

# Petroleum and the World War of 1939-1945

(1)

Gh. Buzatu

## A. Petroleum – the vim of modern war

In comparison to the world war of 1914-1918, the development of the conflagration from 1939-1945 depended infinitely more on the **petroleum factor**. Not only the admittance of those interested and involved, but also the evolution of the military operations as well as the numerous political-diplomatic measures, the economic policy of the belligerent states, the special concern of all the states for the preservation, exploitation, and conquering of the main oil resources everywhere in the world are categorical in this sense. Ample and thorough specialized studies have established with precision the fact that having/lacking liquid fuel depended greatly on the success/failure of the crucial military operations in Western Europe and the Eastern Front, in North Africa and Asia, in the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, or in the Pacific Ocean, the air battles on all the major theaters of war, and, at a global scale, the approaching or the failure of the 1945 victory.<sup>1</sup> A French publicist was of the opinion that, if in 1914-1918, petroleum helped the Anglo-French-American allies 'to win the war', later, in the inter-war period, it caused them to "lose the peace,"<sup>2</sup> imposing itself as "master of peace and war."<sup>3</sup> René Sédillot noticed remarked that, "**apparently, petroleum has greater responsibilities in unleashing the second conflict of the century than the first one.**"<sup>4</sup> The development of the century's conflagration conferred to some specialists like Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle a fruitful and exemplary field of research in the history of international relations, confirming the extent to which their evolution between 1939 and

1945 depended decisively on the **profound** forces (the geographical factors, the demographic conditions, the economic and financial forces, the national and pacifist sentiments, nationalisms) or on the **actions of the state men**.<sup>5</sup> Showing that, in 1935-1939, the world battle for the reserves of raw materials accentuated, the two French specialists pointed out that, more than the economic interests, the political preoccupations were the essence of the phenomenon, **the policy of raw materials being dominated by military and strategic reasons**,<sup>6</sup> both on the eve of as well as during the world war, we add. Of the authors we have mentioned, the majority dealt especially with or talked also about the role and place of Romania as an oil possessing country in the plans of the belligerents, either in the initial period of the war, as objective of Germany, or later on as its "satellite" (1940-1944) and adversary of the United Nations, or, in the end, as partner of the latter in the *decisive assault on the Nazi Reich in Europe*. The development of the hostilities proved to what degree the possession/lack of "black gold" resources favored/disadvantaged the two hostile camps, respectively the **Axis** powers (Germany, Italy, Japan and their allies) and the **Allied** powers, whose coalition was formed gradually between 1939 and 1941 (Great Britain, France, the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., and China). Consequently, already from the beginning the world war unfolded, for each of the belligerent camps, under the sign of oil possession of penury. René Sédillot commented: "**From the beginning it is... obvious that petroleum was found in the**

camp of the Allies, not in the camp of the nations of the Axis. The latter concluded an iron pact: it is not an iron pact. From the beginning it is clear that, in the unfolding of the conflict, petroleum worked for the victory of the nations that already possessed it and for the defeat of the nations that lacked it. The stakes are down. Germany's – or Japan's – only chance would be a victorious express war: they would have to triumph in a few weeks. Otherwise, the lack of petroleum would annihilate their any hope of success. Or they would have to conquer as soon as possible important resources – the Caucasus in the case of the Germans, the Dutch Indies in the case of the Japanese. Without them, their cause is lost.”<sup>7</sup> Jean-Jacques Berreby stated with good reason: “More than the First World War, the war from 1939-1945 depended on petroleum, whose importance was essential.”<sup>8</sup> In the unleashed battle, Romania, as subject, but especially as object, had an indisputable role. According to the statistics of the period, Romania obtained 2.2% of the world's crude oil production, being the sixth producer in the world and the second in Europe, following the United States, the U.S.S.R., Venezuela, Iran-Bahrein, and the Dutch Indies.<sup>9</sup> The documents published after the war emphasized on the major role played by the question of Romanian petroleum in the great military and political-diplomatic decisions of the camps that warred against each other on the battlefield. From a multitude of information, we mention the declaration made by Herman Göring, the Marshal of the Nazi Reich, during his meeting in Berlin, on November 26, 1941, with Mihai Antonescu, the vice-president of the Council of Ministers and the titular of Bucharest's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, namely that petroleum, after the blood sacrifice on the Eastern Front, underlined the place and the rôle the oil represented **“the most precious contribution the Romania can bring to the common cause (namely of the Axis Berlin-Rome-Tokyo, author's bold).”**<sup>10</sup>

The outbreak of the hostilities, in September 1939, opened immediately and with utter brutality the issue of petroleum, both for the belligerents as well as the non-belligerents. The political and military observers of the events immediately agreed in this respect. Cesare Alimenti, a name known to the reader, spoke in 1939 of the role of petroleum as **“war weapon”**,<sup>11</sup> and he was not alone.<sup>12</sup> In Bucharest, *Monitorul Petrolului Român*, noticing that exactly 25 years later the war cataclysm war ravaging the old continent again, wrote that the oil industry had become **“a vital element for the means used by the modern war. More than in the past conflict, the derivatives obtained from crude oil can be partly replaced with synthetic products found in the raw materials that exist in abundance in many countries that have no petroleum or have an insufficient production. On the other hand, alcohol and benzyl, mixed in variable proportions in products obtained from crude oil, increase the quantities that can be utilized. The potential of aviation and of motorized armaments increased enormously in comparison to the past, requiring immense quantities of liquid fuel. Next to the food for the troops, ensuring the fuel for the engines that enable their movement and the flight of the planes appears as a primary concern.”**<sup>13</sup> The facts of the petroleum problem became pressing also in relation with the findings regarding international consumption of oil products,<sup>14</sup> the international production and traffic of motor vehicles,<sup>15</sup> or the consumption by the commercial and war fleet in 1938-1939,<sup>16</sup> or in relation with the statement that Mihail Pizanty made on August 11, 1939 during the courses at the People's University in Vălenii de Munte, about the **“vital”** importance of the oil industry within the entire national economy of Romania.<sup>17</sup>

The world war, unleashed on September 1, 1939 through Germany's attack against Poland, clearly divided the belligerents regarding the manner in which they approached or were confronted with the issue of petroleum. In fact,

already from the previous period, Germany and Great Britain – as the Reich's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Joachim von Ribbentrop, remarked – had been on clearly antagonistic positions both as far as the German military supremacy on the continent, as well as regarding the redistribution of raw materials, Berlin claiming a place not only in Europe, but also in some of its old colonies.<sup>18</sup> It goes without saying that, due to the war, these disputes became more critical, **the Axis and the United Nations** fighting a life-and-death battle in 1941-1942; in 1943 (Casablanca), the well-known formula of **imposing an unconditional capitulation** to Germany and its smaller or bigger allies was launched, which, practically, meant that the confrontation could not end except with the elimination of one of the camps. In matters of petroleum, as we have mentioned, each of the two camps benefited from different situations. At a complete disadvantage, the countries of **the Axis** tried to buy some time, drawing up their political-economic and military-strategic plans in accordance with **the petroleum factor as well**.<sup>19</sup> Already in the first year of the conflict, "blocked" on the old continent, Germany, besides its own oil resources and those (insignificant) of the occupied countries, or counting on the (totally insufficient) quantities obtained through modern procedures,<sup>20</sup> oriented towards Romania<sup>21</sup> and benefited from the good relations established by Hitler and Stalin in the years 1934-1941. After the Reich's aggression took place on June 22, 1941, Stalin claimed that the Führer also intended to **conquer the Soviet resources of "black gold"**,<sup>22</sup> and later, the operational plans of the Wehrmacht<sup>23</sup> in the crucial year 1942 depended categorically on the intention of Hitler and the German High Command (*O.K.W.*) to capture the Caucasus.<sup>24</sup> The basic principles of the economic policy of the Reich in the war years<sup>25</sup> or the plans regarding the area of the Near East and the Middle East were also inspired by the petroleum factor.<sup>26</sup> Today it seems totally strange that, in 1940-1943, acting in the North-African space, the German

and Italian troops suffered from the lack of liquid fuel,<sup>27</sup> although a few decades later ... a "sea of oil" was discovered in the area (Libya).<sup>28</sup> The petroleum problem was no less stressful for Japan than it was for Germany or Italy.<sup>29</sup> On the other hand, for Great Britain and France the petroleum question assumed different coordinates. Their possibility to "block" Germany in the winter of 1930-1940<sup>30</sup> offered them a different perspective, and at that stage they were studying plans of preventing the supplying of the Reich with resources from the U.S.S.R.<sup>31</sup> and Romania.<sup>32</sup> Based on our research, we have concluded that, in the first months of the war (September-December 1939), the *War Cabinet* in London, which assembled 123 times, gave special attention to the question of Romanian oil,<sup>33</sup> which was dealt with and solved in connection with the **economic blockade**<sup>34</sup> instituted by the Anglo-French allies with the purpose of "suffocating" the Nazi Reich. In this sense, the British official history of the 1939-1945 war recorded that, in order to be able to carry on the hostilities, Berlin gave "great importance" to ensuring the provisioning with steel from Sweden and oil from the U.S.S.R., Poland, and Romania.<sup>35</sup> It was to be expected that, planning the total blockade of the Reich already in the first days of the conflagration,<sup>36</sup> the London officials would investigate the sources of liquid fuel available to Hitler, among which were the Romanian ones.<sup>37</sup> As we shall show further, the common French-British plans elaborated in 1939 and 1940 had in view the destruction of Romania's petroliferous region and the blocking of the land and sea transports in the direction of the Reich. The general evolution of the hostilities prevented the application of these plans.<sup>38</sup> For the moment we shall mention that, on September 12, 1939, several members of the British *War Cabinet* made proposals meant to prevent the "oil stocks and the future oil production of Romania from getting into the hands of Germany."<sup>39</sup> A program was adopted expressing in essence the decision of Great Britain to immediately acquisition, in collaboration with France, all the quantities of

liquid fuel that Romania had in stock and to sign firm contracts for the production of the next six months. Lord Halifax, the titular of the Foreign Office, admitted that the adopted measures could present a risk, namely that the Nazi Reich could be determined "to invade Romania."<sup>40</sup> In the following days, the *War Cabinet*, having in view the evolutions in Poland, opined that the *Wehrmacht* could intend to prolong its campaign in Romania as well, in order to capture its resources and to have access to the Black Sea, which, certainly, would have affected the entire south-east of the continent.<sup>41</sup> With a view to Germany's intended operations, especially the **campaign in the West of Europe**, it was of great importance – specified the head of the Imperial General Staff in London – to prevent the immediate use by Hitler of the oil resources found in Galitia and Romania. The debates on the issue of Romanian petroleum were initiated at the recommendation of the Foreign Office and of the Imperial Defense Committee (IDC).<sup>42</sup> The seriousness of the situation and the importance of the matter determined the *War Cabinet* to create a **special committee** presided by Lord M. Hankey,<sup>43</sup> Minister without portfolio.<sup>44</sup> Great Britain intervened through certain private companies – *Royal Dutch-Shell*, *Steaua-British*, and *Phoenix Oil Co.*<sup>45</sup> On September 16, 1939, the members of the British War Cabinet reexamined the issue of buying Romania's available stocks. John Simon, the Minister of Finance, considered unnatural the position of the trust *Royal Dutch-Shell*, which, although of integrally Allied affiliation, was, by virtue of the contracts already signed before the outbreak of the hostilities, supplying ... Germany with oil derivatives.<sup>46</sup> At the meeting from October 18, 1939, the issue of Romanian petroleum was again called forth,<sup>47</sup> at a moment when the British "economic offensive" in Romania had registered successes against the Reich,<sup>48</sup> the

effects being considered "catastrophic" for Berlin (the level of the prices and the decrease of the exports to Germany).<sup>49</sup> The issue of the Romanian oil derivatives continued to come to the attention of the *War Cabinet* a few more times: on November 3, 1939<sup>50</sup> or on November 16, 1939,<sup>51</sup> when Lord Hankey informed his colleagues that, the *Committee* that he directed monitored all the oil supplies that went to Germany; it did not ignore the fact that, compared to the successes registered by the Allies, Germany was exerting serious pressures on Bucharest, threatening it even with invasion.<sup>52</sup> Appealing to statistics, the speaker estimated that the Reich could buy from Romania, in the first year of war, approximately 2-4 million tons of oil products, in which situation he recommended that the *War Cabinet* approve that Sir Reginald Hoare, the Minister in Bucharest, intervene so that the Reich should not benefit from deliveries that exceeded 1 million tons.<sup>53</sup> Constantly preoccupied with the economic blockade of the Reich, the British cabinet examined, on November 24, 1939, the general situation of Germany's supplies with oil products. The discussions were based on a report of Lord Hankey, proposing new measures for the increasing of the effectiveness of the economic "barrage" instituted around the Reich, more precisely: 1) the firm control of the contraband trade in the Dardanelles; 2) the supervision of the acquisitions through neutral India and 3) of the other neutral countries; 4) the supervision of the Romanian exports; 5) instructions for Hoare to support the London mission sent to Bucharest; 6) the control of the grain barges used by the Germans for the transport of oil derivatives on the Danube.<sup>54</sup> Thus, Lord Hankey's report clearly defined the **place** of Romanian petroleum in the Allied economic strategy in the winter of 1939-1940. Germany, of course, did not take long, as we shall further see, to react.<sup>55</sup>

\*

\*

\*

Under the circumstance existing at the beginning of the Second World War, presented in their essential lines, we cannot affirm that Romania's position, be it only with a view to the question of "black gold", did not present an interest for the belligerents. The evolution of the hostilities illustrated this fact.

On September 4, 1939, therefore the second day after the starting of the state of war between Germany on one hand and Great Britain and France on the other hand, Armand Călinescu's government decided to adopt a "peaceful attitude" towards all the states, implicated or not in the war.<sup>56</sup> Two days later, on September 6, 1939, a Crown Council headed by King Carol II unanimously decided on "the strict observing of the rules of neutrality established through the international conventions towards the belligerents in the present conflict."<sup>57</sup> Romania's declared neutrality<sup>58</sup> continued until the end of May 1940, it did not have an absolute and final character, being in fact oriented towards the Anglo-French camp and hostile towards Germany and its allies, for which, however, certain concessions were made.<sup>59</sup> The hope was, as Nicolae Iorga maintained in the Crown Council from September 6, 1939, for Romania to finally join the Anglo-French Allied camp,<sup>60</sup> but later, under the circumstances of France's fall, on September 29, 1940, neutrality was abandoned,<sup>61</sup> Bucharest opting for non-belligerence (May 1940-June 1941). Romania oriented more and more evidently towards the triumphant Reich<sup>62</sup> and, after Carol II's abdication, on September 6, 1940, it integrated itself, under the rule of General Ion Antonescu and with a statute of **satellite and not occupied state**, in the **new Europe** planned by Adolph Hitler.<sup>63</sup> In the meantime there occurred the **collapse of Greater Romania**, ancient Romanian territories being separated from the country (North-Western Transylvania, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, Southern Dobrogea), and with the occasion of the **notes of an ultimatum nature from the U.S.S.R.** from June 1940 or of the **Vienna "arbitrage"** from

August 1940, an important role in dictating the decisions and in evaluating the consequences was played by the petroleum question.<sup>64</sup>

The governments of the last year of Carol II's reign did not exceed their condition of "service" cabinets. Being under the unconditional tutelage of the Sovereign, of his camarilla, and of the one and only party patronized by him (The Front of National Revival, renamed on June 22, 1940 the Nation's Party), the cabinets of Carol's reign, headed in succession by Armand Călinescu, General Gh. Argeşanu, C. Argetoianu, Gh. Tătărescu, and I. Gigurtu, administered a country that, in the positive prospect of the failure of the Great Allies in the West in the face of the Reich, was heading with certainty – despite holding some firm trumps (including petroleum) – towards the border catastrophe of the summer of 1940. The rulers' lack of determination corrupted by the permanent preoccupation not to be in disagreement with the continent's hegemonic powers, the Anglo-French allies or Adolph Hitler's **Axis**,<sup>65</sup> discouraged and confused the Romanians and strengthened their potential adversaries. The crisis of "**the old regime**" of Carol had become chronic before its collapse, on September 5-6, 1940, under the impact of the people's discontentment caused by the collapse of the Greater Romania's borders. As far as the oil policy, each cabinet, established after the assassination of Armand Călinescu on September 21, 1939, came with new promises and was welcomed with unjustified hopes: Gh. Argeşanu's government<sup>66</sup>, followed only six days later by C. Argetoianu's team,<sup>67</sup> and on November 28, 1939 by that of Gh. Tătărescu.<sup>68</sup> Under the circumstances of the fire that was ravaging Europe, Premier Tătărescu launched from the first day an ambitious plan implying **immediate realizations and reforms** spread out for a long period of time, with the general intention of "solving the problems of the present and ensuring the paths of the future."<sup>69</sup> The effects of the war were soon reflected by

the rise, considered unusual, of the prices of the oil products destined to export,<sup>70</sup> in relation to the stagnation of the internal costs.<sup>71</sup> A new import and export regime was established, and its control was the responsibility of an especially created organ – **The Foreign Exchange Office**.<sup>72</sup> Also, beginning with September 17, 1939, the control of the foreign currency resulted from exports (including or, especially, oil exports) was introduced, the National Bank of Romania becoming the main beneficiary,<sup>73</sup> and on January 16, 1940 the **General Petroleum Commissariat**, for the control and coordination of the oil exports.<sup>74</sup> In a very short time, for the belligerents or for the virtual belligerents<sup>75</sup> petroleum ceased to be simple merchandise, becoming a **strategic product** and, no less, a **diplomatic weapon**.<sup>76</sup> L. Mrazec, prefacing a specialized work, mentioned this fact: **“None of the natural energy generators has provoked such a live interest from an economic and political point of view as petroleum.”**<sup>77</sup> Another specialist, Ioan Roceric, included petroleum among the raw materials that had gained an “overwhelming importance for the very existence of their states”, being equal with the **“oxygen of the economic and political life of the states, and, if their absence is felt in normal times only in a painful way, it can become a catastrophe in case of war for the state found in the impossibility to obtain supplies or to replace the raw materials that it needs with other similar ones.”**<sup>78</sup> A famous historian, George Brătianu, pointed out in the same context the fact that Romania, an “essentially agricultural” country, had gained, **due exclusively to petroleum, “a truly international importance.”**<sup>79</sup>

Naturally, under these circumstances, it was not surprising that, soon after the outbreak of the Second World War, Bucharest was “assailed” in the most various manners on the theme of petroleum. On September 11-12, 1939,<sup>80</sup> Premier Armand Călinescu met with the official representatives of Great Britain and France, Sir Reginald Hoare and,

respectively, A. Thierry.<sup>81</sup> On September 18, 1939, Călinescu received W. Fabricius, the German Minister in Bucharest.<sup>82</sup> After the death of the prime minister, the discussions with the representatives of the great powers continued, on November 3, 1939, for example, when Grigore Gafencu and the Allied ministers tackled the question of the destruction of the oil industry “if the circumstances will require it.”<sup>83</sup> In September 1939, in Paris, R. Franasovici engaged in negotiations with an American group, being questioned with brutality “whether we could stop all the oil deliveries to certain countries [Germany and Italy?!].”<sup>84</sup> On the other hand, Berlin often intervened in Bucharest, soliciting the assurance of the oil deliveries to the Reich according to the war necessities,<sup>85</sup> which remained a topical issue in the winter 1939-1940, to which others were constantly added, especially the prevention of the sabotage of the petroliferous region by the Anglo-French.<sup>86</sup> In London, in August-October 1939, the Romanian Minister V.V. Tilea had intense negotiations with the leader of the Foreign Office, Lord Halifax,<sup>87</sup> the Romanian diplomat being often warned about the possibility of the extension of the German aggression from Poland towards Romania, situation in which – on October 17, 1939 – the destruction of the oil derricks and the ceasing of the oil deliveries to Germany were solicited.<sup>88</sup> In December 1939, Tilea and Lord Halifax discussed the issue of a conjugated Germany-U.S.S.R. aggression against Romania,<sup>89</sup> Bucharest’s delegate inquiring about the validity of the guarantees from August 1939, but receiving a totally disappointing answer.<sup>90</sup> The end of the year 1939 marked important successes for Germany as far as ensuring, through agreements,<sup>91</sup> important oil imports from Romania, concretized in the economic agreement from September 29<sup>92</sup> or those from December 21, 1939,<sup>93</sup> interpreted by Berlin as “a new development” of the understanding from March 23, 1939.<sup>94</sup> For several months there took place a constant **British and**

**French counteroffensive,**<sup>95</sup> with manifest tendencies to limit or even stop, be it even through massive acquisitions, the Romanian oil deliveries to the Nazi Reich, to determine the big trusts' branches in Romania to reorient their exports.<sup>96</sup> Carried on especially at a

commercial level, the Allied offensive had positive results,<sup>97</sup> confirmed by the statistics regarding the Romanian exports of oil products to Germany and the British and French Empires in the period September 1939-March 1940:<sup>98</sup>

Period	The German Reich	The British Empire <sup>99</sup>	The French Empire
1939			
September	69 691 tons	33 578 tons	8 859 tons
October	83 713 tons	34 049 tons	32 567 tons
November	88 835 tons	39 088 tons	25 011 tons
December	81 923 tons	145 699 tons	58 203 tons
1940			
January	28 246 tons	123 180 tons	59 533 tons
February	30 778 tons	81 516 tons	15 160 tons
March	44 797 tons <sup>100</sup>	130 398 tons	18 556 tons

The decrease of the oil exports to the Reich,<sup>101</sup> in the first months of the war, "alarmed" the at one point the Ministry of Economy in Berlin, which acted immediately regarding its delegates in Bucharest,<sup>102</sup> who – it appears – made efficient representations to the Romanian officials.<sup>103</sup>

According to Andreas Hillgruber, in the winter of 1939-1940, the Romanian oil exports to the Reich "were much under the rising requests of Germany,"<sup>104</sup> but the causes had to do mostly with transportation.<sup>105</sup> The complications that occurred determined Berlin, in January 1940, to name Hermann Neubacher, the mayor of Vienna at the time, in the position of **special chargé d'affaires of the Reich in economic matters** with the Legation in Bucharest.<sup>106</sup> And that after, on January 2, 1940, at Karinhall, Marshall Herman Göring convoked his own "economic General Staff", with the participation of the representatives of the Economic Ministry of the Reich, of the *OKW* (General Thomas), of the *Abwehr* and the *SD* (Admiral Canaris, respectively the SS Generals Heydrich and Hohst), of the German Legation in Bucharest (Colonel A. Gerstenberg, the air attaché).<sup>107</sup> The speakers, foremost of whom Göring, Clodius, and Landfried (Secretary of State of the Ministry of Economy), pointed out the role

of Romanian petroleum for the war economy of the Reich. They estimated the necessities to the minimum quantity of 130 000 tons per month,<sup>108</sup> a context in which the transportation on the Danube<sup>109</sup> needed to be ensured, and Admiral Canaris was asked to act in order to prevent the possible sabotages.<sup>110</sup> For this last purpose, Göring recommended that the *Abwehr* cooperate with the *SD* in Romania.<sup>111</sup> At the same time, Paris and London were inquiring about the situation of Romania's oil deliveries to the Reich (in the previous chapter we examined the exchange of Anglo-Romanian messages from January-February 1940). On March 2, 1940, the Foreign Office appreciated the "force" of the arguments previously presented by Romania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the necessity to rapidly obtain the necessary armament from Germany.<sup>112</sup> London promised even to provide credits for the armament,<sup>113</sup> but insisted that Romania do not exceed the limit<sup>114</sup> of 130 000 tons of oil products per month delivered to the Reich.<sup>115</sup> In the answer given on March 21, 1940, Bucharest promised to keep London informed "about the state of affairs in the country,"<sup>116</sup> giving assurances that it would not admit facilities for the ensuring of the quota of 130 000 tons of oil products destined to the German market,<sup>117</sup>

just as it had not and would not exert pressure on the oil companies with Allied capital to force the oil exports in the direction of the Reich.<sup>118</sup>

On the eve and in the first phase of the conflagration from 1939-1945, the European protagonists (the British, the French, and the Germans<sup>119</sup>) had in view a few **radical solutions** regarding Romanian petroleum, namely – **the destruction of the Ploiești area**<sup>120</sup> or **the occupation of Romania**.<sup>121</sup> Under completely different circumstances, the same scenario was being repeated that had been applied in World War I,<sup>122</sup> the objective being the same: the decision of the Anglo-French in 1916 to deprive Germany, in the conditions of the “total blockade” they imposed on it,<sup>123</sup> of the possibility to procure oil products from Romania. As it was learned later on, on November 19, 1916, the Romanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Em. Porumbaru, addressed Premier I.I.C. Brătianu, informing him that the British Minister in Romania, Sir Barclay, had solicited that measures be taken so that the oil companies “proceed to the destruction of the oil, derricks, and refineries that they own. The Allied countries [England and France] promise to compensate the Romanian government for the losses that will result from this measure.”<sup>124</sup> The British diplomat specified that his government attributed to the petroleum destruction issue “**primary importance, because the duration of the war** [the 1914-1918 world war] **depends greatly on it** (author’s bold).”<sup>125</sup> As we know, the sacrifice asked by the Allies was accepted by the Romanian government: teams of specialists proceeded without delay,<sup>126</sup> in the counties of Prahova, Dâmbovița, and Buzău, to the destruction of the 1 677 oil derricks (of which 1 047 in production), 26 refineries, tanks on oilfields and in factories, and to the burning of 827 000 tons of oil derivatives.<sup>127</sup> Appreciating the exceptional importance of the oil resources, after the occupation of most of Romania, the German General Headquarters took measures for the immediate repair of the

damages, beginning with February 1917 the first oil derricks being put back into service, and the production continued – and estimated as considerable.<sup>128</sup> Although later the Allied ministers in Romania, especially Sir Barclay, gave repeated assurances that the Romanian government and the oil companies would be compensated for the destructions,<sup>129</sup> after the end of the world war in 1918, there began the great spectacle of establishing **committees**,<sup>130</sup> of **evaluating the damages**,<sup>131</sup> and establishing the **method of payment** (compensations for/against the Romanian debts).<sup>132</sup>

The experience of the First World War determined the governments in Bucharest, in 1939-1940, to be extremely cautious regarding the Anglo-French propositions of destruction of the petroliferous area, because, on the other hand, Germany was interested to prevent such an upshot and, in order to avoid it, planned even the conquering of Romania. In the previous pages we presented the opinions of Grigore Gafencu, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, according to whom Romania had finalized **all the technical and military preparations** in order to take action.<sup>133</sup> Numerous and extremely well documented studies published in the last decades invalidate such a point of view, proving that the preparations were minute and important, that the decision factors in Bucharest (the King, the governments, the General Staff) picked up on the signals of the Anglo-French, that studies were performed and hypotheses were analyzed, but that **there was no question of taking action**, the variant of the oil destructions being considered a **ultima ratio** in the case of a direct military aggression by the Reich, supported by the revisionist neighbors (especially Hungary and the U.S.S.R.). As between 1939 and 1940 Romania, in conformity with the general development of the hostilities, was not confronted with such a situation, it clearly inclined towards Germany, the solution of the oil destructions was **gradually eliminated by Bucharest**, and the Romanian authorities,



while negotiating with the Anglo-French,<sup>134</sup> established with the Germans effective measures to prevent the possible sabotages.<sup>135</sup> In Bucharest it was often considered in the period 1939-1940 defending the neutrality of the country<sup>136</sup> implied measures for saving petroleum from destruction by the Anglo-French.<sup>137</sup> There is no need, of course, to discuss here the French-British preparations, examined and presented in detail in the mentioned works signed by Viorica Moisuc and Horia Brestoiu,<sup>138</sup> as well as in the **memoirs** left by King Carol II, Armand Călinescu, Victor Slăvescu, Grigore Gafencu,<sup>139</sup> or in various works published even in the first phase of the world war<sup>140</sup> on the basis of the interesting revelations made by Berlin after the capture, during the military fall of France in May-June 1940, of the French documents, especially in La-Charité-sur-Loir. As we have already mentioned, the respective documents were capitalized towards a propagandistic purpose in Berlin and, at the end of the world war, they were captured from the territory of the Reich by the forces of the Red Army and were transported and deposited in Moscow, where we had the possibility to study them in 1992.<sup>141</sup> Based on the existent documentation, we can establish that there were several plans regarding the destruction of the Romanian petroliferous area in a manner as systematic as possible, to avoid, as in 1916, an action that would allow the Germans to repair the damages without too much delay. Under those circumstances, the so-called **Léon Wenger plan** from October 1, 1939 prevailed, a plan that, on October 18, 1939<sup>142</sup> was recommended to the government in Paris by General Maurice Gamelin, the French Chief of Staff.<sup>143</sup> **The Wenger plan** had in view the destruction of the oil derricks and the blocking of the Danube line in order to drastically reduce or interrupt the Romanian-German fluvial connections.<sup>144</sup> In order to attain their objectives, the French and British governments maintained close diplomatic contacts, and the secret services in London

and Paris, as we have found, took action,<sup>145</sup> as did, on the other hand, Admiral Canaris's *Abwehr*, to counteract the Western plans.<sup>146</sup> Under this last aspect, the documents recently published under the care of Cristian Troncotă<sup>147</sup> prove to be truly fundamental. They prove that Mihail Moruzov, the head of the *Romania Secret Service*, was the one that **initiated**, at the end of October 1939, an "informative collaboration" with the counterpart service of the German army (the *Abwehr*), headed by Wilhelm Canaris. In general, the collaboration had in view the entire **Eastern Europe**,<sup>148</sup> but mainly – with reference to the period of the Second World War – Moruzov had in view the economic area, being known the major interest of the Reich in the Romanian agricultural and subsoil products.<sup>149</sup> In the discussions held in Berlin by the special delegate of the R.S.S., Major C.Gh. Ionescu-Micandru, the proposition of collaboration made by Bucharest was received with "great satisfaction" by the Germans.<sup>150</sup> It was established that the connections, without having an official character,<sup>151</sup> should be maintained directly between the two intelligence services,<sup>152</sup> and the *Abwehr* should delegate with this purpose Major Dr. Hans Wagner to Bucharest.<sup>153</sup> On November 8, 1939, Wagner arrived in Bucharest for a short visit,<sup>154</sup> and during the discussions he revealed Berlin's attention the observance by Romania of the principles of neutrality, as well as for the fulfillment with the utmost correctness of the obligations assumed towards Germany. The *Abwehr*'s delegate did not conceal the fact that Germany would soon make new proposals for "an economic cooperation as close as possible with Romania."<sup>155</sup> Returning to Romania on November 22, 1939, Wagner – with special messages from the Reich's Marshal Göring and Admiral Canaris – expressed the "considerable importance" of the cooperation between the R.S.S. and the *Abwehr*,<sup>156</sup> insisting directly on the concern for the common supervision of two objectives: **the**

port of Giurgiu and the Ploiești region, for which special people were delegated.<sup>157</sup> Both objectives were inspected and discussions were held at the *Second Section (Intelligence)* of the Romanian General Staff, the main preoccupation being to **avoid the sabotage acts** towards the oil industry and the Danubian oil transports.<sup>158</sup> On December 8, 1939, Moruzov had the surprise of receiving in Bucharest Admiral Canaris himself, who communicated to him from the first moment, in very categorical terms, the purpose of his visit and the possible reaction of the Reich in case Romania did not carry out the oil deliveries.<sup>159</sup> We extract from a note written by Moruzov soon after the departure of the eminent guest: **"First of all, the German High Command and government are in a state of extreme irritation due to the considerable importance that is given to the possible sabotage actions in Romania, having in view that this country – at this time – is the only source of supply for the Third Reich, especially with petroleum. Secondly, I considered it necessary to see personally whether the measures taken by the Romanian authorities for the prevention of the sabotage acts are sincere and sufficient, in order to offer Germany the necessary security and reassurance in this matter (author's bold)."**<sup>160</sup> On May 28-30, 1940, Admiral Canaris returned to Bucharest,<sup>161</sup> after the collaboration of the Romanian-German secret services for the protection of the petroliferous area and of the fluvial and land transports towards Germany had proven effective, preventing the sabotage acts. Not without good reason, at the conference from May 29, 1940, the head of the *Abwehr* thanked King Carol II and M. Moruzov, expressing, for the "invaluable assistance", the appreciation of Adolph Hitler and "the entire Germany."<sup>162</sup> Also, M. Moruzov traveled to Berlin,<sup>163</sup> as well as to Paris and London.<sup>164</sup> In the meantime, Bucharest received numerous signals from Berlin, from Hitler and Göring personally, both of whom declared themselves more than

once impressed with the "loyalty" proven by the Romanian officials regarding the economic collaboration<sup>165</sup> and who, precisely because of that, committed themselves to guarantee the "territorial integrity of Romania"<sup>166</sup> in the face of all the dangers, including the Soviet one.<sup>167</sup> Received at the beginning of March 1940 in Berlin by General Wilhelm Keitel, the head of the *O.K.W.*, M. Moruzov was shown the appreciation of the former **"for the spirit of complete loyalty in which the collaboration between the German and the Romanian intelligence services is taking place, regarding the issue of the security of the petroliferous regions and the transports from Romania to Germany (author's bold)."**<sup>168</sup> The assistance of the *R.S.S.* proved substantial in discovering and preventing the sabotage acts on the Danube<sup>169</sup> or ignored the German illegal weapon transports destined for the guarding of the refineries,<sup>170</sup> just as it cooperated in the application of a common Romanian-German plan for the protection of the petroliferous area in case of a possible Anglo-French attack.<sup>171</sup> Everything unfolded normally, and M. Moruzov's credit in Berlin was permanently consolidated, until the unforeseen occurred: in June 1940, during the decisive battle for France, the German troops captured important political-diplomatic and military archives of Paris. From the immediate examination of the funds discovered in La-Charité-sur-Loire, the Germans had irrefutable proof about the **double game** of M. Moruzov, namely that, while in the winter of 1939-1940 he had assisted the *Abwehr* in the mentioned operations, he had not ceased the collaboration with *Deuxième Bureau* or with the *Intelligence Service*.<sup>172</sup> From **that moment**, we can consider that Moruzov's destiny was determined; as it is well known, he was arrested upon the installation of Ion Antonescu's regime and executed by the Legionaries at Jilava in November 1940. Previously, in the night of July 24-25, 1940, Major Hans Wagner solicited M. Moruzov, after the publication in the Romanian press of

some of the secret documents discovered in La-Charité-sur-Loire regarding the French-British preparations for the destruction of the Ploiești petroliferous area and the blocking of the Danube traffic, to urgently proceed to the identification and expulsion from Romania of the people involved in the deal. This was immediately carried out,<sup>173</sup> but for the head of the *R.S.S.* it was, however, too late.<sup>174</sup>

Without suspecting such an unfolding of events, M. Moruzov continued in the meantime to show himself loyal to the "German card." Thus, no later than May 20, 1940, in a meeting with Manfred von Killinger,<sup>175</sup> the future Minister of the Reich in Bucharest, he presented himself unconditionally as a Germanophile and supporter of the immediate collaboration between Berlin and Bucharest. Moreover, Moruzov assured the special delegate of the Reich that, in case the U.S.S.R. came to close to the region of Ploiești, he would personally direct the destruction of the area.<sup>176</sup> On May 17, 1940, while in Paris, Wenger officially presented to the Ministry of Public Works the purpose of his mission in Romania, asking the proper quarter to take action.<sup>177</sup> In the same sense, on May 15, 1940, A. Thierry, the French Ambassador to Bucharest, received the text relative to the destruction plan, at the same time with the assurance that he would return to Romania after 12 days, but that it was not necessary to wait for him in order to take action.<sup>178</sup> The fall of France, the efficiency of the German countermeasures, and Romania's fears regarding the immediate prospects of the war determined the quashing of the Wenger file.<sup>179</sup>

In the meantime, in Bucharest and Paris, in Berlin, Moscow, and London, in Rome and Washington, sensation was created<sup>180</sup> by the revelations made, first of all by the German and Romanian agencies, about the attempts of the British, at the beginning of April 1940, to block the Danube,<sup>181</sup> primarily the area of the Iron Gates.<sup>182</sup> The discovery made at Giurgiu did not allow for any doubts that the purpose of the planned operation was "the blocking of the Romanian oil from being transported to

Germany."<sup>183</sup> Consequently, strict measures were imposed for the supervision of the Danube traffic, both by Romania as well as by Yugoslavia.<sup>184</sup> At one point, it was said that Germany asked Hungary for the right to patrol on the Danube,<sup>185</sup> but later on the rumor was denied by Berlin,<sup>186</sup> which declared itself satisfied with the prompt intervention of the Gh. Tătărescu government.<sup>187</sup> In March-May 1940, the delegates of the Reich to Bucharest (Fabricius, von Killinger, Clodius, Neubacher), concomitantly with the efforts to reach a **Petroleum Pact** with Romania (**Ölpakt**),<sup>188</sup> finally realized on May 27, 1940,<sup>189</sup> discussed with King Carol II,<sup>190</sup> with the Romanian Premier,<sup>191</sup> and with the Minister of Foreign Affairs<sup>192</sup> the issue of preventing the Anglo-French sabotaging of the oil industry and transportation. The strictly financial-economic issues were discussed by the German delegates with Victor Slăvescu and Mircea Căncicov, the Romanian Ministers of Endowment and of Economy, and the negotiations took place in the period February-March 1940, with certain periods of crisis.<sup>193</sup> Some of the agreements signed in the meantime were temporary (March 1939).<sup>194</sup> At one point, Berlin's delegates left Bucharest, and on May 27, 1940 the famous **Petroleum Pact**, also known as the **Armament-Petroleum Pact**,<sup>195</sup> was signed by Căncicov and Neubacher, establishing that Romania would deliver to the Reich the quantities of oil the latter was entitled to as state dues, and the Reich would send weapons, including those captured in Poland. For the exchange, the parties did not make payments in cash,<sup>196</sup> although prices were established on the basis of which the transactions were made. On May 22, 1940, Victor Slăvescu and H. Neubacher signed a convention, according to which the prices of the oil products were established at the level reached in March 1940 (the average price of 3 826 *lei*/ton), which during the war registered several adjustments.<sup>197</sup> Mention should be made that, in May and June 1940, in direct relation with the favorable evolution of the *Wehrmacht's* operations on the Western Front, King Carol II

and his ministers proved more and more conciliatory towards Berlin's solicitations, including or rather especially regarding petroleum,<sup>198</sup> officially admitting the cooperation of M. Moruzov with the German secret services for the safety of petroliferous area against the sabotages planned by the Allied agents.<sup>199</sup> Under these circumstances,<sup>200</sup> on June 21, 1940, therefore on the even of the official capitulation of France, Minister Fabricius received from the Tătărescu government the text of a declaration that reconfirmed the assurances from May 1940, namely that Bucharest was decided to

"strengthen and extend the collaboration" with Berlin, collaboration imposed by "the geopolitical circumstances of Romania" and by the "new European order".<sup>201</sup> A "rapid organization" of this collaboration was intended, both at a political as well as an economic level.<sup>202</sup> As we have shown at the beginning of this chapter, **Romania began its orientation towards the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis**, the neutrality proclaimed in September 1939 being **abandoned** unilaterally by Bucharest.<sup>203</sup> This **did not save** Greater Romania from the border disaster, just as it did not save King Carol II's regime.

\*

\*

\*

Romania's renouncing of its neutrality<sup>204</sup> was only apparently a voluntary act, initiated by the rulers in Bucharest. The decision to orient towards Germany, maintaining **de jure** and **de facto** a **statute of non-belligerence** for longer than one year (May 1940-1941), took place in a certain context of the evolution of the hostilities on the European continent and with immediate repercussions on all the states, belligerent or not.<sup>205</sup> King Carol II, who had a decisive role in establishing the new orientation, confessed in his *Jurnal*: "... **The danger to reattach [Romania] to Germany is great, but, if fatality is pushing us in this direction, it is better we do it at the eleventh hour.**"<sup>206</sup> With regard to the context, King Carol II did not hide the consequences of the fall of the Allies on the Western Front, Great Britain remaining alone in the decisive confrontation with the Nazi Reich, benefiting, for a short time, of Italy's support: "The policy that I have wanted to carry on for the last ten years [since he had come to the throne of Romania] – wrote Carol – is collapsing, a policy of becoming friends with England, in which the latter gave me, however, no help [?!], but this collapse also comes with the first serious blow given to the British prestige [by Hitler]."<sup>207</sup> In the immediately following period, Romania found itself in the position of

a patient; it was amputated, without any hesitation, losing, through the will of the winners of the moment (Germany, first of all) and due to the foolish desires of the small or big neighboring imperialisms, in less than three months, a third of its territory and as much of its population, Romanian in its majority, respectively 100 000 square kilometers and 7 million inhabitants.<sup>208</sup> In the summer of 1940, the territorial seizures done to Romania's disadvantage depended to a great extent on the **petroleum factor**, intending to obtain either **closeness** to the Ploiești area (by the U.S.S.R.), either the ensuring of the security of the region (by Germany) against Moscow's expansionistic plans or the possible sabotages planned by the British. For Hitler – as he declared to Ciano on October 1, 1939<sup>209</sup> – the agreement of the "spheres of influence" in Romania, concluded after August 23, 1939 between Germany and the U.S.S.R., functioned fully and, if Bucharest dared to make the wrong move, then the Führer would use "every means" to try to mobilize Moscow, Budapest, and Sofia in order to "liquidate the Romanian issue." As it is known and has been established, Romania did not confront the Reich in any way, which, in the summer of 1940, did not stop the latter from supporting one after the other the

pretensions of the U.S.S.R., Hungary, and Bulgaria with regard to Romania. Kremlin acted with priority, on June 26-27, 1940, after having obtained Berlin's approval, which had imposed on it a moderation of its pretensions.<sup>210</sup> By occupying Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, the Herța Region and certain cyots on the Danube, the forces of the Red Army got unacceptably close, from Adolph Hitler's point of view, to the region of Ploiești.<sup>211</sup> The fact was all the stranger as it had been done **with the approval** of the Führer! Italy,<sup>212</sup> and even Germany, felt threatened by the risk of losing the Romanian oil.<sup>213</sup> Robert Goralski and Russel W. Freeburg, frequently quoted in the previous pages, observed with good reason that **there was no coincidence between** the Soviet aggression against Romania in June 1940 and the moment when Hitler decided irrevocably to **attack the U.S.S.R.** in the shortest time possible.<sup>214</sup> As we know, in *Mein Kampf*, Hitler had insisted on German necessity for **vital space (Lebensraum)**, to the detriment of the East-European countries, including the U.S.S.R.: **"...We begin where it [Germany's traditional foreign policy] was ended six hundred years ago. We are ending the eternal march of the Germans towards the south and the west of Europe and are looking towards the East. We are putting an end to the pre-war colonial and commercial policy and inaugurating the territorial policy of the future [...] First we can only think of Russia and the limitrophe countries that depend on it (author's bold) ..."**<sup>215</sup> The intention "to liquidate" the U.S.S.R. was not abandoned by Hitler even at the moment when he decided to sign with Stalin the pact from August 23, 1939.<sup>216</sup> During the secret meeting from November 23, 1939 with the main commanders of the *Wehrmach*, the Führer confessed: "I asked myself for a long time whether I should **begin with an attack in the East, and then in the West (author's bold).**"<sup>217</sup> But since he was liquidating the free Polish state, consequently being involved in a conflict with the Western

powers, Hitler promised firmly: **"We will be able to start against Russia when we are free in the West (author's bold)."**<sup>218</sup> In May-June 1940, at the height of the victorious campaign in the west of the continent, Hitler made known his intentions – as General Alfred Jodl, the head of the operation section of the *O.K.W.* – to attack the U.S.S.R. in the near future.<sup>219</sup> Immediately after the capitulation of France, on June 25, 1940, General Franz Halder, the Chief of Staff of the German terrestrial forces, recorded in his journal the Führer's declaration from that day, namely that he oscillated between a landing on the British Isles and **"an attack in the East (the attack of the U.S.S.R. – Gh. B.)."**<sup>220</sup> According to Andreas Hillgruber, Hitler decided as early as June 21, 1940 to prepare the invasion of Russia.<sup>221</sup> In the following weeks, the military intentions of the Reich were specified in Berlin, so that, on July 22, 1940, the commander of the terrestrial troops, von Brauchitsch, expressed Hitler's decision in the same firm terms: **"The Russian issue will be solved offensively. We must draw up the plan of the operation (author's bold)."**<sup>222</sup> Nine days later, in Berghof, at a meeting with his generals, Hitler stated: **"...Russia must be liquidated. Deadline – the spring of 1941. The sooner we crush Russia, the better (author's bold)."**<sup>223</sup> Consequently, extensive preparations were made at the level of *O.K.W.*, so that, on December 18, Hitler signed **war directive** no. 21 for the attack of the U.S.S.R. no later than May 15, 1941 (**Operation "Barbarossa"**).<sup>224</sup> Resuming the issue of the occupation of the Romanian historical territories by the forces of the Red Army, we shall find that the Soviet aggression led to a "cold war" between Bucharest and Moscow, which lasted until June 22, 1941.<sup>225</sup> The Kremlin's move displeased Hitler profoundly, the more so as, after June 28, 1940, the Ploiești petroliferous area entered in the radius of action of the Soviet aviation or, in case of a Romanian-Hungarian conflict, caused by Budapest, the Führer was afraid that Soviet Russia could intervene and simply

occupy the eastern part of Romania. It is true that, through the secret protocol of the non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939, Bessarabia was recognized as being under the U.S.S.R.'s "sphere of influence." Then, on June 28, 1940, Moscow also occupied Northern Bukovina, the Hertza Region, and a few cyots on the Danube, which for Hitler was equal with a "betrayal" by Stalin,<sup>226</sup> but, on November 10-13, 1940, while visiting Berlin, V.M. Molotov, the head of the Soviet government and diplomacy, explained categorically to the Nazi leaders the plans of Kremlin to not renounce the **expansion in the south-east of Europe,**<sup>227</sup> although it was also interested in the "vast East-Asian space." Hitler found yet another argument to justify his preparations for the "liquidation of the Russian danger,"<sup>228</sup> and the **petroleum factor** returned obsessively in his calculations.<sup>229</sup> In Berlin, the Führer did not conceal from Molotov – on November 13, 1940 – his satisfaction for the way in which he had distributed the U.S.S.R.'s "spheres of influence" and mentioned especially Northern Bukovina ceded to Moscow beyond the limits of the "understanding" from 1939.<sup>230</sup> The Soviet diplomat, on the contrary, replied that the U.S.S.R. was unhappy, because Germany had **guaranteed** the territorial integrity of Romania, which meant that Berlin had ignored Kremlin's interests in... the south of Bukovina.<sup>231</sup> Hitler replied to his guest that Bukovina had been a province of the Habsburg Empire and, by accepting the seizing of its northern part, he had shown understanding towards the "Russian exigencies", especially since, in cooperation with Italy, he had insisted in Bucharest, in June 1940, that Romania should cede Bessarabia. At that moment, the Führer motivated this way the presence of the **Axis** in the Romanian affairs: "... **Romania represents a real German-Italian interest by virtue of its oil resources** (author's bold) and its government asked Germany to protect it by air and by land from the terror of the British attacks. AS for the threat of a British

landing in Salonika, Germany will not allow it, but it promises to withdraw its troops from Romania as soon as the war is over."<sup>232</sup> Regarding the new situation that the U.S.S.R. was facing, Molotov concluded that, precisely for that reason, Moscow did not wish "to stay away from the big issues of Europe and Asia."<sup>233</sup> As Joachim von Ribbentrop noted, Molotov's visit to Berlin and the exchange of opinions did not meliorate the Soviet-German relations. On the contrary,<sup>234</sup> in December 1940, he met with Hitler, who declared that, if in the Finland issue he was willing to give in to Moscow's pressures, he did not accept to discuss the statute of the Dardanelles and the situation of Bulgaria. His reason was as clear as possible: **"If Bulgaria was subjected to the Soviet military influence, then the Balkans and especially Romania and its oil resources would necessarily fall under Soviet tutelage** (author's bold)."<sup>235</sup> This strengthened Berlin's conclusion that the decision the Führer<sup>236</sup> had made in the previous months to **liquidate the Russian issue** was the most convenient one.<sup>237</sup> Goralski and Freeburg concluded: **"It was not a coincidence that, a few weeks after refusing with repulsion Russia's pretension in Romania, Hitler oriented irrevocably towards his invasion in the Soviet Union** (author's bold)."<sup>238</sup> **THE ARITHMETIC OF PETROLEUM,** as the two authors suggestively point out,<sup>239</sup> had a **predominant role** in defining the strategy of the Third Reich in 1940-1941, especially since Berlin **was interested not only in the oil resources of Romania, but, through the very objectives of "operation Barbarossa", aimed at drawing near the resources of "black gold" in the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus.**<sup>240</sup> As far as the moment at the end of 1940, more exactly Molotov's visit and the sanctioning of **war directive no. 21,** we must mention the fact that the Reich had already managed to secure itself with regard to Romania: the action of Kremlin against Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina encouraged Sofia and Budapest, which

immediately made territorial claims, equally supported by Germany, Italy, and the U.S.S.R. and, partially, by Great Britain; I. Gigurtu's government, emanation of Carol II's regime, engaged in continuation in the direction of the integration in the "new European order" patronized by Adolph Hitler, yielded and, through the "agreements" signed in Craiova (September 7, 1940) and Vienna (August 30, 1940), Southern Dobrodgea (Cadrilater) and the north-west of Transylvania were "ceded" to Bulgaria and, respectively, to Hungary.<sup>241</sup> Beforehand, Romania renounced the French-British guarantees (July 1, 1940),<sup>242</sup> it withdrew from the Society of Nations (July 11, 1940),<sup>243</sup> and King Carol II addressed Hitler – on July 1, 1940 – asking him to send a military mission to "protect us in these times from this hardship."<sup>244</sup> Also, on July 6, 1940, Carol II informed, through the Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Manolescu, that Romania was willing to initiate negotiations with Hungary and Bulgaria, in order to examine their territorial claims.<sup>245</sup> Further, Premier I. Gigurtu and M. Manolescu visited Berlin (July 26-27, 1940)<sup>246</sup> and Rome.<sup>247</sup> I. Gigurtu renewed Carol II's request for the sending of a military mission to Romania.<sup>248</sup> Thus, Hitler did not miss the opportunity to reconfirm the Pharisaic character of his external orientation: he affirmed the political and territorial "disinterest" of the Reich towards the Balkans,<sup>249</sup> which was not true from an economic point of view. The countries in this area, specified the Führer, were for Germany the "ideal commercial partners", for the exchange of agricultural and industrial products, and "in Romania's case for petroleum" (author's bold).<sup>250</sup> Hitler himself revealed that the secret documents captured from the French – he referred to the archives from La Charité-sur-Loire – attested that London and Paris intended "to burn the Balkans", which he could not accept, acting for the peaceful solving of the problems of South-Eastern Europe.<sup>251</sup> Hitler urged to the solving of the "differences" between Romania and Hungary and Bulgaria, and, as far as the

Reich, he stated that he "would closely examine its interests", acting to "defend them" with weapons.<sup>252</sup> Mention should be made that, in the draft of the note on the meeting in Berghof, those interests were specified: "**the supply with petroleum and cereals**" (author's bold).<sup>253</sup> In the following weeks, around the Vienna dictate, Franz Halder wrote in his *Journal* on August 27 and 28, 1940 that the Reich was determined to intervene at a military level to "defend its interests in the petroliferous area [Ploiești]."<sup>254</sup> In August 1940, Italy and especially Germany were deeply involved in imposing the "solution" of the **Vienna dictate**, and so the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the two powers of the **Axis**, Galeazzo Ciano and Joachim Ribbentrop, asserted themselves as **authors of the odious document**.<sup>255</sup> Also theirs was the formula "Szeckler inlet" that extended the area ceded to Hungary all the way to the surroundings of the city of Braşov,<sup>256</sup> where the Reich could be only 1-2 hours away to keep the Ploiești area under the control of its motorized forces, in the case of a Soviet aggression against Romania<sup>257</sup> or an air attack initiated from Great Britain's bases in the Mediterranean Sea.<sup>258</sup> Ribbentrop and Ciano offered to the betrayed and subjugated Romania, the second day after the dictate, **the territorial guarantee** of Berlin and Rome for the integrity of the state that was practically brought back to the form of Smaller Romania **prior** to 1916, a fact that deeply upset Moscow, which, seeing its imperialist pretensions severed in the South-East, did not cease to protest, accusing Berlin also of ... violating the pact from August 23, 1939.<sup>259</sup> The fall of Greater Romania marked the end of the regime of Carol II,<sup>260</sup> not before entrusting the formation of a new government unto General Ion Antonescu, who officially became **the leader of the Romanian state** (1940-1944) and ensured the maintaining of the monarchic system by bringing back to the throne King Michael I (1927-1930, 1940-1947), the son of the sovereign who had just abdicated and left in exile.<sup>261</sup>

## NOTES:

<sup>1</sup> See, especially, Robert Goralski, Russel W. Freeburg, *Oil and War. How the Deadly Struggle for Fuel in WWII Meant Victory or Defeat*, New York, William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1978, *passim*; Jean-Jacques Berreby, *Le pétrole dans la stratégie mondiale*, Paris, Casterman, 1974, *passim*; George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, second edition, Ithaca (New York), Cornell University Press, 1956, p. 438 and the following; E.M. Friedwald, *Oil and the War*, London-Toronto, William Heinemann Ltd., 1941, *passim*; Benjamin Shawdran, *The Middle East. Oil and the Great Powers*, second edition, Boulder – London, Westview Press, 1985, p. 5 (petroleum – “the most decisive force in war”); F. Venn, *Oil Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*, London, Macmillan, 1986, pp. 83-104; Maurice Levêque, *Le pétrole et la Guerre*, quoted edition, *passim*; Eugen Preda, *Miza petrolului*, quoted edition, *passim*; Constantin Croutziou, *L'importance du pétrole dans la vie économique*, Paris, Librairie Sociale et Économique, 1941, p. 28 (petroleum – “vim of the war”); Jaques de Launay, Jean-Michel Charlier, *Istoria secretă a petrolului*, quoted edition, pp. 79-88; René Sédillot, *Istoria petrolului*, quoted edition; *passim*; Henri Michel, *La drôle de guerre*, Paris, Hachette, *passim*; Viorica Moisuc, *Diplomația României*, quoted edition, *passim*; Horia Brestoiu, *Acțiuni secrete în România*, quoted edition, *passim*; Maurice Pearton, *Oil and the Romanian State*, quoted edition, p. 223 and the following. During the war years, the successful works of Anton Zischka were published in Romanian, *Războiul petrolului*, București, Editura Cartea Românească, 1942; *Știința distruge monopolurile*, second edition, București, Editura Gorjan, 1942. From this last work we quote: “petroleum has become the blood of the war fleets and of automobiles, of airplanes and Diesel engines” (p. 271). In *Războiul petrolului* the author demonstrated the role of blood of economy gained by “black gold” (p. 14).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Edmond Bloch, *1919-1939. Le pétrole mène le jeu...*, Paris, G. Durassié et C-ie, Éditeurs, 1961, p. 119.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 116-119.

<sup>4</sup> René Sédillot, *Istoria petrolului*, p. 228.

<sup>5</sup> See *Introduction à l'histoire des relations internationales*, quoted edition, *passim*; Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *Tout empire péria. Théorie des relations internationales*, Paris, A. Collin, 1992, p. 129 and the following.

<sup>6</sup> *Introductions...*, p. 85.

<sup>7</sup> René Sédillot, *Istoria petrolului*, p. 228.

<sup>8</sup> Jean-Jacques Berreby, *Histoire mondiale du pétrole*, quoted edition, p. 207.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. Mihail Pizanty, *Aperçu general sur l'industrie pétrolière de Roumanie*, București, Editura Cartea Românească, 1940, p. 4; idem, *Privire retrospectivă asupra industriei petrolifere în perioada 1930-1939*, București, 1940, p. 6.

<sup>10</sup> *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, Series D, vol. XIII, London, HMSO, 1964, p. 844. While in Berlin, at the end of November 1941, Mihai Antonescu also met with Joseph Goebbels, Joachim von Ribbentrop, and Adolph Hitler

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Cesare Alimenti, *Il petrolio nell'economia mondiale*, quoted edition, p. 62.

<sup>12</sup> See Stefan Th. Possony, *L'économie de la guerre totale*, quoted edition, *passim*; Edgar Faure, *Le pétrole dans la paix et dans la guerre*, quoted edition, *passim*; André Labarthe, *La France devant la guerre. La balance des forces*, Paris, Éditions B. Grasset, 1939, p. 10; V. Forbin, *Le pétrole*, Paris, 1940, p. 5 (“those belligerents who can count on a sufficient reserve of oil products hold the forfeit of victory”). A decade after the outbreak of the hostilities, R. Jouan specified that petroleum had been “the soul of the military operations”, that “owning it, once the first surprises passed, played a capital, even decisive role in the fall of Germany and, especially, of Japan” (*Le pétrole. roi du monde*, Paris, Payot, 1949, p. 155).

<sup>13</sup> “Zgomotul armelor a înlocuit acțiunea diplomaților”, in *M.P.R.*, no. 18/September 15, 1949, p. 1185. On the same subject, see also “La guerre et le pétrole”, in *M.P.R.*, no. 10/1949, p. 571 and the following (commentaries on the study of General Serrigny – *L'Allemagne face à la guerre totale*); “Le pétrole dans la guerre mondiale”, in *M.P.R.*, no. 17/1940, p. 940 and the following; “Le combustible liquide au Japon”, in *M.P.R.*, no. 5/1941, p. 243 and the following; “Importanța zăcămintelor din Caucaz în industria de petrol a URSS”, in *M.P.R.*, no. 24/1941, pp. 935-944; *M.P.R.*, no. 19/1939, p. 1277; *M.P.R.*, no. 23/1940, p. 1225 (preface by G. Macovei, dated September 1940, to the work by L. Mrazec *Le problème du pétrole en Roumanie par rapport au problème mondial en 1915*, also published in Romanian: *Problema petrolului în România față de problema mondială din 1915*, București, 1940); *M.P.R.*, no. 1.1941, p. 35; *M.P.R.*, no. 8/1941, p. 375; *M.P.R.*, no. 11/1941, p. 521.

<sup>14</sup> See “Consumul mondial al produselor petrolifere în 1939”, in *M.P.R.*, no. 12/1940,, pp. 663-664. The situation in the last years that preceded the world war: 1935 – 212 231 000 tons; 1936 – 231 000 000 tons; 1937 – 254 500 000 tons; 1938 249 100 000 tons; 1939 – 255 786 000 tons (*ibidem*, p. 663).

<sup>15</sup> See *M.P.R.*, no. 23/1939, p. 1472 and the following. (In the year 1938 there were 43 223 000 motor vehicles in the world, necessitating 90% of the world's gasoline consumption, p. 1473).



<sup>16</sup> *M.P.R.*, no. 21/1939, pp. 1347-1357. In the years we are referring to, the world tonnage increased to 69.4 million commercial vessel tons; 11.4 million petroleum tons; 6.9 million war vessel tons, for all the categories of ships, the order being, generally, the same: Great Britain and its colonies or possessions, the United States, Japan, Norway, Germany, Italy, France, etc. See also Mihail Pizanty, *Le tonnage de la flotte mondiale. Situation des navires de commerce, des navires-citerne et des bateaux de guerre*, București, 1939, *passim* (excerpt from *M.P.R.*)

<sup>17</sup> *Idem*, *La vitalité de l'industrie pétrolière roumaine*, București, Editura Cartea Românească, 1939, p. 3.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Joachim von Ribbentrop, *De Londres à Moscou*, București, Editura Cartea Românească, 1939, p. 3.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Robert Goralski, Russel W. Freeburg, *Oil and War*, pp. 324, 334. The Second World War proved "the crucial connection" between petroleum and the national security of the states, the role of "crucial pivot" of the liquid fuel in determining the general policy of all the states; Constantin Croutziou, *L'importance du pétrole dans la vie économique*, quoted edition, pp. 149-151 (about the role of fuels in the battle between Great Britain and Germany).

<sup>20</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 77-80.

<sup>21</sup> In the years 1940-1944, Romania represented "the main source for supply with oil products" for the Nazi Reich (cf. S.M. Lisičikin, *Neftianiaia promišlennost stran narodnoi demokratii*, Moskva, 1960, p. 133). According to F. Venn, Romania, through the deliveries of oil products from 1939-1944, had "a substantial contribution to [the functioning] of the German war machine" (cf. *Oil Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*, quoted edition, p. 85).

<sup>22</sup> See I. V. Stalin, *Despre Marele Război al Uniunii Sovietice pentru Apărarea Patriei*, third edition, București, Editura PMR, 1952, p. 22 (from the speech made by Stalin on the radio on July 3, 1941: "... [Germany] intends [in the war started on June 22, 1941] to conquer our land, bedewed with our sweat, to take our grain and our petroleum, obtained through our work...").

<sup>23</sup> For the activity of O.K.W. between 1940 and 1945, see a fundamental document, edited by the well known German historians Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Andreas Hillgruber, Walther Hubatsch, and Percy Erns Schramm, *Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtführungsstab)*, I-IV, Frankfurt am Main, Bernard Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1961-1965. See also the war directives of Adolph Hitler, edited by Walther Hubatsch, *Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegführung 1939-1945. Dokumente des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht*, Frankfurt am Main, Bernard und Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1962 (followed by the English and the French editions: Adolph Hitler, *Directives de guerre*, présentées par H.R. Trevor-Roper d'après Walther Hubatsch, Paris, Arthaud, 1965).

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Robert Goralski, Russel W. Freeburg, *Oil and War*, p. 174 and the following (chapter 11 – *Germany Bleeds for Oil: The Caucasus and Stalingrad*, with this motto: "If I do not capture the petroleum in Maikop and Groznii, then I will have to end the war", A. Hitler, June 1, 1941).

<sup>25</sup> See Dietrich Eichholtz, *Geschichte der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft 1939-1945*, I, 1939-1941, Berlin, Akademie-Verlag, 1971, p. 168 and the following.

<sup>26</sup> See Andreas Hillgruber, *Die Zerstörung Europa. Beiträge zur Weltkriegsepoche 1914 bis 1945*, Frankfurt am Main – Berlin, Propyläen, 1989, p. 219 and the following; *idem*, *Deutsche Grossmacht-und Weltmacht im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Düsseldorf, Droste Verlag, 1979, *passim*.

<sup>27</sup> Robert Goralski, Russel W. Freeburg, *Oil and War*, p. 124 and the following (chapter 8 – "Mideast Oil and the Mediterranean").

<sup>28</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>29</sup> "Le Combustible liquide au Japon", in *M.P.R.*, no. 5/1941, p. 243 and the following; Robert Goralski, Russel W. Freeburg, *Oil and War*, p. 141 and the following (chapter "Japan's Oil Gains").

<sup>30</sup> Robert Goralski and Russel W. Freeburg insisted on the fact that the success of the economic blockade of Germany, depending on the accomplishing of the naval blockade, "exacerbated" for Berlin the problem of liquid fuel for the entire course of the world war (cf. *Oil and War*, p. 38).

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Henri Michel, *La drôle de guerre*, pp. 240-249.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 244-245; Sir Llewellyn Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*, I, London, HMSO, 1970, *passim*.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Gh. Buzatu, *Din istoria secretă a celui de-al doilea război mondial*, I, pp. 200-201.

<sup>34</sup> See W.N. Medlicott, *The Economic Blockade*, I, quoted edition, *passim*. About the preoccupations of the British government to ensure the oil quantities necessary for the war, see D.J. Payton-Smith, *Oil. A Study of War-time Policy and Administration*, London, HMSO, 1971, *passim*; W.K. Hancock, ed., *History of the Second World War. United Kingdom Civil Series. Statistical Digest of the War*, London – Neudeln, HMSO and Kraus Reprint, 1975, pp. 87-94 (*Petroleum*). Relative to the determinant role of petroleum in the specification of the strategic plans of the British Empire during the war years, cf. Sir Charles Webster, Noble Frankland, *The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany 1939-1945*, vols. I/1-3, II, III/5, IV, London, HMSO, 1961. About the blockade of the first years of the world war, cf. Marion C. Siney, *The Allied Blockade of Germany 1914-1916*, The University of Michigan Press, 1957.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. J.R.M. Butler, *Bolșaiastrateghiia*, I, *Sentiabr 1939-iun 1941*, Moskva, 1959, p. 86.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 85.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 87.

<sup>38</sup> Gh. Buzatu, *Din istoria secretă a celui de-al doilea război mondial*, I, p. 209.

<sup>39</sup> Great Britain, Public Record Office, Kew, London, 766, War Cabinet 65/1, War Cabinet 13 (39) (according to A.N.R., fund *Microfilme Anglia*, roll 7). See details in the fundamental work of W.N. Medlicott, *The Economic Blockade*, I, pp. 250-251. It is worth mentioning the belief of British public opinion in the period that the economic blockade represented the "secret weapon" that could give decisive results in the war (cf. also V.G. Truhanovski, *Vnešneia politika Anglii v period vtoroi mirovoi voini, 1939-1945*, Moskva, Nauka, 1965, p. 64). It mentions the example of the famous British historian Arnold Toynbee according to whom, in the winter of 1939-1940, the Allies had the conviction that, through the blockade, Germany could be forced into moderation (*ibidem*, p. 65).

<sup>40</sup> Great Britain, PRO 766, War Cabinet 65/1, War Cabinet 13 (39), September 12, 1939.

<sup>41</sup> Idem, War Cabinet 15 (39), September 14, 1939.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>43</sup> See Stephen Roskill, *Hankey. Man of Secrets*, I-III, London, Collins, 1970-1974. Sir Maurice Hankey's committee was officially entitled Preventing Oil Reaching Germany (POG), which says everything about its purpose (*ibidem*, III, p. 431). In connection with Hankey Committee (1939-1940), in the year 1940 and afterwards there functioned, with identical purposes, the so-called [Sir Geoffrey] Lloyd Committee (cf. Sir Charles Webster, Noble Frankland, *The Strategic Offensive against Germany 1939-1945*, I, pp. 158-159).

<sup>44</sup> Idem, War Cabinet 15 (39), September 14, 1939; Philippe Marguerat, *Le III-e Reich et le pétrole roumain*, pp. 168-169.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 169.

<sup>46</sup> PRO 766, War Cabinet 15 (39), September 14, 1939; Philippe Marguerat, *Le III-e Reich et le pétrole roumain*, pp. 168-169.

<sup>47</sup> Idem, War Cabinet 50 (39), October 18, 1939.

<sup>48</sup> Cf. Philippe Marguerat, *Le III-e Reich et le pétrole roumain*, pp. 168-169.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 170-172.

<sup>50</sup> PRO 766, War Cabinet 65/2, War Cabinet 69 (39), November 3, 1939.

<sup>51</sup> Idem, War Cabinet 85 (39), November 16, 1939.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>54</sup> Idem, War Cabinet 93 (39), November 24, 1939.

<sup>55</sup> Gh. Buzatu, *Din istoria secretă a celui de-al doilea război mondial*, I, p. 211.

<sup>56</sup> Cf. Gh. Buzatu *România și războiul mondial din 1939-1945*, quoted edition, p. 7.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibidem*, Ion Mamina, *Consilii de Coroană*, București, Editura Enciclopedică, 1997y, pp. 176-188; N. Dașcovici, *Neutralitatea României*, București, 1939, p. 14. As the famous specialist in international law observed, Bucharest's neutrality "has nothing against any of the present belligerents" (*ibidem*), Romania being decided to defend its territorial integrity, its political (*ibidem*, p. 21) and economic (*ibidem*, p. 18) independence, including the defending of the petroliferous region against destruction, sabotage, etc. (*ibidem*, p. 24).

<sup>58</sup> As we have already shown, Romania's attitude was not a surprise, the most important capitals having been warned in this sense before the attack against Poland: Paris (cf. Arh. M.A.E., fund 71, France, vol. 69 bis, ff. 68-70, telegram no. 576/Paris, August 9, 1939, Franasovici to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bucharest; *ibidem*, f. 42, telegram no. 537/August 29, 1939, Franasovici to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs); London (idem, fund 71 England, vol. 40, f. 286, telegram no 43 061/Bucharest, July 8, 1939, Gafencu to the Legation in London; Great Britain, Public Record Office, London-Kew, FO – 371/23 852, the minute of the meeting Tilea-Lord Halifax, London, August 26, 1939); Belgrade (Arh. M.A.E., fund 71 Yugoslavia, vol. 52, telegram no. 52 570/Bucharest, August 17, 1939, Gafencu to the Legation in Belgrade), Ankara (idem, fund 71 Turkey, vol. 61, *passim*); Berlin (idem, fund 71 Germany, vol. 77, ff. 312-313, the note of the meeting Gafencu-Fabricius from August 31, 1939); Rome (idem, fund 71 Italy, vol. 66, *passim*) and, also, Moscow (idem, fund 71 U.S.S.R., vol. 87, *passim*), despite the fact that, from more and more directions, more and more pressing messages arrived, in the sense that, "when the U.S.S..R. has the occasion and is able to do it, it will bring up the question of Bessarabia" (*ibidem*, f. 425, telegram no. 753/Paris, October 30, 1939, Franasovici to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bucharest; *ibidem*, f. 386, telegram no. 10 761/Washington, October 23, 1939, Irimescu to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; *Ibidem*, f. 387, telegram no. 4 757/Budapest, October 23, 1939, Crutzescu to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

<sup>59</sup> Gh. Buzatu, *România și războiul mondial din 1939-1945*, pp. 7-8.

<sup>60</sup> Apud Ion Mamina, *Consilii de Coroană*, p. 184 ("... Today we are carrying on a different policy than the one we carry in our heart. It is the only one we can carry on in the present!")

<sup>61</sup> Gregoire Gafencu, *Préliminaires de la Guerre à l'Est. De l'accord de Moscou (21 Août 1939) aux hostilités en Russie (22 Juin 1941)*, quoted edition, p. 338 and the following. Until May 29, 1949, while there was still an anti-German resistance center on the continent, Romania was determined, according to the declarations of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the period December 1938-May 1940, "to defend with weapons its national independence and its

policy loyal to the European legitimate order" (*ibidem*, p. 329). Since September 1939, the army had been mobilized, Romania being capable to tolerate a first shock from the East, North, or West, afterwards retreating to defense positions. A meeting summoned by Carol II on April 19, 1940 had decided the armed resistance of Romania under any circumstances and at any price (*ibidem*, p. 336-337). Under such circumstances, "all the technical and military preparations had been finalized with a view to setting fire to, if it was necessary, the oil industry and resources (author's bold)" (*ibidem*, p. 337).

<sup>62</sup> Gregoire Gafenco, *Préliminaires de la Guerre à l'Est...*, p. 338.

<sup>63</sup> Gh. Buzatu, *România și războiul mondial din 1939-1945*, pp. 8-11; Maurice Pearton, *Oil and the Romanian State*, pp. 225-226.

<sup>64</sup> See the notes from 1940 of the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Galeazzo Ciano (apud *The Ciano Diaries*, Garden City, 1946, pp. 269-270, 288. On August 28, 1940, before going to Vienna, Ciano was received by Hitler, who solicited that, through the prepared "arbitrage", "peace should be ensured" in the South-East. The Italian diplomat found an explanation for the Führer's wish, namely "that Romanian petroleum should continue to be pumped in his [Hitler's] tanks," (*ibidem*, p. 288); Robert Goralski, Russell W. Freeburg, *Oil and War*, pp. 59-61; Maurice Pearton, *Oil and the Romanian State*, pp. 223-224; Andre Fontaine, *Istoria războiului rece*, vol. 1, 1917-1950, București, Editura Militară, 1992, pp. 179-180; Raymond Cartier, *La Seconde Guerre mondiale, I, 1939-1942*, Paris, Larousse-Paris Match, 1965, p. 172. The French historian recorded Hitler's declaration regarding the fact that, without Romanian petroleum, "Germany could not continue the war; it must be protected from the Russian danger" (*ibidem*).

<sup>65</sup> See Al. Gh. Savu, *Dictatura regală (1938-1940)*, București, Editura Științifică, 1970, *passim*.

<sup>66</sup> Cf. *M.P.R.*, no. 19/1939, p. 1283.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 1283-1284.

<sup>68</sup> *Idem*, no. 23/1939, p. 1510.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 1511.

<sup>70</sup> *Idem*, no. 21/1939, p. 1392.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 1389.

<sup>73</sup> *Idem*, no. 23/1939, p. 1505.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. Viorica Moisuc, *Diplomația României*, p. 274; Philippe Marguerat, *Le III-e Reich et le pétrole roumain*, quoted edition, pp. 189-190.

<sup>75</sup> Cf. Axente Sever Banciu, *Aspectul economic al războiului actual (Potențialul economic al marilor puteri)*, București, Editura Universul, 1941, *passim*; Marcel Livian, *L'Entente Balcanique et l'après-guerre actuelle*, Paris, Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1940, pp. 130-131.

<sup>76</sup> See details in Viorica Moisuc, *Diplomația României*, p. 246 and the following (with references to the Romanian-German economic agreements from September 28, 1939, containing special dispositions referring to petroleum, cereals, etc., exchanged for armament, a fact that determined the Third Reich to act for the momentary stopping of the extending of the conflict in the South-East).

<sup>77</sup> Ioan Basgan, *Petrolul și gazele naturale în România*, București, Institutul Român de Energie, 1940, p. 3. To be confronted with the opinions expressed in 1940 (L. Mrazec, *Problema petrolului în România față de problema mondială din 1915*, quoted edition, pp. 10-11).

<sup>78</sup> Cf. *Iupta pentru înlocuirea materiilor prime coloniale cu surrogate și materii sintetice*, București, Editura Cartea Românească, 1940, p. 3.

<sup>79</sup> Cf. G.I. Brătianu, *Roumanie et Hongrie. Considérations démographiques et économiques*, second edition, Bucarest, Editura Dacia, 1942, pp. 10-11. See also M.N. Constantinescu, *Importanța europeană a petrolului românesc*, București, Imprimeria CFR – Filaret, 1943, *passim*.

<sup>80</sup> See Viorica Moisuc, *Diplomația României*, p. 269.

<sup>81</sup> Arh. M.A.E., fund 71 England, vol. 40, f. 369.

<sup>82</sup> See Armand Călinescu, *Însemnări politice*, p. 432. Details in Victor Slăvescu, *Note și însemnări zilnice*, II, pp. 427-429 (The Premier relates the contents of the discussions with Fabricius which laid the basis for a future agreement – from May 1940 – based on the petroleum/armament exchange, p. 428).

<sup>83</sup> Arh. M.A.E., fund 71 England, vol. 40, ff. 369-374; Viorica Moisuc, *Diplomația României*, p. 270.

<sup>84</sup> Arh. M.A.E., fund 71 France, vol. 69 bis, f. 66 (telegram no. 565/Paris, September 8, 1939).

<sup>85</sup> See the meeting Fabricius-Călinescu from September 15, 1969, in *Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918-1945*, Series D: 1937-1945, Band VIII, *Die Kriegsjahre, I, 4. September 1939 bis 18. März 1940*, Baden/Baden – Frankfurt/Main, P. Keppler Verlag KG, 1961, pp. 57-58 (telegram no. 549/Bucharest, September 15, 1939, Fabricius to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

<sup>86</sup> Arh. M.A.E., fund 71 Germany, vol 78, f. 202 (telegram no. 39 665/Berlin, December 6, 1939), Crutzescu to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bucharest); *Ibidem*, ff. 188-189 (verbal note no. 7 125/November 18, 1939, Germany's Legation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bucharest).

<sup>87</sup> Great Britain PRO, London-Kew, FO – 23 852, *passim*.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibidem*, ff. 279-285 (the minute of Lord Halifax on the meeting with Tilea). Tilea replied that, in only six weeks, Germany could repair the destructions, but that the invasion of Romania would be “disastrous” for the Anglo-French allies (*Ibidem*, f. 280).

<sup>89</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 338 and the following (minute of the discussion from December 4, 1939).

<sup>90</sup> Cf. Paul D. Quinlan, *Clash over Romania. British and American Policies towards Romania: 1938-1947*, Los Angeles, 1977, p. 57; Gh. Buzatu, *Din istoria secretă a celui de-al doilea război mondial*, I, pp. 216-217.

<sup>91</sup> On September 13, 1939, King Carol II wrote in his *Jurnal* that “Gafencu is worried because he is afraid of Clodius’s coming one of these days and making exorbitant requests [for export]” (Carol II, *Între datorie și pasiune. Însemnări zilnice*, I, p. 431).

<sup>92</sup> See *ADAP*, Series D, vol. VIII, pp. 134-135 (telegram no. 673/Bucharest, September 29, 1939, Fabricius and Clodius to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs); *Ibidem*, pp. 315-316 (report of Claudius, Berlin/November 1939, about the agreement from September, 1939 through which the Reich delivered war materials to Romania in value of 100 million marks in exchange for 600 000 tons of oil products); *Ibidem*, p. 342 (report from November 21, 1939 of Wiehl); Philippe Marguerat, *Le III-e Reich et le pétrole roumain*, pp. 160-163, 178-179; Viorica Moisuc, *Diplomația României*, pp. 246-248.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 250; *ADAP*, Series D, vol. VIII, p. 726-727 (von Ribbentrop to Göring, Berlin/March 16, 1940 – about the agreement from September 21, 1939, which ensured monthly 130 000 ton oil deliveries, with the prospect of their increase, starting with March 1, 1940, to 200 000 tons per month).

<sup>94</sup> Viorica Moisuc, *Diplomația României*, p. 250.

<sup>95</sup> Philippe Marguerat, *Le III-e Reich et le pétrole roumain*, pp. 168-178. The fact results from the French documents captured in the summer of 1940 by the German troops and which, after the war, reached Moscow, being returned to Paris in 1993. In 1939-1940, the Ministry of War in Paris, benefiting from the famous Bureau 2 of the General Staff of the French Army, drew up various syntheses examining the German penetration in the Romanian economy (including, if not especially, in the area of petroleum). In this sense, we refer to the synthesis *La pénétration allemande en Roumanie* (from April 21, 1940, ȚGASA, Moskva, file 375, ff. 108-156) or *Activité allemande en Roumanie* (May 2, 1940, *ibidem*, f. 157 and the following). The last synthesis showed that the German expansion was “systematic” at an economic and political level, preparing in fact the military intervention (*ibidem*). Under those circumstances, the Allied response was expected (cf. Note sur la politique alliée roumain, My 1, 1940, *ibidem*, ff. 159-162) (see also Gh. Buzatu, *România în arhivele Kremlinului*, quoted edition, pp. 200-201).

<sup>96</sup> Philippe Marguerat, *Le III-e Reich et le pétrole roumain*, pp. 169, 173, 175.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 174.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 177.

<sup>99</sup> About the “reorientation” of certain Allied oil companies regarding the exports to Germany we mention that, in 1940, the situation was as follows: *Astra Română* – 22 050 tons out of 564 550 tons; *Romanian-American* – 135 122 tons out of 417 656 tons; *Steaua Română* – 1 710 tons out of 228 348 tons; *Concordia* – 2 481 tons out of 206 424 tons, in comparison to *Creditul Minier* – 468 178 tons out of 517 017 (cf. *M.P.R.*, no. 6/March 15, 1941, supplement).

<sup>100</sup> See other numbers, in Andreas Hillgruber, *Hitler, Regele Carol și Mareșalul Antonescu*, quoted edition, pp. 291-292.

<sup>101</sup> According to the German statistics: from 70 000 tons in October 1939 to 60 000 tons in November 1939.

<sup>102</sup> *ADAP*, vol. VIII, p. 367 (telegram no. 835/ Berlin, November 30, 1939, Wiehl to Clodius).

<sup>103</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 387-388 (telegram no. 963/Bucharest, December 6, 1939, Clodius and Fabricius to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs – they obtained guarantees for 130 000 ton oil exports per month). Under the same circumstances, the Reich’s interest for Romanian petroleum being obvious, Grigore Gafencu met with Wilhelm Fabricius, to whom he expressed his fears regarding the possible actions of the U.S.S.R. and Hungary against Romania, which would have jeopardized the security of the Ploiești area (*ibidem*, pp. 391-392, telegram no. 975/Bucharest, December 8, 1939). Fabricius received instructions, in the following days, to ensure Bucharest that Romania did not need to worry about the danger of the U.S.S.R.’s intervention in the issue of Bessarabia (*ibidem*, pp. 419-420, telegram no. 891/Berlin, December 15, 1939, Wieszäcker to Fabricius).

<sup>104</sup> Andreas Hillgruber, *Hitler. Regele Carol și Mareșalul Antonescu*, p. 119.

<sup>105</sup> About the issues of the export and of the transport of petroleum especially on the Danube in the first stage of the world war, see Mihail Pizanty, *Privire retrospectivă asupra industriei petrolifere în perioada 1930-1939*, quoted edition, pp. 29-31; “Exportul petrolifer al României în anul 1940”, in *M.P.R.*, no. 5/1941, p. 199 and the following; “Le conduits de pétrole”, in *M.P.R.*, no. 10/1941, p. 461 and the following; “La flotte marchande danubienne de la Roumanie et des pays voisins”, in *M.P.R.*, no. 7/1941, p. 339; “Le trafic sur le Danube maritime en 1940”, in *M.P.R.*, no. 3/1941, p. 122 (according to S. Foca’s commentaries in the economic hebdomadal *Excelsior*). Comparative data regarding the traffic on the maritime Danube in 1939-1940: 484 vessels/386 vessels, out of which: 72 Greek, 71 German, 60 French, 45 British, 34 Italian, 29 Romanian in 1940, compared to 134 Greek, 125 Italian, 49 British, 62

Romanian, 7 French in 1939, with a total tonnage of 552 455 in comparison to 1 037 007. In 1940, as a result of the war, the quantities of transported products decreased drastically: to 373 290 tons compared to 1 332 746 tons in 1939 (*ibidem*).

<sup>106</sup> *Ibidem*; ADAP, Series D, vol. VIII, p. 593. See also Hermann Neubacher's memoirs: *Sonderauftrag Südost 1940-1943. Bericht eines fliegenden Diplomaten*, Göttingen-Berlin-Frankfurt am Main, Muster Schmidt Verlag, 1957.

<sup>107</sup> See ADAP, vol VIII, pp. 469-473 (report of Wiehl on the meeting at Karinhall). The representatives of the Reich's Ministry of Foreign Affairs were not invited (see *Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918-1945*, Series D, Band IX, *Die Kriegsjahre*, II, 18. März 1940 bis 22. Juni 1940, Frankfurt/Main, P. Keppler Verlag KG, 1962, p. 24, telegram no. 295/Berlin, Wiehl to Fabricius, March 27, 1940). The answer of Clodius and Fabricius to the respective communication (*ibidem*, pp. 33-34, telegram no. 399 from March 29, 1940).

<sup>108</sup> ADAP, vol. VIII, p. 470.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 471.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 472. On the same theme, later on, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Reich, Joachim von Ribbentrop, suggested to Göring that he should accept the collaboration of "his personal agents", namely of the agents infiltrated in the diplomatic missions (*ibidem*, pp. 482-484, von Ribbentrop to Göring, Berlin/January 4, 1940).

<sup>112</sup> Arh. M.A.E., fund 71 Romania, General, vol. 8, f. 102.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 104.

<sup>114</sup> Reconfirmed through a German-Romanian "temporary convention" on March 6, 1940 (cf. Viorica Moisuc, *Diplomația României*, p. 278).

<sup>115</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 103.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 110.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>119</sup> They all had Romania "under supervision", politically, militarily, economically, etc, including with regard to petroleum (see A.N.R., the collection *Microfilme S.U.A.*, rolls 36-39, 43, *passim*, German documents). As far as the French, see the syntheses about Romania's fluvial lines (ȚGASA, Moskva, fund 198, opis 2, file 403), army organization (*idem*, files 419, 421, 424, 427-429), railway (*idem*, file 402), telephone lines (*idem*, vol. 401), mercantile marine and the port of Constanța (*idem*, vol. 400), petroleum (*idem*, files 395-396).

<sup>120</sup> ȚGASA, Moskva, fund 198, opis 2, files 395-396, *passim*.

<sup>121</sup> See Galeazzo Ciano, *The Ciano Diaries*, p. 233 (entry from April 8, 1940: the decision of the German General Staff to occupy the Ploiești petroliferous area in case the U.S.S.R. attacked Romania).

<sup>122</sup> See Gh. Buzatu, *România și trusturile petroliere internaționale până la 1939*, quoted edition, pp. 31, 39.

<sup>123</sup> Cf. Marion C. Siney, *The Allied Blockade of Germany 1914-1916*, p. 192.

<sup>124</sup> Apud "Istoricul chestiunii distrugerilor din 1916 (Actele și documentele oficiale), in *M.P.R.*, no. 24/1925, pp. 1983-1988.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 1983-1984.

<sup>126</sup> See orders no. 1 787/November 6, 1916 of the General Command of Stages and Communications (apud Arh. M.A.E., fund 71/1914, E/2 petrol, vol. 232, ff. 20-21), no. 3 216/November 16, 1916 of the Romanian General Headquarters (*ibidem*, f. 19), and no. 3 490/November 20, 1916 (*ibidem*, f. 22), disposing the destruction of the petroliferous area even before the intervention of the Allies; the National Library of Romania, fund Al. Saint-Georges, stock XCIV/3, *passim*.

<sup>127</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 1984-1985.

<sup>128</sup> See *M.P.R.*, no. 1/1919, pp. 3-6; *M.P.R.*, no. 2/1919, p. 41 and the following; *M.P.R.*, no. 2/1919, p. 50 and the following; *M.P.R.*, no. 6/1919, pp. 182-184.

<sup>129</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>130</sup> The first committee met on February 9, 1922, including L. Mrazec, I. Tănăsescu, and L. Wenger.

<sup>131</sup> In October 1922 the losses of the private companies were estimated to 9 980 527 pounds (cf. *Istoricul chestiunii distrugerilor...*, p. 1986), while the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the years 1922-1926, I.G. Duca, estimated the total value of the losses to 15 million pounds (see Arh. M.A.E., fund 71 England, 1921-1929, vol. 15/Press, f. 48-49). On March 6, 1922, L. Mrazec wrote a report that established the value of the losses to 15 537 389 pounds, compared to the sum of 8 872 998 pounds admitted by the Anglo-French (the National Library of Romania, fund Al. Saint-Georges, stock XCII/6, ff. 114-115).

<sup>132</sup> See Arh. M.A.E., fund 71/1914, E/2, Compensations vol. 5, *passim*; *idem*, E/2, Compensations 7, vol. 76, *passim*; *idem*, fund 71/1914, E/2 Petroleum, vol. 231 (1916-1927), *passim* (especially about the negotiations of N. Titulescu in London in 1925-1926); *idem*, fund 71/1914, E/2 Petroleum, vol. 232 (1928-1933), *passim* (the conventions signed by N. Titulescu with the British on November 1, 1926 and the French and Belgians on November 8, 1926, ff. 221-230); *idem*, fund 71/1914, dund E/2 Petroleum, vol. 233 (1934-1940), *passim*; A.N.R., the Royal House fund, fișe 21/1925,

*passim*; the National Library of Romania, fund Al. Saint-Georges, stock CCCLXVIII/15, *passim*; *M.P.R.*, no. 22/1926, pp. 21663-2165; "Rezolvarea problemei despăgubirilor pentru distrugerile din ordin", in *M.P.R.*, no. 24/1926, pp. 2291-2295; *M.P.R.*, no. 1/1927, pp. 35-38; *M.P.R.*, no. 7/1929, pp. 621-623.

<sup>133</sup> Cf. Gregoire Gafenco, *Préliminaires de la Guerre à l'Est...*, p. 327 and the following (chapter XIII – *L'agonie de la neutralité roumaine*).

<sup>134</sup> They considered at the time that Romanian oil was "of supreme importance" for the German war economy (cf. Hamerton and collaborators, *The Second Great War*, II, London, 1945, pp. 557, 566).

<sup>135</sup> See, in this sense, Horia Brestoiu, *Acțiuni secrete în România. În preajma și la începutul celui de-al doilea război mondial*, quoted edition, *passim*; idem, *Impact la paralela 45. Incursiune în culisele bătăliei pentru petrolul românesc*, Iași, Editura Junimea, 1986, *passim*; Viorica Moisuc, *Diplomația României*, p. 267 and the following. An very important role in preventing the sabotages was played by the agents of the famous military espionage and counterespionage service *Abwehr*, under the command of Admiral W. Canaris (*Ibidem*, pp. 272-273), which enjoyed the cooperation of M. Moruzov, the head of the *Romanian Secret Service* (Horia Brestoiu, *Acțiuni secrete...*, pp. 247-252).

<sup>136</sup> Soon after the audience that Carol II had granted him on August 28, 1939, Colonel Gerstenberg informed Berlin, while the war had not started yet, that the King of Romania "rejected the Anglo-French sabotage offer against the oil fields in Romania, given the neutrality of the country" (apud Horia Brestoiu, *Impact la paralela 45*, p. 105). Carol II wrote in his *Jurnal* that Gerstenberg had come with a message – a "serious" one, in fact "an attempt of intimidation" – from Göring: the adoption of a neutral position in case of war (cf. Carol II, *Însemnări zilnice*, I, p. 415).

<sup>137</sup> See the opinion expressed in the daily paper *Timpul* from July 28, 1940 (apud *Acestea erau garanțiile anglo-franceze. Planurile de distrugeri ale Aliatilor în regiunea petroliferă și pe Dunăre*, București, Institutul Grafic "Arta" [1940], p. 13).

<sup>138</sup> See above.

<sup>139</sup> See above.

<sup>140</sup> *Acestea erau garanțiile anglo-franceze. Planurile de distrugeri ale Aliatilor în regiunea petroliferă și pe Dunăre*, quoted edition, *passim*; Paul Allard, *Les plans secrets de G.Q.G. pendant la Guerre*, quoted edition, *passim*; Rudolf van Wehrt, *Asfel s-a făcut războiul*, București, Editura Cartea Românească, f.a., *passim*.

<sup>141</sup> See Gh. Buzatu, *România în arhivele Kremlinului*, cap. IX – "Arhive pierdute, arhive capturate, arhive regăsite" (p. 167 and the following). We studied the respective files only a year before they were restituted, through an agreement, to the French government (December 1993): see I.G.A.S.A., Moskva, fund 198, opus 2, file 295, 203 pages (entitled *Roumanie: Destruction des puits de pétrole*); idem, file 396, 229 pages (*Rumanien: Mission Wenger*).

<sup>142</sup> I.G.A.S.A., Moskva, fund 198, opus 2, file 395, ff. 129-146 (*Rapport sur la destruction de l'industrie pétrolière*; two photocopies of the document, in Horia Brestoiu, *Acțiuni secrete...*, pp. 64-65). The plan of the former director of the French-Belgian consortium *Petrofina*, which controlled *Concordia* in Romania, stipulated two variants – the first one a rapid destruction (executed in 24 hours) and a methodical destruction (in 10-30 days), paralyzing the production in a proportion of 90% and the means of transportation (cf. *Acestea erau garanțiile anglo-franceze...*, quoted edition, p. 7; Horia Brestoiu, *Impact la paralela 45*, pp. 111-112). A coordinating "general staff" was constituted (Roger Sarret, Pierre Angot, Jacques Pierre Coulon, etc.), which established contacts, on the Romanian territory, with the group of officers of the *Intelligence Service* (Colonel Colin Cubbins, Major Garfit Watson, and Ted Masterson). The French-British plan was communicated to the General Staff of the Romanian army (*ibidem*, p. 113). In their preparations, the British gave attention to the "actions of sabotage" in the petroliferous area (the adopted common plan had in view that "especially the oil derricks, the production, transportation, and refining equipment needed to be destroyed", in *Acestea erau garanțiile anglo-francezilor...*, p. 6), without ignoring the paralyzing of the traffic on the Danube (see Horia Brestoiu, *Acțiuni secrete...*, p. 115 and the following). On the Romanian side, at the level of the General Staff, we know that intense preparations were made (cf. Viorica Moisuc, *Diplomația României*, p. 289), but, under the circumstances of the Reich's pressures and the orientation of Bucharest towards Berlin, of the Canaris-Moruzov collaboration in 1939-1940 precisely in the petroleum area, they were in no way materialized nor disclosed (see Horia Brestoiu, *Acțiuni secrete...*, p. 172 and the following).

<sup>143</sup> Apud Paul Allard, *Les plans secrets...*, p. 39; Horia Brestoiu, *Acțiuni secrete...*, pp. 95-96 (photocopy).

<sup>144</sup> Paul Allard, *Les plans secrets...*, p. 40. The strictly secret telegram no. 1 114 from September 28, 1939 sent by Adrien Thierry to his Center in Paris pointed out the following: "In my opinion, we have a decisive interest to realize, without delay, a blocking of the Danube, so that the fluvial traffic between Romania and Germany may be completely interrupted", which "would mean for us an advantage at least equivalent to the destruction of the oil fields, because it would paralyze at the same time all the oil and cereal transports" (apud *Acestea erau garanțiile anglo-franceze...*, p. 9).

<sup>145</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 41 and the following; Ian Colvin, *L'amiral Canaris*, Paris, 1952, pp. 204-205; Henri Michel, *La drôle de guerre*, p. 240 and the following.

<sup>146</sup> See Horia Brestoiu, *Acțiuni secrete...*, *passim*.

<sup>147</sup> See Cristian Troncotă, *Mikhail Moruzov și Serviciul de Informații al Armatei Române. Studii și documente*, București, Editura I.N.I., 1996, p. 177 and the following.

<sup>148</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 300 (doc. no. 47).

<sup>149</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 302-303.

<sup>150</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 310 (Report of C. Gh. Ionescu-Micandru, doc. no. 48).

<sup>151</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 313.

<sup>152</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>153</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 314.

<sup>154</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 320-324 (Report of Ionescu-Micandru on the visit, doc. no. 49).

<sup>155</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 323.

<sup>156</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 336 (Report from December 4, 1939, doc. no. 55).

<sup>157</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>158</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 336-344.

<sup>159</sup> We extract from the note written by Moruzov himself: "... I wanted very much – began Canaris – to make this trip to Bucharest, with the purpose – on the one hand – of saluting you personally, and – on the other hand – of examining, on the spot, the sabotage problem, since the German High Command and government are in a state of extreme irritation due to the proportions given to the sabotage action in Romania. Given the extreme seriousness of this matter, we considered that it was necessary to examine personally whether the measures for the prevention of the sabotage acts are sincere and sufficient, so that Germany can be offered the necessary security and reassurance; in a contrary case, Germany will act accordingly. In any case, for me, your person, as head of the Secret Intelligence Service of the Romanian army, and the organization of the Service that you lead present a complete guarantee; however, having in view that the provisioning of Germany with the necessary supplies, in accordance with the economic agreement (from March 23, 1939 – author's note), is extremely important, I was delegated to do additional investigations on this matter and, therefore, to appeal to you to give me your collegial assistance, reminding you that this issue is of equal interest to both states." (*ibidem*, p. 351, Note of Moruzov from December 11, 1939, doc. no. 58).

<sup>160</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 352 (doc. no. 59).

<sup>161</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 445-450 (Note of M. Moruzov, doc. no. 106).

<sup>162</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 447.

<sup>163</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 419-421 (Report, doc. no. 92).

<sup>164</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 389-397 (doc. no. 77), 407-415 (doc. no. 90), 416-419 (doc. no. 91), 421-425 (doc. no. 92).

<sup>165</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 368 (doc. no. 62).

<sup>166</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 369 (doc. no. 63).

<sup>167</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>168</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 391 (doc. no. 77).

<sup>169</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 425-430 (doc. no. 93). Several agents of the R.S.S. ("Cg", "T", etc.) were infiltrated on the British ships that traveled loaded with weapons and explosives towards Giurgiu, with the final destination to the Iron Gates. After the blocking of the British convoy on the Danube, A. Hitler – as H. Göring communicated through Colonel A. Gerstenberg in Bucharest – declared himself "extremely satisfied with the measures taken by Romania for the prevention of the sabotage acts in general and, especially, with the occasion of the inspection of the British ships at Giurgiu" (*ibidem*, p. 403, doc. no. 84).

<sup>170</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 440-441 (doc. no. 103).

<sup>171</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 437-438, 438-439 (doc. nos. 100-101, from May 16, 1940).

<sup>172</sup> See M. Moruzov's report on the visit to France in which he inserted the confessions of Colonel Rivet, the head of the supreme French military espionage organism, in the sense that: "The informative material that the French Intelligence Service has – especially on Germany – is in majority the material procured by our Service (author's bold)" (apud Cristian Troncotă, *Mihail Moruzov*, p. 407, doc. no. 90). In London, as well, the head of the *Intelligence Service* congratulated him "for the informative activity of our Service" (author's bold) (*ibidem*, p. 416, doc. no. 91).

<sup>173</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 481-482 (doc. no. 126).

<sup>174</sup> In July 1940, Fabricius met with General Ion Antonescu, who declared that he had asked King Carol II to dismiss M. Moruzov, a "traitor". Fabricius stood up for the head of the R.S.S. (cf. A.N.R., the collection *Microfilme S.U.A.*, roll T 120-175, frames 137 086-137 088, telegram bno. 1 142 from July 9, 1940, Fabricius to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin).

<sup>175</sup> In April 1940, he was received by King Carol II, to whom he presented data regarding the role of Romanian petroleum in the continuation of Germany's war. The sovereign did not reject the importance of the issue, but he insisted on the Soviet danger in Bessarabia, alluding to the possibility, in case of emergency, of the defending of the petroliferous region by the Reich (cf. *ADAP*, Series D, vol. IX, pp. 134-135, report from April 14, 1940, Bucharest, Manfred von Killinger to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Von Killinger recommended to his Center to pay

serious attention to the collaboration of the *Abwehr* and the *S.D.* with the *Romanian Secret Service* and *General Security* for the protection of the Romanian petroliferous area from possible sabotage (*ibidem*, p. 135).

<sup>176</sup> See Larry L. Watts, *Romanian Cassandra. Ion Antonescu and the Struggle for Reform. 1916-1941*, New York/Boulder, Columbia University Press, 1993, p. 214; Gh. Buzatu, *Din istoria secretă a celui de-al doilea război mondial*, II, București, Editura Enciclopedică, 1985, p. 97.

<sup>177</sup> ȚGASA, Moskva, fund 198, opis 2, file 395, ff. 75-77.

<sup>178</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 78.

<sup>179</sup> Among the documents found in the original Wenger "file", we mention: *Roumanie – Destruction des puits de pétrole. Pièces antérieures à la guerre* (ȚGASA, fund 198, opis 2, file 395, ff. 168-203); *Mission Wenger – Pièces de base* (*ibidem*, ff. 72-167; idem, file 396, ff. 4-191); *Pétroles – Lutte contre les achats roumains* (*ibidem*, ff. 192-229); *Note sur une politique du pétrole en Roumanie pendant sa neutralité*, study by L.W. dated November 6, 1939 (*ibidem*, ff. 59-75); the study *La politique pétrolière en Roumanie*, dated February 7, 1940 (*ibidem*, ff. 129-142); bulletins regarding the maritime traffic and the oil exports of Romania in 1939-1940 (*ibidem*, ff. 143-158); the synthesis *Sur une politique économique en Europe Orientale*, April 4, 1940 (*ibidem*, ff. 163-167); *Note au sujet de la Mission Wenger*, November 24, 1939 (*ibidem*, ff. 39-41); the official record of the "Wenger meeting" from December 28, 1939 which resulted in the decision to initiate an action that would paralyze the oil production and transports in Romania (*ibidem*, ff. 13-24). It also results from these documents that, in the month of May 1939, the French official circles tackled the issue of the oil destructions in Romania (idem, fund 198, opis 2, file 395, ff. 170-172).

<sup>180</sup> See Horia Brestoiu, *Acțiuni secrete...*, p. 167 and the following.

<sup>181</sup> About the preparations for the operation, details in Horia Brestoiu, *Acțiuni secrete...*, pp. 143-167; Paul Allard, *Les plans secrets...*, pp. 42-44. On April 3, 1940, a convoy arrived at Giurgiu, formed of several tug boats and barges (Britania, Elisabeth, King George, Scotland, Lord Byron, Thermond, etc.). On the ships, served by predominantly British crews, there were important quantities of armament, with regard to which the Romanian government decided initially to "seal them on board". Informed, the German Minister in Bucharest, Fabricius, intervened immediately, soliciting firm measures for the blocking of the operation of dynamiting certain sections along the Danube and, especially, of the sluice gates (Horia Brestoiu, *Acțiuni secrete...*, pp. 163-164; Viorica Moisuc, *Diplomația României*, p. 289).

<sup>182</sup> On April 10, 1940, the U.S. Minister to Bucharest, F.M. Gunther, transmitted to the Secretary of State Cordell Hull that the information about the intentions of the British had been intercepted by the Nazi spies, who had pervaded Romania (apud National Archives of the U.S.A., Washington, D.C., Record Group 59, Department of State, Box No. 2 113, telegram no. 118). See the special reports written by Gunther to Hull). In this period, Gunther was closely following the statistics registering Romania's oil exports – the monthly quantities and the countries of destination (cf. idem, Box No. 2 115 A, telegram no. 221/Bucharest, May 21, 1940, Gunther to Hull).

<sup>183</sup> Idem, Box No. 2 113 (telegram no. 95/Belgrade, April 9, 1940, Lane to Hull). At the end of March 1940, Clodius met with Premier Tătărescu, discussing among other things the issue of the oil exports to Germany. They agreed that the transportation was difficult, that measures were necessary from both sides for the prevention of sabotage (cf. *ADAP*, Series D, vol. IX, pp. 39-42, report from Bucharest/March 30, 1940, Clodius and Fabricius to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Killinger informed Berlin about the sabotage on the Danube planned by the British (*ibidem*, pp. 134-135, the mentioned report from April 1940).

<sup>184</sup> National Archives, Washington, Record Group 59, Box No. 2 113 (telegram no. 122/Bucharest, April 12, Gunther to Hull).

<sup>185</sup> Idem, Box No. 2 112 (telegram no. 76/Budapest, April 12, 1940, Montgomery to Hull).

<sup>186</sup> *Ibidem* (telegram no. 940/Berlin, April 12, 1940, Kirk to Hull).

<sup>187</sup> *Ibidem* (telegram no. 31/Sofia, April 13, 1940, Earle to Hull; telegram no. 127/Bucharest, April 14, 1940, Gunther to Hull); idem, Box No. 2 114 (telegram no. 1 027/Berlin, Kirk to Hull). The U.S. Department of State drew up a synthesis about the British attempts of sabotage on the Danube for the period April 4-11, 1940 (*ibidem*, 7400011/2384).

<sup>188</sup> See *ADAP*, Series D, vol. IX, p. 35 (telegram no. 400/Bucharest, March 29, 1940, Fabricius and Neubacher to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

<sup>189</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 375-377 (secret report from Bucharest/May 28, 1940, Neubacher to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs); Viorica Moisuc, *Diplomația României*, pp. 293-294. "The petroleum pact – in the opinion of Viorica Moisuc – represented the establishing of Germany's control over one of the main branches of Romania's industry; the exploitation, processing, and distribution of the largest part of the oil products to the German market were transferred, shortly after the signing of the pact, onto Germany; the foreign shares in the Romanian oil industry were taken over by the companies with German capital. The petroleum pact was imposed on the juridical basis of the economic treaty from March 23, 1939 and under the circumstances created by the aggravation of the international situation of Romania in the spring of 1940" (*ibidem*, p. 294). See the complete text of the *Petroleum Pact* in Mircea Mușat, Ion Ardeleanu,



România după Marea Unire, II/2, București, Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1988, pp. 1082-1084. Cf. also Margot Hegemann, *Die Grenze...*, p. 75 and the following.

<sup>190</sup> *ADAP*, vol. IX, p. 285 (telegram no. 712/Bucharest, May 16, 1940, Fabricius to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

<sup>191</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 39-42 (the mentioned report of Clodius and Fabricius from March 30, 1940).

<sup>192</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 354-356 (telegram no. 790/Bucharest, May 25, 1940, Fabricius to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

<sup>193</sup> Cf. Andras Hillgruber, *Hitler, Regele Carol și Mareșalul Antonescu*, pp. 119-120.

<sup>194</sup> Viorica Moisuc, *Diplomația României*, p. 278; Philippe Marguerat, *Le III-e Reich et le pétrole roumain*, pp. 189-191. According to the Swiss historian, through the agreement from March 6, 1940, the Reich obtained a "privileged treatment" regarding oil trade (*ibidem*, p. 190), the prices accepted by Bucharest being inferior to those of the market, which continued to be valid for the French and the British. Thus, in the period previous to the signing of the agreement, the Germans paid an average of 9 600 lei/ton, and afterwards the prices were established at 3 826 lei/ton (*ibidem*, p. 190, note 4; on page 191, note 1, the comparative prices on March 15, 1940, for essences, oil, gasoline and mazut, per categories of: prices established by agreement, prices of the market, and international prices fob Golfe, namely 4 407 lei, 8 889 lei, and respectively 3 065 lei. Also, on December 20, 1939 the rate of exchange for the lei had been established in relation to the German mark: 49.50 lei = 1 DM (*ibidem*, p. 187).

<sup>195</sup> Andreas Hillgruber, *Hitler, Regele Carol și Mareșalul Antonescu*, p. 120.

<sup>196</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>197</sup> See A.N.R., the Ministry of Industry and Petroleum fund, file 41/1943, f. 2. The adjustments of the prices of the oil products delivered to the Reich, to which we have referred, consisted in several increases: by 9% in June 18, 1941; by 15% on October 31, 1941; by 26% on March 12, 1943; by 30% on February 9, 1944, so that upon the breaking of the Romanian-German alliance, the total registered increase, in relation to May 1940, was of 128.69% (*ibidem*). For the coordination of the oil imports from Romania, at the request of the Reich's Ministry of Economy, the company *Rumänien-Mineralöl GmbH (Ruminöl)* was established (cf. Andreas Hillgruber, *Hitler, Regele Carol și Mareșalul Antonescu*, p. 120).

<sup>198</sup> See *ADAP*, Series D, vol. IX, pp. 382-383 (telegram no. 808/Bucharest, May 29, 1940, Fabricius to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs); *ibidem*, pp. 383-385 (report of Manfred von Killinger, Berlin, May 29, 1940).

<sup>199</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 383-384.

<sup>200</sup> At the end of May 1940 the British decided to withdraw towards Istanbul their ships that had ensured the transport on the Danube. At Fabricius's intervention, Bucharest stopped the departure of 20 ships (5 tow boats, 11 barges, 2 tanks, one floating elevator and one pontoon - 73 million lei); at the moment of the signing of the armistice, on June 22, 1940, the crews of the French ships (19) solicited to be placed under British flag, which Bucharest did not accept; also, under the same circumstances, at Hârșova, the Dutch and the Belgian ships were blocked, and 27 British citizens were caught by the events on Romanian territory (engineers and clerks), who had planned the acts of destruction or sabotage of the Romanian oil industry. Finally, on July 3, 1940, the Gh. Tătărescu decided their expulsion (see Arh. M.A.E., fund 71/Romania General, vol. 8, ff. 441-450, *Diferende pentinde între România și Marea Britanie*). As far as the predispositions of the new government I. Gigurtu to "strengthen" the collaboration with the Reich, including by guaranteeing the oil deliveries, the Premier communicated to H. Göring in July 1940 that: "... We are willing to double the deliveries as far as quantity. As means of transportation we provide [...] 3 000 tank cars [...]. The same effort will be made for the delivery of the cereals..." (author's bold) (*ibidem*, f. 437).

<sup>201</sup> See *ADAP*, Series D, vol. IX, pp. 543-544 (text transmitted through telegram no. 957/Bucharest, June 21, 1940, Fabricius to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

<sup>202</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>203</sup> Gregoire Gafenco, *Préliminaires de la Guerre à l'Est...*, pp. 343-344.

<sup>204</sup> As it was pointed out in the period by N. Dașcovici, eminent specialist in international law, for Romania, neutrality had established the situation in which it had "nothing against any of the present belligerents" (cf. *Neutralitatea României*, quoted edition, p. 14). A complete analysis of the internal and external situation of Romania on the eve and at the beginning of World War II, in Mircea Mușat, Ion Ardeleanu, *România după Marea Unire, II/2, passim*. With reference to the abandoning of neutrality, *ibidem*, pp. 1085-1086.

<sup>205</sup> Cf. Gh. Buzatu, *Români și războiul mondial din 1939-1945*, pp. 10-11.

<sup>206</sup> Cf. Carol II, *Între datorie și pasiune. Însemnări zilnice, II, 1939-1940*, edition of Marcel-Dumitru Ciucă and Narcis Dorin Ion, București, Editura Șansa, 1996, p. 177.

<sup>207</sup> *Ibidem*; idem, *În zodia satanei. Reflexiuni asupra politicii internaționale*, first edition, București, Editura Universitaria, 1994, pp. 134-135. About Carol II's attempt of "adaptation to reality", see Constantin I. Kiriteșcu, *România în al doilea război mondial*, I, ed. Gh. Buzatu, București, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, 1995, pp. 110-111.

<sup>208</sup> Gh. Buzatu, *România și războiul mondial din 1939-1945*, p. 11; Constantin I. Kiriteșcu, *România în al doilea război mondial*, I, p. 116 and the following.

<sup>209</sup> See *The Ciano Diaries*, p. 154; G. Cioranescu and collaborators, *Aspects des relations russo-roumaines. Rétrospective et orientations*, I, Paris, Minard, 1967, pp. 153-154; Andreas Hillgruber, ed., *Les entretiens secrets de Hitler. Septembre 1939-Décembre 1941*, Paris Fayard, 1969, p. 47.

<sup>210</sup> Initially, the U.S.S.R. had intended to impose on Romania through a note of the nature of an ultimatum, to immediately "transmit" not only Bessarabia, but also the entire Bukovina, but after Hitler's intervention it reduced its pretensions only to the north of the province (cf. G. Cioranescu and collaborators, *Aspects des relations russo-roumaines*, I, pp. 158-159; Valeriu Florin Dobrinescu, *Bătălia diplomatică pentru Basarabia. 1918-1940*, Iași, Editura Junimea, 1991, pp. 149-150; Ion Constantin, *România. Marile Puteri și problema Basarabiei*, București, Editura Enciclopedică, 1995, pp. 64-65).

<sup>211</sup> Cf. Henri Michel, *La Seconde Guerre mondiale*, I, 1939-1943, Paris, PUF, 1968, p. 288; Robert Goralski, Russel W. Freeburg, *Oil and War*, pp. 59-60.

<sup>212</sup> In 1939-1940, London manifested the hope that Italy might abandon non-belligerence, opting for the cause of the Allies, for which purpose, for instance, on October 1, 1939, Churchill promised it the statute of a "great and friendly power" (cf. V.G. Truhanovski, *Vnešneia politika Anglii v period vtoroi mirovoi voini*, p. 46).

<sup>213</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 61.

<sup>214</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>215</sup> Apud Adolph Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, translated by Maria Florea, București, Editura Pacifica, 1993, p. 465; see also Gh. Buzatu, *Din istoria secretă a celui de-al doilea război mondial*, I, p. 69.

<sup>216</sup> *Ibidem*, I, pp. 69-70.

<sup>217</sup> Apud *Istoriia Velikoi Otecestvennoi voini Sovetskogo Soiuzu 1941-1945*, vol. I, Moskva, 1960, p. 351.

<sup>218</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>219</sup> D.M. Proektor, *Agressia I katastrofa*, second edition, Moskva, 1972, p. 189; Gh. Buzatu, *Din istoria secretă a celui de-al doilea război mondial*, I, p. 70.

<sup>220</sup> Cf. F. Halder, *Voennii dnevniki. 1939-1942 gg*, II, Moskva, 1969, *passim*, (the entries from July 3, 4, 5, and 18, 1940, pp. 29, 31, 37, 52). References to Romania (the entries from July 9, 11, and 14, 1940, pp. 41, 45, and 47).

<sup>221</sup> Cf. *Hitlers Strategie. Politik und Kriegführung 1940-1941*, Frankfurt am Main, Bernard und Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1965, p. 449.

<sup>222</sup> F. Halder, *op. cit.*, II, p. 60.

<sup>223</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 80-81 (note on the military meeting from July 31, 1940).

<sup>224</sup> Cf. Gh. Buzatu, *Din istoria secretă a celui de-al doilea război mondial*, I, pp. 71-72; William L. Shirer, *Le Troisième Reich des origines à la chute*, Paris, Stock, 1967, pp. 848-849; Henri Michel, *La Seconde Guerre mondiale*, I, p. 228; Lieutenant-Colonel Eddy Bauer, *The History of World War II*, Leicester, Galley Press, pp. 157-164.

<sup>225</sup> Constantin I. Kirîțescu, *România în al doilea război mondial*, Chișinău, Lyceum, 1997, pp. 59-60.

<sup>226</sup> Cf. Ion Constantin, *România. Marile Puteri și problema Basarabiei*, pp. 64-66; Hermann Weber, *Die Bukovina im zweiten Weltkrieg*, Hamburg, 1972, p. 11 and the following; Anatol Petrencu, *Basarabia în al doilea război mondial*, Chișinău, Lyceum, 1997, pp. 59-60.

<sup>227</sup> About the visit of V.M. Molotov to Berlin, see *Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918-1945*, Series D, 1937-1945, Band XI/1, *Die Kriegsjahre*, IV/1, I. September bis 13. November 1940, Bonn, Gebr. Hermes KG, 1964, p. 448 and the following (the minutes of the meetings V.M. Molotov – Adolph Hitler from November 12, 1940, doc. no. 326, pp. 455-461 and from November 13, 1940, doc. no. 328, pp. 462-472; the minutes of the meetings V.M. Molotov – Joachim von Ribbentrop from November 12, 1940, doc. no. 325, pp. 448-455 and from November 13, 1940, doc. no. 329, pp. 472-478). The minutes of the meetings Molotov – Hitler were published in a critical edition by the historian Andreas Hillgruber (see *Staatsmänner und Diplomaten bei Hitler*, I, 1939-1941, Frankfurt am Main, Bernard und Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1966 and the French edition – *Les entretiens secrets de Hitler*, quoted edition, pp. 399-307 (the meeting from November 12, 1940) and pp. 308-321 (the meeting from November 13, 1940)). About the interest of the U.S.S.R. for the south-east of Europe, *ibidem*, pp. 306, 321. In order to attract the U.S.S.R. towards the plans of the Axis, Hitler did not exclude its adhering to the Tripartite Pact (*ibidem*, pp. 306-307).

<sup>228</sup> Cf. G. Cioranescu, *Aspects des relations russo-roumaines*, I, p. 162.

<sup>229</sup> *Ibidem*; Gh. Buzatu, *Din istoria secretă a celui de-al doilea război mondial*, II, pp. 253-254, Robert Golaski, Russel W. Freeburg, *Oil and War*, p. 61.

<sup>230</sup> Andreas Hillgruber, ed., *Les entretiens secrets de Hitler*, pp. 312-313.

<sup>231</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 311-312.

<sup>232</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 319.

<sup>233</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 321.

<sup>234</sup> Joachim von Ribbentrop, *Des Londres à Moscou*, p. 183.

<sup>235</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 183-184.

<sup>236</sup> In the letter from December 15, 1943 sent to Marshal Antonescu, Hitler wrote: "... Because, in November 1940, when Molotov arrived to Berlin, the discussions were not mostly about Germany's situation, but that of Finland,

Romania, Bulgaria, and the issue of the Dardanelles. Very aware of its European responsibility to oppose the Soviet wish, Germany entered then in the bloodiest war of all times" (Vasile Arimia, Ion Ardeleanu, Ștefan Lache, eds. *Antonescu-Hitler. Corespondență și întâlniri inedite (1940-1944)*, II, București, Editura Cozia, 1991, p. 130) (Further quoted as *Antonescu-Hitler*).

<sup>237</sup> Cf. William L. Shirer, *Le Troisième Reich...*, pp. 846-848; David Irving, *Churchill's War*, New York, Avon Books, 1991, p. 378 and the following (Hitler's war preparations against the U.S.S.R. intercepted by the British due to the deciphering machine *Enigma*).

<sup>238</sup> Robert Goralski, Russel W. Freeburg, *Oil and War*, p. 61.

<sup>239</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 63.

<sup>240</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 53-67 (chapter 4 entitled "Russian Oil: The German Key"). Chapter 5 of the mentioned work ("The Russian Campaign", pp. 68-86) has I.V. Stalin's words as a motto: "The war was caused by engines and octane" (p. 68); William L. Shirer, *Le Troisième Reich...*, pp. 940-941.

<sup>241</sup> Cf. Gh. Buzatu, *România și războiul mondial din 1939-1945*, pp. 12-13; Constantin I. Kirițescu, *România în al doilea război mondial*, I, pp. 140-152. The cabinet that accepted and signed the documents of the territorial ceding is called "the government of the country's grave diggers" (*ibidem*, p. 134). See also Mircea Mușat, *Drama României Mari*, București, Editura Fundației România Mare, 1992, *passim*.

<sup>242</sup> Mircea Mușat, Ion Ardeleanu, *România după Marea Unire*, III/2, p. 1137.

<sup>243</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 1159-1160.

<sup>244</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 1137. Hitler answered on July 15, 1940 (*ibidem*, pp. 1162-1164), and Carol II on July 26, 1940 (*ibidem*, pp. 1167-1171).

<sup>245</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 1147-1148.

<sup>246</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 1175-1187.

<sup>247</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 1187; *The Ciano Diaries*, p. 279.

<sup>248</sup> Andreas Hillgruber, ed., *Les entretiens secrets de Hitler*, p. 174 (the minute of A. Hitler's meeting with I. Gigurtu and M. Manoilescu, Berghof, July 26, 1940).

<sup>249</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 177.

<sup>250</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 178.

<sup>251</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 179.

<sup>252</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 181.

<sup>253</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 181, note e.

<sup>254</sup> Franz Halder, *Voennii dnevnik*, t. 2, pp. 116-118.

<sup>255</sup> See details in: Aurică Simion, *Dictatul de la Viena*, second edition, revised and completed, București, Editura Albatros, 1996, *passim*; Mihail Manoilescu, *Dictatul de la Viena. Memorii. Iulie-august 1940*, edition of Valeriu Dinu, București, Editura Enciclopedică, 1991, *passim*; Valeriu Pop, *Bătălia pentru Ardeal*, edition of Sanda Pop, Nicolae C. Nicolescu, București, Editura Enciclopedică, 1992, *passim*.

<sup>256</sup> In the memorandum sent to Hitler in September 1943, Marshal Antonescu examined the circumstances in which the dictate from August 30, 1940 "came into being": the ensuring of Germany's military objectives, first by creating the Szeckler corridor, which "descended towards the Romanian oil" (apud Vasile Arimia, Ion Ardeleanu, Ștefan Lache, eds., *Antonescu-Hitler. Corespondență și întâlniri inedite (1940-1944)*, II, p. 108).

<sup>257</sup> Cf. Aurică Simion, *Dictatul de la Viena*, pp. 317-318; Mircea Mușat, *Drama României Mari*, p. 149.

<sup>258</sup> Cf. Andreas Hillgruber, ed., *Les entretiens secrets de Hitler*, p. 319.

<sup>259</sup> Prince Michael Sturdza, *The Suicide of Europe. Memoirs of...*, Boston-Los Angeles, Western Islands Publishers, 1968, pp. 171-174.

<sup>260</sup> Constantin I. Kirițescu, *România în al doilea război mondial*, I, p. 157 and the following; Paul D. Quinlan, *The Playboy King. Carol II of Romania*, Westport-London, Greenwood Press, 1995, pp. 208-218; Mircea Mușat, *Drama României Mari*, pp. 234-236.

<sup>261</sup> See Gh. Buzatu, *România și războiul mondial din 1939-1945*, pp. 16-17.