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Mustafa Kemal Atatürk et la politique extérieure de la Turquie républicaine

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La politique extérieure de la Turquie républicaine repose sur quelques principes clairs, dont certains furent émis très tôt, dès avant le départ de Mustafa Kemal pour Samsun en 1919. Relatant, dans son grand discours de 1927, les discussions qu'il eut alors avec quelques amis sur l'avenir de la Turquie, il déclare : « Il n'y avait qu'une seule résolution à prendre, celle de créer un nouvel Etat turc, basé sur la souveraineté nationale, et jouissant d'une indépendance sans réserve ni restriction aucune »[1]. Le Pacte National de janvier 1920, qui reprend ces revendications de base et précise les frontières de la future Turquie, précise dans son préambule : « Les principes énoncés dans le Pacte National établissent la limite des sacrifices qu'il serait possible de consentir pour obtenir une paix juste et durable »[2]. Ces principes ont une contrepartie, l'abandon des idéologies pan-islamistes et pan-touranistes et des politiques agressives qu'elles impliquent. Mais aucune négociation n'est envisageable qui mettrait en cause la souveraineté[3] et l'indépendance nationales. A cet égard, le traité de Lausanne (du 23 juillet 1923) donne satisfaction aux kémalistes à trois exceptions près : Mossoul, le sandjak d'Alexandrette (Iskenderun), et le statut des Détroits.

Mais une deuxième série de principes vient en quelque sorte tempérer la mise en pratique des premiers : la Turquie a besoin de la paix. Sortant de onze ans de guerres, le pays doit naturellement consacrer toutes ses énergies à mettre en place les conditions de son développement économique et de la consolidation de la République. Mustafa Kemal en est profondément convaincu, et il revient constamment sur le thème de la paix nécessaire. On connaît le lapidaire : « Paix dans le pays, paix dans le monde »[4] qui souligne le réalisme kémaliste en matière de politique extérieure, celle-ci devant être proportionnée à la capacité émanant de l'organisation interne de l'Etat : « La politique extérieure est en étroite relation avec la structure interne de la société. Car la politique extérieure qui ne prend pas appui sur la structure interne est vouée à l'échec. Plus la structure interne d'une société est solide, plus sa politique extérieure est ferme et puissante »[5]. En tout état de cause, la sécurité de l'Etat passe par l'établissement et le maintien de la paix : « Notre politique étrangère, franche et loyale, est fondée en premier lieu sur l'idée de la paix. Chercher à résoudre un problème international par des moyens pacifiques est une voie conforme à nos intérêts et à notre mentalité »[6] déclare Mustafa Kemal en 1929. Il découle de ces principes que la Turquie s'engage, sur le plan international, à ne jamais employer la force pour faire aboutir une revendication et adhère, en août 1928, au pacte Briand-Kellog[7] ; Mustafa Kemal nourrit par ailleurs de grands espoirs dans la Société des Nations où la Turquie est admise en 1932 ; il s'inscrit comme un défenseur convaincu de la sécurité collective.

Ajoutons l'implication directe du président de la République dans la définition et la mise en forme de la politique extérieure de la Turquie. Tant sur le plan tactique qu'au niveau stratégique, Mustafa Kemal imprime sa marque dans tous les problèmes importants de la politique étrangère du pays. Il est vrai que la mise en place de la nouvelle diplomatie

républicaine pose à la fois des questions de mentalité et de choix des hommes. Mustafa Kemal a dû tirer les leçons de sa déconvenue vis-à-vis de Bekir Sami bey, lors des premières négociations avec la France en mars 1921[8] ; certes, il sait qu'il peut s'appuyer sur son fidèle compagnon des premières heures, Ismet paşa, le vainqueur d'Inönü et le négociateur de Lausanne ; sans doute s'est peu à peu dégagé une élite républicaine au ministère des Affaires étrangères, à l'administration centrale et dans les principaux postes diplomatiques, mais le président reste celui qui impulse incessamment le cours de la politique extérieure du pays. Nous en verrons maintenant quelques exemples.

Le premier souci de la jeune diplomatie républicaine fut de créer une aire régionale de paix en signant des traités bilatéraux d'amitié et d'arbitrage avec les pays de son environnement immédiat, complétés souvent par des accords économiques. C'est ainsi que, dans le prolongement et l'esprit des accords signés pendant la guerre de libération, les relations entre la Turquie et l'URSS sont l'objet de plusieurs ententes soulignant la convergence de vues sur les grandes questions internationales ; en 1925, un traité de non-agression et de neutralité est signé entre Ankara et Moscou, chaque partie s'engageant à ne pas entrer dans quelque alliance dirigée contre l'autre et à régler les différends par la négociation ; ces accords sont réaffirmés et précisés en 1929 et 1935. Un premier traité de commerce est signé en mars 1927. Toutefois, des nuages ne seront pas absents, Mustafa Kemal ayant dès 1921 clairement annoncé la couleur : « Nous avons conclu [en mars] un accord d'amitié avec les Bolchéviques. L'une des principales dispositions de cet accord stipule que les Russes ne feront pas de propagande et ne se laisseront pas aller à la provocation dans notre pays. Car il y a des différences fondamentales entre la structure des Soviets et la nôtre »[9] ; souci donc de non-ingérence extérieure, mais aussi de ne rien faire qui puisse détériorer de manière sensible et durable les relations cordiales avec le grand voisin du nord.

Des traités d'amitié sont signés avec l'Albanie en 1923, avec la Bulgarie en 1924,

suivis par un traité de paix et d'amitié avec la Yougoslavie en 1925, et d'un traité de neutralité avec l'Italie en mai 1928. Mais l'un des succès les plus brillants de la diplomatie kémaliste est bien la réconciliation gréco-turque. Les dernières modalités de l'échange des populations ayant été réglées en 1926, Vénizélos, à l'invitation de Mustafa Kemal, se rend à Ankara en octobre 1930, et leurs entretiens dans la capitale et à Istanbul débouchent sur la signature d'un traité de neutralité et d'arbitrage, d'un protocole de parité navale et d'une convention commerciale. Un accord de garantie des frontières et de consultation mutuelle suivra en décembre 1933.

A l'est, la politique de modernisation de leurs pays engagée, en Iran par Réza Khan, en Afghanistan par Amanullah, qui se réclament tous les deux du modèle kémaliste, facilite la signature d'un traité de sécurité et d'amitié entre Ankara et Téhéran en avril 1926, et d'un traité d'amitié et de coopération avec Kaboul en mai 1928. Quant aux relations de la Turquie avec l'Irak, mandat britannique, et avec la Syrie, mandat français, elles s'inscrivent nécessairement dans le cadre turco-anglais et turco-français.

Les relations anglo-turques sont dominées, dans un premier temps, par la question de Mossoul. Cette région, qu'on sait riche en pétrole et qui comporte une importante population kurde, a été occupée par les troupes britanniques en 1918. Les Anglais décident que Mossoul doit revenir à l'Irak, alors que le Pacte National considère qu'il s'agit d'une région turque. A Lausanne on décide d'un commun accord de s'en remettre à l'arbitrage de la S.D.N. Comme on pouvait s'y attendre, la S.D.N. attribue, en décembre 1925, Mossoul à l'Irak. Etant donné les rapports de force et les immenses inconvénients d'un conflit armé dans cette région, Ankara accepte le verdict genevois et signe le traité de Mossoul, le 31 mai 1926. En accord avec l'Angleterre, un traité d'amitié est signé avec l'Irak en juin 1926. Les relations turco-anglaises ne s'améliorèrent ensuite que lentement.

En dépit du traité d'octobre 1921, les relations turco-françaises connurent maints épisodes orageux. En effet, il ne fut pas

toujours facile de gérer la liquidation d'intérêts financiers, économiques et culturels considérables. Sans doute, du côté turc, dans le cadre des principes évoqués plus haut, est-on disposé à éviter toute mesure de spoliation, mais les moyens sont limités. A Paris, on est bien décidé à apporter tout le soutien nécessaire aux négociateurs français, mais en évitant soigneusement d'aller à la rupture. C'est ainsi qu'après de longues et difficiles discussions, un accord sur la dette ottomane est signé en 1928, remplacé en 1933 par l'émission d'un emprunt 7,5% dette turque, complété en 1936 par un accord sur des remboursements en nature. Quant aux écoles françaises, devenues moins nombreuses, elles durent fonctionner conformément au règlement turc[10].

C'est donc dans un contexte difficile que se situent les relations franco-turques relatives à la frontière syrienne. Une convention turco-française d'amitié et de bon voisinage, relative aux relations de la Turquie avec la Syrie et le Liban, est signée à Ankara le 26 mai 1926. Il y est rappelé le statut particulier du sandjak d'Alexandrette, inscrit dans le traité de 1921, et annoncé la mise en place de la commission mixte d'abornement de la frontière turco-syrienne, qui terminera ses travaux en 1930[11]. Enfin, un traité plus général d'amitié, de conciliation et d'arbitrage est paraphé à Paris en février 1930 ; il ne sera ratifié par la France qu'en 1933.

Le traité de Lausanne, en abolissant les Capitulations, met en quelque sorte l'Allemagne sur un pied d'égalité avec les autres puissances en Turquie[12]. Très tôt, la nouvelle Turquie, jalouse de son indépendance, renoue avec la nouvelle Allemagne, dominée et donc rassurante. En mars 1924, est signé un traité d'amitié, qui préside à la reprise des relations diplomatiques entre les deux pays et prévoit le retour des anciens biens allemands tombés aux mains des alliés. Ce traité sera complété, en juillet 1925, par une convention d'établissement et, en mai 1929, par un traité d'arbitrage et de conciliation. Très vite, la complémentarité économique est célébrée : une Allemagne qui peut fournir des produits fabriqués mais aussi des biens d'équipement nécessaires aux objectifs d'industrialisation d'Ankara, contre les matières premières agricoles et industrielles dont dispose la Turquie : sont signés, au début de 1927, un traité de commerce et, en mai 1930, une convention de commerce qui servira de base aux échanges économiques dans les années trente ; dès 1933, l'Allemagne pèse pour 20% dans les exportations et 25% dans les importations de la Turquie.

Dès la Conférence de Lausanne, Ismet paşa annonça « le désir de la Turquie d'établir des relations amicales avec le Japon ». Ainsi fut immédiatement décidée, d'un commun accord, l'ouverture de relations diplomatiques et l'on signa une convention commerciale. En novembre 1925, des ministres plénipotentiaires furent échangés, le diplomate japonais étant envoyé à… Istanbul. Cela jeta un froid, mais ce « faux pas » sera oublié grâce à la création de la Société d'amitié Turquie-Japon et à l'élévation des légations au statut d'ambassades en 1929. Le commerce turco-japonais est multiplié par cinq entre 1923 et 1929. Un traité de commerce et de navigation est paraphé en octobre 1930, et le clou des amicales relations turco-japonaises sera la rencontre à Ankara, en janvier 1931, entre le prince Takamatsu, frère de l'empereur Hirohito, et Mustafa Kemal[13].

En février 1927, un échange de notes et d'ambassadeurs marque l'ouverture de relations diplomatiques entre la Turquie et les Etats-Unis.

La crise économique de 1929, l'arrivée de Hitler au pouvoir, le protectorat italien sur l'Albanie, la guerre d'Ethiopie, le rapprochement entre l'Italie fasciste et l'Allemagne nazie, créent en Europe une tension croissante qui a naturellement des conséquences sur la politique extérieure de la Turquie. Les craintes majeures pour Ankara viennent de Rome et de sa politique agressive dans les Balkans et en Méditerranée. Au moment où la Turquie met en route ses plans de développement industriel dans le cadre de l'étatisme économique, Mustafa Kemal proclame que l'occident représente le modèle pour la modernisation de la Turquie. Mais les impératifs de sécurité conduisent Ankara à piloter deux ententes régionales plurilatérales : à l'ouest, le pacte balkanique ; à l'est, le pacte de Saadabad.

Après la réconciliation gréco-turque de 1930, marquée par la visite de Vénizélos à Ankara, les entretiens Atatürk-Vénizélos à Istanbul et à Ankara et la signature d'un traité de neutralité et d'arbitrage, des conférences interparlementaires balkaniques ont préparé des rapprochements significatifs qui mèneront au pacte balkanique. Il est intéressant de noter, à cet égard, le message adressé par Mustafa Kemal lors de la deuxième conférence balkanique tenue à Ankara en 1931. Après avoir rappelé que les Etats balkaniques, y compris la Turquie, sont nés du démembrement et de la disparition de l'Empire ottoman, le Gazi poursuit : « Par conséquent, les nations balkaniques ont une histoire commune séculaire. Si, dans cette histoire, il y a des souvenirs douloureux, tous les Etats balkaniques ont leur part. Mais la part des Turcs n'est pas moins douloureuse. C'est pourquoi, vous élevant au-dessus de sentiments et des calculs compliqués du passé, vous allez établir les bases d'une fraternité profonde et ouvrir des horizons de vaste union »[14]. Finalement le pacte balkanique, signé le 5 février 1934, ne regroupa que quatre pays, la Turquie, la Grèce, la Roumanie et la Yougoslavie. Cet accord comporte une garantie mutuelle des frontières, mais une série de déclarations dérogatoires (pour la Grèce, pas de conflit avec l'Italie, pour la Turquie, pas de conflit avec l'URSS) en diminue la portée : le pacte est donc valable tant qu'il ne concerne aucune grande puissance et couvre uniquement contre les révisionnismes hongrois et bulgares. Pourtant, un rapprochement entre la Turquie et la Grèce s'affirme à partir de 1936, et aboutit à la signature d'un traité politique turco-grec en avril 1938.

Le ministre turc des affaires étrangères, Tevfik Rüstü Aras (1934-1938), apporte à la politique de Mustafa Kemal tout le dynamisme souhaitable. Comme pour l'entente balkanique, il est l'artisan, avec l'aide de Téhéran, du pacte de sécurité régionale en Orient. Après le rapprochement entre l'Irak et l'Iran et la rencontre à Ankara, en juin 1934, entre Réza chah et Mustafa Kemal, les trois pays paraphent à Genève, en octobre 1935, le texte d'un traité de non-agression auquel se joint l'Afghanistan en novembre. La médiation d'Ankara qui permet à l'Iran et à l'Irak de régler leurs différends frontaliers, et l'arrivée au pouvoir à Bagdad du colonel Bakr Sidqi, admirateur de la Turquie kémaliste[15], favorisent la signature, au palais de Saadabad, le 8 juillet 1938, d'un traité de non-agression entre les quatre partenaires.

Situé résolument « dans le cadre de la S.D.N. », ce pacte veut « contribuer ainsi à la paix générale », mais curieusement il ne connaît pas d'ennemi extérieur. Par ailleurs, le souci de l'ordre intérieur anime les signataires qui s'engagent à prévenir la formation et l'action de « bandes armées ». Considéré par certains observateurs comme un traité d'assurance mutuelle contre le peuple kurde, le pacte de Saadabad témoigne aussi de l'entrée des signataires dans la grande politique internationale. Ce « bloc oriental » annonce l'émancipation de la région et avertit que l'Orient n'est plus « un gâteau à partager entre les grandes puissances »[16]. Les principes kémalistes y trouvent ici leur compte.

La montée des périls va permettre à la Turquie de recouvrer, par la négociation, la plénitude de son indépendance et de sa souveraineté, et fournir l'occasion à Mustafa Kemal, de mettre en pleine lumière ses qualités de stratège et de tacticien, au sens large des termes ; il s'agit de la révision à Montreux du statut des Détroits, et de l'annexion du Hatay.

Si les relations économiques et financières ne cessent de se développer avec le IIIe Reich[17], Ankara proclame haut et fort que, sur le plan politique, il cherche les garanties de sa sécurité auprès de la Grande-Bretagne, seule puissance crédible à ses yeux en Europe occidentale, et aussi de la France. L'amitié turque est recherchée avec au moins autant de détermination par Londres et Paris, car la Turquie est un élément clé du dispositif allié en Europe orientale et balkanique ; mais Atatürk, qui espère un accord tripartite anglo-franco-turc (complété par un accord tripartite anglo-franco-russe) est bien décidé à ne pas s'engager sans contrepartie. Le scénario concernant la révision du statut des Détroits, mis en place à Lausanne, est un chef d'œuvre du genre[18].

Démilitarisés, les Détroits disposaient de trois sortes de garanties : l'intervention de la S.D.N., l'action collective des signataires de la

convention, la promesse de désarmement général. L'échec du désarmement, la division des signataires au moment de la guerre d'Ethiopie, l'impuissance de la S.D.N. à imposer des sanctions à l'Italie, font ainsi disparaître successivement les garanties dont disposait la Turquie pour la défense des Détroits.

Cela commence d'abord comme un ballon d'essai lancé, en octobre 1933, par le représentant de la Turquie auprès de la conférence du désarmement, le Dr Tevfik Aras, actionné directement par le président de la République sans que, ni le ministre des Affaires étrangères, ni le premier ministre Ismet pacha, en soient prévenus : les ministres des Affaires étrangères de Grande-Bretagne et de France ont beau jeu de répondre qu'une conférence sur le désarmement n'est guère le lieu où parler de remilitarisation. Nullement découragé, le délégué turc récidive au Conseil de la S.D.N. en avril 1934, soulignant que le statut des Détroits « n'est pas satisfaisant ». Devant le refus de Londres et de Paris, Rüstü Aras ne baisse pas les bras. Il réitère sa demande auprès de l'ambassadeur britannique à Ankara en novembre 1934, puis en mars 1935, et enfin au conseil de la S.D.N., en avril 1935. Pendant ce temps, des bruits de bottes sont signalés en Thrace où d'importants contingents de troupes turques venues de l'est sont en train de prendre position: une nouvelle division, la 46ème, serait créée à Kirklareli, équipée des premiers tanks et voitures blindées soviétiques. L'ambassadeur de France craint que Londres et Paris ne soient placés devant le «fait accompli». C'est là ignorer la méthode kémaliste.

En effet, en mai 1935, à Genève, le représentant de la Turquie s'abstient d'évoquer la question, voulant éviter qu'un amalgame soit fait avec l'Italie qui a décidé d'en découdre avec l'Ethiopie, action hautement condamnée à Ankara. Embarrassé, le gouvernement britannique interroge les chefs d'Etat-Major de la marine et des armées, qui arrivent à la conclusion unanime que « la remilitarisation des Détroits serait un excellent moyen de gagner l'amitié de la Turquie, sans qu'il soit nécessaire de rentrer dans une escalade de compromis croissants » : les politiques en concluent que la remilitarisation

des Détroits constitue la pièce maîtresse d'une politique d'apaisement.

Du reste, Ankara hausse le ton. Le ministre de l'intérieur, Sukru Kaya, proche compagnon d'Atatürk, déclare que « la Turquie n'hésitera pas à prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires en cas d'événement inattendu». Devenu ministre des Affaires étrangères, T. Rüstü Aras repart à l'attaque en septembre 1935. La remilitarisation de la Rhénanie a, dans cette affaire, un important impact. La remilitarisation des Détroits est désormais «une question d'honneur et de dignité pour la nation ». Enfin un mémorandum envoyé à Londres, le 10 avril 1936, précise qu'Atatürk juge « vital » que la question soit réglée avant la fin du conflit italo-abyssin. Rüstü Aras explique à l'ambassadeur britannique à Ankara, qu'en quatre heures l'armée turque peut s'installer sur les Détroits. Il reste alors à Londres, en accord avec Paris, à lancer les invitations : l'Italie et l'Allemagne ayant refusé, la conférence de Montreux réunit l'Australie, le Royaume-Uni, la Bulgarie, la France, le Japon, la Roumanie, la Turquie, l'URSS et la Yougoslavie. La convention, qui ne donna lieu qu'à peu de discussions, est signeé le 20 juillet 1936. La commission internationale des Détroits est supprimée et la Turquie est autorisée à les remilitariser. Les règles de passage donnent satisfaction à la Turquie.

C'est un grand succès pour Atatürk et pour la Turquie, qui acquiert sa pleine souveraineté sur une région particulièrement sensible du pays. C'est aussi une victoire pour la Grande-Bretagne, les Détroits pouvant être désormais fermés aux navires italiens[19]. Cela favorise le rapprochement entre les deux pays : Londres va apporter immédiatement son aide financière et technologique à la mise en place du complexe sidérurgique de Karabük, et signer, le 27 mai 1938, un accord par lequel la Grande-Bretagne ouvre à la Turquie un crédit commercial de 10 millions de £ et un second crédit de 6 millions de £ pour l'achat de matériel militaire anglais[20]. Cela sera couronné, sous la présidence d'Ismet Inönü, le 12 mai 1939, par la déclaration anglo-turque d'aide et d'assistance mutuelle, en attendant l'entente tripartite souhaitée par Ankara.

Ce retard est dû aux ultimes péripéties relatives à l'affaire du sandjak d'Alexandrette.

C'est la dernière revendication concernant les limites territoriales de la Turquie, sur la base du Pacte National. Je serai plus succinct sur cet important contentieux franco-turc, auquel j'ai autrefois consacré une étude[21].

Le fonctionnement du statut particulier du sandjak, mis sur pied en 1921, dure pratiquement, sans graves anicroches, jusqu'en 1934-1935. Si Kemal Atatürk rouvre le dossier en octobre 1936, c'est que Montreux lui laisse maintenant les mains libres et qu'un fait nouveau vient d'intervenir qui servira de prétexte : le 9 septembre 1936, le traité franco-syrien accordant l'indépendance de la Syrie dans les trois ans, est paraphé à Paris[22]. Or, si les autorités turques s'accommodaient de l'administration française, elles déclarent n'avoir aucune confiance dans les Syriens. Donc le sandjak d'Alexandrette, « où les Turcs sont majoritaires » doit lui aussi « devenir indépendant ». Toutefois, conformément à une tactique éprouvée, le gouvernement turc propose des solutions intermédiaires, au demeurant assez floues : un condominion ou une confédération.

Cette revendication, qui masque à peine l'objectif de l'annexion, est un coup dur pour le sous-secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires étrangères, L. Viénot, qui craint de voir ainsi capoter toute sa politique mandataire, impliquant l'entente avec les Syriens. Ne sachant trop à quel saint se vouer, il remet le dossier entre les mains du président du Conseil, Léon Blum. Celui-ci propose pour le sandjak un régime « spécial » qui serait comme une survivance du mandat après l'indépendance syrienne[23]. Tevfik Rüstü Aras refuse, et l'on décide d'un commun accord de s'en remettre, en janvier 1937, à la S.D.N.

En attendant la décision de l'instance genevoise, le gouvernement turc ne ménage pas sa peine : aux affirmations d'amitié se mêlent les menaces de quitter la S.D.N., de régler l'affaire directement sur le terrain avec mouvements de troupes à la clé, la multiplication des incidents dans le sandjak avec les Arabes et les Arméniens, ainsi qu'à la frontière de la Djezireh, l'affectation d'un rapprochement avec Rome. Toutefois, comme pour les Détroits, la priorité reste à la négociation. Pour Atatürk qui n'oublie pas

qu'il a assuré le commandement de la division « Yıldırım » dans cette région, à l'extrême fin de la Grande Guerre, le problème du Hatay s'accompagne d'une tonalité fortement sentimentale. Voici ce qu'il déclare au printemps 1937 : « Le Hatay est mon problème personnel. Tout à fait au début, j'avais expliqué clairement la situation à l'Ambassadeur de France. Dans l'état actuel du monde, il ne saurait être question qu'un tel problème aboutisse à un conflit armé avec la France. Mais j'ai même pris en considération cette éventualité et j'ai déjà pris ma décision. Si une telle éventualité – pratiquement improbable – apparaissait à l'horizon, je démissionnerais de la présidence de l'Etat, je quitterais même mon statut de parlementaire et, en tant que simple individu, avec les quelques amis qui me rejoindraient, j'irais au Hatay. Côte à côte avec ceux qui sont sur place, je continuerais la lutte»[24].

On n'en est pas là. Au contraire, le « Compromis genevois » de mai 1937 a tout lieu de satisfaire, pour l'heure, les Turcs. Le sandjak, démilitarisé, aura son « indépendance » pour les affaires intérieures, une gestion commune des affaires douanières et monétaires, tandis que les affaires extérieures reviennent à la Syrie, dont la souveraineté est réaffirmée. Cependant les Syriens élèvent de vives protestations et assistent impuissants à l'affrontement, dans le sandjak, de deux nationalismes inégalement organisés, le turc bénéficiant d'un fort appui extérieur et de la bienveillance des autorités mandataires. On le voit bien lors de la mise en place des institutions du sandjak : la commission électorale constituée par la S.D.N. n'arrivant pas à trouver une majorité de Turcs (ceux-ci sont 40%) est dissoute et un accord franco-turc décide que, dans la future assemblée, les Turcs seront 22 sur 40 députés. Le 3 juillet, un accord d'Etat-Major organise l'occupation simultanée du sandjak par les troupes turques[25] et françaises. Le lendemain est signé le traité d'amitié franco-turc, mais Ankara refusera obstinément de le ratifier, car il comporte une clause de désintéressement territorial concernant le sandjak.

En cette année 1938, où se met en place le gouvernement du Hatay[26], dans un

environnement international menaçant, et alors que les négociations anglo-turques vont bon train, la France désire hautement l'amitié de la Turquie. Or, le 2 novembre 1938, quelques jours avant la mort du président, Menemencoğlu déclare à René Massigli : « La Turquie désire l'annexion du Hatay ». Il est clair désormais que, la France n'ayant rien à offrir à la Turquie sur les plans financier et militaire, le Hatay est, pour Ankara, le prix de l'amitié. Paris hésite à sauter le pas, ce qui fait dire à notre ambassadeur à Ankara, dès janvier 1939, que si « on attend encore il n'y aura plus rien à négocier ». Comme pour mieux souligner le dilemme parisien, c'est le même jour que sont signés, le 23 juin 1939, l'*Arrangement* portant cession du sandjak à la Turquie[27], et la *Déclaration franco-turque* tant souhaitée[28].

Même si Kemal Atatürk n'a pas vu le dernier épisode de cette affaire, il en est bien l'artisan. Ainsi la diplomatie kémaliste, reprise et prolongée par le nouveau président de la République, Ismet Inönü, est bien, Mossoul mis à part, une sans faute. La jeune république turque a su s'affirmer dans ce qu'on n'appelle plus le concert des nations, conforter sa souveraineté et son indépendance, être admise dans cette Société des Nations, en laquelle, au début, Mustafa Kemal avait mis, semble-t-il, beaucoup d'espoir. En 1924, il déclarait : « Nous souhaitons que la Société des Nations s'avère et se développe comme une institution qui ne soit pas l'instrument de domination des puissants ; une institution qui assure une harmonie, un équilibre entre les nations, une institution susceptible d'aplanir les différends d'une façon juste et équitable »[29]. Le verdict

sur Mossoul ne devait pas être, à ses yeux, de bon augure. Il exprime ses doutes, dès 1932, au général américain MacArthur : « La paix qui semble régner aujourd'hui, ne peut être considérée que comme un armistice. Si vous, Américains, vous ne vous étiez pas retirés des affaires européennes et si vous aviez insisté pour que le programme de Wilson fût appliqué, nous pourrions avoir aujourd'hui une paix durable »[30]. Et pourtant, la Turquie jouera le jeu, votant notamment les sanctions contre l'Italie, et s'impliquant dans des pactes régionaux de sécurité collective, même si l'on peut douter de leur efficacité.

En outre, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk qui, à la lumière de l'histoire de l'Empire ottoman, se méfiait à juste titre de la finance internationale, ne souscrivit, jusqu'en 1938, que deux emprunts d'ordre économique, l'un avec les Etats-Unis en 1930, l'autre avec l'Union soviétique en 1934 : la Turquie venait d'inventer, sans savoir le dire, une nouvelle pratique des relations internationales : le neutralisme[31]. Quant à la position fondamentale de la Turquie devant l'orage qui menace, il est clair que, si Atatürk a annoncé à maintes reprises ses choix stratégiques en matière de politique extérieure, il fait en sorte, très conscient des rapports de force, que la Turquie ne soit impliquée dans un conflit général, que si ses intérêts vitaux sont évidemment et immédiatement mis en cause. La neutralité, si elle demeure possible, est bien, pour la Turquie, le meilleur choix. C'est en tout cas la position qui sera fermement maintenue, en dépit de toutes les pressions, par le successeur Ismet Inönü.

NOTES :

[1] *Discours du Gazi Moustafa Kémal, président de la République turque, octobre 1927*, traduction française, K.F. Koehler Verlag, Leipzig, 1929, p. 8.

[2] A.M. SHAMSUTDINOV, *The National Liberation Struggle in Turkey 1918-1923*, pp. 92-95, cité par V.I. DANILOV, « Le kémalisme et la paix mondiale », dans *Atatürk fondateur de la Turquie moderne*, sous la direction de Ali KAZANCIGIL et Ergun ÖZBUDUN, Masson, 1984, p. 107.

[3] Après la victoire d'Inönü, la Grande Assemblée Nationale adopte une loi constitutionnelle affirmant que « la base de l'Etat turc est la souveraineté du peuple ». Ainsi, la défense de l'indépendance nationale est liée au principe démocratique et détachée définitivement de la souveraineté du sultan-calife. Le sultanat est aboli le 1er novembre 1922, le califat le 23 mars 1923 et la République est proclamée le 29 octobre 1923.

[4] Exprimée en 1931, cette sentence de Mustafa Kemal a été choisie comme devise par le *Turkish Daily News*.

[5] Cette réflexion date de 1923. *Citations de Mustafa Kemal Atatürk* (réunies et traduites par Atil ARSAN), MAE turc, 1982, pp. 112-113.

[6] *Ib.*, p. 115.

[7] Ce pacte de renonciation générale à la guerre est signé à Paris, par 15 puissances, le 27 août 1928 ; 63 Etats y adhèrent, dont 54 de la SDN et 9 non-membres, parmi lesquels la Turquie.

[8] Pour certaines péripéties de la mise en place de la nouvelle diplomatie turque, voir J. THOBIE, « De Constantinople à Ankara, d'un Empire piétiné à une République respectée 1920-1929 », dans *Relations Internationales*, n° 31, automne 1982, pp. 263-282 ; repris dans *La France et l'Est méditerranéen depuis 1850*, Isis, Istanbul, 1993, pp. 591-612.

[9] *Citations...*, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

[10] Voir Ismaïl SOYSAL, « Les relations politiques turco-françaises 1921-1985 », dans *L'Empire ottoman, la République de Turquie et la France*, publié par Hamit BATU et Jean-Louis BACQUE-GRAMMONT, Ed. Isis, Istanbul-Paris, 1986, pp. 608-609.

[11] Sur l'abornement de cette frontière, voir Soheila MAMELI-GHADERI, *Quelles frontières pour le Moyen-Orient? Les frontières des Etats nés de la partie asiatique de l'Empire ottoman 1913-1939* thèse de doctorat, Université de Paris-1, 1997, pp. 384-488.

[12] Antoine FLEURY, *La pénétration allemande au Moyen-Orient 1919-1939 : le cas de la Turquie, de l'Iran et de l'Afghanistan*, IUHEI, Genève et Sijthoff, Leiden, 1977, pp. 95-109.

[13] Umut ARIK, *A Century of Turkish-Japanese Relations*, The Japan-Turkish Friendship, 1991, 311 pages.

[14] *Citations...*, *op. cit.*, p. 117. Quatre ans plus tard, il dira encore : « Le renforcement de la fraternité entre les peuples balkaniques est, depuis toujours, notre principal souhait ». *Ib.*, p. 123.

[15] Il ne peut être question, dans le cadre de ce court article, et ce n'est d'ailleurs pas le sujet, d'évoquer l'impact du kémalisme sur nombre de pays islamiques. On se reportera à ce sujet notamment à Menter ŞAHINLER, *Origine, influence et actualité du kémalisme*, Publisud, 1995, pp. 141-189, et dans sa version turque *Atatürkçülüğün Kökeni, Etkisi ve Güncelliği*, Kitap Basın ve Yayın A.S., Istanbul, 1996, pp. 183-254.

[16] Antoine FLEURY, « La constitution d'un 'Bloc oriental', le pacte de Saadabad comme contribution à la sécurité collective dans les années trente », dans *Revue d'Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale*, n° 106, avril 1977, pp. 1-18.

[17] En 1936, le commerce avec l'Allemagne représente 51% des exportations et 45,1% des importations turques.

[18] Tout ce qui suit sur ce sujet est tiré de l'étude très documentée de Brock MILLMAN « Turkey, Britain and the Montreux Convention of 1935 », dans *Turkish Foreign Policy: Recent developments*, Kemal H. KARPAT ed., Madison, Wisconsin, 1997, pp. 139-163.

[19] Le mécontentement de l'URSS concernant les règles de circulation dans les Détroits va entraîner un refroidissement passager des relations entre Ankara et Moscou.

[20] Le 16 janvier 1939, l'Allemagne met à la disposition de la Turquie un crédit de 150 millions de R.M. pour 10 ans.

[21] « Le nouveau cours des relations franco-turques et l'affaire du sandjak d'Alexandrette 1921-1939 », abrégé (sans les références d'archives) dans *Relations Internationales*, n° 19, 1979, pp. 355-374 ; intégral, dans *Annales du Levant*, n° 1, 1985, pp. 98-130 ; repris dans *La France et la Méditerranée...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 613-638. Il existe une copieuse littérature sur le sujet notamment en français, en anglais, en italien, en turc.

[22] Ce traité ne sera jamais ratifié.

[23] L. Blum à Rüstü Aras, le 18 janvier 1937.

[24] *Citations...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 123-124.

[25] Les premières troupes turques entrent dans le sandjak le 4 juillet.

[26] L'Assemblée se réunit le 2 septembre. Elle élit le président de l'Etat, Tayfur Sökmen, qui désigne le premier ministre Abdurrahman Melek. Le gouvernement est formé le 5 septembre.

[27] La France cède ainsi un territoire qui ne lui appartient pas (Art. 4 de la Charte du mandat).

[28] Le pacte germano-soviétique du 23 août 1939 vient considérablement compliquer la tâche de la diplomatie turque. Néanmoins l'accord tripartite anglo-franco-turc sera signé le 19 octobre 1939.

[29] *Citations...*, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

[30] *Ib.*, p. 118.

[31] J. THOBIE, *Phares ottomans et emprunts turcs 1904-1961*, Ed. Richelieu, Publ. de la Sorbonne, 1972, p. 180.

Romania and the Great Powers on the Eve of War (Tilea's Case)

Gh. Buzatu, Marusia Cîrstea

Numerous syntheses, monographs and specialty papers, memoirs or volumes of documents published after 1945 in England, Romania and in some other countries approach in more or less details the evolution of the political relation between London and Bucharest on the eve of the Second World War. At the same time we underline that important inedited documents are still, in diplomatic archives waiting to enter in the scientific circuit. As to the interpretation of the facts and the pointing of their significance we have to remark that, as it see-ms natural fact, the opinions of the specialists is not always in agreement. A single *moment* (being, at the same time a single case) makes an exception: March, 17, 1939, V. V. Tilea's step at the *Foreign Office* to obtain British assistance in favor of Romania. Without considering that this fact was a climax – it being rather a *test* of Anglo-Romanian relations, the overwhelming majority of the specialists completely agree with the fact that V. V. Tilea's step is among the *reference points* of the general diplomacy during the inter-war epoch. Thus, according to Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott ; the authors of a classical book devoted to the appeasement thought that, he conference between Halifax and Tilea may be considered as one of the most important political events of the period between the two world wars"[1]. Naturally they had in view the consequences of Tilea's step carried out immediately after the occupation of Prague by Hitler for the re-orientation of England's policy towards the Third Reich and, for only several months, the place of London among the virtual enemies of Berlin in the

then future world war. The American historian Paul D. Quinlan concludes: Tilea's action provoked „a formidable change in British foreign policy"[2].

One can state that, far the present, the essential data of „Tilea case" are well known. Only one unknown factor persists – as it is known – : *who* telephoned him[3], in the morning of 17 March, 1939 to inform him on the forwarding of a German ultimatum to Romania? There have been various standpoints – we had one of our own[4] – but the problem cannot be considered as having been solved. Not to consider again the entire „Tilea case" we intend to subject to your attention – in the annex of our intervention – some of the most illustrative documents and some of the most /specialized opinions expressed by various specialists. The research of such materials gives a general image of the actual stage of the research work referring to the famous step of the Romanian Minister in London on 17 March, 1939. Consequently we propose ourselves that, without abusing the patience of the honored auditorium, to submit – as we already announced in the sub-title of our intervention – some conclusions and suggestions resorting to some inedited documents.

1. Today, all specialists agree on one point: during the spring of 1939 *there was no* ultimatum of Germany forwarded to Bucharest. Within the Romanian-German economic negotiations held in Bucharest the representatives of Berlin advanced daring proposals, resorted on pressures, but did not deliver – neither *de facto* nor *de jure* – any

ultimatum. It is worth remarking that on 17 March 1939 Tilea himself was extremely nuanced in all his diplomatic steps, insistently précising to the representatives of the *Foreign Office* that the German claims on Romania were only very similar with an ultimatum. Lord Halifax and his collaborators in their telegrams and declarations of those days understood exactly the content of – Tilea's words, underlining that: „These seemed to the Romanian Government something very much like an ultimatum"[5]; „These proposals took the form of an ultimatum"[6]; and Oliver Harvey, writing in his *diary* of Tilea's visits at the *Foreign Office* noted: „Romanian Minister (Tilea) called to see Secretary, of State and said that Germany was demanding *in the form of an ultimatum* a monopoly of Rumanian exports..."[7]

As it is known, willing or not (?), all the nuances concerning the ultimatum of Germany disappeared in the reports issued by the international press starting from 18 March 1939[8].

2. It is also known that Tilea himself showed Cadogan, on 18 March 1939, that the news about German pressures under the form of an ultimatum had reached him 24 hours before, by telephone, from Paris ; the source was not yet indicated by „cipher" : „He [Tilea] said – Cadogan noted immediately after the conference – that he received it from *a private source*, which, on further questioning, he declared to be *the general manager of a big Rumanian industrialist who had come especially to Paris to pass the news on to him*"[9]. The Canadian historian Sidney Aster indicated Max Auschnitt as the „private source" of Tilea, in the middle of March 1939 the big industrialist being actually in the capital of France[10].

Here we need to reveal that some historians indicate other sources : Telford Taylor, for example, does not ignore, recently, that on 17 March, 1939 Tilea met the representatives of „The Times" and „The Daily Telegraph"[11]. A recent document discovered by us in the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bucharest confirms the following facts: on 20 March

1939, Dianu, the Romanian Minister in Moscow communicated to Grigore Gafencu that he had met the British Ambassador in the capital of USSR and that the latter had told, him that : „the Romanian Minister in London, made a necessary step at the Foreign Office on the basis of the information given by the correspondent of „Times" (about whom Litvinov told me)..."[12]

'3. It is also known what happened after Tilea's step : the denial by Bucharest of the news about the German ultimatum; the temporary recall of the Romanian diplomat to his country etc., etc. Why did Tilea act in the known manner that is very decidedly and courageously? Some specialists revealed that the Romanian diplomat had „very large commissions" (Sidney Aster): King Carol II, Premier Armand Călinescu, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Grigore Gafencu. We must add to the known documents Gafencu's speech at the lunch offered in honor of Tilea by the „Anglo-Romanian" society‧ on the occasion of his appointment as Minister in London (17 January, 1939): Tilea's nomination – Gafencu declared – represented „the honor of a faithfulness", and he was to make of himself in England .the interpreter of Romanian feelings of sympathy and high esteem"[13]. The most recent studies attest that as soon as he arrived in London, Tilea decidedly acted to obtain England's economic, financial and political assistance for the support of Romania as against the pretences and the plans of Germany[14]. Moreover, the Romanian diplomat was to take another step – after 45 days – as a consequence of the occupation of Czechoslovakia and the future vision of German danger for Romania. He did not prove – as some of his ex-collaborators reproached him – „lack of experience"[15], but, in difficult circumstances he took steps, on his own responsibility"[16] being preoccupied with the fate of his own country and to avoid the German danger as well as with the success of his mission in the British capital[17].

4. The news on the German ultimatum was denied by the Romanian Government the day after Tilea's step. But if we consider Tilea's step as it actually was – German pressures

very much like an, ultimatum – we become aware that the Romanian diplomat was not wrong and that he did not resort to *a bluff*. This side of the fact was recognized as such even by those who repudiated him in March 1939 from various reasons! The American historian David B. Funderburk, the today's United States Ambassador in Bucharest, noticed : „It would be more exact to affirm that in fact what he (Tilea) had said was *misinterpreted or exaggerated*. Anyway, taking into account the Romanian-German economic agreement of 23 March 1939 and the subsequent relations between Berlin and Bucharest Tilea's apprehension proved to be reasonable. [...] King Carol II repeated Tilea's anxieties [...] Moreover, Alex Cretzianu, the general secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was sent to London „officially to guide Tilea who could not be trusted ; but, in fact, to let British know that Tilea had said them the truth" (A. Chanady, J. Jensen)[18]. An inedited document from Romanian diplomatic archives attests that Grigore Gafencu himself – he is said to have been in disagreement with Tilea in March 1939[19] – entirely confirmed the apprehensions of the Romanian Minister in London and he did it only three days after Tilea's step at the *Foreign Office*. Thus, on 20 March 1939 Gafencu sent to Gh. Tătărescu, Romanian Ambassador in Paris, a „top confidential and personal" report. I selected from this document which might have been the basis of a step of the Romanian diplomat at the French Cabinet the following paragraphs:

„I have been asked from several sides about Romania's attitude and policy in these moments of general anxiety. I have also been asked to precise our attitude in view of a possible common action of the Western Powers to re-establish the equilibrium and to enforce the security of the European states.

I am authorized to clarify the standpoint of the Romanian government in this way:

1. Romania is decided to defend her boundaries and independence. Any touch of our frontiers will mean armed defense.

2. Without being imminent, the danger is not out of question. There are general reasons for anxiety. We also have got information about concentrations of exceptional forces – German troops in Slovakia, Hungarian troops near our frontiers – which directly concern us [...] Romania carried out so far military preparations not to be surprised by events.

3. Romania guarded and guards against a policy towards Germany which might be regarded as provoking. Any action of this kind would quicken the rhythm of political and military actions of Germany and would hasten the events which would find us and the Western Powers on unfavorable and unfinished defending position.

Consequently, we do not believe the necessity of a Pact of mutual assistance.

But we do believe that both for us and for the general ambiance of European policy it is necessary that the Great Western Powers let by their own initiative know in a most précised way that they do not admit new changes of frontiers and territories; in Europe and that they are decided to help us with all their military forces to defend our frontiers [...]

5. Due to the above mentioned things, we want to be known that in order that our resistance could be more efficient and the value of the guarantee of our borders more real it is necessary that Romania should be helped as quickly and perfectly as possible in her efforts of arming preparations. This is more so as due to the disappearance of Czechoslovakia all our orders in the course of execution and deliverance to this country are suspended and might be cancelled..."[20].

Bearing in mind paragraphs 2 and 5 of this report and taking into account the general tone of the document I can draw the conclusion that Gafencu himself was on Tilea's tracks this time he was the one to alert the. French government!

5. We appeal again to David B. Funderburk findings: „*Much more important than* the question if Tilea exaggerated or if the reports on his declarations have been misinterpreted *was the reaction of British government*"[21]. The author brings about as an argument documents from the archive of London Cabinet, documents which attest that „Tilea's timely indiscretion influenced British policy"[22].

Leaving for our British colleagues to determine at what degree Tilea's action provoked a change of attitude of Her Majesty's Government –, a fact so much commented by numerous specialists, considered even by A. J. P. Taylor[23] – it is worth mentioning that after the Romanian Minister's conference with Halifax, the *Foreign Office* promptly reacted setting in motion its entire gearing just during the night of 17/18 March 1939. The aim was but one : to understand which was the attitude of the interested states to prevent the change of Romania into a victim of the Third Reich? On the basis of British diplomatic documents already published and of the Romanian ones I investigated this aspect so that I shall no longer insist upon it[24]. In connection with this it appears another problem : after the repudiation of the news about the German ultimatum and the short re-call of Tilea to Bucharest the British government was asked by the Romanian government not to lose its confidence in the Minister accredited to London. Actually, as it is known, Her Majesty's Cabinet, *Foreign Office* remained in, best contacts with V. V. Tilea until the end of his official mission in Lon-don in the Fall of 1940 when the Romanian diplomat decided to remain in England during hostilities as a sign of hostility towards I. Antonescu's dictatorship. Such a situation, it is important to underline would not have been possible if : 1. in March 1939 Tilea had launched a false alarm a fact that would have compromised him in the eyes of British authorities ; 2. the British government had not „profited" after Tilea's action in the meaning I revealed here in the above quoted paper, that the action of the Romanian diplomat could represent in March 1939 *„not the impetus, but the necessary alibi"* for the abandonment of the conciliatorism with Hitler[25]. Several documents during the years of the War prove that Tilea continued to enjoy the esteem of British officialdom. At the –beginning of

1941, the British Press („The Daily Sketch", 28.03.1941) released, the news that „The Romanian Committee" initiated and led by Tilea would have been possibly „sponsored by the British government"[26]. As it is known it was only an approach : „The Romanian National Committee" which was to play at a certain moment the role of an exiled Romanian government in London did not survive. Overconfident in the advice and actions of Iuliu Maniu, the British authorities – and consequently the ones of the United States – did not admit such a committee and less than that Tilea as its leader. Iuliu Maniu and Grigore Gafencu had expressed their doubt concerning Tilea[27] due to the fact that in Romania the ex-diplomat did not enjoy a good reputation being considered as the „collaborator of King Carol II"[28]. But in England Tilea enjoyed the support and encouragement of numerous sincere friends, his initiative being supported by the celebrated professor Seton Watson[29]. When it appeared the problem of the leadership of the „Free Romanian Movement", Tilea's name was the one most insistently pronounced[30] a fact that proves that the British had no doubts as to „his sincerity and honesty"[31].

We are convinced that such British manifestations for the advantage of Tilea in 1941 would not have been explainable if, two years before the ex-Minister of the Romanian Legation in London had acted as an „unexperienced" or without a real basis. We can, therefore, conclude that even under this last aspect V. V. Tilea's action of 17 March 1939 was fully justified and correctly interpreted by the British officials.

The last problem we should like to insist: In 1998, in London, were published the **_Memoirs_** of the Romanian diplomat, and surely the book represents the veritable „the epilogue" of the so-called *Tilea's case*. We publish in the annex a chapter from Tilea's **_Memoirs_**.

ANNEX

Tilea's Bombshell[32]

Coming three days after the occupation of Prague, the leaking of the news that pressure was being exerted to subjugate Romania economically caused a great stir in London and rage in Berlin. In Bucharest, Gafencu was furious. Later that day Viorel was summoned by Sir Alexander Cadogan to the Foreign Office. Their conversation is here given in full[33]:

'*I asked the Romanian Minister to call this afternoon and I read to him most of Sir R. Hoare's telegram No. 45. I said that, in view of the statement which he had made last night to the Secretary of State and to myself about the so-called German ultimatum, this denial of it, coming from the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, was rather disconcerting, and I asked him whether he could give me any further explanation of the situation.*

M. Tilea produced a telegram from his Minister for Foreign Affairs in Romanian, of which he read out a translation to the effect that he was to give a categorical denial of the story of an ultimatum and that the negotiations with the German Government were continuing <<within the cadre which he knew>>'.

He then went on to explain to me that he was quite convinced that the story of the ultimatum was true, but he added that it had been presented by the Germans about ten days before the recent Czech crisis and had been turned down at once by the Romanian Government. He said that he had received it from a private source, which, on further questioning, he declared to be the general manager of a big Romanian industrialist, who had come specially to Paris to pass the news on to him. He added that he had recently written to the Romanian Minister of Economics, referring to this ultimatum and urging that the Romanian Government should hold out against it. The Minister of Economics had rung him up this morning to say that discussions with the Germans were continuing on questions of principle: that they were not discussing details and that he hoped to continue discussion of general principles in order to gain time.

I said that it was not clear to me that M. Tilea had at any time obtained knowledge of the ultimatum directly from his Government. He observed that the Minister of Economics, in speaking to him this morning in reference to his letter, had not denied the ultimatum. I observed that he had equally, if the substance of his remarks had been given correctly to me, not confirmed the truth of the report. Nothing would shake M. Tilea as to the truth of his story about the ultimatum. He said that there were many cross-currents in Romania, but that he was convinced that it was true that the ultimatum had been presented and had been refused: his fear was that the refusal might not be maintained. He saw that it was somewhat disconcerting for us to have this conflict on information: he himself realised that he was in a delicate position: he did not mind so much about his position vis-à-vis the authorities in Bucharest, but he was afraid that his position here might be compromised. I said that I hoped that that would not be the case. It was perhaps possible to believe that there was some truth in both stories. According to him this ultimatum had been presented some little time ago and had been rejected out of hand and, therefore, if that had disappeared as a basis of negotiation, it was perhaps possible for the Romanian Minister for Foreign Affairs to say now that <<economic negotiations with the Germans were proceeding on completely normal lines>>. Indeed, if that were the case, his remark that <<the tone of the German negotiations was more conciliatory since the Czech coup than before>> was for the moment true.

Finally M. Tilea said that he thought that on the whole the appearance of this story in the press in London had not done any harm.

In taking leave of me, he referred to his representations in favour of a loan to Romania and he explained that he had not informed his Government that he had put this proposal to us. He felt that in the case of a refusal that would dishearten his Government and might have a very bad effect in Bucharest.

On the whole I do not think that my interview with M. Tilea increased my confidence in him'.

From his closing remark it is obvious that Sir Alexander Cadogan did not believe Viorel, and a number of historians, including A.J.P. Taylor in his Origins of the Second World War, were to follow suit, doubting the veracity of his statement and considering the mysterious telephone call as a complete fabrication. He was called a warmonger, and the Nazi press accused him of lying. The Volkischer Beobachter declared it a conspiracy between Vansittart and Tilea.

Viorel could not disclose the names of the two intermediaries who had transmitted the message, which he thought emanated from King Carol with the full knowledge of Prime Minister Calinescu (who was also Minister of Defence and Minister of the Interior) and of Gafencu. This is why, when passing on the telephone message to Lord Halifax on 17 March, Viorel thought he was speaking in the name of Government, that wanted to act unofficially so as not to precipitate a German attack before the mechanism of a West-East alliance could be established. His initiative had been to disclose it to the press, as he thought the British Government would act too slowly. Great was his surprise at Gafencu's angry denial, and at being recalled to Bucharest on the 19th. This means that he was wrong to have supposed that Gafencu knew of the private message sent to him. It seems he wanted to replace Viorel with Raoul Bossy but the King refused, because to him Viorel represented Transylvanian youth – an unlikely reason for keeping an envoy in London[34]. That same day Marthe Bibesco was told by Malcolm MacDonald, son of Ramsay MacDonald, one of the many leading figures smitten by her at some stage, that King Carol had sent on S.O.S. to King George VI, so she thought Tilea was right to be worried[35].

While London was seething with diplomatic activity – the departure of the German Ambassador, arrival of Sir Nevile Henderson from Berlin, various ambassadors calling on Lord Halifax, such as Corbin (France), Kennedy (U.S.A.) and Maisky (U.R.S.S.) – Viorel stayed at his Legation and sent a telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bucharest on 19 March: <<I consider it my duty to inform Your Excellency that the publication of the demand

information has woken public opinion to reality... people were beginning to get accustomed to Czechoslovakia's destruction, which was taken as a fait accompli. It also stopped British public opinion becoming accustomed to swallowing any poison given in instalments. At the same time, it showed the whole Anglo-Saxon world that Romania existed, and would resist being crushed from any side, and it crystallised the public's belief that a further extension of German domination in the South-East was inadmissible. All this has created a huge wave of sympathy for Romania... Those who know the Nazi outlook stressed the fact that the publication may have stopped pressure on us, for the time being, for their plan has been revealed in all its brutality>>[36].

The Prime Minister, Calinescu, having telephoned to say everything was all right, Viorel was in no particular hurry to return to Bucharest as an East-West alliance was taking shape. His friends rallied round him.

On Monday, 20 March, Viorel's day was full of phone calls and meetings, but he had some relief in the evening at a dinner of the Worshipful Company of Coachmakers, whose Master, Mr. Peter Croall, was a Scot. Next day The Scotsman described the event: 'The Romanian Minister was given an ovation notable for its warmth and length. M. Tilea, who referred to the <<still hopeful discussions>> which were taking place, interested the Company by his references to the ties between the northern parts of his country and Scotland. In Transylvania they wore the kilt, though it was a few inches longer, they played the pipes, they had haggis, and they performed the sword dance'.

In the manuscript of his diary (kept at Balliol College, Oxford) Harold Nicolson noted, in his entry for March 20, that everyone seemed puzzled by Tilea's ultimatum. He himself suspected that the story of the ultimatum came from Bucharest at the highest level.

'King Carol... sent on S.O.S. to Tilea who being perhaps over-zealous had rushed off to the Foreign Office-al They had tried to mobilize the Balkans. Hitler on hearing of this told Wohlthat to withdraw his ultimatum and force the Romanian Government to assert that no ultimatum had been delivered. In fact they back out without appearing to lose face. But poor Tilea will be accused of impulsiveness.

March 21. In the evening Baldwin-Webb and I have arranged a dinner for Tilea. Some sixty members turn up and many of them are crowded out and have to dine upstairs. Tilea makes a dull and discreet speech and is afterwards asked the most indiscreet questions. He answers them extremely well and in fact makes a splendid impression. He says definitely that if Romania is invaded the Romanians will fight'.

Earlier that day Viorel had sent a coded telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bucharest: *'For the urgent attention of H.M. the King. Yesterday's Cabinet meeting decided in principle that Romania should be helped, and authorized Lord Halifax to start negotiations for the formation of an Eastern Pact of mutual assistance.*

Halifax decided to work with extreme speed and sent the proposal to Paris, Moscow and Warsaw yesterday, so as to draw up first a common declaration, that in their desire to maintain peace they are in favour of guaranteeing the frontiers of other countries too, that might join in. That is the gist – I have not yet seen the next. Then a conference would be called of all the interested powers. Here firm optimism is shown, particularly as the first soundings had favourable results. Yesterday's speech by Lord Halifax – who also mentioned the denial made by the Romanian Government – proves this. The Conservative Party clearly told the Government that it favoured this policy to block Germany's advance, of which they are now convinced here.

I would like to point out to your Excellency, that the foreign correspondents of the great English dailies in Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest and Warsaw reported to their papers their impression that Germany intends, for economic reasons, to bring Romania into the orbit of the German Empire in the course of this year, using force if necessary. Besides, some members of the German Embassy here have expressed the same views for some time. In case of a war, both the food situation in Germany, as well as the urgent need of oil for the air force and for mechanized transport, would be the main motives. This opinion is shared here by all the political and military circles who urge quick action.

In the course of yesterday and today, it was confirmed to me in government, parliamentary, financial and diplomatic circles that the

conviction is growing among British public opinion that Romania constitutes a vital point for the British Empire, which must be defended at once...

In my opinion, it would be a grave mistake if today, when we can no longer have any confidence in Germany's words and when we may expect anything from them, we did not benefit from the support which England – and others – are prepared to give us not only in writing, but also in practice. We can no longer pursue a policy of perfect balance today, not when the Western Powers have come to a decision. To ignore their initiative would hand us over to Germany with all its inevitable consequences, as seen by what happened to another state.

The creation of this pact between East and West does not imply an aggressive hostility towards Germany, but the creation of a strong basis on which to make a final attempt to reach a compromise for avoiding war. If your Excellency thinks that in the present circumstances, which are developing with unusual speed, it is of vital necessity that I should absent myself from London, I shall comply, although I am convinced that in the difficult moments through which the whole world is passing only quick actions and results count, and those are best achieved here'[37].

The Star (21.3.39) made some perceptive comments:

'The shrewd and active M. Tilea, Romanian Minister in London, has become for the present the most noticeable of foreign diplomats in this city. His position is curious. Within a few days he has managed to persuade the British Government to take in his country an interest which King Carol failed to arouse during his visit last year. That is primarily due to the invasion of Czecho-Slovakia. Now M. Tilea finds himself compelled to exercise his persuasive powers on his own Government. In Bucharest there are two minds on the problem of openly joining a defensive European alliance. The two minds, I gather, are both in the head of King Carol himself and as he, too, is a dictator, the matter is not unimportant'.

[The next day the Star, under the heading London Envoy goes to Carol, wrote:] *'M. Tilea, Romanian Minister in London, is expected to arrive in Bucharest soon. He will report to King Carol and the Government on the latest*

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developments and will, it is understood, receive new instructions. Trade talks between Germany and Romania, which were expected to have resulted in the signing of a limited agreement today, have come to a halt. Herr Wohlthat, head of the German delegation, is leaving for Berlin to obtain fresh instructions'.

In the event Wohlthat did not return to Berlin, and after an all-night session, the trade agreement with Germany was signed on 23 March, the Romanian Government claiming that it did not infringe Romania's independence. On that day Viorel was on his way to Bucharest. A fortnight later he was back at his post in London.

The first vindication of Viorel came some months later in a telegram to Lord Halifax from Sir Reginald Hoare in Bucharest on 21 November 1939[38].

'1. I have the honour to transmit herewith a record of conversation, communicated to me by Monsieur Wenger, between Colonel Radulescu, Head of the Bureau of Industrial Mobilisation of the Army, and Monsieur Marinescu, Chairman of the Concordia Oil Company, with whom Monsieur Wenger is in close relations.

2. I do not know Colonel Radulescu personally, but Colonel Macnab entirely shares Monsieur Wenger's view that, though he may have an exaggerated sense of his own importance, he is certainly a man of great ability and driving power.

3. It will be remembered that on March 17th last... the Romanian Minister informed Your Lordship that the German Government had presented certain economic demands to the Romanian Government which the latter <<was disposed to regard as in the nature of an ultimatum>>.

4. It will further be remembered that both Monsieur Gafencu, and subsequently also the King to whom I spoke in accordance with your instructions, categorically denied that any communications had been received from Germany which could remotely be regarded as an ultimatum. In spite of these denials, Monsieur Tilea, as you informed me in your telegram No. 44 of March 19th, maintained that whatever might be said to me here, his statement had been essentially correct.

5. I would draw your attention to the fact that what Colonel Radulescu is recorded as having said on the subject of Romanian

mobilisation in March is substantially confirmed by my Military Attaché's reports, ending with my telegram No. 66 of March 22nd. The conclusion appears to be that the language held in London by Monsieur Tilea corresponded more closely with the facts than that held to me by either the Minister for Foreign Affairs or the King himself, though why the King should be willing to give in London information which he withheld here is not readily comprehensible.

[There follows the gist of Radulescu's conversation with Marinescu about what happened in Bucharest on 18 March. At the time Radulescu was still a Major]. On that day at 11 p.m. he was at a friend's house when he was urgently called to the General Staff by the Commander-in-Chief, as the King had asked the Commander-in-Chief's opinion about how possible it was to resist German pressure. The General Staff officers hesitated. The Commander-in-Chief, however, asked Major Radulescu to voice his opinion as being the youngest officer there. He answered they should not hesitate, they should resist at all costs and added: <<It is not a question of finding out whether we can resist. What we do is not for results but for history. If we are crushed, by having tried to resist, we will have preserved our rights>>'.

The Head of the General Staff went to see the King at midnight, after he had just seen all his Ministers. They had all advised him to give way.

During his absence the discussion amongst the officers of the General Staff continued and Major Radulescu won them all over. When the General came back he was told of this unanimous opinion. He then went back to the King and it was decided to call up class 5 [of army reservists] immediately and orders were sent out to all the General Staff bureaux to prepare for resistance. When on 20 March German sent a sort of ultimatum it was answered by calling up five more classes.

Since that date, Major Radulescu seems to have acquired considerable influence, not only with the General Staff but also with the King. As the facts above are the result of one man's account, they need to be verified, but in any case, they show an interesting state of mind in the Romanian General Staff.

An interesting side-light concerns a secretary at the German Legation in Bucharest

called Schmidt. In a letter (13 June 1939) from Sir Reginald Hoare to Maurice Ingham at the Foreign Office, the death of Schmidt in April 1939 is reported, ostensibly because he 'chattered about the famous <<Tilea ultimatum>> [39]. (This document was discovered and a copy sent to Viorel by Sidney Aster).

The written proof of the actual existence of the mysterious telephone call and its content came in 1957 from an unlikely source – the office of a Counsellor at Law in Washington, Jacques Wasserman, who sent Viorel a United States Department of Justice Immigration and Naturalization Service questionnaire on behalf of his client, Nicolae Malaxa, who wanted to become a U.S. citizen. After asking whether he was the Romanian Minister <<stationed in London, England>> in 1939, and whether he was engaged in this capacity at the time the Commercial Treaty of 23 March 1939 was being signed between Romania and Germany, also whether he knew Nicolae Malaxa, and when he first became acquainted with him, it goes on to ask:

Prior to the execution of the 1939 Treaty, did Malaxa send Adrian Dumitrescu to Paris to telephone you?

Did Dumitrescu then advise you be phone of the German economic demands which Clodius [the German negotiator] handed to the Romanian Government?

Did you then use this information in conversation with the members of the British Government and did also advise the English Press of the same?

As a result, did Lord Halifax attempt to create a peace bloc against Germany and did Anglo-Saxon opinion become aware of the danger of German economic domination of Europe?

Is there any doubt in your mind of Malaxa's sincere opposition to the German Commercial Treaty of 1939? (etc.)

To refresh Viorel's memory Wasserman also enclosed a copy of a letter Viorel had written to Malaxa on 1st July 1946, when he heard the latter was in Paris. Each of the questions above was based on a statement Viorel made is this letter, starting with <<you will remember that a few days after Hitler took Prague, in March 1939, you sent M. Adrian Dumitrescu to Paris to telephone me from there all the details of the German economic demands which Clodius handed over to the Romanian Government>>. He then went on to remind Malaxa of the use he made of the information. He concluded that, in order not to endanger his life under German occupation, he had of course never disclosed Malaxa's name, but asked for permission to do so now, both in conversation and in writing.

Malaxa was an important industrialist in Romania in 1939, so obviously he did not want the Romanian economy limited just to agriculture. He was growing in favour with King Carol at the time, and must have offered his services to transmit the message to Viorel by private means. Adrian Dumitrescu was Malaxa's General Manager. So what Viorel told Lord Halifax on 17 March 1939 and Sir Alexander Cadogan on 18 March 1939 (without giving names) was true. The telephone call was no fabrication.

NOTES:

[1] Martin Gilbert, Richard Gott, *Conciliatorii*, Bucureşti, 1966, p. 306.

[2] Dr. Paul D. Quinlan, *The Tilea Affair: A Further Inquiry*, in „Balkan Studies", Vol. 19 (1), Thessaloniki, 1978, p. 155; idem, *Clash over Romania, British and American Policies towards Romania : 1938-1947*, Los Angeles, 1977, p. 41.

[3] See, in annex, the *Memoirs* of V. V. Tilea.

[4] Gh. Buzatu, *Dosare ale războiului mondial (1939-1945)*, Iaşi, 1978, pp. 11-43, 222-235.

[5] *Ibidem*, pp. 224-225.

[6] Halifax – 18.III.1939 (Arhivele Statului Bucureşti, fond *Microfilme Anglia*, rola 5, c. 43).

[7] John Harvey (Ed.), *The Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver Harvey 1937-1940*, London, 1970, p. 262.

[8] Gh. Buzatu, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

[9] Gh. Buzatu, Valeriu Dobrinescu, *Din arhiva istorică a României contemporane*, I, in *AIIAI*, XX, 1983, p. 348.

[10] Sidney Aster, *1939: The Making of the Second World War*, London, 1973, p. 72.

[11] Telford Taylor, *Munich, the Price of Peace*, New York, 1980, pp. 959-960.

[12] Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe al României, Bucureşti, fond 71 1920. 1944. U.R.S.S. Relaţii cu România, vol. 86 (1939), f. 121 (telegr. no. 778).

[13] *Ibidem*, fond 71/România: General, vol. 6, f. 28.

[14] M. I. Rooke, *The Concept of Political Trading in Peacetime. The British Government and Trade with South-Eastern Europe, 1938-39*, in RESEE, 2/XXII, 1984, pp. 191-192.

[15] See Paul D. Quinlan, *Clash over Romania*, p. 42.

[16] Ian Colvin, *Vansittart in Office*, London – New York, 1963, pp. 299-300.

[17] Sidney Aster, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

[18] David Britton Funderburk, *Politica Marii Britanii faţă de România 1938-1940. Studiu asupra strategiei economice şi politice*, Bucureşti, 1933, pp. 96-97.

[19] Cf. Sidney Aster, *op. cit.*, pp. 72, 396.

[20] Arhiva M.A.E., fond 71/1920-1944, U.R.S.S. Relaţii cu România, vol. 86 (1939), f. 124-126 (Report No. 18 255/20.III. 1939).

[21] David Britton Funderburk, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

[22] *Ibidem*.

[23] A. J. P. Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War*, Second Edition, New York, 1979, p. 200.

[24] Gh. Buzatu, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-35.

[25] *Ibidem*, p. 43.

[26] PRO, FO 3711/ 29978 (Philip Nichols to Sir Maurice Peterson, London 5.IV.1941).

[27] PRO, FO 371/29977 (Rex A. Leeper to Sir Orme Sargent, London/14.III.1941); *ibidem* (Sir Stafford Cripps to Foreign Office, Moscow, telegr. no. 205/7.III.1941).

[28] *Ibidem* (R. Hoare to Philip Nichols, Bucharest /4.I.1941).

[29] PRO, FO 371/29976 (Philip Nichols to Sir Orme Sargent, London/20.II.1941).

[30] PRO, FO 371/29977 (Donald Bell to Philip Nichols, London/24.II.1941).

[31] PRO, FO 371/29977 (Rex A. Leeper to Sir Orme Sargent, London/14.III.1941).

[32] Viorel Virgil Tilea, *Envoy Extraordinary. Memoirs of a Romanian Diplomat*, edited by Ileana Tilea, London, Haggerston Press, 1998, pp. 219-227).

[33] Document C358, initialled and dated 18.3.1939 by the Foreign Secretary.

[34] Raoul Bossy, *Amintiri din viaţa diplomatică*, vol. II, Humanitas Publishers, ed. Stelian Neagoe, pp. 130-131.

[35] Marthe Bibescu, *Jurnal Politic 1939-1941*, p. 55.

[36] Tilea 582.

[37] Tilea 589.

[38] Document stamped R10674, 23.11.1939, pp. 224-225, headed *Very Confidential*.

[39] F.O. 371/23832.

The Legitimacy of Nasser's Ideology during Eisenhower Administration

Cristina Nedelcu

The purpose of our work is to establish a schedule of the evolution of Gamal Abdel Nasser's ideology during a part of Dwight Eisenhower's second administration. From a chronological point of view, the period stretches from 1955 to 1958, where the first year of this limit represents the moment when Nasser actually took the political power and 1958 was the moment of obvious deterioration of American-Egyptian relations.

Our intention is to answer to the following question: did Eisenhower's foreign policy in Middle East help the creation of a favorable framework for Nasserism's legitimacy? In order to ask to this question, we shall focus mainly on two moments: 1956 and 1958.

First of all, it is necessary to present the explanation of some concepts, which are going to be used in this text.

The ideology of Egyptian president was called Nasserism, which is the political and social attitude of Arabs from many countries, who regarded Gamal Abdel Nasser as the leader of all Arabs, and republican Egypt as the prototype of a nation progressing towards national freedom and social justice. This movement takes its inspiration from the personality, actions and utterances of Nasser[1]. This ideology, gradually developed, mostly after its promoter got Arabs admiration for his daring political acts, most of them against Western interests in Middle East. The Nasserism required for Arab nationalism and pan-Arabism, neutrality (idea which during this period became to described feelings against West and pro-Soviets), and Arab socialism.

In establishing a definition for the Arab nationalism, we should keep in mind the continuous change of signification of the word "Arab". If centuries ago, this word described the people from Arab Peninsula's tribes, during Nasser's time the Arab language became the most important aspect of the definition and, as well, the cultural and historical heritage got through the Arabization process combined with Arab's geographical heterogeneous area.

In the early times, the creation of Arab nationalism was influenced by the penetration of Western civilization to Middle Eastern area and, inspired by the XIX-th century European liberation and romantic nationalism. The Arab nationalism idea clarified after the First World War, since during the previous century it was marked by proto-nationalism[2].

During the period of time between the two World Wars, Arab Nationalism asked for liberation from foreign influence and for the creation of a great Arab state (there had been many such projects known as "Great Syria"). After the Second World War and 1948 War, Arab nationalism doctrine had two shapes: Nasserism and Ba'athism. Both ways of expression had the same request:" Arab unity, liberty, socialism and revolution", and, as well, they had the same tendency to undermine rival regimes. The totalitarian approach of the political system was supported by the structure of one party and a single ideology. Still, there had been differences between Nasserism and Ba'athism[3], which with the time passing became more obvious and after Syrian-Egyptian union broke in 1961, had turned to direct clashes between the two movements.

Pan-Arabism was an element of the nationalism's doctrine, which had spoke for

solidarity, cooperation and political unity. After the mid of 50's, Nasser developed a pan-Arab policy, through which he had tried to impose Egypt's hegemony in the entire Arab Middle East. Despite the many projects of Arab unification[4], the Arab States League was the only inter-Arab cooperation structure which survived during time.

Arab socialism was Nasser's official doctrine for Egypt's internal and social affairs. Its main characteristics referred to the growth of Egyptian people's income, the development of social legislation in fields such as health, education and the protection of workers rights, the nationalization of basic industries and foreign trade and the planned economy. Unlike communism, Arab socialism allowed the private property over the production tools, in some fields encouraged national capitalism and strongly rejected the nationalization of agricultural properties. Arab socialism didn't reject openly the Islamic religion, and even presented itself to the masses as a form of applying some religious precepts, such as the equality between umma[5]'s members.

In order to answer to the question on which is based this article it is necessary to establish the chronology of the creation and the search of legitimacy of Nasserism. Concerning the Egyptian policy we should point that one of the most important moments of their post Second World War period is the July 1952 Revolution.

In the Arab world during the 50's it had been a decade of coup d'etats, which had started in 1949 in Syria with colonel Zaim's violent action. As a common characteristic of these movements is that those who took the power came from the military structures or had been its allies, and were the members of the generation, which had reached maturity age during 30's or the beginning of 40's, when they had been put out the political system by the old elites and the colonial establishment[6]. The alliance with the military structures was absolutely necessary not only because they needed instruments of action, but as well because the Army was a symbol of dignity and national pride. National armies were recent creations in the Arab environment; in Egypt's case the Military Academy opened for everybody in 1936 and the first generation of graduates were the officers (The Young Officers) who took the political power in 1952.

While Nasser's group took quite easy the political power from 1955 on, after General Neguib's departure, his main problem had been his legitimacy. In order to gather prestige, considered as a source of legitimacy, Nasser had to establish a system of ideas which answered people's needs and expectations and then to apply it in internal and foreign policy. In which concerns Nasser, the problem of legitimacy has to be analyzed separately on both Egyptian and Arab levels. Nasser was the charismatic leader, who managed to mobilize political the Egyptian masses and then, by underlying in his speeches ideas like unity, the restoration of past times Arab glory, he appealed the Arab population too. The great popularity he received from Arabs after the Bandung Conference and Suez crisis made him the leader of Arab world. In other words, he had started to gain legitimacy first on Egyptian level and then he had moved to the Arab circle.

The period of Nasserism's creation and search for legitimacy started in 1955 and ended in 1961 when the United Arab Republic broke. As many authors underlined the period 1958-1961 is the peak of Nasser's ideology.

Nasser got masses support by resorting to Arab past glory and by announcing his intention to recover it. Seven years after 1952 Revolution he told to Egyptian people that the people and the army are "those who in such a short time accomplished glorious pages of history" such as "king's expulsion, who had spread corruption around the country; the expulsion of imperialists and above all they've put the foundation of glory, liberty and dignity."[7]

In reaching the status of Arab leader (not just Egyptian leader) he had to develop spectacular actions in foreign policy field, but also in the internal policy. His interior policy was marked by the Arab socialism's principles and their application turned in a source of legitimacy even in the foreign field, since republican Egypt became the model to follow by all Arabs. Socialism was a new phenomenon in Middle East. The Arab version represented an ideological adaptation of Socialism to Egypt's needs. Before the 60's the idea was spread mainly inside the intellectual group, because the political segment was preoccupied with problems as independence, while the social aspect was secondary on their lists. The socialism was an attractive idea for the Young

Officers because they had theirs origins in the middle or low social structures, which had been ignored by the traditional political leadership. In Egypt the Young Officers had observed the corruption of the liberal democratic system and the fanatic approach of "Muslim Brotherhood". They concluded that the solution for all social problems could be only a new ideology, which represented the real democracy and social justice. For them Arab socialism was:

1. The symbol of real independence. Since the European companies still had the control of Middle Eastern economy even after these countries had granted their political independence, the solution of nationalization and establishing the planned economy (supported be Arab socialism) had made these new governments to declare the full political and economic independence;
2. The symbol of modernity. It was an ideology that hadn't been used before, so it became prove that a country which had applied Arab socialism hadn't been backward anymore.
3. A way to introduce new values into Arab world such as equality, sharing of goods, cooperation, which were considered to be superior to those promoted by the capitalism world, where the individual existence was underlined[8].

The Aswan Dam, the industrialization programs and the agrarian reform are examples practicing Arab socialism's principles. For Nasser Aswan Dam was the symbol of "determination and decision of the entire Arab nation to carry his self-taken task of building the great, free home"[9]. Still, its principles couldn't solve the most important of Egyptian society "that another 175.000 people were to be born in the country that month and they had to be fed"[10].

Arab socialism was a way to gain popularity beyond Egyptian borders. In other words, we can say that Nasser's prestige in Arab world was first obtained involuntary and then in a second phase he started to build purposeful activities — most of them in foreign policy field — to enhance prestige. These activities were:

1. The Bandung Conference (April 1955), the moment which stands as the beginning of an Egyptian active foreign policy, Nasser strongly opposed colonialism and foreign domination. His first success in

this field was in 1954 when, after the negotiations with Great Britain in order to conclude a new treaty, he obtained total withdrawn of the British troops from Egyptian territory. This was also the developing point of a new approach in foreign policy: the neutrality. Fundamental for this evolution of his future political acts had been the meetings with Tito and Nehru from February 1955. Mohammed Heikal wrote about those meetings and the admiration shared between one and another. His relation with Nehru became even better and stronger after Nasser had tried to find a peaceful solution for the conflict between India and China[11].

2. The arms deal with Czechoslovakia (September 1955), behind which had stood the Soviet Union, although in a declaration from September 30th 1955, after the treaty with Czechoslovakia had been signed, Nasser tried to put USSR aside this arms deal, underling that "we [the Egyptian people] have accepted the arms deal offered by Czechoslovakia on a pure commercial base. Therefore, it is not necessary an accord with USSR"[12].
3. The rejection of the Baghdad Pact (1954-1955), which Nasser considered to be a new type of British domination.
4. Building Aswan Dam, which Nasser presented as an all Arabs property.
5. The nationalization of Suez Company (1956).
6. The creation of United Arab Republic in 1958.

From Eisenhower point of view, USSR was e main enemy of USA. All his foreign policy actions were in the direction of an active containment and roll back of communism. Concerning Arab world he considered that the Americans had the mission to put some order into the chaos[13]. For him reaching peace in Middle East was synonymous with reducing the chances for Russians to go deeper in Arab world. Accordingly, if Nasser's foreign policy wasn't helpful for American interests then it became automatically pro-Russian.

On the other hand, during Nasser's time the Western states when analyzing Arab world's realities were strongly influenced by the contrast between Arab visions about building the great Arab nation and the conflict situation,

which developed inside the Arab system[14]. Eisenhower perceived the Middle Eastern area as one of contradictions. This perception was found in "Eisenhower Doctrine": Eisenhower and Dulles's geopolitical vision was concerned with the containment of communism, so the Middle East region was tied with containment—disregard for the aspirations and interests of the local populations and states. This was not a very successful strategy because the threats perceived by the regional states and those perceived by United States were different: Israel's threat were the Arabs and Israel the threat to the Arabs not the USSR.

During 1956 Suez Canal Crisis: the US demonstrated with its actions that: it wanted to exert more influence in the area (tough on Britain and France) and didn't consider Israel as its top ally in the area.

At the same time the US conception of Arabs and Palestinians has been negative in the above mentioned period of time:

1. their way of life threatens ours,
2. the historical animosity between Islam and Christianity,
3. the colonial and imperialist legacies,
4. they are anti-democratic/hence all the authoritarian regimes in the area,
5. they are terrorists

What a reader should keep in mind is the fact that in the period 1955-1958 Nasser was in an active search of legitimacy, while Eisenhower's intentions were to stop and to roll back communists, regardless the means he might've been forced to use.

In Eisenhower's policy in Middle East there are few moments which must be stressed, because they had helped Nasserism's legitimization.

After Nasser had signed the arms deal with Czechoslovakia, Eisenhower had perceived this as a Soviet advancement in Middle East. He wrote in his diary that "the Arabs, absorbing major consignments of arms from the Soviets are daily growing more arrogant and disregarding the interests of Western Europe and of the United States in the Middle East region"[15]. Assuming that his perception was correct Eisenhower decided over the necessity to isolate Egypt using two methods:

1. To support strongly Saudi Arabia up to the point where this country could've become Nasser's rival.

2. To withdraw the American financial aid for Aswan Dam.

Eisenhower believed that if the above two mentioned situation were realized then, eventually, Egypt would turn to USA. He thought that "if Egypt finds herself thus isolated from the rest of the Arab world, and with no ally in sight except Soviet Russia, she would quickly get sick of that prospect and would join us in the search for a just and decent peace in the region"[16].

While United States had this tough attitude, the Russian Foreign Ministry had had underlined in a declaration from April 16th 1955 — a declaration very well received by Nasser — the idea that the Western world was aggressive, while the Soviet government had always supported the legitimate requests of Middle and Near Eastern countries for national independence and sovereignty"[17].

Nasser felt any kind of pressure from the Russian side but he perceived the Americans as a new dominative power.

Eisenhower did not pay enough attention to Arab Nationalism's or Nasserism's success[18]. The Nasserism was a new movement and with growing popularity in Arab countries, while Saudi Arabia's Wahhabism[19] reached only one country. If the first movement had a political and a social program and ideals to achieve, the Wahhabism insisted only on society's morality aspects.

Among other things, which do not concern the subject of this paper, the official announcement of American's administration decision to stop financial for Aswan project made Nasser to react very harsh: he nationalized Suez Company. Through this action, Nasser achieved one of his political goals: the restoration of national property over the most symbolic remain of foreign domination. Although the war which broke soon after ended badly for Nasser on battlefields, he transformed it in a political victory. In 1956 he proved to all Arab masses that his political program considered by some to idealist can be achieved.

Eisenhower deepest fear was a direct confrontation with the Russians, so, in 1956 he contained not just the Soviets but also the British and French. Nasser used American position in his advantage, presented as a support was for Egyptian policy.

Another crucial moment was 1958 because of the creation of the United Arab Republic and the application of "Eisenhower Doctrine" in Lebanon.

The American administration received with doubts all the unification plans from Arab world, especially if they included Egypt, because they were afraid of positive neutrality's expansion[20]. In the first phase neutrality didn't mean communist advancement, but since they could not control Nasser, they hadn't had any guarantees about keeping the status quo.

For Nasser the situation from Lebanon represented a form of imperialist intrusion in Arab world. The American intervention in the name of "Eisenhower Doctrine" helped Nasser to create an atmosphere of insecurity by presenting within his speeches the danger of a new foreign occupation. Convinced that 1956 was still fresh in Arab people's minds he stressed the idea that he had been the only one who could've done something to prevent the "imperialist conquest". Arab unity under Nasser's leadership was presented and perceived as the only solution.

On this ground, the application of United Arab Republic project under Nasser's condition (total domination of this newly created structure by the Egyptians) became easy to do, although Syria had had the first initiative towards unification[21].

Sadat wrote that all this foreign policy actions made Nasser as popular as one of world's leaders[22].

Again, like in 1956, indirectly Eisenhower's foreign policy in Middle East helped Nasser's plans. The Egyptian leader talked to Arabs about the danger represented by Israel, supported by the Americans, and on the background of the situation from Lebanon, Nasser could sustained in front of the Arabs the "theory of a Western plot" against Arabs. In 1958 he got the prove he needed to show Western world's aggressive intentions.

Thanks to US position Nasser could say he had won his war with colonialism and foreign domination and had achieved a good part of the Arab unification plan. Through these achievements he put into practice some main goals of Nasserism and transformed it from a political idea in a legitimate state policy.

NOTES:

[1] Yaacov Shimoni and Evyatar Levind (eds.), *Political Dictionary of the Middle East in the Twentieth Century*, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, The Jerusalem Publishing House Ltd., Jerusalem, 1972, p. 270

[2] The word "Arabism" was first used by C. Ernest Dawn to describe early Arab nation's beliefs, which had been in contrast with the Ottoman's, the ideology from the final stage of the Ottoman Empire. Before First World War most of the Arabs kept the political loyalty towards the Ottoman Empire and had asked just for more autonomy for the Arab group. Also, they wanted to follow the economical and technological track of the European countries. From ideological and political points of view, the word Arabism concerns proto-nationalism, not full nationalism, which requires the constant, need of Arab people to separe themselves from Ottoman Empire's structures.

[3] The Nasser underlined the charismatic leader, but kept the pragmatism, which consisted in Nasser's availability to negotiate with Islam and opposed political regimes, while the Ba'ath orientation considered more important collective leadership, the pure doctrine and secularism.

[4] In 1958 Syria and Egypt have created the United Arab Republic, project which lasted until 1961; in 1958 the union project between Iraq and Jordan remained only on paper; in 1963 appeared a new project which engaged Egypt, Iraq and Syria, but was never concluded; the 1971 Egypt-Libya union plan got a premature burial.

[5] Umma is the Arab word which describes the entire community of Muslim believers.

[6] Hisham B. Sharabi, *Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World*, D. van Nostrand Company Inc., New Jersey, 1966, p. 60.

[7] *Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser on the Anniversary of the July 23rd Revolution, President Gamal Abdel Nasser's Speeches and Press-Interviews, 1959-1960*, vol. 1, Information Department of UAR, Cairo, 1961, pp. 252-253.

[8] Bruce Maynard Borthwick, *Comparative Politics of the Middle East. An Introduction*, Prentice Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1980. p. 73.

[9] Speech Delivered by President Gamal Abdel Nasser on January 9 1960 on the Occasion of the Laying of the Foundation Stone of the High Dam, in Gamal Abdel Nasser's Speeches and Press-Interviews 1959-1960, vol. 2, Information Department of UAR, Cairo, 1961, p. 2.

[10] Robert Stephens, *Nasser. A Political Biography*, Allen Lane-The Penguin Press, Hazell Watson and Viney Ltd., London, New York, 1979, p. 8.

[11] Mohammed Heikal, *Nasser. The Cairo Documents*, New English Library, London, 1972, pp. 262-263.

[12] T.G. Fraser, *The Middle East, 1914-1979 (Documents)*, Edward Arnold Publishers Ltd., London, 1980, p. 87.

[13] Robert H. Ferrel (ed.), *The Eisenhower Diaries*, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, London, 1981, p. 318.

[14] Allan M. Findlay, *The Arab World*, Routhledge, London and New York, 1994, p. 11.

[15] Robert H. Ferrel (ed.), *op.cit*, p. 318.

[16] *Ibidem*, p. 319.

[17] W. Bruce Lincoln, *Documents in World History, 1945-1967*, Chandler Publishing Company, San Francisco, 1968, p. 225.

[18] Steven S. Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict. Making America's Middle East Policy from Truman to Reagan*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, London, 1985, p. 50.

[19] The Wahhabism is a political-religious movement which had been developed in Saudi Arabia area from 1744 on by Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who had based his preaching on a XIVth century doctrine. The Wahhabism became the state's policy and religion. One of its main characteristics refers to the very traditional attitude towards all the changes that might occur in society.

[20] *Foreign Relations of United States (FRUS)*, vol. XIII: *Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa*, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1992, p. 408.

[21] John F. Devlin, *The Ba'ath Party: Rise and Metamorphosis*, in "The American Historical Review", vol. 96, no. 5, Dec. 1991, pp. 1399-1400.

[22] Anwar el-Sadat, *In Search of Identity. An Autobiography*, St. James's Palace, London, 1978, p. 136.

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The United States-United Kingdom Relations (1961-1962)

Ionuț Alexe

Throughout the last 40 years, Britain has been remarkably successful in balancing its European and American relationships. Impressively, through deft diplomacy, Britain has avoided choosing between its European and American orientations for half century.

Great Britain has fewer major options, it entertains no ambitious vision of Europe's future, and its relative decline has also reduced its capacity to play the traditional role of the European balancer. Its ambivalence regarding European unification and its attachment to a waning special relationship with America have made Great Britain increasingly irrelevant insofar as the major choices confronting

Europe's future are concerned. London has largely dealt itself out of the European game. Sir Roy Denman, a former British senior official in the European Commission, recalls in his memoirs that as early as the 1955 conference in Messina, which previewed the formation of a European Union, the official spokesman for Britain flatly asserted to the assembled would-be architects of Europe:
The future treaty which you are discussing has no chance of being agreed; if it was agreed, it would have no chance of being applied. And if it was applied, it would be totally unacceptable to Britain .... au revoir et bonne chance. [1]

1. The Actors

A document from the State Department considered in 1961: "In the post-war period the Anglo-American Alliance has become the most intimate international Relationship which the United States maintains, and it is also unmatched on the British side by anything comparable..." [2]

Accompanying the Cold War the diplomatic practice has changed, with universal acclaim, and that is the procedure whereby foreign ministers, and even heads of states, participate personally and frequently in direct negotiations with one another. Certainly there are advantages to the so-called summit-meeting. Top decision-makers may benefit by getting to know one another personally, not because acquaintance necessarily leads to cordiality, but because it provides the

opportunity to size up one's counterpart in another government. [3]

Starting from this idea, this study is trying to stress the importance of the personal relation between John Fitzgerald Kennedy and Harold Macmillan on the United States (US)-United Kingdom(UK) Relations.

The British Prime Minister, **Harold Macmillan** [4] had come to power in 1957, before de Gaulle and Kennedy, following the resignation of Anthony Eden [5] compromised by the Suez Crisis. Macmillan had expected to remain in office for just six weeks, but once the general election had confirmed him considerably longer, he had set about organising the Conservative Party and the country after his views. Probably his greatest

objective in foreign policy was to restore close Anglo-American relations.

Harold Macmillan had decided very early in his premiership on the importance of restoring a close relationship with the United States. To a large extent, by 1962 he had managed to achieve this quite successfully.

Before 1960 the US perception for U.K. was that of an old ally, Americas oldest friend. As *The Times* commented: *the sincere regard which many Americans feel for Britain is largely instinctive and emotional ... For America, powerful allies are desirable: for Britain they are indispensable...* [6]

Increasingly, administrations found themselves struggling with a deeply rooted sense of obligation and sentimental attachment to Britain, which conflicted with current foreign policy directives. [7]

When at a meeting Eisenhower asked Macmillan for his personal assessment of the two candidates, Kennedy and Richard Nixon[8], the prime minister had replied ironically that Nixon was 'beat', explaining that *one looked like a convicted criminal and the other looked like a rather engaging young undergraduate* was likely to become the next president of the United States [9]

Kennedy's intentions, as they are presented in his Inaugural Speech shows finally to be reality: "To those old allies whose cultural and spiritual origins we share, we pledge the loyalty of faithful friends. United, there is little we cannot do in a host of co-operative ventures. Divided, there is little we can do--for we dare not meet a powerful challenge at odds and split asunder". [10]

2. American Objectives

The United States principal objectives before Macmillan visit to Washington, in April 1961[11] may be summarised in following points:

a) Reassure Mr. Macmillan of the importance of Anglo-American alliance and to close relations at all levels. The ties US-UK are of central importance in building the strength and unity of the Free World in the Atlantic Community and elsewhere.

b) The importance of both the U.S. and U.K. moving toward greater interdependence within NATO and helping to strengthen NATO defenses, with increased emphasis the importance of OECD as a forum for co-ordinating policies to attain economic growth.

c) The long term importance for the US of the political and economic strength and unity of the Atlantic Community; the desirability

of strengthening British bonds with the Continent; the value we attach to the integration movement of the Six as a step which tie Germany in closely with the West and reinforce the strength and unity of the Atlantic Community as a whole.

d) The need for continuing to move as rapidly as possible to grant independence to the remaining colonies without undue risk to their future stability.

e) No unilateral concessions to the Soviets for the sake of an agreement.

f) No precipitate action, which might damage the US-UK relations in the campaign to seat Communist China in the UN.

g) U.S. need for a realistic combination of military and political steps in Southeast Asia (Vietnam) to prevent irreparable erosion of the Western position. [12]

3. Kennedy's Grand Design

Thus American thinking on its European and international policies was greatly speeded up by the British decision to join the European Community. This found this way into Kennedy's own Grand Design[13] put forward in his famous Philadelphia speech of 4 July, 1962, in which he stressed the

importance of two pillar Atlantic partnership developing co-ordinated policies in all economic, political and diplomatic areas. Kennedy's view of Europe was very close to that of the British Prime Minister: It was in short the idea of interdependence under American guidance.

For the American President the British entry into Europe was something of forfeit: The British Government would guarantee by its own national interest the breakdown of the protectionist taxes: it would be willing to aid America's anti-Communist policy: for the pure costs of Britain's own expenses in such a policy it would be a helpful ally in pressing for finance support from the Common Market. Britain would also counterbalance France's dominant position in the Communities, showing at the same time a comparable interest in containing the Germans through integration.

4. Kennedy-Macmillan Relations

„There are certain disadvantages to *diplomacy at the top* if negotiations take place at a very high level, it is impossible to conduct them in complete confidence. There are bound to be information's leaks" [14]. There are official briefings of the press like in the Nassau case analysed in the final part.

Kennedy had set out early in 1961 to establish personal contacts not only with his chief adversary but also with his chief partners in the Atlantic Alliance. The western leader whom he saw first, liked best and saw most often-four times in 1961 alone, seven times altogether- was British Prime Minister. They did not always see eye to eye.

Since the beginning of Kennedy's administration the contacts between them were analysing the *continuance of Anglo-United States Understandings concerning consultations before the use of nuclear weapons, and the use of bases in United Kingdom*. Macmillan wrote to Kennedy in January 1961:

...These Understandings have their origin in war-time collaboration for production of the atomic bomb and for the liberation of Europe. They have been developed by successive United States Administrations, and now form an essential part of the whole network of Anglo-United States joint defense arrangements, which underlie Britain's defence policy and planning. We therefore attach great importance to them. I hope very much that you and your Administration will accept these arrangements and Understandings ... [15]

In the April 1961 meeting- Macmillan's visit to Washington- Kennedy underlined that *strategic doctrine and political directive do not need change but rather some interpretation.* [16] Also, *it is important to maintain effective nuclear deterrent in NATO forces.*

Kennedy knew his government could not go along with Great Britain's recognition of Red China.[17] From time to time, the President had to discourage the Prime Minister's temptation to plain the role of peacemaker between East and West. And at least once Macmillan was briefly but violently angry- when he thought Kennedy's offer of American Hawk missiles to Israel had displaced a British sale. But no differences of opinion or age prevented the two leaders from getting along famously. Each recognised in the other a keen understanding of history and politics both international and domestic. Kennedy regarded Macmillan as a reliable ally, co-operative on issues that were difficult for him back home – such as the 1962 nuclear test resumptions. He enjoyed the British amiable conversation and the style, his often-eloquent letters, their frequent talks by transatlantic phone and his delightful sense of humour. He enjoyed retelling Macmillan's version of how Eisenhower *wouldn't let Nixon on the property*. A fondness developed between them, which went beyond the necessities of alliance. A Washington luncheon in the spring of 1962, for example, was devoted mostly to a relaxed discussion of books and politics. Told after the Nassau agreement described below that he was *soft* on Macmillan, Kennedy replied: *If you were in that kind of trouble, you would want a friend.* [18]

Their relationship was, perhaps, unparalleled in modern times and facilitated a virtually unbroken period of smooth and untroubled relations. Macmillan was in no doubt about the dept of the relationship. Writing to Jacqueline Kennedy some years after the President 's death, he recalled: *He*

seemed to trust me, and (as you well know) for those of us who have had to play the so-called game of politics-national and international- this is something very rare but very precious... [19]

As Kennedy once remarked: *I feel at home with Macmillan because I can share my loneliness with him. The others are all foreigners to me...* [20]

The two leaders were bound together by a powerful sense of isolation fuelled by the knowledge that they were ultimately responsible for the well being of their respective countries Kennedy according to Carl Kaysen, 'liked and admired' Macmillan while regarding him as *a successful politician with whose general political attitudes he was sympathetic and with whom he could talk easily, informally and directly. No other European figures, nor indeed foreign politician, he believed, filled a similar position.* [21]

Kennedy and Macmillan have been meeting on seven occasions and it was often the case that they disagreed on matters of policy and strategy although they were always close. As Macmillan wrote to Kennedy *it is of the greatest value to me to have the opportunity for private talk, which tease meeting provide.* [22]

Within the administration a debate raged about the relative advantages of having a special relationship with England. While certain policy documents like the April 1961 NSC Memorandum[23] clearly identified official policy moving away from preserving these special links and trying to preserve a policy of non-favouritism.

Kennedy opposed the official policy, and recognised that the easy intimacy he had with Macmillan reinforced and strengthened their ability to work together on issues of common interest such as the nuclear test ban treaty, NATO, Britain's Common Market aspirations and Berlin.

In addition Sorensen recalls, Kennedy found Britain *more reliable than any of our other major allies*[24] More often than not, the extraordinarily solid relationship shared in a frank open and more often than not, friendly way.

A letter from Kennedy after de Gaulle's rejection of Britain's bid to enter the European Economic Community reveals de dept of the relationship:

"You will know without my saying so that we are with you in feeling and in purpose in this time of de Gaulle's great effort to test the chances for his dream world. Neither of us must forget for a moment that reality is what rules and the central reality is that he is wrong and Europe knows he is wrong... We are doing everything we can at this end, as our people will be telling yours. And if this is an unmentionable special relationship, so much the better..."[25]

Finally, the two countries had a powerful tie in the form of total collaboration between their intelligence services. This was a unique element in the Anglo-American relationship, which remained closed to all other countries, including France.

5. British Application for the Common Market: Kennedy, Macmillan-de Gaulle Opposition

It appears that a coherent and detailed American position on the prospective British application was only finalised and backed up between May and August 1961, only after Kennedy visit in Paris.

"Kennedy fully understood the economic difficulties British entry would bring to the United states. But this were in his mind overborne by the political benefits. If Britain joined the Market, London could offset the eccentricities of policy in Paris and Bonn; moreover, from becoming a high tariff inward-looking white man's club. Above all whit British membership, the Market could become a basis for a true political federation of Europe." [26]

Kennedy was quick, when presenting his view on the telephone to Macmillan, to coin his own advantages into a special role for Britain and his Prime Minister: Kennedy repeated *how anxious the American were for us to get into the Six.* This would firstly mean

better tariffs bargaining, and secondly, politically they hoped that if we were in the Six we should be able to steer them, and influence them, whatever might be the political personalities. In this connection he expressed some anxieties about the Germany that would come after Adenauer'[27].

The Kennedy–de Gaulle talks in Paris[28] offered to Kennedy the opportunity to initiate closer co-operation and consultation, proposing special liaison representative for a tripartite framework. When de Gaulle suggested in turn that *a new organisation should be created to deal with the utilisation of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world by the three powers.* Kennedy had to retreat on his Three special liaison officers. After exchanging mutual guarantees for NATO, de Gaulle-and not Kennedy- raised the Common Market topic. He assumed hat the UK still found it difficult to join the EEC because it was *leery and political co-operation* it could only have *either Commonwealth preferences or Common Market, but not both!* To which Kennedy repeated the already Well-Known political coherence by a British accession. This ruled out he said *a limited association.*

Later he and Macmillan would agree that *the degree of help given to President de Gaulle should be adjusted to the amount of co-operation he showed generally.* [29]

Nevertheless, there was advisers like Kennedy's assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy who weren't so committed to the British. Bundy thinks that Kennedy *has every right to sustain the special relationship with the UK as long as the fundamental basis of that relationship is co-operative common effort, and not special preference. After al, we would like a special relationship with the French too, if only it could involve some real co-operation.* [30] After a few days Macmillan's visit to Washington (in April 27-29, 1962) reached the issues of UK-EEC negotiations, Britain and Western defence and NATO strategy. Macmillan stressed the need to take care of interests of Commonwealth and EFTA countries[31]. Kennedy pointed out that that UK could not take care of everyone in its wake as it joined the Common Market, and that US was prepared make many sacrifices but could not go all the way.

6. The Bilateral Relations in the Cuban Missile Crisis

I am lost in admiration for the superb manner in which you handled the momentous events of the critical week we have just lived through. I know what a mass of conflicting advice you received and I can only say that looking back on it all you acted at each stage with perfect judgement. I mean it quite sincerely when I say that America and all of the free world must feel a deep sense of gratitude that you are President of the United States at this moment in history. [32]

The British role in October 1962, both in NATO and in the Commonwealth, was helpful for Washington. But, the French position was more robust within NATO. While de Gaulle was a growing diplomatic problem for Anglo-Saxon within the alliance, he nevertheless provided unambiguous support for Kennedy in the Cuban Crisis. The British did provide a lead to the Italian government, which made two interventions with Moscow, one along the

lines of Home's statement to Loginov on 27 October, and the other telling the Soviets they saw no future in the Cuba-Turkey deal. Perhaps most important within NATO, the Turks adopted an uncompromising stance on trading the Jupiter's, which owed nothing to anybody, certainly not to the British.

British-American disagreements over shipping and trade with Cuba affected the relations. British solidarity over Cuba was a necessary, if insufficient condition for the supply of Polaris.

Close analysis of the relations during the crisis reveals different phases. Before the discovery of the missiles, Macmillan pursued a robustly independent approach to trade with Cuban in the face of increasing US pressure, including Kennedy's pleas that Britain should support an ally in difficulty. Macmillan however was prepared to stand alone within NATO on the ground of principle and

economic interest. When Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba were discovered Kennedy decided to act Without seeking counsel from Macmillan or other European allies. If London had supported Washington's policy toward Cuba before October 1962, Kennedy might as well have sought British views on the new situation. Kennedy informed Macmillan of the missiles on Sunday 22 October, over a day before his televised Speech. As with other key NATO allies, there was the opportunity to register dissent, so that there was a form of consultation. I reality Kennedy had already decided upon a course of action which, as Ormby-Gore explained, was he minimum the American public required.

Macmillan's role during the Cuban crisis was to provide support for Kennedy and the United States, even though the British government's legal advisers were convinced the quarantine was illegal. [33]

7. Skybolt Crisis and Nassau Negotiations

Anglo-American relations during the controversial Skybolt crisis were publicly in disarray like never before. The Kennedy administration, only initially backed Skybold. An unsigned memorandum to Kennedy illustrates the doubts articulated about the wisdom of continuing with Skybolt after first test: "Although we have a moral commitment to the British on this, will equipping more bombers with still more missiles be necessary when this doubtful weapon only replaces similar shorter–range Hound Dog missiles…"[34]

No doubt Macmillan feeling were offended by the fact that Kennedy had not called him after the decision to cancel Skybolt. The storm, when it broke, threatened a rift in Anglo-American relations. It caused a major political crisis for Macmillan's already shaky government. McNamara[35] had alerted Thorneycroft[36] and Ormsby Gore[37] in November but postponed until mid-December his trip to London to break the news definitely. Then he frankly stated at the London airport that Skybolt was on his way out, and refused to present an alternative they would keep alive a separate British deterrent. This led to an angry outburst but by the British government's failure to face up to the problem during the preceding month, and even the prevision fourteen months which had witnessed recurring doubts about Skybolt. He had expected them to propose an alternative, probably Polaris which they could negotiate. But the British under pressure from their own air force and defence contractors, preferred to take their stand on Skybolt, hoping that delay would pressure Kennedy into keeping it.

Although McNamara was committed to cancellation, he could not reveal this when he was visited by the new British Minister of Defence. Instead he informed him that the weapon had already failed four successive test and, in term of cost-effectiveness, was becoming an increasingly poor investment. In November during phone conversation between the two men, McNamara tried and failed, to grasp what Thorneycroft and his team were expecting. Not surprisingly, the next meeting concluded without anything having been resolved. The resolution of the crisis was left Kennedy and Macmillan, who were scheduled to meet in Nassau in the Bahamas for late December.

Some political scientist suggested that there was no agreed US position before the Nassau Conference.[38] However we have strong evidence to indicate that Polaris must be considered as a solution to the Skybold problem at a meeting on the 16 December.[39]

The two leaders talked briefly and with essential agreement on the next steps for the Congo, India, test-ban negotiations and conventional forces. But the nuclear issue prolonged their session. Kennedy adamantly refused to retain the full Skybolt cost in the budget, ignoring the suggestions that he keep it alive until Britain's Common Market negotiations were settled. His public commitment to abandon it and his plans for the tax –cut budget made that impossible.

Kennedy proposed an agreement to build the Skybolt with 50-50 cost for the British,

that was rejected. He pressed harder, saying that *if the United States gave Polaris missiles to Britain it would be difficult in logic not to say that if in future any country developed a nuclear bomb the United states would give them a missile system* adding that *to give the Polaris missiles to Britain would be a new step and so regarded in Europe.*

Macmillan expressed his belief chart there not a great difference in the two weapons system, saying that *Polaris for Skybolt was not a new step in principle, since the weapons were basically the same, that is ballistic missiles. One was fired from an aeroplane, the other from a submarine.*

He did not think that the French would make an issue out of Skybold being swapped for another missile. Kennedy however, was unconvinced. His government he said was most concerned with how de Gaulle would react to any arrangement involving Polaris. The original Skybolt deal had been made in 1960 when the France was not a nuclear power. Since then, they had acquired this capability and deeply resented the amending of the prohibitive McMahon Act, which facilitated Anglo-American nuclear co-operation but not aid to France. Theoretically, France could now be given assistance. In these new circumstances, the offer of Polaris to Britain would be seen as further proof of America's willingness to discriminate against her NATO ally.

Macmillan wanted Polaris on the same terms as Skybolt agreement a no-sting-attached deal, and pressed harder. He told his audience at Nassau:

"We were really between two worlds, the world of independence which was now ceasing to exist and the world of interdependence which we had not quite reached, though we were moving towards it. The nearer we got to it the more surrender of sovereignty there would have to be in practice, but until our design for independence was completed, we must be able in the last resort to control our own forces." The next day it had become clear that Kennedy was not prepared to risk a serious rift in the Anglo-American relations over a missile system. Kennedy knew

he had a moral obligation to provide an alternative to Skybolt. A political crisis in England could upset plans for its accession to the Common Market or even the agreement – made simultaneously in the 1960 with the Skybolt agreement- to provide a Polaris submarine base for the US in Scotland.

The controversial elements of the Nassau Agreement are to be found in the Paragraphs 6,7 and 8 of the document. Paragraph 6 referred to the pooling of national nuclear forces under the single NATO command. This would form de basis for the multinational force and would comprise mainly British and American Elements. If General de Gaulle could be persuaded to become more NATO friendly, it was envisaged that France might also contribute something to this force. Paragraph 7 committed both Britain and United States to work towards the creation of a multilateral nuclear force that would incorporate a mixed-manned element. Paragraph, however, 8 did not make clear which of these two forces, multilateral or multinational the British Polaris force would be assigned to. The agreement did not explicitly commit Britain to a multilateral course, stating only that they have agreed that "the purpose of their two Governments must be the development of a multilateral NATO multilateral nuclear force in the closest consultations with others NATO allies". [40]

After numerous drafts had been prepared and rejected, a formula was eventually agreed upon. To satisfy both British demands for independence and American demands for a multilateral force component, Kennedy and Macmillan agreed that the United States would sell Britain Polaris missiles, which would be assigned to a NATO multilateral force. To preserve the independence of the British national nuclear force, Macmillan secured an escape clause. With the agreement reached in principle, numerous aids and bureaucrats set about producing an official communiqué. A *Statement on Nuclear Defence System*s was jointly drafted as part of the general communiqué. With agreement reached, the president mind turned once again to France. Almost as an afterthought, it was

agreed that the same offer be made to France in order to entice General de Gaulle to commit himself to some degree to the NATO framework which he had been shunning. After hasty discussion it was decided to send this by way of a personal letter, to be followed up by discussions with Ambassador Bohlen. [41]

Macmillan returned home exhausted but jubilant. Not only had he managed to walk away from Nassau with Polaris, having acquired it at a knockdown price of less then 2 % of Britain's national defence budget, but he had effectively saved almost 800 millions dollars worth of research and development cost already carried out by the United States government.

The British press saw him returning home without Skybold. In its place was the promise of a weapon that would not be available for at least another couple of years[42]. As if this was not bad enough Britain was going to have to build a fleet of submarines in which to carry the missiles as weal as warheads to arm them. The cost, they argued, would be massive. The final contentious point was that, upon completion, this Polaris force would be assigned to NATO. The deal, the press claimed, was a *sell-out*, the escape clause *paper-thin*. [43] It seemed that *almost everyone in Britain had some objection to the agreement*. [44] A telegram from the American Embassy in London captured the mood:

"Nearly all comment agrees that Nassau marked fateful turning point in Anglo-American Relations, less by way of initiating absolutely new line than by confirming one already in progress. The France that France was offered same terms as UK within framework of projected European deterrent concept underlined ending unique Anglo-American Relationship in nuclear field, and probably in others. Retention of British independence over nuclear weapons is regarded as largely fictional…what Macmillan comment implied, is tarnished Christmas bauble without more than tinselled meaning and effect… [45]"

8. Brussels and Nassau, the Same Concept?

In 1962 the negotiation in Brussels run into difficulties. Macmillan's increasingly weakened domestic position combined with Commonwealth states and restrictive CAP system on the size of the Six, led the negotiations to slow down to nearly stopping. There was a real danger a t the begging of the December that the Positions would increasingly harden up, thus leaving the French isolated and making a solution impossible. Request for help were picked up by the American delegation Brussels and in turn promoted in Washington[46].But how should this *need for US leadership in the Brussels negotiations* be realised?

Hallstein[47] was in favour of using the USA as *a tunnel of communication between the Commission and the British*. A week later Dean Rusk confronted the Luxembourger who was going to chair the negotiation in January 1963, with the treat that the USA *intended to take full advantage of trade expansion Act between US and the EEC slowing the negotiations right down if no advance was* accomplished in Brussels. [48] But when the EEC negotiations stopped for the Christmas break Tuthill[49] report a *favourable outlook* and claimed it was not yet time for a major US intervention.. He warned however about the possible impact of Skybolt and Polaris and put a lot of blame for the slow negotiation on the too rigid British position. For the time being he role of United States should remain that of a *sympathetic observer*.

Nassau was seen in retrospect as a huge mistake. *It was a case of King to King and it infuriated the court.* [50] If Macmillan wanted to save the illusion of an independent nuclear nation, and he needed to do so both for domestic and European reason, he had to secure his unrestricted use for Britain national interests. He exclaimed that:

"a (multinational) group such as the United Kingdom had suggested was the alternative . He had taken his country a long way on the European road and if France accepted, Britain would join the Common Market. It has been said that he was going against a thousand years

of history by doing this. He would be going against it far more if he were to abandon Britain's independent (nuclear) power" [51].

In other words, Macmillan was in fact arguing that he needed Polaris to carry his public opinion in London into Europe- or at least this was why he was claiming to Kennedy that he needed Polaris now. But, taking into account de Gaulle rejection at Rambouillet meeting, we could say that Macmillan was bluffing.

Conclusions

The Nassau Agreement recognises that the security of the West is indivisible, and so must be our defence. But it also recognises that this is an alliance of proud and sovereign nations and works best wen we do not forget it. It recognises further that the nuclear defence of the West is not a matter for the present power alone. "We remain to near the Nassau decisions, and too far from their final realisation, to know their final place in history. But I believe that, for the first time the door is open for the nuclear defence of the Alliance to become a source of confidence, instead of a cause of contention..." [52]

Kennedy had two weighty problems to contend with. First was the pressure from an element within the administration that wanted him to use this opportunity to extract the United States from the restrictive constraints of this special relationship. A number of them were also concerned that a policy concept – the multilateral nuclear force – should not be fatally undermined by any arrangement that Nassau might produce. Second, Kennedy was deeply concerned with the impact a Polaris deal might have on American's other NATO allies, particularly France and Germany. On 13 December, The Times commented: "If Britain is without a role in deterrent nuclear strength, she may be driven closer to the French who could not doubt profit greatly from British know-how..." [53]

Nevertheless, Kennedy did not want to be blamed for the collapse of Macmillan's Conservative government or for a situation were the British leader might be forced to adopt an anti-American platform in order to stay in power. [54]

The president and his staff could live with the idea of making Polaris available to the British because of <u>concessions</u> he felt Macmillan had offered in return. First, Macmillan had agreed to work hard for the creation of a multilateral force, toward which British had hinted shown barely concealed hostility. The second concession Macmillan offered was a commitment to put the British V-bomber into NATO, which together with a similar American contribution would the basis of a NATO multinational force. Third, the Prime Minister had accepted the need to increase the strength of Britain's non-nuclear forces.

On the other hand, like Kennedy said, 'For only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed' [55] – maybe Nassau was the proof for US respect for his closer ally.

There is little doubt that the Nassau Agreement represented the apogee of Anglo-American defence relations in the post-war era. [56] Kennedy decision to sell Polaris missiles to Britain was singularly responsible for maintaining the British independent nuclear deterrent well into the 1970's. Moreover the offer of this same deal to the French signalled a willingness to change the US-French nuclear policy and the acceptance than both, Britain and France will continue indefinitely to be nuclear powers. These decisions were nothing short of momentous. In order to get a fuller understanding of the importance of the Conference, one must examine the negotiations in some detail.

The decisions taken at Nassau had been put forward for many reasons:

Primo To prevent an independent West German nuclear force.

Secundo To minimise this country's preferential treatment of Great Britain.

Tertio To meet charges of an American nuclear monopoly- yet, y retaining

an American veto, the MLF[57] concept produced fresh attacks upon the monopoly.

Quatro To strengthen Western Strategic defence forces –yet no one denied that the real purpose of MLF was political and that it could increase those forces by no more than 1,2 percent.

Macmillan's ambition to see the special relationship restored was successful. So much so that, in December 1962, Kennedy overruled the advice of a greater portion of his government and executed the most public U-term in the American foreign policy possibly seen in this century.

Although Macmillan's critics later described the deal over Polaris as a betrayal, the Nassau Agreement confirmed Britain's pretention's to be a nuclear power well into the 1970s. One of the side effects of the conference was the elevation of the Multilateral Nuclear Force proposal causing bitter debate and acrimony to pervade the alliance for the remainder of the Kennedy presidency.

Even though a vast majority of the Kennedy Administration believed the British determination to preserve the independent nuclear deterrent at all cost was an act of folly, this did not prevent the administration from supporting this decision at a crucial time for Britain. Under Kennedy and Macmillan the special relation was revived. After Kennedy's death, the new opportunity afforded to the Anglo-American alliance slipped away. This was more than simply the loss of a bright, charismatic president who had befriended an angling skilful politician; after the Kennedy presidency the emotional commitment to, nd desire for a special relationship was lost amidst the changing personalities and circumstances. It has never truly disappeared but lingers on no doubt to be recaptured again, if and when the need arises.

Macmillan implied, during the course of the conversations, that a deep split in the Anglo-American alliance was a likely consequence of an unresolved crisis. If let down by the United States, Macmillan might find himself having to adopt an Anti-

American position in order to retain in power in Britain. He also hinted at the possibility of Anglo-French nuclear collaboration if Kennedy was not prepared to fulfil his obligation to provide Britain with a viable alternative weapon. this was an unwelcome scenario for the Americans which would have disastrous consequences. Any Anglo-French collaboration would certainly have enormous consequences for NATO and an unimaginable effect on Germany –a worry that Kennedy administration was increasingly struggling to address. In order to play this hand it was necessary to Macmillan to refrain from telling the Americans about his depressing meeting at Rambouillet with de Gaulle[58]. He knew that the General almost certainly meant to keep Britain out of Europe and possibly felt that if Kennedy and his pro-European staff were aware of this it would unlikely that they would consider an Anglo-French collaboration a possibility nor would they agree to a deal that almost certainly would provide de Gaulle with an excuse to keep Britain out of Europe. Macmillan was fairly sure that his European policy had failed, at least for the moment. All that was left was the independent deterrent and the special relationship. It seems, unlikely. However that he would had followed Through with any of these threats. He had made the restoration of the Special relationship the cornerstone of foreign policies since coming to power in 1957. Moreover he was aware that short of any unlikely Anglo-French collaborative venture, the United States was the only ally Britain could turn for technological and scientific assistance.

Nassau-a Genuine Offer to the French

The decision to make a similar offer to the French was perhaps even more controversial than the British Polaris agreement. The debate about whether or not to aid the French nuclear programme had been raging within the administration but eventually had been won by those who were opposed to the idea. Kennedy himself had said in the course of the Nassau negotiations that although the United States was helping France with very marginal nuclear problems[59], this was *minuscule* and at

the very outer circle of the nuclear world, while his government had no plans to increase or extend this assistance. [60] A letter was sent outlining the offer of Polaris missiles on the same terms as the British agreement to France. Upon further consideration, the drafter realised that this was insulting given the fact that France's nuclear programme was not sufficiently advanced to make use of these terms. Polaris missiles were of no use to de Gaulle unless something is done to help France to a point were the weapon could be utilised. Panicking, *same* was changed to *similar* in the letter to be sent to de Gaulle. Unfortunately it was too late to change de letter sent to Adenauer[61], explaining to decisions taken, and probably the French read both letters. The Offer to France could be regarded as a *damage limitation excise*- if de Gaulle could be contained, the fall out might not be so severe as to cause any major problems. This view however is less likely, mainly because Kennedy and his staff appeared to be quite optimistic not only to the possibility to France accepting or at least opting to begin negotiations based on the offer, but that Nassau was the catalyst that would stimulate and inspire a new era in the US-European Relations.

For Americans the English are cousins **Briton cousins**-of course Europeans, strange and complicated people with witch they have a common culture, history language and a indisposition to the European unification and to those French people who believe they are the center of the world. For Americans the British are the less foreign from the foreigners. And the British care a lot about statue of privileged ally. [62]

After this close view of the crisis's of the 1961-1963 period on the US-UK-France Relations we could draw the following conclusions: the numerous contacts (meetings, telephones and diplomatic consultations) and the undisguised attitude of the Macmillan and Kennedy ended into a close relationship based on trust and friendship that reflected in the new special relationship of the two countries. On the other hand, the cold superior attitude of France President and his opposition to close contact at the high level with Kennedy[63] led to a cold personal relation with Anglo-Saxons which affected the diplomatic relations.

The Community of interest, culture, and civilisation is the most important cornerstone for an Alliance, adding the distance and the lack of frontier conflicts. The Anglo-Saxon relations passed through difficult times in the two major crises of 1962, but the friendship between the two leaders saved the Special Relationship. This close relation undoubtedly strengthened the Anglo-American Alliance and seriously deteriorate the relations with France.

NOTES:

[1] Sir Roy Denman, *Memoirs*, Palgrave, 1967.

[2] *The Policies Affecting the Anglo-American Alliance, revised* document of SU Embassy in London to State Departmental, 6 Jan 1961, Central Decimal Files 1961-1963.

[3] William C. Olsen, Fred A. Sondermann, *The Theory and Practice of International relations,* Second Edition, Prentice-Hall Ins, 1966, p. 257.

[4] Macmillan, Harold, Prime Minister of The United Kingdom1957-1963, and First Lord of the treasury.

[5] Eden, Sir Anthony, British Foreign Affairs Minister until April 1955; Prime Minister April 1955- January 1957.

[6] The Times, 2 august 1963.

[7] Ian Clark, *Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship,* Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994, p. 46.

[8] Nixon, Richard, Vice president of the US in the Eisenhower Administration.

[9] Donette Murray *Kennedy, Macmillan and nuclear weapons*, Macmillan Press, London, 2000, p. 23 Macmillan diary: *it looks as if Kennedy is going to this Presidential election. He seems definitely to be gaining ground... on the whole, I feel that Kennedy and Johnson will be more friendly than Nixon...-that is, the Republicans without Eisenhower...* HMD, d. 39, 20 October 1960.

[10] John F. Kennedy, *Inaugural Address*, January 1961.

[11] *Macmillan Visit to Washington, April 4-9, 1961*, to meet with the new US President was regarded by the Department of State, (Paper Prepared in the Department of State, MVK B-III-52. Washington. March 21, 1961, FRUS XIII, Doc 380, p. 1033), was due to obtain US support for:

a) A British role vis-à- vis the Continent which would not necessitate an amalgamation of British political personality with the Continent; would retain for the UK a distinctive a world-wide role; and would permit a continuation of the Anglo-American relationship and Commonwealth ties.

b) A co-operative economic program intended to expand the rate of Western economic growth.

c) British interests in its reaming colonial territories.

d) The admittance of the Communist China in the UN, suspension of the nuclear tests and disarmament

[12] Paper Prepared in the Department of State, MVK B-III-52, Washington, March 21, 1961, *FRUS* XIII, Doc 380, p. 1034.

[13] Joseph Kraft, *The Grand Design, From Common Market to Atlantic Partnership*, New York, Harper, 1962, The ideas behind this grand design were a far cry from Kennedy's programmatic list of foreign politic issues as he had described it in his article *A Democrat Looks At Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs*, vol.36, 1957, p. 44-57. As a young senator Kennedy had express then his apprehension over Britain on nuclear power, Germany's rising position in the Western Camp and the EEC as a European club of rich nations.

[14] William C. Olsen, Fred A. Sondermann, *Loc. cit*, p. 25.7

[15] Message from prime Minister Macmillan to President Kennedy, January 26, 1961, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, Volume XIII, West Europe and Canada, United States Government Printing Office Washington, 1994, p. 1030.

[16] Circular telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in France, *FRUS*, Volume XIII, p. 1037.

[17] Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy-Special counsel to the last President*, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, 1965, p. 558.

[18] *Ibidem*, p. 559

[19] Alistair Horne, *Macmillan 1957-1986*, Vol II, of the *Official Biography*, Macmillan, London, 1989, p. 304.

[20] Alistair Horne, *IBIDEM.*, p. 305.

[21] Donette Murray. *IBIDEM*, p. 28 correspondence between Carl Kaysen and Murray.

[22] Donette Murray. *IBIDEM*, p. 29, *Macmillan to Kennedy*, 29 April 1962, JFKL, folder 7.

[23] Policy Directive : NATO and the Atlantic Nations, Washington, 20 April 1961, Document No.100, *Vol .XIII, FRUS*.

[24] Theodore C Sorensen, *Oral History* p 101, JFKL.

[25] Kennedy to Macmillan, POF, box 127, Countries, UK general1/63 JFKL *Apud* Oliver Bange *The EEC Crisis of 1963. Kennedy, Macmillan, de Gaulle and Adenauer in conflict*, London, Macmillan Press LTD 2000, p. 37.

[26] Arthur M. Schlesinger, *A thousand days, John Fitzgerald Kennedy in he White House*, London, 1965, p. 720.

[27] Phone call of Macmillan to White House, 6 April 1961, 2.45 PM *Apud* Oliver Bange *Op. cit*, p. 39.

[28] Kennedy visit Paris in 31 Mai- 2 July 1961-on his way to Vienna —was regarded as a public relation affair by the White House *Documents Diplomatiques Francais*, 1962 tome II, Paris, Imprimerie Nationale 1997, doc 200

[29] 9 July 1961 *Apud* Oliver Bange, *Op.cit*, p. 39.

[30] Memorandum- McG.B initials for- Mc George Bundy to Kennedy, Washington, April 24, 1962, *FRUS*, volume XIII p 1068; Bundy said: *The question of British membership in Europe is now urgent. The nuclear question is less pressing from our point of view, simply because the time does not look right for a solution. Certainly there is nothing for us in any possible British notion that the UK might pay its entrance fee to the Common Market by providing nuclear assistance to the French.*

[31] *Ibidem*, Briefing of the Joint Chief of Stafon Macmillan's talks p. 1071.

[32] Letter David Ormsby-Gore to JFK, 30 October 1962,in L.V. Scott, *Macmillan, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis: Political, Military and Intelligence Aspects*, Palgrave. London. 1999, p. 179.

[33] *Ibidem, Unflappable Mac*, p. 185.

[34] *Memorandum*, December 1960, Record of meeting between Gates and Watkinson, 12 Dec 1960.

[35] McNamara, Robert S, Secretary of Defence, January 1961-1964.

[36] Thorneycroft, George Edward Peter, British Minister of Defence from 1962-1963.

[37] Ormsby Gore, Sir William David, British Ambassador to the United States from October 1961.

[38] Andrew J. Pierre, *Nuclear Politics: The British experience with an Independent Strategic Force, 1939-1970*, Oxford University Press: London, 1970, p. 234.

[39] John Baylis, *Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy*. Oxford University Press: New York, 1995, p. 153.

[40] Record of Meeting –Nassau Talks, PREM11 4229 PRO *in Domette* Muray, p. 102.

[41] The idea to extend the Polaris offer to France is certainly a curious one. Some month later Kennedy mentioned that the idea had come from Macmillan., Bohlen. Charles E. Ambassador to France from September 1962.

[42] The British Prime Minister had insisted on the Polaris A-3 missile, the most advanced version that was not in production. Although, in effect, Britain had to face a deterrent Gap, the British suggestion that the US could load Britain a couple of Polaris submarines until the British force was ready was not pursued at Nassau.

[43] David Nunnerley, *President Kennedy and Britain*, Bodley Head, London, 1972, p. 161.

[44] *Ibidem*, p 160, Macmillan recorded in his Diary: *no one will find it profitable to take a fair or balanced view.*, HMD, 23 December 1962, d.48.

[45] London to Secretary of State, 22 December 1962, *FRUS volume XIII, 1961-1963*, p. 1118.

[46] Oliver Bange, *Op. Cit.*, p. 47.

[47] Hallstein Walter, President of The Commission of European Economic Community.

[48] Oliver Bange, *Apud*, George Ball Memorandum for the President entitled *United Kingdom –Common Market negotiations,* 10 Dec 1962 NSF/170.

[49] Thutill, John, UK Representative to the European Communities from October 1962.

[50] Richard E, Neustadt, *Alliance Politics,* New York : Columbia University Press,1970, p. 110.

[51] Record of a plenary session on 19 December 1962 after c9.50 am, Macmillan reply to Ball's outline of a multilateral concept which foresaw mixed manning of ships carrying the nuclear deterrent and allowed for a national withdrawals. Oliver Bange *Apud* PRO: PREM 11/4229.

[52] President Kennedy's State of the Union Address, 14 January 1963.

[53] Donnette Murray, *Op. cit.,* p. 95.

[54] According to Schlesinger this might happen, *instead of pleading that his government would fall, Macmillan seemed to be saying that his Party would accept an anti-Americanism to remain in Power...,* A Thousand Days, London, 1965, p. 737.

[55] John F. Kennedy *INAUGURAL ADDRESS*, JANUARY 20, 1961.

[56] Henry Brandon, *Special relationships: A Foreign Correspondent `s Memoirs from Roosevelt to Reagan,* Atheneum, New York, 1998.

[57] Multilateral Force, an American project.

[58] Rambouillet meeting de Gaulle –Macmillan, 15-16 December 1962 on the role of nuclear national forces, see Part I. *Documents Diplomatiques Francais,* 1962 tome II, Paris, Imprimerie Nationale 1997, doc 200.

[59] A US position prepared in April 1962 stated: "we do not agree to the US and UK providing nuclear assistance to the French national program Such action would in the long term stimulate a German aspiration for a comparable treatment; it would tent to fragment the nuclear deterrent and would almost certainly not divert de Gaulle from his basic policies or national nuclear effort...We believe that the nuclear problem of the Alliance must be met through a multilateral, rather than bilateral, approach. Initial French participation in a multilateral approach from achieving one of its basic purposes: weakening and diverting German pressures from the nuclear program" *position Paper for Macmillan Visit* 21 April 1962,State Department, *FRUS*, Vol. XIII, p. 1102.

[60] *FRUS, Vol. XIII, Memorandum of conversation, Nassa,* pp. 1102-1105.

[61] The letter to Adenauer was send off hurriedly. It contained a premature reference to the offer to de Gaulle as "the same arrangement" as that for the British. When reflection in Nassau showed that *the same* amounted to an insult to the French because their lack of nuclear technology to build warheads and missiles would render it useless- the term was changed to *a similar arrangement* in the letter to de Gaulle on 21 December 1962. There can be little doubt that the Elysee read both letters and the lapsus thus contributed to de Gaulle rejection.

[62] Bernard Guetta, *Geopolitics, State reason,* Ed. Aion, Buc 2000, p. 100.

[63] Only one Meeting and one Phone call in three years.

Turkey and European Union

Mihaela Mustățea

Located between Asia and Europe, constituting a bridge between different cultures and religions, Turkey has been trying for decades to find a peaceful co-existence between Islam and democracy and regards itself as a European country and a model for other countries with Islamic populations.

If Europe were to be defined purely by geography then Turkey, who lies southeast of the traditional borderline of the Dardanelles-Bosphorus ribbon of water linking the Aegean and Black Seas, would not be included. Turkey is however part of the Europe of ideas. Brian Beedham points out in *The Economist* that for two-thirds of the last 2500 years Turkey has been a political, economic and cultural extension of Europe. After 1453 contacts with Europe continued, often in the form of clashes between European states and the Ottoman Empire. In 1856 Turkey was welcomed as a European Power when it fought alongside Britain and France in the Crimean War, and was brought into the Concert of Europe. So even if in this period Turkey was domestically Asian, her foreign policy was directed at Europe. The greatest change occurred in the 1920s with the Westernisation of Turkey as a formal and fundamental policy under Kemal Attaturk[1].

Through a carefully calculated series of reforms in the 1920's and 1930's Mustafa Kemal Ataturk attempted to move his people away from their Ottoman and Muslim past. The basic principles or "six arrows" of Kemalism were populism, republicanism, nationalism, secularism, statism, and reformism. Rejecting the idea of a multinational empire, Kemal aimed to produce a homogeneous nation state, expelling and killing Armenians and Greeks in the process.

He then deposed the sultan and established a Western type republican system of political authority. He abolished the caliphate, the central source of religious authority, ended the traditional education and religious ministries, abolished the separate religious school and colleges, established a unified secular system of public education, and did away with the religious courts that applied Islamic law, replacing them with a new legal system based on the Swiss civil code. He also replaced the traditional calendar with the Gregorian calendar and formally disestablished Islam as the state religion. Emulating Peter the Great, he prohibited use the fez because it was a symbol of religious traditionalism, encouraged people to wear hats, and decreed that Turkish would be written in Roman rather than Arabic script[2].

Turkey thus became a secular state just like any other European country, the difference being the population is predominantly Islamic rather than Christian.

Since 1945, and in the context of the cold war, Ankara's foreign policy priority has been to achieve affiliation with and membership of western institutions as the external policy expression of this westernizing orientation.

Turkey joined the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development in 1948, the Council of Europe in 1949, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952, became an associate member of the European Economic Community in 1963, applied for full membership of the EU in 1987, and in January 1996 entered into a customs union with the EU.

During the cold war, Turkey played a crucial role on the southern-eastern flank of NATO.

NATO membership and strategic sponsorship by the United States were seen as vital, both by Ankara and by its western allies, for a country that lay on the southern flank of the Soviet Union, controlled egress from and access to the Black Sea, and linked Europe to (or insulated it from) the oil-rich and crisis-prone Middle East. The West's readiness to envelope Turkey into its institutional structures served to further encourage Ankara in its commitment to pursue this western path in its diplomatic prioritisation. In cold war Europe, the very idea of the 'West' and even of 'Europe' had rather loosely come to mean NATO members and other free-market states, in contrast to the excluded communist 'East'. In this way, Islamic and economically semi-developed Turkey found itself in the West, and affiliated to a raft of European institutions, whilst eastern Germany, Poland, the Baltic States, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the like were banished to the 'East'. In much of every day political, analytical, and journalistic language and discourse, strategic relationships had usurped civilizational factors as the determinant of 'fault lines' across the European continent[3].

The disintegration of Soviet Union pointed out the strategic importance of Turkey.

After the Cold War, the Turkish elite remained overwhelmingly supportive of being Western and European. Sustained NATO membership is for them indispensable because it provides an intimate organizational tie with the West and is necessary to balance Greece[4]. So, Turkey's foreign policy has focused to find new strategies to guard against its possible isolation from the emerging economic and political institutions of Europe and to reassert its importance as a regional power.

Having applied for E.U. membership far earlier that any of the states in the East and Central Europe, Turkey remains a special case who rises a series of questions, not only about the direct effects and costs of enlargement, but also about the fundamental eligibility criteria on European Union. The first requirement to be considered in the enlargement process is to be European.

Some Turkish commentators have expressed their worries that the eventual acceptance of Turkish membership will be a political decision. That means the fact that the decision it will depend not only on progress made by Ankara, but also on the political preferences of EU member governments at the moment of choice. It is the believed that the E.U's decision will be more about its own identity and its own future than the eligibility of Turkey

Discussion of Turkey's suitability for full membership has always centered on whether Turkey fulfils the basic eligibility criteria of being a European state.[5]

The Rome Treaty stated that "any European State may apply to become a member". In 1992 the European Commission gave a vague definition of this concept, saying, "it combines geographical, historical, and cultural elements"[6]. But no formal definition of "European" has yet been offered. As for Turkey, its eligibility for membership is noted by the Commission's Opinion in 1989 on the Turkish application, as well as the Presidency Conclusions in all European Council summits regarding enlargement.

Since the accession agreement signed in 1963, Turkey's declared goal has been full E.U. membership and in 1987 she applied for this. The text of the 1963 agreement explicitly gives Turkey the legal right to expect to become a full member. Walter Hallstein, the President of European Commission, with the occasion of the conclusion of the Ankara Agreement, stated that "Turkey belongs to Europe".

Turkey's eligibility has been formally reconfirmed in *Agenda 2000,* but it did not recommend commencement of accession negotiations or the initiation of pre-accession strategies. At the European Council's Helsinki meeting in December 1999, Turkey was accepted, officially, as a candidate for EU membership. Candidacy status (as distinct from membership itself) is seen as important because it confirms Turkey's identity as a European state. Thus, in his statement in Helsinki welcoming the decision to grant candidate status, Prime Minister Ecevit

asserted that 'full membership of the European Union is Turkey's birthright by virtue of Turkey's historical development, its geography, and its present day attributes as well as the provisions of the 1963 Association Agreement'[7].

In addition to being European, there are certain conditions to be fulfilled for membership, known as the "Copenhagen criteria" because were adopted at European Council Summit in Copenhagen in June 1993.[8] All candidate countries must satisfy these criteria in order to qualify for membership of the EU and in 1999 Helsinki European Council decided to apply these criteria to Turkey as well.

This paper proposes to analyse the Turkey's history with the EU, its ability in meeting the Copenhagen criteria, the role of Turkish-Greek relations on Turkey's relations with the EU, the EU' s institutional set-up, as well as the role of public opinion towards the enlargement process, especially towards Turkey's membership.

The first step on the European accession's road was made after the Greece's application, on 31 July 1959 when the Turkish government asked the European Economic Community to enter into negotiations to them about an Association Agreement. The request has based on political and economics reasons, largely as a response to the Greek application (Greece had applied to the European Community on 15 May 1959). Turkey's export products were very similar to those of Greece. Turkey feared that a probable Greek integration into the European market could diminish the Turkish exports, which were already quite weak at that time.

But one of the major economic motives leading Turkey to opt for an economic relation with European Communities was the difficulty to find new financial sources. Turkey, faced with the problems in obtaining new credits from the Unite States, saw European Communities, at the time, as a new and strong financial centre to give her new credits. Turkey believed that establishing a new type of economic integration with European Communities, which would transcend a simple type of economic relation, could assure her some advantageous position in that prospected financial relationship[9].

Despite the Turkish economy backwardness, the European Community started to develop models to prepare Turkey for economic integration. This positive approach from the Six can be explained in the context of the Cold War, common perception of the Soviet threat and the strategic importance of Turkey.

The EEC's response to Turkey's application was to suggest the establishment of an association until Turkey's circumstances permitted its accession. The ensuing negotiations resulted in the signature of the Agreement Creating an Association between the Republic of Turkey and the European Economic Community (known as the "Ankara Agreement") on 12 September 1963. This agreement, which entered into force on 1 December 1964, aimed at securing Turkey's full membership in the EEC through the establishment in three phases of a customs union, which would serve as an instrument to bring about integration between the EEC and Turkey[10].

The agreement was less generous than that with Greece, reflecting alarm, particularly in France and Italy, about both economic and political identity issues. It has the longest association with the European Union among the candidate countries.

The Ankara Agreement was supplemented by an Additional Protocol in 1970 which it stipulated a transitional stage prior to Customs Union. It was signed on 23 November 1970 and came into force on 1 January 1973, establishing a timetable of technical measures to be taken to attain the objective of the customs union within a period of 22 years.[11]

The Turkish invasion of Cyprus created new obstacles, particularly when it became clear that Greece was likely to join the EC. By 1976 the Association Agreement was in trouble, and in 1978 Turkey formally requested an effectively finished off by the 1980 military coup. Even after the restoration of democracy in 1983, it proved difficult to reactivate[12].

The economic dynamics of Turkey-European Community relations in the first

phase of the relations were quite weak, resulting from the structural problems of the Turkish economy. Both sides to the Ankara Agreement saw the unrealistic economic targets of this agreement. However, they were very willing to go ahead with Turkey's eventual full-membership to the European Community. This observation was shared by the two contracting parties. The strong determination in developing the relationship and extending integration bearing pretentious aims has been shaped by political dynamics rather than economic. The initial economic difficulties of Turkey and its agriculture-titled economic structure, plus Turkey's unilateral suspension of legal obligations following the oil crisis have shown quite clearly that the economic dynamics were not the principal determinant of the first phase of the relations[13].

The beginning of the 1980's was marked by the adoption of structural adjustment policies for Turkey in the field of economics. The Demirel Government drafted the 24 January 1980 Programme for the realization of an outward-oriented free market economy, as a conclusion of external pressures. The full implementation of these policies was realized by the Özal Government, which came to power following the 1983 elections.

During the first year of the programme, almost all price controls were abolished and agricultural price supports and input subsidies were gradually reduced[14]. Financial-sector reforms and the encouragement of foreign direct investment were the mayor supplementary measures. A mechanism was introduced in 1985 to allow the markets to set interest rates. This structural adjustment policy has contributed to the opening up of the Turkish economy into the world competition.

The Özal government formally applied for full membership on 14th April 1987.

Preoccupied with its Internal Market plans and the Single European Act, the EC found the application an unwelcome embarrassment. The Commission's Opinion, which took thirty months to prepare (18 December 1989), gave a strongly negative response to the application. Whilst reaffirming the principle that no enlargement could take place before 1993,

following completion of the Single European Market, the Opinion, in any case, listed a number of formidable economic obstacles to Turkish membership, all of which posed fundamental challenges to the classical enlargement method[15].

Thus, the European Commission pointed out the substantial development gap between the Community and Turkey, the low level of productivity and incomes, severe major structural disparities, in agriculture and industry, macro-economic imbalances, high levels of industrial protectionism, human rights problems. The level of unemployment still represented a cause for concern and the rapid population growth has been identified as one of the more serious obstacles to economic development. The dispute between Turkey and Greece had also a significant role in that negative decision[16].

The Commission's opinion in 1989 rejected the application on the grounds that it would be "inappropriate" to consider at that time. As an alternative to Turkish accession, the Commission recommended that the long delayed customs union with Turkey will be speedily completed. The European Council accepted this recommendation on 3 February 1990 and rejected Turkey's application.

Several major studies of Turkey's industrial competitiveness were undertaken in support of its membership application. The Economic Development Foundation, a non-governmental organization that represents the Turkish private sector vis-à-vis the European Union, acting as the expert institution on EU affairs and Turkey-EU relations, declared that 75% of Turkish industry would be capable of withstanding international competition. It argued that, of the fifty-three industrial sectors studied, only fifteen, representing 22% of industrial output, would be in a weak financial position. But the size of Turkey's agricultural sector would pose enormous challenges to the CAP. Full integration would increase the EC's agricultural land area by 22% and nearly double the agricultural force[17]. Over 50 per cent of the Turkish workforce was in agriculture, as compared with 7 per cent in the EU.

In spite of this set back, the Community and Turkey negotiated to enter into the final stage of the Association; the European Commission recommended the completion of the Customs Union by 1995. The negotiations for a customs union agreement with Turkey have been controversial and, finally, it came into operation on 1 January 1996.

The Customs Union not only brings Turkey into line with EU trade legislation in the areas of import and export duties and common external tariffs, it also harmonizes Turkey's competition legislation with that of the EU. Since the introduction of the Customs Union Turkey has effectively been part of the EU single market. However, not all sectors of the Turkish economy are included in the Customs Union. For example, agriculture is excluded from the agreement. Early in 1998 a farm trade agreement between Turkey and the EU into force but this does not amount to an extension of the single market[18]. Currently, Turkey is the only country who established customs union but not a full member.

Since 1995 the trade flows between the two partners has increased significantly in favour of the EU. European Union exports to Turkey increased from $15.8 billion in 1995 to $24 billion in 1997. Imports to the EU from Turkey increased from $10.7 billion in 1995 to $12 billion in 1997. Turkey's trade deficit with the EU rose from $5 billion in 1995 to $11.8 billion in 1997[19]. Also, Turkey was obligated to provide preferential access to its markets to all countries to which the EU grants preferential access. These countries include Central and Eastern European countries with whom EU had association agreement, EFTA countries, Mediterranean countries that are covered by the Mediterranean Policy of the EU, and African and Pacific countries included in the Lomé convention.

Turkey, via the Customs Union, has been accepted as an economic partner in the single market, but at the same time was excluded from the range of projects that were design to underpin the common market and even there was not a pre-accession strategy for Turkey at that time.

One of the delicate problems was the Cyprus issue. The Nicosia (Greek) government of this divided island made its application for EU membership in 1990. Although the Turkish government and the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash declared that this application did not apply to the northern part of the island, Brussels not only decided to begin processing it – in contrast with its treatment of Ankara's application – but at its 1990 Dublin summit the Community declared that future relations with Turkey would depend on Ankara adopting a more cooperative stance on the Cyprus issue.

The new Demirel government, which strongly supported Özal's goal of joining the EC, was disappointed in 1992 when the EC agreed to consider membership applications from Austria, Finland, Norway, and Sweden without making a decision on Turkey's long-standing application. By then it seemed obvious that the EC was reluctant to act on Turkey's application. In fact, most EC members objected to full Turkish membership for a variety of economic, social, and political reasons. To make matters appear even worse from a Turkish perspective, the eleventh officially recognized candidacy of (Greek) Cyprus.

In December 1997, when the Luxembourg European Council decided to open accession negotiations with five Central and East European countries as well as Cyprus, it also indicated that Turkey, while eligible for accession, was not yet ready for it.

Deeply affronted because the EU had deemed it less worthy of accession than countries like Bulgaria and Romania, Turkey retaliated by freezing its official ties with the EU. More ominously, Turkey threatened to block progress on the reunification of Cyprus unless the EU reconsidered Turkey's candidacy and to integrate the TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) into Turkey if the EU opened accession negotiations with only the (southern) Cypriot government. Intended as a celebration of European unity on the eve of new enlargement negotiations, the inaugural European Conference, held in London in March 1998, was marred by Turkey's absence[20].

Ankara suspended political dialogue with Brussels and the Turkish government also began wondering out loud about the purpose of a customs union with the EU if it were not linked to a genuine prospect of full membership, as now seemed to be the case. Essentially, Ankara's post-Luxembourg position was that it was up to Brussels to make

amends, and unconditionally. At the same time, many Turks – including Motherland Party leader Mesut Yilmaz – began questioning whether pursuit of the country's traditional European aspirations was worth the humiliation that it seemed to entail[21].

Commenting on Ankara's decision not to attend the European Conference in March, EU Commission Spokesman said that the absence of Turkey would diminish the importance of the conference. German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel stressed that Turkey was a part of the European family and criticized the Turkish government for its harsh reactions to the decisions that emerged at the EU Luxembourg Summit. On the other hand, representatives of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), a partner of the coalition government on power in Germany, voiced their satisfaction over the Luxembourg decisions. European papers gave extensive coverage to Turkey's decision to withdraw its application for EU membership and described this move as "shocking". In a statement to the noted "New York Times" newspaper, Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz said that the EU was trying to set up a new "Berlin Wall" in Europe. According to Yilmaz, the real factor that influenced the EU decision to exclude Turkey from the EU enlargement process for the time being was religious discrimination. The Turkish Prime Minister pointed out that the EU would bear the main responsibility for the deterioration in the process for resolving the Cyprus issue. Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit said that the Turkish decision to limit political dialogue with Europe has worried EU leaders[22].

Washington too expressed its unhappiness with the EU 's treatment of this strategically important NATO member. The Clinton administration criticized the European Union, which assumed a discriminative stance against Turkey during the Luxembourg summit and wants Turkey not to take hasty decisions regarding the future of the country and the region. The Spokesman of the US State Department, James Foley, said: "We believe that Turkey's place is in Europe"[23].

Ankara felt that its cold war contribution to the western alliance should have earned the right to special consideration. Many in Europe, on the other hand, now wondered openly whether a semi-developed Islamic country could in fact be regarded as European – the boundaries to the new Europe had to be set somewhere, after all – and also whether, post-cold war, Turkey's strategic significance was now so compelling[24].

Following the request of the Luxembourg European Council, the European Commission adopted on 4 March 1998 its *Communication on a European Strategy for Turkey* which contained the approximation of legislation and the adoption of the acquis, extending the customs union to the service sector and agriculture, a closer cooperation between the EU and Turkey.

A significant change took place at the Cardiff EC summit in 15-16 June 1998 when this strategy was welcomed. The Council stated the Commission's intention to reflect on ways and means of underpinning the implementation of the European strategy, and to table appropriate proposals to this effect. In September 1998 the Commission and Turkey met to discuss the implementation of the European Strategy and in October 1998 a financial support package[25]. On 21 October 1998, the Commission presented two draft regulations to provide funding for the European strategy of EUR 150 million over three years from 1999. It sent a signal to Ankara that the EU commitments to Turkey regarding the Customs Union would be honoured. Under the Commission's proposal ECU 135 million of EU aid would be granted under a clause, which gives Turkey the status of a developing country.

Even so, it wasn't enough to persuade Ankara to lift its boycott of political dialogue with Brussels. The prospects for an improvement in the situation also increased with the shift in a number of EU states from Christian to social democratic governments, most notably in Germany. Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's government was determined to do whatever it could to rescue Turkish-EU relations, and was greatly assisted in this by a letter sent to Schroeder in May 1999 by Ecevit[26]. Drafted by Turkish and German

officials, the letter outlined Turkey's commitment to implement domestic reforms that would enable the country to meet the Copenhagen criteria. The letter also expressed Ankara's awareness of Turkey's singularity, and the consequent requirement for a pre-accession 'road map' that would take account of its special situation[27].

Armed with this reaffirmation of Turkey's commitment and determination, Germany used its presidency to insert the Turkish question into the agenda of the EC's Cologne meeting in 3-4 June 1999. The best that Germany's endeavors could manage in a gathering largely dominated by the Kosovo crisis was a commitment by the EC to revisit the Turkish case at Helsinki in December. Only Greece, Sweden and Italy opposed the German draft at Cologne[28].

Another factor has played an important role in the relations between Turkey and Germany. The recognition by the new Deutsche government of the fact that Germany is an immigration country with a multicultural society led to the new citizenship law. That stipulates the fact that the German citizenship shall no longer merely based on the *jus sanguinus* principle, but must incorporate elements of the *jus soli* principle, as well.

This positive attitude continued in October when the European Commission recommended the candidate status and the European Parliament adopted a generally encouraging resolution on Turkish accession.

Ankara made clear that it would be satisfied with nothing less than the unconditional granting of candidate status. "Turkey cannot accept candidate status...if as a condition the start of entry talks is linked to irrelevant political subjects such as Cyprus. They (EU) may offer a special candidacy status setting no schedule for the start of entrance talks but instead conditions. Such a proposal will bring us back to the 1963 agreement," said Sukru Sina Gurel, minister in charge of ties with Cyprus[29]. But Turkey was not entirely confident about the Europeans consensus.

Part of the explanation for Ankara's caution lay in the controversy surrounding the fate of the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, who had been arrested by Turkish security forces earlier in the year in circumstances that provoked considerable anger in Turkey in the face of the behaviour of some EU members, notably Greece, Italy and Germany. German Ambassador Hans-Jochaim Vergau stated at Ege University that Turkey must find a democratic solution to the Kurdish problem and pointed out that the EU is against the death penalty and is seeking to have it banned in all member countries. The German ambassador told Turkey it could forget about the Helsinki summit if it executes Ocalan[30].

Some European countries' diplomatic representatives based in Ankara told the Turkish Daily News (TDN) that this decision was not a good step before the upcoming Helsinki Summit. A senior diplomat from the British Embassy drew attention to the timing of the decision saying: "It is very interesting that the decision was declared before the Helsinki Summit. I think it would have been better for Turkish officials to have waited until after the Helsinki Summit. There was no need to put the Ocalan case back on the front burner at a time when the European countries are concentrating on enlargement issues, including the issue of Turkey." The senior diplomat added, however, that the Turkish Court of Appeals' decision would not create any obstacles for Turkey's membership because there were many other processes before the execution could take place. A senior EU official in Ankara also told the TDN that they expected the Turkish government to wait for the decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). "We are against the death penalty and this is not because he is Abdullah Ocalan. We are not friends of Ocalan. It is a general point of view", said the EU official. "If the United States had applied for EU membership, we would have requested them to abolish the death penalty as well" the EU diplomat said[31].

As Helsinki approached, it became clear that Turkey's chances of becoming a candidate would be scuppered were Ocalan's death sentence upheld. However, the delay in confirmation of the death penalty, and the

hints emanating from Ankara that the government not only opposed it but might put the issue before the European Court of Human Rights – particularly in the event that Turkey be granted accession status at Helsinki. In mid-January 2000, following the successful outcome in Helsinki, Ankara did indeed put Ocalan's fate before the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg [32].

At the European Council summit held in Helsinki on 11-12 December 1999, Turkey was granted candidate status to the European Union and recognized as a candidate member. That means it will be treated like any other candidate country: it will be judged on the basis of the same criteria. Accession negotiations will commence only when Turkey has fulfilled the political criteria: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law, respect for human rights as well as respect for and protection of minorities. The Council decisions integrated Turkey into the Community programs and agencies, and moreover, allow its participation in meetings between candidate States and the Union in the context of the accession process. Also, it was set that the earliest date when negotiations on Turkish membership could begin will be the end of 2004.

This delay was the effect of the Aegean dispute between Turkey and Greece and the summit urged 'candidate states to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border dispute' via direct negotiations (Ankara's preference), or the dispute should be brought before the International Court of Justice (Athens' preference).

Ankara initially interpreted this as both a deadline by which the dispute must be resolved, and an indication that resolution of the Aegean dispute with Greece constituted a precondition before accession negotiations could begin. In fact, the Turks had insisted throughout that they would accept no conditions and that Turkey be treated on an equal basis with other applicants. Accordingly, the Turkish response to the drafting was cool in the extreme. What followed was an intense bout of diplomacy aimed at persuading Ankara to accept the terms of the offer.

Telephone calls were received from the German and French leaders, and from Clinton too, who it seems agreed with the Turks that the offer was flawed but argued that it was the best that would be devised at that moment [33].

The United States was also not completely satisfied with the wording of the candidacy invitation, but Clinton told Ecevit that the obstacles imposed were not so large that they would be impossible to overcome [34].

A European delegation was sent from the Helsinki summit to Ankara, headed by the EU's foreign policy High Representative Javier Solana and the Commissioner for Enlargement Gunter Verheugen. Never before had two of the Union's top diplomats been sent to a would-be candidate in order to save the process. In addition, Ecevit received a letter from his Finnish counterpart Paavo Lipponen representing the EC's presidency, which sought to reassure him that the offer was neither conditional nor an ultimatum. Ecevit finally accepted the wording, and agreed to fly to Helsinki – which he had earlier refused to do unless and until he was satisfied with what the Council had come up with – for the ceremonies.

There were also difficulties over Cyprus. Whereas Turkey had persisted in its refusal to recognize the right of the Nicosia government to speak for the Turkish Cypriot north in its application to the EU, Athens sought assurances that failure to reach agreement with Turkey on Cyprus need not prevent Cypriot accession to the EU. The Helsinki summit concluded that 'a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union' but that, should no such settlement emerge, the Council would determine the appropriateness of Cypriot membership 'without the above being a precondition'. It seems that Ecevit first consulted with the Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash, before he accepted the EU wording. Foreign minister Cem acknowledged that the paragraph on Cyprus was the one aspect of the Helsinki conclusions that really rankled in Ankara even after the deal was accepted [35].

In his statement in Helsinki welcoming the EU decision to grant candidacy to Turkey,

Ecevit commented that 'Some members of the European Union may think it will take many years for Turkey to become a full member. But I am convinced that given the dynamism of the Turkish people and their attachment to democracy, we will achieve this objective in a far shorter period'[36].

The foreign minister Ismail Cem also stated that Ankara would become a full member sooner rather than later. Turkey is not just any candidate. Turkey has a different identity and a very different historical experience than the others. Turkey would move rapidly to bloc membership and bring with it the heritage of a country that has always looked towards both Christian Europe and the Islamic Middle East[37].

The Turkish commitment, the dispute with Greece, Washington's influence, the country's domestic problems and European responses to them have combined to bring Turkish-EU relations to their present. It is obviously a tribute to Turkish diplomacy that the country finds itself a candidate member of the EU despite the general absence of sustained or enthusiasm in Europe over the years.

The pre-accession strategy for Turkey, as agreed in Helsinki, is proceeding along the lines of enhanced political dialogue with the three main components: human rights, border issues and Cyprus problem.

On 8 November 2000 the European Commission adopted its Accession Partnership Document for Turkey which was approved in the General Affairs Council of December 4, 2000 and finally adopted by Council on March 8, 2001. It defines the objectives and priorities for the fulfilment of the accession criteria, which Turkey must implement in the short and medium term within the framework of the pre-accession process. On 19 March 2001 the Turkish government adopted its national programme to give effect to the Accession Partnership. This comprehensive document defines a set of individual measures Turkey proposes to implement in order to adopt the acquis communautaire.

On 15-16 June 2001, the heads of state and government of the EU met at the European Council summit in Göteborg. Turkey has put forward a national programme for the adoption of the EU regulatory framework. The European Council stressed the need for further steps, for example concerning human rights. The statement also urged Turkey to "vigorously" implement an economic program agreed to with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to create the conditions for economic recovery following its recent financial crash.

On 3 October 2001, the Turkish Grand National Assembly adopted thirty-four amendments to the 1982 Constitution, which included a series of political reforms on reforming the death penalty sentence, the usage of "mother tongue", increased civilian control in politics, and freedom of expression.

With the reform package enacted on 9 August 2002 Turkey embarked upon a number of important steps to implement the accession partnership (abolition of the death penalty, among other things). The EU Commission's progress report of 9 October 2002 specifically commended the major progress achieved while at the same time mentioning persistent shortcomings (torture, restrictions on freedom of expression, incomplete implementation). The new government elected on 3 November 2002 submitted further reform proposals to address these shortcomings.

At the Copenhagen European Council of 12-13 December 2002, the EU took decisions of historic significance concerning its next enlargement. It was decided that ten candidate countries (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Cyprus, Slovenia, and Slovakia) would be members to the EU as of 1 May 2004. Concerning Bulgaria and Romania, the European Council reaffirmed the objective to welcome these two states as members in 2007.

As regards Turkey, The Copenhagen European Council decided that "if the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the EU will open negotiations without delay."

The Commission, in its latest assessment of Turkey's progress towards meeting EU standards of democracy and human rights, also said that Turkey still has much to do, especially in eliminating torture and upholding the rights of the Kurdish minority. The EU wants Turkey to back down over its military occupation and claim of sovereignty over northern Cyprus, to pave the way for a political settlement there before Cyprus formally enters the EU in May this year. The absence of a settlement could become a serious obstacle to Turkey's EU aspirations[38].

While the E.U. experts pressure on the nation's leaders to meet European political criteria before starting negotiations on full membership, opponents of Turkish European Union membership such as France argue that Turkey with its population of 70 million is too big and too "culturally different".

Giscard d'Estaing, former president of France and the head of the convent charged with drafting a European constitution, declared that Turkey doesn't have a place in the EU. Turkey, he said, has "a different culture, a different approach, a different way of life"; for these reasons, he said, admitting Turkey to the EU "would be the end of the European Union"[39].

The Conservative German politicians also suggest that the cultural and religious differences between Turkey and the European Union are insurmountable.

Thus, at a conference of the (Christian Democrat) European People's Party in March 1997, Chancellor Kohl and other prominent Christian Democrats plainly stated that Turkey could never be admitted to the predominantly Christian E.U[40].

In public, European officials referred to Turkey's low level of economic development and its less than Scandinavian respect for human rights. In private, both Europeans and Turks agreed that the real reasons were the intense opposition of the Greek and, more importantly, the fact that Turkey is a Muslim country. European countries did not want to face the possibility of opening their borders to immigrations from a country of 70 million Muslims and much unemployment. Even more

significantly, they felt that culturally the Turks did not belong in Europe[41].

Even if it is just about possible to envisage Turkey assimilated into the governmental institutions of the EU, it strains belief that Turkey's borders close to the Tigris and Euphrates can be inwardly digested and recognized by all other countries of the EU as the frontiers of Europe[42].

According to many European politicians the Turks are still too poor, too unruly and too Muslim to qualify.[43] Unfortunately, this point of view is echoed by much of the Europeans politicians who remain quite opposed to the very idea of Turkish EU membership.

Islamic values /states have been widely identified as the "new" threat to Western values and societies. In the context of the E.U. – personified as "the Turk"- have several advantages as the alien other. First, there is a strong resonance with ancient and prejudices. Second, as in the case of Communism, it is possible to find evidence of the "enemy" within. Indeed Turkish residents are much more readily identifiable, since they have tended to cluster together, both from choice and necessity, and to maintain their religious and other customs. This has served to emphasize cultural differences and, in particular, the "strangeness" of the newcomers[44].

Samuel Huntington said, "The Velvet Curtain of culture has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology. Conflict along the fault line between Western and Islamic civilization has been going for 1300 years. For the immediate future, therefore, Islam will be a central focus of threat to the West ".

Of all the countries that have applied for EU membership, Turkey has the lowest level of support from the European public, with the least support coming from Greece, Austria, France and Germany, and the highest support from Spain, Netherlands, Portugal, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom[45]. This attitude demonstrates the public's general concerns about enlargement, loss of structural funds, fear of an "alien" culture, the size and the large population of Turkey.

Greece has the highest level of spread, as even though it has the highest support for enlargement (70%), its support for Turkey's membership is among the lowest of all members (26%) due to the conflicts of interests between Turkey and Greece.

Of all EU members public opinion in Spain is most favourable towards Turkish membership: according to Eurobarometer surveys of 2001, 43% of all Spaniards are in favor of Turkey's membership. In Portugal, 52% of the population supports process of the enlargement and 41% support Turkey's membership. It is very clear that Spain and Portugal are the major beneficiaries along with Italy and Ireland, of the EU's structural funds and Cohesion Fund. Turkey's membership would diminish their share from these founds. So why this support? Spain argues that the stability in the European territory is tied directly to stability in the Mediterranean and Turkey could play an important role in achieving this stability. Under the Spanish presidency the EU adopted the program on Euro-Mediterranean Partnership – Barcelona Process that was launched in 1995. The premise was that threats to security in Europe come from the poor South, and dangers of immigration from the Southern Mediterranean countries pose a security risk to the Union.

The Barcelona Declaration defines three main objectives: the first objective is to creation of a common area of peace and stability such as respect for human rights and democracy, the second objective calls for the construct of a zone of shared prosperity an economic and financial partnership that includes the gradual establishment of a free trade zone by 2010, and the third objective the development of human resources, the promotion of understanding and the rapprochement and exchange of peoples.

So, the goal is to create incentives for the peoples of the Mediterranean non-EU members to stay home by creating employment opportunities there. Another motive behind the Mediterranean countries' relative support to Turkey's membership might be to counterbalance the political weight of Germany and MittelEuropa.

The EU has a strong interest in economic welfare in Turkey since it is the largest immediate neighbour of the EU. Any economic crisis could lead to a massive immigration into the EU. Moreover, the issue of immigration is a cause of concern for many member states as it is associated with the fear that the enlargement will bring "outsiders" claiming resources that naturally belong to the "insiders" as well as threatening the norms, values and basic structures of their community.[46]

The social problems already posed a series of problems: there are two million Turkish workers in Germany and is not a surprise that where fear of immigration is highest is the lowest public support. According to Eurobarometer 55 of 2001, 52% of all Germans believe that enlargement would lead to a significant increase in immigration and 77% of those perceive this is an undesirable outcome. 33% of those people believe that increased immigration would lead to increased unemployment and a decrease in wages whereas 17% fear crime and illegal drug trafficking would increase.

On the other hand, a country like United Kingdom, which is less threatened by immigration and which retains its borders controls by refusing to participate in the Schengen agreements, has less problems with Turkey. The UK is more concerned about the EU's security and the potential security risks that Turkey's exclusion may carry. The UK would like to see more intergovernmental Union, rather than a federal Euro-State. Turkey's size and its cultural diversity from the rest of the Union would be an impediment to the federalist aspirations of certain states.

Another worry is that some think that Turkey is a Trojan horse of the United States of America that would give rise to the destruction of the European Union and to the increased influence of the USA into it[47].

The American leadership has been particularly vocal in pushing for Turkey's full membership, the underlying assumption being that its vital interests in the Middle East and Central Asia would be best served by having its strategic ally, Turkey, firmly anchored to the norms of the European Union[48]. The US

urged the EU to admit Turkey as a Member State for strategic reasons. So, identity or economic issues less affected the Turkish-US relations than those with Europeans states, which require a democratic, stable and modernizing country.

But away from the delicate question of European heritage and identity and the fact that European Union continues to define itself as a white Christian identity, other factors rise economic and political concerns.

First, there are persistent disputes with Greece over offshore rights and territorial waters in the Aegean Sea, the treatment of Greek Christian and Turkish Muslim minorities in the two countries and the failure to reach a new constitutional settlement in Cyprus. Then there is Turkey's poor record in human rights, a problem constantly highlighted by the European Parliament [49].

Tensions over Cyprus have been a complicating factor since Turkey's military intervention in 1974, but were greatly exacerbated by the accession of Greece to the EC in 1981. The Greek veto has been an important factor in Turkey's relations with the EU.

In 1990 the government of the Republic of Cyprus formally applied, on behalf of both parts of divided island, for membership of the EC. However the legality of this application were disputed by officials of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and by the Turkish government, which alone in officially recognizing the TRNC. In its Opinion on the Cypriot application, the Commission confirmed the eligibility of Cyprus for membership also recommended that, in the event of continuing failure of UN mediation efforts, the Cypriot application should be reconsidered in January 1995.

This reconsideration resulted in a complicated trade-off, in which an undertaking was given that accession negotiations with Cyprus would begin six months following the conclusion of the 1996-7 IGC– in return for Greek approval of the customs union with Turkey[50].

Nowadays in the Cyprus conflict the official Turkish insist on that the Cyprus problem should not interfere or put in jeopardy future Turkish accession to the EU. Peace talks between the two nations have so far produced a political stalemate, which hence only adds to the EU' s concern that this issue must be resolved before Turkey can become a member. Gunter Verheugen urged progress on the Cyprus issue before then: "I can hardly imagine that the Commission would give a positive recommendation if the situation on Cyprus is still the same as it is today at the end of next year", he said.

Romano Prodi, the president of the European Commission also declared that a settlement would also greatly facilitate Turkey's membership aspirations and will clearly influence decisions to be taken in the second half of this year. This is not a formal condition, but a political reality[51].

It is very clear that the confrontation between Turkey and Greece would prevent internal consensus being reached within the Union if the Cyprus question had not been resolved before Turkey's accession.

The most important obstacle to membership is the political aspect of the Copenhagen criteria. The main problems are structural problems in Turkish democracy, such as the role of the military in civilian politics, respect for human rights and the Kurdish problem.

Thus, the internal political situation in Turkey has proved a greater impediment to closer EU-Turkish relations, such as the close involvement of military in Turkish policies. The Turkish military forces retain considerable powers since the last *coup d'etat* through their involvement in the National Security Council. The National Security Council was set up as an advisory body but in fact it has a very influential role in the field of security policy and even beyond in practically all parts of Turkish policies. It is composed of the five highest ranking military commanders on the one hand and (at least) seven civilians on the other hand: The President, the Prime Minister, the vice-Prime Minister and the Ministers for Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Justice and Defense[52]. That concludes that Turkey does not fully abide the democratic

standards required by the European Union and the current Turkish system does not seem to be a stable democracy.

The requirement of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms still seems to constitute a major problem for a possible accession of Turkey.

EU members have expressed reservations about Turkey's human rights record. Amnesty International and Helsinki Watch, two human rights monitoring organizations supported by the EU, have reported the persistence of practices such as arbitrary arrests, disappearances, extrajudicial killings, torture in prisons, and censorship. The Turkish Human Rights Association, itself subject to harassment and intimidation tactics, has prepared detailed chronologies and lists of human rights abuses, including the destruction of entire villages without due process, and has circulated these reports widely in Europe. The documented reports of human rights abuses, like the coup rumors, sustained questions about Turkey's qualifications to join a collective body of countries that have striven to achieve uniform standards for protecting citizen rights[53].

The most urgent issue is the situation of the Kurdish minorities. The Kurdish population represents 12 million, the biggest minority, but they have not been given legal minority status, or been recognizing by the Turkish Government. Minority status in Turkey was determined by the Lausanne Agreement, recognizing only non-Muslims as minority group. Statistical indicators show that a discriminatory policy by the State has left the regions of east and southeast Turkey, where the majority of the Kurdish population live, economically, politically and socially underdeveloped.

Over the past couples of years notable progress has been achieved in the area of freedom of demonstration, freedom of expression, cultural rights and civilian control of the military. The competence of military courts to try civilians has been abolished. Positive changes have been made to the system of State Security Courts, such as the abolition of *incommunicado detention*. Turkey has ratified major international as well as European Conventions, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on Social and Economic Rights as well as Protocol 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

These latest reforms are part of a number over the past year the Turkish parliament has adopted, many of which are aimed at bringing Turkey's laws up to European standards on issues such as minority rights and human rights.

Ankara is hoping that by adopting these reforms – and allowing enough time to demonstrate that it is implementing them – it can prove to the EU that it is ready to start accession talks by the end of 2004. "This package is one of the most important steps Turkey has taken on its way to a more contemporary society", Justice Minister Cemil Ciecek told parliament after the vote.

The issue of functioning market economy could be another point of obstruction to accession. The Gross Domestic Product per capita in real terms is only about half the size of that of Portugal – one of the poorest EU members. It has a staggering inflation rate and a budget deficit. It is very clear the fact that Turkey will become a net beneficiary rather than a net contributor to the EU budget. Support from the European Regional Fund is estimated at around $10bn. Turkey's high unemployment and low level skills would make her a recipient of European Social Fund Grants.

The growing population will not only adds more financial problems, but also will create problems in the balance of EU institutions. The Union declared itself to be ready for accession of new members by concluding the Nice Treaty. In fact, this goal was only partially reached. The Convention on the Future of Europe now tries to establish a solid basis for the future EU. A European Union composed of 25 States will be different from what is now. Accession of Turkey would face the EU framework with enormous institutional challenges. At present, Turkey has a population of almost 70 millions citizens, which will be rise to almost 80 millions shortly after 2010 and reach 100 millions by

2035.[54] So, Turkey's size would be a problem for the European constitutional system. If Turkey will be the full member, it would become the most influential Member State simply because of its size, the Turkish MEPs and the Turkey's votes in the Council, which would be the highest. Since the Council is much more influenced by national interests than the European Parliament, Turkey could block decision-making in the EU easier than any other member state.

Against doubts such as these, there are strong strategic arguments for consolidating Turkey's relationship with Western Europe which, even if the end of the Cold War may have weakened them, can be reinforced by instability in the Middle East or Central Asia; and there are political grounds for giving what encouragement outsiders can to Turkey's still fragile democracy [55].

It is obviously that Turkey needed positive signals and support from the EU to help counter the rise of Muslim fundamentalism. Recently, the terrorism attacks showed the vulnerability of democracy in that part of Europe.

Until today, all pro-European Turkish elite and citizens have tried (and lost time) to defend that Turkey is European and belongs to the EU. However, since "Turkey is destined to the EU," from now on, it's the very time to concentrate on the construction of European identity and on the reconstruction of stronger and more efficient EU institutions including

Turkey with the help of Turkish elite and citizens. That's the real chance for the EU to foster its democratic character.[56]

In all the public opinion polls, the population revealed this European commitment in great majorities. The Candidate Countries Eurobarometer survey between 2 September-16 October 2002 showed that 73% think that Turkey should join EU, and it is beneficial for Turkey. On the other hand 17 % of the same population think that the conditions that EU puts in front of Turkey to delay this integration, such as freedom of speech, human rights, Turkish-Greek relations and the Cyprus problem are not realistic. About 49% of the population consider that they know" a little" about the European Union, 40% think that they know "enough" and 9% consider that their level of knowledge is "satisfactory" [57]. Above results show clearly that Turkish citizens have commitment in such integration but a considerable part of it is "ignorant" about the issues and problems of it. Those results show us clearly that the commitment to EU is quite accepted by Turkish population as a goal for Turkey.

At the moment, Turkey fulfils only some conditions for accession and will be eligible only after further substantial changes in its political system, particularly with the respect to democracy and the rule of law. Even if Turkey's way into the European Union seems paved it's still a long way towards a possible accession.

NOTES:

[1] See Fotis Moustakis, *Turkey's entry to the EU: asset or liability?* In "Contemporary Review Company", 1998

[2] Samuel P. Huntington, *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*, Simon&Schuster, London, 1997, p. 144.

[3] Park, William (1998): '*Rethinking European security*', in W.Park and G.Wyn Rees, (eds), *Rethinking security in post-cold war Europe*, London and New York: Longman. 1-20.

[4] Samuel P. Huntington, *op. cit*, p. 145.

[5] Christopher Preston, *Enlargement and Integration in the European Union*, Routledge, London and New York, 1997 p. 213.

[6] The term European ... combines geographical, historical and cultural elements which all contribute to the European identity. The shared experience of proximity, ideas, values and historical interaction cannot be condensed into a simple formula, and is subject to review by each succeeding generation ...it is neither possible nor opportune to establish now the frontiers of the European Union, whose contours will be shaped over many years to come *European Commission.*

[7] *Statement of Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit in Helsinki on Turkey's Candidacy to the EU*, 11 December 1999.

[8] Former Art O of the Treaty on European Union stated only one single requirement for accession, namely that the applicant state must be European. Art. 49 EU, as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam, introduces further requirements for an applicant state. It makes accession conditional upon the respect of the principles set out in Art 6(1) EU. An applicant must adhere to the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. The 1993 Copenhagen European Council set out further conditions. The first of these requirements is that the Applicant State must have achieved stable political institutions, which guarantee democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and the rights of minorities. Secondly, a functioning market economy is required. Interrelated with this requirement, the European Council established the hurdle that the economy of the Applicant State must be able to cope with competition on the Union's market. The final criterion set out in Copenhagen is the ability and the will of the candidate to take on the obligations arising from membership, as well as "adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union". Moreover, the European Council stressed that for an applicant to be accepted, the Union must be able to absorb new members. Is not obliged to accept the application of a candidate even if it fulfils all the criteria.

[9] Cinar Özen, *Neo-functionalism and the change in the dynamics of Turkey-EU relations*, in *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. III, no. 3, September-November 1998.

[10] see *Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey*, Ankara, 12 sept. 1963.

[11] see *Additional Protocol in Official Journal of European Communities*, no. L 361, 31.12.1970.

[12] Christopher Preston, *op. cit*, p. 215.

[13] Cinar Özen, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

[14] Balkir Canan, *Turkey and the European Community: Foreign trade and direct foreign investment in the 1980's*, in *Turkey and Europe*, p. 103.

[15] *Ibidem*, p. 216.

[16] See European Commission: *Opinion on Turkey's Request for Accession to the Community*.

[17] Christopher Preston, *op. cit*, p. 215.

[18] Chris Rumford, *European Cohesion? Contradictions in EU Integration*, Macmillan Press, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, London, 2000, p. 92-93.

[19] see State Institute of Statistics, Turkey's trade with the EU 1995-97.

[20] Desmond Dinan, *Ever closer Union. An introduction to European Integration*, Palgrave, 1998, p. 196.

[21] see Bill Park, *Turkey's European Union Candidacy: From Luxembourg to Helsinki — to Ankara?* in International Studies Association, 41st Annual Convention, Los Angeles, CA March 14-18, 2000.

[22] see Turkish Press Review, Directorate General of Press and Information, Office of Prime Minister, 16.12.1997.

[23] *Idem*.

[24] Bill Park, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

[25] see *The Council Presidency Conclusions* from Cardiff Summit, June 1998.

[26] This letter confirmed several important Turkish commitments such as: awareness of the requirements of membership, in particular the Copenhagen criteria, including democracy, human rights, state of law and a functioning social market economy; Turkey's determination to proceed with reforms in these fields in order to reach the standards expected of an EU member; Turkish interest in working out a 'road-map' outlining a systematic evolution of these reforms; and The understanding that the pre-accession strategies for candidates cannot be identical and that Turkey needs a strategy adapted to its special situation.

[27] Bill Park, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

[28] *Ibidem*, p. 6.

[29] see *Turkey against Cyprus-bound EU candidacy in Turkish Daily News* by Elif Unal, November 24, 1999.

[30] *Ankara reacts to German ambassador's speech* in *Turkish Daily News*, 25 November, 1999.

[31] *European diplomats warn Ocalan's execution will harm* by Kemal Ilter, in *Turkish Daily News*, 26 November 1999.

[32] see Yahya Kocoglu, *Turkey needs to abolish death sentence*, in *Turkish Daily News*, December 7, 1999.

[33] see Selcuk Gultasli, *Stalemate overcome by intense diplomacy in Turkish Daily News*, December 12, 1999.

[34] *Idem*.

[35] Bill Park, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

[36] for more information see *Statement of Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit In Helsinki On Turkey's Candidacy To The EU*-11 December 1999.

[37] see *Cem: Turkey will be a member sooner than expected in Turkish Daily News*, December 14, 1999.

[38] see *Strategy Paper and Report of the European Commission on the progress toward accession by Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey*, 2003.

[39] see *Le Monde*, 9 Novembre 2002.

[40] Charlotte Bretherton, John Vogler *The European Union as a Global Actor* Routledge, London and New York, 2002, p.167.

[41] Samuel P. Huntington, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

[42] Maurice Keens-Soper, *Europe in the World. The persistence of power politics* Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1999, p. 122.

[43] *The Economist*, 11 February 1995.

[44] Charlotte Bretherton, John Vogler, *op. cit.*, p. 243.

[45] see *E.U. Member State's Support to Turkey's Membership*, Standard **Eurobarometer** 54. Spring 2001.

[47] see Hasan Engin Sener, *Copenhagen chess: the EU, the USA and Turkey* http://www.thesprout.net/005/graft/graft10.htm

[48] *Luxembourg, Helsinki and Beyond: Towards an Interpretation of Recent Turkey-EU Relations.*" *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 35, No. 4, 2000.

[49] Carol Cosgrove – Sacks (Ed), *The European Union and Developing Countries .The challenges of Globalization*, Macmillan, Houndmils, p. 162, 1999.

[50] *Ibidem*, p. 163.

[51] See the speech of Romano Prodi in Turkish Grand National Assembly, Ankara 15 January 2004.

[52] see art. 104 Turkish Constitution.

[53] *Turkey – European Union*, U.S. Library of Congress, www.loc.gov

[54] see State Institute of Statistics, www.unfpa.org.tr/popdynamics.htm

[55] John Pinder , *The building of the European Union*, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 1998.

[56] Hasan Engin Sener, *op. cit.*

[57] see European Commission, Directorate General Press and Communications, Public opinion analysis, *Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002.*

La participation de l'Armée roumaine aux opérations de gestion des crises sous le mandat des Organisations Internationales

Constantin Marinescu

La Loi de la Défense nationale[1] dispose: „Dans l'intérêt de la sécurité collective et conformément aux obligations assumées par la Roumanie à travers les traités internationaux, à la demande du Président de la Roumanie, on soumet au Parlement, pour l'approuver, la participation avec effectifs et moyens de combat à la création des forces internationales destinées au maintien de la paix ou ayant des buts humanitaires". Les éléments principaux de nature politique et militaire caractérisant la constitution et l'emploi des forces roumaines de maintien de la paix et d'aide humanitaire sont les suivants[2]:

– ces forces seront uniquement engagées en opérations approuvées par l'ONU et / ou l'OSCE ou par d'autres organisations internationales à cette vocation, quand on a le consensus des parties pour le moins au niveau stratégique (les opérations classiques de maintien de la paix); en certaines circonstances, avec l'autorisation du Parlement, on peut aussi participer aux opérations visant à imposer la paix ;

– maintenir un nombre limité de forces spécialement préparées, pour être déployées, à la demande des organisations internationales habilitées et à base d'une décision nationale, en opérations de soutien à la paix et d'aide humanitaire, même si celles-ci n'ont pas été jusqu'à présent incluses dans le système de forces en attente (Stand-by) de l'ONU ;

– les forces roumaines de maintien de la paix ne sont pas exclusivement destinées à prendre part aux opérations internationales, en ayant leur place et leur rôle bien définis dans la structure des forces nationales;

– la Roumanie se réserve le droit de contrôler la manière dans laquelle ses forces développent leurs activités ainsi que de décider leur retraite au cas où les parties n'observent pas les dispositions à caractère international ou quand on ne peut pas assurer la sécurité dans la zone (les zones) des missions.

Dès le 1er février 1991, la Roumanie a notifié au Secrétaire général de l'ONU les forces disponibles (personnel, matériels, spécialistes) pour les opérations de maintien de la paix. L'accord de la Roumanie, communiqué à l'ONU en 1995, de prendre part aux systèmes des arrangements en attente (Stand-by) est matérialisé par la présentation d'une offre concrète et par la conclusion d'un "Mémorandum de convention" approprié.

A présent, la Roumanie a 4 bataillons d'infanterie, 1 bataillon de génie, 1 compagnie de police militaire, 1 hôpital militaire de campagne et 1 compagnie de protection civile destinés à participer aux missions de maintien de la paix et d'aide humanitaire. En outre, elle dispose d'autres petites unités logistiques et de services ainsi que de moyens aériens et navals. Depuis février 1991 et jusqu'à présent, la Roumanie a participé à plusieurs opérations de maintien de la paix et elle est en train de participer à trois autres ; en même temps, elle est en mesure de s'impliquer en autres opérations de ce type, selon la sollicitation et la possibilité d'obtenir les autorisations internes nécessaires.

1. La guerre du Golfe

La Roumanie a participé[3] avec l'Hôpital chirurgical de campagne no. 100, déployé à Al Jubayl (Arabie Saudite), avec un effectif total de 384 militaires et 200 lits, du 20 février au 20 mars 1991, faisant partie d'une brigade logistique britannique participante aux actions de la Force multinationale de paix de la zone du Golfe (participation reposant sur la Résolution no. 678 du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU).

2. La mission d'observateurs de Moldova

La Roumanie a participé[4] avec un groupe d'observateurs militaires, déployé dans la région de la localité de Tighina, avec un effectif de 24 officiers, du mai 1992 au février 1993. Elle a été formée à base du mécanisme quadripartite (avec la participation de la Moldova, de la Roumanie, de la Fédération Russe et de l'"Ukraine) de réglementation pacifique du conflit de la partie de l'est de la Moldova.

3. L'opération des Nations Unies en Somalie (ONUSOM II)

La Roumanie a participé avec un Hôpital militaire de campagne, déployé à Mogadishu, avec un effectif total de 236 militaires et 50 lits, qui a agi du 6 juillet 1993 au 23 octobre 1994. Outre l'assistance médicale d'urgence pour les troupes de l'ONU, l'hôpital a assuré aide humanitaire substantielle à la population locale.

4. La mission d'assistance des Nations Unies pour Rwanda

La Roumanie a participé avec une équipe de cinq officiers ayant le statut d'observateurs militaires, qui ont agi du 6 mars au 16 avril 1994 intégrés au contingent belge de la mission.

5. La III-ème mission de vérification des Nations Unies pour l'Angola

La Roumanie a participé[5] avec les forces suivantes:
 – un hôpital militaire de campagne, déployé dans la localité de Viana, avec un effectif total de 108 militaires et 40 lits, entre le 10 juin 1995 et le 30 mai 1997. Outre l'assistance médicale d'urgence offerte au personnel de la mission, il a exécuté des activités à caractère humanitaire au bénéfice de la population civile locale ;
 – un groupe d'officiers et de sous-officiers d'état-major (31militaires), en mission entre le 1er avril 1995 et le 5 juin 1997 dans les commandements de la mission déployés dans les localités de Luanda, Menongue, Lubango, Saurimo et Uige ; les militaires roumains ont eu des fonctions de commandement et d'état-major au niveau du commandement de la force et des commandements régionaux ;
 – un bataillon d'infanterie (Casques bleus) (758 militaires), ayant le commandement et une compagnie déployés à Lubango et trois compagnies à Loboto, Chicuma et N'Gove, (d'octobre 1995 – juin 1997; durant la participation à la mission, les effectifs de ce bataillon ont été remplacés tous les six mois par du personnel des bataillons de " Casques bleus " de Bucuresti, Craiova, Iasi et Bistrita; après la fin de cette mission et sa transformation en Mission d'Observation des Nations Unies pour l'Angola (MONUA), en juillet 1997 le bataillon a été remplacé par une force de réaction rapide au niveau compagnie (150 militaires), qui a agi en Angola jusqu'en juin 1998.

Pour l'organisation de la Force multinationale de protection pour l'Albanie[6] la Roumanie a envoyé le Détachement tactique "Sfantul Gheorghe" (391 militaires), déployé dans les localités de Girokaster et Tepelene, et un groupe d'état-major (10 officiers) dans les structures de commandement de l'opération ALBA, dirigée par l'Italie, d'avril au juillet 1997; la mission a été réalisée conformément à la Résolution no. 1101 – (mars 1997) du Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU (la Roumanie

étant le seul pays d'en dehors de l'OTAN participant à cette opération) ; dans le contexte de la stabilisation de la situation de ce pays, dans le cadre de l'initiative MAPE (en anglais Multinational Advisory Police Elément), un représentant du Ministère Roumain de l'Intérieur a été en mission en Albanie.

En Bosnie- Herzégovine[7] la Roumanie a pris part à la mission de l'IFOR (Force de mis en oeuvre de la paix) avec le 96e Bataillon de génie (200 militaires), déployé dans la localité de Zenica, du 8 mars au 1-er novembre 1996. Le bataillon, dépendant du corps allié de réaction rapide, a exécuté en principal des activités de déminage[8], réparations de chemins et de ponts, constructions et réparations de bâtiments. Après la fin du mandat de l'IFOR, il a continué sa participation du 1er novembre au 22 juin 1998, à l'opération de la SFOR (Force de stabilisation de la paix), avec un effectif diminué (180 militaires). Dans le cadre de la SFOR ont également agi trois officiers roumains d'état-major, dépendants du Commandement des forces terrestres alliées de l'Europe Centrale (en anglais LAND CENT) ainsi qu'un détachement de ravitaillement en carburants - lubrifiants, formé de 10 militaires et 6 autospéciales. Le prolongement de la mission de la SFOR a eu comme résultat le prolongement du mandat du contingent roumain, toujours dans le cadre des forces de l'OTAN.

Conséquente, avec détermination, la Roumanie a poursuivi la réalisation de la direction stratégique de sa politique extérieure – le maintien de la paix en participant à:

1. La mission d'observation des Nations Unies pour l'Irak et le Koweit, avec 7 observateurs militaires dès le mois d'avril 1991. Leur nombre a été ultérieurement diminué, depuis octobre 1996, à 5. La mission, exécutée sous l'égide de l'ONU, a résidé en l'observation du respect du cessez-le-feu dans l'ancienne zone de conflit du Golfe Persique.

2. La mission post-SFOR en Bosnie-Herzégovine dirigée par l'OTAN ; on y a participé depuis 22 juin 1998 avec les forces suivantes:

– le 96-e Bataillon de génie (166 militaires) ;

– un détachement de transport de carburants – lubrifiants (10 militaires) ;

– un peloton de police militaire (21 militaires), intégré dans une unité multinationale de police militaire ;

– 3 officiers d'état-major, dont 1 comme assistant du chef d'état-major de la Section d'opérations civiles et 2 en tant qu'officiers CIMIC, au commandement de la force ;

– 2 aéronefs militaires de transport C-130 H (seulement à la demande).

En outre, la Roumanie a mis à la disposition de la Réserve stratégique de la SFOR un bataillon d'infanterie (400 militaires) et les moyens de transport aérien nécessaires.

3. La Mission d'administration intérimaire de l'ONU en Kosovo (UNMIK) et la Force de protection de Kosovo (KFOR), avec des policiers et une compagnie de gendarmes.

Conformément à l'approbation du Parlement roumain, le Ministère de la Défense Nationale a envoyé des éléments militaires d'appui pour la Force internationale d'Assistance de Sécurité (FIAS) de l'Afghanistan. Les soldats roumains ont contribué au maintien de la sécurité dans la capitale du pays, Kabul, et aux alentours, pour permettre à l'administration intérimaire de l'Afghanistan d'accomplir ses multiples fonctions.

En déployant ces troupes dans le cadre de la FIAS, la Roumanie a montré, sans équivoque, son appui à l'effort international d'apporter de la stabilité dans ce territoire agité. De cette manière, la Roumanie est devenue l'un des deux aspirants à l'OTAN avec un apport effectif à la FIAS. Les éléments roumains de soutien ont été : un peloton de police[9] militaire, un avion de transport C-130 Hercules avec son équipage, une équipe d'assistance technique de l'armée de l'air et trois officiers de liaison. Le personnel militaire roumain qui a participé à la FIAS a été sélectionné des unités militaires d'élite conformément à l'expérience individuelle et aux résultats obtenus pendant les opérations de maintien de la paix dans les Balkans et l'Afrique. Les autres critères de sélection ont été l'état physique, médical et psychologique ainsi que la pratique de la

langue anglaise. Il faut signaler le fait que le peloton de police militaire a été formé par des volontaires.

La contribution de la Roumanie à la Force internationale d'Assistance de Sécurité d'Afghanistan a augmenté avec le temps en fonction des besoins militaires du théâtre d'opérations. Un bataillon roumain, appartenant à la Force de réaction rapide, dont la base a été établie à Kandahar, a eu une contribution substantielle à l'instauration et au maintien de la paix. D'autres spécialistes roumains, y compris des civils, ont eu un apport important aux efforts alliés dans le combat contre le terrorisme.

La Roumanie a accompli totalement et de bonne foi toutes les obligations assumées par les traités et les accords internationaux du domaine du contrôle des armements, du désarmement et de l'accroissement de la confiance et de la sécurité auxquels elle prend part.

La Roumanie a aussi adhéré, en 1995, au "Groupe Australie", qui réalise le contrôle de l'exportation de matières premières pouvant servir à la fabrication des armes chimiques et biologiques ainsi que des installations de production à double emploi. Depuis avril 1997, deux experts militaires roumains ont participé aux inspections effectuées par le Comité spécial de l'ONU pour l'élimination des armes de destruction massive de l'Irak.

Conformément à la Décision du Conseil Suprême de Défense du Pays, dès le 1er mars 1997 dans l'Armée roumaine a été constituée, par étapes, en trois années, la Force de Réaction Rapide (FRR)[10] qui, conjointement avec les Forces d'engagement de zone immédiate, représente les Forces de réaction en situations de crise.

La réorganisation et la mise en oeuvre de la capacité opérationnelle complète des premières grandes unités et unités de la FRR (1 brigade mécanisée, 1 escadrille d'aviation, 2 frégates, 1 bataillon d'infanterie marine et 1 bataillon de transmissions) ont été réalisées. On a modernisé la structure du bataillon de génie, qui agit déjà au sein des forces de mise en oeuvre de la paix en Bosnie-Herzégovine. On a assuré les effectifs, les matériels et les ressources financières à d'autres grandes unités intégrées dans la FRR (3 brigades mécanisées, 1 brigade de chars, 1 brigade de chasseurs alpins et 1 brigade de parachutistes /aéromobile).

C'est l'Etat-Major Général qui va commander la FRR par le biais du "Centre opérationnel pour situations de crise" (COSIC) et des structures appropriées. créées au sein des états-majors des armées. La FRR est le noyau de la future structure de forces du pays. La réforme militaire poursuit son développement par la diffusion, dans l'ensemble de l'armée, de l'expérience acquise par la FRR (structures, instruction, personnel, interopérabilité avec l'OTAN).

Dans le cadre du processus des Réunions des Ministres de la Défense de l'Europe du Sud-Est (en anglais SEDM), conformément au principe de la rotation stipulé par le Premier Protocole additionnel à l'Accord pour la Force multinationale de paix de l'Europe du Sud-Est (en anglais MPFSEE), la Roumanie a reçu du partenaire grec, pour une période de deux années à partir du 1-er septembre 2001, la présidence du Comité de Coordination de la SEDM (SEDM-CC) et du Comité directeur politico-militaire (en anglais PMSC) de la MPFSEE.

La présidence de la SEDM-CC et du PMSC a offert à la Roumanie une meilleure visibilité dans le dialogue sud-est européen par la coordination des réunions politico-militaires de haut niveau et des projets lancés dans le cadre de l'initiative. Tout cela a renforcé l'effort d'intégration de la Roumanie dans les structures euro-atlantiques ainsi que son statut de générateur de sécurité dans la zone du sud-est européen.

Les objectifs politico-militaires assumés par la Roumanie durant la présidence du Comité de coordination du processus des Réunions des ministres de la Défense de l'Europe du Sud-Est (SEDM-CC) et du Comité directeur politico-militaire (PMSC) de la Force multinationale de paix de l'Europe du Sud-Est (MPFSEE) ont été:

– augmenter la contribution de la SEDM à la sécurité et à la stabilité de l'Europe du Sud-Est ;

– maintenir la transparence et l'ouverture de l'initiative dans la perspective d'intégrer à la SEDM de nouveaux membres ;

– élargir le domaine de coopération au cadre de la SEDM afin de pouvoir englober des aspects non conventionnels et non militaires concernant la sécurité régionale ;

– créer les conditions diplomatiques et militaires favorables au renforcement de l'engagement des pays partenaires dans la gestion des crises dans l'Europe du Sud-Est ;

– développer et mettre en oeuvre les programmes de coopération de la SEDM: le CIN (Crisis Information Network), le SEESIM (South Eastern Europe Simulation Network) et le SIMIHO (Satellite Interconnection of the Military Hospitals) ;

– améliorer la préparation militaire dans la région ;

– achever le processus de rendre opérationnelle la Force multinationale de paix de l'Europe du Sud-Est (MPFSEE).

La présidence de la SEDM-CC et du PMSC ainsi que les structures qui la soutiennent ont représenté une capacité nationale qui accomplit ses attributions dans un régime international, en étant le gérant principal du processus de la SEDM. Celles-ci sont créées et fonctionnent de la manière suivante :

– l'activité de la présidence de la SEDM-CC et du PMSC est coordonnée et approuvée par le ministre de la Défense Nationale ;

– la présidence est assurée pour deux années par l'adjoint du chef du Département pour l'intégration euro-atlantique et la politique de défense;

– le président a un conseiller pour les problèmes militaires et un conseiller diplomatique

– les structures de la présidence roumaine de la SEDM-CC et du PMSC ont été opérationnelles dès le 1-er août 2001.

Aux structures qui ont assuré la présidence de la SEDM-CC et du PMSC ont été affectés des militaires et des civils du Ministère de la Défense Nationale conformément à une Décision du Gouvernement sur les questions de la présidence de la SEDM-CC et du PMSC.

Les critères de la sélection ont été les suivants :

– la pratique de l'anglais ;

– des études supérieures militaires ou civiles pour les membres des deux secrétariats;

– des compétences professionnelles: utilisation de l'ordinateur; expérience dans le domaine des relations internationales ou des missions internationales.

La proposition de créer la Force multinationale de paix, au niveau de brigade (SEEBRIG en anglais), a été lancée à l'occasion de la Réunion des ministres de la Défense de l'Europe du Sud-Est, tenue à Sofia, le 3 octobre 1997. Cette force doit exécuter des missions de maintien de la paix sous l'égide de l'ONU et de l'OSCE, déterminées par des résolutions du Conseil de Sécurité conformément à la Charte des Nations Unies.

Les Etats fondateurs ont été: la Grèce, l'Italie et la Turquie (des pays membres de l'OTAN) ; la Roumanie, la Bulgarie, l'Albanie et la FYROM (des pays partenaires); la Slovénie, les Etats-Unis et la Croatie (des pays à statut d'observateur).

Les documents juridiques sont: "Le Premier Protocole additionnel à l'Accord sur la MPFSEE" concernant le principe de la rotation au cadre de la force (Athènes, le 12 janvier 1999); "Le Deuxième Protocole additionnel à l'Accord sur la MPFSEE" concernant la Force multinationale de génie (ETF) et le Réseau informationnel pour les situations de crise /CIN (Bucuresti, le 30 novembre 1999); "Le Troisième Protocole additionnel à l'Accord sur la MPFSEE" concernant le statut du commandement (Athènes, le 21 juin 2000) ;

« L'Accord de création de la Force multinationale de paix de l'Europe du Sud-Est » (Skopje, le 26 septembre 2000).

Le Comité directeur politico-militaire (PMSC) est l'organisme politico-militaire de coordination des activités de la MPFSEE. La réunion d'inauguration s'est tenue le 2 et le 3 septembre 1999.

Le Commandement de la force se trouve à Constanta, en Roumanie, dès le 1-er septembre 1999.

La force est opérationnelle depuis le 1-er mai 2001.

La contribution de la Roumanie est la suivante: un bataillon d'infanterie à structure

modulaire (400 militaires); un peloton de recherche (24 militaires); un peloton de transport (32 militaires); un groupe d'officiers et de sous-officiers d'Etat-major (15 militaires). La Roumanie participe déjà au Noyau permanent d'état-major avec des officiers et deux sous-officiers.

Le personnel de la présidence roumaine de la SEDM-CC et du PMSC a commencé à travailler depuis le 1-er août 2001.

L'armée roumaine a envoyé, jusqu'à présent, dans les missions internationales, plus de 8.000 militaires.[11] 9 militaires sont morts aux cours des missions. Actuellement plus de 1.340 militaires roumains sont engagés dans différénts théâtres d'opérations: en Afghanistan, Georgie, Balkans, Ethiopie, Erythrée et Congo.

A partir de 1996 plus de 1.000 militaires roumains ont pris part à la Force de stabilisation en Bosnie (SFOR); le support financier assuré par la Roumanie a été, annuellement, de presque 5.000.000 USD. A présent, en Bosnie-Herzégovine il y à un détachement de génie, un peloton de police militaire et, dans le cadre du détachement "Hollande" – 38 militaires roumains. En réserve stratégique, la Roumanie met à la disposition de l'OTAN un bataillon d'infanterie.

Au Kosovo la Romania a engagé plus de 340 militaires, dans la mission KFOR. Une compagnie d'infanterie est dans la structure de la Brigade Multinationale d'Ouest. Dans le commandement KFOR sont intégrés 4 officiers d'état-major roumains.

En Afganistan[12] les forces terrestres roumaines participent, dans le cadre de la Force Internationale pour l'Assistance de Sureté (ISAF III), avec un peloton de police militaire basé a Kaboul. Toujours dans les opérations antiterroristes (opération "ENDURING FREEDOM III"), dans la région de Kandahar (ayant la base à Bagram) la Roumanie participe avec un bataillon d'infanterie. Au total, les effectifs roumains engagés en Afghanistan ont dépassé plus de 1.300 militaires, nécessitent chaque année, plus de 50 millions USD.

Plus de 600 militaires roumains ont été envoyés jusqu'à présent, par la Roumanie, en Irak. Le remplacement des effectifs est planifié se réaliser tous les 6 mois.

A côté de la Pologne, la Norvège, le Danemark, l'Autriche, la Suède, la Hongrie, la Roumanie participe avec une compagnie d'infanterie à la brigade multinationale à capacité élevée de combat des forces ONU – SHIRBRIG.

Dans la Force multinationale de paix du sud-est de l'Europe – SEEBRIG, constituée par la Grèce, l'Italie, la Turquie, la Bulgarie, l'Albanie, la Macedoine, ayant le commandement à Constanta (Rou), la Roumanie assure les effectifs suivants: 1 bataillon d'infanterie (400 militaires), 1 compagnie de génie (119 militaires), 1 peloton de transport (40 militaires), 1 peloton de reconnaissance, un groupe d'officiers d'état-major.

La Roumanie a réalisé, avec la Hongrie, projet supervisé par la France et l'Allemagne, un bataillon de maintien de la paix,[13] dont le commandement est alternatif.

Une autre coopération militaire interationale est réalisée par la Roumanie (une compagnie renforcée) avec la Slovaquie, la Hongrie et l'Ukraine dans le cadre du bataillon de génie "Tisa".

La Roumanie a fait de grands efforts pour créer sa Force de réaction rapide dont les unités sont transportables, mobiles et capables de s'intégrer rapidement dans les structures multinationales. Cette force contribue à la sécurité internationale, en représentant la base des activités de partenariat avec les voisins de la Roumanie, avec d'autres pays de la région et, en même temps, un véritable modèle pour la formation des militaires professionnels. Elle peut agir rapidement et d'une manière efficace pour prévenir les conflits et gérer les crises avant qu'elles se transforment en conflits, ainsi que pour repousser une éventuelle agression contre la Roumanie. L'armée roumaine, intégrée dans l'OTAN, a les qualités nécessaires de répondre d'une manière adéquate à ses missions dans ce nouveau cadre, à côté des alliés historiques, traditionnels.

NOTES:

[1] *La Loi de la Défense nationale*, l'art.5, alin.1.

[2] *La Stratégie de Sécurité Nationale de la Roumanie*, p. 27.

[3] GHEORGHE, Ion SOARE, Corneliu, *Doctrina Militară Românească, 1968-1989*, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 1999, p. 238.

[4] *Ibidem.*

[5] Gândirea Militară Românească, nov. 2002 (nr. 6), p. 103.

[6] GHEORGHE, Ion SOARE, Corneliu, *Doctrina Militară Românească, 1968-1989*, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 1999, p. 238.

[7] CERNĂIANU, Adrian, MANTA, Dănuţ, *Consideraţii privind proiecţia forţelor B.96 Ge. în teatrul de acţiune din Bosnia-Herzegovina*, Editura A.I.S.M., Bucureşti, 2003.

[8] COLECTIV, *Geopolitică şi istorie militară în perioada post-război rece*, Editura A.I.S.M., Bucureşti, 2003, p. 245.

[9] *Gîndirea Militară Românească*, nov. 2002 (nr. 6), p. 104.

[10] CIUCĂ, Nicolae, *Dimensiunea angajării Armatei României în operaţiile întrunite multinaţionale*, Bucureşti, Editura A.I.S.M., 2003.

[11] Documentar S.M.F.T., 2004.

[12] *Gândirea Militară Românească*, nov. 2002 (nr. 6), p. 104.

[13] *Ibidem*, p. 95.

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The Limits of the Direct Effect of Directives

Vasilica Mucea

I. The Member States' Obligations Deriving from International Agreements

Although the direct effect of directives is considered to be one of the cornerstones of the European Community judicial system or one of its characteristic features, the former is not sacrosanct as the direct effectiveness of European Community law and, implicitly, of directives[1], it has a series of limitations.

The first among the limitations mentioned above has relatively recently been laid emphasis on and it is the result of the enforcement of the conflicting rule established by article 234 from the CEE Treaty. According to the first paragraph of this provision, 'the rights and obligations deriving from the agreements settled before the coming into effect of this treaty between one or more member states, on the one hand, and one or more third parties, on the other hand, shall not be affected by the stipulations of this treaty'.

In two French cases[2] related to the prohibition of women's night labour, the Court of Law considered that, as long as night labour was permitted for men workers, such a prohibition infringes on the principle of equality of treatment regarding working conditions, stipulated by article 5 of Directive no. 76/207 (equality of treatment at work). Moreover, it had already been settled through legal channels that these stipulations had a direct effect. As a matter of principle[3], this

meant that the National Court was under the obligation to ensure the full effect of this rule by not enforcing any contrary provision from the Domestic Law[4]. However, the problem was that the contrary provisions as far as the matter is concerned had been promulgated so as to enforce Convention no. 89ILO that prohibited women's night labour. France had ratified this Convention by means of a law from September 21st 1953, therefore before the coming into effect of the CEE Treaty and at that time it had not condemned it. In a thorough justification of the cases[5], the High Court concluded that the National Court was not under the obligation of not enforcing the domestic legal stipulations which contravened the Directive, as the enforcement of the provisions in question was necessary in order to ensure that the respective state discharged the obligations derived from an agreement anterior to the Treaty, as stipulated by article 234. According to the Court of Law, it is the State Court that must verify the concrete duties settled by means of the agreement, with a view to establishing the limit from which these could represent an obstacle in the way of the enforcement of article 5 of the Directive. At the same time, the same court must verify whether the domestic legal stipulations in question are such as to implement the above mentioned obligations.

II. The General Principles of European Community Law

To settle the direct effect of a stipulation is a matter of interpretation. As a rule, the interpretation of the European Community

Law[6] dispositions by the Court of Law has a retroactive effect; thus, as interpreted by the Court, the stipulation is to be enforced from

the moment it comes into effect[7]. Regarding the direct effect of directives, this means that the stipulation declared as directly effective produces this effect from the expiry of the period stipulated for its implementation, even if the process through which this is settled takes place at a subsequent date. Nevertheless, in exceptional cases, the Court has limited the rule's general retroactive effect, the basis of this limitation being represented by 'important considerations of juridical certainty'[8].

One of the few cases in which the Court of Law resorted to this exceptional measure concerned the finding that article 141 (the former article 119 CEE) was directly effective in *Defrenne II*. In this instance, there are no reasons for which the Court might not proceed in the same manner when the stipulations of a directive are concerned. *Defrenne II* clearly stated that the principle of juridical certainty might, in certain special circumstances, limit the direct effect of the stipulations in the European Community Law. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize the fact that only the Court of Law is able to settle whether the circumstances are such as to compromise this principle. Moreover, it is precisely due to this line of reason that the principle of juridical certainty, which applies in these circumstances, is the community one, as to allow the direct effect to be limited by a national principle would contravene the supremacy rule.

Defrenne II was related to the limitation of the direct effect as such, situation that needs to be distinguished from the case when the Court allows for the enforcement of national principles within the state procedures involved in the implementation of European Community Law. Therefore, if *Defrenne II*

restricts the direct effect as such, the second hypothesis limits the 'effects of the direct effect'. In other words, national principles[9] may not infringe upon the individuals' procedural right to appeal to stipulations in the European Law, but they may restrict the exercise of this right.

The distinction is sometimes difficult to make, as illustrated in the *Cotter and McDermott II* Case[10]. At the basis of this stood the fact that the direct effect of the prohibition of sexual discrimination settled by Directive 79/7 (equality of treatment in social security systems) was in some cases that dependent wives and children were paid certain benefits although they were not actually dependent, and, furthermore, there was the possibility of paying these benefits twice for the same household. In this case, allowing for such requests was considered to encroach upon the rule which prohibits the unjust enrichment[11], which, according to the national law in question, which represent good reason to restrict or decline the benefit in certain circumstances. The Court rejected this argument, considering that allowing the national authorities to rely on this national principle would permit them to use their own illicit demeanour[12] as a ground for depriving the directive from its full effect.

The difference between the direct effect as such and the 'effects of the direct effect' is, as evident from the jurisprudence of the Court of Law, a decisive criterion. The direct effect can only be limited by the principles of European Community Law, whereas the effects[13] of the direct effect may be restricted, under certain circumstances, by the enforcement of the principles of National Law.

III. The Direct Horizontal Effect of Directives

1. The Debate Anterior to the *Marshall I* Case

The most important limitation of the direct effect of directives is represented by the absence of the direct horizontal effect, sanctioned by the Court in the ruling from *Marshall I*. By **direct horizontal effect**[14] we understand the possibility to invoke and

enforce incidental stipulations by an individual against other private persons. This must not be mistaken for the **reverse direct vertical effect**, which stands for the possibility of a member state to set a stipulation against a private person.

The issue of the direct horizontal effect has been a long-running dispute and has generated a considerable literature[15] both before and after the trial of the *Marshall I* Case, the main arguments for and against remaining for a long time unchanged.

The first argument invoked against the direct horizontal effect derives from the way directives are defined by article 249(3) from the Treaty which establishes the European Community, and consists in the directives' mandatory nature for the member states and, therefore, not for private persons, which means that they cannot impose obligations on individuals, but only on states. However, other theorists have called our attention to the Court's jurisprudence as far as the direct effect of the stipulations of treaties is concerned. The main outcome of these findings was that those that the provision in question is intended for did not condition the direct effect. According to some of the authors, it is the obligation to make legal corrections, as settled in Case *VNO* and *Enka*, that especially indicates the fact that the nature of the juridical relation involved is irrelevant in this matter. *Defrenne II* is another case frequently mentioned when this issue is addressed. Notwithstanding the fact that, according to the wording of article 141, the provision is intended for the member states, the Court has ruled in favour of the direct horizontal effect. Nevertheless[16], the opponents of this effect in the case of directives have indicated that the definition in article 249(3) is too explicit to allow for an analogy.

The cases regarding the direct effect[17] of the stipulations from treaties have clarified the fact that, when determining the legal effects, it is the content of the measure that is decisive and not its form. Moreover, it did not result from the cases related to the direct effect in general – therefore the direct effect of directives as well –, that the direct effect was conditioned by the legality of the document which contains the relevant stipulations.

More recently, attorney general Jacobs has voiced the opinion that the textual argument is neither persuasive, nor decisive, as the wording of article 249 TCE does not specifically exclude the possibility of certain obligations assigned to other individuals (not member states). Richter has expressed a similar point of view, as he argued that a distinction must be made between the obligations[18] of the member states (the implementation of the directive) and the duties stipulated by the directive itself. The mere fact that the states[19] are under the obligation to implement the directive does not clarify as such the issue of the potential juridical effects of the substantive law provisions[20].

The second argument against the direct horizontal effect of directives is related to the difference between regulations and directives. According to article 249, only the former can be directly enforced and, therefore, impose obligations on private persons. The acknowledgement of the direct horizontal effect for directives would lead to their being assimilated to regulations, which would deprive the directives of their original status and would contravene article 249. It has been noticed that this argument is the one invoked against the direct effect of directives in general (rejected by the Court of Law), and, in addition, that the acknowledgement of the horizontal effect would neither change anything as far as the obligation to implement directives is concerned[21], nor would it infringe upon the member states' right to choose forms and methods[22].

The third argument regards the juridical certainty and is based on two distinct lines of judgment. Firstly, there was no legal requirement that directives should be published in The Official Journal[23]. Under the circumstances of publishing directives in practice with a few exceptions, the argument has been viewed as purely formal by some authors, whereas others have considered it important. In this line of thought, attorney general Lenz has made a distinction between the publication of a directive with a constitutive effect and the publication of a directive with a declarative effect In his opinion, 'the fundamental condition on imposing an obligation on the citizen by means of legislation is the latter's publication with a constitutive effect'[24]. According to the

former regulation, the coming into effect of directives was conditioned by their notification, and not by their publication. Nevertheless, amending article 191 by means of the Maastricht Treaty resolved this issue. Secondly, it has further been maintained that allowing parties to invoke this series of community laws against private persons would lead to juridical uncertainty. As a matter of principle, as far as obligations are concerned, individuals should be entitled to rely on the national law. In the event that the direct horizontal effect was acknowledged, those in question would be confronted with a conflict between the requirements of the state's domestic law and the obligations imposed on them by the directive. Furthermore, in order to determine the exact content of the obligation, they should keep in mind both regulations, national and European, which might be a very difficult task for those in question.

The fourth argument against the direct horizontal effect emerged in the *Ratti* Case, the Court laying down by statute the fact that a member state which had not adopted the implementation measures required by the respective directive could not invoke – in relation to individuals – the state's guilt in discharging its obligations – the so-called 'legal hindrance principle'. On the contrary, it has been considered that an individual can invoke the state's guilt regarding the implementation of the directive as a ground for him/her being exonerated of accountability. The best counter-argument in this respect is the fact that the High Court[25] has never acknowledged the legal hindrance principle as a really important fundamental concept; it was the doctrine that turned the above mentioned rule into the rationale behind the direct effect of directives.

Consequently, neither one of the arguments against the direct horizontal effect has proven conclusive, nor those in favour of this effect have proven decisive. However, some theorists[26] have stated that the consistent enforcement of the European Community law and its 'useful effect' cause this direct horizontal effect. The acknowledgement of the horizontal effect would undoubtedly bring about the increase in the effectiveness of directives and would represent a new incentive for the states when taking into consideration their implementation on time, and the enforcement of European Community law as consistent as possible, and the protection of the individuals' rights deriving from these norms. There have even been voices to say that denying the direct horizontal effect would lead to denying the supremacy of the European Community law.

Other authors have suggested that at least a *restricted form*[27] of the direct horizontal effect might be acknowledged, which would consist in an analysis of the lawfulness of the national measures as far as a dispute between two private parties is concerned. Thus, without requesting for the enforcement of the stipulations of the directive in the given case, the individuals in question could still invoke the respective provision before the national court in order to oppose the enforcement of the domestic law, which does not correspond to the former, even in a 'horizontal' juridical relation.

There have been voices to advocate the exclusion of the restricted horizontal effect[28] as well, since its outcome could be the lack of enforcement not only of the domestic law, due to its incompatibility, but also of the stipulations of the directive, which do not have a direct horizontal effect, thus severely jeopardizing the legal stability and leading to an inconsistent enforcement[29] of European Community law.

Other authors[30] have sustained the idea that the restricted horizontal effect is possible, as 'the normal enforcement of the illegality exception, while there being a balanced tackling of the issue[31]. From this point of view, the acknowledgement of the illegality exception without further specification in the dispute regarding 'the horizontal nature' of the direct effect of directives is difficult to accept, as the lack of enforcement of certain national legal provisions could lead to the appearance of some obligations incumbent upon individuals. In this line of thought, we notice that the lack of enforcement of an interdiction stipulated by a national law that contravenes

the directive is different from the lack of enforcement of a national law that entitles an individual to something. These aspects must be taken into consideration and, for this reason, the National Court considers for each concrete case the real effect of acknowledging the illegality exception.

2.Views on the Direct Horizontal Effect of Directives Subsequent to the *Marshall I* Case

In the *Marshall I* Case, the Court of Law ruled in favour of a textual argument, laying down by statute that, since article 249(3) TCE establishes the compulsory nature of directives only with respect to the member states – those which the directives are intended for –, directives cannot by themselves impose obligations on an individual and, consequently, the stipulations of a directive cannot be invoked against a private person.

According to some authors, an important role in this ruling has been played by a political rather than juridical argument, more precisely the difficulty which some national courts evinced when accepting the direct effect of directives. The ruling has been severely criticized, not only by some theorists, but also by the members of the Court of Law, as it was considered that arbitrary distinctions were thus being created between member states, depending on the size of the state system, and within the member states, between the public and the private sector, as regards the employees, the consumers and the providers of goods and services. Moreover, it has also been brought to relief that conflicting situations might arise when an individual is at the same time the employee of a private company and of a public body, all these leading to discriminations and inequality, which cannot be viewed as compatible with the principles of European Community law.

The evolution of the jurisprudence of the Court of Law has brought again into attention the debate over the direct horizontal effect of directives. In the first place, the 'state' concept has been enlarged as to encompass all public bodies and, at the same time, a series of public companies which were prevented from invoking the state's guilt to their defense, even though they could not be held accountable for the non- implementation of the directive in question. This evolution has evidently encroached upon the legal hindrance principle to the extent to which the latter might be considered the basis of the direct effect of directives. In addition, to determine whether an institution emanates from the state or not is not at all devoid of difficulty.

On the other hand, the obligation of a thorough and comprehensive interpretation imposed on national courts has determined them to act according to their prerogatives in order to render a full effect to the European Community law. In some cases, a comprehensive interpretation is very close to the acknowledgement of the direct horizontal effect of directives.

The third important element related to this matter is the Court's ruling in the *Francovich* Case, according to which the state is responsible, under certain circumstances, for the damage suffered by an individual as a result of the non-implementation of some directive. Nevertheless, the ruling cannot successfully replace the direct enforcement of a directive and, in particular, it does not cover the inequitable conditions under which different the subjectives of law are faced with.

Fourthly, the more recent jurisprudence of the High Court has been substantially influenced by the aspiration that the national courts might offer effective and full protection to the individuals' rights deriving from the European Community regulations, protection which is seriously infringed upon by the Court's denial to grant a direct horizontal effect to directives.

In conclusion, the Court's juridical construction referring to the domestic effects of directives is extremely complex[32] not only for the national courts, but also for individuals, as it implies difficult tasks for courts, it may lead to confusion, and there is the inherent risk that the outcomes of the rulings made for a case or another might be inequality and inconsistency.

A possible solution, especially for those who consider the requirement of publication as an essential one, might be the direct horizontal effect of those directives that will be published, according to article 191, as modified by the Maastricht Treaty[33]. The issue is that the directives adopted (and published, although not obligatorily) on the basis of the old text can cause effects long after being adopted, as evinced in the *Ponente Carni* Case[34]. Moreover, some doctrine-setters and practitioners have advocated the Court of Law's return to the 'useful effect' of directives and the renunciation of the strict and literal interpretation of article 249 or the taking into consideration of the 'legal hindrance principle', while others have opted in favour of granting the horizontal effect only to *some* of the stipulations of the directives. However, among all the more or less convincing arguments brought into discussion, the one the entire debate is based on is the *juridical certainty*.

In the *Faccini Dori* Case[35], the issue of the direct horizontal effect re-emerged as an invitation to reanalyze the ruling in the *Marshall I* Case. Paola Faccini Dori invoked the stipulations of Directive no. 85/577/CEE (the house-to-house canvassing), which had not been implemented yet, against a trader who had not acted according to them. The court found that the community law was liable to direct effect upon verifying whether the conditions for the exertion of the direct effect are met, since the directive clearly settled who is granted rights and who is imposed obligations on, and – regarding the content of the right – that a period of seven days was established for annulment and that, although the member states were granting a larger protection, this did not encroach upon the seven days limit. This finding opened the possibility of reconsidering the issue of the direct horizontal effect. Two of the Court's attorney general, attorney general Van Gerven in the *Marshall II* Case[36] and attorney general Jacobs in the *Le Foyer versus Vaneetveld* Case[37], had already spoken in favour of the direct horizontal effect. In the *Faccini Dori* Case, the opinion of attorney general Lenz was in favour of acknowledging the direct horizontal effect and rejecting the *Marshall I* ruling in this matter. In Lenz' view, in addition to the arguments based on the equality among and within states, the development of the domestic market, with strong contacts between private persons from various member states, implied giving them the possibility to appeal to the rights directly granted them by the directives.

After explaining the fact that the jurisprudence related to the direct effect aims to prevent the state from taking advantage of its own guilt as far as the observance of the European Community law is concerned and from depriving individuals of the benefit of the rights granted them by means of directives, the Court laid down by statute that 'the effect of the extension of the legal practice to the domain of the relations between individuals will be the acknowledgement of the Community's ability to impose immediately effective obligations upon individuals, taking into consideration the fact that it is within the competence of the Community to do so when it is entitled to adopt regulations'. What this standpoint does is to reinforce an argument against the direct effect of directives in general: the Community may only create 'direct' rights and obligations for individuals by means of regulations.

Although the ruling from the *Faccini Dori* Case has irrevocably confirmed the lack of the direct effect of directives, the issue has again been raised several times, partly as a consequence of the questions related to this aspect sent by the state courts and, partly through the rulings made by the Court of Law in the analyzed cases. The *El Corte Ingles SA* Case[38], coming from a Spanish court represents an example for the first circumstance; it is the dispute between Cristina Blasquez Rivero and a travel agency on the matter of Directive no. 87/102/CEE regarding the consumer credit (non-implemented). The issue raised subsequently to the coming into effect of the Maastricht Treaty which, by means of article 129A (the former article 153), created an explicit basis for the European Community policy regarding consumer protection.

Indicating that the protection measures in question were generally taken by means of directives and that the consumer usually needed to be protected against other private persons, the national court inquired whether the principle of a high level of consumer protection infringed upon the Court of Law's doctrine related to the direct effect of directives. The Court formed of a panel of five judges returned to *Marshall I* as a ground for its judgement, reconsidered the main aspect of the *Faccini Dori* ruling and settled that article 153 CE did not encroach upon the acknowledged standpoint even though directives regarding consumer protection were involved.

The High Court represented by a panel of three judges reiterated the grounds of judgement in the *Arcaro* Case[39], sent by an Italian court with the inquiry whether Directives no. 76/464/CEE and 83/513/CEE regarding water pollution and cadmium waste, which had not been entirely implemented, could be invoked against the individual polluter.

Moreover the ruling in the *Daihatsh-Handler* Case[40], related to the First Directive no 68/151/CEE, regarding trading companies, reiterated the idea that the stipulations of a directive cannot by themselves impose obligations on individuals.

While rulings similar to those previously mentioned have consolidated the rejection of the direct horizontal effect, other rulings of the European Court of Law have kept open the issue whether directives can, under certain circumstances, be invoked by an individual against another individual. The best example in this matter is given by the *CIA Security* Case[41], related to a Directive regarding technical standards (1983) – litigation between CIA Security and another two Belgian security firms. Thus, CIA had promoted the Andromede security system, about which the competitors had said that it did not observe the requirements stipulated by the Belgian legislation. In reply to this, CIA claimed that the decree and the law taken into consideration contravened the stipulations of the Directive regarding technical standards, by introducing new conditions on products without having given prior notice to the Committee. First of all, the Court established that the Belgian measures represented technical regulations, analyzing then whether the directive was sufficiently clear and precise so as to allow an individual to invoke it. Finding that these requirements were met, the Court ruled against the argument that the directive only evinced procedural implications and that it did not encroach upon the validity of the technical standards which had not been notified. The ruling thus implied that the general lack of enforcement of the technical regulations that had not been previously notified prevents them from being invoked by an individual against other individuals.

The outcome of the ruling is that an individual can use a directive against another individual before the national court, as a means of defense. On the other hand, the outcome of the ruling made in the *Faccini Dori* case is that a directive cannot, in a similar procedure, be a direct source of such a request.

Conclusions

Adopting a comparative approach to the International law and the European Community law, it becomes apparent that as far as the former is concerned it is not impossible for certain provisions of international conventions to convey, under certain circumstances, a *self-executing* effect, if this has been the intention of the contracting parties. However, this possibility evinces an exceptional character and only regards those stipulations intended for individuals. As far as European Community law is concerned, the situation is completely different qualitatively and quantitatively, since the entire European Community law system benefits from the virtual ability to produce direct effects.

In relation to the classical international law, this difference becomes even more important as the direct effect is not established *in terminis* by the wording of the treaties, but it is the result of a juridical construct. On the one hand, it is obvious that the Court of Law has taken into consideration the essential characteristics of the establishing treaties when acknowledging this fact, as: the latter's objective is the establishment of a single market whose functioning directly concerns the justiciable (reparatory); the treaties' preamble does not only address the governments of the member states but also the Community's peoples; the European Community mechanisms do not only affect the states but also their citizens; the individuals are decision – making partners by means of the European Parliament and of the Social and Economic Committee; article 234 TCE confirms the fact that the states have undertaken to acknowledge the authority of the European Community law, liable to be invoked before the national courts; the provisions of the treaties create rights for justiciable (reparatory) who are to be protected by the national courts.

Even though none of these arguments is by itself conclusive, in addition to the explicit justifications the reasoning elaborated by the Court allows for giving prominence to the latent reasons in favour of the acknowledgement of a direct effect of community norms. From the way in which it is conceived, the direct effect has the aim not only to protect individual rights, but also to guarantee the effectiveness of enforcing the European Community law in the domestic legal system of the states.

Regarding the direct effectiveness of directives, this is accepted by the doctrine and acknowledged by the jurisprudence of the Court of Law, but, as mentioned in the previous chapter, it has a series of limitations. More precisely, it is the **direct vertical effect** that is accepted – in other words, the ability of

justiciable (reparatory) to invoke the directive with a view to constrain the member state in question to comply with the obligations incumbent upon it and to enforce the rights created for the benefit of the private persons.

However, the aspiration to guarantee the obligatory effect and the useful effect of directives has lead to a substantial extension of the notion of direct vertical effect. With this in mind, we mention the existence of the `**dismembered vertical effect**` (which regards the directives' ability to oppose not only a member state, but all the public communities, and the corporate bodies, independent of any organic criterion, as well), and the **direct oblique effect** (i.e. the possibility of invoking the directives against the state seen both as an employer and as a public power).

This move towards the `**dismembered vertical effect**` and the of the **direct oblique effect** vertical effect, together with the possibility of cumulating the two extensions of the term, could but only raise new questions about the appropriateness of acknowledging a **direct horizontal effect** of directives, as far as litigation among private persons is concerned. In spite of the legitimate questions raised by the doctrine, the European Community Court has constantly denied extension along this line of the direct effect of directives. The reason behind this denial was the necessity of maintaining the distinction made by the Treaty between regulations and directives. These grounds do not, however, prevent directives from producing legal effects in litigation between private persons. Thus, a justiciable is allowed to invoke the provisions of such an European Community law against an administrative ruling.

Furthermore, we mention the acknowledgement by the more recent jurisprudence of a form of **procedural effect of directives** in the litigation with a horizontal effect, which indisputably reinforces their opposability nature in the relations established between private persons.

NOTES:

[1] The specific character of directives lies in the type of obligation, which they impose upon addresses. Directives amount only to obligations of result, not obligations of conduct. However, the implementation of directives is a positive for the Member States, and the effective implementation of directives is one of the Keys to the realization of the EU's objective sphere.

[2] . Case C-345/89 *Stoechel* [1991] ECR I-4047, and Case C-158/91 *Levy* [1993] ECR I-4287

[3] In practice, the miss –implementation of directives is as serous a problem as the failure to implement, and the Court of Justice is frequently faced with preliminary reference regarding the interpretation of particular directives where national implementing measures.

[4] Case C-158/91 *Levy* [1993] ECR I-4287, *paragraph 9.*

[5] For more details, see Case C-13/93 Minne [1994] ECR I-371.

[6] The Member States have discretion as to how they implement directives. This normally involves either adopting are changing legislation is sufficient.

[7] As settled in Case 61/79 *Denkavit Italiana* [1980] ECR 1205.

[8] According to the rulings from Cases: 43/75 *Defrenne II* [1976] ECR 455; 24/86 *Blaizot* [1988] ECR 379; and C-262/88 *Barber* [1990] ECR I-1889.

[9] It should however be noted that the requirement that national law should be interpreted in the light of community law so as to give effect to the aims of the latter is not to direct or to non–directly effective law: see Case C-165/91,*Van Munster v.Rijksdienst for Pensionen* [1994] ECR –4661.

[10] Case C-377/89 [1991] ECR I-1155.

[11] Paul Craig, Grainne de Burca – *EU LAW, Text, Cases, and Materials* Oxford University Press 1ˢᵗ edition 1998

[12] The non-implementation of the directive in the prescribed time.

[13] Jo Shaw – *Law of the European Union*, Macmillan 1996 1ˢᵗ edition p. 200.

[14] J Coppel – *Horizontal Direct effect of directives* 1997 28 ILJ 69, p. 73.

[15] D.Simon et A.Rigaux – *L'ârret Marshall II et l'effect des directives: une solution d'especé á une question de principe ?* Europe 1993 p. 1.

[16] See P.Craig – *Directives: Direct Effect, Indirect Effect and the and the Construction of National Legislation* 1997 22 EL Rev. 519.

[17] But the explanation for the direct effect of regulations was less teleological and more straightforwardly textual: Article 249 (old 189) specifically provided for their direct applicability, which the Court largely treated as being synonymous with direct effectiveness.

[18] It follows that, in applying the national law and in particular the provisions of a national law specifically introduced in order to implement Directive No 76/207 national courts are required to interpreted their national law in the light of the wording and the purpose of the Directive in order to achieve to in the third paragraph of Article 189.

[19] Denys Simon – *L'application des directives par les tribunaux nationaux* Bulletin de la Cour de Cassation, oct. 1993.

[20] See P.M.Eiseman – *L'integration du droit international et communautaire dans l'ordre juridique national,*La Haye,Kluver Law International, 1996, p. 587.

[21] According to Jacobs'opinion expressed in Case C-316/93 *Vaneetveld* [1994] ECR I-763, paragraph 25.

[22] The opinion of attorney general Lenz in Case C-91/92 *Faccini Dori*, February 9ᵗʰ 1994, [1994] ECR I-3325, paragraph 59.

[23] According to article 191 CEE Treaty, before it was modified by the Treaty concerning the European Union

[24] Opinion expressed in Case C-91/92 *Faccini Dori* [1994], ECR I-3325, paragraph 64.

[25] See F.Hervouet -*Politique jurisprudentielle de la Cour de Justice et des jurisdictions nationales. Receptions du droit communautaire par le droit interne des Etats*, RDP Paris 5/1992 p. 1257.

[26] See D Simon- *La directive europeénne*, Dalloz, Paris 1997.

[27] The idea of "passive" horizontal direct effect which does not amount to appositive obligation was suggested by Stuyck and Wytinck in their early comment on the *Marleasing Case* 1991 28 CML Rev. p. 205.

[28] Timmermans, *Directives: their Effect within the National Legal Systems*, CML Rev. 1979, p. 543.

[29] Leo Flynn – *Enforcement of EC Law. Protection of Individual's Right in National Courts*, UNIDEM Campus, Trieste, Italy, 2001.

[30] Louis, Vandersanden, Waelbrock & Waelbrock, *Commentaire Megret*, vol. 10, La Court de Justice. Les actes des institutions, 2ⁿᵈ edition de lÚniversite de Bruxelles, 1993.

[31] Sacha Prechal – *Directives in European Community Law. A Study of Directives and their Enforcement in National Courts*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995 p. 299.

[32] Denys Simon – *Le systeme normatif communautaire*, troisième édition, Presses Universitaires de France, 199

[33] In lawyer Lenz'opinion, Case C-91/92 *Faccini Dori* [1994] ECR I-3325, paragraph 45. Lenz also accepts t direct horizontal effect of the directives prior to the Maastricht Treaty, on condition that the latter should effective only the future.

[34] Cases C-71/91 and C-178/91 [1993] ECR I-1915.

[35] Case C-91/92 [1994] ECR I-3325.

[36] Case C-271/91 [1993] ECR I-4367.

[37] Case C-316/93 [1994] ECR I-763.

[38] Case C-192/94 [1996] ECR I-281.

[39] Case C-168/95 [1996] ECR I-4705.

[40] Case C-97/96 [1997] ECR I-6843.

[41] Case C-194/94 [1996] ECR I-2201.

Regionalism, Sub-regionalism and Security in the Black Sea Region Research Summary

Adrian Pop

TOPIC OF RESEARCH

Taking as case studies the elites' perceptions in Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine, the research has focused on the relationship between regionalism and security in the Black Sea area. Its aims have been to evaluate the conflict mitigating and security enhancement potential of the Black Sea regional cooperation, its main achievements and shortcomings, and to suggest possible areas of action for its future development in order to strengthen regional security and stability in the area.

RELEVANCE AND CONTRIBUTION TO FIELD

The choosing of Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine as case studies was done taking into consideration several reasons. First, Romania and Bulgaria are in the same "basket" in terms of Euro-Atlantic and European integration: invited to start accession talks for joining NATO in November 2002, the two countries have prospects of EU accession in 2007. Thus, they make good comparison cases of how Black Sea regional cooperation have worked for them. Second, Ukraine has constantly pursued a balancing act in terms of its foreign policy orientations, oscillating between stating its willingness to join both the EU and NATO and deepening its participation in the CIS structures (the CIS Anti-Terrorism Centre, the CIS Free Trade Zone, etc), between offsetting the US (the "Kolchuga" scandal) and making gestures of benevolence towards Washington, DC, hinting a desire to be helpful within internal and geopolitical constrains (the dispatch of a NBC battalion to Kuwait, and the participation of Ukraine in the stabilization force in Iraq). Third, Ukraine is considered to be a key component of the neighborhood of both enlarged NATO and future enlarged EU.

Focusing on the Black Sea regional cooperation as a foreign policy tool of building new bridges towards Ukraine, which is an important strategy of both NATO and EU, the project contributes to the ongoing efforts of exploring creative ways of dissipating potential new divisive lines. In addition to this, the results of project are likely to advance the awareness of the positive impact Black Sea regional cooperation has in the area of energy security, especially in view of the prevailing importance of the Caspian-Black Sea transit corridor. Furthermore, various experts have pinpointed to the need of the countries lying in the Black Sea region to take a common approach to deterring terrorism, drugs and small and light weapons (SALW) smuggling, as well as illegal migration and trafficking of

human beings. The project advocates the role of multilateral regional cooperation in devising and deploying effective tools in deterring transnational security threats. Last but not least, by assessing the elites' perceptions in Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine on the perceived degree of experiencing a common sense of the Black Sea region, the descriptive and normative aspects of regional and sub-regional cooperation in the area, the main factors favoring and obstructing Black Sea cooperation, the regional initiatives with the most significant security impact, the relationship between the regional cooperation and the European and Euro-Atlantic processes, the national interests in participating in the Black Sea regional cooperation and the most talked about aspects of it, the research addresses the paramount important issue of the variables that explain the efficiency of various Black Sea groupings.

SUMMARY OF APPROACH AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research has combined quantitative and qualitative methods, using the questionnaire and the in-depth face-to-face interview as sociological techniques. It has focused on significant data gathering meant to grasp the elites' perception in Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine on the Black Sea regional cooperation and its security impact in the region.

After reviewing the initial draft of the questionnaire's content, the four collaborators of the project have agreed on a final draft of it. An estimate target group of thirty individuals to be addressed during the survey in each of the three countries was agreed upon, too. The respondents were selected to encompass diverse expertise, including security and defense, foreign affairs, intelligence, and energy and infrastructure development.

The target group was identified on the basis of the professional experience and expertise of the respondents on issues related to the Black Sea area, particularly in the area of security, defense and cooperation. Hence, it comprised of governmental staff from various ministries, National Security and Defense Councils, Presidential Administrations, secret services and municipal authorities; high-ranking governmental officials; members and staff of the Parliaments; scholars from civilian and military academic institutions; researchers from think tanks; risk assessment experts from private firms; and journalists specialized on international affairs.

The research sites, covered throughout the 2002-2003 academic year, have included:
– Romania: the Presidential Administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of European Integration, the Ministry of Industry and Resources, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Communications, the Parliament, the University of Bucharest, the National School of Political and Administrative Studies, the Faculty of Economics of "Petroleum-Gas" University in Ploiesti, the Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History, the Center for Conflict Prevention and Early Warning, the Civil Society Development Foundation, the PriceWaterhouseCoopers company, ING Romania, the "Evenimentul Zilei" daily, Radio Romania International, and Mediafax News Agency.
– Bulgaria: the Presidential Administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications, the Ministry of Regional Development, Sofia municipal authorities, the National Intelligence Service, the University of Sofia, the University of National and World Economy, the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, the National Defense College "G.S. Rakovski", the National Police Academy, the Institute of Euro-Atlantic Security, the Institute for Regional and International Studies, and the "Capital" weekly.
– Ukraine: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economy and European Integration, the State Committee of Border Control, the National Institute for International Security Problems of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, the Atlantic Council of Ukraine, the National Kyiv Mohyla University, the Center for Independent

Political Research, the Institute of Economic Research and Political Consulting, the Center for Army, Conversion and Disarmament Studies, the National Institute for Strategic Studies, the Razumkov Center/Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Studies, the Euro-Atlantic Association, the Center for Economic Development, the Civic Center for Anti-Crisis Studies of the National Institute for Strategic Studies, the Center for International Studies of Odessa National University, and the Center for the Study of Social Prospects of Donbass.

After finalizing the data gathering, the results were comparatively studied and corroborated with the ones of the previous research on Black Sea security cooperation. Then, the research findings were discussed among the four collaborators of the project, namely Professor Daniel Nelson, Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut in New Haven, USA, Marin Lessenski, Program Director with the Institute for Regional and International Studies in Sofia, Bulgaria, Inna Pidluska, President of the Europe XXI Foundation in Kyiv, Ukraine and Professor Adrian Pop, Faculty of Political Sciences, "Dimitrie Cantemir" University in Bucharest, Romania. Finally, the preliminary conclusions were tested again against selected respondents.

SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The bulk of respondents in the three countries under consideration consider the sense of regionness in the Black Sea region as being very little in evidence. As for the reasons explaining that situation, various factors were emphasized, including the heterogeneous built-up of the region, the sense of nationalism, rivalry and competition, the little visibility of the Black Sea regional projects, Ukraine's regional diversity, and Bulgaria's predominant identification with the Balkans, not the Black Sea, as well as the predominance of the Balkan/Southeastern European identity, as the preferred and "imposed" regional identity by the West. Although few in absolute figures, the largest number of respondents that have stated that the sense of regionness is non-existent altogether in the Black Sea region, is to be found among Bulgarian ones. The very few Bulgarian respondents who think that the sense of regionnes is moderately evident have mostly an economic background (which is consistent with the wide perception of economics being the most important feature of the Black Sea regional cooperation). The variations among different dimensions of regional cooperation and among countries and among different regions of the same country were dealt with only by very few respondents and with different results. The variations among different components of regional cooperation were addressed by only one Bulgarian correspondent, who thinks that from an economic viewpoint, the sense of regionness is very little in evidence, but from a political one is moderately evident. The variations between the sense of regionness developed in various Black Sea countries at the level of the government and the one existing among the people, at the level of the "man of the street" were dealt with only by a couple of Romanian respondents. The variations among different regions of the same country were addressed by just one Ukrainian correspondent, which pointed to the fact that the self-identification with the Black Sea region is higher among the people from Crimea, Odessa and Mykolayiv regions, as opposed to the one developed in Western Ukraine.

There is a wide consensus among the respondents that the content of cooperation covers economic, security, political, and environmental aspects. As to the prevalent aspects of it, the majority of respondents in all three countries think that it has primarily economic features. In Romania and Ukraine, respondents tend to ascribe the second place to the cooperation in the area of security, whereas in Bulgaria they seem to opt for the political-oriented cooperation, underlining the regional political activism of the new political elite throughout the region. As a rule, respondents coming from the economic

milieus tend to emphasize the economic dimension of it, whereas respondents from the security and political milieus manifest the opposite tendency, to emphasize the security and political aspects of it. As for the normative aspect of regional cooperation in the area, the overwhelming part of respondents in the three countries considers that it should have primarily an economic content. The second option for what the Black Sea regional cooperation should consist of is security in Romania and Bulgaria, whereas the Ukrainian respondents seem to vacillate between security and environmental preservation in this respect.

In relation to the three principal factors conducive to regional cooperation in the area, the answers were extremely diverse. In Romania the most consensual factors have proved to be the joint interest in the exploitation of natural resources, especially energy ones (oil and gas) in the Black Sea-Caspian Sea area, and the (rather vaguely defined) common economic interests. Other Romanian respondents opt for economic factors at large, particularly the joint interest in the implementation of market oriented policies and projects, in liberalization and privatization and fostering a more attractive environment for investment, whereas other consider that security factors/common security interests are playing the conducive roles. For Bulgarian respondents the three main factors are the geographical proximity and the geostrategic location, the shared security interest in combating "new threats", and the prospect of EU membership. Ukrainian respondents tend to think the transit potential of energy resources as the most conducive factor, followed by (nondescript) common economic interests, and environmental concerns.

Among the three top factors obstructing regional cooperation, as far as Romania is concerned, the most frequent cited are, in order, the economic backwardness/lack of financial resources, the historical legacy, the lack of economic cohesion of the region, and the different political goals and strategic orientations of the countries of the region. Under the heading of other than the top three obstructing factors, only the cultural and religious differences and organized crime are cited more frequently. Bulgarian respondents consider the economic backwardness lack of financial resources and the instability triggered by the conflicts and ethnic tensions in the region as the most obstructing factors, to be followed closely by corruption and organized crime. Ukrainian respondents deem the different political goals and strategic orientations to be the most obstructing factor, to be followed by the economic rivalry, and the unstable political situation in the member-states. Under the heading of other factors that hinder regional cooperation, Russia's ambitions to dominate and its involvement in the settlement of interethnic conflicts in the region, the weakness of organizational support for multilateral cooperation, and the conflicting (nondescript) interests of the member-states are mentioned more frequently in Ukraine.

Asked to mention the three major regional initiatives that have had an impact on the security environment of the area, the bulk of the respondents in all three countries have cited the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) organization as having the biggest impact. Second to BSEC, as a major initiative with a significant security impact in the region is considered to be the Black Sea Naval Task Group (BlackSeaFor) in Romania, and GUUAM (Georgia-Uzbekistan-Ukraine-Armenia-Moldova) grouping in Ukraine, whereas in the case of Bulgaria, for the second place are vying BlackSeaFor, SECI, the NATO/PfP cooperation, and the Multinational Peace Force South East Europe/South East European Brigade (MPFSEE/SEEBrig). The third position is ascribed to GUUAM in Romania, BlackSeaFor in Ukraine, and to the trilateral cooperation between Bulgaria, Romania and Greece, and Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, respectively, in Bulgaria.

Notice is to be made that asked to define how they view GUUAM grouping, the vast majority of Ukrainian correspondents have stated that is an economic association of a group of countries around the Eurasian transport route, only one declaring that is a military-political union of countries intended

to deepen contacts with NATO. Thus, the majority of Ukrainian experts believe that the main national interest of Ukraine in GUUAM lies in the creation of the Eurasian Oil Transport Corridor (EAOTC) as an extension of the Baku-Supsa pipeline across Ukraine's territory, using Odessa-Brody oil pipeline and Pivdennyi oil terminal. In contrast, Romanian and Bulgarian respondents are inclined to underline another aspect of GUUAM, namely the political opposition to Russia's influence within the CIS.

Mention is to be made also to the fact that quite a few Bulgarian respondents declare that there are no regional initiatives with a significant security impact in the area or that they are not aware of any. Similarly, but at the same time oddly enough in view of the respondent's position, a Deputy Secretary of State from the Romanian MoD considers that there is no, as yet, any major initiative with a significant security impact in the area.

Some Romanian and Bulgarian respondents manifest the tendency to consider different regional initiatives individually and on their own merit, even if they are just parts of a bigger framework. The tendency lays down good premises for an objective evaluation of various regional initiatives in the area. The most obvious case in point is BSEC, where the different institutional achievements of it are dealt with separately, not as parts of the overall framework. Thus, are mentioned, one time each, the following BSEC reunions and documents: the Summit Declaration on BSEC (25 June 1992); the Bucharest Statement of the High Level Meeting of the Heads of State or Government (30 June 1995); the Moscow Declaration of the Heads of State or Government (25 October 1996); the Yalta Summit of the Heads of State or Government (5 June 1998); the BSEC Environment Ministers meeting in Thessaloniki; the BSEC Abolition of Double Taxation (19 October 1998); the Istanbul Summit Declaration (18 November 1999); the BSEC Declaration concerning the fight against organized crime; the institutionalized BSEC-EU dialogue; the BSEC Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs Declaration against terrorism (25 October

2002); the Agreement among the Governments of the Participating States of the BSEC on Collaboration in Emergency Assistance and Emergency Response to Natural and Man-made Disasters; the implementation of the Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on money laundering; the setting up of an ad-hoc Study Group between representatives of BSEC Member States and international organizations with a view to elaborating a concept on strengthening security and stability in the Black Sea region; and the proposal to set up a Police Liaison Center.

The respondents in all three countries overwhelmingly consider that the goals of regional cooperation and European and Euro-Atlantic integration are complementary. Whereas in the case of Romania and Bulgaria this result was somehow expected, the fact that Ukraine sees the two processes in a strikingly similar way is rather remarkable. Romanian and Bulgarian respondents add that the two goals are not only complementary, but mutually reinforcing, too. Some Bulgarian respondents reckon also that the Euro-Atlantic and European integration of some Black Sea countries will give a boost to the process of regional cooperation.

The majority of Romanian respondents think that their country's major interests in regional cooperation are economic cooperation and development, and regional security and stability, respectively. Bulgarian correspondents state as their country's major interests developing energy-related infrastructure projects and fighting organized crime, whereas the Ukrainian ones consider them to be the facilitation of energy transportation projects (especially in relation to GUUAM grouping), and the settlement of regional conflicts. The most locally talked about aspects of regional cooperation seem to be, in Romania, the fighting against asymmetrical/non-conventional threats, and the access to Caspian oil and gas, in Bulgaria, environmental cooperation, trade, and the Black Sea as a transit area for energy resources, tourism and leisure, and in Ukraine, GUUAM, Ukraine's provision with energy

resources, the presence of Russian Black Sea Fleet on the Ukrainian territory, the environmental preservation, and the development of recreation facilities and tourism in the region.

To sum up, from the elites' perceptions point of view, the Black Sea could hardly be conceived as a region. The bulk of the people surveyed are unable to relate the sense of regionness to different dimensions of regional cooperation, various Black Sea countries and different regions of the same country.

The regional and sub-regional cooperation are not viewed as foreign policy priorities. However, their goals are seen as complementary to European and Euro-Atlantic integration.

Participation in energy transportation projects and combating organized crime are both major interests of the countries involved in regional cooperation and crucial factors conducive to it.

The factors that hinder the most the Black Sea regional cooperation are the economic backwardness of the member-states and their differences in terms of political and strategic orientations.

The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) organization is seen as generating the most significant security impact in the region, because its large economic potential and geopolitical importance – it provides the necessary links between the enlarged EU, Eastern Europe, the Caspian region and Eastern Mediterranean. Second to it, although it has become operational only in 2001, BlackSeaFor is perceived as having a (potential) major security impact in the region.

The role of Upper Prut and Lower Danube Euro-regions in Black Sea regional and sub-regional cooperation is ignored as if non-existent altogether.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

In view of the paramount importance of the Black Sea-Caspian Sea geoeconomic and geopolitical axis, two main areas of future research in the field would be worth exploring. The first one would be to extend the empirical study of elites' perceptions on the Black Sea regional cooperation in riparian Black Sea countries other than Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine, namely in the Russian Federation, Turkey, Georgia, and the Republic of Moldova. The second one would be to further explore how the Black Sea regional groupings, on the one hand, and the ones established within the CIS (the Union of Russia and Belarus, the Central Asian Economic Community, the Eurasian Economic Community, GUUAM) on the other, relate among themselves and with each other. These two types of approaches are likely to make finer distinctions in relation with issues such as the Black Sea sense of regionness, factors hindering regional cooperation, and the positive and negative overlapping between various groupings, and third parties dialogue in the region.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY AND CORPORATE COMMUNITIES

In view of the possible new dividing lines triggered by NATO and EU enlargement processes, the joint interest of the Black Sea countries and the Euro-Atlantic community at large in securing stability and security in the Black Sea-Caspian Sea region, the imperative of deepening economic ties and implementing critical transport projects between the countries of the region, and the proliferation of transnational security threats, the multilateral regional cooperation in the Black Sea area should be ascribed a greater role within the new Euro-Atlantic security architecture in the making.

Multilateral regional cooperation in the Black Sea region should be an instrument for carrying out tasks that cannot be accomplished within the framework of bilateral contacts and are complementary to the ones promoted by European and Euro-Atlantic institutions.

The current tension between NATO and EU integration and regional cooperation in the Black Sea region should be overcome. To that effect, NATO and EU should make clearer to the Black Sea countries that a good record of cooperation at the regional level increases their chances for integration.

The Black Sea regional projects should be given more visibility in international, regional and national political arenas and mass media.

The promotion of Black Sea regional cooperation should be based on a discriminatory strategy, focused on those regional initiatives that have proved to be more successful than other.

In view of the fact that the bulk of experts in the three countries consider that the regional cooperation in the Black Sea currently has and it should continue to have primarily economic features, priority should be given to projects that promote market oriented policies, liberalization and privatization, a more attractive environment for investment, and business-to-business cooperation among companies in the region.

In the area of security, priority should have those programs and projects targeted towards accelerating the riparian states' integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures and determining the areas for consultation, decision and action in order to efficiently prevent and counter the "new" security risks and threats in the area, in particular the ones that devise criteria and methods for correct monitoring and assessment of cross-border crime.

The Back Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) should become a tool not an alternative for the promotion of EU norms and policies in the area. Based on that, the EU should more actively support the BSEC projects. Thus, a balanced and mutually beneficial cooperation could and should evolve between BSEC and the EU.

BSEC should continue to promote the open regionalism formula, in order not to transform itself into a trade block with preferential treatment. Priority should be given to the following areas: higher energy efficiency and wider introduction of energy saving technologies; the establishment of regional infrastructure networks aimed at facilitating intra Black Sea region trade flows, linking BSEC region's telecommunication infrastructure to the trans-European telecommunications networks; giving a boost to the innovation activity in the BSEC region; associating the private sector in developing the use of information and communications technologies in the BSEC region; an increased attention devoted to the BSEC vocational training; devising special programs relevant to the transition of the BSEC region into a knowledge based society; and stimulating the tourism and leisure activities in the BSEC region.

Taking into consideration the geopolitical and strategic role of the Black Sea in the post 9/11 security environment, the security enhancement potential of BlackSeaFor, as well as the fact that as for now, the joint task naval force could be used only in UN-mandated and OSCE-led operations, NATO and EU should take into consideration the possible future use of BlackSeaFor in search and rescue, mine clearing, humanitarian assistance and environmental protection operations under their aegis.

Due to the fact that the number of experts working on Black Sea regional cooperation or feel competent to speak about it has proved to be rather limited, more effort should be put in introducing its specifics in the curricula of civilian and military academic institutions.

Geo-strategic Evolutions in Black Sea Region

Iulia Antonian

In ancient Greece, the Black Sea was first known as Pontus Axeinus, meaning "Inhospitable Sea". After exploration moved the frontiers farther past the sea, the name was changed to Pontus Euxinus, meaning "hospitable sea". Later, the Turks considered the sea less than agreeable, with it's violent storms and called it Karadeniz, or "Black Sea".

In 1997, William Ryan and Water Pitman[1] from Columbia University published evidence that a massive flood through the Bosphorus occurred about 5600 BC. It has been popularly suggested that the survivors' memory of this event was the source of the **legend for Noah's Flood**[2]. Besides this myth, it is accepted that the Argonauts traveled there in search of the Golden Fleece, which was hidden in a land located at the Western end of the Caucasus Mountains.

From ancient time the geo-strategic position of Black Sea region, between South Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Middle East, down to Mediterranean and North Africa, has made the region in metaphorical terms both a bridge and a dividing line among three continents, with all advantages and difficulties drawn from this location. Nowadays this dilemma is still a valid one. Black Sea area became the "subject" of important military campaigns, transit zone for significant trade roads ("the silk road", "the road from Varegians to Greeks", and contemporary TRACECA and INOGATE) and economic debauchee.

Due to its characteristic, as a "closed" enclaved sea (from geographic point of view), the Black Sea has been controlled, during the history, by the so-called great powers, majority arriving from Oriental Mediterranean Sea. It was the case with Roman Empire, Byzantine Empire, and the Venice-Geneva condominium. The Ottoman Empire transformed the Black Sea into an "Ottoman lake", and starting with XVII century, Europe and Russian Empire struggled for Black Sea hegemony. In this latest case the strategy was a reverse one: possessing strong position in Black Sea, Russia tried to control the Oriental Mediterranean. In the first half of XIX century Black Sea was a "Russian lake" and till the First World War, Russia had the preeminence in the region. Between the two World Wars has been established a condominium between the Soviet regime and the other riparian states, based on Lausanne (1923) and Montreux (1936) treaties.

During the IInd World War, for several years Germany held the control over the Black Sea. As a result of Soviet victory, the USSR took the total control over the region, except the Southern flank. Based on this power position, the USSR tried to extend the control over the Oriental Mediterranean, Turkey being the first target. In this context, US sent several ships in Oriental Mediterranean and according to Truman doctrine, Ankara was strongly sustained against a possible Soviet aggression. From 1952, NATO has become involved in Black Sea regional evolution, due to Turkey' membership.

In this context, we could draw as a first conclusion that *the Black Sea had contributed to the shaping of the Cold War and subsequently had sustained the creation of political-military blocs*. During the Cold War, the Black Sea was a "closed sea" with USSR as a dominant, hegemony power.

Over the time, Black Sea area was under the hegemony of some great powers with short periods of relative freedom (such as Venice-Geneva condominium, or between wars period). In other words, the Black Sea history knew a cyclic evolution a succession of unipolarism and multipolarism. As a general principle the hegemony power took the control including over the small riparian states not only over the Black Sea waters.

The end of the Cold War transformed the power politics' logic from a confrontational logic with two enemy blocs to "horizontal", cooperative relations at regional level. If during the Cold War bipolar world, Black Sea was the subject of regional directions of the two superpowers' foreign policies, after '90's the globalization of regional issues has been produced[3].

USSR' implosion and the dissolution of Warsaw Treaty were among the major facilitators for Black Sea area transformation. First of all, increased the number of riparian states. The emergence of new independent states reduced Russia' (the proclaimed heritor of USSR) direct control over the region. Ukraine took the control over 30% of Black Sea littoral, including major military bases (such as Sevastopol) and Georgia detains 12% from the maritime Black Sea shores. Russia even though detains 75% of the former USSR territory and 55% from its population holds only 13% from Black Sea cost.

The second major transformation is concerning the military base redistribution. Till 2016, Russia could use the Sevastopol base according to the agreement signed in 1997. The military bases and sea harbors under Russia's direct control have modest capacities and do not compensate the Sevastopol lost. Besides that, Russia' direct sea cost is very difficult to be controlled (geographic, social and political). Those difficulties were obvious during the latest decade evolutions. From geo-economic point of view, Russia lost the capacity to assure the transport of the Central Asian oil and gas to Western Europe. The end of the Cold War transformed Russia into a regional power in Black Sea area and produced scenarios for recovering the lost global power status.

Ukraine' heritage is more favorable than Russia' s one. Ukraine detains strong positions for all three major geo-strategic directions of Black Sea area (Bosphorus and Dardanele Straits, Danube mouths, Cimmerian Bosphorus). So, Ukraine took Russia' place at Danube's mouths, holds the Crimean Peninsula and the main harbors and controls the Cimmerian Bosphorus. From this perspective, Ukraine is part of three geopolitical regions: Black Sea, Central European and East European.

Another significant change of status knew Turkey. During the Cold War, Turkey was the key element of US geo-strategic doctrine and the unique Black Sea riparian state allied with the "capitalist bloc". Till 1989, its main focus was on Oriental Mediterranean and only with the end of Cold War Black Sea gained a new strategic value. Currently, Turkey is "fighting" for regional power status. Turkey remains both the strongest Allied state in Black Sea region and the main partner of Russia in its direct relation with the "West". Any possible change and diversification of foreign presence in Black Sea area is a disturbing factor for Turkey.

Basically, with the end of Cold War, Black Sea changed its status from a *closed sea* to an *open sea*. In this respect, an encouraging factor was the opening of the Main-Danube navigation channel (in 1992), who assures the direct link between Black Sea and Nordic Sea. Coupled with the possibility to gain the access to Planetary Ocean through Rhine-Main-Danube navigation channel, the importance of the Straits were significantly diminished. From this perspective, it is obvious the geo-strategic position of Romania, who controls the Danube river mouths and Danube- Black Sea navigation channel.

Another significant change was produced form the perspective of the foreign presence at Black Sea shores, both in terms of alliances and individual states. NATO increased its direct presence in the region and following the latest enlargement process, Black Sea could become a "NATO lake". All riparian states have institutionalized relations with NATO. Romania and Bulgaria are the newest members. From 1997, Ukraine has an individualized

relation with the Alliance, through NATO-Ukraine Commission. Russia has, from 1997, a special relation through Permanent Joint Council, respectively NATO-Russia Council (since 2002). Alike Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan are interested in becoming NATO members. If Romania and Bulgaria are strictly interested in Euro-Atlantic integration, the Black Sea' Eastern flank is still facing a characteristic dilemma for countries located in a "turn table of great traffic and international exchanges"[4], between the Eastern and Western integration choices. As possible alternatives to NATO, Russia launched the Community of Independent States, the Collective Security Treaty Organization and a similar initiative for economic integration (EU model). In fact, the Black Sea opening enabled the initiation and the development of multiple forms of cooperation (bilateral, trilateral, sub-regional and regional). From Romania's point of view, at bilateral level, good cooperation is developed with all riparian states. At trilateral level, Romania participates in cooperative initiatives with Moldavia and Ukraine (1997), Bulgaria and Turkey (1997), Poland and Ukraine (1997), Bulgaria and Greece (1998), Hungary and Austria.

A significant impact on regional evolution has the EU enlargement process. The interests for developing direct relations and even for becoming members have all riparian states. Romania and Bulgaria are to become members in 2007, Turkey' dossier will be analyzed also in 2007.R. of Moldavia have an individual action plan with, EU as part of EU Whither Europe initiative. Ukraine and Russia have institutionalized relations with EU since 1997.

At sub-regional level, BSEC is in fact the most institutionalized organization in region. In military field is worth to be mentioned the BLACKSEAFOR. Turkey launched the majority of sub-regional and regional initiatives, according to some annalists, as a substitute for EU integration. Among the Western/NATO initiatives, it is worth to be mentioned GUUAM, launched during the NATO summit (Washington, 1999), in the context of Russia' nonparticipation.

As a result of its geographical position, between two strategic corridors (Balkans and Caucasus) that link Asia and Europe, cultural diversity became another hallmark of Black Sea area. The frequent change of political status, the impressive ethnic mobility had transformed the region into a real melting pot (ethnic, religious, social and political values).

The latest evolutions, respectively the revitalization of both corridors and the Balkan and Caucasian synchronism stroke the annalists. In fact, the Black Sea situation is very complex due to its "*specific spatial architecture*"[5] produced by the succession "sea (Adriatic)- continent (Balkans)- sea (BS) continent (Caucasus) – sea (Caspian Sea). The region owns simultaneous a strong creative and destructive potential. Currently, states in region and the region as a whole are in the so-called transitional period. For long term, a higher stability or a higher instability could be achieved. For a positive scenario it is obligatory to be increased the foreign support (bilateral, multilateral, institutionalized forms etc) and to be enhanced the regional cooperation.

The end of Cold War produced in this area several major changes such as:
- the transformation of confrontation policy into dialogue;
- the conversion of isolation into cooperation and interdependence;
- the recognition of global vision, regional strategies, national policies as part and parcel of regular mental exercise;
- transition to market economy.[6]

Still the metamorphosis from historical adversarial relationship to cooperation is a long term and painful journey. Among the obstacles often cited for explaining the slow progress of improving the regional cooperation at institutional and non-institutional level, a special place has the following[7]:
- lack of the culture of dialogue and cooperation;
- difficult mentality shift (old habits die slowly);
- serious shortage of local capital and minimal flows of FDI's;
- problems of transition and nation building that restricts focus on regional cooperation;
- lack of proper infrastructure.

The regional cooperation is restricted by historical perceptions, lack of homogeneity, implementation mechanisms, resources, and

international visibility, lack of a clear vision of priorities.

The term 'Black Sea area (or region)' has been used in a rather flexible way. **The first dilemma regarding this space is the very attestation of Black Sea as a region**. The problem of defining the Black Sea region is complex, as there are many different interpretations and geographical delimitations. I would like to stress that **the concept of Black Sea has two approaches**. In a broad sense, the concept includes the Balkan, Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean areas, the Caucasian and Central Asian states. In a limited sense it includes only the Black Sea basin and the territories of the riparian states.

It is perceived either as a concrete geopolitical entity, actual or resulting from history – and thus with a sense of common identity and togetherness – or as a process in hand; as a sub-region, rather than an entity per se, or a network of bilateral, trilateral, or multilateral links. Barry Buzan has defined a region as "a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national security cannot realistically be considered apart form one another"[8]. This security interdependence results into a region becoming a security complex. Other scholars describe the region as constructed political designs or "imagined communities".

However, the creation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Project (BSEC) in 1992 has contributed to the intensification of regional cooperation and a perception of emerging common interests.

In this study the term Black Sea region (or area) is used as referring to the territories of the eleven states participating in the BSEC (i.e. the sea's six littoral states – Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine and the adjacent countries – Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece and Moldova).

In fact is only now that the students pay attention to Black Sea as a region and not to individual states evolution. As Olexandr Pavliuk noted the Black Sea is still a work in progress, a region in the making and regional cooperation remains a nascent process.[9]

Sufficient reasons are for **not considering BS as a region**: first of all the absence of regional solidarity and conscience of common interests and common future, lack of a common mentality of affiliation to same region. All of the Black Sea states have already defined themselves according to other geographical or institutional ties (to South East Europe, South Caucasus, the Community of Independent States, NATO and EU). These individual differences among Black Sea states, together with the lack of an integrated strategy in approaching the region limit the efficiency of regional cooperation efforts.

From economic perspective, intra–regional trade remains behind expectations. Countries in this area develop closer relations with other countries and organizations than between them. Russia is the focal point in the flow of regional trade although is share is falling. For all countries the main commercial partner is EU. Insufficient local powerful investors, lack of necessary infrastructure (including bank network), severe financial crisis that stroke almost all countries, insufficient development of local market oriented economy were among the obstacles both for obtaining a high attention from western organizations and institutions and for forging a real regional community of interests and solidarity.

The Euro-Atlantic and European integration processes had determined at regional level a vast competition between countries from the Black Sea area and their behavior was not always fair but focused on neighbor's failures.

The Black Sea area's strategic importance to the West, and to Europe in particular is bound to increase substantially in the years to come. Given the region's geo-strategic position as a natural link between Europe and Asia, and between Central Asia and the Middle East, it constitutes a vital trade link as well as an important area of transit. Consequently, instability and potential for conflict in the Black Sea area, its energy resources and its economic prospects matter to the international community. Black Sea area is recognized within the EU system of Pan – European Transit Corridors as a Pan European

transport area and further extended to cover Central Asia in the frame of Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA).

Instead of promoting closer relations based on mutual trust and respect, the majority of interested countries have developed conflicting ones. The increase of the independent countries number produced an increased number of conflicts and possible conflicts. Till present time, the countries from Black Sea are famous more for their conflict potential than for regional solidarity. The majority of conflict sources is, mostly, part of the so-called "soviet heritage"(territorial claims, national borders disputes, ethnic diversity coupled with ethnic animosity, struggle for attributes of nationhood etc).

Another aggravating elements are the disparities in military power and the preference of countries from region to forge alliances with different centers, even competitive ones. The possibility to establish NATO military bases on the Black Sea shores produced another disputes between states in region. Finnaly Russia was convinced that military bases in Romania and Bulgaria sustains the general fight against terrorism.

A current dilemma regarding the Black Sea is if a transit zone could be perceived as a region? Since ancient times Black Sea provoked this dilemma, but the difference is that now Western institutions and organizations are directly interested in developing relations with the region as a whole and not necessarily with a particular country. To secure and develop only one country is nor sufficient! The western community paid attention to this area, sadly, only after decades of conflicts and a massive attack on US soil. Black Sea became famous due to its transit area qualification, no mater what (human traffic, dangerous materials, arms proliferation etc).The Western community perceived the area as the first entry door of dangers for European security and stability. The western awareness was not produced by local requests but by the real manifestation of globalization. Finally Black Sea became part of European village and some leaders recognized that even Caucasus is part of Europe. Nowadays Black Sea is not the object of particular Western

countries interest for certain countries from the area but the object and subject of Western strategies and coherent policies. Till 2001 NATO and EU had no regional strategy, especially for Black Sea. For time being, still Black Sea is part of a long endeavor. It is not an end but just a part of a general strategy. So the aim is to promote the security, stability, democracy towards Caucasus and Central Asia and Black Sea is again the necessary link, part of a chain and not the only beneficiary of a strategy. The question is still valid. It is Black Sea perceived as a region in real terms? If the end aim is to promote stability in Central Asia and Black Sea is important through its member states, then maybe is better that member states to be used individually in different projects. If in the end, the states in the region will be a part of a "happy unique democratic community", then we should analyze the possibility to "miss" the regionalization phase.

In this context, the question is if Black Sea face the "old" dilemma of "globalization vs regionalization" or "globalization through regionalization".

The third dilemma for riparian countries what path should be chosen? It is better to be a part of a region and to promote the regionalization or to continue the existent individualized path? New asymmetric risks and threats demonstrated (11th of September 2001), that the individual states security depends on regional one, so the regional solidarity and cooperation should be promoted and developed with priority. In this respect, aside the negative characteristics, still Black Sea posses relevant incentives and attractions such as;

Geographic position:
- The Black Sea is the required link between Caucasus and Europe (especially for gas and oil pipelines);
- Its contiguity with unstable (political-military) areas impose active NATO/EU involvement (i.e. cooperation program in the security domain between USA and Caucasian states);
- The Black Sea detains important maritime opening (Ohotsk Sea, Caspian Sea,

Marmara Sea, Aegeean Sea, Mediteranean Sea, Ionic Sea, Azov Sea);

Political potential:
- Impetus given by the NATO-Russia and NATO-Ukraine relations,
- Active participation of all riparian states in PfP activities and in regional and sub-regional initiatives,
- Ongoing democracy consolidation process, the emulation produced by the Euro-Atlantic and European integration process,

Economic potential:
- Strategic position in maritime transport;
- Important transport facilities (related to Rhin-Danube-Black Sea channel, Volga-Don channel);
- Important oil and gas deposits and transit zone for the pipelines (from Caucasus and Central Asia to Europe)
- Potential market for 350 millions consumers,
- Storage and exploitation infrastructures,
- Opportunities for tourism industry,
- Important opportunities for business (i.e. the modernization and privatization of the defense industries),
- Existing potential in the field of infrastructure and communications (Constanta-Batumi ferry-boat, Burgas-Poti, Burgas-Batumi),
- Significant qualitative professional human resources

Military potential:
- National facilities (Romania's and Bulgaria's ASOC connected at NATINADS) appropriate for extending the NATO's air space management towards the Caucasian area;
- Buffer zone opposing the traffic with armaments and sensible materials originated from the CIS area;
- Regional infrastructure (Constanta, Varna, Burgas, Batumi harbors) suitable for projecting the military forces in PSO in Central Asia, sustaining/ rotating the troops deployed in the Balkan area;
- Regional cooperation in the domain of classified information exchange and the implementation of counter terrorism measures as a part of general effort in combating terrorism.

Due to latest conflicts from Balkan, Caucasian regions, BS was perceived only as a transit zone between conflicting areas. Naturally, Western institutions were not very involved in such an area, having in mind the preference for approaching and solving the problems at regional level and not case by case and also the obligatory existence of a sound solidarity and cooperation between countries from the region. Unfortunately, BSEC was not sufficiently developed to sustain a real dialogue with western institutions and organizations as representative of BS riparian countries.

According to Aymeric Chauprade and Francois Thual[10], Black Sea area belongs to the same geo-system as the Caspian Sea and is characterized by Russian-German tensions as result of conflicting interests (Western factor against Eastern factor).

But recent post 90-99 evolutions allowed the dissociation of the Black Sea from the Asian geo-system and a full integration into European geo-system. From this perspective Black Sea became a "European Interior Lake" and a region.

The proximity with NATO and EU (BS states as Europe's periphery) raised two questions: first about the Europe's geographic definition and identity and secondly the right of riparian states to be considered, recognized as *de jure* and *de facto* European states (no more discriminatory policies regarding population from BS area).

Latest conflicts in Balkan region and EU and NATO enlargement processes produced also a change in so called "traditional spheres of influence". On the southern Black Sea flank (Balkan +Romania and Bulgaria) NATO and US exert the control over the Balkan Peninsula. According to Ioanis Loucas[11] US and Germany have already formed their own geo-political sub systems in the area of Central Europe and Balkans. Besides Germany and US, in Eastern Europe the competition includes Russia.

The end of Soviet Union produced three geo-systems: first, the Eastern Europe (Baltic States, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldavia, and Russia), second the geo-system of the

Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) and the geo-system of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kirgistan). The border between systems is not anymore one country. Eastern Europe allows the implementation of the so called Middle Europe ("Zwischen Europa") and it is a needed buffer zone both for defensive space against the risks coming from East and sufficient space for West strategic advance (famous Drang nach Osten). Ukraine as part of Central Europe is one of the subjects of the transforming influences, being in the traditional Poland-Germany and Russia area of influence is currently the space of competition for traditional external actors and US.

The so-called Eastern border of Europe, the Caucasian region knew recently a multiplication of member states. This geo-system constitutes a geographical unity with Turkey. The Eastern European border is transferred from the line: Ural Mountains-Ural river-Caucasus-Black Sea-Straits-Aegean Sea to the line Ural mountains-Ural river-Caucasus-Euphrates-East Mediterranean. As a result of restructuring the European geo-political dynamics relevant effects are including on Black Sea South Eastern Europe will not be the Balkans but rather the area comprising Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Cyprus. So Balkans are part of Central Europe (apart from that component are the Scandinavian geo-system, the German geo-system, Italian geo-system, the Balkan one with Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Romania, Bulgaria, FYROM, Albania, Greece.

The **lack of a powerful local leader** accepted by all countries in region is another impediment both for developing the regional cooperation and imposing Black Sea as a well-defined region. From this perspective scholars still argue who is the most relevant actor in region. Individual actors (Russia, Turkey and lately Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria) and collective actors (NATO[12], EU, BSEC, OSCE) are components of this power game aimed to impose and recognize a regional leader.

Although the existence of a number of regional or sub-regional initiatives is positive (GUAM, BSEC, BLACKSEAFOR), **none of them has sufficient potential for a comprehensive security framework**. For some scholars OSCE remains an important actor in region given the legitimacy of its role in resolving remaining conflicts even though on the other hand OSCE suffered from a lack of efficiency in overcoming the regional problems.

In early '90s EU and NATO enlargement process was considered a panacea for regional problems, but recently has became obvious that both organizations has no strategic common policy for the area. Latest evolutions proved that traditional collective frameworks are not applicable to this area but the main focus should be on creating a regional cooperative security framework or a common security space.

In classical geopolitical terms, controlling the Black Sea would mean controlling the access to those regions. From a modern strategic perspective, securing the area and promoting a climate of peace and stability contributes directly to the diminishing of a whole range of conventional and non-conventional risks to Europe's security.

After the end of Cold War this region has become a strategic center-stage as a result of three processes: first, the recession of Russian power and consequent chance for the region's states to pursue a Western orientation; second, the discovery of the real potential of Caspian oil and gas in the 1990s, and its importance to Europe; and, third, the operational requirements of anti-terrorism coalitions post-9/11. This means that the Black Sea and Caspian basins, with the South Caucasus uniting them, must now be seen as comprising together a functional aggregate in the near abroad of an enlarging West.

Black Sea region is a boundary and so, as a final conclusion I stress the idea that is a bridge to new challenges and opportunities for the Western institutions. The region divides Europe and Asia geographically and has been a bridge between Russia and the West.

I also stress the idea, that connecting the Black Sea to the Balkan and Mediteraneean issues through a integrated approach of

NATO's southern flank, the management of the risks and threats against European security will be optimized and it will set up a strategic bridge between Europe and Turkey.

NOTES:

[1] William Ryan and Walter Pitman, *Noah's Flood*, 1999.

[2] Initial resistance came from those who looked for more detailed correlation with the Book of Genesis (see Noah's Ark and Mount Ararat) or preferred as prototype the similar marine ingression that formed the Persian Gulf in the lower Tigris and Euphrates valley. Subsequent work by marine archeologist Robert Ballard has identified ancient shorelines, freshwater snail shells, drowned river valleys and tool-worked timbers in 300 feet of water off the coast of modern Turkey.

[3] Petre Otu, *Black Sea from a closed sea to an open sea*, in Geopolitic and military history during the Cold War, ed. Col. prof. univ. dr. Ion Ghiurcă, col. lector univ. Mircea Chiriac, Bucharest 2002, High Military Studies Academy printing house.

[4] Gheorghe Bratianu, *Black Sea, from origins to Ottoman conquest*, IInd ed. Polirom, 1999.

[5] Petre Otu, *Black Sea from a closed sea to an open sea*, in Geopolitic and military history during the Cold War, ed. Col. prof. univ. dr. Ion Ghiurcă, col. lector univ. Mircea Chiriac, Bucharest 2002, High Military Studies Academy printing house.

[6] Amb. Nurver Nures, formerly first deputy secretary general in the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, "Black Sea Economic Cooperation/A vision of opportunities, delivered at the NATO Colloque in Bucharest, 2/4 may 2001.

[7] *Ibidem.*

[8] Barry Buzan, *Peoples, States, and Fear.* An agenda for international security studies in the post cold war era, 2nd ed. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 1991.

[9] The Black Sea region. Cooperation and security building, ed by Olexandr Pavliuk and Ivana Klympush Tsintsadze, East West Institute, 2004.

[10] A. Chauprade and Fr. Thual, *Dictionnaire de Geopolitique*, Paris, Eclipses, 1998, pp. 437-439.

[11] Ioannis Loucas, *The new Geopolitics of Europe&The Black Sea region.*

[12] Despite the fact that currently NATO doesn't claim a leading role in solving regional conflicts.

NATO, U.S. and the EU in the Changing International Environment

Teodora Moşoiu

There is no news that states perceptions of the international environment in terms of threats to national security in a broader sense suffered a tremendous adjustment after September 11 attacks. Although no new threats were registered, their scale and consequences compelled the international community to find common grounds in assessing the newly emerged situation and in assuming new roles for the existing alliances (either politico-military such as NATO or with military aspirations such as the E.U.).

Non-state actors had played in the past a positive, constructive role on the international arena. Nowadays, they overtly support organized crime and international terrorism and therefore don't want to change the current order of the system as it favors their actions. Therefore, international organizations and particularly Western organizations such as NATO and the E.U. need to adapt their strategies in order to better cope with this new trend.

New roles and missions NATO assumed are about to transform it in the "policeman of the world" and although NATO had been created for a very specific purpose when "the coalition defined the mission" in this new context and environment "the mission defines the coalition". The new statement that the "mission defines the coalition" was somehow a blow to NATO, because NATO as a whole was not prepared to deal with such a type of operation based on the "coalition of the willing", a setback that provoked rifts in the transatlantic relation.

Both U.S. and the E.U., delivered security strategies (the latter as a consequence to its desire to put in practice its CFSP policy and assume new military roles) with impact on the future foreign policy to be followed and thorough evaluation of them is welcome and necessary.

While the issuance of the U.S. security strategy (USSS) is already a tradition and was hammered out as a result of an existing external threat, the E.U. security strategy (EUSS) came out as a result of the strains registered in the transatlantic relation and the need to make the CFSP more assertive.

When comparing the two security strategies one should note since the beginning a clear dichotomy between the timeframe chosen as starting point for laying down the objectives to be followed. While the emphasis in the EUSS is put on the events starting 1989 in Europe and the outcome they produced and how it shaped the European security environment, the USSS has a dominating agenda set in 2001, following the tragic events of 9/11.

The red thread to be followed throughout the EUSS touches upon how to extend EU values and norms within Europe but also in its "near abroad". Referring only to these regions as areas of interests notwithstanding, the EU is assuming a global role, which basically doesn't match with its area of interest and responsibility ("The increasing convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU makes us a more credible and effective actor. Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security"[1]). In opposition, the dominating thought of the USSS is to seek security on a global basis ("Today, the world's great powers

find ourselves on the same side-united by common dangers of terrorist violence and chaos. The United States will build on these common interests to promote global security")[2].

Both documents do not differ fundamentally on the common threat assessment putting a great weight on either solely WMD proliferation (USSS) or a combination of three factors such as international terrorism, WMD proliferation and failed states. The difference between the two occurs in how to handle such threat, bringing into question the hotly debated idea of pre-emptive actions. While the USSS is clearly stating that "to forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively"[3], the EUSS still stresses the importance of an existing UN mandate for a decision requiring the application of military force ("The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfill its responsibilities and to act effectively, must be a European priority.")[4] Furthermore, the EUSS is talking about pre-emptive engagement but not dwelling upon this term because the EU does not foresee any pre-emptive military action. There are several reasons that explain this attitude: first, the EU does not have the necessary military capabilities to undertake pre-emptive strikes as the U.S. recently employed in Iraq; second, the E.U. does not want to create a precedent alongside the U.S. and transform it in a rule to be followed, as other major powers or even rogue states can also pursue it and use it as a discretionary tool; third, it is very difficult to identify without doubt the right moment to use pre-emption against *imminent* threat as the Iraqi case showed up (lack of hard evidence regarding production of WMD in Iraq undermined the whole idea of pre-emptive action).

The USSS conveys the idea that U.S. does not enjoy the idea of unilateralism but also does not clearly state its interest in multilateralism: "America will implement its strategies by organizing coalitions-as broad as

practicable-of states able and willing to promote a balance of power that favors freedom. Effective coalition leadership requires clear priorities, an appreciation of others' interests, and consistent consultations among partners with a spirit of humility."[5] On the other hand the EUSS is stressing the idea of building "an international order based on effective multilateralism".[6] Does it mean that until now multilateralism was not effective? Or that Iraq proved to be the first actions/operations in a long range to come where the U.S. imposed its interests, making the idea of multilateralism only empty shell.

Both documents stress the importance attached to contain "soft" security threats and in particular they refer to the need to have good governance. Tone of the strategic objective of the E.U. is "restoring good government in the Balkans, fostering democracy and enabling the authorities there to tackle organized crime."[7] There are differences/gaps between what E.U. declares and what actually can do and although E.U. is asserting itself as global actor its actions are confined to the European continent and with slightly exceptions to Middle East (politically involved in the peace process) or Africa (see operation Artemis). The USSS lays instead a great emphasis on "freedom", with good governance sense attached: "For freedom to thrive accountability must be expected and required."[8]

Although it takes stock of the means to implement its strategic objectives, the EUSS does not dwell upon them much. „Proliferation may be contained through export controls and attacked through political, economic and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled. Dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, political, military and other means. In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian to tackle the immediate crisis. Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government. The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations."[9]

Is this only self-fulfilling prophecy the E.U. needs to accommodate its weaknesses? The E.U. is in between phases trying to build up an effective independent military force able to act under the E.U. hat and assume more roles for combat-type operations not only Petersberg tasks. Do the Americans agree with it? Is it a threat to NATO? Or it is a long-waited move that lifts some burdens from U.S./NATO shoulders?

All in all, both NATO and E.U. encountered major shifts in their projecting interests and means to accomplish them. The creation of NATO Response Force and E.U. Rapid Reaction Force (although it was declared operational in 2003 it still has shortfalls of capabilities) alongside engagement in operations in Afghanistan and possibly in Iraq (for NATO) and in FYROM, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Congo (for the E.U) prove the case.

NOTES:

[1] A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 2.

[2] The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, p. 1.

[3] The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with WMD, June 2002, p. 15.

[4] A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p..9.

[5] The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of Global Power, June 2002, p. 25.

[6] A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 9.

[7] A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 6.

[8] The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, p. 3.

[9] A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 7.

An Overview of Political and Economic Aspects of the European Union Enlargement

Dan Ciupală

The dismantling of the communists regime which generated the so-called Iron Curtain presented the countries of both eastern and Western Europe with the challenge of completely redefining their relationships, overcoming the artificial division of Europe.

The EU decided to offer the countries of central and Eastern Europe the prospect of membership opened by the Treaty on European Union (the "Maastricht Treaty") of 1992 which states that any European state may apply to become a member of the EU[1] and these countries started to prepare making the significant reform efforts required to achieve this goal.

In March 1998 the European Union formally launched the process that will make the enlargement possible, involving ten applicant countries from Central and Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. These states must share the values and objectives of the European Union as set out in the founding treaties. Moreover, the European Council calls that compliance with the political criteria laid down at the Copenhagen European Council is a prerequisite for opening of accessions negotiations, and compliance with all "the Copenhagen Criteria" is the basis for accession in the Union. In this respect it has been said that the process that started in 1998 was not one of negotiations but one in which the European Commission assessed the progress which the applicants were making in meeting those criteria[2]. Finally the negotiations will determine the conditions under which each applicant country joins the European Union.

Moreover, the progress in negotiations must go hand in hand with progress in incorporating the *acquis communautaire* into legislation and implementing and enforcing it. Each applicant country presents its position on each of the 31 chapters of the *acquis Communautaire* and engages in negotiations with the member states. On joining the European Union, applicants are expected to accept the *Acquis communautaire* – the detailed laws and rules adopted on the basis of the Union's fundamental treaties such as the Treaties of Rome, the Treaty of Maastricht and the Treaty of Amsterdam.

The Copenhagen European Council set out the conditions for EU membership in June 1993 in the so-called "Copenhagen Criteria" which require the following of the candidate countries:

– stable institutions to guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the protection of minorities (the political criterion);

– a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU (the economic criterion);

– the ability to take on all the obligations of membership, i.e. the entire body of EU law (the so-called *acquis communautaire*), and adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union (the *acquis* criterion).

In the 1990's the EU concluded European Agreements with the following countries in central and eastern Europe: Hungary and Poland in December 1991, Romania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia in February 1995, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in February 1998 and Slovenia in February 1999[3].

The main aim of these agreements was to liberalize trade between the EU and the country in question. Apart from regulating trade policy issues they also set out the guidelines for political dialogue and for cooperation, for example, in the areas of industry, environmental protection and transport. The European Agreements also include provisions and simplifications for bringing national laws into line with EU law, which helps the accession candidates greatly in their preparations for joining the EU.

Apart from the European Agreements the EU has Association Agreements with Turkey (since 1964), Malta (since 1971) and Cyprus (since 1973). The aim of each of these earlier agreements was a customs union with the EU. In the case of Turkey this came to fruition with a Customs Union agreement in 1995.

Along with the European Agreements (with ten central and eastern European countries) and Association Agreements (with Cyprus, Malta and Turkey) the EU's support for these countries is based on Accession Partnerships and financial pre-accession instruments known as PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD:

Accession Partnerships provide an overall framework under which all the forms of support for these accession candidates are implemented. It is within this framework that the priorities for the adoption of the *acquis communautaire* are defined and the funds available to pursue these priorities are put together for each country. The scale of this support is based on the progress made by the respective accession candidate particularly in the implementation of the programme to adopt the *acquis*.

PHARE, which was originally an acronym for "Poland and Hungary Action for the Reconstruction of the Economy", has, as the French term "phare" (lighthouse) suggests, proved to be one of the most important EU instruments for economic restructuring of the accession candidates[4]. Under the PHARE programme to support the process of reform in the countries of central and eastern Europe, the EU has made available a total of 10.6 billion euro between the years 1990 and 2000. Since 1998 the programme has been tailored specifically to the needs of the accession process. Approximately 70% of its budget goes on supporting investment to comply with the *acquis* and about 30% goes towards institution building in the candidate countries. The latter includes the highly successful "twinning" arrangements between EU institutions and those of the accession candidates[5].

In order to intensify accession preparations the Berlin European Council in March 1999 decided to introduce additional pre-accession instruments in the areas of agriculture (SAPARD or Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development, to promote modernization of agriculture and the food industry) and structural policy (ISPA or Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-accession, to promote infrastructure projects in the areas of transport and the environment)[6].

Between 2000 and 2006 a total of 21.84 billion euro (i.e. 3.12 billion euro per year) is being made available as pre-accession assistance to the ten countries of central and eastern Europe, half of it through the PHARE programme, a third through ISPA and a sixth through SAPARD. There are separate financial assistance arrangements for Cyprus and Malta (approx. 95 million euro for 2000 to 2004). Turkey currently receives about 177 million euro each year, but the Copenhagen European Council decided that these funds will be increased significantly as of 2004[7].

The Luxembourg European Council of 1997 declared that while compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria was a prerequisite for the opening of negotiations, the economic and *acquis* criteria must be assessed "in a forward-looking, dynamic way"[8]. It decided to open accession negotiations with Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia (the so-called "Luxembourg Group"), which started in the spring of 1998. The decision to open negotiations with Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Malta was taken in Helsinki in 1999 and these negotiations with the "Helsinki Group" started in the spring of 2000.

The accession negotiations between the EU and ten accession candidates – the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia – were concluded at the European Council of 12-13 December 2002 which was also held in Copenhagen.

The ceremonial signing of the Treaty of Accession with the ten accession countries took place in Athens on 16 April 2003 with the participation of the heads of state and government and the foreign ministers of the countries involved. The Treaty of Accession sets out the conditions of accession for the ten accession countries on 1 May 2004.

Under Article 49 of the EU Treaty the formal pre-conditions for the signing were the positive opinion of the European Commission (given on 19 February 2003), the approval of the European Parliament of each application for accession (granted with overwhelming majority for each country on 9 April 2003) and finally the decision taken by the European Council on 14 April 2003 to accept new member states.

Negotiations are continuing with Bulgaria and Romania with the aim of their accession in 2007. With regard to Turkey, the European Council will decide at the end of 2004 on the basis of a report and recommendation of the European Commission whether to open accession negotiations.

The signed accession treaty requires the ratification of each of the signatory states according to their constitutional requirements. None of the current Member States requires a referendum on the issue, which means that the national parliaments will have responsibility for ratification.

The majority of the EU Member States plan to complete their parliamentary ratification process by the end of 2003. As the country that hosted the concluding accession negotiations, Denmark was the first Member State to ratify the treaty on 11 June 2003.

Further to the referendums they had organized, the ten acceding countries will become full members of the EU upon their accession on 1 May 2004. As of this date, European law (known as the *acquis communautaire*) will in principle be applicable in these countries. However, periods of transition were agreed with the future member states on certain EU provisions affecting various areas of life. Following their accession, the new Member States will participate on an equal basis in the institutions and committees of the EU. They already have the status of active observers, which grants them the right to speak but not to vote in these bodies.

Consequently we could be concerned about the rightfulness of the reasons, which legitimated this EU enlargement due on 1 May 2004.

The main argument in favor of maintaining the EU availability to enlargement towards the "Helsinki Group" is the hope of the most nationals of this countries that the successful model of the EU with its values of democracy, the rule of law, the protection of human rights and minorities can be transferred to the countries of central and eastern Europe, thus ensuring lasting peace, freedom, security and political stability.

Moreover, consolidating peace and mutual security in an enlarged union, will enable the development of trade and investment within the geographic area of Europe. With the accession of the applicant countries, the population of the European Union will grow by more than 75 million into an economic area of almost 450 million people and will thus become the world's largest single market, one which is admirably equipped for the challenges of global competition[9].

The economic potential of the candidate countries is considerable: the EU will thus integrate valuable growth markets with these countries. It will also be easier for small and medium-sized companies to conduct business under the common rules of the enlarged economic area.

While the basic institutional requirements for the enlargement of the EU will be fulfilled, the fundamental reorganization of Europe brought about by enlargement demands a conceptual response from the European Union extending to questions about its ability to act both internally and externally, its relationship

with its Member States, the relations among its institutions and above all its meaning for the citizens of Europe. To this end, over the last one and a half years, the Convention in which the accession countries were active participants drew up a future-oriented draft constitution, which was presented to the Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003. The Presidency Conclusions of that Council welcome the Convention's Draft Constitutional Treaty as a good basis for starting. One of the aims of the new constitution is to ensure the enlarged Union's capacity to act by means of a reform of the institutional architecture and of the instruments and procedures.

Under the economic aspects, the single market will be expanded with the accession of the new Member States. The free movement of goods, already largely introduced under the Europe Agreements will be become complete in relation to the accession countries. Also the full freedom of movement for people will be introduced. This means that the citizens of both the old Member States and the acceding countries will be able to travel freely everywhere in the enlarged European Union. An exception to this will be the sensitive area of the free movement of workers, for which there will be a phased transitional period of up to seven years during which Member States can retain their national arrangements. However, the necessity for such arrangements to continue is to be examined after two years. The *acquis communautaire* is to be generally applicable five years after accession. However, a Member State may still maintain its national arrangements for a maximum of two additional years should there be major disruption to its national labour market or the threat of such disruption, but only in such cases.

The free movement of capital to and from the new member states will also become applicable upon accession. However, national rules will continue to take precedence, for example with regard to the purchase of agricultural and forest land in all the accession countries with the exceptions of Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia for a transitional period of seven years, or 12 in the case of Poland. Different rules will apply to self-employed farmers who have leased land[10].

The accession countries will become part of the single European market upon joining the EU which means that there will no longer be any controls on goods at national frontiers. However, checks on people at internal borders – those borders between the old and new member states – will continue, even though the free movement of persons will come into effect upon accession. Checks on persons can only be dropped when the accession countries are able to show that the security of their borders with non-EU members – i.e. the new external borders of the EU – meets the standards required under the Schengen Agreement.

The accession countries will benefit from fair quotas for farm produce in the common agricultural market without raising concerns about over-production. They will also receive funds for rural development which will be about 50% more per capita than the funds earmarked for the current Member States[11].

For acceding countries to join the euro they must fulfill the Maastricht Criteria and thus also have participated in the exchange-rate mechanism for at least two years[12]. The introduction of the euro in the acceding countries is thus the final step of a multi-stage convergence process and can only be reached in the medium term even by those countries that have made the most progress so far.

Nevertheless the economic, social and political realities in the candidate countries are very often different from the average of the EU. The prospective candidate countries are less developed economic system and their economies are more oriented towards the agricultural sector than the average of the EU countries. The enlargement will only be financially sustainable if the agricultural and structural policies of the EU are reformed further on, as both policies represent 80% of the total EU expenditures. Already the present structure of the EU budget limits investment for the future like education and science to small amounts[13]. The reforms on agricultural and structural policies, which were decided by the European Council in 1999, are a remarkable step towards a financially sustainable budget

after enlargement, but they do not represent a final model for the future. In this respect it has been already said that accession members should be wary of future EU initiatives, such as harmonization of taxes, which will reduce their competitiveness. Once the candidates countries join the EU, they should pursue a strategy that seeks to introduce economic dynamism to the region by forging an alliance with more economically liberal governments to prevent further centralization in Brussels, working to prevent the adoption of costly welfare entitlements in the new EU constitution, guarding the national veto system within the EU, and working to abolish or substantially reform the unfair Common Agricultural Policy[14]. To the extent that the accession countries can continue to unilaterally liberalize, their economic performance could provide a useful example for other EU countries[15].

To face the challenges the candidate countries must have a functioning and competitive market economy and democratic structures. Additionally young entrepreneurs from these countries call for the implemen-tation of all human rights principles, a functioning legal and administrative system, the opening of borders, full market access for companies and individuals and the will for peaceful solution of bilateral conflicts as standards to be fulfilled.

In conclusion unity in diversity for Europe should be the guideline for future integration in Europe. The enlargement must not hamper steps forward in the deepening of the Union. Due to stability reasons the integration of the Central and Eastern European Countries is necessary for the European Union. The enlargement will increase the economic power of Europe in the long run. It is a contribution to stability, to accelerate economic growth, to the necessary change of the economic structures and to increase the pressure on the reform process in the European Union.

In this respect 1 May 2004 will mark the continuation of a series of enlargements which the EU and its forerunners have completed in the past and should be seen as a further high point within the complex process of enlargement.

NOTES:

[1] Before the enactment of the "Maastricht Treaty", the six founding states Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy, France and the Federal Republic of Germany were joined for the first time in 1973 by Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom in an enlarged European Economic Community (EEC). In 1981 Greece acceded to the European Community (EC), followed by Spain and Portugal in 1986. Most recently in 1995, Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the EU.

[2] Charles Jenkins, *Negotiating EU enlargement*, in *Unification of Europe. An Analysis of EU Enlargement*, edited by Centre for Reform, 2000.

[3] General Directorate Enlargement of the European Commission, *Synthesis Report* - Enlargement Futures Report Series 00/2, EUR 20115 EN.

[4] Swinnen J., *Transition and integration in Europe: implications for agricultural and food markets, policy and trade agreements*, in "The World Economy", vol. (25,2), April 2002.

[5] *Ibidem.*

[6] General Directorate Enlargement of the European Commission, *Synthesis Report*, Enlargement Futures Report Series 00/2, EUR 20115 EN.

[7] *Ibidem.*

[8] *Ibidem.*

[9] *Report on Economic Transformation* - Enlargement Futures Report Series 01/2, EUR 20116 EN.

[10] *Report on Economic Transformation* - Enlargement Futures Report Series 01/2, EUR 20116 EN.

[11] *Ibidem.*

[12] *Report on Economic Transformation* - Enlargement Futures Report Series 01/2, EUR 20116 EN.

[13] *Ibidem.*

[14] *Report on Economic Transformation* - Enlargement Futures Report Series 01/2, EUR 20116 EN.

[15] Marian L.Tupy, *EU Enlargement: Costs, Benefits, and Strategies for Central and Eastern European countries* in Cato Policy Analysis, No. 489, Washington, Cato Institute, 2003.

The European Union and the United Nations Organization – Working Together Towards Achieving Common Goals

Mihaela Augustina Dumitraşcu

The Second World War left behind a destroyed continent, speaking from human, material and economic point of view; that was the reason why states tried to find a way to prevent future conflicts by collaborating through international intergovernmental organizations. Thus, after the Second World War, a series of intergovernmental organizations appeared, among which the subjects of our analysis: the United Nations Organization[1] and, later, the European Communities[2] which are usually now referred to as the European Union[3].

In this paper we will try first to draw a parallel between the two IGOs and then we will present the participation of the European Union and its member states to the United Nations organs and the main domains of activity common to the two entities, using as an important source the data offered through a common EU@UN website launched on 23 January 2002 and aimed to increase understanding of the EU activities at the UN.

1. Establishment and Objectives of the United Nations Organization and of the European Union – Overview

According to the international law and doctrine, an international organization is a free will based association of at least three states, which has common objectives and goals enshrined in a multilateral treaty and, also, an institutional structure helping the organization function. The international organization, once these elements present, obtains legal personality, distinct from that of the states which created it, becoming a derived subject of international law. The tendency of the institutionalizing the international relations which appeared especially after the Second World War is explained by the necessity for the international society to be organized, as a natural reaction to the anarchy resulted from conflicts.[4] The UN, including its 17 specialized institutions,[5] and later the EC were created with the main goal of preventing the conflicts and maintaining peace in the world by teaching states how to collaborate and by offering them an organized framework to this purpose.

The doctrine summarizes the reasons of the international organizations' proliferation and diversification to three[6]:
- the need to prevent war and to regulate its rules, especially due to the discovery of new mass-destruction weapons ;
- the interdependence existent in the process of nations' development (commerce, monetary and financial relations, technology transfer, regional development);
- the global dimension of the world problems which need to be dealt with in a global manner (increasing demography, poverty, food, environment, natural resources, cosmic space etc.).

So, the international organizations have the essential role of providing the means,

mechanisms and instruments for the states' cooperation in more and more domains and forms and we may say that they have proved to be extremely useful to the international community, the most obvious role being the one related to the creation of a legal order for the international relations.

The two international organizations which are the subject of our analysis make no exception to the above-mentioned realities.

The UNO was established in 1945 as an universal cooperation organization both as to their state parties and the domains it is involved in, its main goal being that of maintaining international peace and security. The UN functions as "centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends". The Charter also provides for that one of the UN's purposes is to "develop friendly relations among nations ... and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace" and "to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion".[7]

The European Communities, on the other hand, are international integration organizations[8], established as follows: first of them in 1951 – the European Community of Steel and Coal[9] and, then, the European Economic Community[10] and the European Community for Atomic Energy[11] in 1957.

The 1957 Treaty of Rome, which laid the foundations for the European Community, was a milestone in the process of Western European integration. It looked forward an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe and set out the basis for a common market and an economic and monetary union. The EC continues to exist today as a vehicle for these policies. The success of this project, which saw its membership increase and its economic importance in the world grow, is a unique example of integration between sovereign states and goes far beyond normal intergovernmental cooperation. Unlike the UN, NATO or the OECD, the European venture was, from the outset, conceived as a supranational structure with common institutions, including a Council, a Commission, a Court of Justice, a Court of Auditors and a directly elected Parliament. The *European Parliament* has an important role in the decision-making process notably in the approval of legislation and adoption of the budget which gives the Community its own resources. European Community legislation has precedence over national legislations and is subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. In 1992, building on the success of the EC, European leaders signed the Treaty of Maastricht which established the European Union. This Treaty significantly deepened the relationship between their countries in the areas of monetary policy and justice and home affairs. It also confirmed the Union's desire to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy. In December 2000, the EU Summit in Nice reaffirmed that the EU should quickly be made operational in the framework of the common European Security and Defence Policy. The *European Council*, bringing together the Heads of States or Governments of the EU member states, provides the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and defines the general political guidelines. The Union's principal decision-making body is the *Council of the European Union*. The Council is composed of one representative at ministerial level from each Member State, who is empowered to commit his Government and who is therefore politically accountable to his national parliament. Every six months one of the fifteen Member States takes over the Presidency of the Council and its preparatory bodies. The *Presidency* ensures follow-up of policy decisions taken by the Council. It also represents the Union in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) matters and is responsible for the implementation of CFSP decisions. On this basis, it expresses the position of the Union in these matters in

international organisations and at international conferences. The Presidency is assisted in its tasks by the *High Representative for the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy*, and by the General Secretariat of the Council under his responsibility. *The European Commission*, comprising 20 Commissioners, including at least one from each Member State, is the EU executive and takes policy decisions collectively. It has exclusive powers for initiating policy proposals across the whole spectrum of Community matters and negotiates bilateral treaties and international commitments on behalf of the Community. The European Commission is fully associated in the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy. In the UN the Commission represents the European Community. *The European Parliament* has wide powers in the decision-making process with regard to Community legislation, agreements and the budget. The presidency consults it on the main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP. And the European Parliament follows EU external policies closely, in particular through its Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights and the CFSP. It expresses itself through non-binding resolutions on important international issues, many with UN aspects. During 2002–2003, the 'Convention on the Future of Europe' completed its work to draft a new EU constitution, which is being debated in a EU Intergovernmental Conference. Once agreement has been reached and all EU Member States ratify the new Treaty, new provisions relating to institutions and external policies are expected to take effect as from 2006.[12]

2. The European Union's Participation in the United Nations Organization's Organs and Activities – General Aspects[13]

As we will notice, The European Union and the United Nations Organization are very much alike when it comes to analyzing their efforts aimed at achieving peace on international level.

Thus, the European Union is committed to insuring a stable and peaceful Europe while building its presence on the world stage to contribute more effectively to peace and development across the globe. Having started in the 1950s as a project to bind Europe together through economic integration, aiming to prevent future war, the EU has grown into a significant world actor, the biggest trading entity in the world with a single market as well as a single currency for 12 member countries. The EU is also the world's largest provider of overseas development assistance, totaling some USD 35.6 billion in 2002.

In the 1990s, the EU developed a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) to match its already formidable economic clout. This led to the decision at the European Council meeting in Nice in December 2000 to include in its CFSP the progressive framing of a common defence policy, including a rapid reaction force, civilian crisis management capabilities and the creation of permanent political and military crisis management organs.

On 16 April 2003, 10 more countries, most of them from the former Communist bloc, signed Accession Treaties and join ad the EU on 1 May 2004 — Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. In addition, Bulgaria and Romania are expected to join in 2007, and Turkey could start membership talks soon after 2004. The countries of the western Balkans may not be far behind, either. Together, the EU-25 comprises more than one eighth of all votes in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Along with other European countries, almost one sixth of UN Member States now align themselves with EU statements at the UNGA. And EU member and candidate countries account at present for a third of the UN Security Council's (UNSC) membership. These future member countries have made a remarkable transition — politically, economically and administratively — guided by the EU enlargement process, with the Union serving as a goal, a model and a monitor of progress. Hence, the EU is an expanding zone of peace, stability and

prosperity in today's highly volatile world. The main objectives of the UN are to maintain international peace and security, to develop friendly relations among nations, to cooperate in solving international economic social, cultural, human rights, trade and humanitarian problems and to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in attaining these common aims. As a consequence of the EU's own political development and very similar objectives, it is not surprising that the EU and the UN should be deepening their relationship at this time. The UN promotes the values of democracy, solidarity, sustainability, market based economy, cultural diversity and the rule of law, which are central to the EU.

Moreover, the EU makes a major contribution to the UN's activities. It works with all UN bodies, agencies and programs across virtually the whole range of UN activities, from development policy and peacemaking to humanitarian assistance, environment, human rights and culture, throughout the world. Not least, EU Member States together are the largest financial contributor to the UN system. At present, the EU-25 pay 38 % of the UN's regular budget, more than two fifths of UN peacekeeping operations and around half of all UN Member States' contributions to UN funds and programs. Despite the fact that EU Member States already contribute far more to the UN than their share of the world economy, the EU as a whole decided to keep its overall financial contribution at the same level as before in the last round of UN budget negotiations in 2000. It is proud to have maintained its generous share of UN funding as a sign of its support of the UN system. Working through the UN is an EU priority. The EU recognizes its responsibility to support and strengthen the UN in order to protect the organization's role in seeking multilateral solutions to global problems on the basis of its charter.

Drawing on well-equipped European troops from national armed forces, the EU has undertaken to create a rapid reaction force of 60 000 soldiers as part of its European security and defence policy (ESDP). Depending on circumstances, this force can be made available to provide prompt assistance for UN peacekeeping operations, like the 'Artemis' EU military operation launched in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in June 2003 in response to the UN Secretary General Annan's request (and as authorised by UNSC Resolution 1484). This EU operation reflects the contribution the ESDP can make to crisis management in cooperation with the UN.

The EU and the UN have also cooperated intensively throughout the Balkans in recent times and will continue to do so into the future, including, _inter alia_, in the UN Mission in Kosovo, where the EU is in charge of the reconstruction 'pillar', the current EU police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (based on UNSC Resolution 1396); and the ongoing EU military operation 'Concordia' in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (based on UNSC Resolution 1371) to help build peace and stabilise the political situation there.

The EU is also very grateful concerning the UN Secretary's efforts in trying to find a comprehensive solution to the issue of the divided island of Cyprus, which is due to join the EU in 2004. The EU seeks to promote an integrated follow-up to all major UN conferences, aiming to make the review and appraisal processes more rational and manageable, and to maximize the political impact of any follow-up event.[14]

The EU also raises UN issues of concern during its summits with major countries in the world, as and when necessary.

The presence — and the representation — of the EU at the United Nations has many faces. As only States can be Members of the UN, the Union is represented by the State holding the presidency of the EU Council, which at present rotates every six months. At the Security Council, EU positions are also represented and defended by EU Member States who are elected or permanent members. In order to ensure continuity, the EU Council has set up a Liaison Office with the UN, as part of its Secretariat. For the same purposes, the EU Council has also set up an office in Geneva.

The European Community was granted observer status at the 29th General Assembly in

1974 by Resolution 3208. It is represented by the European Commission, which has delegations that are accredited to UN bodies.[15] The European Commission's original information office in New York officially became a Delegation to the United Nations in 1974.

As an observer within the UN General Assembly and most UN specialised agencies, the European Community has no vote as such, but is a party to more than 50 UN multilateral agreements and conventions as the only non-State participant. It has obtained a special 'full participant' status in a number of important UN conferences, as well as for example in the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) and in the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (IFF).

In 1991, the European Community was accepted as full member of the UN's Food and Agriculture Organisation, the first time it had been recognised as full voting member by a UN agency. The European Community speaks and votes on behalf of all EU Member States in areas where powers have been transferred to it.

As far as the cooperation of EU institutions with the UN is concerned, we may add that the EU meets the UN Secretary General at ministerial level annually in New York as part of an agreed format for regular EU–UN meetings. The UN Deputy Secretary General and other senior UN officials also visit EU institutions in Brussels (where 16 UN specialised agencies, funds and programmes now have offices), Luxembourg and Strasbourg regularly for policy discussions. Regular meetings of senior UN officials with the EU Council's Political Committee are foreseen. EU and UN officials liaise together more and more frequently as daily working contacts develop.

Furthermore, the visibility of the EU at the UN has been enhanced by the participation of EU Heads of State or Government in major UN conferences, and by ongoing visits of Commissioners and high-ranking EU officials to cities hosting UN bodies.

The UN Secretary General and Deputy Secretary General are also developing contacts with the European Parliament. The European Parliament, in turn, has increased the number of high-level members[16] visits to the UN to attend major events.

In autumn 2003, the European Commission issued a Communication for discussion and agreement by the Council and the European Parliament entitled 'The European Union and the United Nations: the choice of multilateralism', which proposes the future course of the EU–UN relationship.

The European Council reaffirms the deeply rooted commitment of the European Union to make effective multilateralism a central element of its external action. The European Council therefore welcomes the comprehensive Commission communication on 'The European Union and the United Nations: the Choice of Multilateralism' which comes at a dynamic junction in the EU–UN relations. In this context, the European Council also recalls the EU-UN Joint Declaration of 24 September 2003 on cooperation in crisis management, which constitutes the basis for enhanced cooperation in this area.

But how the EU coordinates its work at the UN? All EU countries are members of the UN in their own right, and many have been since the UN's foundation in 1945. The establishment of the EU's common foreign and security policy brought forward the need for EU Member States, the Council and the Commission to enhance the coordination of their actions in international organisations. The EU Treaty requires them to uphold common positions so that their collective weight can have more impact in the world. Coordination now covers the six main committees of the General Assembly and its subordinate bodies, including ECOSOC and the subordinate functional commissions. More than 1 000 internal EU coordination meetings are conducted each year in both New York and Geneva to prepare and finalise EU positions. The EU has also spoken with one voice in the follow-up of all the major conferences and summits held since the beginning of the 1990s.

As the EU's CFSP becomes a daily reality, the activitiesof its members on the UN Security Council increasingly take account of

the EU dimension on those global security issues where the EU has a political position. Article 19 of the European Union Treaty foresees that EU 'Member States which are also members of the UN Security Council will concert and keep other Member States fully informed. Member States which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the positions and interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under provisions of the UN Charter'. The Union's common viewpoint on such issues is made known publicly by joint statements delivered by the EU presidency in open meetings of the UNSC.

The role of the EU presidency is particularly important in this respect. It is responsible for day-to-day EU coordination and represents the Union in most areas of UN activity. It also represents the EU in discussions with other UN Member States, regional groups or organisations, and delivers démarches and statements on behalf of the Union.

The European Commission is actively involved at the UN, where it works with the EU presidency to represent EU views in various areas, especially development, environment and humanitarian aid. Furthermore, the European Commission has specific responsibilities to speak for the European Community in areas such as trade, fisheries and agriculture.

When the EU meets with non-EU countries or regional groupings or undertakes démarches, it often does so in the Troika format, a representative group composed of the presidency, the Council Secretariat, the European Commission and the incoming presidency.

Through its CFSP, the EU speaks almost always with one voice at the UN General Assembly (UNGA). From globalisation and human rights, to development and disarmament, the EU aims for unanimity. And the results are clearly evidenced in EU cohesion, which has stood at around 95 % of all resolutions passed by the UNGA since the mid-1990s.

Of the 15 to 25 % of resolutions that are actually voted on at the UNGA each year, the EU votes unanimously on average four times out of five. Even on contentious issues like the Middle East, the EU has managed to achieve unanimity on virtually every occasion over the past decade.

The EU's enlargement is spurring greater cohesion between current and future members as well. In the UNGA, most EU candidate countries had already achieved 100 % alignment with the EU even before signing their Accession Treaties on 16 April 2003.

Now, both present and acceding States consistently uphold EU common positions. As a candidate country, Turkey is also making good progress in this regard. Furthermore, over the past few years, all candidate countries have associated themselves increasingly with EU statements made at the UN, along with Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway (which are not expected to join the EU for now). This larger European convergence is set to increase further among the 25 current and future Member States that are now sitting together around the same table in all EU coordination meetings at the UN.

3. Perspectives of the EU-UN Cooperation

In September 2003, Commission[17] called for the EU to renew its commitment to the UN system and multilateralism. The paper puts forward practical ways in which, by working through the UN system, the EU can strengthen its position as a central pillar of the multilateral system. Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten commented: *"The EU's commitment to a multilateral foreign policy needs to be better reflected in our approach to international institutions, starting with the UN. As the largest financial contributor to the UN, the EU needs to find concrete ways of strengthening our political influence in the UN system."*

The Communication puts forward a series of concrete ways of improving the way the EU engages with the UN system:

- improving the EU co-ordinating mechanisms in Brussels, New York, Geneva and Vienna
- establishing early contacts/co-operation between EU services and those of UN agencies, including hands-on co-operation in the field.

The EC budget provides some 300 million per year for UN agencies, e.g. for development (UNDP) and humanitarian (WFP) assistance. When combined with national contributions from Member States, the EU is the largest contributor to UN operations. The European Union's significant weight, which is bound to increase with enlargement, gives the EU the opportunity, as well as the responsibility, to make proactive suggestions in the UN reform debate. The Communication builds on the extensive EU-UN co-operation that has developed in recent years across a wide range of policy areas. High-level political dialogue now involves regular meetings between the UN Secretariat and the Council, Commission and High Representative for CFSP. In addition, the EU and the UN already work together on development and humanitarian aid. This cooperation should expand to other areas.

The point of departure of this Communication is the European Union's attachment to multilateral solutions on issues as varied as international security and climate change as a fundamental principle of its external relations.

At the same time, it notes that the EU's ability to influence multilateral debates has at times lagged behind its economic and combined political clout.

The Communication sets out three ways in which the EU could contribute more effectively to the work of the UN:

- By taking the lead in the negotiation and implementation of key UN targets and instruments. The Communication argues that the EU can and should act as a 'front-runner' in developing and in implementing UN targets. In this context, the EU should apply the proactive approach it has shown on issues such as the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court or Financing for Development, much more widely in areas such as counter-terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, or human rights. It also commits the Commission to looking at how the implementation of multilateral targets can be integrated more systematically into the EU's external assistance programmes.

- By moving towards a more systematic policy of partnership with the UN in the field. The Communication takes stock of recent moves by the Commission to develop more stable, long-term funding relationships and strengthen policy dialogue with selected UN development and humanitarian aid agencies. It calls for a strengthened partnership with the UN in areas like human rights and conflict prevention, where concrete co-operation between the EU and the UN has yet to be developed more extensively, as well as in the field of crisis management. The Communication calls in particular for regular upstream concertation on the EC's and UN's respective country-level assessments and programming, for action to make training standards compatible, and for regular joint training activities and exchanges of personnel.

- By giving itself the means to become a dynamic, flexible and coherent force in policy debates in the UN. The Communication notes that the EU has emerged in a short period of time as a visible presence at the UN, capable of arriving at common, coordinated positions in most UN policy forums (such as the General Assembly or many specialised agencies). However, it points to the factors which still prevent the EU from 'punching at its weight' in the UN, such as the persistence of occasional split votes by EU Member States in key UN bodies or the lack of effective EU coordination in certain multilateral forums which are crucial to the EU's sustainable development agenda. The Communication sets out concrete proposals for addressing these issues, such as giving relevant Council groups in Brussels a strong role in determining EU policy in the main UN bodies, moving towards a flexible, mandate-based approach for the

EU's participation in UN negotiations, or extending EU coordination to all parts of the UN system.

In this context, the Communication also covers some sensitive issues surrounding CFSP and the Security Council on which the Commission role is limited. However, the Communication suggests more can be done to improve the coherence of the EU foreign policy within the limits or Article 19 of the Treaty, which contains significant obligations for Member States to consult each other and to defend agreed EU positions on issues that are discussed in the Security Council.

Finally, from the EU coordination to the UN point of view, we should add that, in July 2002, a EU Paper was adopted, regarding the following issue: "How to represent the EU at model UN Conferences"[18]. This Paper contains an annex, which explains the phases of the EU coordination at the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council:

UN General Assembly Committees

I. A debate takes place on a particular subject.

- UN Secretariat or another UN representative introduces the subject
- UN Groups make statements, e.g., EU, G77, etc., on a first come, first served basis.
- The EU makes its statement pronounced by the country holding the Presidency.
- Individual UN delegations may make (shorter) statements; EU Member States will rarely speak.
- Observers may make statements, e.g. Arab League etc.

II. Procedure:

- An individual delegation of a group of delegations such as the G77 or EU provides a draft text.
- Delegations and groups prepare amendments (in informal consultations/ bilateral contacts/in writing). EU Presidency calls an EU coordination meeting and EU partners consult their capitals. EU must reach a consensus as no EU position can be put forward without it.
- Discuss draft text in GA committee until a consensus is met or a vote by roll call.

- Delegations which wish to mark their particular support to a resolution become "co-sponsors", that is, they associate themselves to the first proponents of the resolution (this may happen at any stage before adoption).
- Adoption in the General Assembly Committees by either consensus or vote.
- Brought to Plenary.
- Adopted by the Plenary where there might be a public vote.
  - EU partners (including the Commission) may sit in on these (formal or informal) meetings in order to follow the procedures, however the discussion is carried out by the EU Presidency except on issues of its competences when the European Commission takes the floor.
  - The EU Presidency may designate another EU delegation to represent the EU if it is not available.

In the Second Committee (Economic and Financial), the EU is represented by the European Commission Delegation in areas of its exclusive responsibilities (trade, agriculture, fisheries). The EU Presidency represents the EU on all other issues.

Heads of State and Government as well as Ministers often attend UN General Assembly Special Sessions and conferences. In these cases, the EU Presidency speaks on behalf of the EU, but both EU Member States and the Commission can also make statements in line with agreed EU policy.

UN Security Council

The EU has no status at the Security Council. Member States act separately and individually. Two EU Member States have permanent seats on the Security Council: France and the United Kingdom. There are usually one or two additional EU Member States present as non-permanent Members.

At EU weekly briefings chaired by the Presidency, EU Member States who are sitting on the Security Council take it in turn to brief EU partners on the previous week's Security Council activities.

On occasion, the EU High Representative Mr. Javier Solana may be invited to speak to the UN Security Council on behalf of the EU. EU Member States on the UN Security Council incorporate EU views and positions when they can in their statements. In addition, EU positions and statements are issued as Security Council documents. Increasingly therefore, the EU's foreign policy is being reflected at the Security Council.

As far as the phases from draft to final text are concerned, the same Paper provides for the following steps:

– Depending on the subject of the draft, either the EU Member State holding the Presidency or the European Commission (for trade, agriculture and fisheries) will draft a text;

– The draft text will be presented at a EU Coordination Meeting for discussion amongst the Member States and Commission;

– Based on these discussions, the Presidency, Member States and/or the Commission may propose amendments to the text;

– Eventual consensus on the text amongst the Presidency, Member States and Commission is achieved;

– The agreement becomes an EU Statement at the UN and, finally, it is recorded by the Council Secretariat.

The European Union and the United Nations Organization are both international organizations which, although are different in many ways, they are still very much alike if we consider the main reason for their creation, i.e. attaining peace in Europe, and their fields of activity which have many similarities. We also should bear in mind their constant will to coordinate their activities in order to reach common objectives, such as peace, prosperity, respecting human rights and collaboration throughout the nations. These two organizations should be looked at as models by other international entities and by states in general, in terms of coordination of their efforts towards achieving a better world for all.

NOTES:

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[1] UNO/UN

[2] ECs

[3] EU

[4] *Organizaţii internaţionale interguvernamentale*, Raluca Miga-Beşteliu, Ed. All Beck, 2000, pp. 1-2.

[5] (plus the International Atomic Energy Organization - IAEO), all of them form the „UN System Family" (plus the International Atomic Energy Organization - IAEO)

[6] *Organizaţii internaţionale interguvernamentale*, Raluca Miga-Beşteliu, Ed. All Beck, 2000, pp. .3-7.

[7] See art.1 of the *Charter of the United Nations* signed on 26 June 1945, in San Francisco, at the conclusion of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, and came into force on 24 October 1945.

[8] With regional character and not universal like the UN.

[9] ECSC; it was concluded only for a period of 50 years, so that it expired on 23 July 2002.

[10] EEC – after the entering into force of the *Maastricht Treaty regarding the EU* (1993), the new name was set to be the „EC" („the European Community").

[11] ECAE or EURATOM

[12] Summary: *What is the European Union?* („*The EU, and how it works at the UN*") – www.europa-eu-un.org;

[13] „*The enlarging EU at the UN: making multilateralism matter*", published by the EU, January 2004. (www.europa-eu-un.org).

[14] This approach applies to the follow-up to all major conferences and summits held since the beginning of the 1990s — Rio (environment and development), Vienna (human rights), Cairo (population), Beijing (women), Copenhagen (social development), Rome (World Food Summit), Istanbul (habitat), New York (children), Kyoto (climate change), Monterrey (financing for development) and Johannesburg (sustainable development) — as well as the Millennium Summit itself.

[15] In Geneva (including, *inter alia*, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the World Health Organisation (WHO),

the World International Property Organisation (WIPO), the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN/ECE)), Paris (the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO)), Nairobi (the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Habitat), New York (the UN Secretariat, the General Assembly and its main committees, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), etc.), Rome (the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)) and Vienna (including the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the UN Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)).

[16] MEP (member of European Parliament)

[17] Communication – September 10, 2003: EU-UN: *Commission calls for the EU to renew its commitment to the UN system and multilateralism* (Brussels).

[18] *EU Paper on Model UN Conferences* – July 1, 2002.

Peace - a Dialectic Process

Dumitru Mazilu

History comes to prove that peace has always been achieved by paying the price of great efforts, as a result of the fights and struggles of millions and millions of people. Peace maintenance and consolidation usually implies the confrontation of opposing forces – as an expression of the subordinated processes and phenomena's *dialectic nature*. This dialectical character is being amplified nowadays, as a consequence of the international situation's obvious deterioration.

The complex problems of contemporary age, including international relations, were submitted to ample studies, most researchers inferring thesis and useful conclusions[2] with view to understand the dialectical character of actual processes and phenomena[3]. The thorough study of the *objective* causes of these phenomena facilitates the understanding of certain senses and general tendencies in international relations. Meanwhile it explains its correlations with the *subjective* factors considering that the political decision of the government and the will of state representatives gain more and more ground. There are evoked significant moments in the historical evolution in order to make easier an insight on the essence of these complex phenomena and identify the required solutions.

§ 1. Contradictory Tendencies

In the light of studying contemporary life's phenomena, there resulted important *mutations* in the relation of forces on a world scale as well as significant tendencies and orientations in the evolution of peace phenomenology. There is a major conclusion, according to which action is taken, further on, in international life to maintain influence and domination spheres using different means to this end, should them be of economic, political, diplomatic or military nature[4]. It becomes clear that great danger is represented by *military* ways, trough the destruction means it provides for taking action as well as through its particularly serious consequences on the human material plane[5].

At the same time, experience displays the risks of the other ways and ans. For instance, it is also known that *economic pressure,* inequitable contractual formula, credit solution and other ways of "assistance" determine the accentuation of dependencies and favors the climate of some new relations of dependence and subordination. According to United Nations estimations, as a consequence to *inequitable* exchange relations, restrictive commercial practices as well as to tariff and tariff free obstacles, the number of developing countries decreased from 31% in 1950 to 21% in 1965, 18% in 1973 and 11% in 2002. It is considerable that manufactured products represent only 5% of the exportation made by developing countries to developed country markets. Thus, "the great majority of the developing countries, even after having conquered their political independence, continue to preserve relations of inequality and dependence with the former colonial forces, fact that explains the maintenance of domination in international relations after World War M"[6]. Such a situation has often generated confrontation by maintaining and deepening the sources of *strain and conflict.*

Grave perils addressed to peace are generated by *political pressure,* interference in the internal affairs of States, encroachments or diplomatic operations aiming at domination maintenance and consolidation of relations between States in different regions and areas of the world.

The UN General Assembly rejects all pressure forms of political, military, economic, ideological or cultural nature within international relations, by blaming menaces that imply violence, recourse to force, direct or indirect aggressions, interference and open or dissembled intervention in other states' internal affairs. All these *jeopardize* peace and peoples[1] state of quiet by generating tension and conflicts in international relations.

It is seldom stated that the assertion of peoples[1] will, namely the will of becoming the masters of their own fate and national wealth *should constitute a* peril to peace. Or, as it is well known, what really endangers peoples[1] peace is not their fight for independent and sovereign development but *domination* policy exercised on other peoples, the violation of their fundamental rights and their legitimate aspirations to progress and development. Such a policy may become the generating cause of strain and tensional state that can easily evolve into conflagrations. That is exactly the reason why, the consolidation of peace[7] implies the liquidation of domination, of interference policy in other peoples[1] internal affairs and guaranteeing conditions for each people's free and independent development. In promoting and guaranteeing these conditions, far from creating any peril to peace, *the most solid grants of its maintenance and consolidation* are achieved.

Bringing into the open the main tendencies and orientations existing in the contemporary evolution of peace concept and phenomenology, helps to understand the need of intensifying struggle to combat every bellicose attempt or action, so that none of them might be finalized while peace be *maintained and Consolidated.*

§ 2. Major Requirements

In light of the deep knowledge of today's complex realities there emerge the demands and requirements of primordial importance in peace defence, preservation and consolidation: a. revealing the causes of facts and actions that generate a state of strain and conflict between States; *b.* eliminating suspicion and uncertainty in the relations between nations and peoples; *c.* creating an environment to enhance friendly relations between nations implying mutual respect for the dignity and worth of each human person.

a. The evolution of international relations in different areas of the world emphasizes the need to have a precise knowledge of *the causes determining facts and actions,* which generate state of tension and conflict[8]. This necessity is justified by the fact that it represents the only way that makes possible their elimination[9] as well as the re-settlement of deterioration -endangered relations on their natural track, as a consequence to the removal of previously existing conflict sources.

It is also to be considered that subjectivity often interferes when explaining the causes of certain situations or tensional state. Therefore, the aspects under which things are presented become different, and most frequently contradictory. For this very reason, the objective analysis of causality represents a *sine qua non* condition for ridding real causes in order to re-establish normal relations in the region or area where the state of tension or conflict has appeared.

b. The relation of peace cannot be erected but on the *very foundation of complete trust between peoples and nations.* Doubt always germinates actions and leads to facts that generate tensional state and even conflicts. A climate of uncertainty favors actions that estrange peoples from each other, by creating the deformed image of impossibility to cooperate and get closer; fact, which – gradually – may degenerate into a serious state of conflict. By the multiple interrelations it gives birth to, this unreal image, represents frequently a starting point in

generating strain relations and conflict. This is the very reason why, *eliminating suspicion* represents a priority demand as far as strivings for the promotion of peace and the creation of peaceful structures and relations between peoples and nations are concerned.

c. There is no doubt that peace can be maintained and strengthened, provided concerted action of progressive forces contribute to the preservation *of a favorising climate for living in good understanding*. Thus, no room is left for actions that do not meet the requirements of developing peaceful relations. Experience regarding relations between states, nations and peoples proves that such climate can be promoted provided *mutual respect for each people's human worth and dignity* is ensured. It is unconceivable that a nation or people enjoy greater respect than another; that its evolution, material or spiritual living conditions confer it more dignity in its relation to another people or nation. Such an approach cannot but lead to a tensional state, in many cases able to pose threat on peace relation and generate clashes. Consequently, it is necessary to promote and guarantee the mutual respect of each nation and people. In this regard, natural guarantees are given to enhance trust and strengthen the spirit of brotherhood and peace.

Peace promotion and consolidation require: a. the instauration of a new international democratic and equitable policy; b. the cessation of arms race and the orientation of all peoples' resources towards economic and social progress[10]; c. the intensification of all efforts for detente and cooperation between all nations.

Bringing durable and equitable solutions to the complex problems that our contemporary world is faced with, implies *the act of thinking over and re-settling* international relations on the solid foundation of equality and mutual respect, elimination of threat or use of force, guarantee the conditions for the free and independent development of all peoples.

Peace pledge implies radical change in armament policy. The problem of maintaining military equilibrium *should not be approached in the sense of completing one 's own arsenal* in order to keep pace with the adversary, but by *reducing* systematically troops and armament[11] in order to achieve a balance as far as it concerns disarmament and *not armament*. In a recent study of the International Institute for Peace Research, attention is called to the fact that reality behind numerical equality - allowing each party to destroy the other for an equal number of times - is represented by the advancement of one of the parties, thus leading to the danger of starting a nuclear war. To stress the imperative of halting arms race, we recall a study made under the UN aegis stating that peoples in the world are nowadays confronted with an unprecedented *military complex:* 23 millions armed people; the dissemination of destruction means that reached a high perfection level; a super-destroying stock of nuclear and conventional weapons and a permanently increasing bent on mass destruction technology. Furthermore, this study concludes that the portentously wide dissemination of weapon accumulation constitutes a defining feature of world trade. In this case, putting an end to arms race appears to be the only reasonable measure, and the unique solution possible becomes global effort, the global strategy of total and general disarmament.

In contemporary conditions – in order to approach and solve all complex matters of world policy – it is required to start from the stringent need of *cooperation,* and not that of *confrontation,* the respect for each people's human worth and dignity as well as the right to freely and individually create their own destiny without any external interference. There is no doubt that the determination and acceleration of certain evolution directions aiming at peace maintenance and consolidation need everyone's direct implication, an active contribution. Triumph in the cause of progress and peace is conditioned by *a broader participation possible* in the solution brought to the problems we are facing nowadays[12]. It is a complex dialectical! process, where positive tendencies favoring progress and peace, gain ground in their permanent confrontation with opponent forces and militarist tendencies. The analysis of objective evolutions let us draw the conclusion

that – despite rather persistent hindrances and obstacles – it lays in the power of all progressive forces in the world that the

spectrum of a new conflagration be deterred, and *peace prevail.*

§ 3. The Role of International Law

Nowadays, International Law has an essential role to play in the maintenance of peace and consolidation. This role, motivated in various theoretical works, is proved by the daily evolution of Interstate relations. In this respect, while emphasizing the need to increase the role of International Law[13], the UN Secretary General showed that at present a difficult responsibility was borne "not only by governments, but also by mankind, itself, because "peoples live under the threat of an uncontrollable conflagration". Peace maintenance obliges us to undertake all measures required "in an emergency case"[14]. According to Riccardo Monaco, Contemporary International Law should serve to the promotion of peaceful relations[15], while Edwin Glaser brought attention to the fact that the norms of International Law postulated the obligation of every state to refrain from *"any action meant to harm international relations,* to aggravate a conflict between States, to create or amplify situations that might imperil peace, security and international welfare"[16]. Gheorghe Moca asserts, more directly, that "peace and security relations with the participation and in the benefit of all States in the world cannot occur only on the grounds of International Law, the overall observance of its principles, norms and institutions made for a common interest[17]. In numerous researches, particularly in last years' studies, it has been proved the need and significance of the increasing role that International Law plays in peace promotion and maintenance, finding peaceful solutions to conflicts, preserving relations of cooperation between all the nations and peoples of the world, and in the consecration of "principles that should lay at the basis of interstatal *relations[18]*. The *active* part played by Contemporary International Law in peace preservation and consolidation is determined by: а. the enhancement of human conscience aiming to search and find really *durable* solutions to the major problems it is

confronted with; *b.* the need to consecrate more clearly the rights and obligations of all States in their relations with one another; c. the demand to restrain gradually and eliminate war from international life; *d.* the imperative aiming at general disarmament, and mainly, at nuclear disarmament; e. awareness of the role that peoples, the overall progressive forces should play in the prevention of conflicts and tensional state as well as in finding solutions to any international conflict exclusively by peaceful means[19].

Certainly, Contemporary International Law acquired new dimensions, more clear finalities in peace maintenance and consolidation under the conditions of *enhancing human conscience* aiming to search and find really durable solutions to the serious crises it is confronted with. Provided the solutions given to international problems take into account the *objective* requirements necessary to the harmonious development of every nation, within a peaceful environment, they acquire a *long lasting, durable* character. International regulations issued according to these requirements prove their necessary efficiency by serving the progress of each and every nation.

Noteworthy efforts have been made - especially during last decades – in stating more clearly the rights and obligations of all States as for the relationships between them. According to the Charter and its annex, the General Assembly of the united Nations adopted in 1970 *The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning the Promotion and Development of Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States,* and in 1974, *The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of the Nations.* It has been rightfully considered that the specification of those rights and obligations represented a "means for peace consolidation for a common benefit. The natural development of international relations implies mutual respect for the rights and obligations of

each state, should it be large, medium-sized or small. It represents a *major premise* of peace, cooperation and good understanding between all nations.

In numerous international documents[21], as well as in doctrinaire works it appears more and more frequently the need to *restrain* gradually and *eliminate* war from international life. Fulfilling its mission, by limiting and finally doing away with war on the Planet, Contemporary International Law proves in a most obvious way possible, its new features and significance in peace maintenance and consolidation[22]. In doctrine, it has been demonstrated that restrain and elimination of war could not be done "in virtue of a rhetoric full of devoutness or a purely platonic thinking"[23]. In this respect, there are required certain norms that make out of this general desideratum the objective *of practical* action. Undoubtedly, it represents a noble mission of International Law, implying new improvements and transformations regarding the elaboration and applications of its norms[24].

There is an even more efficient role given to International Law in the process of disarmament, notably in nuclear disarmament. The viability of the undertaken measures depends on the nations[1] political will which is reflected in the juridical norms that make *real* disarmament and implicitly, leads to the cessation of arms race with all the consequences it brings about. Life shows that - the more the will of peoples or of any progressive forces all over the world increases and state of tension and strain, conflicts of life on the Planet have to be prevented and ridded - the more the role of international norms increases, aiming to achieve these decisive goals in peace preservation and consolidation.

The fulfillment of these objectives requires important changes in the *structures and finalities* of International Law, the improvement of previously regulations and the adoption of new norms, meeting actual requirements. All make possible that International Law manifest today as "a factor that influence and condition democratic evolution in international life, peace maintenance and international security"[25]. In respect of these changes, it is needed an ample and sustainable action in order to guarantee the enhancement and codification of this law meeting the present and future needs of a world of international peace and cooperation[26].

NOTES:

[1] see William Epstein, *Nuclear proliferation: The Failure of the Review Conference.* In Survival, vol. XVII, nr. 6, Nov./Dec. 1975, p. 262-269; Kei Wakaizumi, *Japan's Role in a New World Order,* in F.A., vol. 51, nr. 2, January 1973, p. 310-326; A. James Gregor, *The Fascist Persuasion in Radical Politics,* Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1974, p. 408 and next.

[2] see Neville Brown, *The Future Global Challenge. A Predictive Study of World Security,* 1977-1990, Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, Whitehall, London, Crane Russak & Company, Inc., New York, pp. 3-60; 157-381; Correlly Barnett, *Strategy and Society,* Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1975; Nils Skold, *Defence Policyforthe 1970 s and W s, The Ministry of Defence,* Stockholm, 1974, p. 60 and next

[3] see J. C. Kapur, *India in the Year 2000,* India International Centre, New-Delhi, 1975; E.E. Mahaut, *Canada and the European Community: The New Policy,* in L.A., vol. 52, nr. 4, October 1976, pp. 551-564, William Rees-Mogg, *The Reigning Error,* Hamish Hamilton, London, 1974, p. 68 and next; E. Colin S. Gray, SALT: *Time to Quit,* in Strategic Review, vol. VI, nr. 4, Fäli 1976, p. 14 and next; L.F. Damrosch, D.J. Scheffer, eds., *Law and force in the new international order,* Rev. by J. Manas, Harvard Intl. LJ, 36, 1995.

[4] A. James Gregor, *op. cit.,* p. 408 and next.

[5] It is known that - on the grounds of historical experience -war has been defined as being *an instrument of decision* in major conflicts concerning possession or the distribution of certain values. It decides in an imperative manner "who is the one who takes and who is the one who keeps". Still, it has been proved at the same time, that in the case of certain armed conflicts we might face a multitude of interests of various nature (Th. C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict: Prospectus for a Reorientation of Game Theory,* in J. C. R., nr.2, 1958, pp. 203-251); see L.F. Damrosch, D. J. Scheffer, *cit. op.*

[6] Doc.A/C6/34/L 7, p. 3

[7] It is known that in its classical *definitions,* peace is the type of international relations that exclude armed violence and is characterized by the absence of war between peoples and States. According to G. Bouthoul's conception "peace represents the natural state of a sovereign human group, endowed with political autonomy, whose mortality does not involve a part of organized and directed collective homicide" (Definition et delimitation de la paix, in E.P., nr. 11,1974, p. 50).

[8] Several researchers underlined the importance that economic interests hâd in generating conflicts and tensional state (see G. Bouthoul, *De l' agressivite a l' animosite,* in "Guerres et paix", nr. 2, 1696, p. 24; see Jan Tinbergen, *Restructuring International Order,* Edit. Politică, 1978, p. 56 and next). In studies on Belgian trials it has been made a distinction between a. *structures* – either spiritual or material; b. *circumstances* – force balance at an international scale, different social group relations; c. *occasional causes,* while certain authors – like W. Mc Dougall – drew attention to the role played by the instincts of domination, submission, and those of possession and aggressiveness. Jan Tinbergen – by analysing the chances to mankind's survival - showed that "the problem to be questioned is not whether passing from a war economy, to a peace economy but that of making the passage from a *belligerent mentality to a peaceful one".* Furthermore, he emphasized the "it would be a real disaster if this conclusion were inferred only from the ruins of a nuclear holocaust" (Jan Tinberegen, cit. work, p. 78, underl. ns.).

[9] The doctrine underlined the need that – in order to maintain and achieve peace – armed confrontation should be studied minutiously. As it is only the acquisition of a deep knowledge of war etiology that makes possible to find "profilactic techniques" and necessary "therapeutic" means, in general (see the research made by H. Savon, for instance, in E.P., nr. 4, 1972, p. 11 and next).

[10] *Relationships between disarmament and development,* A/51/45 D of December 1996 and A/52/600 D of 9 December 1997.

[11] *General and complete disarmament.* A/52/600 of 9 December 1997.

[12] see Leopold Kohr, *The overdeveloped Nations.* Schocken Books. New York. 1978. p. 9 and next; Wilfrid L. Kohl, *Economic Foreign Policies of Industrial States,* Lexington Books, 1978, p. 21 and next.

[13] *Action to be taken dedicated to the 1999 centennial of the first International Peace Conference and the closing of the United Nations Decade of International Law.* A/52/647 of ember1997.

[14] Havier Perez de Cuellar, *Statement at the twelfth special session of the General Assembly,* doc. A/S - 12/PV. 1. in June 7, 1982.

[15] see Riccardo Monaco, *Manuale di Diritto Internazionale Pubblico.* II edizione, Unione Tipografice - Editrice Torinese, 1977, p. 5 and next

[16] Edwin Glaser, *Participation in International Life* – a *right and obligation of each state,* in Towards a New *International Order,* Edit. Politica, Bucharest, 1976, p. 448 (underl. n.s.).

[17] Gheorghe Moca, *Public International Law,* vol. l, University of Bucharest, Faculty of Law, Bucharest, 1977. p. 3 (underl. n.s.)

[18] see *United Nations Decade of International Law,* A/52/647 of 15 December 1997.

[19] *Ibidem.*

[20] Resolution 3281/XXIX, of 12 December 1974.

[21] see A/52/647 of 15 December 1997.

[22] *Ibidem;* see United Nations Decade of International Law, *A/521647* of 15 December 1997.

[23] John Courtney Murray, *Morality and Modern War,* Church Peace Union, New York 1959, p. 40 and next. See Paul Ramsey, *The Limits of Nuclear War,* New York, 1963, p. 15 and next.

[24] See P. Craig, Ed.: C. Harlow, Ed., *Lawmaking in the European Union,* Sweet & M., 1997.

[25] Gheorghe Moca, *cit. work,* p.9 (underl. en.).

[26] See A/52/647 of 15 December 1997.

Security Paradigm Between Classic and Modern

Constantin Buşe, Constantin Hlihor

The security concept is a relatively new issue in all political and academics discussions, although the efforts of the individuals, human communities and states to assure there peaceful existence, prosperity and to protect the achievements and the way of life go way back in time and the only difference was in the forms and the methods that have been used throughout one century or another.

Long time the security has been identified with military power. Gaining or loosing of military potential was essential for every state in order to play an important role in the power equation which was realized in international relations and also was essential for stability of the security. That situation has created a very distinctive security architecture which was materialized on Europe continent as "power equilibrium" formula. Historians in international relations has domain have noticed that the "power equilibrium" formula assured security as long as all the states respected some moral principals and legal engagements. That formula almost diminished the believe in the use of brutal force and have led to moderacy and stability After the Weastfalien Peace Treaty to the very ending of the Cold War, peace and war as well as security and insecurity have changed there places so many times with so many dramatic consequences for so many people and nations.

There are just a few aspects in historical evolution of international society, which point out the fact that security has suffered essential transformation. To understand all those transformations we have to know the way of people's influence over security in evolution of the international relations. A very profound analysis of the security concepts evolution is more then necessary in order to understand all the changes that every state has made in its security strategies in the past decade. Barry Buzan was right when he said that if we want to understand correctly all the problems with national security, first we have to understand the very concept of security. It's necessary to highlight the fact that the definitions and concepts for security were presented differently by all philosophical schools and that's the reason we have so many different security definitions without having possibility of creating one unifying concept. Until mid 80's there were two major tendencies in security domain which had dominated all discussions.

- **"Security as a consequence of power"** that tendency is followed by **"Realistic School of International Relations"** developed by E.R.Carr and H. Morghentau and analyzes the concept of power. Security is a consequence of one player's dominant position that has suffusion power to impose him on the international relations scene.

- **"Security as a consequence of peace"** that tendency is followed by "Idealistic School" which has been created in the early years of 20-th century based on "The League of The Nations". "A lasting peace would give security to everyone"- claim idealists, but so far they can not impose there point of view because of the mistakes made by "The League of The Nations" in the past.

One of the most important researches in security domain have been made by John Herts, who in the early 50's has created and has introduced in science discussions the concept of "security dilemma", as well as Arnold Wolfers who has insisted on elaborating a

multidimensional concept. Robert Jervis has introduced a new interesting idea of different security regimes and has underlined the necessity of systematical analysis. His way of analyzing has its origin in the International Organizations Theory promoted by Stephen D. Krasner, Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye. Robert Keohane claims against theory of the classic realism which describes international relations as a battle for power, which is based on three statements: "All the states are coherent units and has a very important role on the political scene", "The power is a efficient instrument and it's used often in policy", "There is a hierarchy of the problems in world policies dominated by the requirements for military security.

He states that, under the globalization conditions and the increase of the inter-dependencies caused by the appearance of non-state actors, there is no clear hierarchy of solutions so force become inefficient.

In the '80s both the realistic school of thinking and the liberal one reconsidered the conceptualization and analysis of security phenomenon. Thus, Keneth Waltz, developing the neo-realism theories in international relations asserted that security depends on the state behavior within an anarchic system. "In anarchy, underlined K. Waltz, the security is the supreme goal. The purpose of a system which encourages the quest of the states is the security"[1]. His studies are centered in the proximity of the International Security magazine. The Idealist School simultaneously offers a new concept and solution to the security relations inter-dependency: "the common security", term which was emphasized for the first time by the Palme Commission in 1982 and made operational as an idea of non-provocative defense.

In 1988, M. Allagappa used his study "Comprehensive Security: Interpretation in Asian Countries"[2] to call the scientific community to a "comprehensive" and "total" approach of the national security concept, according to the threats total and multi-dimensionality. In the same year (1988), Barry Buzan introduced the concept of "security complex"[3] when he realized an analysis on security dimensions in South East Asia and developed it in his 1991 study: "People, States

and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era". He also underlines the necessity of establishing some analysis levels: "Because the reality of interdependent security is inevitable, the only hope to define some maneuverable studying subjects, which neither be lost, nor vanish in front of the vital signification of the whole, is to find an hierarchy of analytic levels in the international system. Each of these levels must identify long lasting, significant and essentially independent features of the security problem"[4]. The concept of "security complex" is built on regional level on the dynamic of friendship pattern ("from a simple friendship to requesting protection and help"[5]) and enemy pattern ("relations established on suspicion and fear"[6]). Barry Buzan succeeds in enriching the concept of security in international relations domain and to go further to a holistic perspective of neo-realism, eliminating the criticism of ethnocentrism[7].

These two evolutions circumscribe the main conceptual dualities of security around which the notion is dimensioned in the '80s:

✓ security – anarchy; security is either the result of the maintaining of the power balance (the bi or penta-polar model), or of the developing of a hegemonic international system (uni-polar model).

✓ security – community; community of interests creates joint security structures, on the base of proximity laws.

The contradiction security – defense can be added.

From the structural point of view there are two approaches of the security concept dimensions:

✓ from Kenneth Waltz's structural theory are kept the levels at which these act: individual level, state level and international level[8].

✓ from the theories of interdependencies are kept the domains at which the concept of security acts: military, political, economical, social and environmental.

The beginning of the '90s coincides with the development of several thinking schools in the field of security concept, rising from international relations, political doctrines or organizational and cultural domains. It is noticeable that methodological and conceptual

mechanisms from various domains are used, going to a pluri-paradigms knowledge of security.

From these schools three are the most important: realism (neorealism, classic realism), liberalism (neoliberalism) and constructivism. Each school develops different approaches, but maintaining the basic ideas of each of them as they were established by the classics. Thus the realism gets a series of variants which enrich its literature; Robert Jervis operates with the distinction between offensive realism and defensive realism, Alistair Jonson creates a context with three analysis categories (power balance, maximization of power, threat balance, identity), Dale Copeland introduces the theory of dynamic differentials, Jacek Kruger – the theory of power transition, Charles Glaser and Benjamin Miller elaborate the theories of the cooperation between the great powers, Randall Schweller – the theory of the interest balance, John Mearsheimer – the theory of the great powers policies, all these theories respecting the desideratum of realism, as it was established by Morghentau and E.H.Carr.

In its neo-classic form, the realism gets enriched with Stephan Walt's theory of threats balance, Fareed Zakaria's realism of centric state, Thomas Christiansen's theory of domestic mobilization, offensive – defensive theories elaborated by Stephen Van Evera, Thomas Christiansen, Jack Snyder, Charles Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, Eric Labs' theory of targets and William Wohlforth's hegemonic theory of foreign policy.

The distinction between neo-realism and neo-classic realism can be better understood if these two are considered as continuous and not divided. The theories of neo-realism try to explain the international results, for example the probability of war between the great powers, the durability of alliances or the probability of international cooperation. The neo-classic realism, through its theories, tries to explain the foreign behavior of the states as a hole, for example the economic foreign policy, the military doctrine, the diplomacy. In the same context of ideas specific to neo-realism, there is the school from Copenhaga, developed around Barry Buzan, Jaap de Wilde and Ole Weaver, school that promotes concepts as:

"security as silence", "subsuming security", securization – non-securization, and from the structuring models perspective it keeps the same general categories of security (military, environmental, economic and political) or adds new models, as the one of Ole Waever – the security model of a "hourglass"[9].

From the beginning of the '90s in the international relations literature, where the main paradigm was the realism, a new paradigm emerged – the one of constructivism. The realists who tackled structural or systemic theories, inspired from the Keneth Waltz's theory of international policies, were the main target of the constructivist school which accused them of failing to analyze the decisive factor which is the share inter-subjective of ideas, which generates the behavior by setting up the identities and interests of the actors. The result of this school's effort is to diversify and enrich the specific literature with many models such as norms, culture, identity, trust, persuasion, learning, demonstrative effects, trans national conceptual flows, socialization and many other processes of ideas that influences the dramatic end of the great powers rivalry[10].

The main theorist of constructivism is Alexander Wendt who, in his 1999 "Social Theory and International Politics" study, synthesizes the whole criticism of realism. According to Wendt, even if a system is conflictual or pacifist, this is a function and is not due to anarchy and power, but to shared culture, created through discursive social practices. Each actor's opinion about himself (his interests and identity) is a product of the diplomatic gestures of the others; states can redefine the structure through a process and reconfigure interests and identities through a new gesture.

The postulates of constructivism are:
1. The global politics are the result of intersubjective sharing of ideas, norms and values, at the level of the actors. The constructivists are centered on the intersubjective dimensions of the knowledge, because they want to emphasize the social aspect of human existence – the role of ideas being shared in the theory of the behavior compulsion and directing.

2. The theoretic structure has not only a steadily effect, but also a constitutive one on the actors.

3. Between the theoretic structures and the actors (agents) there is a double direction: of determination and of constitution. The structures constitute the actors, in terms of their interests and identities, and the structures themselves are produced, reproduced or altered by the actors' discursive practices[11].

At the border between the constructivism and institutionalism is the study co-coordinated by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett[12], edited in 1998 at Cambrige University Press, which, inspired either from security concept of the English school, or from constructivist theoretic models, offers a heuristic model which assumes three developing stages: "nascent", ascendant", "mature". The utility of this model is to ensure a common set of questions for the cases treated in this study. In the last chapter the authors emphasize how trust develops as a main idea in the creation of "the security community".

From the political doctrines field, in the line of international relations, liberalist and neo-liberalist analysis models are borrowed. The adjustment of the models is made by Mike Mochizuki and Michael O'Hanlon[13] who, through their analysis on the core principles of security relations between USA and Japan, show that the guarantee of US – Japan alliance is not a common military threat, but common interests arouse from sharing democratic values.

Together with those three schools described previously others can be identified: the Feminist School[14], the Poststructuralist Studies School[15], Third World States Security School[16], and Critical Studies School[17].

The diversity of approaches on the security concept and the coagulation of some thinking schools in international relations field shows nothing else but the main directions of research which, combined, allow a complex operationalization of security.

The components of the concept of security, after the post Cold war period show a transfer of accent to the things concerning the new realities and threats to the security, very different from the epoch of political ideological confrontation between the democratic eastern world and the communist eastern world. At the beginning of the nineteen's the identification of the five dimensions of the security, political, military, economical, social, (here we can include the human rights and the protection of the minorities) and of course ecological[18]. As seen by Barry Buzan leads to a postbelic vision based on the understanding of security both in its political and military variants. The idea of security for all in an Euro Atlantic cooperation area opposed to old time confrontation abandoned the old formula "game with no gain". In older to define a new domain in security that in which everybody is a winner and the benefits are divided according to the security.

The pentagonal formula of security as seen by Buzan, stressing a special meaning for obtaining the dimension of protection of human rights as part of the concept of security have been rapidly adopted by the main organization of Euro-Altantic security: OSCE, NATO, UEO, and European Union after the establishment of Foreign Politics and Mutual Security in the Maastricht Treaty, in 1992. For example, chapter VIII-th, about THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF THE DECISIONS, adopted thru a document during the OSCE summit, in Budapest, TO A REAL PARTENERSHIP IN A NEW AGE , from December 1993, stated clearly; "the human Rights and fundamental liberties, the rightful state and democratic institutions represent the foundation of peace and stability, giving a crucial contribution in preventing the conflicts, in a system of security"[19].

Starting from the idea of protecting this component of world security namely the respecting of human rights, a new idea come to life including the interpretation of the famous article 2 (7) from UNO Charta, that deals with the policy of non-intervening of the UNO in the internal affairs of the states with the exception of the cases when internal events contravene with the chapter VII-th of the chart the necessity of protecting peace and international security. From this moment in the council of security were inevitable the transformations in interpreting the role of the council as is stated in Charta; a precise policy

of intervention appeared in order to limit the massive violations of human rights anywhere in the world unconditioned to obtain the vote of the permanent members. So on the 5/th of April 1991 the resolution 688 appeared and connected the protection of the human rights in Iraq with the preservation of the peace and international security. Chapter VII UNO Charta. Based on this resolution a multinational coalition intervened in Iraq under UNO guidance in order to protect the Kurds from the brutal reprimation lead by the leaders from Baghdad.

From our point of view this would be the first major change of the paradigma security after the Cold War a change that goes from games with no gain's to providing security for the whole world but which seems to focus on the dimensions of the concept of security that were not take in account during the 90's at least from the point of view of the motivation for which the states could go to war with UNO blessing. It's about th4e consolidation of the idea that the military intervention is a solution to stop the genocide and the massive violation of the human rights in counties were along the whole period of the cold war the atrocities were seen as an internal affair by the chart.

The second change derives from our point of view from the new dimensions of the concept of collective defense applied at NATO and USA defense department. After "the beginning of the global war against terrorism" after 09/11 although terrorism is considered a danger to the security of the alliance the new NATO strategic concepts expressed at Rome in 1991 and reiterated at Washington in 1999, only after 09/11 coherent strategic doctrine against terrorism appeared first in the American administration and then in NATO without giving birth to controversies between the allied countries.

The main architect of the new doctrine is president Bush, the Formula proposed by him being defined by many specialists as that of preventive action (the military dimension being included), in front of nonconventional threats especially terrorism. Without being a doctrine for the first time in history this fact leads to a phenomena of reinterpretation of article 51 from the UNO Chart, concerning the right of self defense and launch once again the

dispute about the imminence of danger which must be eliminated by a preventive action: "the terrorists and the terrorist countries don't unveil this threats, through right modalies as formal declarations and to answer to such enemies only after they had stroke first is not self defense but pure suicide[20] (this is in fact the logic of the article 51 from UNO Chart).

This new idea of the American administration makes use of the strategic data gathered after the cold war and which hadn't existed in the relations of security between two superpowers after the world war two which were both hostile and wiling and capable of a dialogue. The paradingm of security has undertaken dramatic changes after 1991: "as we face the new realities the old security doctrines seem outdated. In the days of cold war we are able to face the menace with the strategies of deceptions and containment". But it is harder to do it with enemies who don't have a country to defeat. It is also very difficult to act when the dictators can get weapons of mass destruction and are ready to give them to the terrorists that want to produce huge losses to the USA[21].

Although this Bush doctrine (which has a even more important element, that of making the countries that help and shelter terrorists, pay[22]) was contested by some members of the alliance it imposed itself during NATO summit from Prague in the 2002. In a formula adapted, through creation of NATO Response Force (NRF) with a operational capability that has to be reached no later than October 2004 and with a full operational capability to be reached no lather than October 2006[23]. On the 18 December 2001, the North Atlantic council at the level of ministers of defense asked the military authorities of NATO to prepare A MILITARY CONCEPT FOR DEFENSE AGAINST TERORISM which later would be approved by NAC. This concept was approved by NAC in the permanent session and then assumed by the heads of state and government during the Prague Summit on the 21.11.2002. the main idea of this NATO concept is: "the alliance had to be prepared for military operations against terrorist groups, when and where it is needed and as will be decided by NAC[24].

In what concerns the strategy of the European Union security that is linked to that of the NATO, the document called THE EUROPEAN STRATEGY OF SECURITY is very important. It was adopted in Bruxelles by the European Council, on the 12.12.2003. In it is specified that the union needs a strategic culture, which generates an early, rapid and necessary strong intervention"[25].

The modification of the international system of security by linking to the protection of human rights to the concept of international security and the placement of this matter under the incidence of chapter VIII-th of the chart as well as the important part which Bush doctrine played in rethinking of the security strategies on global scale as an answer to the threat of international terrorism are from our point of view the new directions in the evolutions of the paradigma of security of present time.

NOTES:

[1] Apend., Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, Chişinău, Cartier, Pu, page 24.

[2] See, R. Scalpino, *Asian Security Issues: Regional and Global, Berkeley*, Institute for East Asian Studies, 1988.

[3] Barry Buzan, *op.cit.*, page 196.

[4] *Idem,*, page 193.

[5] *Idem*, page 196.

[6] *Ibidem.*

[7] Joanne Wright, "Northern Isles Security Complex" in *Terrorism and Political Violence*, volume 5, no. 4, 1993, pages 266–286.

[8] Kenneth Waltz, Man, *The State and War: A theoretical Analysis*, Romanian edition, Iasi, 2001.

[9] Barry Buzan, *op.cit.*, pages 32-36.

[10] Stephen Brooks, "Power, Globalizations and the End of the Cold War", in *International Security*, no. 3, vol. 25, 200/2001.

[11] Dale Copeland, "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism" in *International Security*, no. 2, vol. 25, 2000.

[12] Emanuel Adler, Michael Barnett (ed) *Security Committees*, Cambrige, University Press, 1988.

[13] Mike M. Mochizuki, Michael O'Hanlon, "A Liberal Vision for the US-Japan Alliance", in *Survival*, no. 2, vol. 40, 1998, page 127-129.

[14] Martin Griffiths, *op.cit.*, page 349-364.

[15] Lene Hansen, "A Case for Seduction? Evaluating the Poststructuralist Conceptualization of Security", in *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. 32, no. 4, 1997.

[16] Brian L. Job (ed), *The Insecurity Dilemma> Natural Security of Third World States*, Columbia University Press, 1992.

[17] Martin Griffiths, *op.cit.*, page 183–231.

[18] Barry Buzan, "New patterns of global security in the twenty-first century", in *International Affairs*, vol 67, No. 3 . July 1991, pp 431-451.

[19] See CSCE Budapest Document 1994 "Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era" Budapest Decisions, Chapter VIII: the Human Dimension, second paragraph.

[20] News from the Washington File, Washington File, 17 March 2003, transcript : Bush Glives Saddam Hussein and Sons 48 to Leave Iraq (Refuzal to do so will result in military conflict" president says)(2170), THE WHITE HOUSE ,office of the press Secretary, March 17, 2003, REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT IN THE ADDRES TO THE NATION, The cross Hall.

[21] News from the Washington File, Washington File, 26 August 2002, Transcript: Cheney Cites Threat from Iraq's Saddam Hussein (Says Iraq has weapons of mass destruction and is preparing to use them)(4430), Office of the Vice President, August 26, 2002, REMARKS BY THE VICE, PRESIDENT TO THE VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS 103RD NATIONAL CONVENTION.

[22] G. Bush the president of the USA, was very firm in his decision to express its determination to act against the supporters of international terrorism: (...) the doctrine which I sustained in front of American people, in front of the Congress, said that will not only seek and bring that terrorists, that kill in front of justice, and that we will bring also. in front of justice their hosts, that train, sustain, shelter and feed them. See For Immediate Release, Office of the Press Secretary, October 11 , 2001 President Holds rime Time News Conference, The East Room, 8:00 P.M.EDT.

[23] See. NATO Press Release (2002)127, 21 Nov. 2002 Prague Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Prague on 21 November 2002, para. 4.(a).

[24] NATO/IMS:NATO's military concept for defense against terrorism, Updated: 15-Oct-2003 , NATO's military concept for defense against terrorism.

[25] A SECURE EUROPE IN A BETTER WORLD, EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY, Brussels, 12 December 2003.

Euro-Atlantic Integration: an Instrument for Stability

On March 1st-5th 2004, the Ivan Franko University of Lviv and NATO Information and Documentation Centre co-hosted the conference **NATO Winter Academy, Euro-Atlantic Integration: an Instrument for Stability** in Lviv(Lvov) the cultural capital of Ukraine. The beautiful city with his oldies buildings, museums and churches, the Opera House and the medieval and wonderfull University was a excellent place for holding this winter event.

The participants were university professors, political and military analists from Ukraine, Ambassador B. Tarasyuk, the Foreign Affairs Minister of Ukraine Mr. Kostiantyn Hryshchenko, Poland 's Ambassador, high representants of Georgia, Turkey, Romania, Russia, USA, students from all neighboring countries and the Ukraina's Universities. NATO high representants like Mr. Jean Fournet, Jamie Shea, Patrick Hardouin, John Colston from NATO headquarters were also presents in video-conferences.

The communiques of the conference were divided within five sections, one for each day:

- <u>About Security</u>: The Genesis of Conflict's, The development of national security policies and the role of States.
- <u>Post-Prague NATO</u>: NATO from the 1990's to Instambul and into the future, NATO adjusting to the new challenges.
- <u>Selected Euro-Atlantic Issues</u> and Partnerships: The future role for a reorganized NATO in international politics, its cooperation with other multilateral institutions, including the United Nations, the European Union and the OSCE, international peacekeeping operations, Regional Security Vectors: Black Sea, GUUAM, Central Asia, Deterrence and Resolution Conflict.
- <u>About Ukraine</u>: Ukraine and Security: from neutrality to integration, Military and security sector reform in Ukraine, the role of NATO as a partner, Defining the sharted democratic values of NATO States.
- <u>Regional Security Vectors</u>: Asymetrical Threats to Security, Europe, USA and the future of NATO.

Verry interesting was the analys of Prof. Paul M.E.Volten, of the University of Groningen on *Different approaches to developing National security policy:"*... The name of the game in international relations in Europe has fundamentally changed; so has the organisation of security between East ans the West. Cold War has been taken out our vocabulary; so has the strategy of a MAD bipolarity. By now infamous promise of President Bush made in the euphoric days after fall of the Berlin Wall, about a new world order is, however, still an enigma. Europe is in a process of change, but where will this lead us? The security arrangements have fundamentally changed and the prospect of all-European co-operation and even integration is present, at least perceived as such. Indeed, we may even succed in shaping, what Karl Deutch has called, and an *international security community*. He defined it as *a group of people which has become integrated*. The European Union and NATO are examples of organizations in which non of the member states have any doubt about the absense of the use or threat of military force in the relations between them."

Interesting was also Victor Hvozd's material on State export control and Ukraine's deficiencies in controling arms and drogs traffic. An young professor from Lvov University presented a theory about *Just war,* dangerous from the romanian point of view, that is why we understood to conteratac'it.

Interesting is also Conference Reading materials, a book which contain exposes about security and NATO, many of them that were not presented at the event. However, a bad poit is that interesting materials about Ukraine's political situation were writen in ucrainian language, a language used only in the western part of Ucraine, and therefore inaccesible.

Romania was represented in Lviv by **Mr. Ionut Alexe** on behalf of Centre for Euro-Atlantic Studies of University of Bucharest and by Mr. Claudiu Arghir, Second Secretary of the Embassy of Romania in Ukraine.

Cezar Barzea – „*Policies and Institutions of the European Union*", Corint Publishing House, Bucharest, 2001, 214p.

Addressed to all those who are interested in the historical evolution of the European Union, its institutions and their activity and also the economic, political, military and monetary policies of the European Union, the work is, as the author says: "a synthesis of what is already known for a certainty and the foreseeing of hypotheses or scenarios about the future development of the integration process".

Having as start-point this idea, the author organised the book in seven distinct chapters, each of them approaching a specific issue regarding the EU: the European identity, the European construction process, the European institutions, the European economy, the common policies, the economic and monetary union, the future of European project.

Also, every chapter is composed of several modules, detailing the general issues approached by within it.

The work ends with the presentation of the biography used for elaborating the work, a glossary of European terms and also an anthology of documents on European integration.

For a better understanding of the content of the work, we will shortly present the topic of each chapter and finally we will draw a few conclusions about the importance of the work.

The first chapter, "European Identity" is made up by two modules: "Europe: area or territory?" and "Evolution of the European idea". In the first module the author's intention is to identify the European area and the historical pattern of its evolution. In the second module he the evolution of the European identity conscience.

The first chapter ends with an important chronology of the European union projects, beginning with Charles the Great (768-814), considered "father of Europe" and finishing with Aristide Briand.

The second chapter, "The European Construction: Stages, Principles and Legal Foundations", consists of two modules: "The Birth and the Evolution of the European Community" and "The European Integration: Federalism and Subsidiary".

While, in the first module the main topic is the post-war evolution of the European Construction, insisting on several events: 1950 – Schuman Plan, 1951 – the Treaty of Paris, 1957 – the Treaty of Rome, in the second module, the emphasis is on the legal and political matters regarding the European integration process.

The third chapter, "European Union Institutions", composed of two modules: "European institutions" and "Decision-making process of the European institutions", provides the reader with an important amount of information on the European institutions: their configuration - in accordance with the Treaty of Maastricht –, characteristics, prerogatives and decision-making process.

Analysing the four decision-making procedures within the Community system (consultation, consent, co-operation, co-decision), Cezar Barzea supports the readers by providing them with a series of helping schemes, this way simplifying the understanding of the decision-making process.

The fourth chapter, "Economic Europe", organised in two modules: "The stages of European economic construction" and "The Common Market" presents the European integration process from the economical standpoint.

Emphasising on the stages of the economical integration (ECSC, EEC, The Common Market, European Union), Cezar Barzea analyses the process of achieving the four types of

freedom (free movement of goods, persons, financial assets and services) and their economic implications; presents the three distinct policies of strengthening the Common Market (supporting the small and medium enterprises, competition and consumer protection policies) and describes the advantages and the draw-backs of the Monetary and Financial Union.

The fifth chapter, "Common Policies", comprises two modules: " The Welfare Policies" and "The Common Action Policies".

Analysing in the first module, the regional development policy and the social policy and in the second module, the common agriculture policy; the energetic policy; the transportation policy; the research and development policy and the environmental policy, prof. Cezar Barzea explains to the reader a broad range of terms such as: "European Fund for Regional Development", "European Social Fund", "European Fund for Agricultural Orientation and Guarantee", "Financial Instrument for Fisheries Orientation", "Structural Funds", " Cohesion Fund".

The sixth chapter, " Economic and Monetary Union", presents the evolution of the Common Monetary Policy emphasising the three stages of its development (" the European Monetary Snake", European Monetary System, Economic and Monetary Union).

The seventh chapter, "European Project: from Myth and Achievement", is structured in two modules: " The Enlargement towards East" and "Outlook and challenges".

In the first module, the reader will find information about the main events related to the European Union enlargement, the elements of the pre-acceding process and the characteristics of the main strategies adopted to achieve the European enlargement towards East.

In the second module the emphasis of the presentation falls on the definition of the three circles of European integration, of the European citizenship and identity.

Drawing the conclusion, we can observe that prof. Cezar Barzea's work stands out from others works, first of all, through the complex approach of European integration topic, providing the reader not only with a historical and political dimension but also with an economical point of view.

Addressed not only to those specialising in the European integration field, but also to those already specialised, the work has the worth of providing the reader with both a glossary of European terms and an anthology of documents on European integration, this way simplifying the understanding of this topic.

Luminița-Cristiana Mușat

Adrian Pop – *"Strategy of European Integration"*, Ed. Sylvi, Bucharest, 2003. 202 pages

Professor Adrian Pop's book, *Strategy of European Integration* is a very good analysis of European integration process.

The work is divided in seven chapters, each of them containing a stage of European integration process and all of them considered together form a self-explaining whole: European Integration – evolution, concept and tools; European Union Institutions; European Union Enlargement; Security and Defense – components of European Integration; European Union Strategy for its proximity areas; Debates for European Union future; Romanian Strategy for European Union adhesion.

The first chapter, *European Integration – evolution, concept and tools*, begins with the presentation of a short history of European Integration process, the set-up process of European Community and its evolution; then the chapter deals with the presentation of theoretical patterns of

European Integration: federalism, neo-functionalism, inter-governmental and multi-level governance.

The author's conclusion is that the EU structure corresponds to the last pattern.

The first chapter is concluded with the presentation of the Structural Funds, used to eliminate the economic differences between the member states: European Social Fund, European Fund of Regional Development, European Fund of Orientation and Agricultural Guarantee.

In the next chapter, meaningful named *European Union Institutions* , the EU institutions are enumerated:

Common institutions:

- European Parliament, its structure and organization, its competencies – normative, budgetary, political, international, community law defense;
- European Council, its structure, organization an evolution, it is an important institution of EU because at this level are debated communitarian construction;
- EU Council, which is the main forum for decision of EU;
- European Commission, its composition, structure and competencies;
- European Court of Low, its legal nature, composition and procedures;
- European Court of Account, composition, competencies;

Institutions: European Investment Bank, Central European Bank, European Investment Fund, the Ombudsman; auxiliary bodies of European Communities: Advisory Committee CECA, Committee of the Regions, Economic and Social Committee – composition, structure, competencies and internal organization; as well as other autonomous bodies (agencies), such as: European Agency of Environment (EEA), European Reconstruction Agency (EAR), EUROPOL, etc.

The second chapter ends with the presentation of the main legal documents adopted at communitarian level: regulations (rules), orders (directions), recommendations, resolutions and notices, agreements and conventions.

The third chapter is dedicated to enlargement of EU and starts with the presentation of the pre-adhesion strategy of the EU candidate states; then follows with the presentation of the EU financial assistance for the candidate countries through its programs: PHARE, ISPA, SAPARD, the European Agreements and Structural Dialogue and we are presented with a detailed analysis of negotiation process: how is it started, the conditions for the candidate countries, how is it finished.

In the end of this chapter the author makes an analysis about the cost and the benefits of the EU enlargement when compared to the non-enlargement options.

In the fourth chapter the author approaches the defense and the security elements of European integration: ESDI, CFSP, ESDP, and in the end are presented the Romanian proposals in this area: her contingents for peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding.

In the fifth chapter are presented the EU strategies for its proximity areas: Russian Federation, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and for the Balkans: the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) which is made up on: Stabilization and Association Agreements SAAs, Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization CARDS, Autonomous Trade Measures ATM and the Forum EU- West Balkans and the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe.

In the sixth chapter is debated the future of Europe through the presentation of European Convention and the European Constitution Draft, which are very important for the future of Europe because includes the main stipulations for an enlargement Europe.

The last chapter is dedicated to Romanian strategy for EU accession.

In the end of this chapter, the author makes a parallelism between the advantages and the constraints of European Integration for Romania. His conclusion is that the Romania will obtain the EU accession. In turn, European Union helps Romania through his funds: PHARE, SAPARD, ISPA to make important step in this way.

The work is a very good reference material, a complex analysis of European integration process, presenting a large variety of points of view related to this issue.

The book can be granted the merit of bringing an important amount of information about a less studies issue in Romania.

Based on a significant number of documents (a representative bibliography, comprising basic and complementary Community documents, books and webs-site), the book has the merit of trying to accustom the readers with the main documents of EU, WEU, NATO that regard the issue approached in this paper.

Constanța Cristina Ghiță

Florin Șperlea, *From the Royal Army to the Popular Army. The Sovietization of the Romanian Military (1948-1955),* Bucharest, Ziua, 2003, 333 p.

Florin Șperlea is a young and promising Romanian historian, who few months ago have published his second work. The book called *From the Royal Army to the Popular Army. The Sovietization of the Romanian Military (1948-1955)* should become a basic tool for students and scholars who intend to study the problem of communist establishment in Romania after the Second World War.

Although, first, the reader may think that this book is concerned only with military structures, he will have the pleasant surprise to discover a deep and a keen critical analysis of the Romanian society during a crucial historical period.

This book has developed, as the author himself testifies, from his PhD thesis, which it was coordinated by Professor Dinu C. Giurescu and it have been very well received when asserted. Thus, the publishing of this project become imperative for our historiography field for many reasons.

First of all, this necessity is due to the lack from the Romanian historiography of an objective work about the military structures at the beginning of communist era. Before 1989 such kind of works preoccupied with military field should've answer to the communist regime's legitimacy needs. Another justification of this book's importance stands in the fact that it brings into the light many primary sources found by the author in various archives and libraries. All these documents couldn't have answered to the criterion of an objective and proper analysis during the time of communist regime. Of great importance is also the fact that this book represents the spirit of the new Romanian historiography. It is a demonstration of author's ability to go beyond simple narration of military and political events up to identify psychological lines, propagandistic models and modalities of persuasion and actions promoted by the totalitarian regimes.

The book is divided in four major parts, a foreword signed by Professor Giurescu, annexes which includes an important selection of unpublished documents and an afterword in English. Șperlea begins his study from 1945, when the army leadership still belonged to old traditional and royal elites and ends it in 1955 when the new 'socialist soldier', as the Soviet model requested, was in control of every structure.

The first part deals with a presentation of the Romanian society from the end of the Second World War, within the framework of which the military structures had functioned. As a special section of this chapter the author stresses some key concepts and the fact that the sovietization process from Romania took place within a regional system.

The second part is dedicated to the period of effective action developed by the Communist Party from 1948 to 1950 in order 'to conquer' the army. Inside this range of time he establishes chronological phases and describes the model, the doctrine and the type of action which the

Communists had followed to achieve the purpose of getting control over military. This period was followed by the phase of inside army action from 1950-1955 at the end of which army's loyalty belonged to the Party, not to the country.

Florin Şperlea proves that the sovietization process had been a punctilious work made by a minor group — the communists in 1945 represented only a minority— from the Romanian political system, which in the end was successful because of Russian support.

It should be pointed out that the author sets down a very useful methodological approach, which can be helpful for those who study the mechanism of taking power by the communists in other state's fields. His analysis on the military level is just a schedule of a micro ossature, which, in order to understand correctly the sovietization process, can be transpose on the grand level of the whole society.

The book, written in a clear style, easy to understand and to follow, is an honest examination of a 'black' period in Romanian history, concerned mainly with the evolution of a professional category, but, also, extended to the complex political and propagandist mechanism. Following, it should be pointed out that the author has the ability to perceive and to describe the delicate changes of conception of a generation. This conception change could've been one of the reasons of communism's long life in Romania.

Cristina Nedelcu

"Romanian Identity and European Integration. Problems and Perspectives",
Editor Gabriela Gabor. Edited by Ars Docendi, Bucharest, 2003, pag.283[*]

These days, the European integration studies tend to become a kind of meta-discipline overshadowing all other specializations in the political science field.

A brief research in any European library catalogue shows that almost a hundred books have been published in the past ten years with at least two of the keywords "Europe," "nation," "integration" and "identity" in the title.

So, it is quite clear that the theme of European Integration presents a particular challenge and it is a profitable topic of discussion not only for the politicians, but also for the academic field.

For more understanding of the contemporary debate on the meaning of European identity, issues such as the relationship between European identity and national identity, and the necessity of integration in the European assembly, many initiatives have been taken at the academic level.

One of them is that which we are analyzing in the following lines.

The book *Romanian Identity and European Integration. Problems and Perspectives* is the work of a research group, established at Faculty of Letters - University of Bucharest in 2001.

This book brings together powerful and cutting edge contributions from all sides of the debate, from academics, journalists to politicians. The authors work mainly within one of three major disciplines – linguistic, law and political sciences.

It is a stimulating collection of essays, a serie of different approaches have been taken, but these collected essays are united by their common concern on European identity changes and European integration issues.

There are many issues covered by this paper and I will only examine those that I think are most worthy of discussion.

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[*] "Identitate Românească şi Integrare Europeană. Probleme şi Perspective", *coordonator Gabriela Gabor, Editura Ars Docendi,Bucureşti, 2003, pp. 283*

In this book's prologue, Dan Horia Mazilu – the Director of this research program underlines the aims of the conference and book, and he insists on the fact that the goal is to determine the factors which are for and versus European integration in Romanian culture.

This book is divided into five thematic sections:

First section *"European Institutions"* and the fifth section *"European Community law"* examine the institutions, their roles and interactions that produce the Community and European Union policies. A series of key concepts, such as European federalism, European citizenship, are debated by Augustin Fuerea and Raluca Giorgiana Frățilă.

One of the articles defines a delicate issue such as the division of powers between the Community and its member states in the field of external relations. George Grigore also brings special insight to discussions on the meaning of national identity in the European Security and Defense Policy context.

Other articles outline the report between Romania and European Union, as well as the relationship between the Community law and the joining of new members.

A detailed presentation of Anamaria Georgiana Jilcu about European Community law reveals the priority of the communitarian law order over the law of the member states and the direct effect of an entire set of communitarian dispositions, known as "acquis communitaire", which is applied directly to the member states.

The section *"Communication, Advertising, Integration"* examines the relationships between tradition and modernity in Romanian linguistic field, as much as advertising.

"The globalisation process offers the framework for international hegemony of English" says Adriana Stoichitoiu Ichim in her article" *Romglish – personal option or effect of globalisation process"*.

In his essay, Constantin Popescu thinks that the advertising represents an indicator of tradition and modernity in Romanian society. In his opinion, the historical past represents one of the fundamental forms of communication, such as the article reveled, but it is practically ignored in Romanian advertising field and even threatens the capacity of building the future world.

In the third section *"Romania and Europe"*, Dragos Zaharia focuses on the historical projects of the construction of joint Europe. Thus, he offers a justification and even a legitimacy of this actual European integration process.

Doru Vasile Ionescu analyzes the identity and integration concepts, which are not in opposite terms. Integration is not strictly equivalent to losing one's national identity and the dissolution of the nation-state. Obviously, economic globalization, worldwide cultural assimilation, multicultural societies, and European integration will change the nation, national identities, and nationalism without, however, eliminating them.

The historical dimension is pointed out in the article of Irina Moroianu Zlatescu.

Diversity of historical context has created a series of perceptions about Europe, such as Mediterranean Europe, a Catholic Europe, or an Orthodox Europe and so on.

For the first time in its history, Europe has the possibility to form a single political entity with a European identity. That is not based on the predominance of a single nation, but on the recognition of interdependent relationships and on a common wealth of values. It can not be realized neither by the dissolution of European national identities. Irina Moroianu Zlătescu said that it would be possible only in a cultural pluralist Europe.

Following the same line, Luminița Cristiana Mușat summarizes in her essay *"Unity in diversity. Romanian Identity and European Integration"*, that the diversity of the processes of construction of national identities is an essential part of nation-state and national identity. In European's case, the goal is not the creation of European identity like a national identity, based by a common cultural tradition, but the necessity to preserve national identities in the European integration process. The way the identity is imagined is therefore crucial in exploring the relationship between nationalism and European integration.

Avram Filipas complets the ideea that the European culture represents proxim gender and national cultures represent its specifical diferrences.

In the section: "*The faces of identitites*" the authors stress with the deals about national identity problems in contemporary Europe on a more theoretical and/or comparative level. They evaluate the national culture as a part of the European civilization.

This chapter indicates two publications in the linguistic field: *A dictionary of European Anglicisms. A Usage Dictionary of Anglicisms in Sixteen Languages* and *A recent dictionary of linguistic.*

Also, we can mention the article of Adina Berciu Drăghicescu, which it offers a short history of the Romanian national flag, starting from the basic signification of its colors.

The authors of this section are quite right to deal pragmatically with the current theoretical debates on the identity issue and focus on the link between theory and a wide variety of national identities in current Europe. A case study is debated by Cristina Avrigeanu and shows in which form the European identity is found in Romanian society.

Finally, Dan Horia Mazilu said that the relevance of this type of research is double scientific because of its research methods and social because of the correlation between cultural and social dates.

It is clear that the collection under review can be a contribution to the debate on European identity and European integration.

The practical application of this study research was THE PROMETEU PROJECT designed by the *International Relations Department. European Studies*. Its objective is to inform the high school's students about the functions and institutions of E.U., its foundation and its perspectives, the advantages and disadvantages of this process.

This educational program was developed from July 2002 to June 2003.

To sum up, this is an essential research work for all those who wish to be informed about one of the most important issues of our time-a matter which affects us all.

Mihaela Mustăţea