin's preeminence in the area Eastern Europe. The Commonwealth of Independent States, the soft-power component that provided the answer to the "dilemma of restoring the large Euro-Asian space"⁶⁷.

The antagonisms that both the Western and Eastern attempts to export their own model in the former Communist camp brought the great powers of the time to the logic of the Cold War, testifying in this respect to the analyzes of the era of the Washington leadership agenda: "Although the Clinton Administration would prefer to focus on internal revitalization, would make a big mistake if they ignored the dangers and opportunities that Central and Eastern Europe offers"⁶⁸. In addition to the American vision from 1993, the Western policy since 1999 has been that of *participatory reconciliation*⁶⁹, but the viability of this strategy has been questioned by the reality of the scene: "Central and Eastern Europe are covered by the Weimer Mini-Republic, each able to apply a tremendous degree of violence to others. Paradoxically, although they were heavily armed, these states were still unable to defend themselves against external aggressors"⁷⁰.

The analogies between dysfunctionalities of the inter-war period and those that belong to the post-Yugoslav order were not at odds, as the Clinton Administration's solution to the Kosovo issue was inspired by the ethnic-bound border projects after 1918. In fact, a solution a mirror of the prehistory in Upper Silesia, the White House proposal for post-conflict reconstruction of the Western Balkans included a mechanism allowing Kosovars to make a decision on their "future homeland"⁷¹. It is also should be taken into account the democratization mission that motivated the international involvement in Yugoslavia, with ideologies describing the fever of democratization. Critics of the civilizing mission of the democratic states expressed ideas according to "the term is used on the international scene as a devalued exchange currency"⁷², a *façade* for the interference within the domestic affairs of another state, while legitimizing the use of force in the name of democracy. A good example of this is Romanian poet Adrian Paunescu, who presented NATO's intervention against Belgrade in the most metaphorical terms possible, martyred the Serb side by presenting allied bombings as the "crucifixion of Yugoslavia"⁷³.

The international community's plans to establish Kosovo's autonomy were also subject to pressures coming from the Kosovar leaders, for whom the desire for self-control had rather the valences of a movement of independence, especially after the

⁶⁷ Viorel Roman, *op.cit.*, p. 25.

⁶⁸ *Apud* Zalmany Khalizad, *Extending the Western Alliance to East Central Europe: A New Strategy for NATO*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, p. 4.

⁶⁹ Hillary Rodham Clinton, *op.cit.*, p. 248.

⁷⁰ Ioan Mircea Pașcu, *op.cit.*, p. 49.

⁷¹ National Archives and Records Administration, William J. Clinton Presidential Library and Museum, Kettering Foundation, *Advise the President: William J. Clinton. What Should the United States Do About the Kosovo Crisis?*, f.l., 1999, p. 4: <https://s3.amazonaws.com/sitesusa/wp-content/uploads/sites/402/2016/11/clinton-kosovo.pdf> (accessed on May 1st, 2018).

⁷² Sergiu Gherghina, Vasile Boari, *Abordări multidimensionale ale unei vechi problematice*, published in the volume "Regăsirea identității naționale", edited by Sergiu Gherghina and Vasile Boari, Iași, Polirom Publishing House, 2010, p. 16.

⁷³ Laura Ganea, *op.cit.*, p. 50.

experiences of a frontless war. The failure of *Yugoslavism*, along with the "rejection of the tyranny of the majority"⁷⁴, led to the vehement opposition to any form of authority, even formal, of Belgrade over Kosovo. Unlike a conflict in the classicist warfare paradigm, the conflict in Kosovo was manifested by the annulment of marginal and civil margins as a result of ethnic cleansing policies, which made unthinkable any peacemaking project involving the return of the province under the Yugoslav authorities.

The *strategic violence*⁷⁵ applied by the regime from Belgrade, which was responded in the most retaliated manner possible, has induced an exponential degree of radicalization in former combatants' discourse: for the Serbian side, the "anti-strategic experience in Kosovo"⁷⁶ raised some insurmountable obstacles between Belgrade and the Alliance, the Kosovars' struggles – that began when the *Iron Curtain* started to crumble – could have another end than the independence. Pristina's position is the same with that expressed by the advisors of the US President in 1993: "the association between the US and the independence movements, following the precedent after bombing Yugoslavia"⁷⁷. The constructivism that characterizes the post-Cold War order demonstrated how diplomacy and strategic thinking intersect, but especially how the philosophy of the "universal interdependence of mankind"⁷⁸ exposed by Marx and Engels had some elements of symbiosis with the doctrine of humanitarian intervention exposed by Kofi Annan, that "a global age requires global involvement"⁷⁹.

The Kosovo case, one of the incipient manifestations of the *military globalism*, is an edible example of the forces projection, which led to the change of Yugoslavia's borders without any official change in the sovereignty over the province. The intervention motivated by the safeguarding of human rights was followed by the establishment of *liberal institutionalism*⁸⁰ in Kosovo. Keohane offers a simplistic definition of the international guardianship, explaining that "international regimes may have a functional role in facilitating cooperation between rational egoists"⁸¹. We distinguish, on this occasion, the neorealist perspectives such as that "security is a value with a positive null amount"⁸², assuming that the states seek for maximizing the security rather than gaining power, although one of the conditionalities of this system of projecting the strategic reality was not fulfilled: the collaborative game.

The *non-cooperative game*⁸³ played by Belgrade and Pristina, mixed with the Serbian neotraditionalism, exposed how "the primacy of security in front of all other

⁷⁴ Radu Sebastian Ungureanu, *Identități și comunități politice*, published in the volume "Relațiile internaționale contemporane: teme centrale în politica mondială", edited by Daniel Biró, Iași, Polirom Publishing House, 2013, p. 51.

⁷⁵ Colin S. Gray, *op.cit.*, p. 265.

⁷⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁷⁷ National Archives and Records Administration, *op.cit.*, p. 9.

⁷⁸ Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, *Putere și interdependență*, Iași, Polirom Publishing House, 2009, p. 289.

⁷⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁸⁰ Edward Harrison, *Sistemul internațional după Războiul Rece. Strategii, instituții și reflexivitate*, Iași, Polirom Publishing House, 2010, p. 61.

⁸¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 61-62.

⁸² Randall R. Schweller, *Noile cercetări realiste asupra alianțelor: rafinarea și nu respingerea poziției lui Waltz referitoare la balansare*, published in the volume "Realismul și balanța de putere: o nouă dezbatere", edited by John A. Vasquez, Colin Elman, Iași, Polirom Publishing House, 2012, p. 96.

⁸³ Bruce Bueno de Mersquita, *Logica și evidențele neorealismului: când este o teorie falsificată?*, published in the volume "Realismul și balanța de putere: o nouă dezbatere", edited by John A. Vasquez, Colin Elman, Iași, Polirom Publishing House, 2012, p. 192.

possible goals"⁸⁴ has amended what the analysts call the "revisionist jackal"⁸⁵. Specific for the post-conflict reconstruction of Yugoslavia, but especially for antagonistic interests and incompatible goals, remains Charles Tilly's statement, which depicts the states as "protective gangsters"⁸⁶. The prioritization of the security, at the level of national interests, has led to an oscillation of the dialogue between the state doctrines of Clausewitz and Machiavelli, as well as completed by the ideas subsequently exposed by Palmerston, Bismarck or Kissinger.

The post-conflict reconstruction of South-Eastern Europe represented both a mission for NATO in the framework of a "robust confidence-building exercise in the core of the Western world"⁸⁷ and for Europe, based on Robert Cooper's optics, that "there is a safe area in Europe and one of dangers and chaos outside of it"⁸⁸. In fact, the reconstruction of Kosovo was likely to avoid transforming the province into a *terra nullius* enclave in the center of Europe, thus neutralizing a threat to the post-modern safety zone. In the context of the growing international interdependence, the West metamorphosed into "unified rival authority"⁸⁹ is in a position to deal with "the revived history in the Balkans"⁹⁰. The divergent energies within the Serbian and Kosovo corporative actors⁹¹ have also been manifested ideologically, mentioning the existence of an "anthropomorphic language as a reference to the state personality"⁹².

The UN's internal debate on the correctness of NATO's intervention in Kosovo continued is one of the main obstacles to reconstruction, noticing the internal divisions between the permanent members of the Security Council: the United States, the United Kingdom, and France had a pronounced philosophical position, while Russia and China unconditionally supported the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, and later of Serbia. Relevant to the post-Kosovo internal disruptions of the UN remains the speech of Secretary-General Kofi Annan at the 54th UN General Assembly session: "if consciousness of humanity cannot find a better tribunal within the UN, then there is a danger that it may seek for peace and justice elsewhere"⁹³.

For both camps as well as for the powers guaranteeing the new Balkan order, the UN takeover of Kosovo – doubled by NATO's military mission to maintain order – was a compromise solution until a sub-strategy was drawn up. The risk of instability, however, remained constant despite the "pigeon of peace"⁹⁴ omnipresent in the reports and analyzes

⁸⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 192.

⁸⁵ Randall R. Schweller, *op.cit.*, p. 98.

⁸⁶ Alexander Wendt, *Teoria socială a politicii internaționale*, Iași, Polirom Publishing House, 2011, p. 213

⁸⁷ George Cristian Maior, *Noul aliat. Regândirea politicii externe și de apărare a României*, Bucharest, RAO Publishing House, 2012, p. 37.

⁸⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 38

⁸⁹ Alexander Wendt, *op.cit.*, p. 217.

⁹⁰ *Apud* Ioan Mircea Pașcu, *The Race for NATO. Reinventing the Alliance: Peacekeeping and Other Prospects and Problems of Change*, Knokke-Heist, 23rd-26th September 1993.

⁹¹ A "corporate actor" is a state marked by divergent energies, like Serbia and Kosovo, with both actors facing internal contradictions on issues like strategic thinking or foreign policy.

⁹² Alexander Wendt, *op.cit.*, p. 204.

⁹³ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*, Ottawa, International Development Research Centre, 2001, p. 2: <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf> (accessed on May 1st, 2018).

⁹⁴ Bruce Bueno de Mersquita, *op.cit.*, p. 209.

of the committees and missions dedicated to the Kosovo issue, whose work has also been the subject of international investigations and criticisms. The post-conflict relations between Serbia and Kosovo relied heavily on the characteristics of the late Yugoslav order: "the increased inability of Belgrade to manage economic issues in the 1980s or the de-legitimation of the regime led to the search alternative ways of solving problems"⁹⁵.

The years after the 1999 conflict demonstrated how the development of the parallel regional structures, combined with exclusive *exclusivist nationalism*⁹⁶, determining the violent break-up of Yugoslav unity but also to the blockade of dialogue between former combatants for almost two decades. The reconstruction of trust proved to be the most sensitive point of the international missions in this area, especially as the *mutual vulnerabilities*⁹⁷ supposed to be assumed by an international regime. The Serbian and Kosovar actors, both homeostatic coagulators of elements⁹⁸, within a recent conflict, marked by the interplay between *Balkanization* and defense diplomacy, have been in the post-war era under *the pressures of socialization*⁹⁹.

The presidential election of September 24th, 2000 reflected the demands for change within the Yugoslav society with the election of Vojislav Koštunica, the leader of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia. The same political party won two months later the parliamentary elections of December 23rd, 2000, becoming prime minister Zoran Đinđić. The new leadership from Belgrade mainly focused on normalizing the relations with Western Europe and international organizations, agreeing to hand over Slobodan Milosevic to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the Hague. There are also reports stating that the decision to extradite the former President to the Kingdom of the Netherlands was an "action denied by the almost totalitarian Serb people"¹⁰⁰.

Milošević's arrest took place on April 1st, 2001, the former President being transferred to the ICTY for trial on charges of war crimes or crimes against humanity committed during the Kosovo war. Milošević's judgment created, in some ways, more problems than it actually solved. First of all, the idea of international justice has been harshly criticized on the assumption that the impartiality of the process was to be strictly formal, with conflicts of interest generating subjectivism. It is precisely these "controversies over the ability of the international community to operate with such a concept"¹⁰¹ that arose just before the onset of the trial, placing the idea of international justice in a shadowy cone, all the more so since the idea of judging a head of state means the usurpation of certain prerogatives of the domestic legal system.

The controversies surrounding the politicization of Milošević's process overlapped with an intrinsic Serbian desire for internal management of the transition: "There is a strong need for every people to internally deal with this situation of interest. After all, the people want to see their own legal system pronouncing on organic issues of

⁹⁵ Radu Sebastian Ungureanu, *op.cit.*, p. 53.

⁹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 49.

⁹⁷ George Cristian Maior, *The New Ally...*, p. 37.

⁹⁸ Radu Sebastian Ungureanu, *op.cit.*, p. 210.

⁹⁹ Edward Harrison, *op.cit.*, p. 149.

¹⁰⁰ Traian Valentin Pocea, Aurel I. Rogojan, *op.cit.*, p. 163.

¹⁰¹ George Cristian Maior, *Incertitudine...*, p.235.

their destiny"¹⁰². The Serb resentments and suspicions were fueled by the death of Slobodan Milošević on unelicted conditions, subject to specific uncertain causalities such as the medical history of the former President, the quality of the emergency response, and especially the impact of the prolongation of the trial on Milošević's medical condition.

The critics even determined a bunch of factors that allegedly affected the health of the former Yugoslav leader, in this case around the general delays in the proceedings, which brought to light the hypothesis of the unacceptable mix of justice and politics. These critical voices about Milošević's trial were coached by Boris Tadić, who said that the entire responsibility for the death of the former Yugoslav President belongs to the ICTY. Even if Belgrade's reaction to Milošević's death during the process of essentially had a vehement dimension, the relationship with the West was not deteriorated, given "the need for identity change that would lead to Serbia breaking the chords of history and its entry into the European rhythm"¹⁰³.

The challenges of the Yugoslav transition were converted into considerable inter-institutional tensions, erupting with the rivalry between the President and Prime Minister, the socio-economic reforms vital for national recovery being the most productive elements of dissension. The struggle for power on the Yugoslav political scene intensified with the ever more visible dichotomy of vision between the Government and the Presidential Administration: Đinđić represented the pro-Western current of Yugoslav society, while Koštunica was an exponent of Milošević's neo-traditionalism. This dual dimension of the executive structures from Belgrade lowered the pace of the dialogues related to the regional construction mechanisms, imposing a considerable lengthening of the whole process, of course having a direct effect in accentuating crises rather than solving them.

The turning point at the level of Yugoslav internal consistency was the international conference to change the borders of the Balkans, organized at the suggestion of Zoran Đinđić. The project finally aroused strong nationalist sentiments, especially considering a territorial change that meant a change to the post-Dayton regional order: Republika Srpska joining Yugoslavia in exchange for an independent Kosovo. The reaction to this unthinkable strategy for the artisans of Serbia's territorial integrity came from the ultranationalists who assassinated Đinđić on March 12th, 2003.

These systemic crises were the inherent consequences of Yugoslavia's explosive disintegration, but especially of radical speeches designed to capture popular legitimacy during these episodes of the revival of the Crusades. The inherent implication was that of the persistence of the proximity of the Western Balkans to the problematic neighborhoods, with societies marked since the onset of the millennium of divergent energies but especially by country projects not only incompatible but also contradictory: within the same state - as can be seen in Yugoslavia - there are both admirers of the *Atlantic civilization*¹⁰⁴ evoked by William Pfaff, as well as nontraditionalists for whom Mihail Sadoveanu's assertion that "the light comes from the East" remains a medium and long-term perspective of unwavering.

¹⁰² *Ibidem*.

¹⁰³ *Ibidem*, p. 237.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 165.

The major long-term implication for the Kosovo – Serbia binomial was the strengthening of the separate road hypothesis, making it clearer on the occasion of each crisis or tension that the two actors could no longer be included in the same state entity. The revanchism at the level of external discourse was accompanied by the issue of internal consumption, insufficient to legitimize a coherent agenda, especially since the domestic stability of both parties was severely disturbed by internal secessionist movements.

The parallel structures and the insurgency that characterized the radical type of asymmetric threats in the region would impart a climate of instability at interstate and intrastate level, especially since their resolution was attempted by what critics call a "hot peace that abnormally warms the Balkan area, and the status of Kosovo is still a source of conflict both within the EU and within the UN, especially between the US and the Federation"¹⁰⁵.

¹⁰⁵ Traian Valentin Pocea, Aurel I. Rogojan, *op.cit.*, p. 169.

Italy's view on Turkey joining the Atlantic Treaty (1949-1952)

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Key-words: NATO's enlargement, Turkey, Italy

Abstract

This study aims to examine the difficult way in which Turkey and Greece negotiated their membership applications in the North-Atlantic Treaty and it analyzes the consequences of this foreign policy choice which placed these countries in one of the Cold War teams. Heavy emphasis was put on the reasons why the Italian administration considered and supported these states' demands for security. Essentially, this study tried to redraw the diplomatic effort, using documents from the collections of the Italian diplomacy (I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani), mostly from the recently published 11th/XI series, which discusses Italy's political and diplomatic view within NATO. It is also worth mentioning that this study also followed the attitudes and reactions of the government in Athens regarding the issue of the first expansion of the Atlantic Alliance, although the author placed emphasis on the more fleshed out policy of the Turkish Government, another reason being its influence in the Middle East and among the Arab states.

By February 1952, the Atlantic Alliance finished its first enlargement, the twelve original members of this collective security organization being joined by two Mediterranean states, Greece and Turkey. Given their decidedly important geostrategic value, offered by their geographic positions, the aforementioned states made the object of the Truman Doctrine, a program through which the United States supported the defense of a region considered vital in the security of Western Europe¹.

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¹ By the end of February 1947, the Italian ambassador at Washington, Alberto Tarchiani, noted that the State Department was starting to view Greece and Turkey as its first line of defense in Europe. This policy would evolve to become the Truman Doctrine, defined on March, 12 by the American president in *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, Decima Serie: 1943-1948 Volume V (2 febbraio-30 maggio 1947)*, Roma, Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 1997, pp. 160-162, [hereafter ***DDI X vol. V]; Beginning with March 1947, through the Truman Doctrine, Greece received economic and military help amounting to 300 million dollars, whereas Turkey received goods valued up to 100 million dollars. The aim of this aid was to fortify these two states against the communist threat. It is also worth mentioning that this was the first step in including the Mediterranean area in the American and British interests, from a military perspective, thus initiating a new direction for the American foreign policy. For more information on the impact of the Truman Doctrine on Turkey's economy and politics, see Joseph C. Satterthwaite,

The American aid offered to Greece and Turkey provoked strong reactions among the Italian diplomatic circles², and only the launch of the Marshall Plan would shift the interest of the administration in Rome towards the new financial instrument announced, in June 1947, by the new State Secretary, George Marshall.³

It should be mentioned that, originally, the Atlantic Alliance was thought out to be a defensive system dedicated to states on the coasts of the Atlantic Ocean; Italy, a Mediterranean country, therefore inclined towards a Mediterranean alliance, having been integrated in NATO opened the way for Turkey and Greece to demand the same treatment, especially considering that, after the experience of the established Truman Doctrine, the seemingly natural thing to do was to follow up with the integration of the two states in the new military organization.⁴

Furthermore, during preliminary negotiations for the treaty, when the French ambassador at Washington, Henri Bonnet, proposed that Italy should be considered as a member, the British fiercely opposed the idea, considering that the advantage of „strategic placement” that Italy had, could be also argued for both Greece and Turkey, thus – theoretically – offering these two the opportunity to be part of the new alliance.⁵

Initially, Turkey had no intention of being part of the North-Atlantic Treaty, aware of its geographic position being too far away from the Euro-Atlantic security zone covered by the Alliance; however unsuitable for the North-Atlantic Treaty, Turkey wanted to obtain immediate guarantees through a Mediterranean agreement or a treaty, this linked under NATO⁶.

The Truman Doctrine: Turkey, in “The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science”, vol.41, America and the Middle East (May 1972), pp. 74-84.

² The major economic and financial crisis Italy was going through could have easily become a point of speculation for politicians in Rome, who could have used the similarities between the three Mediterranean states to highlight the need for immediate financial help for the Italian peninsula, through the Truman Doctrine in *Foreign Relations of the United States 1947 Volume III The British Commonwealth; Europe*, Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1972, p.880, [hereafter****FRUS 1947 III*].

³ ****DDI X vol V*, p. 419.

⁴ Maria Antonia di Casola, *Grecia, Turchia e Patto Atlantico. Le ragioni di un'adesione ritardata* in „Il Politico” vol.54, no.2 (150) (aprile-giugno 1989), p.313; Moreover, the Marshall Plan had been extended to include the two Mediterranean states, and the inclusion of Turkey in the executive group of OEEC satisfied the Ankara Government, being also considered a personal victory for minister Necmettin Sadak in *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, Undicesima Serie:1948-1953 Volume II (1 gennaio-30 giugno 1949)*, Roma, Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 2006, [hereafter ****DDI XI vol. II*], pp. 412, 485.

⁵ *Foreign Relations of the United States 1948 Volume III Western Europe*, Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1974, [hereafter ****FRUS 1948 III*], p. 329; In addition, Great Britain wanted to offer Italy a sort of „limited membership” within the Alliance, a way to solve the security issues of the peninsula; the offer, however, was found disagreeable during the negotiations in ****DDI X vol. II*, p.163; During a conversation with the Greek foreign minister, Konstantinos Tsaldaris, the head of the British diplomacy, Ernest Bevin, confessed that Italy should not be an original member of the Treaty, not only because of its military shortcomings, but also because its presence dimmed the Atlantic character of the organization in *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, Undicesima Serie:1948-1953 Volume I, (8 maggio-31 dicembre 1948)*, Roma, Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 2005, [hereafter****DDI XI vol I*] p.1151;****DDI XI vol. II*, p. 494.

⁶ Since September 1948, the new Turkish ambassador in Rome, Feridun Kemal Erkin, gave a declaration, of his own, to the *Associated Press* agency, in which he underlined the necessity of a Mediterranean Union, founded in association with another group of states, the Scandinavian one, in order to form a unique and

In 1949, the Atlantic Agreement was, essentially, a North-Atlantic Alliance, therefore it was illogical for Turkey to insist on participating, something recognized, not by chance, by the Turkish minister of foreign affairs, Necmettin Sadak, on February 15, 1949, prior – then – to the actual completion of the alliance⁷.

Even the Greek Government took the same stand, that of signing an agreement between the Mediterranean states, in order to make the region seem unified. Furthermore, this consent given by the Greeks to the Turkish initiative was coming at a rather delicate time, considering the dissension between the two regarding Cyprus seemed to reappear, mostly because of the Greek press speculating arguments for the return of the island instead of conceding to Turkey⁸.

Meanwhile, the Turkish side was treading lightly in trying to enter the Atlantic Alliance,⁹ and found useful ground in the Italian political circles, where they were assured that if the issue of extending the alliance beyond the established geographic principle would have been discussed, and if Italy had been admitted to the alliance as an founding member, then their approach would have been supported.¹⁰

Therefore, the most important objective of the Turkish foreign policy in the post-war years was to obtain security guarantees from the US, and in this endeavor, a Mediterranean agreement or the newly founded Atlantic Treaty were considered valuable options.

This study aims to examine the difficult way in which Turkey and Greece negotiated their inclusion in the North-Atlantic Treaty and it analyzes the consequences of this foreign policy choice which placed these countries in one of the Cold War sides. Heavy emphasis was put on the reasons why the Italian administration considered and supported these states' demands for security.

efficient continental military unit. While Washington looked approvingly upon the opportune military alliance between Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, a Mediterranean treaty seemed useless, even naive, considering the discrepancy of interests, resources and even regions in the Mediterranean and The Middle East. Additionally, the Palestinian issue would have further complicated things. As a result, American military assistance, in combination with aid offered to Greece and Turkey seemed sufficient to stabilize the region, although this aid had to be continuously sustained (the Americans guaranteed that the funds would be granted at least until June 30, 1949, or until the Western Union would have expanded to include not only Italy but also Greece and Turkey) in ****DDI XI vol I,* pp.651-652, 687, 1026.

⁷ Just as true is that the admittance of Italy in NATO, therefore the inclusion of the Central-Mediterranean proved to the political figures in Ankara that the geographic principle was not the most important one when debating the membership to the Alliance in ****DDI XI vol. II,* pp.661-663

⁸ *Ibidem*, p.356.

⁹ It is worth noting the visit made by the Turkish minister of foreign affairs, Sadak, to Brussels, before the conclusion of the Alliance, when he declared that Turkey had no intention of pursuing NATO in *Ibidem*, pp.419-420.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p.466; It should be said that the international actions of post-war Italy were characterized by political indecision, easily identifiable in its attitude towards military alliances, such as the North-Atlantic Treaty or the Brussels one, concerned with a hostile reaction from the Soviet Union. Besides these internal hesitations, Italy had to deal with those of the Western powers, regarding the role the peninsula would have to play. On the other hand, the Italians were concerned that, should they fail to be assimilated to a Western alliance, it would have gravely affected Italy's reputation and reduced it to second-rate power status, next to Greece and Turkey in Mihaela Mustatea, *Italia și construcția europeană: politica externă italiană în primul deceniu postbelic (1945-1955)*, București, Editura Universității din București, 2016, p. 185; The actual integration of Italy in the Atlantic Treaty dismissed these fears, but it also dimmed Rome's interest in a Mediterranean agreement in ****DDI XI vol.II,* p. 947.

Essentially, this study tried to redraw the diplomatic effort, using documents from the collections of the Italian diplomacy (*I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani*), mostly from the recently published 11th/XI series, which discusses Italy's political and diplomatic view within NATO. It is also worth mentioning that this study also followed the attitudes and reactions of the government in Athens regarding the issue of the first enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance, although the author placed emphasis on the more fleshed out policy of the Turkish Government, another reason being its influence in the Middle East and among the Arab states.

Although wary at the beginning¹¹, the administration in Rome came to view the inclusion of Turkey and Greece in the Atlantic Treaty as a positive event, given the fact that it would have secured the South side of the Euro-Atlantic defensive system, while also protecting the Italian shoreline; other members of the Alliance opposed the enlargement because of the too large area to secure, especially considering the discrepancies between the original members and the two Mediterranean states (mostly the largely Muslim Turkey). Italy's support for these countries to be included in NATO was also linked with the head of the Foreign Cabinet, count Carlo Sforza¹², who was believed to have a plan to create a *junior partner*,¹³ in the quest to push the Southern line of Atlantic security, emulating a strategy already employed by France during the negotiations for Italy's membership in the Atlantic Treaty.¹⁴ An important part played the Italian ambassador in Ankara, Luca Pietromarchi, since the fall of 1950, who realized the strategic meaning Turkey had for the security of Western Europe.

Initially, France was against including Turkey in the Treaty, mostly because it didn't want the Alliance to look like it was surrounding the Soviet Union, so the French wanted to spare Moscow the hassle, preferring the idea of regional agreements, such as a Mediterranean one, separate from the North-Atlantic Treaty, but still under its supervision, agreements in which Paris could still be a deciding factor.¹⁵

¹¹ ****DDI XI vol. V*, p.503.

¹² The Italian diplomat was knowledgeable in Turkish realities, having held consular positions in Constantinople prior to the World War I.

¹³ The phrase was used by France during the negotiations, when supporting Italy's inclusion in the Alliance. The purpose was both military and political: securing American insurances for the defense of the Mediterranean and the North-African coast, a French dominion, while politically moving the axis of the Alliance from Northern Europe and the Atlantic; France then could have counted on a „junior partner” – Italy – who would have then became loyal and grateful towards Paris in Antonio Varsori, *L'Italia fra Alleanza Atlantica e CED (1949-1955)*, in Ennio Di Nolfo (ed.), R. Rainero (ed.), B. Vigezzi (ed.), „L'Italia e la politica di potenza in Europa (1950-1960)”, Milano, Marzorati Editore, 1992, p.591.

¹⁴ Maria Antonia di Casola, *op.cit.*, p. 319; ****DDI XI vol.II.*, p.465; For more information on Italy's inclusion in NATO, see Mihaela Mustatea, *op.cit.*, pp.184-194; Furthermore, within NATO's authorities, Italy was not welcomed in the executive committee, as the structure was considered limited, having only the US, UK, and France; in the other functions, Italy was allowed „*participation as appropriate*”, such as Western Europe Group, such being considered more of a Mediterranean state, rather than a Western one, a thing confirmed by becoming a member of the Southern Europe Group. Initially, this structure was named *The Regional Group of the Western Mediterranean*, then renamed *Southern Europe and Western Mediterranean Group*, so that the defensive plans for the Alliance would not be limited to Mediterranean aspects only, but include Italian continental aspects, too in Mihaela Mustătea, *op.cit.*, p. 289.

¹⁵ ****DDI XI vol.V*, pp.543, 546.

In February 1949, the ambassador Alberto Tarchiani affirmed that the State Department found it unnecessary to take on new responsibilities in favor of the countries left outside the Atlantic Alliance (it was the case of Greece and Turkey); this way, it was also postponed the idea of the Mediterranean agreement, linked with the Atlantic Treaty. As far as Washington was concerned, the obligations towards Turkey and the assurances that were to be formulated as a bare minimum to the Mediterranean states were enough to make them feel secure.¹⁶ Furthermore, it was reinforced that the signing of the North-Atlantic Treaty was not changing the established relations between Turkey (meaning the entire Eastern Mediterranean region) and the US, and the American commitments for economic and military aid for Greece and Turkey were still valid.

Finally, the State Department considered the idea of a debate to draft a Mediterranean alliance, an agreement reuniting the military weak nations, was not urgently needed, for it was more of a future possibility after the Atlantic Treaty had proved its worth.¹⁷

For Great Britain, however, a favorable formula would have been an alliance containing all states “from Pakistan to Greece”, put under London’s careful watch; this way, the Greek and the Turks would have been appeased, security-wise (even though the Arabs could have perceived this move as a British intrusion).¹⁸ This status was also supported by the determination of the Americans to let the UK take on a leading role in the region, considering London was bound by several agreements both with Turkey and some Arab states.¹⁹ Therefore, for Turkey, the best card to play at the moment was an alliance with the British, even though it felt that their Eastern politics were still traditional, rather anachronistic and insensitive to demands for independence of the Arab states.²⁰

Momentarily, however, given that the reaffirmation of the former treaty between the French, the British and the Turks from 1939 was not enough assurance of security, all London was able to offer to Turkey was the admittance in the Council of Europe.²¹ The French took a much more articulate stance. In the summer of 1950, at the proposition of France and with its support, Turkey was welcomed in the Council.²² Meanwhile, Italy’s interest in supporting the admittance of Turkey and Greece in the Council of Europe, according to the principle that all members of OEEC should be automatically given this membership, hid the Italians’ desire to move the non-military decisions from under the “Brussels Club”, as Brussels Treaty was also known, under the authority of the Strassbourg institution, where Italy had a bigger role to play.²³

¹⁶ ****DDI XI vol. II*, p.455; ****DDI XI vol. I*, p.1026.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p.813

¹⁸ ****DDI XI vol. II*, p.455.

¹⁹ ****FRUS 1950 vol. V*, pp.163-166; ****DDI XI vol. V*, p.54.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, pp.53-55.

²¹ ****DDI XI vol.II*, p.1178.

²² *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, Undicesima Serie:1948-1953 Volume III (1 luglio 1949-26 gennaio 1950)*, Roma, Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 2007, [hereafter ****DDI XI vol III*], p.110.

²³ *Ibidem*, pp.785,906; It should be said that the Italians believed the American aid had given Turkey too much ground, a rather irritating fact for Italy, who took international hierarchy very seriously and who viewed Turkey as a second-hand kind of power, unlike Italy, placed in the Great Powers’ corner. This impression was mostly based on the mechanics of the Italian-Turkish agreement, politically null, but for which the Turks demanded a signing ceremony in Ankara. In the end, in January 1950, the Turkish foreign

The Korean War's beginning, in June 1950, brought with it the debate on the necessity of a solid western military system, thus the issue of the remilitarization and integration of Western Germany in the Alliance. Perceived as a new phase of aggression from USSR, the Asian war fired a definite shift in the Euro-Atlantic strategy as far as integration projects were concerned, especially the military aspects of them. In other words, the Americans were looking for a way to allow the active military participation of Western Germany.²⁴ The project for a European military alliance was only vaguely defined, for a variety of reasons: because of the Americans' requirements, of the necessity to prevent Paris' involvement in the German remilitarization process and the firm belief that Bonn was not to be admitted in the Atlantic Alliance. The French were going to allow their former enemy to remilitarize only as part of a European army, put under the authority of a supranational organ, akin to ECSC's High Authority, remilitarization under NATO being considered unthinkable. In October 1950, the French Government presented the Pleven Plan, in favor of this sort of European military structure.²⁵

Without consulting or even informing the Athenian Government, on August, 5th 1950, Turkey made the first step towards its inclusion in the Treaty, by applying for membership of the Atlantic Alliance.²⁶

On August, 22nd, the Turkish embassy in Rome asked for the support of this endeavor from the administration at Chigi Palace. The Italian answer from August, 26th pointed out that, in theory, Turkey's admission in NATO would have strengthened the Mediterranean group in the Alliance, but without prior consultations with the rest of the members, Italy could not offer its' support, individually.²⁷

In the other European capitals, the answers varied: Brussels was in favor of Turkish membership of NATO, Paris was cautious, whilst at Oslo, Turkey's representing official did not formally announce anything. In Ottawa, however, the reaction was rather harsh, with the Italian ambassador, Di Stefano, noting that the Canadian Government was against the enlargement of the Treaty in the Eastern Mediterranean region.²⁸

Denmark was cautious too about Turkey's demand, considering the new political and strategic security risks, far away of Copenhagen's interests. If, however, the US and Great Britain would have been accepting of the matter, the Danish Government would have conceded to the Western Governments wishes.²⁹

As far as London and Paris were concerned, such a step initiated by Ankara not only meant additional responsibilities, but it was also considered overkill, considering the security engagements guaranteed by the renewed 1939 treaties a year prior were similar with what the North Alliance had to offer. The decisive factor was still Washington's take on Turkey's demand (at least for the Italian and Canadian Governments), for which the

minister, Sadak, who was in Europe for a Council of Europe reunion, stopped in Rome and signed the treaty in ****DDI XI vol. III*, p.553; ****DDI XI vol. IV*, pp. 4, 53.

²⁴ ****DDI XI vol.V*, p.205.

²⁵ For more details on the Pleven Plan see *Ibidem*, pp.62-66.

²⁶ ****DDI XI vol. IV*, p.409.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, pp.444, 462-463.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, pp.446-447.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, pp.454-455.

admittance for Ankara in the Treaty meant, unequivocally, the inclusion of Greece. For the moment, though, Washington suggested that no member state was to give individual answers to Ankara, at least until the issue would have been further discussed in the following North-Atlantic session in New York.³⁰

For the United Kingdom, Turkey's application for NATO membership raised a few problems: it would have ruined the entire concept of the Alliance, that of an economic and politic community with similar security interests and traditions, it would have brought more security risks to the fledgling organization, which was focused on the Euro-Atlantic region, it would have forced the hand of member states, by imposing expanding responsibilities in areas with little to no interest, and finally, it would have meant an alliance with a country whose borders were managed jointly with the Soviets. Furthermore, if Turkey was to be a member, it would have opened the door for Greece, too, even though Athens had not put forward an application for membership. The Foreign Office felt the only option was for the Americans to take responsibility for Turkey's moves.³¹

On the other hand, Turkey pointed out that only as a member of NATO could it exercise any kind of power in the Middle East, mainly with the relations with the Arab states, which could have leaned towards the Soviets, should the Western states show little interest in the region.³²

The Atlantic Council in New York, in September 1950, rejected both applications, giving to Greece and Turkey "associated membership" status, an action perceived as the first step to full membership. Meanwhile, this association seemed to appease the security demands of the two states, given they could participate alongside NATO members to a series of operations in the Mediterranean region.³³

On 2nd October 1950, the Turkish president, Celal Bayar confessed to the Italian ambassador in Ankara, Renato Prunas, that the refusal to include Turkey in the Alliance was more than unjust, it was a grave error given Ankara's status as devoted ally to the West, an ally laced in a vulnerable region and for whom security was a struggle, considering half of the Turkish Government funds were going to military spendings. The dignitary appreciated as positive, however, the new measures regarding the military-related discussions between the Mediterranean Group of the Treaty and the Turkish Military Staff, thinking them a way to correct the afore-mentioned error and, again, seeing them as the first step towards integration.³⁴

On 1st October 1950, the Turkish president, while inaugurating the first legislature of the National Assembly, declared that the fundamental objective of Turkey's foreign policy remained the organization of its own security, in a tentative collaboration with Greece, which had recently been called by the Mediterranean Group's Military Staff to give accounts on the status of preparations for the military plans meant to secure the region. At the same time, Turkey's aspiration to be part of the Atlantic Alliance, considered- among

³⁰ *Ibidem*, pp.458, 460.

³¹ Behçet K. Yeşilbursa, *Turkey's participation in the Middle East Command and its admission to NATO* in „The Middle Eastern Studies“, vol 35, no.4, Seventy-Five Years of the Turkish Republic, (October 1999), pp. 77-78; ****DDI XI vol V*, p.513.

³² *Ibidem*, pp.10-12.

³³ ****FRUS 1950, vol. III*, pp.1218-1220.

³⁴ ****DDI XI vol. IV*, p. 516.

others- the only tool to efficiently resist aggression, was not without ground, given the country's efforts in the cause of peace. Ankara had supported every European initiative as far as integration was concerned, showing attachment to the values of the United Nations, has sent a military unit in Korea response to the request of the Security Council, hoping this military effort (4500 soldiers) would facilitate its' admission in NATO.³⁵

Even the plan of the European army put forward by the French Government (the Pleven Plan), in theory, was seen by Ankara's Government as an alternative path for Turkey to follow for the membership of the European security system, guaranteed by the Americans. The delay caused by France caused a powerful resentment in the political circles in Ankara, where it was believed that without the military participation of Western Germany, considered a factor of stability in Europe (an idea forwarded by the Turkish president to Schuman), the European alliance was an impossibility, a sort of continental suicide. More so, the Italian ambassador in Ankara recognized that Turkey suffered by an "isolation complex", partly because of its' geographical position and its' experience during the war, trying now to get close to Europe, putting a lot of value on its' relation with Italy, an European country geographically closest to Turkey.³⁶

Athens was equally frustrated and unhappy, according to the Italian diplomat, Marieni, who told De Gasperi that the Greek Government was disappointed in not having become part of the Alliance, instead remaining an annex, even if under the tutelage and protection of the Western states; while its' international relations obligations were largely passive in this arrangement, Greece compared itself to Italy, who lost the war, yet who recovered an important position on the world stage (the Italians perceived this as arrogance from the Greeks, who often reminded of the fact that they were on the winning side in the war.³⁷

Since the fall of 1950, Turkey's strategy was a joint action with Greece, in an attempt to turn *de facto* collaboration with the Atlantic group in a partnership *de jure*; it was a new take on the Turkish view on Athens, Greece having been considered so far, because of its' military weakness and its' political state, an obstacle in Turkey's way to integration in the Euro-Atlantic system; therefore, Ankara preferred to act alone.³⁸ In addition, the new Turkish foreign minister, Fuad Koprülü, since his coming to power, has given a more dynamic tone to foreign affairs, in opposition to the excessive cautious that characterized the former government.³⁹

In February 1951, Turkey's strategic position started to be a major interest for the Western Powers, both from a diplomatic and military point of view. During the discussions between the Turkish officials and the Americans diplomats, held between 14-21st of February, there was a new element, that of the fact that the Americans were ready to support Turkey's and Greece's integration in NATO, and a final decision had to be reached within a maximum period of six months. In spite of this, there was no talk of a firm agreement that would have allowed the participation of Ankara in the alliance.⁴⁰

³⁵ ***DDI XI vol. V, p.10; ***FRUS 1951 vol. III, p.472.

³⁶ ***DDI XI vol.V, pp. 11, 52-56.

³⁷ ***DDI XI vol.III, pp.527-528.

³⁸ ***DDI XI vol.V, p.10.

³⁹ *Ibidem*, p.512

⁴⁰ ***FRUS 1951 vol.V, p.50-57.

On the other hand, in May 1951, the Italian ambassador to Athens, Adolfo Alessandrini, raised the issue of Italy's diminished role in the Atlantic Treaty, if Greece and Turkey were accepted as members, because Rome has not been able to lead the decision-making process in the Mediterranean region, this task has been given to the French and, even more so, the English. He admitted, though, that the enlargement of the alliance in this direction would have brought the attention of the West on an area rather ignored until then.⁴¹

On May, 15th, 1951, ambassador Pietro Quaroni sent a note to Carlo Sforza in which he announced that the State Department decided to support Greece and Turkey to join the North-Atlantic Alliance. Moreover, the Americans were going to pressure the French, for whom regional agreements were a better option, to reconsider their opposition to the enlargement. Regarding the Italians' attitude, they had looked favorably on the inclusion of the Eastern Mediterranean region under the protection of the Alliance from the beginning, having sensed that the indecision of the US could have negatively affected Turkey's evolution and its' influence over the Arab states; finally, since the Americans decided to include them in the alliance, it was good for Italy to follow their lead, and the exploration of further regional agreements to be postponed.⁴²

On June, 17th 1951, the foreign affairs minister, Carlo Sforza, sent to the officials of all NATO members Italy's point of view regarding Greece and Turkey's integration in the alliance. The document pointed out that, given the many delays in the creation of an alliance comprising all the Mediterranean states, the Italian Government was in favor of the "clear and simple" admission of the two states in the Atlantic Treaty, instead of looking for another formula to satisfy their security demands.

At the same time, the administration in Rome recognized the important role played by Asia Minor (read Turkey), as a stronghold in the defense of the entire Southern sector of the Alliance, having the same value as the Scandinavian region, which protected the Alliance in the Atlantic region. Furthermore, Chigi Palace declared that, in the eventual acceptance of other solutions, Rome would back them up just as surely. It was not to be ignored, said the Italians, the extraordinary circumstances of these two states: Greece, forced to stop the communism at its borders, while Turkey had to face intense pressure to accept a new systematization of the Straits. In addition, the neutral stance took by the Arab states was quite dangerous for Western Europe, these states lacking the consolidation required to keep centered in the face of the Soviet orbit's expansion. In the case of Turkey, refusing its application for membership would have revived the neutralism tendencies, in other words, a few politic circles thought that rather than unsuccessfully applying to the unrelenting Western States for security assurances, Turkey should become neutral. Finally, if the Eastern Mediterranean was to be included, Rome thought that the European defense system would have been completed, as a means to discourage the aggressive tendencies of the Soviets.⁴³

⁴¹ ****DDI XI vol.V*, p.542.

⁴² *Ibidem*, p.543; the Americans would have supported Turkey to enter the Alliance to avoid its' participation in the Tripartite Pact signed in 1939, renewed by the French and the English, mostly because of its' USSR clause in *Ibidem*, p.461.

⁴³ *Ibidem*, pp.643-645

Not only in London, but also in Paris, the applications were received with reservations, the first considering the imminent risk of worsening the political situation if the Treaty would have been extended in the Mediterranean (the declaration of the British foreign minister Morrison, May, 30th, 1951), while for the French worried about an open military clash with the Soviets. Moreover, Paris considered the addition of these two countries, in a region altogether different than the Atlantic one, would have weighted down the decision-making mechanisms of the Alliance (placing in a somewhat of an opposition the Scandinavian and Benelux Groups with the now heavily represented Mediterranean Group), based on the shared values and interests. It was not the first time when the geographical issue was used as a fundamental principle in considering new members for the Alliance.⁴⁴

Therefore, the two diplomatic offices preferred a Mediterranean alliance between the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy, with the participation of Greece and Turkey, an organization tied to NATO and placed under the command of General Eisenhower. An important fact to remark upon is the openness of this organism towards the Arab states, especially Egypt, next in line to pressure NATO for membership, after Greece and Turkey.

For the Italians, the enlargement of the Alliance came with fewer complications:

1. the American Congress and, by extension, the Parliaments of the NATO members would have accepted it easier than a new treaty;
2. Italy's participation in the Atlantic Alliance meant the guaranteed defense of European regions in its area of interests and to which Italy felt historically linked; a better option than a Mediterranean agreement, open to the Middle East, for the defense of which the Italians' responsibilities would have been too large compared with their interests.⁴⁵ A deal between NATO on one side, and Greece and Turkey on the other side, would have meant the insertion of the last into an organization with an uncertain judicial position and diminished prestige.⁴⁶

In Ankara, the hesitation (more like refusal) of the Western states to offer Greece and, especially, Turkey formal security assurances created a very tense atmosphere, the main culprit being identified as Great Britain, although it was only partially true, considering vocal resistance came from France, as it was already mentioned, from the Scandinavian Group, from the Netherlands and Portugal, too. For these governments, the better option was an agreement between all Eastern Mediterranean states, rather than enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance.⁴⁷ Especially for the Danish Government, the admittance of Turkey would have brought with it a strong and violent Soviet reaction, increasing tensions at a global scale and a risk of general military conflict.⁴⁸ Still, Ankara

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, pp.621-622; the French ambassador in Ankara, Lescuyer, would have said to Pietromarchi that France did not want to expand the Alliance, mainly to avoid the risk of becoming a global organization, such as the United Nations in *Ibidem*, p.567.

⁴⁵ ****Ibidem*, p.567-568

⁴⁶ *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, Undicesima Serie:1948-1953 Volume VI (26 luglio 1951-30 giugno 1952)*, Roma, Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, 2015, [hereafter ****DDI XI vol. VI*], p.79

⁴⁷ ****DDI XI vol.V*, pp.463, 657.

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, p.687.

refused categorically a simple collaboration with NATO's Military Staff, the way it was discussed in 1950.⁴⁹

The Allies considered other formulas for alliances, such as bilateral accords between the North-Atlantic states and Turkey, discarded as ill-suited because of the American policy, as pointed out by the American representative, Charles Spofford, who declared itself in favor of collective accords. As far as a single Mediterranean pact was considered, while the idea had merit at least momentarily, it was impossible to act on it because of the Israeli-Arab dispute. The Italians kept supporting the two candidacies, because of both practical reasons and to continue the Italian-American unit, leaving the idea of a Mediterranean agreement to solidify at a later date. Furthermore, the Turks already left it to be understood that, should they become part of the Alliance, they wouldn't oppose a NATO military base on their national territory.⁵⁰

In the summer of 1951, the English stance started so often, so much so that on July, 10th the Foreign Office declared it accepted the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in the Alliance. Even if the enlargement only served political purposes, without solving the military issues in the Middle Eastern region, the British proposed the establishment of a NATO command center for the Middle East, under British supervision (which it would have included Standing Group and Turkey, while the Dominions, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa would have contributed with troops). The project did not include an American-commanded Greece.⁵¹

On August, 8th 1951, ambassador Quaroni declared that the French Government supported the admittance of Greece and Turkey in the Alliance, meaning France, Great Britain, and the US would have to come up with a practical way to make this enlargement possible. The only objection the French had was the inclusion of Turkey in the British-ruled special commandment for the Middle East. They viewed this proposal as a way for the British to augment their troops' presence in the Middle East with effective from the Dominions, to change their status from British to Atlantic troops, an exploratory move for the future inclusion of Egypt in the Alliance.⁵²

For the Italians, Greece and Turkey had to enter the Alliance as soon as possible and as equals with the rest of the members, but at the same time, to appease the Scandinavian states' objections, the Italian Government proposed to its partners to find an informal mechanism through which the original members could enjoy a sort of "freedom of action", a difficult thing to do in an alliance in which all the members have the same status. France still insisted that an alliance between the Middle and Near East was still necessary, a pact interested states, such as Italy, could have joined.⁵³

For the next session of the North-Atlantic Council, in Ottawa, the political agenda of the Ankara Government had to insist on the admittance of the country in NATO, under the same conditions as the other members, so as the issue of the Middle

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, p.569.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, pp.660-661.

⁵¹ *Ibidem*, p.698, 704, 710.

⁵² ***DDI XI vol. VI, p.72.

⁵³ *Ibidem*, p.73; the Italians had no objections regarding a Mediterranean Treaty, but they would have insisted to be in the commanding organism in *Ibidem*, p.79.

East wouldn't become a pressure point, not as a way for Turkey to stroke its ego, but more of a way to put distance between the country and the problem of the Near East, whose political situation and military tensions would have compromised Turkey's application for membership. Only after it became a member, could Turkey start discussing the security of the entire Middle East.⁵⁴

Moreover, the Italian ambassador in Ankara, Pietromarchi, recounted that on September, 7th 1951, the leader of the Turkish diplomacy, Fuat Köprülü, admitted that while Turkey wanted to remain a regional power, it strongly refused to be burdened with the responsibility of the security of the Middle East region, wanting to avoid antagonizing the Arabs, admitting that voting in the line of the Western states on the Suez Channel, Turkey received Egypt's hostility, along with those of the Arab states. The inclusion of Turkey in the Alliance had to deter and warn the USSR that Ankara was always ready to engage in a potential conflict, its military force having good moral and logistic levels (largest army on the continent), and the country's strategic position represented a threat to Moscow. In the Turkish official's opinion, his country was the only one in the region able to oppose the Soviet propaganda, having a degree of prestige and influence in the Arab world. In the issue of the Balkan agreement proposed by Yugoslavia, which would have included both Greece and Turkey, Ankara declined to discuss it until after its inclusion in the Atlantic Alliance.⁵⁵

At the seventh session of the North-Atlantic Council in Ottawa, held between 15-21 of September 1951, the twelve member states reviewed the issue of the first enlargement of the Treaty, to include Turkey and Greece. At the same time, the German problem was an important point of discussion, negotiations being held between the High Commissaries for Germany and the envoy of the German federal state, thus completing the talks held at the Paris Conference about the European army. It was decided that, during the next session in Rome, the dossier regarding Germany's role in the defense of Western Europe would be discussed in its entirety.⁵⁶

In the September 18th meeting, it was the first time examined the membership application of Greece and Turkey, the bulk of the reactions being on the positive side. All the states' officials, with the exception of the Danish one (foreign minister Biørn Kraft asked for permission to confer with Copenhagen before giving the final response regarding the enlargement), declared that they were in favor of the North-Atlantic Treaty's enlargement to include Greece and Turkey, thus deciding to officially hand out the invitation.⁵⁷

In the meeting from September, 20th 1952, the official from Netherlands mentioned the agreement of his government regarding the inclusion of the two Mediterranean states in the Atlantic Alliance, with the condition that they would enter the

⁵⁴ *Ibidem*, p.114.

⁵⁵ *Ibidem*, pp.145-147.

⁵⁶ *Ibidem*, pp.228-229; The general impression was that the session held in Rome did not solve the major issues, the idea of another session in Lisbon, in February-March, being the solution (the third reunion in five months); this would have been the final deadline for solving the German remilitarization problem (the Soviet press speculated about a crisis among the Allies, while the French opposed Germany's inclusion in the Treaty, an unfortunate move that would affect the defensive character of the Alliance, risking the end of any German agreement) in *Ibidem*, pp. 328, 411, 415, 418.

⁵⁷ *Ibidem*, p.231

Treaty under the same conditions as the rest of the members, sharing the same obligations and rights as them. Additionally, Kraft mentioned yet again that Copenhagen conditioned this integration by Greece and Turkey's obligations towards the functioning of the newly discussed commandments, by dismissing the obstacles still present in the peace treaties. For Italy, this declaration was yet another opportunity to demand the adjournment of the military clauses in the peace treaty which, in theory, blocked the country from participating in military alliances.⁵⁸

After the debates, the Council recommended that all members' governments take the necessary actions to invite the Mediterranean states to join them, a process after which the US Government should be notified regarding the unanimity concerning the applications. Only after the instrument of accession was stored at the Government of the United States, would Article VI of the Treaty have been modified. At the same time, it was decided that a new protocol would be added to the Treaty, containing 4 articles, among which the most important were:

Article 1, in the name of all NATO member states, the United States Government invited Turkey and Greece to join the Atlantic Alliance, to become members of the pact, starting with the date at which the instruments of accession were stored at the US Government.

Article 2, at the moment when Turkey would become a member, Article 6 would be modified to include the Turkish national territory in the area covered by the Treaty, and defense mechanism stipulated by Article 5 would apply to Turkey, also.⁵⁹

As a first step, while waiting for the ratification of the protocol of accession by the members, it was agreed that two observers, one Greek and one Turkish would attend the sessions of the Council in Rome, in November,⁶⁰ and in December 1951 it was raised the issue of the two states' participation, as full members, to the Lisbon NATO reunion in February 1952; for that to happen, the national Parliaments were pressured to finish the ratifying process.⁶¹

Finally, it should be mentioned that the debate concerning the new Commandments brought with them new tensions within the Alliance, first between Turkey and Greece, then between the two and Italy. Nearing the meeting, in Athens, of the leaders of Military Staffs of France, Great Britain and the US, meeting that would have discussed the role Greece was to play in the Alliance, ambassador Alessandrini declared that Athens does not wish for an express inclusion, next to Turkey, in the Commandment for the Middle East, only in that regarding Southern Europe, placed in the responsibilities of the Americans. Alessandrini noted that the Turkish officials were skeptical regarding the future military collaboration with their Turkish counterparts. The idea was supported by the Italians, concerned that Turkey was gaining influence in the

⁵⁸ *Ibidem*, p.231; In this context and under the pressure of the Italians for the revision of the document signed in Paris, in 1947, on September, 26th 1951 was launched a Declaration signed by the British, the French and the Americans, regarding the revision of the peace treaty with Italy and which stipulated that, given the present situation, the document was outdated; it was also mentioned the need to cancel the military clauses and the paragraphs in which Rome had to explain its' policies to the winning powers in *Ibidem*, p.231.

⁵⁹ *Ibidem*, p.232.

⁶⁰ ****DDI XI vol.VI*, p.343.

⁶¹ *Ibidem*, p. 431.

Mediterranean side of the Alliance, thanks to its' military might (a participant to the Korean war) and less to its politic moves. Meanwhile, there was a shared feeling that the Americans lean more towards Turkey, given that the campaign for the enlargement of the Treaty was mainly planned for Turkey's benefit.

Additionally, there were rumors coming from Ankara that the Turkish refused to support Italy in keeping the vice-command of the Commandment in Southern Europe. At the same time, the French noticed that the Greek opposed an Italian deputy for Admiral Carney.⁶² In a talk with the Italian ambassador in Athens, the Greek foreign minister, Sophokles Venizelos confessed that, while understanding the issues of prestige behind the Italians' requests to remain in command, admitted that the proposed solution would bring with it "the germs of dissension, necessary to be avoided"; moreover, such a project could not be presented to Greek public opinion. In his opinion, the best solution would have been the sectioning of the Mediterranean area in two zones, Western and Eastern, the first under Italian command, the second shared by the Greek and Turkish armies, under an American general or admiral directly subordinated to General Eisenhower.⁶³

Lately, Turkey is in a delicate moment of its foreign policy about relations with NATO, although its armed forces represent the second largest force of the Atlantic alliance after that of the United States. Its clear rapprochement to Moscow, the announcement made by Ankara to be interested in the purchase from Moscow of a missile system, the strategic partnership with Russia in the energy sector and the recent retirement of Turkish military from the exercises of the alliance created problems in the western military structure. At the same time, the delays in admission to the European Union and finally the instability of the Middle East (also the Kurdish problem and the referendum on the independence of Kurdistan from Iraq), all these show that Turkey is increasingly out of Atlantic Alliance and Europe, at least at the declarative level. Although after the failed 2016 coup attempt, some European officials have reiterated the fact that "Turkey is important for the whole of Europe"⁶⁴, but one fact remains, which means that the Ankara government has already a new (different) choice of camps which means a departure of Turkey from NATO and the beginning of a strategic partnership with Russia.

⁶² *Ibidem*, pp.253, 257-258, 299, 409-410, 52; Reminding the French that the Italians supported the project of an European army, but, recently, in the issue of NATO's permanent headquarters, when the French offered Paris, the authorities in Rome were asking for French support, even though ambassador Quaroni suggested that Chigi Palace should not bank on France, who would use its limited influence to name a French general in *Ibidem*, p.521; In June 1952, the Southern Europe Commandment was defined; it was located in Napoli and it was going to exercise its influence over Greece and Turkey, too, with 2 terrestrial commandments, one for Italy, in Verona, under Italian (gen. De Castiglioni) and another, for Greece and Turkey, under American command in *Ibidem*, p.788.

⁶³ *Ibidem*, p.550.

⁶⁴ Nato General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg at the European Parliament in May 2017 and also in September 2016, in <http://www.eunews.it/2017/05/03/la-nato-la-turchia-e-un-alleato-importante-per-leuropa/84436>

“Substantial progress has taken place in [the] United States – Rumanian relations”: The Road to Upgrading the Level of Diplomatic Missions from Bucharest and Washington 1961-1964

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Key-words: The US-Romanian relations, diplomatic mission, the Cold War

Abstract

This study represents an analysis of the United States-Romanian relations during 1961-1964, focusing on the background process that led to the elevation of diplomatic missions to embassy status in June 1964. Primarily based on documents from the American and Romanian archives, it reveals the path to diplomatic ties' improvement during the Kennedy years and the Johnson Administration's first year. While Romania was seeking to distance itself from the Moscow's economic and political control and to strengthen its domestic and foreign position, the United States started to reexamine her relations with the satellite – countries from Eastern Europe. In this regard, the study explains how the US' perception toward Romania started to change, what gestures and actions influenced this change and how the bilateral relations registered progress amidst Cold War crises and international tensions.

Introduction

The US-Romanian relations endure for more than 135 years. The first diplomatic contacts between Washington and Bucharest had been established in 1880. Back then, the American government officially recognized Romania's independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1879 and the Kingdom of Romania in 1881. For a while, there had been only one US designated official for the American diplomatic missions in Bucharest, Belgrade, Athens and sometimes Sofia altogether. Contacts generally involved trade dealings and consular issues regarding US citizens & US citizens with business interests in Romania and Romanian citizens in the United States.

The first signs of progress between the two countries were visible after World War I. In 1921, the American government appointed the first plenipotentiary minister exclusively designated to the US Legation in Bucharest. Romania had already sent a diplomatic representative to Washington three years earlier, thus officially establishing

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the Romanian Legation in the United States. The US-Romanian relations severely deteriorated during World War II. Five days after Pearl Harbor and as a member of the Axis powers, Romania declared war against the US on December 12, 1941; the American government answered in kind in June 1942. The two countries resumed their diplomatic relations at the beginning of the Cold War yet by 1946-47, the Romanian political climate was changing dramatically. It was only a matter of time before a communist Kremlin-controlled regime was imposed in Bucharest. On December 30, 1947, King Michael I of Romania was forced to abdicate and leave the country. The communists seized the entire power and Romania completely entered into the Soviet Union's orbit. For the next decade, its relationship with the Western world was very fragile – the one with the United States being no exception.

Soviet military forces were withdrawn from Romania in 1958, thus ending a 14 years period of military occupation combined with an aggressive, direct Soviet control exerted over the country. Romania's bilateral relations with Western countries received their second chance after the Soviet retreat. In this regard, Romanian communist leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and his Politburo were determined to focus mainly on the economic opportunities the West could offer – like trade and industrial investments¹.

Washington reacted both cautiously and with interest to Romania's signals for reconciliation. The Department of State and the US Legation in Bucharest started to devise an approach for this process. To give this opportunity a fair shot, the plan was to start with cultural and educational exchanges then move to the next level – namely diplomatic and economic affairs. Over the year of 1960, there were several talks between the two countries with respect to a cultural exchange agreement and the raising of diplomatic missions. On November 10, 1960, Secretary of State Christian Herter wrote a memo to President Dwight D. Eisenhower on raising the level of diplomatic missions from Bucharest and Sofia. The Secretary argued that

“Such action would strengthen our diplomatic presence in Rumania and Bulgaria and place us in a better position to influence the Rumanian and Bulgarian Governments toward more active and positive relations with the United States and a less dependent relationship with the Soviet Union”².

Further on, the memo explained that Romania was one of the three countries that still had a US Legation instead of an US Embassy (the other two being Hungary and Bulgaria). The diplomatic status was also an issue for the American stationed diplomatic corps because the protocol considered them as lower in rank compared to their Western or Soviet counterparts. The memo insisted that

¹ Mihai Retegan, 1968. *Din primăvară până în toamnă*, RAO, București, 2014, p. 36.

² *Memorandum to the President, 11/10/1960*, file 611.6594/11-562, 1960-1963, Central Decimal File, Record Group 59 (hereafter RG 59) General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.

Herter explained to President Eisenhower that, while Hungary also had a Legation, he would not recommend changing the diplomatic status because US' relations with Budapest were “*abnormal and completely negative*”. One of the reasons for this was the 1956 uprising and the Soviet aggressive intervention to restore order in Hungary.

“...this step does not connote approval of the policies of the Rumanian and Bulgarian regimes ...We already maintain Embassies at Moscow, Warsaw and Prague, and it is accepted that the status of these three Missions in no way implies approval of the policies and character of the governments concerned”³.

Consequently, Secretary Herter recommended the elevation of US diplomatic missions from Bucharest and Sofia to embassy level⁴.

In the summer of 1960, the United States initiated talks with the Romanian government on raising the diplomatic missions. The proposal was connected to an agreement for cultural and educational exchanges between the two countries. These bilateral exchanges were an American idea and they would later become part of an exploratory ‘bridge-building’⁵ plan with the communist regime from Bucharest. The study of American official documents shows that the US was the one who set the tone and dynamic of these bilateral talks. If the negotiations were well-received and respected by the Romanians, then the chances to develop serious diplomatic relations would be higher.

As far as Gheorghiu-Dej was concerned, his country’s main purpose now was to make the transition from a predominantly agricultural state to an industrial-oriented one. This was the key factor in approaching the US with an extended view. Dej and his advisers knew that the US was the only country in the world who could provide them with the best available technology and they were planning to start negotiations for acquiring American logistics. On December 9, 1960, Romania’s plenipotentiary minister to Washington George Macovescu informed the Secretary of State that his country agreed to proceed with the cultural exchanges (in fields like education, science, arts, technology, sport and tourism among others)⁶. Overall, though, these bilateral ties evolved very slowly – definitely much slower than the Romanian authorities had anticipated. One could say that this was a predictable thing due to ideological differences, as the United States was a democracy and Romania a totalitarian state.

The 1960s bore a significant importance for the US-Romanian relations. Slowly but surely, progress has been made over this decade. The Washington-Bucharest

³ *Ibidem.*

⁴ *Ibidem.*

⁵ According to US historian Frank Costigliola, the policy of ‘bridge-building’ was launched in the spring of 1966 by the Johnson Administration, aiming to open avenues of political, economic and cultural contact with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. On the long term, President Lyndon Johnson and his advisers hoped that this policy of ‘bridge-building’ would undermine the communist ideology behind the Iron Curtain, see Frank Costigliola, *Lyndon B. Johnson, Germany, and "the End of the Cold War"* in Warren I. Cohen, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (eds), “Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World. American Foreign Policy 1963-1968”, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1994, p. 193.

After analyzing documents from both the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations on US-Romanian diplomatic relations during 1961-1968, I believe that the ‘bridge-building’ unofficially started during the Kennedy Administration. President Kennedy was eager to see some change in US’ relationship with the Eastern European countries and he understood that trade played a particular key role in this regard. So he started to put things in motion, by creating the Export Control Review Board in 1961 and advocating for trade liberalization and diplomatic normalization with the countries behind the Iron Curtain. Kennedy’s vision would be taken forward by President Johnson, who shared the same interest in opening relations with the satellite-countries and encouraging any chance for potential political transformations in the region.

⁶ *Letter to the Honorable Christian A. Herter, 12/9/1960*, file 611.6643/10-2260, 1960-1963, Central Decimal File, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.

rapprochement represented a complex diplomatic effort for both sides and it is important to emphasize that this relationship had a constant ascending trajectory during these years. Looking at the given circumstances and obvious differences, this should not be considered a minor thing. There were also frictions and problems but, as a whole, they had minor and temporary significance.

The Kennedy Administration opens the path for normalization with Romania

On January 20, 1961, former Democratic Senator from Massachusetts John Fitzgerald Kennedy became the 35th President of the United States. The new presidency aimed to bring a fresh perspective on the US domestic and foreign policy. At the height of the Cold War, Kennedy's *New Frontier* program mesmerized the American public - it was full of hope and vitality and promised to rejuvenate every field of the American society, from politics to culture. Since his days as a Senator, John F. Kennedy stressed that the US should extend their ties with the states behind the Iron Curtain. JFK pushed for trade liberalization with Eastern Europe by taking the floor in Senate meetings and publicly contesting the *Battle Act* that was prohibiting trade and economic ties with the satellite - countries⁷. This would have been an important move, especially after the Western countries helplessly watched as the USSR brutally repressed the Hungarian uprising in the fall of 1956. In an August 1957 speech, named 'Fighting against Imperialism – Poland and Eastern Europe', Kennedy pleaded for a larger support toward Eastern European countries, by invoking the 1956 uprising in Poznań and the harsh living conditions imposed on the Polish people by a Moscow – controlled regime⁸. The speech was essentially emphasizing that the American foreign policy toward this area was at crossroads and the strategy of containment needed to be revisited, especially the way it was applied by the Eisenhower Administration. Keeping Moscow's satellites in isolation, Kennedy argued, was not a wise decision⁹.

⁷ John F. Kennedy made references to his congressional initiatives regarding Eastern Europe during his 1960 presidential campaign. See, for instance, the following speech: John F. Kennedy: "Speech of Senator John F. Kennedy, Polish-American Congress, Chicago, IL," October 1, 1960. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25896> (accessed on June 15, 2018)

The Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 was also known as *Battle Act* - named after the US House Representative of Alabama Laurie C. Battle. The bill prohibited the US government to providing assistance to countries that maintained economic relations with the Soviet Union. Along with the *Marshall Plan* (1947), *Battle Act* is part of a series of laws destined to contain communism and Soviet influence around the world. The changes mentioned by President Kennedy in his speech were designed to bring flexibility in enforcing the law while maintaining the principles of containment. This flexibility was meant to build bridges of assistance and cooperation with communist states in order to create break-through in their total dependence on the Kremlin.

⁸ *Papers of John F. Kennedy. Pre-Presidential Papers*. Senate Files. Speeches and the Press. Speech Files, 1953-1960. "Struggle against Imperialism, Part II -- Poland and Eastern Europe", August 21st, 1957. JFKSEN-0898-002, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum (accessed on August 6, 2017)

⁹ *Ibidem*.

Less than 4 years later, John F. Kennedy became President of the United States. In his first State of the Union Address on January 30, 1961, the President stressed that the American people

*"(...) must never forget our hopes for the ultimate freedom and welfare of the Eastern European peoples. In order to be prepared to help re-establish historic ties of friendship, I am asking the Congress for increased discretion to use economic tools in this area whenever this is found to be clearly in the national interest.(...)"*¹⁰

The Romanian officials were genuinely interested to decipher President Kennedy's foreign policy vision and closely watched his Inaugural & State of the Union Addresses. The ideological differences were more than obvious; however, the Romanian Politburo was quick to notice the signal for opening toward Eastern Europe. For quite a while, Romanian leader Gheorghiu-Dej had some ambitious plans for his country and he recognized the opportunity he now had with the new leadership at the White House. By establishing commercial ties with the West and acquiring American technology, Dej could build an industrial-oriented economy with agriculture as a secondary resource. An internal production would have given Romania a certain degree of autonomy in the Soviet-controlled COMECON and would have cemented the path for exports to the Western markets. It was Romania's opportunity to transform itself from a predominantly agricultural country into an industrialized one. In retrospective, Dej's decision to approach the US and distance himself from COMECON has strengthened his political power.

Building better relations between Washington and Bucharest was a long-term process, with several ups and downs. In the spring of 1961, the cultural and economic agreements signed in the previous year gave a boost to the American-Romanian relations. On April 5, Romanian minister George Macovescu met with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Richard Davis (he would become the US ambassador to Romania in 1965) to discuss about the US-Romanian consular and diplomatic relations. Davis expressed his delight that a financial settlement was concluded and the cultural exchanges were progressing. From US standpoint, the next step was to update the status of consular relations; hence, a draft was prepared by the Department of State¹¹. The new consular convention would replace the only document of this kind signed between the two countries in 1881. Richard Davis also made a point by reminding to Macovescu that the family reunion cases had to be settled before the two governments would proceed toward signing the new convention. Macovescu tried to push things further, by mentioning the elevation of the diplomatic missions. Undoubtedly, he said, the consular issues were important and mandatory to be solved, but wouldn't that be easier if there were ambassadors instead of ministers in Bucharest and Washington? The old saying 'first things first' can sum up Davis' answer:

¹⁰ John F. Kennedy, "Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union," January 30, 1961. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8045> (accessed on July 12, 2017)

¹¹ *Memorandum of Conversation, April 5, 1961*, file 611.6594/11-562, 1960-1963, Central Decimal File, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. The following lines from this paragraph are based on the same source.

“Mr. Davis said very serious consideration is being given to the question and we believe steps along the lines just mentioned could be a strong contribution to a satisfactory resolution of the matter. Starting the process of settling these matters or at least beginning negotiations on these points would contribute to a favorable decision on this point.”¹²

The US government considered that there were several issues that needed to be settled down before negotiations on diplomatic relations could start. Firstly, there were the unsolved financial claims which dated back to the World War II era, when Romania was an Axis ally. This situation, however, extended after 1944 when the Soviets imposed their control over Romania. Besides that, the US encountered constant barriers in solving pressing problems such as: reuniting the American-Romanian citizens with their families, solving people's cases with both US & Romanian citizenship who wanted to leave Romania for the United States and finding solutions for the financial and material compensations that the American citizens of Romanian descent were entitled to receive from the Romanian communist authorities. The US Legation and the Department of State had knowledge of hundreds of registered cases that were expecting a solution and this was a frequent topic of correspondence between the US mission in Bucharest and the State headquarters in Washington, D.C. The Legation's relationship with the Romanian government had been particularly hostile, especially when the Soviets were stationed in the country. Consequently, the communist regime from Bucharest constantly rejected the American requests to reconsider the above-mentioned problems. Once Gheorghiu-Dej began to see the American ties as a priority, he found himself obliged to pay attention to the US' demands. The American leadership was adamant regardless of political party, and made these requests as a prerequisite for any progress in bilateral relations.

From the Romanian point of view, the political-diplomatic issues were connected to the success of acquiring American technology and they were usually subordinated to the economic developments. The Romanian strategy was to solve all the other issues in order to achieve this main goal – trade with the US. The Bucharest regime continued to harbor its communist discourse with every occasion but its belligerency toward the United States would become more subdued.

From the American perspective, the political and diplomatic issues had a high priority. The Cold War strategy demanded a different approach for the totalitarian states – from USSR to its satellites. Each step of rapprochement was therefore carefully considered – its implications, its medium and long-term impact and the decisions that lay behind these actions. As opposed to the Romanian government who wanted to speed up the process, the American officials decided to follow a lengthier approach, with small but steady steps. The power dynamic between the two countries is obvious, with the US setting the rhythm and Romania following the lead. Still, Romania did it in her own way by adjusting and trying to maintain a balanced position. When the context and issue required it, other Romanian diplomats - such as Bălăceanu and Mănescu - received similar answers as the one provided by Davis to Macovescu. The Americans took every opportunity to discuss the most pressing bilateral problems until they were solved or a reasonable compromise was made instead.

¹² *Ibidem.*

The situation got complicated in April 1961 when the CIA-backed invasion in the Bay of Pigs failed terribly. The unexpected outcome deeply affected the Kennedy Administration and took Washington by surprise. The mood became tense in Bucharest, too. The Romanian Politburo released a public statement condemning what they considered an American attack over the communist regime in Havana and the Cuban fight against imperialism. This incident, along with the highly tense summer of 1961 that followed, determined a freeze in the bilateral relations. The Soviet ultimatum over Berlin, the Berlin Wall and the pressure for a peace treaty with East Germany were major foreign policy problems for the Kennedy Administration that also had an impact on the US-Romanian diplomatic talks. In the fall of 1961, the cable correspondence between Deputy Chief of mission in Bucharest Frederick Merrill and State Department official Harold Vedeler revealed that the US did not expect any new significant developments. The main reasons were the international atmosphere created by the Berlin crisis and the constant delays of the Romanian government to solve Washington's requirements for improving relations:

*"Regarding the possibility of elevation of the mission, you are correct in assuming that there is nothing new. We believe that the Rumanians are unlikely to respond to our proposals for substantive negotiations during the present period of tension. While our proposals did not directly tie the question of elevation of mission to a successful conclusion of other negotiations, I believe the Rumanians understood clearly the desirata which we have in mind. For the time being, I think it is unlikely that they would be willing to consider a price of any importance to us. As you may have noticed from the memoranda of conversations, when Macovescu was recently questioned about the Rumanian failure to reply to our proposals, he repeated on three occasions that the proposals were still under consideration and we would eventually receive a reply."*¹³

On December 12, 1961, the newly appointed Romanian minister to Washington Petre Bălăceanu presented his credentials to President Kennedy. The conversation was short and the American President went straight to the point: the international context was unfavorable for the United States to increase trade and he warned that this would also affect the Washington-Bucharest negotiations on this issue¹⁴. President Kennedy's words carried a double message: the Administration expected patience from the Romanians and it was testing their intentions and actions. The American officials were eager to assure themselves that Romania's economic priorities were not orchestrated by the Soviets. But things were actually the opposite: Dej was protecting his ambitions and he planned to keep his talks with the US outside Moscow's reach. In the end, both countries would wait for the New Year to come and see where these talks would lead.

The most significant event of 1962 was, undoubtedly, the Cuban missile crisis. Romania was indirectly affected by the political and military confrontation between the

¹³ Letter Harold Vedeler to Frederick Merrill, September 25, 1961, file Status of Mission, 1944-1964, Classified General Records, RG 84, General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.

¹⁴ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey*, vol. XVI, (hereafter FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. XVI), ed. James E. Miller, Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994, Document 6.

United States and the Soviet Union. The crisis' developments and significance, though, had a profound impact on the US-Romanian relations. Diplomatic contacts increased during 1962 with the Romanians remaining focused on the same issue, namely trade. The Department of State officials and the US minister in Bucharest constantly reminded to Mănescu, Macovescu, Bălăceanu and other dignitaries that the Romanian government must honor its commitments for reuniting families and maintaining cultural exchanges in order to see progress with the US.

At the beginning of 1962, Frederick Merrill and Robert Thayer ended their mission in Bucharest as William Avery Crawford, a Foreign Service career diplomat and the first-to-be US ambassador in Romania, was assigned to the mission. Crawford spent three years in Romania and worked tirelessly to improve his country's ties with the communist leadership. He successfully managed the trade opening and the rising of diplomatic missions to embassy level. In his first meeting with the Romanian foreign minister Corneliu Mănescu, Crawford expressed his desire to discover the Romanian society and to visit the country as much as possible¹⁵ (he was obviously aware of the totalitarian surroundings). Crawford was highly regarded by Dej and then Nicolae Ceaușescu for his interest to interact with the Romanian people and to explore their world.

In October 1962, the world anxiously watched the development of the Cuban missile crisis. The crisis symbolized both danger and opportunity, and for Romania it became an opportunity to gradually assert her independence from Moscow in the following years. Dej found out about the Soviet missiles in Cuba as all other country leaders across the globe had – by listening to President Kennedy's *Address to the Nation* from October 22 (October 23, Romania time). On October 25, the Romanian government released a public statement regarding the missile crisis in which it condemned the naval quarantine and described it as a destabilizing and aggravating action¹⁶. The American minister in Bucharest observed that the statement was moderate in tone and followed the general ideological line yet without using a too aggressive language. The Romanians were among the last ones who issued such a declaration and according to Crawford, the written statement was not sent to the US Legation¹⁷. The American officials made a good guessing: the leadership from Bucharest was feeling anxious about recent developments and cautiously adopted a neutral position, as not to make the Soviets too suspicious.

Two weeks after the Cuban missile crisis ended, William Crawford sent a memo on November 15 to the Department of State on Romania's reactions to the crisis. Crawford observed that "*The official Rumanian response to the Cuban crisis was cautious, noncommittal, and relatively moderate. Though the RPR generally followed the Soviet lead, its reactions were more guarded*"¹⁸. There are various explanations for this

¹⁵ *American Legation Bucharest to the Department of State, Foreign Service Dispatch – 144, February 7, 1962*, file 611.6594/11-562, Central Decimal File, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.

¹⁶ *American Legation Bucharest to the Department of State, Airgram - 105, November 11, 1962*, file 611.6594/11-562, 1960-1963, Central Decimal File, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*. The following explanations summarize the main ideas of the document.

cautious attitude – like the uncertain future or the wish to not jeopardize the negotiations with the US. Sure enough, Romania never stepped aside the ideological line and the communist government from Bucharest was convinced that this confrontation happened because of the “American imperialism”. Still, it was not as vocal as other satellite – countries’ governments. Crawford perceived the level of anxiety in Bucharest and how relieved everybody was when Khrushchev announced the missiles’ withdrawal and the de-escalation that followed. In this light though, the American diplomat estimated that the US-Romanian relations would not see any major changes: “*It is doubtful that the Soviet retreat will have any direct effect on Rumanian-Soviet relations, even though the Rumanian leaders’ confidence in the USSR’ ability to uphold its international commitments must have been weakened*”¹⁹.

The October events stuck in Dej’s mind for a long time. From a Romanian-US relations point of view, the Romanian political gestures were very important in showing detachment of those ‘no way out’ –like Soviet decisions. Years later, Raymond Garthoff (Department of State official and expert on Eastern-European Affairs) recounted a meeting on October 4, 1963 between Dean Rusk and Corneliu Mănescu in which the Romanian foreign minister tried to assure the Secretary of State that Romania did not know about the Soviet missile build-up in Cuba²⁰. Mănescu also added that his country would remain neutral in a presumptive political-military conflict between the US and USSR if Cuba-alike actions were to happen again. Being afraid of war, the Romanian diplomat was eager to state that Romania did not have Soviet nuclear weapons on her soil (the Americans already knew that) and he hoped that the US would not target Romania as part of the retaliation plan²¹.

A careful reading of the US Legation’s reports to the Department of State reveals the complexity and astuteness of the Legation’s staff work in collecting, analyzing and transmitting information to their superiors in Washington. The American diplomats in Bucharest noticed a while ago that things started to change in the Romanian capital but persuading their colleagues in Washington proved to be a long-time process. Ambassador Crawford later explained that “*My main job was to report to Washington and to try to persuade them that all these things [a.n. the frictions between the Romanians and the Soviets, the Romanian political - domestic changes, Dej’s ambition for industrialization, Romania’s gestures of independence toward Moscow] were really happening. It wasn’t easy*”²².

US minister William Crawford was keeping the Romanian political transformations under a close eye, as he was trying to understand the power mechanisms of Dej’s leadership, the way his oppressive regime was controlling the society and how this was reflecting over the country’s relationship with the United States. When Dej’s efforts to distance himself from Moscow became a fact, the US Legation in Bucharest

¹⁹ *Ibidem*.

²⁰ Mihai Retegan, *op.cit.*, pp. 43-44. In his presentation and analysis of the Rusk-Manescu meeting, the Romanian historian quotes Raymond Garthoff’s study *When and Why Romania Distanced Itself from the Warsaw Pact*, published in “The Cold War International History Bulletin”, No. 5, spring 1995.

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 43.

²² Torbert, Horace G., William W. Moss, and William Roy Crawford, Interview with William A. Crawford, 1989, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Retrieved from the Library of Congress, <https://www.loc.gov/item/mfdipbib000245/> (accessed on August 7, 2017)

urged the Department of State to change its approach on Romania. Crawford estimated that the Romanians ought to be somehow rewarded for their gestures of independence and he constantly advanced this recommendation over the year²³. His suggestion added to the positive feedback that Richard Davis and Harold Vedeler were getting from their contacts with the Romanian mission in Washington; therefore, the Kennedy Administration initiated a series of actions designed to bring the US-Romanian relations to a new level.

In retrospect, the Cuban missile crisis had a substantial impact over the Washington-Bucharest relations and this became obvious starting with August 1963. Firstly, the US Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman became the first Cabinet member of an American Administration to visit communist Romania. His visit took place between August 3-5 and his talks with Dej focused on trade and export licenses²⁴. A few days later, on August 8, the Romanian deputy foreign minister Mircea Malița came to Washington for the signing ceremony of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty²⁵. By no means just a coincidence, Malița travelled to Washington with the same flight as William Crawford did²⁶. The US minister was to be in the American capital for a couple of days so the Romanian official took this opportunity to have an off-the-record conversation with Crawford. As a result of this talk, the American minister decided to ask his friend and Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs Averell Harriman for a meeting with Malița, considering this action to be highly valuable for both states involved. With Harriman's extraordinary diplomatic experience and knowledge on Eastern Europe, Crawford thought, the bilateral relations might be given a speed-up²⁷. He, indeed, made the right call. Harriman and Malița met on the same day with the Test Ban Treaty signing; the main topics of discussion were Romania's position within the July COMECON Conference from Moscow, the Romanian leadership efforts to move farther apart from Kremlin's policy and trade issues. Harriman praised Romania's stance toward the Soviet Union but was noncommittal on trade issues, warning that their examination would take some time²⁸. Harriman wrapped up his thoughts at a later meeting with Dean Rusk and persuaded the Secretary that Romania deserved additional attention²⁹ and proper signals had to be sent out soon to Bucharest.

²³ William A. Crawford, recorded interview by William W. Moss, John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program (hereafter William A. Crawford interview), March 12, 1971, p. 16.

²⁴ *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. XVI, Document 20.

²⁵ The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty had been already signed on August 5 in Moscow by the US, UK and USSR and was the extraordinary accomplishment of long-time negotiations between Western countries (US, UK, France, Canada) and the Soviet Union on applying sanctions over nuclear testing. The document aimed to put an end to nuclear testing on soil, in water and air, thus leaving the underground testing as the only acceptable option. The initial objective was to ban them altogether, but the Kremlin refused this option fearing UN nuclear inspections and considering them as espionage. Gheorghiu-Dej had declared in several occasions that Romania was against possessing nuclear arsenal and Mănescu held a speech in March 1962 during the Geneva Disarmament Conference in which he pleaded for a nuclear-free Balkan Peninsula in *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. XVI, Document 10.

²⁶ William A. Crawford interview, March 12, 1971, p. 20. The following lines are based on Crawford's recount of the events.

²⁷ *Ibidem*.

²⁸ *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. XVI, Document 20.

²⁹ William A. Crawford interview, March 12, 1971, p. 23.

Yet the highest achievement for the American-Romanian ties was Minister Crawford's meeting with President Kennedy on August 23, 1963. Crawford described to President Kennedy Romania's political, economic and social evolution, highlighting Bucharest's signals for extending trade with the West and for building economic cooperation with the US and her allies. The American minister found President Kennedy being "*extremely interested in developments in Romania*" and in favor of fresh measures to support Romania's current path³⁰. Kennedy's interest had very much to do with a recent report presented to him by the Export Control Review Board³¹ regarding the East-West trade. The report had been sent to the President on August 15, 1963 and was in favor of expanding trade with the satellite-countries but without the Soviet Union³². The report submitted to debate the present tactics of approving licenses and extending them, the proposal for bilateral agreements with these states and redrafting the procedures for trade contacts liberalization (in cooperation with the US Congress and federal institutions such as the Departments of Commerce, State, Defense and Justice)³³. Before the report was sent to the President, Secretary Rusk praised Romania and its evolution during the Board's meeting by remarking that

*"At the moment, Rumania seems to be ripe for a push toward better relations. We should be forthcoming promptly on a number of trade items in which Rumania is interested. If, then, the hoped-for improvement in our relations takes place, we should liberalize further (...) Rumania was the most immediate matter to be looked at."*³⁴

As the signals from Bucharest were considered encouraging, Romania emerged as a good candidate for the policy changes and it was therefore chosen to be the first country to take advantage of them. In this regard, Rusk's remarks during the Export Review Board meeting and the report itself explain President Kennedy's interest in having a conversation with Minister Crawford and his desire to see the matter solidly pursued through Congress, as the legislative power was the one able to initiate change in trade negotiations and bring amendments to existing bills.

In the fall of 1963, the US-Romanian relations were at an all-time high since Romania was under communist rule. From a commercial standpoint, things looked like

³⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 21.

³¹ In May 1961, President Kennedy signed the *Executive Order No. 10945 'Administration of the Export Control Act of 1949'*, hence creating an internal working committee named 'The Export Control Review Board' to examine the at the highest inter-departmental level actions and policies outside the commercial field that could have implications over the US national security. Once concluded, their recommendations would be discussed with the President and their approval was to be implemented by the Department of Commerce, in accordance with the amendments brought to the Export Act of 1949. The Board's members were the Secretaries of State, Defense, Commerce and their deputies. The issue was commonly referred to as the 'East-West trade'.

³² *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Foreign Economic Policy*, vol. IX, (hereafter FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. IX), eds. Evans Gerakas, David S. Patterson, William F. Sanford, Jr., Carolyn B. Yee, Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995, Document 327.

The Romanian-American trade relations are thoroughly examined in Mircea Răceanu's book, *The History of the Most Favored Nation Clause in the Romanian-American Relations*, Tipogrup Press, Buzău, 2008.

³³ *Ibidem*.

³⁴ FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. IX, Document 326.

they started to work out well for Dej's regime; one American company had its license approved for a future collaboration with soon-to-be-finished Galați industrial plant. Moreover, the elevation of diplomatic missions to embassy status had significant chances to succeed in the near future. Even if the American officials did not consider the matter as highly important, they were aware that it was a question of prestige for the Romanian government, especially one in front of the Soviets. In this promising atmosphere, the news of President Kennedy's assassination on November 22 was received with both sadness and shock in Bucharest. Gheorghiu-Dej and members of the Romanian Politburo were in an official visit to Yugoslavian President Josip Broz Tito at that time. Dej offered his condolences to the US chargé d'affaires in Belgrade while prime-minister Maurer in Bucharest called Minister Crawford to do the same thing. Months later, Dej confessed to Crawford that he considered John F. Kennedy as a "*great leader and man of peace*"³⁵ and that he spent that night awake, talking to Tito and wondering what was going to happen from then on³⁶. This was actually one of the questions everybody in the world contemplated. The communist countries were especially concerned because the assassin was an American with communist beliefs and they were now fearful that his action would have serious repercussions over their relationship with the US and it would reflect in a change of approach in the US foreign policy. A Romanian delegation led by the vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers Gheorghe Gaston-Marin attended the funeral of President Kennedy in Washington, D.C. on November 25 and received President Johnson and Secretary Rusk's assurances on continuing President Kennedy's policy regarding US-Romanian relations³⁷.

The Johnson Administration seeks to strengthen the bilateral ties: the June 1964 elevation of American and Romanian diplomatic missions to embassy level

In his first Address to the Congress, President Lyndon B. Johnson pledged to carry on the Kennedy legacy – from the civil rights movement to honoring the American foreign policy commitments³⁸. By making this commitment, Johnson assumed the political vision and legacy of the former Administration and made it his own. As it happened with all other states, Romania was also assured that President Kennedy's demarches would now be fulfilled by President Johnson. The advisory team was to stay virtually the same, with a couple of additions or replacements, but without bringing major changes in the decision-making process or within the decisions proposed to be implemented. The main American cast - Rusk, Harriman, Crawford, Davis and Vedeler –

³⁵ *Telegram American Legation Bucharest to the Department of State, January 1, 1964*, file POL 15-1 RUM. 1/1/64, 1964-1966, Central Foreign Policy Files, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.

³⁶ William A. Crawford interview, March 12, 1971, pp. 26 – 27.

³⁷ *Arhivele Naționale ale României (ANR)*, fond CC al PCR, Secția Relații Externe, dosar 89/1963, pp. 2-32.

³⁸ Lyndon B. Johnson: "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress," November 27, 1963. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25988> (accessed on August 15, 2017)

was there to stay and continue its mission to improving ties with Bucharest and expanding diplomatic and trade relations.

The year of 1964 marked an important moment in the American-Romanian relations with the elevation of diplomatic missions to embassy level. This achievement certified the success of American and Romanian diplomacy in their efforts to find common ground and efficient cooperation for the progress of their bilateral relations. It was a significant step forward for the Dej regime and part of an increasing political involvement in international affairs for Romania. From the beginning of the '60s, Gheorghiu-Dej had been constantly interested in designing a Romanian foreign policy line. In this regard, Romania's position on the international scene identified itself through the following: supporting peace, promoting cooperation, diplomacy and negotiations as tools for solving divergent issues, adopting a non-belligerent or neutral position in conflict situations, supporting disarmament, non-proliferation and the ban of nuclear testing (especially for a nuclear-free Balkan peninsula) and the nations' right for self-determination. In this decade of the Cold War, one can see that Romania's behavior on the international scene was a mix between political idealism, pragmatism and communist ideology. This mix of ideas and actions gave Romania a voice on international affairs – a quite respectable one for an Eastern European communist country.

In a February 1965 report of the US Embassy in Bucharest there is a political and economic evaluation of Romania corroborated with the medium and long-term objectives of the Johnson Administration regarding US-Romanian relations. The US institutions considered that their main mission was "*The encouragement and support of Rumania's drive for independence (...)*"³⁹. At that time, the most efficient way to encourage this trajectory was through trade:

*"Strong economic ties with the US will give Rumania strategic assurances against possible Soviet retaliation, will decrease its dependence on Moscow, and increase its interdependence with the West."*⁴⁰

Romania had asked for synthetic rubber, equipment and logistics for the chemical, electrical, metallurgic industries and so on. The approval of export licenses for these products was a necessary step toward normalization and some progress in this regard had already been made. The export of American technology and equipment, the approval of scientific exchanges and the trading of Romanian products on the American market were potential economic instruments in designing a long-term climate of cooperation⁴¹. Politically speaking, the United States respected Romania's involvement in the international affairs for the same reason, namely to encourage an independent attitude of the Romanian communist officials. The Rusk-Mănescu talks over the years are the most relevant example. Nuclear disarmament, China and Soviet Union, the German

³⁹ *US Embassy Bucharest to the Department of State, February 24, 1965, file POL 2-3. Politico-Economic Reports. 1/1/64, 1964-1966, Central Foreign Policy Files, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.*

⁴⁰ *Ibidem.*

⁴¹ *Ibidem.*

question and West Berlin, the Vietnam War, the Middle East, United Nations' issues, Western Europe and the Common Market were among the most frequent topics of conversation between the two countries' representatives (along with the raising of diplomatic missions to embassy level).

In retrospect, the Romanians gave more consideration to the elevation of missions than the Americans. This is an aspect very well explained by the former US plenipotentiary minister and then ambassador William Crawford:

*“MOSS: How well developed was the move towards raising the legation to embassy level?
CRAWFORD: Well, for us this was a rather minor part of the whole thing. On the other hand the Romanians considered it far more important because for them it was a prestige matter. Since the Soviets had ambassadors everywhere, they didn't want their envoys to be of subordinate rank. I guess the representative of the United States doesn't need to have his prestige enhanced, whether he's down the protocol line a bit or not. (...) From our standpoint, the elevation to an embassy would follow naturally if everything else went right (...).”*⁴²

With the exception of Secretary Herter's memo to President Eisenhower in 1960 – in which the elevation of diplomatic missions was considered advisable – the subject had not been specifically discussed during Kennedy's presidency. However, this possibility had been reexamined at the lower-levels of the Department of State by taking into account the Romanian signals sent to the US diplomatic personnel stationed in Bucharest. Consequently, the Administration's specialists started to focus their efforts in this direction. The US intended to coordinate this move with her Western allies – the United Kingdom and France. One week later, Under-Secretary of State George Ball sent a cable to London and Paris instructing the ambassadors to start consultations with the two governments regarding the elevation of diplomatic missions in some Eastern European countries. In his cable, Ball explained that this demarche is motivated by “(1) progress in solution of bilateral problems and in expansion of bilateral relations; and (2) extent to which EE country [is] asserting [a] more independent position toward Soviet Union” and mentioned that the US mission in Bucharest has priority compared to Sofia and the one in Budapest would keep its current status for now⁴³. Both Britain and France answered positively and raised their diplomatic missions in December 1963. It was now, exclusively, United States' turn.

The process for elevating the status of diplomatic missions intensified by the end of 1963 and during the first half of 1964. There were still several unsolved issues with the Romanian communist regime on the American agenda – such as the family reunions' cases, the double citizenship ones and the signing of a new consular convention. Their favorable and fast settlement was the key for bilateral negotiations. Dej undoubtedly understood this message from the beginning; but he also had an agenda of his own – Romania's industrialization and strengthening his own political power. So his regime improvised a diplomatic scheme based on the principle of proportionality: the US Legation claims would be solved favorably at the same rate with the American

⁴² William A. Crawford interview, March 12, 1971, p. 24.

⁴³ *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. XVI, Document 21.

government's positive answers to their industrial shopping list and trade issues. It was definitely not a strict tactic as the Romanians were fully aware they could not force the Americans' hands with anything; but this was their way of trying to have a position or a card to play in the negotiation process. It is the reason why we find these topics of conversation in almost every contact between the US and Romanian diplomats, whether there were high-level meetings or regular interactions. For the Romanian communist regime, the American requests had no value except as transactional or maneuvering means in their negotiations with Washington. Consequently, the communist authorities solved or delayed this kind of cases by exclusively connecting them to advantages obtained from the American leadership or the lack of them.

In his first 1964 conversation with foreign minister Mănescu, William Crawford expressed his appreciation for the Romanian government's decision to solve all the consular cases that the US Legation brought into attention a year and a half ago. Mănescu confirmed to Crawford that there would be an additional 105 cases to be solved (with the possibility to see this number rising), besides the 267 cases demanded by the Legation⁴⁴. Once these issues were solved, Crawford explained to Mănescu, the Romanian government could pretty soon expect an American decision on elevating the missions. Romania's recent progress and the plans for signing a new consular convention had been extensively analyzed by Washington and awaited a final decision⁴⁵. On March 2, Rusk sent a message to Mănescu through the US Legation, thanking him for his pledge to solve the consular cases and informing the Romanian foreign minister that the Gaston-Marin trade delegation had been approved to visit the United States; the Romanian diplomat was delighted by the answer he received "*from my friend and colleague, Rusk*"⁴⁶.

The elevation of the diplomatic missions from Bucharest and Washington became a sure thing to happen by April 1964. President Lyndon Johnson held a 'Tuesday-lunch' meeting on April 2nd at the White House and gave Dean Rusk a green light for elevating the US diplomatic mission in Bucharest to embassy status⁴⁷. An April 15 memo from the Department of State to McGeorge Bundy mentions the President's approval and thoroughly explains the reasoning behind this decision:

"Since the question of upgrading the level of the respective diplomatic missions in Bucharest and Washington was raised at Rumanian initiative early in 1961, substantial

⁴⁴ *American Legation Bucharest to the Department of State, Airgram – 212, February 28, 1964*, file POL 15-1 RUM. 1/1/64, 1964-1966, Central Foreign Policy Files, RG 59 and *Telegram from American Legation Bucharest to Department of State, February 29, 1964*, file Political Affairs & Rel. RUM-US. 1/1/64, 1964-1966, Central Foreign Policy Files, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁶ *Department of State to American Legation Bucharest, March 2nd, 1964*, file Political Affairs & Rel. RUM-US. 1/1/64, 1964-1966 and *Telegram American Legation Bucharest to the Department of State, March 5, 1964*, file Political Affairs & Rel. RUM-US. 1/1/64, 1964-1966, Central Foreign Policy Files, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.

⁴⁷ *Memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, April 15, 1964*, file POL 17. Diplomatic & Consular Representation. RUM-US. 1/1/64, 1964-1966, Central Foreign Policy Files, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.

progress has taken place in United States – Rumanian relations. It provides a solid base for the planned action. The resolution of outstanding bilateral relations ... is proceeding satisfactorily. (...) Favorable developments in United States-Rumanian relations have been accompanied by equally significant changes in Rumania's relations with the Soviet Union, including steps by Rumania toward internal de-Russification and its assertion of increased political and economic independence and autonomy. These changes constitute further grounds for raising the level of our mission. (...)”⁴⁸

In these conditions, Gheorghiu-Dej's address to the plenary session of the Romanian Workers' Party Central Committee – known as the 'April 22nd Declaration'⁴⁹ – gave an impulse to the developing events. It also marked an important transformation into the Romanian foreign policy, one that had a long-term and major impact firstly on Romania's relations with the Soviet Union and secondly, on its relations with the US and Western Europe. There are numerous academic works on communism in Romania that focus on these particular subjects and their implications⁵⁰. Strictly related to US-Romanian relations though, the 'April 22nd Declaration' and Dej's bold approach pleasantly surprised the American diplomacy. It was obviously a change designed to strengthen Dej's personal power and the regime's oppressive control. But this Romanian effort to distance itself from Moscow really mattered for the US because each dismissal of Soviet authority had the potential to challenge the forced order behind the Iron Curtain. This kind of actions would threaten the equilibrium of the Soviet sphere of influence thus determining changes and affecting the USSR's prestige globally. There were significant aspects within the complex configuration of the Cold War. It's true that Dej and then Ceausescu touted their independent stance toward Moscow yet the domestic political regime remained a Stalinist one⁵¹. The Romanian society did not feel the wave of a better life. The American officials were fully aware of that but they considered this to be the first step out of many others to follow in Romania's eventual transition to democracy. It took another 25 years until Romania got to that point.

In his analysis of the April 22nd Declaration, US minister Crawford pointedly remarked that its content was representing

“(...) [the] pronouncement [of] Rumania's right and intent to exercise national independence and equality in Communist world. In essence, it constitutes resounding proclamation of emancipation from satellite status and marks emergence of what may be justly termed new and original form national Communism.”⁵²

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁹ Official: "Declaration Regarding the Romanian Workers Party's Position on the Communist and Proletarian International Movement Problems", published on April 26, 1964, in "Scântea" (The Romanian communist regime official newspaper).

⁵⁰ Florin Constantiniu, Mihai Retegan, Larry Watts, Dennis Deletant, Vasile Buga, Lavinia Betea, Mioara Anton, Vasile Popa, Dan Cătănuș – are a few of the Romanian and American historians whose works focused on the subject and significance of the April 22, 1964 Declaration.

⁵¹ Mihai Retegan, *op.cit.*, p. 60.

⁵² *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Eastern Europe*, vol. XVII, (hereafter FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. XVII), ed. James E. Miller, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996, Document 141.

This expression of ‘national communism’, Crawford continued, manifested itself through a couple of “remarkable” actions, such as: the refusal to accept USSR’s over-regulations within COMECON and the imposition of an economic specialization, the reduction of Soviet influence in Romanian daily life (as part of the de-Russification campaign, the Russian language was no longer mandatory to be taught in schools, and the Soviet monuments, street names, buildings and town names were removed and replaced with Romanian ones, etc.) the amelioration of diplomatic and economic relations with the Western world and the usage of the Sino-Soviet conflict in promoting Romania’s own political interests. The Moscow-Peking split had been a starting point for this Declaration and for the Romanian leadership’s desire to express its position of independence and denial of hegemonic tendencies. Crawford concluded his report by recommending the Department of State to exploit the good-timing of the Gaston-Marin’s trade –oriented visit in Washington in May and approve a general export licenses list for Romania, as a reward for her audacious attitude on international affairs⁵³.

A last round of bilateral negotiations took place between May 18 – June 1, when American and Romanian officials agreed on raising the level of diplomatic missions and the Americans approved some US export licenses for industrial installations. The Romanian delegation was led by Gaston-Marin while Averell Harriman represented the Johnson Administration in these talks. On May 29, McGeorge Bundy sent President Johnson a memo on this subject, underlining the main points of agreement:

*“1. To expand Rumanian trade with the United States. Rumania will be authorized to buy 11 major industrial installations ... (out of an original shopping list of 15)... For their part, the Rumanian have given us assurances that US shipment will not be trans-shipped or re-exported, and technical data of US origin will not be disclosed or otherwise transmitted without explicit US approval...Estimated value of these sales, if consummated, is \$ 30 million a year.”*⁵⁴

*“Essentially we achieved what we set out to get”, Bundy observed, adding that “The Rumanians accepted virtually every condition we levied, and this, despite the fact that we rejected their request for long-term credits and made clear that the most-favored-nation treatment would not be possible for some time, since this required a major legislative effort.”*⁵⁵

For that precise moment, I consider that the Romanian diplomats underscored a major diplomatic success. Getting the export licenses was a significant step forward. Yet there is something related to this issue that is well highlighted in a State Department cable and is always visible when analyzing the related documents in general: because of their ideological vision, the Romanian officials do not seem to properly understand that protection tariffs, export licenses, commercial credit approvals or strategic materials supplying (nuclear technology included here) were regulated by laws and these laws were made and then approved by the US Congress⁵⁶. These laws could not be changed at any

⁵³ *Ibidem*. The entire paragraph uses this source.

⁵⁴ *Memorandum to the President, May 29, 1964*, McGeorge Bundy. 6/1-30/64, volume 5, Memoranda to the President, National Security Files, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library.

⁵⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁶ *Telegram from the Department of State to American Legation Bucharest, May 30, 1964*, file POL 1. General policy & Background. RUM-US. 1/1/64, 1964-1966, Central Foreign Policy Files, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.

time or in whatever way; moreover, the President could not just change the laws at his will, regardless of how great or small the changes were. The budget for the ongoing year had been approved by Congress last year and the budgets for the next fiscal years were already being established. The 'Most Favored Nation' clause or the elevation of protection tariffs were issues that needed to be debated in congressional meetings and voted upon. If they passed, there would either be amendments to an existing bill or a new bill by itself; and all this process needed time.

Bundy concluded his memo with a very concise description of what motivated the United States to support Romania's current path and what were the expectations:

*"Perhaps the single most significant aspect of these talks was Rumania's determination to succeed in establishing a new and substantial relationship with the US – an important factor in Rumania's drive for independence from Moscow. However ...there is an awareness on both sides that the pace of these developments cannot be forced. To succeed, there must be a gradualness and a logic about them, as well as evidence of continued Rumanian independence in international affairs and greater freedom for the Rumanian people – a point Averell Harriman intends to underscore before the talks are over."*⁵⁷

On June 1st, 1964, the United States of America and the Romanian People's Republic issued a joint communiqué announcing the decisions concluding their talks⁵⁸. The official statement announced the elevation of diplomatic missions from Bucharest and Washington, D.C. to embassy level. The bilateral agreement also mentioned the following: solving potential conflicts through a third state or in an international court, expanding Romanian tourism to foreigners and easing restrictions by both states for business – related travel⁵⁹. On August 14, Petre Bălăceanu presented his credentials as Romania's ambassador to the United States to President Johnson. William A. Crawford officially became the US ambassador to Romania on December 4 and presented his credentials to President Gheorghiu-Dej on December 24, 1964.

The change of diplomatic missions' status determined some Romanian officials to highlight the achievement in their correspondence with their American counterparts. The US ambassador in Buenos Aires Edwin Martin observed that the newly appointed Romanian ambassador to Argentina used a new expression in his courtesy message marking the occasion: "[to] maintain and improve the cordial relations, both official and personal, which unite our two countries and their respective missions"⁶⁰. It may be considered a minor thing but, as Martin noted, this was the first time in those years when a communist country used this concluding remark in a diplomatic message toward the United States⁶¹.

⁵⁷ *Memorandum to the President, May 29, 1964*, volume 5. McGeorge Bundy. 6/1-30/64, Memoranda to the President, National Security Files, LBJL.

⁵⁸ *Telegram from the Department of State to American Legation Bucharest, May 30, 1964*, file POL 1. General Policy & Background. RUM-US. 1/1/64, 1964-1966, Central Foreign Policy Files, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.

⁵⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁰ *American Embassy Buenos Aires to Department of State, Airgram –44, July 18, 1964*, file POL 17. Diplomatic & Consular Representation. RUM-US. 1/1/64, 1964-1966, Central Foreign Policy Files, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, U.S. National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.

⁶¹ *Ibidem*.

Aside from the American specific requirements in order to change the diplomatic status, the communist regime in Bucharest also took some actions that persuaded the American officials to accelerate the process. Gheorghiu-Dej started to extract the Romanian daily life, the schools and the manufacturing of historical facts from the Soviet influence. By the end of 1963, the US Legation in Bucharest announced Washington that the Romanians had stopped the radio-jamming of Western posts. In June 1964, Dej granted amnesty for political prisoners. Overall, these actions proved that the Romanian government was capable to initiate change and develop a political trajectory of its own. By raising the diplomatic status and encouraging Romania's involvement in international affairs, the United States indirectly helped the Eastern European country to maintain this path of autonomy and reject Moscow's full control.

Conclusion

The US-Romanian relations registered great progress during the first four years of the 1960s. It all began with a cultural and scientific exchange agreement between the two countries – a document that started the process of expanding bilateral relations – and reached a high with the elevation of diplomatic missions to embassy level. Once the Soviet troops withdrew in 1958, Romanian communist leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej turned his attention to modernizing the Romanian state-controlled economy. To accomplish his ambitious plans of industrialization, he needed to gain access to the best technology available, and this could only be obtained from the United States.

The Romanian move of rapprochement toward the United States was essentially motivated by economic interests. At the same time, Romania started to redefine her foreign policy objectives and to gradually move farther apart from Moscow and its political and economic control; it sought to make her voice heard on the international scene and became involved in a variety of international issues – from the non-proliferation treaty to the Vietnam War. The changes that Romania experienced during this time were received with a lot of interest by the United States, who was also beginning to reexamine her relations with Eastern Europe. The Kennedy Administration came with a new perspective over dealing with satellite-countries from Eastern Europe and trade was considered the most efficient way to open the path for normalization.

However, the process did not go as fast as the Romanians would have hoped. The United States' government had several conditions that were expected to be settled before proceeding to trade and diplomatic negotiations. Besides that, the international atmosphere had been tense and highly volatile, putting its mark over the US-Romanian bilateral talks. Trade negotiations regularly stagnated when the Kennedy and Johnson upper-echelons of the Administration focused on the come-and-go international crises, yet Romania remained a topic of discussion in the lower ones – as in the State Department's correspondence with the US diplomatic mission in Bucharest – and in the NIEs (National Intelligence Estimates) made by the intelligence community. Most contacts were established through the Department of State officials. The information traffic between Bucharest and Washington, the political initiatives and strategies developed were mainly managed by the Secretary of State Dean Rusk and his team of experts on Europe, Eastern Europe and Soviet Union.

Secretary Rusk's constant talks with foreign minister Mănescu covered a vast array of foreign policy topics and were very useful in providing an insight into the communist Romania's political thinking. The Romanians used these diplomatic conversations in order to stress their independent attitude in international affairs and to prove they were not acting at Moscow's orders. As Romania was a totalitarian-governed country and a satellite of the Soviet Union, it required quite an ability to emphasize and successfully support this position of independence. The Eastern European country still pursued an anti-Western and anti-capitalistic discourse, but it was certainly more tempered than before. The first years of the Sixties were just the beginning of Romania's more independent stance; later on, Romania supported Israel and the US position during the 6 Day War in June 1967 (the communist countries and the USSR supported the Arab states) and refused to join the Warsaw Pact countries in invading Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Though the American involvement in Vietnam brought a more aggressive language from the Romanian leadership, it remained relatively moderate when compared to other satellite-countries.

Ultimately, the elevation of diplomatic missions was Johnson Administration's reward to the Romanian government. As trade ties had yet to become feasible enough and the 'Most Favored Nation' treatment required a long-time debate for congressional action, raising the Legation to Embassy status was the most significant political step the United States could take at that time. Even if the Romanians initially eyed the United States for the commercial opportunities she could offer, Dej and his Politburo were very sensitive to diplomatic protocol and international prestige. The United States made this move knowing that it would be a much-welcomed change and would strengthen their bilateral ties. As more transformations were about to come on both domestic and foreign affairs, the two countries managed to forge a relationship that had a constantly ascending evolution for the rest of the decade.

BOOK REVIEW

Apostolos Patelakis, *Războiul civil din Grecia (1946-1949) și emigranții politici greci în România (1948-1982)*, Târgoviște, Editura Cetatea de Scaun, 2017.

Apostolos Patelakis was born in Craiova in 1951 from Greek parents (Evangelos and Maria, former combatants in the Greek Civil War , initially settled in the Column of Ștefănești, Argeș County and later relocated to Craiova). Young Apostolos followed and graduated in Craiova, including university studies, then worked as a history teacher in Botiza, Maramures, continuing his studies in Cluj-Napoca.

Apostolos E. Patelakis assumed the task of writing the history of Greek Civil War and Greek political refugees in Romania, making a pioneering work. He gathered data from the archives, the press, all the Romanian and Greek works and the result is a masterpiece.

The author shows that the Greeks have enjoyed good conditions. The children were admitted to schools, trying to ensure the learning of the Greek language. Apparently, Apostolos Patelakis shows that the adults have received jobs, even leadership positions, even if they had problems in learning the Romanian language. The first idea of ideological affinity points out Stalin's duplicity that allowed refugees to be received, but he has set specific tasks for the governments of the Eastern Bloc countries to not allow potential volunteers to join Greek combatants.

The book presents dramatic events, such as the political-military developments in Greece in the years of the Second World War (Chapter I), following as the central element, the Greek Civil War (Chapter II), continuing with the detailed presentation of the fate of the Greek refugees from the establishment in Romania until the repatriation (Chapter III).

At the end of the Second World War, following the imperial interests of the Soviet Union and Great Britain, the two friendly countries in the Balkans will be in rival camps. Romania enters the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union, where the communication process will gradually begin, and Greece in the sphere of Anglo-American influence, where it was intended to impose a democratic type of Western regime.

Gradually, Romania was broken off by the West, although the Romanians had no interest for the Communist ideology and they all waited for the arrival of the Americans

to change their fate. In Greece, however, communist ideas were gaining ground without the direct support of the Soviets. At that time, the moral and political force of the Communists was immense, enjoying great sympathy among a large part of the population. Strong social tensions, lack of confidence and political antagonism between political parties would eventually lead to the outbreak of civil war in 1946. The two camps that will face the next three years were very well outlined: on one hand, the governmental, pro-monarchist forces, and on the other hand, the communist forces, which at that time had control over the whole country.

Due to the international conjuncture, after the Second World War Greece and Romania followed a special route, being in opposing political-military blocks. Greece was the only country in Europe where, after the expulsion of the German occupiers (October 1944), peace did not reign, and the people could not enjoy the brilliant victory against Hitlerism. Instead of starting the reconstruction process of the country, as in the rest of the states, the devastating civil war (1946-1949) erupts, which further complicated the situation in Greece and the Balkans.

After the end of the Civil War, thousands of Democratic Army fighters along with their military and political leaders, as well as thousands of civilians, fled to the socialist states, demanding political asylum. Of the nearly 80,000 refugees, around 11,500 people found shelter in hospitable Romania, where they had access to all the economic and social-cultural values of the Romanian society.

For those who came to Romania's hospitable land, fate was better. It was a country that did not differ greatly from Greece, it was quite close: there were Greek communities, they were bilingual, of the same religion, and the Romanians sympathized with the Greeks. But this sudden rupture of the motherland has left a deep impact in most of the people, especially the elders, for their whole life. The Greek Communist Party, in collaboration with the Romanian authorities, made special efforts in the early years to solve the great problems faced by thousands of people scattered in different cities of Romania, but generally remained with interests strained to Athens and the other to Moscow.

In the early years, Greek emigrants have gone through rather heavy emotional burdens. They lacked relatives, friends, geographic space in which they grew up and formed. The rupture of the country was very painful, but they managed to keep in their heart a part of Greece. They have always lived with the hope that one day they will return to the dear home. Over time, emigrants have adapted very well, understanding the spirit of the place, the fact that they have to respect the traditions of the Romanians and, at the same time, to keep theirs. They created associations in which they had a cultural activity, the children were learning Greek at school, and they were working together with the Romanians to build socialism.

The Greek emigrants enjoyed respect from the Romanians, with whom they had close friendship. All former emigrants recognize and appreciate the help received from the Romanian people throughout their staying in Romania.

The author mentions that Greek political refugees have carried out a number of cultural activities, have set up a publishing house, a printing house, a radio station. The

book also presents the events that made part of the Communist Greek Communist archive out of Romania, it relates to internal struggles aimed at ensuring the political control of the Greek Communist Party by one or other of the pro-Moscow and pro-European camps.

Professor Apostolos Patelakis considered it necessary to mirror both the internal political life of Greece and Romania and the influence of political events on the bilateral relations between Romania and Greece. The evolution of the relations between the two factions within the Greek Communist Party is also presented.

The book also shows the particularly difficult way in which, after authorizing repatriation, many Greek refugees and their families had to integrate in Greece, a country integrated in 1981 in the European Economic Community and with a different economic and political system.

Pălășanu Angelia

Timothy Snyder, *Despre tiranie: Douăzeci de lecții ale secolului XX*, București, Editura Trei, 2018.

Addressing totalitarianism is never an easy task, as it guides us to one of history's most excruciating realities. There is a broad literature, both scientific and fictional, that encapsulates the tyrannic episodes of the 20th century, and one of the main interpreters of political extremism is undoubtedly Timothy D. Snyder. Author of works such as *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin* and *Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning*, Snyder is a Professor of History at Yale University and a permanent fellow at the Institute of Human Sciences in Vienna. He received a PhD from the University of Oxford in 1997 and his academic interests focus on modern Central and Eastern Europe and totalitarian regimes.

On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century represents the latest book published by the American author, having been recently edited in Romanian translation. His work can be seen as a synthetic attempt to explain the greatest sins of the XXth century in the form of a sententious essay.

Snyder has divided the book into 20 small-size chapters, adding also a prologue and an epilogue in order to shape and conclude his ideas. During the course of 174 pages we discover, on one side, the realities, the dramas and more importantly, the causes that have led to the rise of radical political parties during the 1930's. On the other side, the author is constantly trying to draw some parallels with today's socio-political narratives, in the pursuit of determining mass-awareness on the recent historical lessons.

The book is written in a mere popular fashion, definitely meant for the vulgarization of scientific knowledge, in order to reach a broad spectrum of readers and to maximize the impact and the importance of his goals. I would include Snyder's essay in a more or less recent editorial trend, alongside works such as Jordan Peterson's *12 rules for life* – which try to express profound and vast phenomena using a comprehensible pedagogical scheme. Throughout the pages, we can observe metaphorical phrases or stories written in an emotional manner – take for example the David Lodge reference in chapter three or the Teresa Prekerowa mention in the 8th chapter –, which try to offer the reader a much more understandable context of the totalitarian episodes.

Recent political events have influenced the author into developing *On Tyranny*, as he constantly addresses the tumultuous narrative that has unfolded in the last couple of years between democracy and populism, between the U.S.A. and Russia or between other opposing ideological sides. Snyder sees the Russian oligarchy that has risen after the

collapse of the U.S.S.R. as dangerous as the Nazis or the C.P.S.U., which at first glance may seem as a bald statement, but his goal is to emphasize the possible harmfulness of democracy as simulacrum.

Probably the most captivating aspect of the book is the fact that it is gradually evolving into an obvious manifesto against the sitting president of the United States. By implying that the 2016 presidential election might just as well be another „1933 – as it was for Germany”, another „1946 – as it was for Czechoslovakia” or another „1990 – as it was for Russia”, the author aims to illuminate the public on the vulnerability of today’s American democracy. For that reason and also taking into consideration the start of the 19th chapter, we may say that the book is meant for the American reader. Surprisingly, even though he uses historical events and figures (such as Hannah Arendt, Leszek Kolakowski, Victor Klemperer, Vaclav Havel and so on) as an example in order to build his thesis, we observe no mention on the 1917 Russian Revolution events.

The anti-Trump rethoric hits a paroxysmal level in the last but one chapter, even though he does not mention the president’s name not even once throughout the book. Snyder offers different negative examples on Trump’s actions and declarations which should hint us the possibility of an escalating authoritarian regime in the United States. He also evokes that the American electoral system and American democracy lacks in various ways, leaving it exposed in the battle against illiberal movements.

To the end of the book, the author makes a couple of interesting points, especially when he gives an explanation on how and why the American political system has failed after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The U.S.A. had been charmed at that time by the neo-hegelian ideal proposed by Francis Fukuyama (even though Snyder doesn’t mention this specific political scientist) on „the end of history”. Historicism trapped American politics into a bubble of undisturbed peacefulness, which is, in Snyder’s view, the main theoretical cause of the rise of populism.

As a conclusion, it is necessary to mention the fact that the book lacks some methodological aspects, neglecting important details when presenting the concept of „extremism”. It might as well be seen as a product of „whisful thinking”, mainly because it addresses future realities by predicting them with no scientific background nor instruments – the book itself being categorised outside scientific literature. In spite of all this, studying Snyder’s work is important in order to understand the evolution of totalitarian or authoritarian thinking. The theological structure of the book makes it accesible for a casual reader to enter the world of political theory and that is why *On Tyranny* can be a significant vector in shaping an individual’s behaviour and reasoning when it comes to future civic engagement.

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