

## Peace Versus War in the Contemporary Age and in the International Relations' Theories

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In the current state of the growing of the human sciences of any kind, including historical ones, and of their bounding it has become almost an axiom the fact of appealing to a science that can easily be inferred from this enumeration, that is sociology, founded around the 50's of the XIX-th century by the French Auguste Comte, which, as seen from its title and definition studies the very totality of the interhuman relations. If the subject of international relations, appeared around the middle of the next century, the XX-th, can be included among sciences, despite some controversies which have continued until almost nowadays, then, logically one of its methods of analysis, keeping therefore the scientific and empiric research instrument, it is based on sociology.

Nevertheless, the international relations had become an university department, shortly after First World War (1914-1918), for starters at Aberystwyth (Wales), when, on one hand, the new geopolitical reality of the world regarding the increase of the international arena players (states), and, on the other hand, by trying to find some truthful explications regarding the causes of the great conflagration from which mankind had just escaped, the study of these relations became directly necessary. The theoretical studies were based on a science which was at its peak, history, but also on other complementary ones: international law, diplomacy, philosophy etc.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, after the setting of its identity and subject, sociology found itself in a stage of experiments and adjustments, already at the beginning of the second decade of the XX-th century, Max Weber published a book that has become emblematic since then, *The Protestant*

*Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. And, in 1929, The Annales School began its activity through Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch, being "responsible" for the changing of the historical paradigm by introducing new approaches: economical, social and regarding mentalities. What is to be noticed, in this context are the initiatives of the interwar Romanian school of sociology, authors like Dimitrie Gusti, Traian Herseni, Henri Stahl etc., didn't find themselves on another level or in another setting, many of their assumptions being taken over in that age or appearing in the later Western works, facts that allowed the synchronization of the Romanian social science with the European one.

However, the new school of international relations, totally outstripping the old diplomatic practices which, according to its investigations, had fatally led at the breaking out of the First World War, centred round exactly on the sharp criticism of these policies: the increase of power and of the potential of power, the power balance, the exaggerated promotion of the national interest, including through the creation of offensive alliances or the practice of secret diplomacy. Having all these in consideration, which areas of the foreign policies did the interwar specialists insist upon? Indeed, they didn't have to do anything but unconditionally promoting the liberal ideas, which have been circulating in that age even since during the war, as a result of being put forward by the American president (democrat) Woodrow Wilson, and which found themselves in the constitution principles of the League of Nations Pact, signed at Versailles-Paris in 1919.<sup>2</sup> That is why, these liberal ideas have

been called "wilsonian" or "idealistic", precisely because their preponderant pacifist feature, being borrowed from the American home policy. At the same time, other specialists consider them too utopic regarding their transposition in reality, especially regarding the attempt of elimination the war from the international life (nonetheless, in the League of Nations Pact was laid down its existence, but only after the crossing, as a preliminary, of about nine months of negotiations between sides and/or other third parties). Moreover, the presence of the League of Nations was steted as being in the centre of international relations, which were based on cooperation both through the "power" of world opinion's moral force – completely rallied to the Pact's principles –, and also through the alleged settlement by the organization, according to the same Pact, through its members, states, of the possible international conflicts, thus setting up the new system of collective security and attempting the definitive removal of old-power, balance, secret diplomacy policies etc.<sup>3</sup>

As, in spite of this theory or idealistic (liberal) practice not only the elimination of disputes was not successful (the Manchurian, Rhenish, Abyssinian crises), but the devastating experience of World War repeated in an unhoped for and much more severe manner (1939-1945), not for anyone was a surprise the fact that in the academic world and not only, the entire idealistic theory was repudiated, developing a new, "superior", realistic one, by the British Edward Carr (in 1946, through the publishing of *Twenty Years' Crisis*<sup>4</sup>), and especially by Hans Morgenthau (German Jew who emigrated in the United States – through his monumental *Politics Among Nations*,<sup>5</sup> appeared in the same year).<sup>6</sup>

In fact, this realistic theory which seemed to be a new one, had been developed by Carr and Morgenthau by studying the old policies put into practice by states until First World War, from the very beginning of the modern international system, set up by the Westphalic Peace of 1648, a system whose initiator was the French cardinal Richelieu (1624-1642), who put forward the concept of *raison d'État*.<sup>7</sup> In

the same way, another reason that can be brought in favour of this paradigm changing in international relations, in fact, having into account the development and the amplitude these studies knew after Second World War we can somewhat talk about the constitution of international relations science, was announced even since the end of the XIX-th century and the beginning of the XX-th century, at first in Sweden, afterwards spreading in Germany too (within the framework of the Haushofer School), when the bases of the subject of geopolitics were built, therefore it was intended to go back to the power politics. But this latter (semi) science, which rallied on the role played by the geographical space in influencing the political decision in a state, was conceived, quite alike international relations as a matter of fact, not only for putting forward pertinent explanations regarding the involvement of the players in the fundamental changings of the international milieu, but also for forestalling these changings. But as these anticipations were not "translated" into reality, they legitimately started the series of complaints aimed at the so-called sciences. In other words, in international relations (or in other human science) a theory built on the grounds of geopolitics (centred round the study of players), if it is not recognized as a scientific subject, it surely is an useful work method, quite alike the sociological one (centred round relations), or other methods: systemic (centred round structure), historic, analytic, empiric etc., being able to be valid, becoming scientific, as long as it may be verified or confirmed in the future in the reality field, otherwise remaining just a descriptive information, to tell the truth, valuable from the historic point of view.

Despite all these, many of the assumptions of the realistic theory, which from certain angles intersects with geopolitics (or more correctly said the latter can be included as a method of study within the framework of realistic theory), and which because of the relinquishing of the idealistic theory seemed to be confused with the subject of international relations itself, have become not only pertinent devices of international relations analysis, but also valid ones, that can be verified in practice

– in the postwar international relations based upon the bipolar confrontation US-Soviet Union, respectively. But how did Morgenthau define the assumptions of this theory and how were they able to be confirmed by reality? Firstly, by completely subverting the liberal principles, he emphasized in a scientific manner for the first time, the old diplomatic standards of the late XIX-th century dominated by the German *realpolitik*, identifying in analyses a series of stages or valid principles in the state practice of foreign polities. The first of these principles, emphasized again, the state-nation as main player of international relations, whose fundamental goal was the increase through any means of its power and power potential (second principle), having in mind the attainment of national interests with regard to foreign policy: independence, security, sovereign working etc. (third principle). Further on Morgenthau's drawing up, the international milieu in which states were fighting for power was completely anarchical, being able to lead including to their clash since each one of states looked after the maximization of power, that is why, the ingenious mechanism of settlement of their divergent objectives and, therefore, of maintaining postwar peace, was exactly outlined by the policy of the distribution of the balance of power: the more a state would increase too much the power necessary to own interests satisfaction, being liable to use it to the prejudice of others' interests, the more it would become impending the diplomatic coalition of the threatened states in a military alliance meant to discourage the potential aggressor<sup>8</sup> (which thus represented a premise to the NATO setting up and also a peace measure through the despondency of the Soviets).

On the other hand, the context in which Morgenthau developed his theory is known by all of us, as being marked by the starting of the Cold War (1947-1989), without having a classical war declaration, more exactly, when observing the real attempts of spreading of the Soviet influence in Iran and in the Balkans, in 1946, diplomat George Kennan could form a perception as adequate to reality as it gets, by sending to the American Department of State

and publishing in mass-media, in 1946-1947, documents that urged to the *containment* of the Soviet actions, while the old labels concerning Nazi leaders and symbols were now applied to the Soviets.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, considering these Soviet attempts as a menace to America's security interests themselves, the Truman administration not only did it step in by politically and economically endorsing the concealed assaulted countries, but, through the Marshall Plan, preventively offered Western Europe, another area aimed at by the Soviet expansion, a solid financial aid so that the influent local Communist parties which speculated the postwar severe economic situations be diminished, and, at the same time, in order to discourage any possible Soviet invasion. In counterpart to the Soviet intention, dating from 1947-1948, of breaking up at least the Western forces in the Western Berlin, USA and Western Europe states reacted in a way even more firm, by founding in April 1949, in Washington, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), particularly in order to counterbalance Soviets' aggressiveness (they latter had already imposed Communist, pro-Soviet regimes in the occupied countries of Eastern Europe) and to restore the global balance of power,<sup>10</sup> thus the reasoning of the substantiation of realistic theory becoming obviously for all the specialists of the foreign evolutions.

Consequently, all these thoroughly reckoned foreign policies were able to confirm Morgenthau's almost entire political realism theory, the analyst who also found a "philosophical" explanation concerning the domination instinct of human groups, precisely in human's biological side,<sup>11</sup> that is why, can have or have not (!) a rational, scientific feature, moreover, in the absence of other theories, they have been confused with the subject of international relations itself. On the other hand, all the realistic studies, in fact very well argued, have refuted the existence of that contemporary *reality* – irrelevant, in their opinions, as it is subordinated to the idealistic theory –, which must have been taken into account more and more in the international arena, certainly implying the UNO. Indeed,

this new universal organization of sovereign states not only did it facilitate USA and other democratic states' intervention in the stopping another Communist aggression happened in the context of the Korea War (1950-1953),<sup>12</sup> by blocking the extension and the generalization of the hotbed of war, but UNO was endowed, like its forerunner, League of Nations – but at a superior level –, with those economical components (World Bank, IMF), social (ECOSOC, ILO) and cultural (UNESCO), which, if they still were not able to compete with the political dements that were involved in the Cold War confrontation, nevertheless, this didn't mean that they didn't exert a certain pacifist influence in the international system, in order to, subsequently, make room for their impulsion in its centre, as the idealists admitted.

Nonetheless, in the atmosphere of the dreadful bipolar confrontation East-West of the 50's, nobody had the courage to approach such realities, essentially sociological, the realistic theory continuing to dominate the scientific climate, especially in the USA where most of the analysts were massed together, and, simultaneously, trying to provide diplomats those conduct elements able to allow them the knowledge of as many variants of action as it gets in a given situation. And, only from these perspectives the existence of those similitudes between realism and geopolitics can be asserted, or, otherwise said, the integration of the latter in the realistic theory, because geopolitics, besides the object of studying the impact of the space over the politics, is centred on two pure realistic concepts, power and interest respectively, only a third one, players' perception being somewhat different.

Transcending the dispute realism vs. idealism, or these interrealistic shades, merely entering the 60's, a second important debate was put forward regarding the directions as part of the realistic school, this time genuine scientific. On one hand, it was the matter of the influence of the economical and social realities, mentioned above, which were grasped by certain realists, like M. Kaplan, H. Bull and T. Parsons. They conceived *behaviorism*, where

the accent was not put only on the increase of the power of states in the anarchic milieu and on the promotion of national interest of security, but also the development by the players of that behavior that could allow them the obtaining of some complementary results, or even more favourable than in the case of promoting the other two principles. It can easily be established the influence of a beginning of cooperation in the international system, because, if we look back retrospectively the events, there were still players who promoted their interests in the classical, realistic direction. But, similarly, there were other players who also holding the capacity of promoting these classical interests, so having a perception adequate to reality thinking that they would surely obtain them, but the attention towards other areas of the reality, like the home society, wouldn't have urged them to the satisfaction of some immediate doubtful interests, but proving a flexible, strategic behavior would rather choose the stability of the system and the peace.<sup>13</sup> For instance, it is the case of what happened in the Suez crisis, in the fall of 1956, when three main allies of the US Great Britain, France and Israel tried to retrieve through force the Suez Channel from Egypt, which the latter had just nationalized it, but the decided intervention of the US wasn't meant to back the interests of its allies, although in other occasions they would have backed them especially the ones of the Israel; but, this time, thinking with good reason at the Soviets' clear intentions of backing Egypt, the US have almost summoned the three countries to evacuate the Channel.<sup>14</sup>

On the other hand, coming back to the debates which took place in the 60's as part of the theory, it was impossible for the classic partisans of the political realism not to maintain a traditionalist spirit. For example, the French Raymond Aron somehow extended Morgenthau's initial assumptions, in the sense that between the home and foreign politics wouldn't exist any kind of relation, only the foreign politics alone being able to contribute to the exhibition of the power of the state, to the obtaining of its prestige and to the setting in order the international relations.<sup>15</sup>

Notwithstanding, these serious controversies concerning the interrealistic conception, which opposed behavioralists to traditionalists, or the latter to those from geopolitics, have not stopped when entering the 70's, but, on the contrary, they amplified giving birth to other trends, or, more than that, even other theories, that were subject to a real inner crisis of realism, and this one was also amplified by at least three reasons coming from the outside of the theory. First of all, the 70's marked one of the few famous military defeats, if not the only one, of the most important democratic power, USA, where the subject of international relations was asserted and developed, particularly in its great universities: Harvard, Massachusetts, Princeton etc. This is not the place of searching all the causes that led to the American failure in Vietnam – as this is the conflict we're talking about –, but the sociological research have established just an apparent or insufficient developed perspective, that is the legitimate point of view of the American public opinion, overexcited through the impact of mass-media, that surely had the decisive role in the American retreat from Indochina.<sup>16</sup> If these social or sociological implications represented a matter of home politics for the White House administrations, a fact that couldn't have been taken into account by the realistic theorists, especially by the ones belonging to the traditionalistic school, then, the second reason for the reformulation of some of their assumptions was undoubtedly represented by the first effects of the long economical recession which fell upon the world starting with 1973 (the year of another Arabian-Israeli conflict, ended with the almost exponential increase of the oil price on the international market),<sup>17</sup> and this happened after almost three decades of unprecedented boost of economy. The last, but not the least, the third reason was represented by Henry Kissinger's appointment as US president's adviser for national security matters, then as State Department secretary, him being a well-known conservative realist of international relations. This appointment that can seem irrelevant, in fact couldn't remain without any effects among realists, regardless of the trend they would have

belonged to. As Kissinger, besides the fact that he was one of the first important theorists of international relations, thus becoming a probationer of them, but, through a realist, in an age of necessary relaxation of the East-West terms – overloaded with the huge destruction power of nuclear weapons –, usefully contributed, alongside of president Nixon, to the decrease of bipolar tension, by using evidently ...behavioralistic cooperation methods, if not semi-liberal ones, but without abandoning the basic realistic principle of containment.<sup>18</sup> Even the classic realists, who had previously invented the "sum zero game" concept,<sup>19</sup> have become useful to the democratic and strategically American pacifist policy, through the utilization of this concept by the American diplomats in the nuclear disarmament negotiations had with the Soviet persons in charge.

Of course, the development of the these changes made that the complex realities of that time to be fundamentally different of those of the interwar age, when the basis of the liberal theory were built, or of those tense realities of the 40's and the 50's, when political realism was elaborated, but a series of important theorists of the latter didn't take into account the effects of the relaxation and the reasons mentioned above – continuing to think in the classic logic, or searching for other possible, structural causes in the middle or at the extremities of the system.

But, a sure thing is the fact that the analyst who truly revolutionized the way of working out international theories was Immanuel Wallerstein, who started publishing in 1974, in New York, the series of volumes called *The Modern World-System*. Thus, in these works, he offered another approach, a structural one of international relations, close in a way to the School of Annales, exclusively based on the social components doubled by those spatial and temporal of the system centre-semioutskirts-outskirts. What comes out of these volumes? No matter how many negotiations of the liberal conferences will take place, or no matter how many interests promotions, including war like, made by realistic politicians, these cannot and are not able to change the current international

structure established through chains of social relations around the year 1500. According to Wallerstein's structural (systemic) theory, the impossibility of deconstructing the system globally connected through liberal interconnections is due to the discovery of America by the nations of the Western Europe, these ones representing the regions that form the centre of the system. They are followed, like in an image of concentric circles, by the regions of the semi-outskirts (South and East Asia and Eastern Europe nations) and by the ones of the outskirts, but without being necessarily established a principle of the position exchange between them, especially of the ones from the semi-outskirts.<sup>20</sup> In other words, Wallerstein's important theory revealed in fact "the long durations" of history, according to which if in the Ancient and Medieval Ages the human activities were carried on at a local level, on the other hand, in the Modern Ages they interact at a global level, and they are supposed to become more prominent in the next centuries, even if the author doesn't use the general term of "globalization".

The appearance, in actual fact, of the third much more complex and, at the same time, more complete international theory based upon social problems, obviously occurred simultaneously with an international situation which found itself on the brink of changes. Hence, on the grounds of Nixon's and Kissinger's openness, more and more Western companies not only did they want to avoid the effects of the global economy recession announced by the oil shock and by the abandoning of the US the dollar-gold standard (established in 1944, through the Bretton-Woods Agreements<sup>21</sup>), but they were also offered the possibility of orienting towards the finding of solutions through "various capital associations", appearing the great transnational corporations, that, through their activity, determine elusion measure, even if partial, of the state control and accumulate more and more capital (power). Against the background of the stagnation of the behavioralistic trend – that previously had insisted on the interconnection of the home

policy with foreign one –, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, realists at the beginning, perfectly observed the new evolutions and generated the first great breach within the already extended framework of their theory, formulating the new theory of *complex interdependence*, by publishing the book *Power and Interdependence*, in 1977. Being inspired by the economical theories, the two authors included in their paradigm the multiplicity of the causal factors that are acting at an international level, taking both some close to the realistic theory concepts, such as the general balance of power and its application, and especially the factors related to the liberal theory, that is the pattern of international organization and the economical and technological process. Even if, in this way, they didn't totally abandon the realistic thought, but through the concessions made to the liberal idealists, at least formally, they restored that school, by understanding through complex interdependence the channels that connect the societies: the inter- and transnational relations (players-corporations) and the varied use of force by the state-players depending on situations.<sup>22</sup>

As a reaction towards this refreshing of liberalism, even if partial, but also towards the identity crisis which characterized the classic realistic theory, in 1979, Kenneth Waltz published the work *Theory of International Politics*,<sup>23</sup> through which not only did he want to defend the theory and the subject of international relations in front of the rise of the social and economical sciences, reminding of Morgenthau's *Politics among Nations*, but he built the foundations of another scientific paradigm *neorealism*, that could use the purposes of Reagan administrations in the taking again of the harsh confrontation with the USSR, at the beginning of the 80's. But what did the neorealistic theory bring new comparatively speaking with the classic one conceived by Morgenthau? Generally speaking, this controversial work didn't bring too many innovations, indeed, Waltz analyzing in a new formula the traditionalistic, "materialistic" concepts of the states' politics: the anarchy of the international system, the

power and balance of power, adding just a economical pattern based methodology, and finally comparing the balance of power with the individualistic laws of the market.<sup>24</sup>

Even if, despite the little revisions, the neorealistic theory seems anchored still in the past, however, the appearance of all these new theories, even reformulated, didn't do anything else than preparing the ground for the development of international studies in the 80's and the 90's, in the new particular international context, almost exclusively liberal generated by the fall of communism, and marked by the continuation of the economical and social interdependencies and by diffusion of power of that classic national states to other transnational players: economical, organizational, mediatical. This new transnational global vitality, that is located mainly in the US, the host country at UNO structures, but also in countries, is permanently fed with the capital streams invested in "the third-world" recently decolonized countries, but -also in more developed, former communist regions; these facts being shown also in the analyses of theorists. Moreover, trying to offer most adequate explanations and potential solutions for surpassing difficulties and crisis as well, they have started not to follow anymore the already superficial demarcation established for the methodologies and basic concepts of the three main theories, but they often borrow syntagm from rival theories, or, from case to case, reject the terms of their own theories, this happening according to their redefined conceptions.

We are now, thus, witnessing not only the converging point of some once irreducible posttheories or paradigm of international relations: neorealistic (now, also called neoconservative), liberal (or, after the amplitude of current nonclassic reshaping, neoliberal) and structural (neomarxist), but also the conceptual interpenetration of what is still left clotted in each of them (thus, a traditional controversy is nowadays present between neoconservative Samuel P. Huntington<sup>25</sup> and neoliberal Francis Fukuyama,<sup>26</sup> or another one between partisans

of globalization and those of regionalization). But we are not too much mistaken if we consider every present-day theorists as the banner of his own scientific approach. On such theoretical defined background the future international relations will surely evolve, some based on peace, understanding and cooperation between the democratic capitalist players (the developed, former communist states, transnational companies), regulated under mutual agreements, and other based on tensions or even conflicts likely to continue, as nowadays reality clearly prove, on the relation East-West (the open antiterrorist wars in Afghanistan and Iraq), but all these must be governed by the UNO Charter, that keeps its actuality.

And for exemplifying these new realities we will just present, in the closing part of this essay, some of the assumptions of a very interesting work *The Retreat of the State*, written by a contemporary theorist of international relations, Susan Strange. Right from the beginning of the book, she points out than "the territorial borders don't coincide anymore with the extension or the limits of the political authority exercised on economy or society". Further on, the author identifies four substructural forces of the world society: security, credit, knowledge and production, each and every one exceeding, therefore, the borders. From all of these, the State authority governs only the security force, although speaking in terms of percentage the real power of state increased, having 60% revenue from the brut gross national product, as opposed to about 30% a century ago (thus, we can draw the conclusion concerning the duration continuity of this kind of players), the retreat of the state being a qualitative one, not a quantitative. Thus, the state still offers security, work and education conditions, administrative and juridical control, and regarding international organizations control, these are generally national rule tools of the dominant states.<sup>27</sup>

Consequently, there are sufficient reasons with regard to the theoretical connections between the different paradigms debated by these contemporary authors, that is why, a good

and thorough schooling of our country's diplomatic personnel, that must commit themselves either to the democratic peace core or to the hard core of a still possible war, requires a feature of all these recently – become

– complementary theories, and that are easier and better to be acquired only through the knowledge of basic classic and nonclassic concepts, the reason of the present study.

#### NOTES:

<sup>1</sup> Stefano Guzzini, *Realism și relații internaționale, Povestea fără sfârșit a unei morți anunțate: realismul în relațiile internaționale și în economia politică internațională*, Iași, Institutul European, 2000, pp. 36, 45.

<sup>2</sup> Martin Wright, *Politica de putere*, București, Editura ARC, 1998, pp. 212-215.

<sup>3</sup> Stefano Guzzini, *quoted work*, pp. 46, 48-51; see also Constantin Bușe, Gheorghe Bădescu, *Relații internaționale în acte și documente*, București, Editura Didactică și Pedagogică, 1974, vol. I (1917-1939), pp. 16-25.

<sup>4</sup> See Edward H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, London, Macmillan, 1946, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn.

<sup>5</sup> See Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York, Knopf, 1948.

<sup>6</sup> See also Stefano Guzzini, *q. w.*, pp. 47, 53-56.

<sup>7</sup> Henry Kissinger, *Diplomatia*, București, Editura BIC ALL, 2003, pp. 15, 20, 50-57.

<sup>8</sup> Martin Wright, *q. w.*, pp. 176-193; see also Stefano Guzzini, *q. w.*, pp. 31, 60-62, 65-71.

<sup>9</sup> Henry Kissinger, *q. w.*, pp. 389, 393-395, 398-400.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 395-398, 401-404.

<sup>11</sup> Stefano Guzzini, *q. w.*, pp. 63-64.

<sup>12</sup> Henry Kissinger, *q. w.*, pp. 417-429; see also Martin Wright, *q. w.*, pp. 233-236.

<sup>13</sup> Stefano Guzzini, *q. w.*, pp. 35, 75-85, 94-97.

<sup>14</sup> Henry Kissinger, *q. w.*, pp. 457-476.

<sup>15</sup> Stefano Guzzini, *q. w.*, pp. 32, 101-103.

<sup>16</sup> Henry Kissinger, *q. w.*, pp. 585-599; for other details, see further *Ibidem*, pp. 600-611.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 642-644.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 615-617, 619-621, 624-631, 641, 645-662.

<sup>19</sup> Stefano Guzzini, *q. w.*, pp. 83, 129-131, 187-188.

<sup>20</sup> Immanuel Wallerstein, *Sistemul mondial modern, Mercantilism și consolidarea economiei mondiale europene 1600-1750*, București, Editura Meridiane, 1993, vol. IV, pp. 5-61. The rest of volumes were published, in translation, by the same publishing house, starting with 1991.

<sup>21</sup> Stefano Guzzini, *q. w.*, pp. 269-270.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 215-219.

<sup>23</sup> See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, The McGraw Hill Companies, Inc., 1979.

<sup>24</sup> Stefano Guzzini, *q. w.*, pp. 213, 233, 237-246, 251-267.

<sup>25</sup> See Samuel P. Huntington, *Ciocnirea civilizațiilor și refacerea ordinii mondiale (The Clash Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order)*, Oradea, Editura Antet, 1998.

<sup>26</sup> See also Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York, The Free Press A Division of MacMillan, Inc., 1992.

<sup>27</sup> Susan Strange, *Retragerea statului, Difuziunea puterii în economia mondială (The Retreat of the State. The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy)*, București, Editura Trei, 2002, p. 7-15.