

Turkey and European Union

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Located between Asia and Europe, constituting a bridge between different cultures and religions, Turkey has been trying for decades to find a peaceful co-existence between Islam and democracy and regards itself as a European country and a model for other countries with Islamic populations.

If Europe were to be defined purely by geography then Turkey, who lies southeast of the traditional borderline of the Dardanelles-Bosphorus ribbon of water linking the Aegean and Black Seas, would not be included. Turkey is however part of the Europe of ideas. Brian Beedham points out in *The Economist* that for two-thirds of the last 2500 years Turkey has been a political, economic and cultural extension of Europe. After 1453 contacts with Europe continued, often in the form of clashes between European states and the Ottoman Empire. In 1856 Turkey was welcomed as a European Power when it fought alongside Britain and France in the Crimean War, and was brought into the Concert of Europe. So even if in this period Turkey was domestically Asian, her foreign policy was directed at Europe. The greatest change occurred in the 1920s with the Westernisation of Turkey as a formal and fundamental policy under Kemal Attaturk¹.

Through a carefully calculated series of reforms in the 1920's and 1930's Mustafa Kemal Ataturk attempted to move his people away from their Ottoman and Muslim past. The basic principles or "six arrows" of Kemalism were populism, republicanism, nationalism, secularism, statism, and reformism. Rejecting the idea of a multinational empire, Kemal aimed to produce a homogeneous nation state, expelling and killing Armenians and Greeks in the process.

He then deposed the sultan and established a Western type republican system of political authority. He abolished the caliphate, the central source of religious authority, ended the traditional education and religious ministries, abolished the separate religious school and colleges, established a unified secular system of public education, and did away with the religious courts that applied Islamic law, replacing them with a new legal system based on the Swiss civil code. He also replaced the traditional calendar with the Gregorian calendar and formally disestablished Islam as the state religion. Emulating Peter the Great, he prohibited use the fez because it was a symbol of religious traditionalism, encouraged people to wear hats, and decreed that Turkish would be written in Roman rather than Arabic script².

Turkey thus became a secular state just like any other European country, the difference being the population is predominantly Islamic rather than Christian.

Since 1945, and in the context of the cold war, Ankara's foreign policy priority has been to achieve affiliation with and membership of western institutions as the external policy expression of this westernizing orientation.

Turkey joined the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development in 1948, the Council of Europe in 1949, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952, became an associate member of the European Economic Community in 1963, applied for full membership of the EU in 1987, and in January 1996 entered into a customs union with the EU.

During the cold war, Turkey played a crucial role on the southern-eastern flank of NATO.

NATO membership and strategic sponsorship by the United States were seen as vital, both by Ankara and by its western allies, for a country that lay on the southern flank of the Soviet Union, controlled egress from and access to the Black Sea, and linked Europe to (or insulated it from) the oil-rich and crisis-prone Middle East. The West's readiness to envelope Turkey into its institutional structures served to further encourage Ankara in its commitment to pursue this western path in its diplomatic prioritisation. In cold war Europe, the very idea of the 'West' and even of 'Europe' had rather loosely come to mean NATO members and other free-market states, in contrast to the excluded communist 'East'. In this way, Islamic and economically semi-developed Turkey found itself in the West, and affiliated to a raft of European institutions, whilst eastern Germany, Poland, the Baltic States, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the like were banished to the 'East'. In much of every day political, analytical, and journalistic language and discourse, strategic relationships had usurped civilizational factors as the determinant of 'fault lines' across the European continent³.

The disintegration of Soviet Union pointed out the strategic importance of Turkey.

After the Cold War, the Turkish elite remained overwhelmingly supportive of being Western and European. Sustained NATO membership is for them indispensable because it provides an intimate organizational tie with the West and is necessary to balance Greece⁴. So, Turkey's foreign policy has focused to find new strategies to guard against its possible isolation from the emerging economic and political institutions of Europe and to reassert its importance as a regional power.

Having applied for E.U. membership far earlier than any of the states in the East and Central Europe, Turkey remains a special case who rises a series of questions, not only about the direct effects and costs of enlargement, but also about the fundamental eligibility criteria on European Union. The first requirement to be considered in the enlargement process is to be European.

Some Turkish commentators have expressed their worries that the eventual acceptance of Turkish membership will be a political decision. That means the fact that the decision it will depend not only on progress made by Ankara, but also on the political preferences of EU member governments at the moment of choice. It is believed that the E.U.'s decision will be more about its own identity and its own future than the eligibility of Turkey.

Discussion of Turkey's suitability for full membership has always centered on whether Turkey fulfils the basic eligibility criteria of being a European state.⁵

The Rome Treaty stated that "any European State may apply to become a member". In 1992 the European Commission gave a vague definition of this concept, saying, "it combines geographical, historical, and cultural elements"⁶. But no formal definition of "European" has yet been offered. As for Turkey, its eligibility for membership is noted by the Commission's Opinion in 1989 on the Turkish application, as well as the Presidency Conclusions in all European Council summits regarding enlargement.

Since the accession agreement signed in 1963, Turkey's declared goal has been full E.U. membership and in 1987 she applied for this. The text of the 1963 agreement explicitly gives Turkey the legal right to expect to become a full member. Walter Hallstein, the President of European Commission, with the occasion of the conclusion of the Ankara Agreement, stated that "Turkey belongs to Europe".

Turkey's eligibility has been formally reconfirmed in *Agenda 2000*, but it did not recommend commencement of accession negotiations or the initiation of pre-accession strategies. At the European Council's Helsinki meeting in December 1999, Turkey was accepted, officially, as a candidate for EU membership. Candidacy status (as distinct from membership itself) is seen as important because it confirms Turkey's identity as a European state. Thus, in his statement in Helsinki welcoming the decision to grant candidate status, Prime Minister Ecevit

asserted that 'full membership of the European Union is Turkey's birthright by virtue of Turkey's historical development, its geography, and its present day attributes as well as the provisions of the 1963 Association Agreement'⁷.

In addition to being European, there are certain conditions to be fulfilled for membership, known as the "Copenhagen criteria" because were adopted at European Council Summit in Copenhagen in June 1993.⁸ All candidate countries must satisfy these criteria in order to qualify for membership of the EU and in 1999 Helsinki European Council decided to apply these criteria to Turkey as well.

This paper proposes to analyse the Turkey's history with the EU, its ability in meeting the Copenhagen criteria, the role of Turkish-Greek relations on Turkey's relations with the EU, the EU's institutional set-up, as well as the role of public opinion towards the enlargement process, especially towards Turkey's membership.

The first step on the European accession's road was made after the Greece's application, on 31 July 1959 when the Turkish government asked the European Economic Community to enter into negotiations to them about an Association Agreement. The request has based on political and economics reasons, largely as a response to the Greek application (Greece had applied to the European Community on 15 May 1959). Turkey's export products were very similar to those of Greece. Turkey feared that a probable Greek integration into the European market could diminish the Turkish exports, which were already quite weak at that time.

But one of the major economic motives leading Turkey to opt for an economic relation with European Communities was the difficulty to find new financial sources. Turkey, faced with the problems in obtaining new credits from the United States, saw European Communities, at the time, as a new and strong financial centre to give her new credits. Turkey believed that establishing a new type of economic integration with European Communities, which would transcend a simple type of economic relation, could assure her

some advantageous position in that prospected financial relationship⁹.

Despite the Turkish economy backwardness, the European Community started to develop models to prepare Turkey for economic integration. This positive approach from the Six can be explained in the context of the Cold War, common perception of the Soviet threat and the strategic importance of Turkey.

The EEC's response to Turkey's application was to suggest the establishment of an association until Turkey's circumstances permitted its accession. The ensuing negotiations resulted in the signature of the Agreement Creating an Association between the Republic of Turkey and the European Economic Community (known as the "Ankara Agreement") on 12 September 1963. This agreement, which entered into force on 1 December 1964, aimed at securing Turkey's full membership in the EEC through the establishment in three phases of a customs union, which would serve as an instrument to bring about integration between the EEC and Turkey¹⁰.

The agreement was less generous than that with Greece, reflecting alarm, particularly in France and Italy, about both economic and political identity issues. It has the longest association with the European Union among the candidate countries.

The Ankara Agreement was supplemented by an Additional Protocol in 1970 which it stipulated a transitional stage prior to Customs Union. It was signed on 23 November 1970 and came into force on 1 January 1973, establishing a timetable of technical measures to be taken to attain the objective of the customs union within a period of 22 years.¹¹

The Turkish invasion of Cyprus created new obstacles, particularly when it became clear that Greece was likely to join the EC. By 1976 the Association Agreement was in trouble, and in 1978 Turkey formally requested an effectively finished off by the 1980 military coup. Even after the restoration of democracy in 1983, it proved difficult to reactivate¹².

The economic dynamics of Turkey-European Community relations in the first

phase of the relations were quite weak, resulting from the structural problems of the Turkish economy. Both sides to the Ankara Agreement saw the unrealistic economic targets of this agreement. However, they were very willing to go ahead with Turkey's eventual full-membership to the European Community. This observation was shared by the two contracting parties. The strong determination in developing the relationship and extending integration bearing pretentious aims has been shaped by political dynamics rather than economic. The initial economic difficulties of Turkey and its agriculture-titled economic structure, plus Turkey's unilateral suspension of legal obligations following the oil crisis have shown quite clearly that the economic dynamics were not the principal determinant of the first phase of the relations¹³.

The beginning of the 1980's was marked by the adoption of structural adjustment policies for Turkey in the field of economics. The Demirel Government drafted the 24 January 1980 Programme for the realization of an outward-oriented free market economy, as a conclusion of external pressures. The full implementation of these policies was realized by the Özal Government, which came to power following the 1983 elections.

During the first year of the programme, almost all price controls were abolished and agricultural price supports and input subsidies were gradually reduced¹⁴. Financial-sector reforms and the encouragement of foreign direct investment were the mayor supplementary measures. A mechanism was introduced in 1985 to allow the markets to set interest rates. This structural adjustment policy has contributed to the opening up of the Turkish economy into the world competition.

The Özal government formally applied for full membership on 14th April 1987.

Preoccupied with its Internal Market plans and the Single European Act, the EC found the application an unwelcome embarrassment. The Commission's Opinion, which took thirty months to prepare (18 December 1989), gave a strongly negative response to the application. Whilst reaffirming the principle that no enlargement could take place before 1993,

following completion of the Single European Market, the Opinion, in any case, listed a number of formidable economic obstacles to Turkish membership, all of which posed fundamental challenges to the classical enlargement method¹⁵.

Thus, the European Commission pointed out the substantial development gap between the Community and Turkey, the low level of productivity and incomes, severe major structural disparities, in agriculture and industry, macro-economic imbalances, high levels of industrial protectionism, human rights problems. The level of unemployment still represented a cause for concern and the rapid population growth has been identified as one of the more serious obstacles to economic development. The dispute between Turkey and Greece had also a significant role in that negative decision¹⁶.

The Commission's opinion in 1989 rejected the application on the grounds that it would be "inappropriate" to consider at that time. As an alternative to Turkish accession, the Commission recommended that the long delayed customs union with Turkey will be speedily completed. The European Council accepted this recommendation on 3 February 1990 and rejected Turkey's application.

Several major studies of Turkey's industrial competitiveness were undertaken in support of its membership application. The Economic Development Foundation, a non-governmental organization that represents the Turkish private sector vis-à-vis the European Union, acting as the expert institution on EU affairs and Turkey-EU relations, declared that 75% of Turkish industry would be capable of withstanding international competition. It argued that, of the fifty-three industrial sectors studied, only fifteen, representing 22% of industrial output, would be in a weak financial position. But the size of Turkey's agricultural sector would pose enormous challenges to the CAP. Full integration would increase the EC's agricultural land area by 22% and nearly double the agricultural force¹⁷. Over 50 per cent of the Turkish workforce was in agriculture, as compared with 7 per cent in the EU.

In spite of this set back, the Community and Turkey negotiated to enter into the final stage of the Association; the European Commission recommended the completion of the Customs Union by 1995. The negotiations for a customs union agreement with Turkey have been controversial and, finally, it came into operation on 1 January 1996.

The Customs Union not only brings Turkey into line with EU trade legislation in the areas of import and export duties and common external tariffs, it also harmonizes Turkey's competition legislation with that of the EU. Since the introduction of the Customs Union Turkey has effectively been part of the EU single market. However, not all sectors of the Turkish economy are included in the Customs Union. For example, agriculture is excluded from the agreement. Early in 1998 a farm trade agreement between Turkey and the EU into force but this does not amount to an extension of the single market¹⁸. Currently, Turkey is the only country who established customs union but not a full member.

Since 1995 the trade flows between the two partners has increased significantly in favour of the EU. European Union exports to Turkey increased from \$15.8 billion in 1995 to \$24 billion in 1997. Imports to the EU from Turkey increased from \$10.7 billion in 1995 to \$12 billion in 1997. Turkey's trade deficit with the EU rose from \$5 billion in 1995 to \$11.8 billion in 1997¹⁹. Also, Turkey was obligated to provide preferential access to its markets to all countries to which the EU grants preferential access. These countries include Central and Eastern European countries with whom EU had association agreement, EFTA countries, Mediterranean countries that are covered by the Mediterranean Policy of the EU, and African and Pacific countries included in the Lomé convention.

Turkey, via the Customs Union, has been accepted as an economic partner in the single market, but at the same time was excluded from the range of projects that were design to underpin the common market and even there was not a pre-accession strategy for Turkey at that time.

One of the delicate problems was the Cyprus issue. The Nicosia (Greek) government of this divided island made its application for EU membership in 1990. Although the Turkish

government and the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash declared that this application did not apply to the northern part of the island, Brussels not only decided to begin processing it – in contrast with its treatment of Ankara's application – but at its 1990 Dublin summit the Community declared that future relations with Turkey would depend on Ankara adopting a more cooperative stance on the Cyprus issue.

The new Demirel government, which strongly supported Özal's goal of joining the EC, was disappointed in 1992 when the EC agreed to consider membership applications from Austria, Finland, Norway, and Sweden without making a decision on Turkey's long-standing application. By then it seemed obvious that the EC was reluctant to act on Turkey's application. In fact, most EC members objected to full Turkish membership for a variety of economic, social, and political reasons. To make matters appear even worse from a Turkish perspective, the eleventh officially recognized candidacy of (Greek) Cyprus.

In December 1997, when the Luxembourg European Council decided to open accession negotiations with five Central and East European countries as well as Cyprus, it also indicated that Turkey, while eligible for accession, was not yet ready for it.

Deeply affronted because the EU had deemed it less worthy of accession than countries like Bulgaria and Romania, Turkey retaliated by freezing its official ties with the EU. More ominously, Turkey threatened to block progress on the reunification of Cyprus unless the EU reconsidered Turkey's candidacy and to integrate the TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) into Turkey if the EU opened accession negotiations with only the (southern) Cypriot government. Intended as a celebration of European unity on the eve of new enlargement negotiations, the inaugural European Conference, held in London in March 1998, was marred by Turkey's absence²⁰.

Ankara suspended political dialogue with Brussels and the Turkish government also began wondering out loud about the purpose of a customs union with the EU if it were not linked to a genuine prospect of full membership, as now seemed to be the case. Essentially, Ankara's post-Luxembourg position was that it was up to Brussels to make

amends, and unconditionally. At the same time, many Turks – including Motherland Party leader Mesut Yilmaz – began questioning whether pursuit of the country's traditional European aspirations was worth the humiliation that it seemed to entail²¹.

Commenting on Ankara's decision not to attend the European Conference in March, EU Commission Spokesman said that the absence of Turkey would diminish the importance of the conference. German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel stressed that Turkey was a part of the European family and criticized the Turkish government for its harsh reactions to the decisions that emerged at the EU Luxembourg Summit. On the other hand, representatives of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), a partner of the coalition government on power in Germany, voiced their satisfaction over the Luxembourg decisions. European papers gave extensive coverage to Turkey's decision to withdraw its application for EU membership and described this move as "shocking". In a statement to the noted "New York Times" newspaper, Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz said that the EU was trying to set up a new "Berlin Wall" in Europe. According to Yilmaz, the real factor that influenced the EU decision to exclude Turkey from the EU enlargement process for the time being was religious discrimination. The Turkish Prime Minister pointed out that the EU would bear the main responsibility for the deterioration in the process for resolving the Cyprus issue. Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit said that the Turkish decision to limit political dialogue with Europe has worried EU leaders²².

Washington too expressed its unhappiness with the EU's treatment of this strategically important NATO member. The Clinton administration criticized the European Union, which assumed a discriminative stance against Turkey during the Luxembourg summit and wants Turkey not to take hasty decisions regarding the future of the country and the region. The Spokesman of the US State Department, James Foley, said: "We believe that Turkey's place is in Europe"²³.

Ankara felt that its cold war contribution to the western alliance should have earned the

right to special consideration. Many in Europe, on the other hand, now wondered openly whether a semi-developed Islamic country could in fact be regarded as European – the boundaries to the new Europe had to be set somewhere, after all – and also whether, post-cold war, Turkey's strategic significance was now so compelling²⁴.

Following the request of the Luxembourg European Council, the European Commission adopted on 4 March 1998 its *Communication on a European Strategy for Turkey* which contained the approximation of legislation and the adoption of the *acquis*, extending the customs union to the service sector and agriculture, a closer cooperation between the EU and Turkey.

A significant change took place at the Cardiff EC summit in 15-16 June 1998 when this strategy was welcomed. The Council stated the Commission's intention to reflect on ways and means of underpinning the implementation of the European strategy, and to table appropriate proposals to this effect. In September 1998 the Commission and Turkey met to discuss the implementation of the European Strategy and in October 1998 a financial support package²⁵. On 21 October 1998, the Commission presented two draft regulations to provide funding for the European strategy of EUR 150 million over three years from 1999. It sent a signal to Ankara that the EU commitments to Turkey regarding the Customs Union would be honoured. Under the Commission's proposal ECU 135 million of EU aid would be granted under a clause, which gives Turkey the status of a developing country.

Even so, it wasn't enough to persuade Ankara to lift its boycott of political dialogue with Brussels. The prospects for an improvement in the situation also increased with the shift in a number of EU states from Christian to social democratic governments, most notably in Germany. Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's government was determined to do whatever it could to rescue Turkish-EU relations, and was greatly assisted in this by a letter sent to Schroeder in May 1999 by Ecevit²⁶. Drafted by Turkish and German

officials, the letter outlined Turkey's commitment to implement domestic reforms that would enable the country to meet the Copenhagen criteria. The letter also expressed Ankara's awareness of Turkey's singularity, and the consequent requirement for a pre-accession 'road map' that would take account of its special situation²⁷.

Armed with this reaffirmation of Turkey's commitment and determination, Germany used its presidency to insert the Turkish question into the agenda of the EC's Cologne meeting in 3-4 June 1999. The best that Germany's endeavors could manage in a gathering largely dominated by the Kosovo crisis was a commitment by the EC to revisit the Turkish case at Helsinki in December. Only Greece, Sweden and Italy opposed the German draft at Cologne²⁸.

Another factor has played an important role in the relations between Turkey and Germany. The recognition by the new Deutsche government of the fact that Germany is an immigration country with a multicultural society led to the new citizenship law. That stipulates the fact that the German citizenship shall no longer merely be based on the *jus sanguinis* principle, but must incorporate elements of the *jus soli* principle, as well.

This positive attitude continued in October when the European Commission recommended the candidate status and the European Parliament adopted a generally encouraging resolution on Turkish accession.

Ankara made clear that it would be satisfied with nothing less than the unconditional granting of candidate status. "Turkey cannot accept candidate status...if as a condition the start of entry talks is linked to irrelevant political subjects such as Cyprus. They (EU) may offer a special candidacy status setting no schedule for the start of entrance talks but instead conditions. Such a proposal will bring us back to the 1963 agreement," said Sukru Sina Gurel, minister in charge of ties with Cyprus²⁹. But Turkey was not entirely confident about the European consensus.

Part of the explanation for Ankara's caution lay in the controversy surrounding the

fate of the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, who had been arrested by Turkish security forces earlier in the year in circumstances that provoked considerable anger in Turkey in the face of the behaviour of some EU members, notably Greece, Italy and Germany. German Ambassador Hans-Joachim Vergau stated at Ege University that Turkey must find a democratic solution to the Kurdish problem and pointed out that the EU is against the death penalty and is seeking to have it banned in all member countries. The German ambassador told Turkey it could forget about the Helsinki summit if it executes Ocalan³⁰.

Some European countries' diplomatic representatives based in Ankara told the Turkish Daily News (TDN) that this decision was not a good step before the upcoming Helsinki Summit. A senior diplomat from the British Embassy drew attention to the timing of the decision saying: "It is very interesting that the decision was declared before the Helsinki Summit. I think it would have been better for Turkish officials to have waited until after the Helsinki Summit. There was no need to put the Ocalan case back on the front burner at a time when the European countries are concentrating on enlargement issues, including the issue of Turkey." The senior diplomat added, however, that the Turkish Court of Appeals' decision would not create any obstacles for Turkey's membership because there were many other processes before the execution could take place. A senior EU official in Ankara also told the TDN that they expected the Turkish government to wait for the decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). "We are against the death penalty and this is not because he is Abdullah Ocalan. We are not friends of Ocalan. It is a general point of view", said the EU official. "If the United States had applied for EU membership, we would have requested them to abolish the death penalty as well" the EU diplomat said³¹.

As Helsinki approached, it became clear that Turkey's chances of becoming a candidate would be scuppered were Ocalan's death sentence upheld. However, the delay in confirmation of the death penalty, and the

hints emanating from Ankara that the government not only opposed it but might put the issue before the European Court of Human Rights – particularly in the event that Turkey be granted accession status at Helsinki. In mid-January 2000, following the successful outcome in Helsinki, Ankara did indeed put Ocalan's fate before the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg³².

At the European Council summit held in Helsinki on 11-12 December 1999, Turkey was granted candidate status to the European Union and recognized as a candidate member. That means it will be treated like any other candidate country: it will be judged on the basis of the same criteria. Accession negotiations will commence only when Turkey has fulfilled the political criteria: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law, respect for human rights as well as respect for and protection of minorities. The Council decisions integrated Turkey into the Community programs and agencies, and moreover, allow its participation in meetings between candidate States and the Union in the context of the accession process. Also, it was set that the earliest date when negotiations on Turkish membership could begin will be the end of 2004.

This delay was the effect of the Aegean dispute between Turkey and Greece and the summit urged 'candidate states to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border dispute' via direct negotiations (Ankara's preference), or the dispute should be brought before the International Court of Justice (Athens' preference).

Ankara initially interpreted this as both a deadline by which the dispute must be resolved, and an indication that resolution of the Aegean dispute with Greece constituted a precondition before accession negotiations could begin. In fact, the Turks had insisted throughout that they would accept no conditions and that Turkey be treated on an equal basis with other applicants. Accordingly, the Turkish response to the drafting was cool in the extreme. What followed was an intense bout of diplomacy aimed at persuading Ankara to accept the terms of the offer.

Telephone calls were received from the German and French leaders, and from Clinton too, who it seems agreed with the Turks that the offer was flawed but argued that it was the best that would be devised at that moment³³.

The United States was also not completely satisfied with the wording of the candidacy invitation, but Clinton told Ecevit that the obstacles imposed were not so large that they would be impossible to overcome³⁴.

A European delegation was sent from the Helsinki summit to Ankara, headed by the EU's foreign policy High Representative Javier Solana and the Commissioner for Enlargement Gunter Verheugen. Never before had two of the Union's top diplomats been sent to a would-be candidate in order to save the process. In addition, Ecevit received a letter from his Finnish counterpart Paavo Lipponen representing the EC's presidency, which sought to reassure him that the offer was neither conditional nor an ultimatum. Ecevit finally accepted the wording, and agreed to fly to Helsinki – which he had earlier refused to do unless and until he was satisfied with what the Council had come up with – for the ceremonies.

There were also difficulties over Cyprus. Whereas Turkey had persisted in its refusal to recognize the right of the Nicosia government to speak for the Turkish Cypriot north in its application to the EU, Athens sought assurances that failure to reach agreement with Turkey on Cyprus need not prevent Cypriot accession to the EU. The Helsinki summit concluded that 'a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union' but that, should no such settlement emerge, the Council would determine the appropriateness of Cypriot membership 'without the above being a precondition'. It seems that Ecevit first consulted with the Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash, before he accepted the EU wording. Foreign minister Cem acknowledged that the paragraph on Cyprus was the one aspect of the Helsinki conclusions that really rankled in Ankara even after the deal was accepted³⁵.

In his statement in Helsinki welcoming the EU decision to grant candidacy to Turkey,

Ecevit commented that 'Some members of the European Union may think it will take many years for Turkey to become a full member. But I am convinced that given the dynamism of the Turkish people and their attachment to democracy, we will achieve this objective in a far shorter period'³⁶.

The foreign minister Ismail Cem also stated that Ankara would become a full member sooner rather than later. Turkey is not just any candidate. Turkey has a different identity and a very different historical experience than the others. Turkey would move rapidly to bloc membership and bring with it the heritage of a country that has always looked towards both Christian Europe and the Islamic Middle East³⁷.

The Turkish commitment, the dispute with Greece, Washington's influence, the country's domestic problems and European responses to them have combined to bring Turkish-EU relations to their present. It is obviously a tribute to Turkish diplomacy that the country finds itself a candidate member of the EU despite the general absence of sustained or enthusiasm in Europe over the years.

The pre-accession strategy for Turkey, as agreed in Helsinki, is proceeding along the lines of enhanced political dialogue with the three main components: human rights, border issues and Cyprus problem.

On 8 November 2000 the European Commission adopted its Accession Partnership Document for Turkey which was approved in the General Affairs Council of December 4, 2000 and finally adopted by Council on March 8, 2001. It defines the objectives and priorities for the fulfilment of the accession criteria, which Turkey must implement in the short and medium term within the framework of the pre-accession process. On 19 March 2001 the Turkish government adopted its national programme to give effect to the Accession Partnership. This comprehensive document defines a set of individual measures Turkey proposes to implement in order to adopt the *acquis communautaire*.

On 15-16 June 2001, the heads of state and government of the EU met at the

European Council summit in Göteborg. Turkey has put forward a national programme for the adoption of the EU regulatory framework. The European Council stressed the need for further steps, for example concerning human rights. The statement also urged Turkey to "vigorously" implement an economic program agreed to with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to create the conditions for economic recovery following its recent financial crash.

On 3 October 2001, the Turkish Grand National Assembly adopted thirty-four amendments to the 1982 Constitution, which included a series of political reforms on reforming the death penalty sentence, the usage of "mother tongue", increased civilian control in politics, and freedom of expression.

With the reform package enacted on 9 August 2002 Turkey embarked upon a number of important steps to implement the accession partnership (abolition of the death penalty, among other things). The EU Commission's progress report of 9 October 2002 specifically commended the major progress achieved while at the same time mentioning persistent shortcomings (torture, restrictions on freedom of expression, incomplete implementation). The new government elected on 3 November 2002 submitted further reform proposals to address these shortcomings.

At the Copenhagen European Council of 12-13 December 2002, the EU took decisions of historic significance concerning its next enlargement. It was decided that ten candidate countries (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Cyprus, Slovenia, and Slovakia) would be members to the EU as of 1 May 2004. Concerning Bulgaria and Romania, the European Council reaffirmed the objective to welcome these two states as members in 2007.

As regards Turkey, The Copenhagen European Council decided that "if the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the EU will open negotiations without delay."

The Commission, in its latest assessment of Turkey's progress towards meeting EU standards of democracy and human rights, also said that Turkey still has much to do, especially in eliminating torture and upholding the rights of the Kurdish minority. The EU wants Turkey to back down over its military occupation and claim of sovereignty over northern Cyprus, to pave the way for a political settlement there before Cyprus formally enters the EU in May this year. The absence of a settlement could become a serious obstacle to Turkey's EU aspirations³⁸.

While the E.U. experts pressure on the nation's leaders to meet European political criteria before starting negotiations on full membership, opponents of Turkish European Union membership such as France argue that Turkey with its population of 70 million is too big and too "culturally different".

Giscard d'Estaing, former president of France and the head of the convent charged with drafting a European constitution, declared that Turkey doesn't have a place in the EU. Turkey, he said, has "a different culture, a different approach, a different way of life"; for these reasons, he said, admitting Turkey to the EU "would be the end of the European Union"³⁹.

The Conservative German politicians also suggest that the cultural and religious differences between Turkey and the European Union are insurmountable.

Thus, at a conference of the (Christian Democrat) European People's Party in March 1997, Chancellor Kohl and other prominent Christian Democrats plainly stated that Turkey could never be admitted to the predominantly Christian E.U.⁴⁰

In public, European officials referred to Turkey's low level of economic development and its less than Scandinavian respect for human rights. In private, both Europeans and Turks agreed that the real reasons were the intense opposition of the Greek and, more importantly, the fact that Turkey is a Muslim country. European countries did not want to face the possibility of opening their borders to immigrations from a country of 70 million Muslims and much unemployment. Even more

significantly, they felt that culturally the Turks did not belong in Europe⁴¹.

Even if it is just about possible to envisage Turkey assimilated into the governmental institutions of the EU, it strains belief that Turkey's borders close to the Tigris and Euphrates can be inwardly digested and recognized by all other countries of the EU as the frontiers of Europe⁴².

According to many European politicians the Turks are still too poor, too unruly and too Muslim to qualify.⁴³ Unfortunately, this point of view is echoed by much of the Europeans politicians who remain quite opposed to the very idea of Turkish EU membership.

Islamic values /states have been widely identified as the "new" threat to Western values and societies. In the context of the E.U. – personified as "the Turk"- have several advantages as the alien other. First, there is a strong resonance with ancient and prejudices. Second, as in the case of Communism, it is possible to find evidence of the "enemy" within. Indeed Turkish residents are much more readily identifiable, since they have tended to cluster together, both from choice and necessity, and to maintain their religious and other customs. This has served to emphasize cultural differences and, in particular, the "strangeness" of the newcomers⁴⁴.

Samuel Huntington said, "The Velvet Curtain of culture has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology. Conflict along the fault line between Western and Islamic civilization has been going for 1300 years. For the immediate future, therefore, Islam will be a central focus of threat to the West".

Of all the countries that have applied for EU membership, Turkey has the lowest level of support from the European public, with the least support coming from Greece, Austria, France and Germany, and the highest support from Spain, Netherlands, Portugal, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom⁴⁵. This attitude demonstrates the public's general concerns about enlargement, loss of structural funds, fear of an "alien" culture, the size and the large population of Turkey.

Greece has the highest level of spread, as even though it has the highest support for enlargement (70%), its support for Turkey's membership is among the lowest of all members (26%) due to the conflicts of interests between Turkey and Greece.

Of all EU members public opinion in Spain is most favourable towards Turkish membership: according to Eurobarometer surveys of 2001, 43% of all Spaniards are in favor of Turkey's membership. In Portugal, 52% of the population supports process of the enlargement and 41% support Turkey's membership. It is very clear that Spain and Portugal are the major beneficiaries along with Italy and Ireland, of the EU's structural funds and Cohesion Fund. Turkey's membership would diminish their share from these funds. So why this support? Spain argues that the stability in the European territory is tied directly to stability in the Mediterranean and Turkey could play an important role in achieving this stability. Under the Spanish presidency the EU adopted the program on Euro-Mediterranean Partnership – Barcelona Process that was launched in 1995. The premise was that threats to security in Europe come from the poor South, and dangers of immigration from the Southern Mediterranean countries pose a security risk to the Union.

The Barcelona Declaration defines three main objectives: the first objective is to creation of a common area of peace and stability such as respect for human rights and democracy, the second objective calls for the construct of a zone of shared prosperity an economic and financial partnership that includes the gradual establishment of a free trade zone by 2010, and the third objective the development of human resources, the promotion of understanding and the rapprochement and exchange of peoples.

So, the goal is to create incentives for the peoples of the Mediterranean non-EU members to stay home by creating employment opportunities there. Another motive behind the Mediterranean countries' relative support to Turkey's membership might be to counterbalance the political weight of Germany and MittelEuropa.

The EU has a strong interest in economic welfare in Turkey since it is the largest immediate neighbour of the EU. Any economic crisis could lead to a massive immigration into the EU. Moreover, the issue of immigration is a cause of concern for many member states as it is associated with the fear that the enlargement will bring "outsiders" claiming resources that naturally belong to the "insiders" as well as threatening the norms, values and basic structures of their community.⁴⁶

The social problems already posed a series of problems: there are two million Turkish workers in Germany and is not a surprise that where fear of immigration is highest is the lowest public support. According to Eurobarometer 55 of 2001, 52% of all Germans believe that enlargement would lead to a significant increase in immigration and 77% of those perceive this is an undesirable outcome. 33% of those people believe that increased immigration would lead to increased unemployment and a decrease in wages whereas 17% fear crime and illegal drug trafficking would increase.

On the other hand, a country like United Kingdom, which is less threatened by immigration and which retains its borders controls by refusing to participate in the Schengen agreements, has less problems with Turkey. The UK is more concerned about the EU's security and the potential security risks that Turkey's exclusion may carry. The UK would like to see more intergovernmental Union, rather than a federal Euro-State. Turkey's size and its cultural diversity from the rest of the Union would be an impediment to the federalist aspirations of certain states.

Another worry is that some think that Turkey is a Trojan horse of the United States of America that would give rise to the destruction of the European Union and to the increased influence of the USA into it⁴⁷.

The American leadership has been particularly vocal in pushing for Turkey's full membership, the underlying assumption being that its vital interests in the Middle East and Central Asia would be best served by having its strategic ally, Turkey, firmly anchored to the norms of the European Union⁴⁸. The US

urged the EU to admit Turkey as a Member State for strategic reasons. So, identity or economic issues less affected the Turkish-US relations than those with European states, which require a democratic, stable and modernizing country.

But away from the delicate question of European heritage and identity and the fact that European Union continues to define itself as a white Christian identity, other factors rise economic and political concerns.

First, there are persistent disputes with Greece over offshore rights and territorial waters in the Aegean Sea, the treatment of Greek Christian and Turkish Muslim minorities in the two countries and the failure to reach a new constitutional settlement in Cyprus. Then there is Turkey's poor record in human rights, a problem constantly highlighted by the European Parliament⁴⁹.

Tensions over Cyprus have been a complicating factor since Turkey's military intervention in 1974, but were greatly exacerbated by the accession of Greece to the EC in 1981. The Greek veto has been an important factor in Turkey's relations with the EU.

In 1990 the government of the Republic of Cyprus formally applied, on behalf of both parts of divided island, for membership of the EC. However the legality of this application were disputed by officials of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and by the Turkish government, which alone in officially recognizing the TRNC. In its Opinion on the Cypriot application, the Commission confirmed the eligibility of Cyprus for membership also recommended that, in the event of continuing failure of UN mediation efforts, the Cypriot application should be reconsidered in January 1995.

This reconsideration resulted in a complicated trade-off, in which an undertaking was given that accession negotiations with Cyprus would begin six months following the conclusion of the 1996-7 IGC— in return for Greek approval of the customs union with Turkey⁵⁰.

Nowadays in the Cyprus conflict the official Turkish insist on that the Cyprus

problem should not interfere or put in jeopardy future Turkish accession to the EU. Peace talks between the two nations have so far produced a political stalemate, which hence only adds to the EU's concern that this issue must be resolved before Turkey can become a member. Gunter Verheugen urged progress on the Cyprus issue before then: "I can hardly imagine that the Commission would give a positive recommendation if the situation on Cyprus is still the same as it is today at the end of next year", he said.

Romano Prodi, the president of the European Commission also declared that a settlement would also greatly facilitate Turkey's membership aspirations and will clearly influence decisions to be taken in the second half of this year. This is not a formal condition, but a political reality⁵¹.

It is very clear that the confrontation between Turkey and Greece would prevent internal consensus being reached within the Union if the Cyprus question had not been resolved before Turkey's accession.

The most important obstacle to membership is the political aspect of the Copenhagen criteria. The main problems are structural problems in Turkish democracy, such as the role of the military in civilian politics, respect for human rights and the Kurdish problem.

Thus, the internal political situation in Turkey has proved a greater impediment to closer EU-Turkish relations, such as the close involvement of military in Turkish policies. The Turkish military forces retain considerable powers since the last *coup d'etat* through their involvement in the National Security Council. The National Security Council was set up as an advisory body but in fact it has a very influential role in the field of security policy and even beyond in practically all parts of Turkish policies. It is composed of the five highest ranking military commanders on the one hand and (at least) seven civilians on the other hand: The President, the Prime Minister, the vice-Prime Minister and the Ministers for Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Justice and Defense⁵². That concludes that Turkey does not fully abide the democratic

standards required by the European Union and the current Turkish system does not seem to be a stable democracy.

The requirement of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms still seems to constitute a major problem for a possible accession of Turkey.

EU members have expressed reservations about Turkey's human rights record. Amnesty International and Helsinki Watch, two human rights monitoring organizations supported by the EU, have reported the persistence of practices such as arbitrary arrests, disappearances, extrajudicial killings, torture in prisons, and censorship. The Turkish Human Rights Association, itself subject to harassment and intimidation tactics, has prepared detailed chronologies and lists of human rights abuses, including the destruction of entire villages without due process, and has circulated these reports widely in Europe. The documented reports of human rights abuses, like the coup rumors, sustained questions about Turkey's qualifications to join a collective body of countries that have striven to achieve uniform standards for protecting citizen rights⁵³.

The most urgent issue is the situation of the Kurdish minorities. The Kurdish population represents 12 million, the biggest minority, but they have not been given legal minority status, or been recognizing by the Turkish Government. Minority status in Turkey was determined by the Lausanne Agreement, recognizing only non-Muslims as minority group. Statistical indicators show that a discriminatory policy by the State has left the regions of east and southeast Turkey, where the majority of the Kurdish population live, economically, politically and socially underdeveloped.

Over the past couples of years notable progress has been achieved in the area of freedom of demonstration, freedom of expression, cultural rights and civilian control of the military. The competence of military courts to try civilians has been abolished. Positive changes have been made to the system of State Security Courts, such as the abolition of *incommunicado detention*. Turkey

has ratified major international as well as European Conventions, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on Social and Economic Rights as well as Protocol 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

These latest reforms are part of a number over the past year the Turkish parliament has adopted, many of which are aimed at bringing Turkey's laws up to European standards on issues such as minority rights and human rights.

Ankara is hoping that by adopting these reforms – and allowing enough time to demonstrate that it is implementing them – it can prove to the EU that it is ready to start accession talks by the end of 2004. “This package is one of the most important steps Turkey has taken on its way to a more contemporary society”, Justice Minister Cemil Cicek told parliament after the vote.

The issue of functioning market economy could be another point of obstruction to accession. The Gross Domestic Product per capita in real terms is only about half the size of that of Portugal – one of the poorest EU members. It has a staggering inflation rate and a budget deficit. It is very clear the fact that Turkey will become a net beneficiary rather than a net contributor to the EU budget. Support from the European Regional Fund is estimated at around \$10bn. Turkey's high unemployment and low level skills would make her a recipient of European Social Fund Grants.

The growing population will not only adds more financial problems, but also will create problems in the balance of EU institutions. The Union declared itself to be ready for accession of new members by concluding the Nice Treaty. In fact, this goal was only partially reached. The Convention on the Future of Europe now tries to establish a solid basis for the future EU. A European Union composed of 25 States will be different from what is now. Accession of Turkey would face the EU framework with enormous institutional challenges. At present, Turkey has a population of almost 70 millions citizens, which will be rise to almost 80 millions shortly after 2010 and reach 100 millions by

2035.⁵⁴ So, Turkey's size would be a problem for the European constitutional system. If Turkey will be the full member, it would become the most influential Member State simply because of its size, the Turkish MEPs and the Turkey's votes in the Council, which would be the highest. Since the Council is much more influenced by national interests than the European Parliament, Turkey could block decision-making in the EU easier than any other member state.

Against doubts such as these, there are strong strategic arguments for consolidating Turkey's relationship with Western Europe which, even if the end of the Cold War may have weakened them, can be reinforced by instability in the Middle East or Central Asia; and there are political grounds for giving what encouragement outsiders can to Turkey's still fragile democracy⁵⁵.

It is obviously that Turkey needed positive signals and support from the EU to help counter the rise of Muslim fundamentalism. Recently, the terrorism attacks showed the vulnerability of democracy in that part of Europe.

Until today, all pro-European Turkish elite and citizens have tried (and lost time) to defend that Turkey is European and belongs to the EU. However, since "Turkey is destined to the EU," from now on, it's the very time to concentrate on the construction of European identity and on the reconstruction of stronger and more efficient EU institutions including

Turkey with the help of Turkish elite and citizens. That's the real chance for the EU to foster its democratic character.⁵⁶

In all the public opinion polls, the population revealed this European commitment in great majorities. The Candidate Countries Eurobarometer survey between 2 September-16 October 2002 showed that 73% think that Turkey should join EU, and it is beneficial for Turkey. On the other hand 17 % of the same population think that the conditions that EU puts in front of Turkey to delay this integration, such as freedom of speech, human rights, Turkish-Greek relations and the Cyprus problem are not realistic. About 49% of the population consider that they know "a little" about the European Union, 40% think that they know "enough" and 9% consider that their level of knowledge is "satisfactory"⁵⁷. Above results show clearly that Turkish citizens have commitment in such integration but a considerable part of it is "ignorant" about the issues and problems of it. Those results show us clearly that the commitment to EU is quite accepted by Turkish population as a goal for Turkey.

At the moment, Turkey fulfils only some conditions for accession and will be eligible only after further substantial changes in its political system, particularly with the respect to democracy and the rule of law. Even if Turkey's way into the European Union seems paved it's still a long way towards a possible accession.

NOTES:

¹ See Fotis Moustakis, *Turkey's entry to the EU: asset or liability?* In "Contemporary Review Company", 1998

² Samuel P. Huntington, *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*, Simon&Schuster, London, 1997, p. 144.

³ Park, William (1998): 'Rethinking European security', in W.Park and G.Wyn Rees, (eds), *Rethinking security in post-cold war Europe*, London and New York: Longman. 1-20.

⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

⁵ Christopher Preston, *Enlargement and Integration in the European Union*, Routledge, London and New York, 1997 p. 213.

⁶ The term European ... combines geographical, historical and cultural elements which all contribute to the European identity. The shared experience of proximity, ideas, values and historical interaction cannot be condensed into a simple formula, and is subject to review by each succeeding generation ... it is neither possible nor opportune to establish now the frontiers of the European Union, whose contours will be shaped over many years to come *European Commission*.

⁷ *Statement of Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit in Helsinki on Turkey's Candidacy to the EU*, 11 December 1999.

⁸ Former Art O of the Treaty on European Union stated only one single requirement for accession, namely that the applicant state must be European. Art. 49 EU, as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam, introduces further requirements for an applicant state. It makes accession conditional upon the respect of the principles set out in Art 6(1) EU. An applicant must adhere to the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. The 1993 Copenhagen European Council set out further conditions. The first of these requirements is that the Applicant State must have achieved stable political institutions, which guarantee democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and the rights of minorities. Secondly, a functioning market economy is required. Interrelated with this requirement, the European Council established the hurdle that the economy of the Applicant State must be able to cope with competition on the Union's market. The final criterion set out in Copenhagen is the ability and the will of the candidate to take on the obligations arising from membership, as well as "adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union". Moreover, the European Council stressed that for an applicant to be accepted, the Union must be able to absorb new members. Is not obliged to accept the application of a candidate even if it fulfils all the criteria.

⁹ Cinar Özen, *Neo-functionalism and the change in the dynamics of Turkey-EU relations*, in *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. III, no. 3, September-November 1998.

¹⁰ see *Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey*, Ankara, 12 sept. 1963.

¹¹ see *Additional Protocol in Official Journal of European Communities*, no. L 361, 31.12.1970.

¹² Christopher Preston, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

¹³ Cinar Özen, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

¹⁴ Balkir Canan, *Turkey and the European Community: Foreign trade and direct foreign investment in the 1980's*, in *Turkey and Europe*, p. 103.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 216.

¹⁶ See European Commission: *Opinion on Turkey's Request for Accession to the Community*.

¹⁷ Christopher Preston, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

¹⁸ Chris Rumford, *European Cohesion? Contradictions in EU Integration*, Macmillan Press, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, London, 2000, p. 92-93.

¹⁹ see State Institute of Statistics, *Turkey's trade with the EU 1995-97*.

²⁰ Desmond Dinan, *Ever closer Union. An introduction to European Integration*, Palgrave, 1998, p. 196.

²¹ see Bill Park, *Turkey's European Union Candidacy: From Luxembourg to Helsinki — to Ankara?* in *International Studies Association, 41st Annual Convention, Los Angeles, CA March 14-18, 2000*.

²² see *Turkish Press Review*, Directorate General of Press and Information, Office of Prime Minister, 16.12.1997.

²³ *Idem*.

²⁴ Bill Park, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

²⁵ see *The Council Presidency Conclusions from Cardiff Summit, June 1998*.

²⁶ This letter confirmed several important Turkish commitments such as: awareness of the requirements of membership, in particular the Copenhagen criteria, including democracy, human rights, state of law and a functioning social market economy; Turkey's determination to proceed with reforms in these fields in order to reach the standards expected of an EU member; Turkish interest in working out a 'road-map' outlining a systematic evolution of these reforms; and The understanding that the pre-accession strategies for candidates cannot be identical and that Turkey needs a strategy adapted to its special situation.

²⁷ Bill Park, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 6.

²⁹ see *Turkey against Cyprus-bound EU candidacy in Turkish Daily News* by Elif Unal, November 24, 1999.

³⁰ *Ankara reacts to German ambassador's speech in Turkish Daily News*, 25 November, 1999.

³¹ *European diplomats warn Ocalan's execution will harm by Kemal Ilter*, in *Turkish Daily News*, 26 November 1999.

³² see *Yahya Kocoglu, Turkey needs to abolish death sentence*, in *Turkish Daily News*, December 7, 1999.

³³ see *Selcuk Gultasli, Stalemate overcome by intense diplomacy in Turkish Daily News*, December 12, 1999.

³⁴ *Idem*.

³⁵ Bill Park, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

³⁶ for more information see *Statement of Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit In Helsinki On Turkey's Candidacy To The EU-11 December 1999*.

³⁷ see *Cem: Turkey will be a member sooner than expected in Turkish Daily News*, December 14, 1999.

³⁸ see *Strategy Paper and Report of the European Commission on the progress toward accession by Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, 2003*.

³⁹ see *Le Monde*, 9 Novembre 2002.

- ⁴⁰ Charlotte Bretherton, John Vogler *The European Union as a Global Actor*, Routledge, London and New York, 2002, p.167.
- ⁴¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *op. cit.*, p. 146.
- ⁴² Maurice Keens-Soper, *Europe in the World. The persistence of power politics*, Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1999, p. 122.
- ⁴³ *The Economist*, 11 February 1995.
- ⁴⁴ Charlotte Bretherton, John Vogler, *op. cit.*, p. 243.
- ⁴⁵ see *E.U. Member State's Support to Turkey's Membership*, Standard Eurobarometer 54, Spring 2001.
- ⁴⁷ see Hasan Engin Sener, *Copenhagen chess: the EU, the USA and Turkey*
<http://www.thesprout.net/005/graft/graft10.htm>
- ⁴⁸ *Luxembourg, Helsinki and Beyond: Towards an Interpretation of Recent Turkey-EU Relations," Government and Opposition*, Vol. 35, No. 4, 2000.
- ⁴⁹ Carol Cosgrove – Sacks (Ed), *The European Union and Developing Countries .The challenges of Globalization*, Macmillan, Houndmills, p. 162, 1999.
- ⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 163.
- ⁵¹ See the speech of Romano Prodi in Turkish Grand National Assembly, Ankara 15 January 2004.
- ⁵² see art. 104 Turkish Constitution.
- ⁵³ *Turkey – European Union*, U.S. Library of Congress, www.loc.gov
- ⁵⁴ see State Institute of Statistics, www.unfpa.org.tr/popdynamics.htm
- ⁵⁵ John Pinder , *The building of the European Union*, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 1998.
- ⁵⁶ Hasan Engin Sener, *op. cit.*
- ⁵⁷ see European Commission, Directorate General Press and Communications, Public opinion analysis, *Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002*.