

EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY*

Practically, there are two fundamental trends within the Euro-Atlantic interlocking security structures, overlapping and hopefully supporting each other. One is pointing out to the effort by NATO to develop its European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), and the other is aiming at shaping the EU's European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

Since 1996 Berlin North Atlantic Council, when NATO reiterated its intention to "build a European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance", the North Atlantic Organisation has gone quite a long way envisaging the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept. The concept has provided the modality through which the Europeans have able to use NATO assets in operations other than those referred to in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The creation of CJTF was a clear consequence of the line of thinking that led to the missions underlined by the new Strategic Concepts, adopted in 1991 and 1999, and established an even stronger relationship the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO since CJTF was primarily intended to enable WEU operations.

The EU, supported by WEU, also embarked on a very ambitious plan which started with the WEU Ministerial Council in June 1992, at Petersbeg, when the 10 member states of the Western Union (which are also EU and NATO members) declared their readiness to undergo missions not connected to common defence. The so called "Petersberg missions" were essentially crisis management missions. Since then the developments within EU have been quite remarkable. The Amsterdam Treaty introduced the concept of "mutual solidarity" referring to decisions on the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and created the post of "High Representative for CFSP".

The December 1998 joint Declaration by Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Jacques Chiriac in St. Malo, France followed and very clearly indicated that EU "must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises".

The June 1999 European Council in Cologne decided that those WEU prerogatives regarding "Petersberg operations" would be included in the EU, according to the Amsterdam Treaty, and consequently gave direction to the setting up of several committees and decision-making bodies in order to make this possible. Moreover, it introduced a much-debated dimension of the new operations undertaken by EU in direct connection with NATO. "For the effective implementation of EU-led operations the European Union will have to determine, according to the requirements of the case, whether it will conduct:

- EU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities or
- EU-led operations without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities".

In December 1999, at its meeting in Helsinki, the European Council set a concrete military "headline goal": "by the year 2003, cooperating together voluntarily, they will be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the

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Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50000–60000 persons). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements. Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level within this to provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness. They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year. This will require an additional pool of deployable units (and supporting elements) at lower readiness to provide replacements for the initial forces”.

At this point in the development of such a complex undertaking changing the whole philosophy of the security arrangements in the Euro-Atlantic area, there were two fundamental questions to be addressed which still keep alive their meaning and inevitability:

1) Will the new EU security and defence structures in the making be capable to act in terms of sustainable troops deployment, adequate equipment, logistical support and reliable communications?

2) Will the EU be able to establish a practical working relationship based on transparency and complementarity with NATO without undermining the cohesiveness of the Alliance and to provide the maximum possible inclusiveness for non-EU NATO Allies?

The outcome at the Santa Maria da Feira European Council, in 19-20 June 2000, gave much room for hope since the Council decided to address the aforementioned issues: “Principles and modalities for arrangements have identified to allow non-EU European NATO members and other EU accession candidates to contribute to EU military crisis management. Principles for consultation with NATO on military issues and modalities for developing EU-NATO relations have also been identified in four areas covering security issues, capability goals, the modalities for EU access to NATO assets, and to definition of permanent consultation arrangements”.

Yet the two issues are still to be addressed in practical matters and we think this is the real challenge for the new Euro-Atlantic security structure.

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