

## About Strangers and Unknowns. Romanian political Elites Towards Lithuania in the First Years of Independence After 1918

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Checking a good introduction it can place, also, a truly conclusion: February 16, 1918 – *Independence Act* in Lithuanian Taryba – undoubtedly quoted any impression or kind of reaction in the Romanian so-called public opinion or in political elites milieus. None of 1918 Prime Ministers – General Alexandru Averescu (January 29 - March 18) and Alexandru Marghiloman (March 18 – November 6) – had no references in their political diaries about the Vilnius event.<sup>1</sup> Of course, because German occupation in the South (and non-existence of a naming *media*, except official *Bukarester Tageblatt*) and censorships in free North (Iași/Jassy), near Russian border, also none of newspapers can't announced the rebirth of Lithuanian state.<sup>2</sup>

In the very beginning of 1918 free-Romania (in the North of country) was in dangerous and complicated political and diplomatic situation. Together with French - trained Romanian armies, Russian (Tsarist) troops of General Scherbachev remained, too, in Moldova because their Allied qualities. Internal evolutions in Russia – March 1917, renewal of Romanian national movement in Bessarabia (seized from Moldova in 1812)<sup>3</sup> and Bolsheviks *coup d'état* – seriously disturbed political and domestic life of Romanians in Iași just because fast Bolshevization of the Russian soldiers and radical propaganda inducing from part of them<sup>4</sup>.

All the news from neighbouring Europe, even from Romanian occupied territories, were seriously gap and unconsistents. Critical starvation, epidemics, lack of houses, thousands of hurts and deads, Bolshevik perils, all of them were stopped a good interest for *the others*. Also, from the end of 1917, on the other side of Pruth, Romanian-Russian border from 1812, is settled a Moldavian Republic, Romanian in form, but yet

linked from Russian Federation structure and opportunities. Together with little Romanian language elites from Chișinău, Romanian troops and Prime Minister Marghiloman statuaded the Union between so-called Democratic Republic of Moldova (Bessarabia) and Kingdom of Romania at March 27, 1918. Decision was voted in a provisional Parliament of Bessarabia, *Sfatul Țării*, in the same day. A very distinct interests from part of Romanian was coming from part of Bessarabia and its issues linked to Russia and Bolshevik regime and propaganda: it was no **strength** inside a population strictly concerned with domestic life and Russian or German occupation perils.

What were Romanian knowing about Lithuania and Lithuanians before 1914? No more it suppose, except some Medieval incidents regarding Moldavia. So, it was common sense that Voivode (Prince) Alexandru (1400-1432) were married with a sister of a Grand Duke Vytautas, Ringailla. Also, Lithuanian leader preserved a strategic military and commercial fortress on Moldavian Black Sea coast (in Bessarabia), built probably in 1420-1421, near Cetatea Albă city. Vytautas managed its efforts to do an accurate controle of the very important strategic ways between Baltic and Black Sea<sup>5</sup>. Any knowledges about emerging modern Lithuanian nation and state, at the end of XIXth century and beginning of the XXth, not existed in domestic or elitist political debates. A lot of common views about Lithuanians were comes from Polish side – novels, historical poems or writings – and induced a common nation, the so-called *Rzeczpospolita*: many of Romanians still thought that Lithuania was nothing but a province of Polish *Commonwealth*, as it was Bessarabia for them.

After December 1918, when Romania gained its national unity (by Transylvania's annexation), political élites from Bucharest started to show Entente policies meant to build a *cordon sanitaire* between Baltic and Black Sea towards Red Russia. Most important neighbour became, after one century and a half, Poland: together with Warsaw's Eastern interests, Romanian looking at Russia, Ukraine and the three Baltic States<sup>6</sup>. Also, without any special limits, Romania accepted Poland's inimical policy toward Lithuania. A lot of common information about Baltics arrived in Romania from Warsaw official and scientific milieus. Romanians were heavy conviction induced by their neighbouring ally in the first years after 1918. For example, studying internal or public documents from Foreign Affairs Ministry in all Inter War it can clearly observe Polish semantics for Lithuanian geographical locations such as *Wilno* (and rarely *Vilna*) and not *Vilnius*, *Kowno* and never *Kaunas*, *Druszkieniki* and not *Druskenikai*. A summarily explanation is compulsory: all European regions, cities or other geographics, without special or historical relations with Romanians, have a native semantic in Romanian language. Locations from Sweden or Latvia, from Finland or Slovakia are, all of them, in these kind of lingvistic solution. Loans are coming, as a rule, from French or Italian (*Londra* in Romanian for *London*, *Praga* for *Prague/Praha*, *Viena* for *Wien*, all of them from French: *Londres*, *Prague*, *Vienne*) and just in Lithuania's case it came, only in Inter War, from Polish. Also, in first months after 1918 end of World War I, Bucharest newspapers and officials made articles and speeches with term *Litva* (from Polish *Litwa*)<sup>7</sup> and no *Lithuania*, common using in Romanian historical discourses.

In 1919-1922 (maybe till 1923, when Pilsudski's projects were failed), Romania ignored the establishment of the independence and international legal status of Lithuania. Because its, Bucharest diplomacy was opened relations with Finland, Latvia and Estonia, with a Legation in Helsinki: it showed, commonly, Polish suggestions. In many times, in 1921-1923, Warsaw tried to convince and to obtain Bucharest's agreement for a military action against Kaunas's army, in accordance – from Polish points of view Lithuania was nothing all but a Soviet pawn – with the stipulations of

defensive bilateral Convention from March 3, 1921, which exclusively regarded Soviet Russia.<sup>8</sup>

Between the summer of 1923 and the next summer, of 1924, several preliminary contacts were made through the legations in Prague between the Romanian and Lithuanian ministers, with Kaunas insisently asking for the establishment of diplomatic relations. Romania, in their part, ended to build its military and diplomatic security projects. From 1921-1922 had threesome alliance in *Little Entente* (together with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia) and a political-military treaty with *Poland*. Also, all of its frontiers (also the Eastern, with Soviet Russia) were recognized by the Allies and, in treaties of St. Germain, Neuilly and Trianon, also from neighbours. Because all of positive these, on August 25, 1923, in answering to a report received from Prague, from Minister Dinu Hiott, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, I.G. Duca, was making that "the other day, Poland requested that we should not resume our relations with Lithuania for the time being"<sup>9</sup> and personally suggested to had a negative position.

Driven to despair by the insistence of Lithuania – government of Kaunas probably hoping that a benevolent attitude from part of Bucharest can somehow release Polish pressures – the Romanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, consulted with much experienced Minister in Warsaw, Alexandru Florescu, in search for a solution, be it partial: "Lithuania has been asking for the establishment of diplomatic relations for a year now. Given her difficulties with Poland, I have postponed an answer. I think it will be difficult for us not to yield to her request now. On the other hand, we do not wish to offend the Poles"<sup>10</sup>. Duca wanted a query made among the officials in Warsaw, in order to prove the reasons for which Romania was recognizing the Lithuanian state were, practically, non existent. "Undoubtely should the Poles continue to object, we shall act on their wish", added the same Romanian Minister for Foreign Affairs<sup>11</sup>.

On August 24, 1924, Romania recognized Lithuania officially, being the last Europe state to do so, barring Poland.<sup>12</sup>

Despite this event, the new independent Lithuania preserved a really negative image inside Romanian political élites. Few days before Bucharest recognizing Kaunas officially, in August 2, 1924, the Minister in Warsaw (also credentialed in Riga and Tallinn), Al. Florescu

had a confident appointment with Al. Skrzyński, Under Secretary of State in Foreign Affairs Ministry and former Minister of Poland in Bucharest. Polish official strongly insisted to convince Romanian diplomat to agreed a common military and political action against Soviet Union and Lithuania together, because they were threated Eastern borders (it is on the spirit of Defensive Convention, signed by Take Ionescu and Prince Eustachy Sapieha, on March 3, 1921). Florescu invited to more calm in relations with Kaunas government and rejected the offer to collaborate, denied also a so-called "Sovietisation" of Lithuania. "For me – told Florescu to Skrzyński, noticed any sympathies for Baltic – is now more clear that Lithuania is a very dangerous location in which it should be born the flame of a possible great conflagration, in this corner of Europe. Romania have the sole objective to take away Lithuania from political forces which trying to push Kaunas government in the arms of *together* Germany and Bolshevik Russia".<sup>13</sup>

Not only Al. Florescu perceived in a negative matter Romanian-Lithuanian relations but also his successors in Warsaw (and in most Baltic capitals) and inside Foreign Affairs Ministry. In August 1925, Alexandru Iacovaky, Minister in Warsaw, described to I.G. Duca his distaste for all Lithuanian activities: Iacovaky was in Warsaw from 1919 and had a good and important Polish education and relations in political and aristocratic milieus. His letter to Duca is more suggestive because it reflected a common opinion – proposed only by Poland – inside Romanians. "Xenophobe Lithuanians – wrote Iacovaky -, who induced complete nationalist principles, had no interests to encouraged a development for German trading in Memel. Contrary, the Lithuanians had more interest to manage an economic and social impoverishment for the Germans of the city. If in future these Lithuanians will have even a little success on the way of economic development of the country, all German influences surely will disappear and losing its importance".<sup>14</sup>

Contrary with anti-Lithuanian points of views in many diplomatic actions of Bucharest – most of them given by ignorance or pressures from Warsaw – it can clearly emerged, from the second half of the '20's, a special interest for strategic points of Romanian diplomacy in Eastern Europe, in accordance to obtain and

processing information and connections about and with the Soviets. Until June 1934, Romania had any relations (diplomatic also) with U.S.S.R. and at its Bessarabian borders it preserved a permanent state of war. Riga argued exceptional importance by the fact that two of Romanian Ministers in Latvian capital – Prince Mihail Sturdza (1929-1935) and Grigore Niculescu-Buzești (1939-1940) – becomes some years after Ministers for Foreign Affairs, in 1940-1941 and respectively in 1944. Romania clearly searched regional allies to complete, together Poland, the *cordon sanitaire* and defends Eastern borders against a Soviet attack: a negative opinion toward Lithuania blocked a benefit bilateral cooperation. Political and military alliance together Poles turned out to be most invincible in comparison with the unknown Lithuanians.

At the end of February and beginning of March 1925, in one of his special mission in Riga, Al. Iacovaky (with residence in Warsaw) connected a lot of confidential meetings with Latvian President Janis Čakste and his Minister for Foreign Affairs, Zigfrids Meierovics. Benevolent attitude was visible: Iacovaky nicknamed Meierovics as "Beneš of the Baltics" and insisted that the two countries must built a strongly "cordon" between Baltic and Black Sea against Soviets. Now, in Riga, Romanian diplomat heard all good news that he wanted to heard. Čakste and Meierovics indicated that Latvia can sustaine Romania in the efforts to repress Soviet propaganda against Romanian administration in Bessarabia<sup>15</sup>. On the same appointment, the two Latvians strengthened Romanian opinion, nominating Lithuania as a "real danger" for the regional *status-quo* and in common interests to keep U.S.S.R. out of European politics.

*Coup d'état* of December 1926, led by Antanas Smetona and Augustinas Voldemaras, at a few months after the same challenge in Warsaw, had no good impact at Bucharest. Common opinions here were focused at foreign policy of the two leaders and indicated that it was settled a "Nationalist" dictatorship. Followed his anti-Polish speeches and opinions, Prime Minister Voldemaras caught a image of a "will of war", an "agent of Soviet propaganda", "anti-Versailles", "defender of Red Star", etc. In any milieus, because Voldemaras attitude, nobody tried to be politically correct or to understood the real reasons of December 1926 challenge in

Kaunas. Hating anti Polish Voldemaras, Romanian officials built a deformed view of entire state and regime. For example, in February 1927, General Alexandru Averescu, Prime Minister, read a conclusive **rapport** made from Special Political **Department** of Foreign Affairs Ministry. According to this document, "in Kaunas the dictatorship raised all Lithuanians against it, except the unpoverish rural population, **unanimously** inert in its political and national issues. This no democratic political regime searching, on the will of development, to **strengthen** some fascist organizations such as *Iron Wolf*. Also, we must be sure that now the Lithuanians are better connections with U.S.S.R., especially between Voldemaras and Kremlin".<sup>16</sup>

Augustinas Voldemaras, better like any Lithuanian, became a very known name in stranger political elites of Bucharest. Also, more even Hungarian leaders – Albert Apponyi, Pal Teleki, Miklos Horthy, Istvan Bethlen – (and, remember, Hungary claimed in many times negotiations about territorial clauses of Trianon Peace Treaty!), Prime Minister Voldemaras turned into a expiates off all European revisionist.

Nicolae Iorga<sup>17</sup> is the most important Romanian historian; also, he was a politician, Prime Minister in 1931-1932, President of little National Democratic Party, member in Parliament. His influence, even at the Royal Palace, was vast. On the same, Iorga was representative for Polish lobby and for Romanian-Polish relations historians. In his capacity as a intimate friend of Marshal Pilsudski he was at Warsaw, in 1924, in spite of President Stanisław Wojciechowski's suggestions, just for encouraged the former chief of state retired at Sulejówek.<sup>18</sup> Two years ago after, in his newspaper, *Neamul românesc* ("Romanian People"), same Iorga wrote an incisive article, *Tratatul cu Polonia* ("Treaty with Poland") in which claimed "creation of a entire Romanian-Polish system, in all domains, against Marxist Russia and its friends"<sup>19</sup>.

In Spring 1928, after Voldemaras-Pilsudski meeting at League of Nations, in early December, Iorga started a famous and strongly anti Lithuanian press campaign in his *Neamul românesc*. In one of the articles, *Între Polonia și Lituania* ("Between Poland and Lithuania"), in August 17, 1928, it displayed a really indictment against Voldemaras, portrayed as a "stupid and foolish politician". This idiot – indicated Iorga –

"makes a continuously war of diplomatic *aide-mémoire-s* against the Poles". Voldemaras, who can't predicted anything except "war", "blood" and "revenge", had nothing but a "very little presidential temperament". "New diplomacy of this Voldemaras – drew a conclusion the quoted author – undoubtedly contains brilliant inventions. Excepting juridical formulas as *my land* and *your land* (Iorga had references to Vilnius question) which existed until now in all debates and minds, Lithuania is striving to induce a non existent but proclaimed so-new international law article as is *land reserving for negotiations*".<sup>20</sup>

It is not to be wondered that Voldemaras fall, in September 1929, has been received with a lot of relief: that whoever admitted Lithuania not recognize Versailles treaties system because did not signed now have not the power. Ministers in Warsaw and Riga quickly reported, day after day, about political evolutions in Kaunas without Voldemaras and made suppositions about the future foreign policy. Charismatic Prime Minister Iuliu Maniu can read, into a report from Legation in Warsaw, some hours after the challenge, that "this is the end of obstinate and persevering motion of Lithuania between Berlin and Moscow".<sup>21</sup> "This country – is written after in the report – have now, last but not least, an opportunity to choice, for future, just a normal evolution".<sup>22</sup> New Prime Minister Juozas Tubialis received, from Romanian diplomats in Latvia and Poland, just an non-exist **favorable** perceptions: after anti-Versailles and anti Polish Voldemaras nothing can will be same in the worse sense. Nicolae Lukaszewicz, charge d'affaires in Poland, after a meeting in Kaunas with Tubialis, informed Prime Minister Maniu, on October 6, 1929, that "Romania can move its Baltic interests from Riga to Kaunas". Tubialis, insisted Lukaszewicz, was a "very upright and well-balanced man, with a high culture and intelligence, a open mind and very friendly with us".<sup>23</sup> Romanian government can input trust in Kaunas but it was necessary – it resumed the new opinions – to convince Warsaw for a new policy in Baltic Republic because the same Tubialis "have not compulsory vigor" for assigned a "correctly political destination"<sup>24</sup> (it means, of course, a Lithuania without its alliance with U.S.S.R.).

Romanian political elites – except Right Orthodox Nationalist "Iron Guard" and the little illegal Communist Party – expressed in all Inter

War a kind of dogma for Versailles peace treaties system, for territorial *status-quo* after 1919-1920 and alliance with France, Poland and Little Entente. Because these, Bucharest fears that Lithuanian starts to broke political and diplomatic isolationism in the '20's together with a help from Berlin and Moscow is almost certain to lift its security. Prime Minister Voldemaras speech, in April 2, 1928, in which it advanced that Poland and Versailles treaties were a menace for his country were taking a hard line against Romanian willingness to engage a negotiation with Kaunas.<sup>25</sup> When, in February 25, 1927 Voldemaras also told about Poland as "a dangerous enemy of Lithuanian independence, greater as the Bolsheviks one"<sup>26</sup>, Romanians were most concerned about possible passing to war. Earlier, two years before, Latvian President Janis Čakste condemned Lithuanian foreign policy and encouraged emergent interests of Romania for Baltic region adopted a similar position toward *status-quo*. At that time, in Spring 1925, Čakste increased distrust in Kaunas in expressing his fears just to Al. Iacovaky, Minister in Warsaw and Riga: Lithuania will be an enemy in a possible Red Army's attack on Poland, Romania and Latvia. "A Soviet war for the seizure of Bessarabia – insisted Čakste – will be the end of Latvia".<sup>27</sup>

Another issue of a bilateral disagreement was after a long private trip in Transylvania and on the Black Sea coast of Marshal Pilsudski, in August-October 1928. First *Lietuvos aidas* and after a lot of newspapers from Germany, Austria, Switzerland and Sweden claimed about a military secret alliance between Warsaw and Bucharest against Lithuania and U.S.S.R.<sup>28</sup>

Minister in Berlin, Nicolae Petrescu-Comnen, had violently condemned Baltic insults in a report of March 12, 1929 written to G.G. Mironescu, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Comnen urged an appointment to his Lithuanian omologue: he sustained that *Lietuvos aidas* allegations were nothing but "inventions" and "dirties".<sup>29</sup> Comnen also continued that Kaunas unexpected assertions made a lot of troubles for Romanian diplomacy in Germany as in Austria or Hungary.<sup>30</sup>

Although both nations and states remained deeply coldly, from the end of the '20's, at the same time with above allegations, it can argue efforts to establish a kind of partnership. These were increasing efforts of Prince Mihail Sturdza,

Minister in Riga (with accreditations also in Kaunas and Tallinn) from 1929 until 1935, who has been taken attack. Sturdza argued in his first reports from Riga the necessity for a challenge in relations with Lithuania: it must formed warm ties towards Great Powers dangers. "We have now a very narrow influence and opportunities in Lithuania – wrote Sturdza, in 1931, to his Minister for Foreign Affairs – and we have any chance to be a close partner of this country. Lithuanians – despite Polish allegations – strenghted a fair balance between Germany and U.S.S.R. and Romanians must learn from the Kaunas all skills which serving to a survive inside the chaos after 1918"<sup>31</sup>. The future Minister for Foreign Affairs (in September 1940-January 1941) have tried to put a favorable spin on events, insisting for "intermitente presence of a Romanians in Kaunas" which would be "providential".<sup>32</sup> Just in 1934, together with Estonia, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nicolae Titulescu, agreed the establishment of a Legation in Lithuania.

In all Inter War, any Romanian officials (except some diplomats) never visited Lithuania; on the same, any Lithuanian not come in Romania. Maybe Eduardas Turanskas, Minister in Bucharest, with residence in Prague, was the only. There were not focused any interests in cultural, economic, scientific domains: a sole symbolic Commercial Convention, signed in Berlin, on March 28, 1931, was a ridiculous impact.

There were in Romania any texts, between the two World Wars, about Lithuanian history or civilization, any translation from Lithuanian literature, any scientific debate for knowing Baltic people and country: in Romanian language, just short and very partial articles in some newspapers included knowledges about Kaunas politics, especially and ever bounded of a pro-Polish attitude, in no matter issue. The so-named N. Iorga traveled, in Spring and Summer of 1924, in Poland and its Lithuanian region, exactly at Vilnius: he is a sole Romanian, before 1937-1938, in a such situation. Single in Inter War literature was Iorga's text about Lithuania in a short chapter, "A corner of Lithuania", included in his Polish diary, *Note polone* ("A Polish Memoirs"). In his edited and quoted memoirs, it appear violent refuse to visite Kaunas because of the "political hysteria" in this location, in 1923-1924. Iorga wrote about provisional Baltic capital

as that an “artificial” one, without any “tradition and power”, in where lived just “common people quickening to have a fast career and whom Lithuanized common and legendary Polish names and locations because their domestic goals”<sup>33</sup>. Iorga, the most important Romanian historian, abandoned his professional conscience and proved strongly Polish version: naming Lithuanian Inter War capital was nothing but a “center of Germans hatred towards reborn Poland”<sup>34</sup>. When he wrote, in the same text, about Vilnius, the historian exulted looking at “the truly location of Polonity and Christianity in all Eastern Europe”<sup>35</sup>. As Visiting Professor at Vilnius University, in June 1924, Iorga made two courses: *Idea of Crusade in European South-East* and *Folk Poetry in Romania*. Also, his opinions, in political ones, were printed in many important Polish newspapers, such as *Rzeczpospolita* or *Kurjer Poranny*, without any mentions about neighboring Lithuania. At the end, in July 1924, Tadeusz Glixelli, Rector of Vilnius University, awarded *Doctor Honoris*

*Causa* to N. Iorga, sole Romanian until now with this distinction in a Lithuanian university.

Just after 1918 – when Romanians and Lithuanians built their own national project – there were any focus to Kaunas inside Bucharest politics. It’s talk not only about ignorance and indifference in a premise of the conclusion. Strategic Romanian-Polish partnership, statuated on Defensive Convention of March 3, 1921 was, certainly, one of the most important in projecting Romanian diplomacy on Eastern and Baltic areas. Because a lot of issues in neighboring frontiers, until the end of the ‘30’s governments and politicians from Bucharest and Kaunas never thought some perspectives of bilateral relations and interest. From Romanian side it was certain structural incapacity to exceed, many years after peace treaties of 1919-1920 signatures, a clearly and stabile strategy, except *status-quo* and its security. Diplomats, politicians, cultural and political elites together ceaseless refused to broke barriers between the two countries and nations.

#### NOTES:

<sup>1</sup> See: Alexandru Averescu, *Notițe zilnice din războiu, 1916-1918*, București, 1928 and Alexandru Marghiloman, *Note politice*, vol. 3 (1918-1919), București, 1995.

<sup>2</sup> About German occupation in Bucharest in 1916-1918 is very informing and suggesting the Sabina Cantacuzino’s diary (she is Liberal Prime Minister Ion I.C. Brătianu’s sister), *Războiul, 1914-1919*, București, 1937.

<sup>3</sup> About 1917-1918 in Bessarabia see diaries and documents from: Petre Cazacu, *Moldova dintre Prut și Nistru, 1812-1918*, Chișinău, 1992; Ștefan Ciobanu, *Unirea Basarabiei. Studii și documente cu privire la mișcarea națională din Basarabia în anii 1917-1918*, Chișinău, 1993; Onisifor Ghibu, *În vâltoarea revoluției rusești*, Chișinău, 1995; Dimitrie Bogos, *La răspântie. Moldova de la Nistru, 1917-1918*, Chișinău, 1998; I. Levit, *Republica Moldovenească (1917-1918)*, Chișinău, 2002.

<sup>4</sup> See, for a good view: Regina Maria a României (Queen Maria of Romania), *Povestea vieții mele*, vol. 3, Iași, 1991; N. Iorga, *O viață de om așa cum a fost*, București, 1985; A.A. Mosolov, *Misiunea mea în România, Curtea Imperială a Rusiei și Curtea Regală a României în timpul războiului*, București, 1997, p. 139-151. Mosolov was Russian Minister in Romania in 1916-1918.

<sup>5</sup> For Moldavian-Lithuanian relations see: Constatin Rezachievi, *Ringala - Ana. Un episod dinastic în relațiile moldo-polone-lituaniene din vremea lui Alexandru cel Bun*, în “Revista de Istorie”, 8, 1982, p. 917-923; Constantin Cihodariu, *Alexandru cel Bun*, Iași, 1984; Virgil Ciocâltan, *Raporturi moldo-lituaniene, 1420-1429*, in volume “Românii în istoria universală” (ed. Gheorghe Buzatu), Iași, 1988, p. 129-143.

<sup>6</sup> See, for Romanian policy: Florin Anghel, *Construirea sistemului “cordon sanitaire”. Relații româno-polone, 1919-1926*, Cluj-Napoca, 2003. See also Silviu Miloiu, *România și Țările Baltice în perioada interbelică*, Târgoviște, 2002.

<sup>7</sup> In Old Romanian language, Pagans/ non Christians were *Lifte*, from *Litwa*. in Polish.

<sup>8</sup> Florin Anghel, *op. cit.*, passim.

<sup>9</sup> Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe (after A.M.A.E.), fond 71/ 1920-1944 Lithuania, vol. 4, p. 251. About this moment, in Lithuania see Florin Anghel, *Polish Influences in the Baltic Demarches of Romanian Diplomacy, 1920-1930*, in “Lithuanian Historical Studies”, 4, 1999, p. 83-94.

<sup>10</sup> A.M.A.E., fond 71/ 1920-1944 Lithuania, vol. 4, p. 253. Report 38111/ July 20, 1924 from I.G. Duca (Bucharest) to Alexandru Florescu (Warsaw).

<sup>11</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 254.

- <sup>13</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 255. Raport nr. 3358/ August 3, 1924 from Alexandru Florescu (Warsaw) to I.G. Duca (Bucharest).
- <sup>14</sup> A.M.A.E., fond 71/ 1920-1944 Polonia, vol. 49, f. 138. Raport nr. 3412/ August 26, 1925 from Alexandru Iacovaky (Warsaw) to I.G. Duca (Bucharest).
- <sup>15</sup> Idem, fond 71/ 1920-1944 Letonia, vol. 8, p. 44-45. Raport nr. 2/ March 2, 1925 from Al. Iacovaky (Riga) to I.G. Duca (Bucharest). Also, for some aspects of Romanian-Latvian relations in the Inter War, see Florin Anghel, *Starp paraleliem spoguliem: Rumanijas un Latvijas attiecibas starpkaru laika*, in "Latvijas arhivi", Riga, 4, 1999, p. 83-94 (with gratitude for Eriks Jekabsons translate and help).
- <sup>16</sup> A.M.A.E., fond 71/1920-1944 Lituania, vol. 2, p. 74-75.
- <sup>17</sup> Born in 1871 and executed in November 27, 1940 by Extreme Right *Iron Guard* fellows, N.Iorga representing, until now, the idea of *Encyclopedia* in Romanian culture.
- <sup>18</sup> N. Iorga, *op. cit.*, p. 456.
- <sup>19</sup> Idem, *Tratatul cu Polonia*, in "Neamul românesc", an XXI, nr. 73, 30.03.1926.
- <sup>20</sup> N. Iorga, *Între Polonia și Lituania*, in "Neamul românesc", nr 181, 17.08.1928.
- <sup>21</sup> A.M.A.E., fond 71/1920-1944 Lituania, vol. 2, p. 97.
- <sup>22</sup> *Ibidem*.
- <sup>23</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 98. Report nr. 6496/ October 6, 1929 from Nicolae Lukasiwicz (Warsaw) to Iuliu Maniu (Bucharest).
- <sup>24</sup> *Ibidem*.
- <sup>25</sup> Concerning after Voldemaras intervention were quickly reported also in diplomatic system. A.M.A.E., fond 71/1920-1944 Lituania, vol. 4, p. 103-105. Memorandum of Special Political Department from Foreign Affairs Ministry for Prime Minister Vintilă I.C. Brătianu, June 29, 1928. Quoted speech also at Alfred Erich Senn, *The Great Powers, Lithuania and the Vilna Question*, Leiden, 1966, p. 211.
- <sup>26</sup> Speech quoted at E.J. Harrisson, *Lithuania*, 1928, p. 55.
- <sup>27</sup> A.M.A.E., fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, vol. 8, p. 62-63.
- <sup>28</sup> Idem, fond 71/1920-1944 Polonia, vol. 53, p.180-183.
- <sup>29</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 176.
- <sup>30</sup> *Ibidem*.
- <sup>31</sup> Idem, fond 71/1920-1944 Lituania, vol. 4, p. 262. See also, Mihail Sturdza, *România și sfârșitul Europei. Amintiri din țara pierdută*, Alba Iulia – Paris, 1994, p. 65.
- <sup>32</sup> A.M.A.E., fond 71/1920-1944 Lituania, vol. 4, p. 294-295.
- <sup>33</sup> N. Iorga, *Un colț din Lituania*, in vol. "Pe drumuri depărtate", edited by Valeriu Răpeanu, I, București, 1987, p. 535-538.
- <sup>34</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 556.
- <sup>35</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 537.