

# Premises of the Establishment of the Warsaw Pact. Issues Related to Security on the European Continent

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## *1. International Political and Military Environment of the Establishment of the Warsaw Pact*

The major changes that occurred at European geo-political level and in the international arena after the end of the second world conflagration, manifested in the dynamics of the development of the Cold War, concurred and had a determinant role in the formation of the two representative opposite political and military blocs, namely NATO and the Warsaw Treaty<sup>1</sup>.

The Western perception of a hostile and even aggressive Soviet Union, from the end of the war, had its origins in Moscow's behavior in the international relationship from that period. The Red Army was present in Central and South-Eastern Europe and under its occupancy of the states in the area, a material modification of their political and economical system was foreseen, in accordance with the Soviet communist totalitarian pattern<sup>2</sup>.

Moreover, Stalin was firmly convinced of the fact that further to the war, the victorious armies should export their own political system in the conquered territories<sup>3</sup>.

During the first period of the Cold War, the geo-political approach, closely related to the ideological one, predominated the Soviet foreign policy in its security relationship with the West, on the European continent. The Marxist and Leninist principles had a defining role in forming the perception of the Soviet decision-makers in relation to the political actions being taken by the Western countries.

In this sense, Molotov recalled the fact that the extension of socialism eliminated the traditional isolation of the Soviet Union while the emergence of states being ruled under

popular democracy principles at its Western borders eliminated the dangerous possibility of creating, by the Westerns, of a new "sanitary belt", obviously directed against Moscow<sup>4</sup>.

During the attaining of foreign policy objectives and implicitly those related to security, the Soviets' error of perception as to the relationship established between Western states generated a vicious circle existing between the perception and elaboration of the political strategy in this sense.

In his relationship with the West, Stalin was driven by a deep mistrust as to the behavior of Western countries, by megalomania and in addition, showed a strong "persecution mania" with reference to his person and implicitly the Soviet state. As stated by the American Professor Vojtech Mastny, Stalin identified the security of the Soviet state with his personal power and any offence brought to the Soviet Union was considered as a personal offence<sup>5</sup>.

As part of the national security paradigm of the Soviet Union, the perception and sensitive approach in the relationship with the Western states were exaggerated. The post-war security plans for the European continent showed that Stalin's vision, aimed to achieve a tangible and pragmatic security, reduced itself to the old concept of geographical security<sup>6</sup>. Stalin preferred the traditional international system of power balance and division on spheres of influence which did not exclude a certain positive attitude as to a "specific" collective security which was to be found in the system of bilateral treaties, concluded even with the

Western countries and among themselves, as well. The main issue consisted of impeding the reconstruction of the economical and military potential in Germany intended as a premise for the re-birth of the German militarism<sup>7</sup>. In their relationship with fellow countries, the bilateral treaties played a major role for their control. As far as their relationship with West-European countries, Stalin preferred such treaties stating as a premise the American non-implication on the European continent. In this sense, the Dunkirk Treaty, concluded on March 4, 1947, between United Kingdom and France received a positive perception, however, its mere conclusion gave birth to queries as to the future in Moscow<sup>8</sup>.

On the other hand, Western Europe, that had hardly ended war, showed a strong economical and political instability that could constitute a most important premise for communist actions meant to give rise to unstable situations. Such a hypothesis could become real in the event of withdrawing the American troops from the continent. United States elaborated, based on their own perception, a coherent policy valid for the future in order to counteract everything that was considered as the Soviet (communist) danger<sup>9</sup>. To maintain the American forces in Europe constituted the major imperative in order to discourage possible Soviet military aggressions, while Washington started in that context political, economical and military measures meant to neutralize the Soviet subversive actions, both on the European continent and at worldwide level.

The adoption of "Truman doctrine" in March 1947, when the United States openly expressed their support for Greece and Turkey, under the menace of the communist subversion and undertook to grant assistance to any state that might oppose it, represented in fact the formal involvement of the United States in issues related to security on the European continent<sup>10</sup>.

On June 5, 1947, General George C. Marshall, the US Secretary of State, proposed the American economical and financial aid to Europe, the United States launching thus a huge program of economical recovery for the European countries, which was, as a matter of

fact, open to the countries under the Soviet influence and rejected, however, by Stalin, who considered it as a tentative to undermine the "strategic glacis" accomplished by the Soviets in Central and Eastern Europe<sup>11</sup>.

The American aid was conditioned by the acceptance of continent reconstruction and institutionalization of European economical structures. As an answer to the American requests, a conference was held during June 27 - April 16, 1948, which was finalized by the conclusion of the Convention establishing the Organization for European Economical Cooperation<sup>12</sup>.

The elaboration and coherent application by the American decision-makers of the doctrine on "containment" made possible a real geo-political "enclosure" of the Soviet Union. Such "containment" of the Soviet Union asked for a policy at global level where the stop of the communist ascent in Europe constituted only one segment, while it was essential to prohibit it and further on the Soviet-Chinese bloc to go beyond the geo-political perimeter it already held<sup>13</sup>. The application of such a policy constituted a constant approach of the US diplomacy under the dynamics of the evolution of the Cold War.

The establishment of Cominform in September 1947, in Szklarska Poreba in Poland and the conclusion of bilateral treaties with the popular democracies, and also with Finland, during the year 1948, led to a deepening of the contradictions manifested by the bi-polarity of the power balance on the European continent<sup>14</sup>. The Soviets, however, did not want to appear in the eyes of the public opinion as "champions" of the formation of political blocs. During a congress of the University members organized in Moscow on March 27, 1948 to discuss the issues related to Slavic studies, Zhdanov – although recognizing that the process of getting nearer the Slavic people was in full development – stated that "there is no need to strengthen this right now, we should leave to the Americans themselves the forefront of unification and forming blocs"<sup>15</sup>.

The ideologist of the Soviet communist regime stated, which was representative for the Soviet perception and mentality, that the

United States inspired obvious tendencies of European integration, being the foundation of Western alliances and the promoter of the anti-Soviet bloc. In Zhdanov's idea, the political behavior of the United States indicated the American expansionism in Europe<sup>16</sup>.

On such a background, on March 17, 1948, in Brussels, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg signed the Brussels Treaty, constituting the Western Union. The treaty provided for the establishment of a joint general staff, located in Fontainebleau (Paris), a permanent committee in London and a plan for the integration of the military forces of the signatory states, laying thus the foundation of the first organization for collective defense in Western Europe<sup>17</sup>.

Under such circumstances, the US Senate adopted, on June 11, 1948, the resolution submitted by Senator Vandenberg, authorizing the US Government to conclude an alliance during a period of peace. Consequently, the negotiations between the United States, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal, Italy and the five states being signatories of the Brussels Treaty led to the signature, on April 4, 1949, of the Washington Treaty constituting the basis for the North Atlantic Alliance<sup>18</sup>.

The creation of the Western Union was perceived as an instrument carried out under American leadership and having an anti-Soviet character, although not explicitly defined, which based on the provisions under Article 4, whereby the contracting parties undertook to provide military aid in the event of an armed attack in Europe, all but strengthened in the Soviet leadership their conviction on their own perception<sup>19</sup>. As a matter of fact, in the Soviet opinion, the Washington Treaty "derived" from the Brussels Treaty.

At the beginning, the decision-makers in Moscow were not extremely worried by the creation of the North Atlantic Alliance. In accordance with Stalin's ideological approach, the information received by him in relation to the limited military capabilities of NATO and the inherent difficulties encountered by the alliance on its setting-up strengthened his conviction that the West was confronting with "a general crisis of capitalism"<sup>20</sup>.

However, a major irritation was produced in Moscow by the joining NATO of Norway and Italy. In the case of the former, the Soviets had made definite proposals to conclude a bilateral treaty at the beginning of 1949, aiming to prevent the adhesion of that state to Western security bodies, most of all that the Scandinavians had expressed their wish to accede to a Northern collective security organization, responding thus to the previous Soviet apprehension in relation to the collective security in post-war Europe, founded on the system of bilateral treaties. The fact that Norway's joining NATO opened the perspective of locating military bases on the territory of a state having a common border with the Soviet Union determined the Soviet leadership to address a protest to the Norwegian Government, a measure that remained without any effects at practical level<sup>21</sup>.

Italy's joining the North Atlantic Alliance determined the Soviet Government to address a Note of Protest to the Italian Government on July 19, 1949. Italy affiliation to NATO and the US military assistance provided to the Italian armed forces were perceived by the Soviet leadership not only as an infringement of the military clauses of the Peace Treaty concluded with Italy but also as an evident proof of the aggressive intentions of the Alliance<sup>22</sup>.

Nevertheless, the Soviets did not correctly caught the significance of the American concept on security on the European continent. In the acceptance of the decision-making structures in Washington, security of the Western Europe was determined by the interconnection and interdependence of the economical reconstruction to the support of the incipient processes of integration and assurance of a viable European and Atlantic political and military alliance necessary to implement the collective defense<sup>23</sup>.

Even from the formation of NATO, the conviction was reached in Moscow that such a process represented the next step towards the revitalization of Western Germany, further to the adoption of the "Bonn Fundamental Law", on May 23, 1949 and its establishment as a state on September 7, 1949<sup>24</sup>. The reproaches addressed to the Western people aimed, in

Kremlin's vision, at aspects that infringed the provisions of the United Nations Charter, of the agreements reached by the great powers winning over Germany and the bilateral treaties concluded by the Soviet Union with United Kingdom and France during the war.

The Soviet perception over NATO as an element of threat at geo-political level was directed towards the assertion in accordance to which the North Atlantic Alliance would concur to the increase of the economical and military potential of Western Germany and would transform it in a basis of American and British aggression<sup>25</sup>.

As stated by the American historian Lawrence S. Kaplan, further to its creation, NATO was definitely related to Germany<sup>26</sup>. Moscow considered that the re-birth of the German militarism constituted the major threat on the European continent and at the same time it was the main problem of the European security. As a matter of fact, the Schumann and Plevin plans were perceived in this sense. Under such circumstances, the Treaty on the relationship between the three powers (United States, United Kingdom and France) and the Federal Republic of Germany was signed in Bonn, on May 26, 1952, becoming also a common Treaty whereby the occupation regime came to an end<sup>27</sup>.

Continuing this process, the West European states, supported by the United States, requested to West Germany to participate in a system of common defense and security. As a consequence, the representatives of France, Italy, Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg signed in Paris, on May 27, 1952, the Treaty on the establishment of the European Defensive Community. Although the British Government denied the participation in the said treaty, it undertook to maintain in Germany four motorized divisions and a significant air force. The project failed, however, being rejected by the National Assembly of France, on August 30, 1954<sup>28</sup>.

At the beginning of the '50s, the remilitarization of West Germany, its economical recovery, its participation to the Economical Community of Coal and Steel (ECCS)<sup>29</sup> as well as the development of

political and military relationship with NATO constituted a constant concern and received utmost attention from the Soviet diplomacy.

The substantiation of the security concept in Kremlin's vision, wherefrom the ideological approach was not missing, as stated by the American professor Barry Buzan, showed several specific aspects. Although Soviet Union did not have, from the military point of view, the characteristics of a weak state, there was no doubt that all the other European communist states could be included in that category. In the classical and real terms of power acquisition, being the foundation of the political and military approach aimed to establish a military alliance, it would have been normal that the popular democracies be directly interested in implementing such an alliance, aiming to strengthen their military potential, as a pre-condition for the achievement of their security<sup>30</sup>.

In practice, however, the Soviet Union was the one that initiated and achieved the military organization of the Warsaw Treaty, as a foundation to counteract to the military threat represented in its opinion by the Western alliances, being identified by Kremlin as an instrument to exercise their control on the satellite states and less as a means to strengthen their military capabilities, however, having a definite finality namely to enhance the Soviet military potential which was considered to guarantee its state's security<sup>31</sup>.

The outbreak of the war in Korea, in 1950, had a major impact in redefining the attitude adopted by the two super-powers as to their own allies in Europe. As for the United States, that event had direct implications on the development of NATO military capabilities and Germany's remilitarization and absorption to the West side. While for the Soviet Union, if until then it promoted a number of offensive and defensive policies in its relationship with NATO, at the beginning of 1951 it started practical counter-measures, most of all military ones. Moscow could not miss such an opportunity to broaden its authority at military level over its sphere of influence<sup>32</sup>.

During January 9-12, 1951, Stalin called for a meeting in Kremlin the political and

military leaders of the satellite states where he made an analysis of the international situation against the background of the war taking place in Korea (on January 4, 1951, the Chinese and North Korean armies had occupied Seoul), formulating conclusions and establishing precise tasks and deadlines for his European "allies"<sup>33</sup>. To represent Romania were Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Vice-president of the Council of Ministers and Emil Bodnăraș, the Minister of Armed Forces.

During the said meeting, that had an "unofficial and strictly classified" character, as expressed by Stalin, he presented a speech considering the United States as being not prepared for the war, being "linked" to Asia for two or three years more while China had already a better army than the other popular democracy countries, which fact was considered as alarming, to a certain extent. Taking that into account, the Soviet leader established the following: "you must create, in the following two or three years, modern and strong armies in the popular democracy countries which at the end of this three-years period should be absolutely ready to fight"<sup>34</sup>. In order to stress the firmness of that decision he even stated that "during these three years you must not work, you must only arm yourselves"<sup>35</sup>.

During the meeting it was found out that "none of the popular democracy countries is prepared today to face the requirements of a war, the armed forces training level is almost identical in each country and such training has been done so far, in terms of organization and equipment, based on plans being not coordinated among the countries"<sup>36</sup>. As a consequence, an adequate equipment was decided following a "coordinated plan" and setting up the effective forces during peace and war times for the armies in the popular democratic countries, providing aviation with jet fighters (MIG-15) and bombers, allocation of communication and radio-location technique and others. An overall number of 1,400,000 of military was decided for the time of peace and 3,000,000 for the time of war. The following figures were allocated to Romania: 250,000 military during peace time and 600,000 during

war the same as each of the following : a division of jet fighters, assault and bomber. The strengthening of the fire strength of the Romanian army was also requested<sup>37</sup>. In this way, the popular democratic countries became a huge market for the armament and military technique of Soviet manufacture.

Also, after reviewing the Report to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers' Party, a document prepared by Emil Bodnăraș when coming back from Moscow and endorsed by Gheorghiu-Dej, referring to that meeting, several aspects are to be stressed in relation to its contents.

A Coordination Committee (permanent commission) was formally set up in Moscow, led at Bulganin's proposal and based on the unanimous agreement of the participants, by Marshall A.M.Vasilevski, the Minister of Defense of the Soviet Union, which was in fact a genuine leading body and a predecessor of the Warsaw Treaty<sup>38</sup>.

At Stalin's proposal, two permanent representatives from each state participated in the Committee (USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria) of which one was a military. At the proposal of Gheorghiu-Dej, the military representative of Romania was appointed in the person of Emil Bodnăraș.

The Rules (statutes) of functioning of that Committee was drafted by Marshall A.M.Vasilevski stipulating that the said Committee was to exclusively deal with equipment issues, being a consultative body, while the decision was to be taken by the respective governments. The Committee members were permanent, the committee electing a president, who was also permanent. Apart from the president, a secretariat of the coordination committee was set up, the said committee meeting on a regular basis, when called by the president<sup>39</sup>. The unanimous adoption of these Rules, in Stalin's presence, established the rule of "consensus", which was anyhow to exist for a long period of time within the political and military relationship established between the popular democracy countries and the Soviet Union<sup>40</sup>.

The international events that took place at the respective moment under the dynamics of

the Cold War confirmed the fact that Stalin mistakenly evaluated the situation in Korea, while the UN forces (most of them belong to US) succeeded to free Seoul on March 14, 1951, which tempered to a certain extent the warlike impetus of the Soviet dictator<sup>41</sup>.

An analysis of the way in which the new "popular" armies of the states under the Soviet sphere of influence were created, shows that the political and military alliance within the Warsaw Pact was established after the pattern of the "Soviet military science" on principles of functioning, doctrine, organization, training and equipment was implemented based on the "brotherly aid" received from the Soviet Union.

As a matter of fact, during the 2<sup>nd</sup> Congress of the Romanian Workers' Party that was held during December 23-28, 1955, Emil Bodnăraş stated that "both in the organization and equipment of our army forces we received the brotherly aid from the Great Soviet Union. The

Soviet Army, being the most advanced military organization of our time, served us as a model"<sup>42</sup>.

After Stalin's death, the environment of international relationship on the European continent developed towards a relative détente. The foreign policy measures taken by the Soviet Union which were determined by the promotion of the principle of a peaceful co-existence, led to new approaches determined by the conduct of the Soviet leaders in the arena of international affairs.

The efforts made by the Western states to develop viable security capacities as well as the accession of West Germany to WEU (Western European Union) and further on to the North Atlantic Alliance would generate a political, military and diplomatic conduct that was specific to the Soviet Union and finally leading to the creation of the Warsaw Pact in May 1955.

## *2. Considerations on the Soviet Political Decision to Establish the Warsaw Pact*

The establishment of the Warsaw Treaty constituted an obvious expression of the Cold War being manifested on the European continent, divided in two antagonistic systems from the social, economical, political and military point of view. On a first analysis, the Treaty may be considered as a replication to the creation of NATO, especially after the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the said alliance while its political and military connotations converge towards the materialization of Moscow's decision to subordinate, in an institutionalized manner, the military potential of the states having signed the Treaty.

Practically, the states in Central and South-Eastern Europe had become communist after 1948, Stalin considering not necessary to establish a super-structure of the type of a political and military alliance to make formal the already existing relations between the Soviet Union and the satellite states, while the Soviets had concluded bilateral treaties with all the popular democracy countries<sup>43</sup>.

The beginning of the '50s marked the starting up of an arming process in the satellite states, imposed by Soviet Union in accordance with its own political and military strategy, the emergence of several measures of integration at military level and an increased number of Soviet advisors located in the said states<sup>44</sup>. Romania, making integral part of the European communist system had, during the years of Yugoslavia crisis, two Soviet army corps being disbanded in its territory, with their HQ in Timișoara and Constanța, the effects of its army forces reaching about 500,000 military during peace time, which was far beyond its needs for defence<sup>45</sup>. Under such circumstances, Romania maintained six divisions in permanent combat state<sup>46</sup>.

Playing its indisputable predominant power part in Central and Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union could have dispensed from such military alliance, however, in the opinion of the Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev, the creation of the Warsaw Pact made available to Moscow the means to militarily subordinate the European communist states (except for Yugoslavia) and

offered it the instrument meant to exercise political pressure on the West while preparing and holding future negotiations in order to provide security on the European continent<sup>47</sup>.

Moscow decision to establish this organization was decisively influenced by the emergence and multiplication of major changes within the international relationship in Europe.

The first NATO enlargement from 1952, through the accession of Greece and Turkey, established a new geo-political and geo-strategic environment in the South-Eastern part of the continent. The setting up of the common land and maritime border of the Soviet Union with the Southern European flank of the North Atlantic Alliance, at the border with Turkey, generated anxiety to the leading bodies in Moscow, which were concerned to increase the importance of the military institution, a fundamental issue to support the power status of USSR, in their opinion, and an additional proof of the aggressive character of the policy promoted by NATO<sup>48</sup>.

While analyzing the political and military background that generated the Soviet decision to establish the Warsaw Treaty, the proposals made by the Soviet government on the accession of the Soviet Union to the North Atlantic Alliance, submitted on March 31, 1954, to the US, British and French governments are to be considered<sup>49</sup>. In accordance with its own concept of collective security in Europe, USSR tried, while considering the case of acceding to the alliance, to change its character, scope and role, making thus inoperative the concept of collective defense, based on which NATO had been created in fact. Becoming aware of the stratagem and aim of such an approach, the three governments in question rejected by a common notice the Soviet proposal, considering it as unrealistic and in flagrant contradiction with the fundamental values promoted and defended by the Alliance. Such a fact all but strengthened the conviction of the leaders in Moscow, being aware of certain drawbacks of the Soviet military system, especially as regards the nuclear weapons, that NATO constituted the major danger for the Soviet totalitarian system set up in its sphere of influence<sup>50</sup>.

In Molotov's opinion, the prior Stalinist approach of an ideological nature, in relation to the existence and deepening, as well, of the contradictions between Western states, had to be turned to good account in the interest of the Soviet Union, the practical finality being that to undermine the West and move away Western Europe from the United States. Soviet diplomacy aimed also, through its promoted policy, to create breaches and divide NATO, aiming to stop the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Alliance<sup>51</sup>.

The project on European Defensive Community was undesirable as, in the Soviet view, it would have offered a first-rank role to the Western German state. Molotov was firmly convinced that only the collective security, in its Soviet variant, would ensure security on the European continent<sup>52</sup>.

The premise the Soviet foreign minister started from proved to be false, the same as the reasoning generated by it.

The failure to set up the European Defensive Community paradoxically imparted an accelerated pace to the measures aimed to implement the European military integration, including the participation of the Federal Republic of Germany. On September 28, 1954, the Conference of the states participating in the Project on the European Defensive Community was held in London, with the attendance of the United Kingdom, United States and Canada, on which occasion an agreement was signed aimed to revitalize the Western German military system. As a consequence, on 19 October 1954, the Conference of the states participating in London previous negotiations began in Paris, during which it was decided to transform the Western Union in the Western European Union, marking thus the inclusion of Italy, as well, in this political and military organization<sup>53</sup>.

Based on the signed agreements, the Federal Republic of Germany was granted the right to have a permanent army reaching the effects of 500,000 military, organized as ground, air and naval forces<sup>54</sup>.

On October 23, 1954, the North Atlantic Council addressed to the Federal Republic of Germany an invitation to join NATO, deciding also the accession deadline for May 5, 1955<sup>55</sup>.

On the same day, in Paris, the nine states participating in the conference signed about 80 documents (agreements) under the name of the Paris Agreements (modified Brussels Treaty) stipulating among other things the accession of Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany to the Western European Union<sup>56</sup>.

The issues related to the implementation of a collective security to the detriment of a collective defense in Europe constituted a constant mark of Soviet diplomacy during the entire year 1954. The diplomatic notices addressed by the Soviet government to the US, British and French governments on July 24, September 10 and October 23, 1954, and also the Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the four major powers from Berlin on February 10, 1954, had a common mark, namely the conclusion of a European General Treaty on collective security in Europe<sup>57</sup>.

The proposals made in the Soviet diplomatic notices brought about irritation and also mistrust in relation to their contents. In this sense, the notice of the French government from May 7, 1954, published in "Scântea" newspaper, quoting the TASS Press agency was significant, stating among other things that "Europe's and worldwide security may not be strengthened in any way through the destruction of defensive associations of the states sharing common ideas and based on attempts to replace them with new illusive security organizations (...)"<sup>58</sup>.

The signing of the Paris Agreements produced a visible irritation in Moscow, generating strong political and diplomatic measures from the Soviets. On November 13, 1954, the USSR government (the initiative and concept of that measure was Molotov's, in fact) addressed to the Governments of France, United Kingdom, Austria, Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Greece, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Poland, Romania, Turkey, Finland, Switzerland, Sweden, Yugoslavia and the United States a notice calling in Moscow, on the 29<sup>th</sup> of November 1954, a Conference of the European countries aimed to assure peace and security in Europe<sup>59</sup>.

As foreseeable, the Western states did not answer to the Soviet calling, the said conference being a diplomatic failure, in terms of representation.

Consequently, on the 29<sup>th</sup> of November 1954, at 15.00 hours, at the site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the Conference of the European countries aimed to assure peace and security in Europe was open, with the participation of delegations from the Soviet Union, Polish People's Republic, Romanian People's Republic, Republic of Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungarian People's Republic and the People's Republic of Bulgaria as well as a representative from the People's Republic of China, as observer<sup>60</sup>. The delegation of the Romanian People's Republic was made up by Chivu Stoica – first vice-president of the Council of Ministers, Simion Bughici – minister of the foreign affairs, Grigore Preoteasa – first deputy of the minister of foreign affairs and Ion Rab – the ambassador of Romania in Moscow<sup>61</sup>.

The attending delegations unanimously adopted the decision to hold the Conference with the participation of the states whose delegations arrived in Moscow, this conference having a stressed propaganda character<sup>62</sup>. The Conference included three meetings: on the 29<sup>th</sup> of November, 30<sup>th</sup> of November and the 1<sup>st</sup> of December 1954. On December 2, 1954, the ceremony of signing the common declaration took place at Kremlin, in the presence of an important number of political and military personalities from Soviet leadership<sup>63</sup>.

The press release issued on the conclusion of the Conference works stated that "the participants in the Conference reviewed in every aspect the situation created in Europe in relation to the signing in Paris of separate agreements by several Western states with reference to West Germany remilitarization and its joining the military groups against the peace-loving countries from Europe. The Conference was held in an atmosphere of cordiality and friendship and made evident the complete unanimity in relation to the measures that would have to be taken in the interest of peace in Europe, in case the Paris Agreements would be ratified"<sup>64</sup>.



The obsession of the Soviet Government and especially Molotov's in relation to the issue of West Germany re-arming, of its integration in the North Atlantic Alliance and WEU as well as the establishment of a system of collective security in Europe, became evident even in the Statement made by V.M. Molotov on the 29<sup>th</sup> of November 1954 before the delegations being present in Moscow.

Although the idea of creating a political and military bloc of the European communist countries was not explicitly stated in the respective statement and in the other Conference documents, the launched message hinted to such a possibility. As stated "from the moment when the re-militarized West Germany is to accede both to the military bloc and the new West European military alliance in the course of establishment (namely the Western European Union – WEU), the aggressive character of the military groups being set up by the United States of America, England and France will intensify to a great extent"<sup>65</sup>.

To support his assertion, he added: "Instead of such military groupings whose creation is to lead to a new war, the European states will have to intensify their efforts to organize the collective security in Europe. The establishment of a European collective security system – this is the idea that leads to peace keeping and consolidation in Europe"<sup>66</sup>.

The idea of constituting an alliance of the communist states was, for the first time, launched by the Czechoslovak Prime minister Viliam Siroky, suggesting special arrangements of security between his country, Poland and the German Democratic Republic, considering the latter faced the major threat following the latest political and military developments in the West. In order to support the measures of developing their military potential, it was considered as absolutely necessary that, in case of re-establishing the West German armed forces, the Eastern Germany should proceed in the same way. Continuing the political approaches on the same trend, the Parliament members from the three concerned states launched in Prague, on December 30, 1954, an appeal addressed to the National Assembly of France not to ratify the Paris Agreements,

obviously relying on a possible repeating of the preceding vote cast by the French Parliament that had rejected the EDC project<sup>67</sup>.

The changes that took place in the political and military leadership in Moscow, at the beginning of 1955, namely the replacement of Malenkov with Bulganin and the appointment of Marshall Jukov as Minister of Defense, obviously marked a modification of orientation in Soviet diplomacy, in the sense of rejecting the policy of reconciliation with the West<sup>68</sup>.

The development of the negotiations with the three Western powers that won the war on the issues related to the signing of the State Treaty with Austria made evident the existing disagreements and confrontation between the ruling groups from USSR<sup>69</sup>.

The hard and inflexible concept promoted by Molotov, in accordance to which the Treaty with Austria had to be strictly related to the settlement of the German issue, providing that in the event of re-arming the West Germany, the Soviet units might re-occupy certain sectors in Austria, was rejected by the Western being considered as unacceptable and endangering the neutrality, independence and sovereignty of Austria<sup>70</sup>.

The idea of dealing separately the issues related to the creation of the neutral and independent Austria and the settlement of the German issue, however in total contradiction with Molotov's position, belonged to Khrushchev. His political calculations, in accordance to which through the restoration of a neutral and sovereign Austria an "Anschluss" with West Germany was aimed at and through the retreat of the Soviet troops from that country no geo-political and geo-strategic disadvantage were created, taking into account the fact that the Soviet Union did not prepare and wish a new war, proved to be reasonable<sup>71</sup>.

The speedy acceptance by the Soviets of the State Treaty with Austria made the Western rather anxious, in the beginning, their direct communication links between the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy being thus interrupted, further to the retreat of the occupation forces<sup>72</sup>.

For the Soviet Union, signing the State Treaty with Austria, on May 15, 1955, meant to

undertake the obligation to retreat the occupation forces from that country and lose the right to keep military forces in Romania and Hungary, forces that ensured in accordance with the provisions under the Peace Treaty from Paris (1947) the communication lines of the Soviet troops stationed in Austria<sup>73</sup>. Nevertheless, further to the establishment of the political and military alliance under the Warsaw Treaty, USSR was able to maintain its troops in the states being members of the Pact.

Although the actions preceding the Conference in Warsaw which was held during May 11-14, 1955, took a period of about four months, consisting of consultations, exchanges of opinion and review of documents to be adopted, the ratification at the end of March of the Paris Agreements and the official accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to NATO, at the beginning of May 1955, generated Soviet counter measures and decisively influenced the Moscow decision to constitute the Warsaw Pact.

Significant for the rather oscillating policy of the leaders in Kremlin is the fact that during a visit made by Khrushchev in Poland, shortly before the Treaty constitution, he looked in mistrust at the military significance of the future alliance, wishing to create a collective security organization in Europe, including the participation of the United States<sup>74</sup>.

During the Warsaw Conference, Bulganin explained to his allies that further to WEU creation, the coordination of specific measures was recommended as adopted by the communist countries in addition to the bilateral treaties; however, the newly created political and military alliance would not mean the abandonment of the efforts aimed to assure the collective security in Europe, which aspect was tackled with priority by Khrushchev in the Conference held in Geneva in the summer of 1955<sup>75</sup>.

In spite of such declarations, it was the opinion of the leaders in Kremlin that the joining NATO of the Federal Republic of Germany increased and encouraged the militaristic and revanchist tendencies of the Western German state, making thus possible a favorable atmosphere so as to contest the political and territorial framework established in Europe at the end of the WW II<sup>76</sup>. That point

of view was also shared by the leaders of Poland and Czechoslovakia due to the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany did not recognize their Western borders. In the opinion of the leaders of the German Democratic Republic, the new international position of West Germany as well as the fact that it considered itself to be, by right, the only representative of the German people, was perceived as a serious threat for the Eastern German communist state, created further to the initiative and with the support of the Soviet Union, on the 7<sup>th</sup> of October 1949<sup>77</sup>. As for the practical measures, the immediate usefulness of the Warsaw Pact was the establishment of the Eastern German armed forces, totally included, unlike the armies of the other member states, in the integrated military structures of the alliance. Based on the position acquired as such, the communist regime in the German Democratic Republic constituted the most devoted member of the Warsaw Pact<sup>78</sup>.

The geo-political and geo-strategic importance of the territory of the German Democratic Republic as well as the specific nature of the Soviet and Eastern German bilateral relationship, led to the fact that during the entire existence of the Warsaw Treaty the most important Soviet military presence outside the USSR borders was that stationed in the German Democratic Republic<sup>79</sup>.

After a substantial evaluation of the political, diplomatic and military measures taken by the Soviet Union one may reach the conclusion that the decision-makers in Moscow aimed to acquire a more advantageous position in the dynamics of the development of the international relationship through the establishment of the Warsaw Treaty. In close relationship, during the negotiations in Geneva, 1955, on the issues of security on the European continent, taking into account the existence of the Warsaw Pact, Moscow could evoke during those talks the simultaneous annulment of the two opposed political and military blocs<sup>80</sup>.

On the long term, through the establishment of the Warsaw Pact, Soviet Union obtained an efficient instrument to promote the political integration of the satellite states, the military alliance being an important auxiliary to keep

them under a rigorous control. From that perspective, the action of the member states in the Treaty (except for Romania) that took place in Czechoslovakia in 1968 most obviously demonstrated such an approach and the promotion, beginning with 1968, of the doctrine of a "limited sovereignty" by Leonid I. Brezhnev, was a consequence of the same fact<sup>81</sup>.

The historic perspective makes evident that the Warsaw Pact became a notable presence, during the development of the Cold War, within

the international relationship and a distinct actor in the European geo-political field.

Inside the body, as a matter of fact subordinated to Moscow's geo-political and geo-strategic interests, several satellite countries (the case of Romania after 1964) addressed requests aiming to ensure a more democratic manifestation within the decision-making mechanisms of the alliance, which practically remained without any notable outcomes.

#### NOTES:

<sup>1</sup> Constantin Hlihor, *Istorie și geopolitică în Europa secolului XX. Considerații teoretice și metodologice*, Ed. Academiei de Inalte Studii Militare, București, 1999, p.47.

<sup>2</sup> Vojtech Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity. The Stalin Years*, Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford, 1996, p.30.

<sup>3</sup> Milovan Djilas, *Întâlniri cu Stalin*, Ed. Europa, Craiova, p.48.

<sup>4</sup> Natalia I. Egorova, *Soviet Perceptions of the Formation of NATO, 1948-1953*, [www.history.machaon.ru/number\\_02/analiti4/2/index.html](http://www.history.machaon.ru/number_02/analiti4/2/index.html).

<sup>5</sup> Vojtech Mastny, *op.cit.*, p.12.

<sup>6</sup> Natalia I. Egorova, *op.cit.*

<sup>7</sup> Lefeber, Walter, *America, Russia and the Cold War, 1945-1984*, Fifth Edition, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1985, p.129.

<sup>8</sup> Natalia I. Egorova, *op.cit.*

<sup>9</sup> Mark Smith, *NATO Enlargement during the Cold War. Strategy and System in the Western Alliance*, Palgrave, New York, 2000, pp.14-17.

<sup>10</sup> Henry Kissinger, *Diplomația*, Ed. All, București, 1998, pp.419-420.

<sup>11</sup> Michael Lynch, *Stalin și Hrusciiov, URSS 1924-1264*, Ed. All, București, 1998, pp.111-113; Constantin Hlihor, *op.cit.*, p.69.

<sup>12</sup> Peter Calvocoressi, *Politica mondială după 1945*, Ed. ALFA, București, 2000, p.199.

<sup>13</sup> André Fontaine, *Istoria războiului rece*, vol. 2, Ed. Militară, București, pp.82-84; Constantin Hlihor, *op.cit.*, p.72.

<sup>14</sup> Vojtech Mastny, *op.cit.*, pp.30-35.

<sup>15</sup> Natalia I. Egorova, *op.cit.*

<sup>16</sup> Lefeber, Walter, *op.cit.*, p.76.

<sup>17</sup> *Brussels Treaty*, [www.weu.int/eng/docu/d480317a.htm](http://www.weu.int/eng/docu/d480317a.htm)

<sup>18</sup> Natalia I. Egorova, *op.cit.*

<sup>19</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>20</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>21</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>22</sup> Mark Smith, *op.cit.*, pp.28-39.

<sup>23</sup> Lefeber, Walter, *op.cit.*, pp.58-63.

<sup>24</sup> Vojtech Mastny, *op.cit.*, p.65.

<sup>25</sup> Robin Alison Remington, *The Warsaw Pact. Case Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, 1973, pp.10-11.

<sup>26</sup> Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States. The Enduring Alliance*, Twayne, Boston, Massachusetts, 1998, p.86.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibidem*, p.48.

<sup>28</sup> Mark Smith, *op.cit.*, pp.111-113.

<sup>29</sup> *Manuel de l'OTAN. Chronologie*, Bureau de l'information et de la presse, OTAN – 1110, Bruxelles, Belgique, 1999, p.6.

<sup>30</sup> Barry Buzan, *Popoarele, statele și teama*, Ed. a II-a, Ed. Cartier, București, Chișinău, 2000, pp. 108-109.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibidem*, pp.124-126.

<sup>32</sup> Walter Lefeber, *op.cit.*, pp.99-101.

- <sup>33</sup> Document. Buletinul Arhivelor Militare Române (Document. Romanian Military Archives Bulletin), 1<sup>st</sup> year, no. 2-3/1998, art. Mîrcea Chirițoiu "Cum s-a impus modelul stalinist 1948-1953", p.68.
- <sup>34</sup> *Ibidem*, art. col. Al.Oșca, maj. Vasile Popa, "Stalin a decis. Lagărul socialist se înarmează", p.72.
- <sup>35</sup> *Ibidem*, p.71.
- <sup>36</sup> *Ibidem*, p.73.
- <sup>37</sup> *Ibidem*, pp.74-75.
- <sup>38</sup> *Ibidem*.
- <sup>39</sup> *Ibidem*.
- <sup>40</sup> *Ibidem*.
- <sup>41</sup> Walter Lafeber, *op.cit.*, p.121.
- <sup>42</sup> *Congresul al II-lea al Partidului Muncitoresc Român*, Ed. de stat pentru literatură politică, București, 1956, p.438.
- <sup>43</sup> Voitech Masny, *The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Warsaw Pact in 1955*, www.isn.ethz.ch/php.
- <sup>44</sup> Gl.corp de armată (r) Ion Gheorghe, Gl.brigadă (r) Corneliu Soare, *Doctrina militară românească 1968-1989*, Ed. Militară, București, 1999, pp.20-21.
- <sup>45</sup> Arhivele Militare Române (Romanian Military Archives), fund Direcția Operații, file no.3, vol.1, p.250.
- <sup>46</sup> Alexandru Oșca, Vasile Popa, *România, o fereastră în Cortina de Fier*, Ed. Vrantop, Focșani, 1997, p.71.
- <sup>47</sup> Robin Alison Remington, *op.cit.*, p.9.
- <sup>48</sup> André Fontaine, *op.cit.*, vol.3, p.170.
- <sup>49</sup> Peter Calvocoressi, *op.cit.*, p.25.
- <sup>50</sup> André Fontaine, *op.cit.*, p.163.
- <sup>51</sup> Voitech Masny, *The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Warsaw Pact in 1955*, www.isn.ethz.ch/php.
- <sup>52</sup> *Ibidem*.
- <sup>53</sup> Mark Smith, *op.cit.*, p.119.
- <sup>54</sup> *Ibidem*, pp.120-125.
- <sup>55</sup> *Manuel de l'OTAN. Chronologie*, Bureau de l'information et de la presse, OTAN – 1110, Bruxelles, Belgique, 1999, p.9.
- <sup>56</sup> *Modified Brussels Treaty*, www.weu.int/eng/docu/d541023a.htm
- <sup>57</sup> Arhivele Ministerului Afacerilor Externe (Foreign Affairs Ministry Archives – FAMA), fund 9 Varșovia 3, file 1963, p.17.
- <sup>58</sup> "Scânteia", anul XXIV, nr.3035, 27 iulie, 1954.
- <sup>59</sup> FAMA, fund 9 Varșovia 3, file 1963, p.17.
- <sup>60</sup> *Ibidem*, file 23/1955, p.13.
- <sup>61</sup> *Ibidem*.
- <sup>62</sup> "Scânteia", anul XXIV, nr.3143, 30 noiembrie 1954.
- <sup>63</sup> *Ibidem*, nr. 3146, 3 decembrie 1954.
- <sup>64</sup> *Ibidem*.
- <sup>65</sup> *Ibidem*, nr. 3144, 1 decembrie 1954.
- <sup>66</sup> *Ibidem*.
- <sup>67</sup> Voitech Masny, *The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Warsaw Pact in 1955*, www.isn.ethz.ch/php.
- <sup>68</sup> *Ibidem*.
- <sup>69</sup> Henry Kissinger, *op.cit.*, p.471.
- <sup>70</sup> Henry Kissinger, *op.cit.*, p.471.
- <sup>71</sup> Voitech Masny, *The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Warsaw Pact in 1955*, www.isn.ethz.ch/php.
- <sup>72</sup> *Ibidem*.
- <sup>73</sup> *Ibidem*.
- <sup>74</sup> *Ibidem*.
- <sup>75</sup> Voitech Masny, *The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Warsaw Pact in 1955*, www.isn.ethz.ch/php.
- <sup>76</sup> André Fontaine, *op.cit.*, pp.172-183.
- <sup>77</sup> Voitech Masny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity. The Stalin Years*, Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford, 1996, pp.134-152.
- <sup>78</sup> Robin Alison Remington, *op.cit.*, pp.23-27.
- <sup>79</sup> Dr.Constantin Olteanu, *Coaliții politico-militare. Privire istorică*, Ed. Fundației "România de Măine", București, 1996, pp.212-213.
- <sup>80</sup> Martin McCauley, *Rusia, America și războiul rece 1949-1991*, Ed.Polirom, Iași, 1999, pp. 60-61.
- <sup>81</sup> Robin Alison Remington, *op.cit.*, pp.109-110.