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
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Traité de Lisbonne et Principes du Droit International

Commentaires

Mădălina Virginia Antonescu

1. Obligation de l'Union Européenne de respecter le droit international selon l'article 2, alinéa 5 du Traité de l'Union Européenne, lors de la modification opérée par le Traité de Lisbonne

Étant donnée la modification opérée par le Traité de Lisbonne, l'article 2, alinéa 5 du Traité de l'Union Européenne représente un article-clé quant aux intérêts des États petits et moyens ayant la qualité de "membres de l'Union Européenne", tout particulièrement en ce qui concerne la Roumanie.

Cette prévision *juridique* (munie, donc, de *force obligatoire* tant pour l'Union Européenne qui est, selon le Traité de Lisbonne, une personnalité juridique, que pour tous les États membres de l'Union, quelles que soient les dimensions du territoire, leur population, le niveau de développement industriel, économique, technologique, le pouvoir militaire, etc.), est, en fait, *l'une des garanties juridiques instituées par le Traité de Lisbonne, relative au respect de l'identité nationale des États membres, mais également du caractère national, souverain, unitaire, indépendant et indivisible de ces États membres lesquels, tout comme la Roumanie, ont inscrit dans leur Constitution Nationale ces caractères juridiques d'État.* Lorsque l'UE assume d'une manière expresse, par l'article 2, alinéa 5 du Traité de l'Union Européenne, modifié par le Traité de Lisbonne, son obligation de "respecter rigoureusement et de développer le droit international, y compris de respecter les principes de la Charte des Nations Unies", cela signifie que l'Union reconnaît (en tant qu'entité politique originale, *ayant des éléments étatiques*, munie de personnalité juridique et devenant, par

conséquent, *un sujet du droit international*, bien que *dérivé* né de la volonté des États membres) le caractère **coordinateur, inter-étatique du droit international contemporain** (où l'État est le seul sujet de droit international souverain et originaire), **mais également du principe fondamental de la souveraineté des États, inscrit dans la Charte des Nations Unies**, qui sert de base à l'ordre juridique international.

Une référence expresse au "respect *rigoureux* du droit international" représente, selon l'article 2, alinéa 5 du Traité de l'Union Européenne – TUE –, une obligation directe de l'Union de s'abstenir de toute action qui pourrait léser les droits des États, qui dérivent des normes du droit international et qui sont protégés par les principes de la Charte des Nations Unies. Même si l'article 2, alinéa 5 du TUE se rapporte aux relations entre l'UE et "*le reste de la communauté internationale*" (c'est-à-dire les *tiers États*, quel que soit leur Statut, en partant des États, candidats à l'intégration dans l'UE, aux États qui ont entamé les négociations d'adhésion, jusqu'aux États qui *n'ont pas* la vocation de devenir des États membres de l'Union, selon les critères de Copenhague/1993), **nous considérons que, par l'application de l'argument juridique *a fortiori*, il est obligatoire que l'Union respecte les normes du droit international et les principes inscrits dans la Charte des Nations Unies dans sa relation avec les États membres de l'UE.**

Ainsi, l'article 2, alinéa 5 du TUE, lors de la modification opérée par le Traité de Lisbonne, doit être vu comme une suite logique d'un rapport juridique initial (en corrélation avec les articles 3.a et 3.b du TUE) entre l'UE et les États membres, fondé sur le principe juridique spécifique à l'*édification européenne*, à savoir le principe de l'*assignation des compétences* (en y ajoutant, selon l'article 3.b du TUE, le principe de la subsidiarité et celui de la proportionnalité). Mais, ce principe juridique "*d'intégration*" (puisqu'il constitue la base juridique de la cession progressive des compétences des États vers les institutions de l'UE) *ne doit pas* être considéré comme un principe juridique *contraire* au principe de la souveraineté des États. Autrement dit, même si la jurisprudence du CJCE voit dans "l'ordre juridique communautaire" un ordre de droit *différent* tant en ce qui concerne l'ordre national de droit des États membres, *mais aussi en ce qui concerne l'ordre du droit international*, il ne faut pas interpréter cela dans le sens d'un "isolement" de l'ordre juridique communautaire (devenu, par le Traité de Lisbonne, "un ordre de droit de l'Union") par rapport au droit international. **Au contraire, les deux types d'ordre juridique restent en interconnexion puisque la qualité d'État membre de l'UE n'exclut pas la participation de ces États en tant qu'États souverains, aux relations juridiques internationales, ni détermine la disparition de la qualité de sujet de droit international souverain et originaire qu'ont les États**

membres de l'UE dans leurs relations de droit international. De plus, nous considérons que *l'existence d'un "ordre juridique communautaire" ne peut pas exclure les rapports de droit international établis entre les États membres de l'UE, de même que entre ceux-ci et les tiers États (qui n'ont pas la qualité de membre de l'UE).* L'existence même de l'UE comme personnalité juridique, selon le Traité de Lisbonne, ne nous permet de parler ni de la disparition des États-nation, ni de la disparition de leur caractère *national et souverain*. D'ailleurs, l'Union suppose également des formes de coopération *intergouvernementale* (PESC, par exemple: coopération policière; coopération en matière civile, énergie) dont les États membres qui sont les titulaires du rôle *décisionnel* principal, mais aussi en ce qui concerne *l'application* des mesures établies. De plus, l'article 3.a du TUE, par la modification opérée par le Traité de Lisbonne, il ressort clairement **le fait que l'hypothèse du déclin de l'État-nation et du principe de la souveraineté est rejetée.** Même s'il s'agit des domaines soumis à l'intégration (ou bien à l'assignation des compétences de l'Union d'une manière exclusive ou partagée), les États membres sont ceux qui ont décidé d'une manière libre et souveraine de céder une série de compétences à l'Union. **L'existence même de l'Union** comme telle est due à la **volonté libre et souveraine des États membres qui ont conclu, dans le domaine du droit international, un traité multilatéral en ce sens.**

2. Question de la validité du Traité de Lisbonne dans la perspective du droit international, tout spécialement de la compatibilité avec *ius cogens*

Le respect manifesté dans tous les traités communautaires et de modification, en vigueur, aussi bien dans le Traité de Lisbonne, en ce qui concerne le droit international *impératif dans son intégralité*, est, donc, le respect manifesté également pour les principes de la souveraineté et de l'égalité des États (*ius cogens*) et représente une condition juridique essentielle, dans la vision internationaliste, pour la validité de ces Traités. Le fait qu'à

travers ces traits on fonde un ordre de droit *communautaire* n'élimine pas l'incidence du *ius cogens* dans les rapports juridiques entre l'Union et les États membres, mais aussi dans les rapports entre les États membres. La convention de Vienne, de 1969, portant sur le droit des traités, stipule que " la validité d'un traité (donc des traités communautaires, de modification et du Traité de Lisbonne, tout spécialement), ne peut être contestée que par

l'application de la présente Convention" (autrement dit, l'article 42 rend obligatoire l'incidence de la Convention de Vienne pour la validité de tout traité, en tant qu'acte de droit international, n'importe si, par ce traité, soit institué un ordre juridique communautaire *différent et autonome* par rapport au droit international). En second lieu, la Convention prévoit aussi le fait que la cessation de l'effet du traité (de même que son extinction, la dénonciation ou le retrait d'une partie d'un traité) ne peut se produire que par l'application des dispositions du traité *respectif* ou du *présent traité*". Tout traité (y compris le Traité de Lisbonne) est supposé d'être valable et en vigueur *si l'une des causes, stipulées par la Convention de Vienne de 1969 n'est pas intervenue*.

Or, sur la base de cette présomption juridique, il faut considérer qu'au moment du Traité de Lisbonne (et des traités antérieurs, que ce traité modifie), les États membres ont respecté les normes *ius cogens*, en ont tenu compte, afin de pouvoir conclure d'une manière valable un traité international. **Les États membres de l'UE n'ont pas considéré, à notre opinion, que l'ordre juridique communautaire et les principes du droit communautaire qui réglementent la relation Union – États membres seraient contraires au droit international (étant donné leurs traits spécifiques), autrement, le traité intégral serait complètement nul** (traité communautaire ou de modification, qui représente la base juridique de l'ordre de droit communautaire tout entier), bien qu'il s'agisse du Traité de Rome de fondation de la Communauté Européenne, du Traité de Maastricht, de fondation de l'Union Européenne, du Traité de Lisbonne ou d'autres traités.

La Convention de Vienne de 1969 portant sur le droit des traités internationaux, prévoit un cas différent de nullité, la *violation*, par le traité, d'une norme de *ius cogens* (dans ce cas l'égalité souveraine des États membres *dans l'ordre juridique communautaire*): l'article 53 de la Convention de Vienne prévoit que "tout

traité est nul, au moment de la conclusion, s'il est en conflit avec une norme *impérative* du droit international général" (dans ce cas avec les principes de la souveraineté et de l'égalité des États).

Mais, d'autre part, le texte du Traité de Lisbonne permet d'observer que l'UE n'assume nulle obligation expresse de respecter tels principes, comme des principes *de droit international*, dans sa relation avec les États membres.

C'est pourquoi il est besoin d'une stipulation expresse du Traité de Lisbonne ou d'un autre protocole annexé, de même que d'une prise de position (par une déclaration) des parlements nationaux des États membres ou une consécration dans la jurisprudence nationale (instances nationales: Cour Constitutionnelle) concernant la nécessité que l'Union s'assume, en tant que personnalité juridique, l'obligation de respecter le droit international (d'une manière expresse *ius cogens*) dans sa relation avec les États membres. Cela pourrait éliminer toute discussion ou doute relatif au caractère légal de l'Union (si elle ne respecte pas *ius cogens* dans sa relation avec les États membres qui restent souverains, tout comme elle pourrait respecter les mêmes normes *ius cogens* dans sa relation avec les tiers États, avec le reste de la communauté internationale?). *Ius cogens* n'admet nulle dérogation (ni par la fondation d'un ordre de droit communautaire, capable de rendre relative ou d'ignorer la valeur impérative et obligatoire, par l'exacerbation forcée de son caractère *autonome* défini par la CJCE).

La doctrine du droit international considère comme étant conclus en violant les normes de *ius cogens* les traités qui **permettent de transgresser l'égalité juridique des États** (Commentaire de la Commission de droit international, article 50 du projet, devenu l'article 53 de la Convention); **les traités qui permettent que les États limitent leur liberté tellement qu'ils ne seraient plus capables d'accomplir leurs obligations de droit international** (or, par les traités communautaires et de

modification, y compris le Traité de Lisbonne, les États membres s'engagent *d'attribuer des compétences à l'Union*, pour accomplir certains objectifs communs; dans ce cas, le caractère *autonome* de l'ordre juridique communautaire, institué par de tels traités, *ne peut pas* être invoqué en tant qu'argument de limitation de la souveraineté des États membres et d'élimination de l'ordre juridique communautaire d'incidence de *ius cogens*. **L'Union ne peut pas traiter les États membres comme s'ils étaient exclusivement des sujets de droit communautaire, en ignorant les droits et obligations que ceux-ci, en tant que sujets originaires, directs et souverains de droit international, ont dans l'ordre juridique international.**

Entre les deux qualités juridiques des États membres de l'UE (celle d'être des sujets de droit communautaire et celle d'être sujet de droit international), nous estimons qu'il y a **une étroite connexion juridique, une relation d'interdépendance** juste grâce au caractère *souverain* que les États membres de l'UE continuent d'avoir, quel que soit l'ordre juridique (national, communautaire, international) qui puisse agir.

Le droit communautaire comme un ensemble de normes juridiques spécifiques à l'Union ne peut pas être considéré comme ayant une supériorité par rapport à la souveraineté des États, car, tout comme le droit international, **il est toujours une création des États, une expression de leur souveraineté, ayant pour base l'accord de volonté librement exprimée par les États membres de l'UE**. L'acte de participation d'un État à la création du droit communautaire (à travers le Conseil, considéré le principal législateur de l'UE, une institution politique intergouvernementale) reflète juste *un exercice de la souveraineté des États* dans le cadre intégrationniste de l'UE et non pas une limitation de la souveraineté des États membres de l'UE.

Mais, en même temps, les États membres de l'UE qui concluent un traité communautaire ou de modification (y compris le Traité de Lisbonne) **ne peuvent pas avoir un accord de**

volonté valable si l'objectif commun est la constitution d'une entité qui affectera directement leur souveraineté; c'est pourquoi le Traité de Lisbonne, qui modifie l'article 1 du TUE n'utilise pas le syntagme "cession/transfert des droits souverains ou de l'exercice de la souveraineté" réalisé par les États membres vers l'Union, puisque celle-ci serait une prévision contraire au principe de la souveraineté. Les États choisissent "d'assigner des **compétences**" à l'Union (par l'article 1 du TUE, modifié par le Traité de Lisbonne), parce qu'une **limitation de la souveraineté**, prévue d'une manière expresse par de tels traités, pourrait avoir *ab initio* un caractère illicite qui mènerait à la nullité du traité en son ensemble pour avoir violé une norme *ius cogens*.

Même si le Traité de Lisbonne ne prévoit pas d'une manière expresse le fait que l'Union est fondée sur les principes de droit international (ce qui aurait engendré une obligation expresse pour l'UE de respecter *ius cogens*) **il est bien clair que l'Union ne peut pas se situer contre les normes *ius cogens* même si elle a une dimension d'intégration.**

Cela est valable également pour les États membres de l'UE, lesquels ne peuvent conclure nul traité international qu'il soit un traité d'intégration, s'ils violent les normes *ius cogens*.

Si sur le plan juridique international le respect mutuel de la souveraineté des États est devenu une obligation fondamentale, reconnue *par tous les États* et, en même temps, un principe juridique unanimement admis, sur le plan du droit communautaire ce principe *conserve sa validité* dans les relations *entre les États membres*. En octroyant la personnalité juridique expresse à l'Union par le Traité de Lisbonne, cette entité devient capable de s'engager valablement dans les rapports juridiques internationaux, sur la base de la volonté des États membres.

C'est ainsi que l'Union est tenue, en tant que sujet de droit international, de respecter le droit international dans les relations avec tous les États (qu'ils soient ou non membres de l'UE), pour ne pas faire des

discriminations dans le sens de la limitation ou du refus de reconnaître certains droits des États *membres*, discriminations qui pourraient affecter leur position sur plan juridique international, dans leur relation avec les tiers États. Le droit international tout entier est une expression de l'égalité souveraine des États, donc il est impossible que l'Union ne considère pas les États membres de l'UE comme des sujets de droit international et qu'elle ne respecte pas les normes *ius cogens*.

Par conséquent, *nous ne pouvons pas être d'accord avec l'idée que le Traité de Lisbonne dans son intégralité est seulement une illustration du "supranationalisme institutionnalisé" et de "la théorie de la compétence"* (ce qui affecterait directement les intérêts des États petits et moyens de l'Union qui voient dans la reconnaissance de l'incidence du droit international sur l'ordre juridique communautaire, une garantie juridique de la souveraineté et l'égalité juridique dans leurs relations avec les États grands et puissants de l'Union). Au contraire, nous considérons que le Traité de Lisbonne, en dépit de son trait spécifique, ne peut pas faire abstraction et ne peut pas "être détaché" du droit international sous le nom duquel est né; de plus, tant le Traité de Lisbonne (qui sera considéré tout comme les traités antérieurs de l'édification européenne, comme une norme juridique du droit communautaire tout entier), mais aussi les traités antérieurs sont des normes juridiques nées de la volonté souveraine des États membres, ils sont, donc, des expressions juridiques de la *souveraineté* des États et non pas de certaines "compétences" de ceux-ci.

Si l'on le considère *seulement comme une entité souveraine*, l'État peut être considéré, sur le plan du droit international, un sujet de

droit capable de conclure d'une manière valable un acte juridique (comme, par exemple, le Traité de Lisbonne); avant de produire des effets juridiques dans l'ordre *du droit communautaire*, le Traité de Lisbonne, en tant que document de droit international, conclu par des États souverains, crée des effets juridiques dans *l'ordre du droit international*, donc il est en premier lieu, une expression de la *souveraineté des États* et, à travers ce prisme, il faut considérer toutes les prévisions, tout spécialement celles qui se rapportent à la relation juridique entre l'Union et les États membres.

Ainsi, **le Traité de Lisbonne ne doit pas être considéré**, dans la conception des États petits et moyens de l'Union, un groupe bien susceptible quant à tout ce qui signifie la limitation et l'aliénation de leur souveraineté, comme **un instrument juridique de consécration de la théorie de la divisibilité de la souveraineté ou bien de la théorie de la compétence** mais, au contraire, **comme un acte juridique qui est, avant tout, un acte juridique de droit international, donc une manifestation valable, juridique de la souveraineté des États qui l'ont conclu** (dans la mesure où l'on ne démontre pas une violation d'une norme *ius cogens* par ce traité, surtout une transgression du principe de la souveraineté des États). La qualité de "membre de l'UE" n'est pas une qualité opposée (ou qui pourrait éliminer) la qualité "d'État qui fait part d'une communauté internationale", mais **il s'agit d'une relation de complémentarité entre les deux qualités juridiques, avec l'obligation des États de respecter les normes *ius cogens*, quel que soit l'ordre juridique auquel on se rapporte.**

3. Principe de la souveraineté des États et théorie de la compétence du point de vue du Traité de Lisbonne

Selon *"la théorie de la compétence"* (si nous considérons le Traité de Lisbonne, tout spécialement l'article 1/TUE, l'article 3.a, alinéa 1 TUE, l'article 3.b/TUE, dont la modification a été opérée par le Traité de

Lisbonne), la notion de "souveraineté" pourrait être considérée caduque, anachronique, un élément qui n'est pas essentiel pour l'État et pour son fonctionnement valable. Autrement dit, sur la base de sa **souveraineté**, l'État a la

capacité d'établir tout seul ses compétences, sans aucune immixtion (de la part d'un État ou d'une autorité supérieure). Au contraire, sur la base des "**compétences**" dont il disposerait, l'État serait muni et habilité d'utiliser, **dans la mesure et les conditions définies, un système juridique supérieur, une autorité supranationale**. Loin d'être seulement un changement de terminologie (on peut observer que le contenu des articles du TUE, modifiés par le Traité de Lisbonne, ne mentionne pas le caractère souverain des États membres, d'autant moins l'adjectif "souverain"), il s'agit, selon la doctrine, dans le cas de la théorie de la compétence, d'un changement du contenu juridique de la souveraineté, plus encore, **d'une négation de la souveraineté** (cette-ci n'existerait plus comme un attribut *originaire* des États à travers duquel ceux-ci *élaborent* les normes de droit international et définissent des relations internationales, mais "elles deviendraient" une simple compétence qui peut être déléguée par un ordre juridique *supérieur* des États – dans le cas des États membres de l'UE, par les institutions de l'UE, en tant que représentants d'un ordre juridique supranational ou d'intégration).

En mettant en relief le caractère *coordinateur* du droit international, Nicolae Titulescu rejetait "la théorie de la compétence" selon laquelle l'État n'aurait qu'une compétence **délégée du droit international** (ce qui signifierait que le droit international est un droit de subordination).

Même si le droit communautaire **n'a pas un caractère coordinateur**, puisqu'il s'agit d'un droit d'intégration, ce droit est **toujours une création des États**, une expression de leur volonté souveraine de constituer un tel ordre juridique (en concluant les traités communautaires et de modification, qui forment la norme juridique fondamentale dans cet ordre d'intégration). L'article 1/TUE, modifié par le Traité de Lisbonne précise d'une manière expresse ce caractère spécifique de l'Union d'être *une création des États*, donc une manifestation de leur souveraineté: "... à laquelle les *États* attribuent des compétences

pour réaliser leurs objectifs communs". Même s'il s'agit d'une entité juridique d'*intégration*, l'Union ne peut pas établir toute seule les compétences par un acte unilatéral, donc elle n'a pas un caractère juridique supérieur aux États membres, ceux-ci *restant des États souverains* même après avoir acquis la qualité de "membre de l'UE" et *décidant* tant les types de compétences, que les limites juridiques de l'Union pour les exercer.

La souveraineté est un attribut inhérent, organique de l'État, en vertu duquel il a le droit de manifester, dans les conditions de pleine indépendance et égalité, ses prérogatives dans les relations avec d'autres États.

En échange, "la compétence" est considérée par la doctrine comme une notion élastique, ayant un contenu imprécis, assignée de l'extérieur par un ordre juridique supérieur des États (dans ce cas, par le droit communautaire des États membres de l'UE); "la compétence" n'est pas unique, pleine, exclusive, autonome tout comme la souveraineté et, par conséquent, affecte le principe de la souveraineté dans sa dimension extérieure (indépendante), mais aussi dans la dimension intérieure la suprématie du pouvoir d'État dans les frontières de l'État respectif).

Il est également faux de considérer supérieur l'ordre juridique communautaire par rapport au droit internationale (fondé sur le principe de l'égalité souveraine des États), puisque **l'ordre juridique communautaire est un ordre juridique spécifique, applicable à des relations étroites, spécifiques**, entre les États d'une certaine zone géographique, qui ne caractérisent pas les relations internationales dans leur ensemble (elles n'ont pas un caractère juridique universel). La fondation et le fonctionnement de *l'Union* (compte tenu aussi de la modification opérée par le Traité de Lisbonne), *en tant que sujet du droit international* (par l'octroi de la personnalité juridique), est étroitement connectée, dans la conception internationaliste, à l'obligation de l'Union de respecter intégralement et

inconditionnellement les normes du droit international, d'appliquer les principes et les normes du droit international, tout spécialement *ius cogens*.

Les caractères *d'unicité et indivisibilité* de la souveraineté, comme un attribut *essentiel* de l'État-nation (affecter et limiter d'une manière fondamentale cet attribut, cela mène à la disparition de l'État en soi-même) ne permettent ni une division de la souveraineté en "pièces" qui pourraient être "transférées" par les États aux autres organismes (l'Union), ni un transfert de *l'exercice* de la souveraineté (sinon elle reste une forme vidée de tout contenu juridique). Par conséquent, ni cette **deuxième théorie, relative à la "souveraineté relative"** (à la différence de "la théorie de la compétence" qui est une théorie radicale, puisqu'elle *nie* l'existence de cet attribut essentiel de l'État) ne peut être acceptée comme servant de base aux traités communautaires et ceux qui opèrent des modifications (y compris le Traité de Lisbonne).

L'existence des États dans le cadre de l'Union est possible seulement en respectant les caractères d'unicité et indivisibilité de la souveraineté comme un attribut de l'État; la limitation, la cession sous n'importe quelle forme de l'exercice effectif de la souveraineté par un État crée, du point de vue des caractères juridiques antérieurement mentionnés, **une lésion de cette souveraineté dans ses deux dimensions (indépendance et suprématie territoriale).**

4. Principe d'assignation des compétences et sa compatibilité avec le principe de la souveraineté des États.

L'alinéa 1 de l'article 3.a TUE précise que: "en conformité de l'article 3.b toute compétence qui n'est pas attribuée à l'Union *par des traités* appartient aux États membres" (en corroboration avec le nouveau article 1 TUE, modifié par le Traité de Lisbonne, qui énonce le principe *d'assignation de la compétence* comme un principe juridique fondateur de l'Union).

À son tour, l'article 3.b TUE, alinéa 1 fait une distinction entre *la définition, la*

La conclusion, par les États membres, des traités communautaires et de modification (y compris du Traité de Lisbonne), du point de vue déjà mentionné, signifie que les États s'assument librement, dans des conditions d'égalité juridique, des obligations juridiques *internationales* (donc, qui doivent se rapporter aux normes *ius cogens*), non pas une *limitation de la souveraineté*. D'ailleurs, La Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale refuse de voir dans le cas Wimbledon (1923) "la conclusion d'un traité quelconque, par lequel un État s'engage de faire ou ne pas faire un abandon de sa souveraineté ... la **faculté de contracter des engagements internationaux est exactement un attribut de la souveraineté**". De cette manière, le Traité de Lisbonne ne peut pas être vu comme un traité de limitation sur la base d'un libre accord des États membres de l'UE de leurs souverainetés, puisque, dans ce cas, les États s'engageraient à une action illégale (cession de la souveraineté), au contraire, il peut être vu comme le résultat de leur souveraineté.

C'est pourquoi *il n'est pas possible* d'interpréter l'article 3.a, alinéa 1 TUE, l'article 3.b TUE, modifiés par le Traité de Lisbonne comme une application de la "théorie de la compétence", ni comme une application de la théorie de "la souveraineté relative", qui nierait ou lèserait (selon la seconde théorie) cet attribut essentiel des États.

délimitation des compétences de l'Union (gouvernée par le principe de l'assignation) et leur exercice (gouvernée par deux autres principes de droit communautaire, qui réglementent la relation juridique entre les États membres et l'Union, à savoir les principes de la subsidiarité et de la proportionnalité).

L'alinéa 2 de l'article 3.b TUE, modifié par le Traité de Lisbonne, **énonce le contenu juridique du principe de l'assignation;** sur

sa base, l'Union agit **seulement dans les limites** des compétences qui lui ont été assignées par les États membres *par des traités*, pour accomplir les objectifs définis par ces traités. Par conséquent, cette prévision permet de voir clairement la compétence *limitée, fonctionnelle, de nature conventionnelle* (assignée sur la base des traités internationaux) de l'Union, en relation avec les États membres qui *restent des entités souveraines* (parce que le Traité de Lisbonne ne prévoit pas une fondation de l'Union par "la cession de l'exercice de la souveraineté", ni par "la cession des droits souverains" des États; en corroboration avec la prérogative des États membres de définir librement quelles sont les compétences à assigner à l'Union, les conditions et les limites de l'assignation, mais aussi la consécration du droit de l'État membre de se retirer de l'Union, il ressort que **l'État membre conserve le caractère souverain dans le cadre de l'Union.**)

Par ces caractères juridiques de la compétence de l'Union, cette entité *s'approche* de la catégorie juridique des organisations internationales intergouvernementales des compétences (assignées par les États membres par l'intermédiaire d'un traité ou de l'acte constitutif de l'organisation), ne doit pas dépasser ce que les États fondateurs ont décidé, toutefois, elle *s'approchant* au type de l'organisation internationale *d'intégration* (prévision de l'article 1, le troisième paragraphe TUE, modifié par le Traité de Lisbonne, par lequel "L'Union se substitue à la Communauté Européenne et lui succède" – La Communauté étant, selon l'opinion majoritaire de la doctrine, possible d'être classifiée dans la catégorie des organisations internationales d'intégration).

Du point de vue des États petits et moyens de l'Union (dans ce cas la Roumanie), même s'il y a une approche au modèle d'une organisation internationale d'intégration, l'Union ne passe pas à un niveau supérieur aux États (du point de vue juridique et politique), ne devient pas un super-État européen fondé sur une souveraineté propre, en vidant de

contenu juridique la souveraineté des États membres. L'étape actuelle d'évolution politique de l'Union reflète *l'originalité* de cette entité qui a tant des éléments de caractère étatique, que des éléments propres à une organisation internationale d'intégration, mais il ne s'agit ni d'un État, ni d'une organisation de ce genre.

L'article 3.b TUE, modifié par le Traité de Lisbonne ne doit pas être interprété comme une négation du principe (*ius cogens*) de la souveraineté des États, à moins qu'il **n'énonce pas d'une manière expresse l'engagement juridique de l'Union de respecter la priorité de ce principe par rapport à tous les principes de droit communautaire. Le principe d'assignation des compétences, en tant que principe de droit communautaire n'a qu'une validité et une applicabilité limitée** (par rapport à l'exercice de la qualité juridique de "membre de l'UE" dans le cadre de l'ordre juridique communautaire, mais dans d'autres domaines aussi (non-juridiques) où les États ont assigné des compétences à l'Union), tandis que le principe de la souveraineté des États a une validité et une applicabilité obligatoire et *universelle*, en tant que principe *ius cogens*.

Le fait que l'article 3.b, alinéa 2 TUE prévoit que l'Union agisse *seulement* sur la base des compétences assignées "par des traités" (il ne s'agit pas d'un traité quelconque, mais *seulement* des **traités modifiés par le Traité de Lisbonne**, donc des traités *spécifiques* à l'ordre juridique communautaire), **nous montre que l'Union ne peut utiliser ses compétences** (spécifiques par rapport au droit international) assignées sur la base des **traités particuliers, régionaux, ayant une applicabilité limitée, ayant une force obligatoire seulement pour les États membres de l'UE, dans le cadre des rapports de droit international avec de tiers États.** Dans ce cas, l'Union entre dans une relation juridique *internationale* non pas communautaire, **donc elle ne peut se prévaloir de nul principe de droit communautaire** (subsidiarité, coopération

loyale, proportionnalité, assignation de compétences), étant obligée de respecter *ius cogens* comme tout autre objet de droit international, de même que toutes autres normes des droits internationaux incidents.

Si nous considérons les articles 3.a et 3.b TUE, modifiés par le Traité de Lisbonne, comme s'ils étaient une application de la "théorie de la compétence", on formerait une brèche majeure en ce qui concerne la situation juridique des États membres de l'UE: ainsi, ils courraient le risque d'être considérés dans leur relation avec l'Union (dans l'ordre juridique communautaire) comme des sujets de droit *subordonnés* à l'Union (qui n'a ni souveraineté, donc, ni volonté juridique propre, comme les États), qui seraient considérés comme **des entités non-souveraines, munies de simples compétences qu'elles cèdent progressivement à l'Union. Mais, en parallèle, les mêmes États resteraient des sujets de droit international, capables d'engager valablement, sur la base de leur volonté souveraine,** des relations juridiques avec d'autres États ou organisations internationales intergouvernementales. Si nous voyons le principe de l'assignation de compétences **comme un principe complémentaire, qui ne contredit pas le principe de la souveraineté et ne se trouve en opposition avec ce dernier,** cela signifierait ne pas nier la souveraineté des États membres dans le cadre de l'Union et considérer le Traité de Lisbonne comme un acte juridique *international* par lequel on ne viole pas et on ne nie pas la souveraineté des États membres.

Au contraire, si nous admettons que le Traité de Lisbonne *n'est qu'une application de la théorie de la compétence*" (comme une théorie qui nie la souveraineté des États), cela signifierait que, du moment de sa conclusion, ce traité est *frappé de nullité absolue* (par la consécration du principe de l'assignation des compétences) pour avoir violé une norme de *ius cogens* (**principe de la souveraineté des États**). C'est pourquoi, seule l'interprétation du Traité de Lisbonne *selon le principe de la souveraineté comme une norme ius cogens*

(c'est-à-dire en considérant le principe de l'assignation des compétences comme étant un principe juridique spécifique et complémentaire) maintient à **l'acte juridique tout entier** la validité sur le plan international et communautaire.

C'est toujours dans l'article 3.b, alinéa 2 TUE, modifié par le Traité de Lisbonne, qu'on fait un renvoi aux "compétences des États membres", dans le contexte de la définition d'une *règle de délimitation des compétences*: "toute compétence qui n'est pas assignée à l'Union par des traités appartient aux États membres". À part un autre argument concernant la *conservation* du caractère *souverain* des États membres dans l'Union (grâce à l'institution de la règle d'assignation *exclusivement par voie conventionnelle* des compétences de l'Union, donc seulement par l'intermédiaire des *traités* qui sont des *manifestations de la souveraineté* des États membres), l'alinéa 2 de l'article 3.b TUE prévoit que *seulement les États membres* ont la qualité juridique d'assigner des compétences à l'Union (et non pas le droit international, en tant qu'ordre juridique supérieur, selon "la théorie de la compétence" si nous tenons compte du fait, que, sur la base du Traité de Lisbonne, les États *perdent leur souveraineté* du moment qu'ils peuvent céder des compétences à l'Union).

Toute autre compétence (nationale, internationale mais aussi sur le plan de l'ordre juridique communautaire) qui n'a pas été assignée à *l'Union par ces traités* est présumée d'appartenir *de iure* aux États membres (selon l'article 3.b, alinéa 2 TUE).

En lui assignant ces compétences étatiques, l'Union *ne devient pas* une entité *supérieure* par rapport aux États puisque les États, selon leur souveraineté, ont créé l'Union; les États sont ceux qui lui ont assigné les compétences; les états sont ceux qui lui ont établi *les limites* d'exercice de ces compétences; les États peuvent se retirer à tout moment de l'Union, donc le transfert des compétences *n'est pas définitif et irréversible* (nécessaire pour créer un super-État européen).

5. Position suprême et prioritaire de *ius cogens* pour l'ordre juridique communautaire

L'accomplissement des objectifs de l'Union et des missions que dérivent des traités par les États membres et l'Union (article 3.a, alinéa 3 TUE) *ne doit pas* contrevenir aux principes *ius cogens* puisque tant les États membres de l'UE, que l'Union, les deux parties ayant la qualité de sujet de droit international, ce qui reste valable dans les relations réciproques (bien que partiellement), sont tenus de respecter les principes fondamentaux de droit international donc, *ils ne peuvent pas édifier* un ordre de droit autonome, distinct, régional, qui contrevienne à ces principes juridiques impératifs.

Les articles 3.a et 3.b TUE, modifiés par le Traité de Lisbonne consacrent **plusieurs principes juridiques** (coopération loyale entre les États membres et l'Union; subsidiarité; proportionnalité; assignation des compétences) qui peuvent être considérés comme des "**principes de droit de l'Union**"; ces principes auront un caractère *conventionnel*, non pas de jurisprudence, dès l'entrée en vigueur du Traité de Lisbonne. Toutefois on ne peut pas faire abstraction du rôle essentiel qu'a eu le CJCE et qu'il continue d'avoir (jusqu'à l'entrée en vigueur du Traité de Lisbonne, prévue pour 2009), dans la rédaction et la consécration par voie de jurisprudence des principes de droit communautaire: par exemple, le principe de la solidarité et égalité entre les États membres (CJCE; 7 Février 1973, Dossier 39/72, Rec. 1973, p.101); principe du respect des pouvoirs et compétences assignées par des traités (CJCE, 24 octobre 1989, Dossier 16/88, Rec. 1989).

Mais la jurisprudence CJCE, bien qu'elle soit considérée dans la doctrine comme la source de droit communautaire, qui intervient dans des domaines de l'ordre juridique communautaire qui est caractérisé soit par le manque de réglementation, soit par la réglementation relative (en matière de concurrence, par exemple) **ne peut être, selon notre opinion, une jurisprudence contraire**

aux normes *ius cogens*, en exacerbant d'une manière injustifiée et illégale (du point de vue de ces normes fondamentales juridiques) de l'argument du caractère spécifique et autonome de l'ordre de droit communautaire.

Il faut spécifier à ce point que, dans le système de droit *continental*, la jurisprudence n'est pas acceptée, en général, comme une source de droit et les décisions judiciaires n'ont pas un caractère obligatoire pour les cas à venir, n'ayant pas, en principe, des effets opposables à tous (*erga omnes*). Mais, pour l'ordre de droit communautaire, la jurisprudence CJCE est considérée comme une source essentielle de droit (C 48/72, Brasserie de Haecht), le rôle de la Cour étant celui de *compléter* et de *préciser* les dispositions des traités communautaires et de modification, en même temps que l'accomplissement de la charge spécifique d'assurer leur observation.

Mais, entre la jurisprudence CJCE et les principes *ius cogens* dans leur qualité de sources de droit communautaire (opinion que nous soutenons) il n'est pas possible d'établir une relation juridique qui puisse conférer une priorité à la jurisprudence CJCE (la Cour étant une instance *régionale*, créée sur la base de la volonté souveraine des États membres dont les attributions – *précisées* et *limitées* par les traités communautaires et de modification – ne doivent léser ou limiter les règles de droit international impératif, à caractère opposable *erga omnes*, universellement valables pour la communauté internationale *toute entière*, quels que soient les ordres régionaux de droit).

Nous considérons que *ius cogens* ne peut pas être classifié (à cause des dits caractères juridiques qu'il a, surtout à cause de l'opposabilité *erga omnes*, donc par rapport à *tous* les États, à toutes les organisations internationales inter-gouvernementales, mais aussi par rapport aux entités juridiques comme UE – par le Traité de Lisbonne qui a la

personnalité juridique) dans la catégorie des "sources coutumières" du droit communautaire. Au contraire, nous considérons que *ius cogens* (bien qu'il apparaisse d'une manière *implicite dans le Traité de Lisbonne*, par une obligation de respect stricte par l'Union, des principes de droit international, dans les relations avec le reste de la communauté internationale) est **d'appliquer directement dans le droit communautaire, en tant que "droit impératif international" et ne peut pas être assimilé à une source distincte de droit communautaire ("principes généraux de droit" où la CJCE a la liberté de dégager ces principes, donc de choisir, par pleine indépendance, parmi les systèmes juridiques des États membres, tout spécialement, et de les inclure dans le droit communautaire. Dans ce cas, la CJCE peut appliquer la règle de sélection de ces principes selon leur conformité au droit communautaire, autrement dit, il peut ne pas les appliquer s'il considère qu'ils ne sont pas compatibles avec ceux-ci). Or, dans le cas *ius cogens*, cela n'est pas possible** puisque nulle instance régionale, même si elle a des attributions supranationales, ne peut ignorer le caractère souverain des États membres du système juridique où elle fonctionne, ni les caractères spécifiques (obligativité juridique, opposabilité *erga omnes*) du droit international *impératif*. **La Cour ne peut juger l'application *ius cogens* à l'ordre de droit communautaire ni selon la règle de leur compatibilité dans cet ordre, ni selon d'autres règles propres.**

De plus, la CJCE ne peut pas éliminer l'application à l'ordre de droit communautaire, une norme *ius cogens* lorsque celle-ci est incidente du point de vue du droit international. Dans les relations juridiques entre les États membres de l'UE et l'Union ou bien entre les États membres de l'UE, puisque la CJCE ne peut pas les sélectionner, manquant, dans ce cas, d'une attribution spéciale conférée par les États membres à travers les traités (de sélectionner *ius cogens*, de décider d'une manière libre et exclusive – c'est-à-dire sans attributions

pareilles conférées aux instances nationales des États membres, son application au droit communautaire, de juger son niveau de compatibilité avec les normes du droit communautaire).

Rappelons-nous que, par rapport aux normes de *ius cogens*, les traités communautaires et de modification (y compris le Traité de Lisbonne) restent des actes de droit international parce que le droit international, ayant un caractère *coordinateur* et étant une expression de la souveraineté des États, ne peut reconnaître en tant que prioritaires par rapport à *ius cogens*, ni les décisions d'une instance supranationale régionale comme l'est la CJCE, ni celles qui ignorant ou qui ne considèrent *ius cogens* applicable à l'ordre de droit communautaire. En second lieu, même si la CJCE a considéré les traités communautaires et de modification (ce qui est valable aussi pour le Traité de Lisbonne, quand il entre en vigueur), comme de véritables "Chartes constitutionnelles" de l'ordre de droit communautaire, cela n'a pas d'incidence *automatique* (et ne peut ni être prévu comme telle, dans un traité, par les États membres) sur le caractère obligatoire et opposable *erga omnes* de ce *ius cogens*.

Si les traités communautaires et de modification sont considérés par l'ordre du droit communautaire comme des "normes fondamentales" de celui-ci, le "droit originaire" (en se plaçant au sommet de la hiérarchie de l'ordre juridique communautaire, c'est-à-dire *prévalant par rapport à toute autre source de droit communautaire* – d'où le rôle *constituant* de ces traités, attribué à la CJCE par la décision du 23 avril 1986, Parti Ecologiste, Les Verts; Dossier 294/83), alors **en tant qu'actes de droit international** (qualité qui reste valable que nous nous rapportons, par ces actes juridiques à l'ordre de droit international ou bien l'ordre de droit communautaire, ce qui signifierait une négation de la base souveraine des États membres, en base desquels ont été conclus), **il faut respecter *ius cogens*, des principes spécifiés par l'article 2/Charte de**

l'ONU. Loin d'être des "principes généraux de droit", décelables par la CJCE, selon son bon plaisir des autres systèmes juridiques et appliqués dans le droit communautaire en fonction de "leur compatibilité" (aspect apprécié toujours par la CJCE) et possibles à classer dans la catégorie des "sources coutumières", *ius cogens* ont pour base *conventionnelle* pas seulement la Charte de l'ONU, en tant que document juridique *fundamental* pour le droit international contemporain tout entier, mais aussi d'autres nombreux documents juridiques internationaux, représentant des principes fondamentaux et impératifs pour le droit international dans son ensemble.

En second lieu, **la priorité des traités communautaires et de modification, y compris le Traité de Lisbonne n'est valable que sur le plan juridique communautaire** (non pas sur le plan du droit international où ils sont des actes de droit international, en engageant les États membres de l'UE sur le plan du droit international pour former un ordre juridique régional) et **seulement par rapport aux autres sources de droit communautaire**, situées à un niveau inférieur du point hiérarchique.

Ces traités, même s'ils sont classifiés par la CJCE "des chartes constitutionnelles" pour les Communautés et l'ordre de droit communautaire, ne peuvent être situées à un niveau *hiérarchique supérieur* par rapport aux normes *ius cogens*: les traités communautaires ont une applicabilité limitée, régionale, tandis que *ius cogens* ont une applicabilité *erga omnes*; les premières ont un caractère obligatoire et fondamental pour l'ordre de droit communautaire, tandis que *ius cogens* ont un caractère obligatoire et fondamental pour l'ordre de droit international dans son ensemble, par rapport desquelles l'ordre de droit communautaire reste un ordre régional; les traités communautaires et de modification sont des normes *originaires* pour le droit communautaire, mais *ius cogens* sont des principes qui ont été consacrés par la Charte de l'ONU – un véritable "code juridique

international fondamental" – étant situées à la base du droit international contemporain qu'elles déterminent, dans sa structure et son contenu.

Tout *instrument international* qui résulte de l'accord des États souverains, émis dans le domaine du droit international – donc, les traités communautaires et de modification, aussi – ne peut créer un ordre juridique valable (surtout un ordre spécial, tout comme celui communautaire) s'il ne respecte pas *ius cogens*. *On ne peut pas admettre* que les États membres ou bien l'Union (dans leur qualité de sujets de droit international) dans la perspective du Traité de Lisbonne (qui confère une personnalité juridique à l'Union), *n'assument pas leur responsabilité juridique* sur le plan international (responsabilité entraînée, selon notre opinion, quand on viole une norme *ius cogens*) lorsque les traités communautaires ou de modification (toute violation de *ius cogens* par un traité international, que le traité jette les bases d'un ordre d'intégration juridique ou bien qu'il conserve une dimension contractuelle comme toute autre convention internationale, attire *d'une manière automatique la nullité du traité tout entier*).

Par conséquent, même si pour l'ordre de droit communautaire, **les traités communautaires et de modification constituent "le droit originaire" ils ne peuvent avoir la priorité, ni être considérés en tant que supérieurs du point de vue hiérarchique par rapport à une norme *ius cogens***.

De plus, en vertu du caractère *coordinateur* du droit international et en vertu de la *souveraineté* des États membres (que l'ordre juridique communautaire n'élimine pas, autrement il se situerait *contre* le droit international et *ius cogens*), nous considérons que **la norme *ius cogens* a la priorité par rapport à toute autre norme de droit communautaire, puisqu'elle provient des États souverains, sans "assignation de compétences" dans le processus d'émission et est supérieure au traité communautaire**

et de modification, en tant qu'un acte de droit international (puisque, dans le droit international, *ius cogens* représente une base juridique obligatoire de référence pour tous les actes de droit international).

Ius cogens n'est pas un concept juridique ayant une relevance *seulement* au moment de la conclusion des traités (les États ne pouvant pas déroger d'une norme *ius cogens*, sinon ils se trouvent sous la peine de la nullité, en concluant le traité), mais il est justifié également dans d'autres situations (acte unilatéral d'un État qui doit respecter *ius cogens* nous y ajoutons y compris des actions de certaines organisations internationales intergouvernementales ou d'une entité juridique originale comme l'UE, en tant que sujet de droit international, dans le domaine du droit international – en relation avec les États membres et les tiers États).

L'observation de *ius cogens* est une condition préliminaire pour agir d'une manière valable dans le droit international et **concerne, selon notre opinion, pas seulement les États (dans ce cas, les États membres de l'UE), mais tous les sujets de droit international (organisations internationales intergouvernementales; UE) qui peuvent s'engager d'une manière valable, dans cette qualité, sur le plan du droit international.** L'UE peut agir sur le plan du droit international (y compris dans sa relation avec les États membres, qui restent des sujets *souverains* de droit international) sans respecter *ius cogens*; les obligations assumées par l'UE et l'exercice de ses droits dans l'ordre juridique international (qui peut être exclus, selon notre opinion, de la relation juridique *complexe* des États membres de l'Union) n'est pas faisable en ignorant *ius cogens*, qui est la base du droit international tout entier, **justement grâce aux valeurs protégées par ces normes juridiques et à l'intérêt général de la communauté internationale, afin de respecter de telles valeurs d'une manière uniforme.**

Donc, *ius cogens* ont un caractère *généralement valable* (souligné par les travaux de la Commission de Droit

International, 1979) et, par conséquent, ont une incidence même en ce qui concerne l'ordre de droit communautaire, comme tout ordre juridique fondé par les États, par des traités, dans leur qualité de sujets de droit international. La fonction "constituante" (déclarée par la CJCE/1989) des traités communautaires et de modification, y compris du Traité de Lisbonne) *n'a de validité que sur le plan régional, en ce qui concerne l'UE, mais pas en ce qui concerne le rapport des traités avec ius cogens (on ne peut pas admettre cette valeur juridique de "Charte constitutionnelle", par rapport à ius cogens, pour les traités internationaux* lesquels, en vertu d'une telle qualification – supranationaux et régionaux, ayant une applicabilité *limitée*, qui n'est pas reconnue par la communauté *toute entière* des États – elle pourrait entrer en conflit avec *ius cogens*).

Bien que la hiérarchie des normes de droit communautaire mette au sommet les *traités* (communautaires et de modification), ceux-ci ne peuvent pas avoir un caractère licite s'ils n'étaient pas conclus en respectant *ius cogens* (Convention de Vienne/1969), donc, ils ne pourraient fonder d'une manière valable, en tant que "droit originaire", l'ordre de droit communautaire. **La compatibilité de ces traités avec *ius cogens*, bien qu'elle ne soit pas une condition expressément prévue par leur contenu et qu'elle ne ressorte pas de la jurisprudence de la CJCE (une jurisprudence à une tendance supranationaliste), elle est une condition juridique obligatoire du point de vue du droit international** et, grâce à son caractère "d'acte juridique international "qu'ont les traités communautaires et de modification, **elle devient une condition obligatoire également pour l'ordre juridique valablement constitué.**

Le droit international (en conformité de la doctrine) admet seulement les *traités licites*, c'est-à-dire les traités qui respectent les principes et normes *ius cogens* du droit international en vigueur, puisque *seulement ces traités peuvent être des sources du droit international.* En continuant ce raisonnement

juridique, si un traité international avait un caractère illicite (pour la violation de *ius cogens*) du droit international, cela pourrait *automatiquement répercuter* aussi dans tous les ordres juridiques régionaux (y compris dans le droit communautaire). De cette manière, *automatiquement*, en même temps dans tous les ordres de droit fondés par les États souverains (ordres juridiques régionaux ou ordre international), ce traité qui ne pourrait pas respecter *ius cogens* aurait un caractère illicite et serait nul *de iure*, quel que soit l'ordre de droit (international ou régional) auquel on se rapporterait et quel que soit le caractère de cet ordre de droit (d'intégration ou de coopération), puisque tous ces ordres sont fondés par des États souverains qui ont l'obligation de respecter, avant tout, *ius cogens*.

Si dans le droit international contemporain le traité international est considéré comme *une source principale de droit*, ce traité doit toujours être conclu et appliqué en conformité des principes fondamentaux du droit international (*ius cogens*), des principes qu'on ne confond pas avec une source *différente* de droit international ("principes généraux de droit"). L'article 38 du Statut de la Cour Internationale de Justice, qui énumère les sources du droit international **ne mentionne pas d'une manière expresse *ius cogens* parmi elles, mais, en échange fait mention des "principes généraux de droit"** (tel que nous avons observé une source *différente* par rapport à *ius cogens*). En conformité de la doctrine, l'article 38 ne représente une énumération des sources du droit international, mais il *indique* des instruments juridiques auxquels la CJCE peut avoir appel dans la solution des litiges déduits devant lui. Un autre côté de la doctrine considère, au contraire, que "les principes généraux de droit" énoncés par l'article 38 *ne représentent pas des sources du droit international*, en apportant comme argument le fait que, selon la pratique des organes judiciaires internationaux, a été soulignée leur origine coutumière ou conventionnelle.

La doctrine des États occidentaux se situe dans la position *d'admettre* la qualité de source de droit international pour les "principes généraux de droit". Nous réitérons encore une fois le fait **qu'il ne faut pas faire une confusion entre ces principes juridiques (communs aux grands systèmes juridiques, qui sont aussi applicables à l'ordre international) et les principes du droit international** (en tant qu'un ensemble des règles généralement acceptées, spécifiques aux rapports juridiques internationaux) et, spécialement avec *ius cogens*.

Ius cogens protège des valeurs *fondamentales* (paix, sécurité internationale, liberté des peuples et des États, collaboration et progrès de l'humanité) dans les rapports entre les sujets de droit international, elles sont des normes obligatoires, ayant une application universelle à un niveau maximum de généralité.

Ius cogens ont une valeur juridique fondamentale, prioritaire par rapport à toute autre norme de droit international, qui représente "le critère suprême d'estimation de la légalité *des autres principes*, normes ou institutions de droit international, de même que des *traités internationaux*". N'importe quelle soit **la forme** dont ils sont apparus (par la voie coutumière ou à travers un traité international), *ius cogens* représente le niveau suprême des normes du droit international tout entier, selon lequel on apprécie la légalité de toutes les autres normes de droit international (sans affecter, par cette suprématie, la hiérarchie des normes de droit international le caractère *coordonnateur*, puisque *ius cogens* représente une expression de la *volonté souveraine des États* et non pas d'une autorité législative qui leur est supérieure).

Il y a des auteurs qui parlent même d'un "ordre public de la communauté internationale" dans le sens de l'existence d'un ensemble de principes et de règles "dont l'application serait si importante pour la communauté internationale dans son ensemble, que toute action unilatérale ou tout accord qui *contreviendrait* à ces principes ou

règles serait sans force juridique (H. Mosler, 1974). Donc, si nous parlons d'une hiérarchie des normes de droit international, ce serait une hiérarchie ordonnée de manière qu'on assure la supériorité de *ius cogens*, normes juridiques qui pourraient générer des obligations opposables à *erga omnes* pour les États (opinion de la CIJ, dans la cause "Barcelona Traction"/1972).

En ce qui concerne l'ordre de droit communautaire, nous observons qu'à présent, en ce qui concerne la place des principes de droit international dans cet ordre, la règle d'application de ces principes dans cet ordre est incidente seulement si les principes sont *compatibles* à l'ordre de droit communautaire (critère défini par la CJCE, par la voie de la jurisprudence). Selon l'opinion d'autres auteurs, il faut effectuer *une distinction entre* "les principes généraux de droit" (qui sont des sources du droit communautaire, puisque la CJCE les considère *parfaitement compatibles* à l'ordre de droit communautaire) et les principes de *droit international public* qui ne font pas partie du droit communautaire, puisqu'ils sont considérés "compatibles avec la structure et les exigences du système communautaire").

La CJCE, dans sa jurisprudence, a traité sous réserve cet aspect, en éliminant tout principe qu'elle avait considéré compatible avec la nature juridique des Communautés (CJCE, Résolution du 13 novembre 1964, Commission contra Grand Duché de Luxembourg et Royaume de Belgique; Dossiers 90 et 91/63, résolution dont il ne s'agit pas, en principe, de *ius cogens*.) Dans une autre cause la CJCE **s'est rapportée aux principes du droit international** (résolution du 4 décembre 1974, Van Duyn contra Home Office, Dossier 41174), en reconnaissant que le traité de la CEE ne pourrait pas **ignorer certains** principes de droit international *dans les relations entre les États membres* (en l'espèce, le principe qui s'oppose qu'un État refuse à ses propres ressortissants l'entrée et le séjour dans son territoire). **Ni ce principe n'est un principe de *ius cogens*** (dans le sens

de l'article 2 de la Charte de l'ONU), mais cet exemple démontre le fait que la CJCE a **admis une application (il est vrai, partielle) des principes de droit international, lorsqu'ils sont compatibles avec l'ordre de droit communautaire.**

Mais la Cour oublie le fait qu'elle n'est pas compétente pour se prononcer sur la compatibilité d'un principe de *ius cogens* par rapport à l'ordre de droit communautaire, puisque *ius cogens* ne permet nulle dérogation (ni faite par un État, ni par une instance supra-étatique comme la CJCE; ni faite sur la voie coutumière, ni par la voie conventionnelle, ni par la jurisprudence d'une instance régionale ou internationale), *ius cogens* ne pouvant être modifié que par une autre norme de *ius cogens*.

La CJCE ne peut pas donc éliminer de son application, à cause de son "incompatibilité avec l'ordre de droit communautaire" et pour nulle autre raison, *ius cogens* du droit communautaire. Au contraire, la communauté internationale (et, par conséquent, tout État qui estime qu'une valeur protégée par une norme de *ius cogens*, a été lésée par le droit communautaire) peut demander sur le plan du droit international, y compris devant la CIJ/ONU, le respect de la norme violée par l'acte d'une institution de l'UE ou par le traité communautaire, de modification, y compris par le Traité de Lisbonne. ***Ius cogens* est le corps des normes juridiques qui peut provoquer la nullité du traité communautaire ou de modification pour non-conformité avec lui et non pas à l'envers.**

Par conséquent, la limite du critère utilisé par la CJCE dans l'application *discrétionnaire* du droit international dans l'ordre de droit communautaire est représentée justement par *ius cogens*.

***Ius cogens* représente, de plus, un critère légal obligatoire de relation avec la CJCE en ce qui concerne l'ordre de droit communautaire.** Le non-respect de *ius cogens* par la CJCE pourrait créer *simultanément* dans les trois ordres juridiques

interconnectés (du point de vue des États membres de l'UE): l'ordre juridique international des États membres de l'UE; l'ordre de droit communautaire; l'ordre international de droit où ces États agissent sur la base des normes de droit international, des effets juridiques *négatifs* (illégalité du comportement juridique et des documents juridiques émis par les États membres de l'UE, par rapport à *ius cogens*), puisque tous ces trois ordres juridiques ont été créés sur la base du caractère *souverain* des États.

En second lieu, la primauté du droit communautaire n'est pas valable sinon seulement en ce qui concerne les ordres juridiques *nationaux* des États membres, *non pas le droit international*. **La CJCE ne peut pas déterminer par sa jurisprudence** (ni les États membres de l'UE, par des traités communautaires, de modification, y compris le Traité de Lisbonne), **le principe de la primauté du droit communautaire (en tant que droit d'intégration) par rapport au droit international (en tant que droit de coordination)**, ni en ce qui concerne les relations entre les États membres de l'UE, ni entre ces États et l'Union.

À la différence du rapport entre l'ordre de droit communautaire et l'ordre national entre les États membres (où, grâce au principe de jurisprudence de la *primauté* du droit communautaire – définie par la CJCE par la résolution Van Gend & Loos du 15 juillet 1964, principe caractéristique d'un ordre juridique *d'intégration*, on a consacré **la priorité du droit communautaire tout entier, tant celui originaire, que celui dérivé, par rapport à l'ordre national de droit de chaque État membre de l'UE) il n'y a pas un rapport hiérarchique en faveur du droit communautaire, par rapport au droit international.**

Par conséquent, **les principes de jurisprudence de droit communautaire** (la primauté; l'effet direct; l'applicabilité immédiate du droit communautaire dans l'ordre *national* des États membres de l'UE) **n'ont qu'une applicabilité limitée, ne sont**

pas opposables *erga omnes*, ne sont pas universellement valables, ni impératifs pour toute la communauté internationale comme *ius cogens*. Non pas parce que ces principes de droit communautaire *de jurisprudence* (créations de CJCE) auxquels on ajoute les principes de droit communautaire à une base *conventionnelle* (articles 3.a, 3.b de TUE, par la modification du Traité de Lisbonne) n'ont pas la priorité sur *ius cogens* d'autant plus, grâce aux caractères juridiques spéciaux de *ius cogens* que les sujets de droit international doivent respecter, quel que soit le caractère régional ou international de l'ordre juridique, **ceux-ci sont prioritaires sur les principes de droit communautaire.**

La prédominance de *ius cogens* sur les principes de droit communautaire (appartenant à un ordre juridique régional) peut être interprétée, comme dérivant aussi de la Charte de l'ONU, document juridique fondamental pour le droit international dans son intégralité, qui le consacre par l'article 2. C'est ainsi que, par l'article 193, la Charte impose d'une manière explicite **la règle de la priorité des obligations qui dérivent de la Charte de l'ONU**, des États membres de l'ONU (obligations assumées aussi par les États membres de l'UE) par rapport aux obligations que les membres de l'ONU et assume par *tout autre* accord international donc, une formulation qui inclut aussi les traités communautaires, de modification, y compris le Traité de Lisbonne, quel que soit leur caractère spécial à travers duquel on fonde un "nouvel ordre juridique", en cas d'un conflit.


De cette manière, si nous admettons que les obligations juridiques assumées dans le droit communautaire par les États membres de l'UE pour entrer dans des relations juridiques (entre eux; entre eux et l'Union) sont contraires à une obligation juridique assumée par les États membres sur le plan international sur la base de la Charte de l'ONU (article 2, dans ce cas), la Charte définit la priorité des obligations de droit international (y compris

des obligations basées sur *ius cogens*, telles qu'elles résultant du texte de l'article 2 de la Charte). Cela simplifie d'une manière implicite **une négation du caractère juridique d'intégration** (en l'espèce du

principe de la primauté) pour les obligations assumées par les États membres de l'UE (qui sont aussi des États membres de l'ONU) dans le domaine du droit communautaire, **par rapport à *ius cogens***.

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Asymmetric Conflict in the International Relations of the XXth Century

Case Study: Argentinean Invasion of the Falkland Islands

Constantin Emil Bucur

“*My Argentinean colleague and I could debate endlessly on the goods and evils of history, and I doubt that we could ever agree on them*”¹. It's more than a quarter of a century since Sir. Anthony Parson, the British representative of the UN, has said these words, on April 1st, 1982, within the highest institution of the United Nations – the Security Council. On the next day, the conflict between the United Kingdom and Argentina burst. Falkland was a reference point in the history of post-war international relations, both through the evolution of military force and through the political significance of the dispute. Therefore, a re-evaluation of the events from the South Atlantic, happened 25 years ago, is very necessary from the perspective of the conflict's consequences and represents a small homage brought to the participants at this forgotten war.

The concept of asymmetric conflict is a very interesting one, for that part of the academic community who studies international relations, leading to a series of debates and controversies around it, in time. This study has been inspired by a publication signed by T.V. Paul², a professor at the Department of Political Sciences of the *McGill University*, and it is a short assertion and extension of those mentioned by that researcher in his work.

According to T.V. Paul, this concept starts from the hypothesis that various nations confront with more powerful states, in

divergent matters, due to the sensation of the weaker state that, by declaring war, may solve the dispute in its favour. Consequently, the asymmetric conflicts appear due to some factors, such as sudden changes in the internal political environment, the strategic calculations of the war-makers, a presumed relation of alliance between the weak state and a big power or the rapid changes in offensive/defensive capacities³. In case of Argentinean invasion, the sudden changes from the internal political environment were critical in making the decision of invading the islands, because, through the access at power of the military Junta, the change of decision was influenced, at political level, in favour of the intervention in the archipelago. As regards the strategic calculation of the worriers, the “*fait accompli*” strategy plays an essential role. When the objective is a limited one, such as the transfer of sovereignty of the archipelago from a country to another, usually, the initiator of an asymmetric conflict approaches a rapid offensive, followed by a defensive one. It is strange that, in case of Argentina, this one did not expect for the United Kingdom to use military action to recover the islands. As regards the assumed relation of alliance between the weak and strong state, Buenos Aires waited and wished at least a diplomatic support from the United States as regards their gesture, this factor becoming essential when one confronts with a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. Shouldn't the

Argentinean Government have over-appreciated the American support, it "almost surely" hadn't started the conflict. If the changes were analyzed, at the level of the offensive and defensive capacities of the belligerents in this case, the following should be noticed, as T.V. Paul says, that, as regards the challenger's decision to use armed force, this depends a lot on adopting in its strategy limited objectives, which could determine a limited war "with a small theatre of operations". Besides, the initiator of such conflict must take into account the defender's percentage of disinterest in making a war, which the Argentinean factor could not properly appreciate⁴.

The Falkland Islands, placed in the South Atlantic Ocean, at about 500 km from the coast of Argentina and at 13,000 km. from the United Kingdom, were named after the British Marine Treasury keeper, Viscount Falkland, by the first European whose disembarking in the archipelago is officially mentioned – the English captain John Strong (1690). These contain two main islands, West Falkland and East Falkland, the latter hosting the capital, Port Stanley, and 200 small islands, among which South Georgia and South Sandwich, which do not belong to the archipelago, but depend on this.

It is not our intention to refer to the rich colonial past of the islands, but we must mention a few aspects. Discovered, seemingly, at the end of the 16th century and the beginning of the 17th century, by the Dutch⁵, the islands, which later on will be called Falkland, were a subject of dispute during the whole 18th century, between Spain, France and United Kingdom. From the proofs regarding the discovery and colonial evolution of the archipelago, from the perspective of the juridical dispute regarding the sovereignty over the archipelago of either Argentina or United Kingdom, we may conclude that these proofs are incomplete and incoherent, deepening the vague character of the claims of both sides, with realistic arguments. At the beginning of the 19th century, with Argentina's gaining

independence, in disfavour of Spain, the former claimed the islands, based on the succession right received from the Spaniards. Despite all these, in 1833, the Falkland Islands entered in the possession of the United Kingdom, being peopled by the Anglo-Saxon colonialists, and London had continuous 150-year sovereignty until the moment of Argentinean invasion, on April 2nd, 1982.

After World War II, both nations entered the UN as members with full powers and obligations, thus accepting, according to art. 2, par. 3 from the Charta, to solve any international dispute, using "peaceful means" without violence. When this matter was brought in front of the U.N. by Argentina, United Kingdom mentioned that the islanders were direct descendents of the British colonists, who benefited of the right to self-determination that they did not exercise, because they wished to maintain the political relation with the metropolis. In exchange, Argentina claimed that the archipelago was one of the latest remainings of the European colonialism in Latin America and that the principle of self-determination did not have any relevance, due to the artificially maintained British character of the population of islands.

The negotiations, which started in 1965, did not reach any result, because neither party ceased in defending their position with solid arguments. According to some of these assertions, the change occurred in the international statute of the islands, after 1833, was a significant one. From the British point of view, the sovereignty title was transferred to the United Kingdom, because this one conquered the islands and thus exercised its sovereignty on them. Also, the ambiguous control of Argentina on the islands, turned into penitentiary colony in 1832, and the United States' claims on the fishing rights from that area, offered London the possibility to claim them. The British right on the Falkland Islands is not well justified by the first geographic discovery or by their first occupation, but the United Kingdom could

claim that, since 1833, it has had a more important role in the islands, coming from their continuous administration. On the other side, Argentina has never accepted a transfer of sovereignty as regards the islands (as Spain did in case of Gibraltar), frequently protesting against the "British usurpation", so that the Argentinean possession title on the islands, from Buenos Aires' point of view, remained as infallible in 1982 as in 1833, mainly because the British have not claimed the islands based on the legal principle "terra nulli"⁶. If, from the point of view of the international relations, the sovereignty dispute between Buenos Aires and London could be compared to the dispute between Japan and Russian Federation regarding the sovereignty over the Kurile archipelago from the Far East, the Argentinean attempt to recover the Falkland Islands by force makes these two situations clearly different.

Another Argentinean argument is the one according to which, from the point of view of the international law, the islands were not literally conquered, because the United Kingdom did not declare a war to Argentina, and the latter did not disappear as political-military entity neither on the moment of 1833 incidents, nor later. Thus, it appeared the idea, from the Argentinean point of view, that the islands could not be conquered because these two countries were not at war in 1833. In this context, Argentina has not officially recognized never the loss of archipelago. So, the conclusion is that the occupation of the islands and the settlement of the colonists in the 19th century granted to the United Kingdom the *de facto* control over this territory until 1982, whereas the Argentineans used their *de jure* historic claims and rights they had taken over from Spain, to explain the action they performed in April 1982, as an internal incident, without international involvement, though the standards in the domain, as regards the utilization of violence, considered it as a clear aggression.

The matter of claiming the Falkland Islands is a very complex one, from the prism

of the international law, being related to the right over the sea and that is why, our intention is not to get involved in this long debate regarding the dispute of the rights of exclusivity on the continental platform in the area. Still, a few elements need to be presented from this point of view. In the first place, we notice that the Argentina's unjustified claims towards the United Kingdom regard the much more extended issue of theirs and Chile's requests, regarding the British area from Antarctica, as well as of the dispute between these two South-American nations, regarding the sovereignty over the *Beagle Channel*. Also, we have to mention that, as years go by, within the negotiation rounds, the British side has seen in the subject of the dispute a peripheral importance to them. In conclusion, the sense of islanders in Falkland has become more acute, as regards their "abandonment" by London. In parallel, Argentina's claims have become more acute also due to the military dictatorships which have led the country, since 1976, having the intention to detour the attention of the traumatized population from the horrors of the regime, regaining thus its trust with nationalist theses and slogans. Thus, the attempt of the Buenos Aires regime to gain the sovereignty over three small islands, at south of *Tierra del Fuego*, in disfavour of Chile, ended dreadfully in 1977-1978, when the arbitration of the International Court of Justice considered Chile as winner, in the "dispute over the *Beagle Channel*", causing tension between the two South-American states.⁷ Freezing the dispute with Chile has led to the reorientation of the Argentinean military government towards East, towards another objective of foreign politics, in view to distract its own population's attention from the difficult domestic economic situation: to recover the Falkland / Malvinas Islands.

From the perspective of the international law, the concept of asymmetric conflict finds a strong support in the theory of Nigel Purvis, who specified that: "...at an elementary level, the sovereigns may seem to take seriously the

property to get engaged in the legal international discourse when they seek to solve their international problems"⁸. This interesting theory affirms that, usually, the international actors use the international right to claim their position in terms of possession of some legal rights. Thus, when a nation decides to use armed force to recover/gain a territory, this will represent its claim, invariably, in terms of international law. In this context, Purvis's theory fits the Falkland conflict.

The perception of the conservatory government from London, according to which the archipelago had a peripheral importance, has led to the acceptance of some budgetary decreases in defence, which materialized in the South Atlantic in withdrawing the only British military ship which activated in that area (HMS Endurance). This has made the Argentinean traders rise the Argentinean flag on the South Georgia Island, placed at South-East of Falkland, in March 1982; the British army chased them away. Initially, the Argentinean Government took into account a possible military action for the most favourable period, meaning the end of the year, but the events from South Georgia, between March 19th and 26th, advanced the project. Subsequent to this incident, on April 2nd, the Argentinean military forces debarked in Falkland and faced the strong resistance of the small British garrison around the British governor's residence, Rex Hunt. The "Rosario" operation continued on the next day with the invasion and occupation of the South Georgia and South Sandwich islands. The London's reaction came immediately and, on the same day, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Margaret Thatcher, declared in the House of Commons the following: "*I must say to the House that the Falklands and their dependences remain a British territory. No aggression and no invasion can affect this simple fact. The Government's objective is for the islanders to be released from occupation and to return under British administration as soon as possible.*"⁹

A War Cabinet led by the "Iron Lady" was founded within the British Government, which would manage the actions related to the "Corporate" operation, aiming at the recovery of the islands. A series of factors concurred to the efficient transit of the British Expeditionary Force from the British harbours to the South Atlantic. One of these elements is mentioned by Admiral Sandy Woodward, the commander of the Corporate operation, who, in his notes, specified the logistic importance of the United States' support, mainly through the agency of the Secretary of Defence – Caspar Weinberger, used by the British to operate the facilities of the American military equipment from Ascension island, placed in the middle of Atlantic Ocean. This island is part of the dependences of St. Helen Island, colony of the United Kingdom.

In the spring of 1982, the United States were in a delicate position, from the point of view of the international relations, because the American decision factors were aware that they were in the situation of choosing between their traditional ally and a political regime which, no matter how appalling, was a strong supporter of the politics of containment communism in Latin America, practiced by Washington. Firmly attached to the values guiding the international law, America could not agree with an encroachment upon the principles mentioned in the *U.N. Charta*, according to which, a territory could not be taken with force by any state. The United States took a position of neutrality, benevolent to the United Kingdom, and the collaboration between these two nations was discretely, almost clandestinely, performed. However, at official level, the United States and other Latin-American states tried to mediate the conflict from a distant position to both parties. However, "...if the Argentine Junta ... not had such a bad reputation for human rights violations..." maybe United States had sustain the Argentinean cause.¹⁰

It is interesting to specify, from the perspective of the international relations, the fact that neither party declared war to the

other, mainly due to the restrictions imposed by the U.N. Charter, and the military hostilities had a limited character. We can assert that art. 2, par. 3, but, more specifically, par. 4 from the U.N. Charter, practically remove from the international law the possibility for a member state to use war in order to solve its international disputes. In 1833, when the United Kingdom took over the archipelago, no war was declared between it and the United Provinces (Argentina), thing that supports the Buenos Aires's thesis according to which, the Great Britain was, in 1982, illegally in the possession of an Argentinean national territory, upon which Argentina claimed sovereignty. The belligerent intentions of the Great Britain were emphasized in the declaration of an *Area of Maritime Exclusion*, and, after April 30th, 1982, of an *Area of Total Exclusion* around the islands.

It is not our intention to make a detailed presentation of the conflict's dynamics, but few elements should be reminded. On April 25th, the Great Britain obtained a first military success, recovering the South Georgia Island. On May 1st, fights continued on sea, having as purpose the creation of a diversion, able to allow the infiltration of the commando troops in the archipelago. Observation posts were placed by the British around the most important localities from the islands, but a crucial signification belonged to an observation post placed by S.A.S. members in Chile. The need for the Sea Harrier planes to receive a warning in due time required this action. Rumours were that the American satellites supplied information to the British, but the truth was that the observation post was monitoring the take-offs of the Argentinean planes and was transmitting useful information to the British fleet, in real time, through a latest-generation equipment. Even in these conditions, the British lost many planes, but the actions of S.A.S., which avoided capturing, reduced a lot the number of losses. Later on, when General Augusto Pinochet, Chile's leader, was held in London, under the accusation of genocide, he was

visited by Margaret Thatcher. The British specialists considered that the *Iron Lady* remained deeply grateful to the Chilean dictator, for the support offered by to the Great Britain in the Falkland Islands war.

On May 2nd, 1982, the Argentinean battle cruiser *General Belgrano* was hulled and sunk by the British nuclear submarine *Conqueror*. Over 370 Argentinean soldiers lost their lives and the immediate consequence of this tragic event was the withdrawal of the Argentinean military marine in harbours. The withdrawal of the Argentinean military marine in its territorial waters meant also the decrease of danger represented by the Argentinean carrier *25 Mayo* for the British fleet. Two days later, in reply, two Argentinean Super Edendard planes hit with Exocet anti-ship missiles and sunk the destroyer *HMS Sheffield*, causing the death of 20 soldiers and the wounding of other 24 soldiers, this being the first military conflict in which such type of weapon was used. Some historians claimed that the attack had caused the withdrawal of the British carrier groups to the East of the archipelago, thus weakening the air defensive of the forward ships, as well as of the debarked infantry. The conclusion is that, after May 2nd, the Argentinean air force was the only one opposing a real resistance to the British Expeditionary Force, the terrestrial troops being overwhelmed by the technical superiority, the professionalism and efficiency of the British adversaries, while the marine preferred to withdraw in harbours after the disaster of the cruiser *General Belgrano*.¹¹ On May 21st, the British troops debarked in Port San Carlos, on the main island of the archipelago. After fixing a bridgehead at San Carlos, the British army went to the capital, but, because their advancement was threatened by the presence of the Argentinean troops around the location at Goose Green, in the south of the island, they focused to that direction. Here, in the night of May 28th to 29th, 1982, a long nocturnal fight took place, when the members of the 2nd battalion of the parachutist regiment defeated a net superior

Argentinean force, and, later on, the British resumed their march to Port Stanley. The Argentineans withdrew in the mountains of the island, where they opposed resistance, mainly around Kent' Mountain, but the strongest region fortified by the Argentineans was the one around Longdon Mountain and Two Sisters, where the British troops had the most violent confrontations, in the night of June 11th to 12th. On June 14th, the Argentinean aviation recorded the greatest loss, and the situation for the Argentinean terrestrial troops was at a dead end, because the British troops were supervising Port Stanley from the heights around the capital. In this context, the commander of the Argentinean troops camped in Islas Malvinas, *gen. Mario Menendez*, surrendered with all the subordinated troops, in the evening of June 14th, 1982. The Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, received the following message: "*The Commander of the Terrestrial Forces from the Falkland Islands, Port Stanley. In Port Stanley, at 9.00 PM local time, on June 14th, the general major Menendez surrendered with all the Argentinean armed forces from East and West Falkland, with all the weapons. Preparations are made for the people to return to Argentina and to collect all weapons and equipment. The Falkland Islands are again under the government wished by their inhabitants. May God protect the Queen. (signed) J.J. Moore*"¹².

The political consequences of the Falkland war appeared immediately. Three days after the surrender, *lieutenant-general Leopoldo Galtier*, the supreme commander of the Junta,

was released from the position of President of the country, opening the way to instituting a democratic regime in Argentina. The conservatory Margaret Thatcher took advantages from the patriotic emergence started by the conflict among the British, assuring thus a huge electoral victory and her re-election as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. After the conflict, Argentina repeated its claims, declaring its wish to achieve them, exclusively by peaceful means. Many years have passed since the conflict, and the diplomatic relations between London and Buenos Aires were resumed only in 1990¹³. Until 1993, the only contacts these two countries had were limited to international sportive contests, the resentments continuing on both sides. For example, at the World's Football Championship in Mexico, in 1986, these two nations met in a game from the superior level of the competition, game won by Argentina, trough a goal marked by Armando Diego Maradona, by hand. The Argentinean football player claimed that it was "*God's hand*", a clear allusion to a possible divine punishment and revenge of the Argentineans. The British did not hesitate to call Maradona a cheater. In 1993, the British foreign affair Minister, Douglas Hurd, was the first member of a British cabinet who visited Argentina officially, since the end of the war. It was only in August 2001, 19 years after the conflict, when Tony Blair was the first Prime Minister to visit Argentina, which was in full economic crisis, thus putting an end to a period of avoidance and susceptibilities at diplomatic level.

NOTES:

¹ His Majesty's Stationary Office, *Britain and the Falkland Crisis: a Documentary Record*, London, 1982, p. 24, *Apud*. Peter Beck, *The Falkland Islands as an international problem*, London, New York, Routledge, 1988, p. 27.

² T.V. Paul, *Asymmetric conflicts: war initiation by weaker powers*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994.

³ *Idibem*, p. 3-15, T.V, Paul gives samples of asymmetric conflicts: Japanese attack on the United States naval base from Pearl Harbour, 1941; the war of Yom Kippur between Egypt and Israel, 1973; the Pakistani offensive in Kashmir, 1965; and others...

⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 167-179.

⁵ It seems that the Dutchman Sebald van Weerdt was the first European who came to these islands.

⁶ The principle of international right which signifies: "territory that does not belong to any state".

⁷ Adrew Boyd, *An Atlas of World Affairs*, London and New York, Routledge, tenth edition, 1998, p. 229.

⁸ Study of Nigel Purvis, *Critical Legal Studies in Public International Law*, no. 32, in Anthony Clark Arend, *Legal Rules and International Society*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 139.

⁹ Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, London, Harper Collins Publishers, 1993, p. 183.

¹⁰ Michael Carlton, *The little platoon: diplomacy and the Falklands dispute*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1989 *Apud* International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944 -), vol. 66, no. 3. (July 1990), pp. 647/648 <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-5850%28199007%2966%3A3%3C647%3ATFFT%27T%3E2.0.CO%3B2-O>

¹¹ Marin Middlebrook, *The fight for the "Malvinas": the Argentinian forces in the Falkland War*, London, Viking, 1989. *Apud* International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944), vol. 66, no. 3. (July 1990), pp. 647/648

<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-5850%28199007%2966%3A3%3C647%3ATFFT%27T%3E2.0.CO%3B2-O>

¹² Rodney A. Burden, Michael I. Draper, Douglas A. Rought, *Falkland – the Air War*, London, Arms and Armour Press, 1987, p. 478.


¹³ Adrew Boyd, *op. cit.*, p. 231.

¹⁴ Source: Rodney A. Burden, Michael I. Draper, Douglas A. Rough, *op. cit.*, 1987.

Annexe

Losses of argentinean air force during the Falkland War

2 April – 15 June 1982.¹



2.IV.

21.V.

28.V.

14.VI.82'


April 2nd – the war starts.

May 21st – the British troops debarked in Port San Carlos.

May 28th – the fights around location at Goose Green.

June 14th – the second attack of British troops against the argentinean pozitions around Port Stanley.

¹ Source: Rodney A. Burden, Michael I. Draper, Douglas A. Rough, *op. cit.*, 1987.



Petroleum and the World War of 1939-1945

(I)

Gh. Buzatu

A. Petroleum – the vim of modern war

In comparison to the world war of 1914-1918, the development of the conflagration from 1939-1945 depended infinitely more on the **petroleum factor**. Not only the admittance of those interested and involved, but also the evolution of the military operations as well as the numerous political-diplomatic measures, the economic policy of the belligerent states, the special concern of all the states for the preservation, exploitation, and conquering of the main oil resources everywhere in the world are categorical in this sense. Ample and thorough specialized studies have established with precision the fact that having/lacking liquid fuel depended greatly on the success/failure of the crucial military operations in Western Europe and the Eastern Front, in North Africa and Asia, in the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, or in the Pacific Ocean, the air battles on all the major theaters of war, and, at a global scale, the approaching or the failure of the 1945 victory.¹ A French publicist was of the opinion that, if in 1914-1918, petroleum helped the Anglo-French-American allies 'to win the war', later, in the inter-war period, it caused them to "lose the peace,"² imposing itself as "master of peace and war."³ René Sédillot noticed remarked that, **"apparently, petroleum has greater responsibilities in unleashing the second conflict of the century than the first one."**⁴ The development of the century's conflagration conferred to some specialists like Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle a fruitful and exemplary field of research in the history of international relations, confirming the extent to which their evolution between 1939 and

1945 depended decisively on the **profound** forces (the geographical factors, the demographic conditions, the economic and financial forces, the national and pacifist sentiments, nationalisms) or on the **actions of the state men**.⁵ Showing that, in 1935-1939, the world battle for the reserves of raw materials accentuated, the two French specialists pointed out that, more than the economic interests, the political preoccupations were the essence of the phenomenon, **the policy of raw materials being dominated by military and strategic reasons**,⁶ both on the eve of as well as during the world war, we add. Of the authors we have mentioned, the majority dealt especially with or talked also about the role and place of Romania as an oil possessing country in the plans of the belligerents, either in the initial period of the war, as objective of Germany, or later on as its "satellite" (1940-1944) and adversary of the United Nations, or, in the end, as partner of the latter in the **decisive assault on the Nazi Reich in Europe**. The development of the hostilities proved to what degree the possession/lack of "black gold" resources favored/disadvantaged the two hostile camps, respectively the **Axis** powers (Germany, Italy, Japan and their allies) and the **Allied** powers, whose coalition was formed gradually between 1939 and 1941 (Great Britain, France, the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., and China). Consequently, already from the beginning the world war unfolded, for each of the belligerent camps, under the sign of oil possession of penury. René Sédillot commented: **"From the beginning it is... obvious that petroleum was found in the**

camp of the Allies, not in the camp of the nations of the Axis. The latter concluded an iron pact: it is not an iron pact. From the beginning it is clear that, in the unfolding of the conflict, petroleum worked for the victory of the nations that already possessed it and for the defeat of the nations that lacked it. The stakes are down. Germany's – or Japan's – only chance would be a victorious express war: they would have to triumph in a few weeks. Otherwise, the lack of petroleum would annihilate their any hope of success. Or they would have to conquer as soon as possible important resources – the Caucasus in the case of the Germans, the Dutch Indies in the case of the Japanese. Without them, their cause is lost.”⁷ Jean-Jacques Berreby stated with good reason: “More than the First World War, the war from 1939-1945 depended on petroleum, whose importance was essential.”⁸ In the unleashed battle, Romania, as subject, but especially as object, had an indisputable role. According to the statistics of the period, Romania obtained 2.2% of the world's crude oil production, being the sixth producer in the world and the second in Europe, following the United States, the U.S.S.R., Venezuela, Iran-Bahrein, and the Dutch Indies.⁹ The documents published after the war emphasized on the major role played by the question of Romanian petroleum in the great military and political-diplomatic decisions of the camps that warred against each other on the battlefield. From a multitude of information, we mention the declaration made by Herman Göring, the Marshal of the Nazi Reich, during his meeting in Berlin, on November 26, 1941, with Mihai Antonescu, the vice-president of the Council of Ministers and the titular of Bucharest's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, namely that petroleum, after the blood sacrifice on the Eastern Front, underlined the place and the rôle the oil represented “**the most precious contribution the Romania can bring to the common cause** (namely of the Axis Berlin-Rome-Tokyo, author's bold).”¹⁰

The outbreak of the hostilities, in September 1939, opened immediately and with utter brutality the issue of petroleum, both for the belligerents as well as the non-belligerents. The political and military observers of the events immediately agreed in this respect. Cesare Alimenti, a name known to the reader, spoke in 1939 of the role of petroleum as “**war weapon**”,¹¹ and he was not alone.¹² In Bucharest, *Monitorul Petrolului Român*, noticing that exactly 25 years later the war cataclysm war ravaging the old continent again, wrote that the oil industry had become “**a vital element for the means used by the modern war. More than in the past conflict, the derivatives obtained from crude oil can be partly replaced with synthetic products found in the raw materials that exist in abundance in many countries that have no petroleum or have an insufficient production. On the other hand, alcohol and benzyl, mixed in variable proportions in products obtained from crude oil, increase the quantities that can be utilized. The potential of aviation and of motorized armaments increased enormously in comparison to the past, requiring immense quantities of liquid fuel. Next to the food for the troops, ensuring the fuel for the engines that enable their movement and the flight of the planes appears as a primary concern.**”¹³ The facts of the petroleum problem became pressing also in relation with the findings regarding international consumption of oil products,¹⁴ the international production and traffic of motor vehicles,¹⁵ or the consumption by the commercial and war fleet in 1938-1939,¹⁶ or in relation with the statement that Mihail Pizanty made on August 11, 1939 during the courses at the People's University in Vălenii de Munte, about the “**vital**” importance of the oil industry within the entire national economy of Romania.¹⁷

The world war, unleashed on September 1, 1939 through Germany's attack against Poland, clearly divided the belligerents regarding the manner in which they approached or were confronted with the issue of petroleum. In fact,

already from the previous period, Germany and Great Britain – as the Reich's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Joachim von Ribbentrop, remarked – had been on clearly antagonistic positions both as far as the German military supremacy on the continent, as well as regarding the redistribution of raw materials, Berlin claiming a place not only in Europe, but also in some of its old colonies.¹⁸ It goes without saying that, due to the war, these disputes became more critical, **the Axis and the United Nations** fighting a life-and-death battle in 1941-1942; in 1943 (Casablanca), the well-known formula of **imposing an unconditional capitulation** to Germany and its smaller or bigger allies was launched, which, practically, meant that the confrontation could not end except with the elimination of one of the camps. In matters of petroleum, as we have mentioned, each of the two camps benefited from different situations. At a complete disadvantage, the countries of **the Axis** tried to buy some time, drawing up their political-economic and military-strategic plans in accordance with **the petroleum factor as well**.¹⁹ Already in the first year of the conflict, "blocked" on the old continent, Germany, besides its own oil resources and those (insignificant) of the occupied countries, or counting on the (totally insufficient) quantities obtained through modern procedures,²⁰ oriented towards Romania²¹ and benefited from the good relations established by Hitler and Stalin in the years 1934-1941. After the Reich's aggression took place on June 22, 1941, Stalin claimed that the Führer also intended to **conquer the Soviet resources of "black gold"**,²² and later, the operational plans of the Wehrmacht²³ in the crucial year 1942 depended categorically on the intention of Hitler and the German High Command (*O.K.W.*) to capture the Caucasus.²⁴ The basic principles of the economic policy of the Reich in the war years²⁵ or the plans regarding the area of the Near East and the Middle East were also inspired by the petroleum factor.²⁶ Today it seems totally strange that, in 1940-1943, acting in the North-African space, the German

and Italian troops suffered from the lack of liquid fuel,²⁷ although a few decades later ... a "sea of oil" was discovered in the area (Libya).²⁸ The petroleum problem was no less stressful for Japan than it was for Germany or Italy.²⁹ On the other hand, for Great Britain and France the petroleum question assumed different coordinates. Their possibility to "block" Germany in the winter of 1930-1940³⁰ offered them a different perspective, and at that stage they were studying plans of preventing the supplying of the Reich with resources from the U.S.S.R.³¹ and Romania.³² Based on our research, we have concluded that, in the first months of the war (September-December 1939), the *War Cabinet* in London, which assembled 123 times, gave special attention to the question of Romanian oil,³³ which was dealt with and solved in connection with the **economic blockade**³⁴ instituted by the Anglo-French allies with the purpose of "suffocating" the Nazi Reich. In this sense, the British official history of the 1939-1945 war recorded that, in order to be able to carry on the hostilities, Berlin gave "great importance" to ensuring the provisioning with steel from Sweden and oil from the U.S.S.R., Poland, and Romania.³⁵ It was to be expected that, planning the total blockade of the Reich already in the first days of the conflagration,³⁶ the London officials would investigate the sources of liquid fuel available to Hitler, among which were the Romanian ones.³⁷ As we shall show further, the common French-British plans elaborated in 1939 and 1940 had in view the destruction of Romania's petroliferous region and the blocking of the land and sea transports in the direction of the Reich. The general evolution of the hostilities prevented the application of these plans.³⁸ For the moment we shall mention that, on September 12, 1939, several members of the British *War Cabinet* made proposals meant to prevent the "oil stocks and the future oil production of Romania from getting into the hands of Germany."³⁹ A program was adopted expressing in essence the decision of Great Britain to immediately acquisition, in collaboration with France, all the quantities of

liquid fuel that Romania had in stock and to sign firm contracts for the production of the next six months. Lord Halifax, the titular of the Foreign Office, admitted that the adopted measures could present a risk, namely that the Nazi Reich could be determined "to invade Romania."⁴⁰ In the following days, the *War Cabinet*, having in view the evolutions in Poland, opined that the *Wehrmacht* could intend to prolong its campaign in Romania as well, in order to capture its resources and to have access to the Black Sea, which, certainly, would have affected the entire south-east of the continent.⁴¹ With a view to Germany's intended operations, especially the **campaign in the West of Europe**, it was of great importance – specified the head of the Imperial General Staff in London – to prevent the immediate use by Hitler of the oil resources found in Galitia and Romania. The debates on the issue of Romanian petroleum were initiated at the recommendation of the Foreign Office and of the Imperial Defense Committee (IDC).⁴² The seriousness of the situation and the importance of the matter determined the *War Cabinet* to create a **special committee** presided by Lord M. Hankey,⁴³ Minister without portfolio.⁴⁴ Great Britain intervened through certain private companies – *Royal Dutch-Shell*, *Steaua-British*, and *Phoenix Oil Co.*⁴⁵ On September 16, 1939, the members of the British War Cabinet reexamined the issue of buying Romania's available stocks, John Simon, the Minister of Finance, considered unnatural the position of the trust *Royal Dutch-Shell*, which, although of integrally Allied affiliation, was, by virtue of the contracts already signed before the outbreak of the hostilities, supplying ... Germany with oil derivatives.⁴⁶ At the meeting from October 18, 1939, the issue of Romanian petroleum was again called forth,⁴⁷ at a moment when the British "economic offensive" in Romania had registered successes against the Reich,⁴⁸ the

effects being considered "catastrophic" for Berlin (the level of the prices and the decrease of the exports to Germany).⁴⁹ The issue of the Romanian oil derivatives continued to come to the attention of the *War Cabinet* a few more times: on November 3, 1939⁵⁰ or on November 16, 1939,⁵¹ when Lord Hankey informed his colleagues that, the *Committee* that he directed monitored all the oil supplies that went to Germany; it did not ignore the fact that, compared to the successes registered by the Allies, Germany was exerting serious pressures on Bucharest, threatening it even with invasion.⁵² Appealing to statistics, the speaker estimated that the Reich could buy from Romania, in the first year of war, approximately 2-4 million tons of oil products, in which situation he recommended that the *War Cabinet* approve that Sir Reginald Hoare, the Minister in Bucharest, intervene so that the Reich should not benefit from deliveries that exceeded 1 million tons.⁵³ Constantly preoccupied with the economic blockade of the Reich, the British cabinet examined, on November 24, 1939, the general situation of Germany's supplies with oil products. The discussions were based on a report of Lord Hankey, proposing new measures for the increasing of the effectiveness of the economic "barrage" instituted around the Reich, more precisely: 1) the firm control of the contraband trade in the Dardanelles; 2) the supervision of the acquisitions through neutral India and 3) of the other neutral countries; 4) the supervision of the Romanian exports; 5) instructions for Hoare to support the London mission sent to Bucharest; 6) the control of the grain barges used by the Germans for the transport of oil derivatives on the Danube.⁵⁴ Thus, Lord Hankey's report clearly defined the **place** of Romanian petroleum in the Allied economic strategy in the winter of 1939-1940. Germany, of course, did not take long, as we shall further see, to react.⁵⁵

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Under the circumstance existing at the beginning of the Second World War, presented in their essential lines, we cannot affirm that Romania's position, be it only with a view to the question of "black gold", did not present an interest for the belligerents. The evolution of the hostilities illustrated this fact.

On September 4, 1939, therefore the second day after the starting of the state of war between Germany on one hand and Great Britain and France on the other hand, Armand Călinescu's government decided to adopt a "peaceful attitude" towards all the states, implicated or not in the war.⁵⁶ Two days later, on September 6, 1939, a Crown Council headed by King Carol II unanimously decided on "the strict observing of the rules of neutrality established through the international conventions towards the belligerents in the present conflict."⁵⁷ Romania's declared neutrality⁵⁸ continued until the end of May 1940, it did not have an absolute and final character, being in fact oriented towards the Anglo-French camp and hostile towards Germany and its allies, for which, however, certain concessions were made.⁵⁹ The hope was, as Nicolae Iorga maintained in the Crown Council from September 6, 1939, for Romania to finally join the Anglo-French Allied camp,⁶⁰ but later, under the circumstances of France's fall, on September 29, 1940, neutrality was abandoned,⁶¹ Bucharest opting for non-belligerence (May 1940-June 1941). Romania oriented more and more evidently towards the triumphant Reich⁶² and, after Carol II's abdication, on September 6, 1940, it integrated itself, under the rule of General Ion Antonescu and with a statute of **satellite and not occupied state**, in the **new Europe** planned by Adolph Hitler.⁶³ In the meantime there occurred the **collapse of Greater Romania**, ancient Romanian territories being separated from the country (North-Western Transylvania, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, Southern Dobrogea), and with the occasion of the **notes of an ultimatum nature from the U.S.S.R.** from June 1940 or of the **Vienna "arbitrage"** from

August 1940, an important role in dictating the decisions and in evaluating the consequences was played by the petroleum question.⁶⁴

The governments of the last year of Carol II's reign did not exceed their condition of "service" cabinets. Being under the unconditional tutelage of the Sovereign, of his camarilla, and of the one and only party patronized by him (The Front of National Revival, renamed on June 22, 1940 the Nation's Party), the cabinets of Carol's reign, headed in succession by Armand Călinescu, General Gh. Argeşanu, C. Argetoianu, Gh. Tătărescu, and I. Gigurtu, administered a country that, in the positive prospect of the failure of the Great Allies in the West in the face of the Reich, was heading with certainty – despite holding some firm trumps (including petroleum) – towards the border catastrophe of the summer of 1940. The rulers' lack of determination corrupted by the permanent preoccupation not to be in disagreement with the continent's hegemonic powers, the Anglo-French allies or Adolph Hitler's **Axis**,⁶⁵ discouraged and confused the Romanians and strengthened their potential adversaries. The crisis of "**the old regime**" of Carol had become chronic before its collapse, on September 5-6, 1940, under the impact of the people's discontentment caused by the collapse of the Greater Romania's borders. As far as the oil policy, each cabinet, established after the assassination of Armand Călinescu on September 21, 1939, came with new promises and was welcomed with unjustified hopes: Gh. Argeşanu's government⁶⁶, followed only six days later by C. Argetoianu's team,⁶⁷ and on November 28, 1939 by that of Gh. Tătărescu.⁶⁸ Under the circumstances of the fire that was ravaging Europe, Premier Tătărescu launched from the first day an ambitious plan implying **immediate realizations and reforms** spread out for a long period of time, with the general intention of "solving the problems of the present and ensuring the paths of the future."⁶⁹ The effects of the war were soon reflected by

the rise, considered unusual, of the prices of the oil products destined to export,⁷⁰ in relation to the stagnation of the internal costs.⁷¹ A new import and export regime was established, and its control was the responsibility of an especially created organ – **The Foreign Exchange Office**.⁷² Also, beginning with September 17, 1939, the control of the foreign currency resulted from exports (including or, especially, oil exports) was introduced, the National Bank of Romania becoming the main beneficiary,⁷³ and on January 16, 1940 the **General Petroleum Commissariat**, for the control and coordination of the oil exports.⁷⁴ In a very short time, for the belligerents or for the virtual belligerents⁷⁵ petroleum ceased to be simple merchandise, becoming a **strategic product** and, no less, a **diplomatic weapon**.⁷⁶ L. Mrazec, prefacing a specialized work, mentioned this fact: **“None of the natural energy generators has provoked such a live interest from an economic and political point of view as petroleum.”**⁷⁷ Another specialist, Ioan Roceric, included petroleum among the raw materials that had gained an “overwhelming importance for the very existence of their states”, being equal with the **“oxygen of the economic and political life of the states, and, if their absence is felt in normal times only in a painful way, it can become a catastrophe in case of war for the state found in the impossibility to obtain supplies or to replace the raw materials that it needs with other similar ones.”**⁷⁸ A famous historian, George Brătianu, pointed out in the same context the fact that Romania, an “essentially agricultural” country, had gained, **due exclusively to petroleum, “a truly international importance.”**⁷⁹

Naturally, under these circumstances, it was not surprising that, soon after the outbreak of the Second World War, Bucharest was “assailed” in the most various manners on the theme of petroleum. On September 11-12, 1939,⁸⁰ Premier Armand Călinescu met with the official representatives of Great Britain and France, Sir Reginald Hoare and,

respectively, A. Thierry.⁸¹ On September 18, 1939, Călinescu received W. Fabricius, the German Minister in Bucharest.⁸² After the death of the prime minister, the discussions with the representatives of the great powers continued, on November 3, 1939, for example, when Grigore Gafencu and the Allied ministers tackled the question of the destruction of the oil industry “if the circumstances will require it.”⁸³ In September 1939, in Paris, R. Franasovici engaged in negotiations with an American group, being questioned with brutality “whether we could stop all the oil deliveries to certain countries [Germany and Italy?!].”⁸⁴ On the other hand, Berlin often intervened in Bucharest, soliciting the assurance of the oil deliveries to the Reich according to the war necessities,⁸⁵ which remained a topical issue in the winter 1939-1940, to which others were constantly added, especially the prevention of the sabotage of the petroliferous region by the Anglo-French.⁸⁶ In London, in August-October 1939, the Romanian Minister V.V. Tilea had intense negotiations with the leader of the Foreign Office, Lord Halifax,⁸⁷ the Romanian diplomat being often warned about the possibility of the extension of the German aggression from Poland towards Romania, situation in which – on October 17, 1939 – the destruction of the oil derricks and the ceasing of the oil deliveries to Germany were solicited.⁸⁸ In December 1939, Tilea and Lord Halifax discussed the issue of a conjugated Germany-U.S.S.R. aggression against Romania,⁸⁹ Bucharest’s delegate inquiring about the validity of the guarantees from August 1939, but receiving a totally disappointing answer.⁹⁰ The end of the year 1939 marked important successes for Germany as far as ensuring, through agreements,⁹¹ important oil imports from Romania, concretized in the economic agreement from September 29⁹² or those from December 21, 1939,⁹³ interpreted by Berlin as “a new development” of the understanding from March 23, 1939.⁹⁴ For several months there took place a constant **British and**

French counteroffensive,⁹⁵ with manifest tendencies to limit or even stop, be it even through massive acquisitions, the Romanian oil deliveries to the Nazi Reich, to determine the big trusts' branches in Romania to reorient their exports.⁹⁶ Carried on especially at a

commercial level, the Allied offensive had positive results,⁹⁷ confirmed by the statistics regarding the Romanian exports of oil products to Germany and the British and French Empires in the period September 1939-March 1940:⁹⁸

Period	The German Reich	The British Empire ⁹⁹	The French Empire
1939			
September	69 691 tons	33 578 tons	8 859 tons
October	83 713 tons	34 049 tons	32 567 tons
November	88 835 tons	39 088 tons	25 011 tons
December	81 923 tons	145 699 tons	58 203 tons
1940			
January	28 246 tons	123 180 tons	59 533 tons
February	30 778 tons	81 516 tons	15 160 tons
March	44 797 tons ¹⁰⁰	130 398 tons	18 556 tons

The decrease of the oil exports to the Reich,¹⁰¹ in the first months of the war, "alarmed" the at one point the Ministry of Economy in Berlin, which acted immediately regarding its delegates in Bucharest,¹⁰² who – it appears – made efficient representations to the Romanian officials.¹⁰³

According to Andreas Hillgruber, in the winter of 1939-1940, the Romanian oil exports to the Reich "were much under the rising requests of Germany,"¹⁰⁴ but the causes had to do mostly with transportation.¹⁰⁵ The complications that occurred determined Berlin, in January 1940, to name Hermann Neubacher, the mayor of Vienna at the time, in the position of **special chargé d'affaires of the Reich in economic matters** with the Legation in Bucharest.¹⁰⁶ And that after, on January 2, 1940, at Karinhall, Marshall Herman Göring convoked his own "economic General Staff", with the participation of the representatives of the Economic Ministry of the Reich, of the *OKW* (General Thomas), of the *Abwehr* and the *SD* (Admiral Canaris, respectively the SS Generals Heydrich and Hohst), of the German Legation in Bucharest (Colonel A. Gerstenberg, the air attaché).¹⁰⁷ The speakers, foremost of whom Göring, Clodius, and Landfried (Secretary of State of the Ministry of Economy), pointed out the role

of Romanian petroleum for the war economy of the Reich. They estimated the necessities to the minimum quantity of 130 000 tons per month,¹⁰⁸ a context in which the transportation on the Danube¹⁰⁹ needed to be ensured, and Admiral Canaris was asked to act in order to prevent the possible sabotages.¹¹⁰ For this last purpose, Göring recommended that the *Abwehr* cooperate with the *SD* in Romania.¹¹¹ At the same time, Paris and London were inquiring about the situation of Romania's oil deliveries to the Reich (in the previous chapter we examined the exchange of Anglo-Romanian messages from January-February 1940). On March 2, 1940, the Foreign Office appreciated the "force" of the arguments previously presented by Romania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the necessity to rapidly obtain the necessary armament from Germany.¹¹² London promised even to provide credits for the armament,¹¹³ but insisted that Romania do not exceed the limit¹¹⁴ of 130 000 tons of oil products per month delivered to the Reich.¹¹⁵ In the answer given on March 21, 1940, Bucharest promised to keep London informed "about the state of affairs in the country,"¹¹⁶ giving assurances that it would not admit facilities for the ensuring of the quota of 130 000 tons of oil products destined to the German market,¹¹⁷

just as it had not and would not exert pressure on the oil companies with Allied capital to force the oil exports in the direction of the Reich.¹¹⁸

On the eve and in the first phase of the conflagration from 1939-1945, the European protagonists (the British, the French, and the Germans¹¹⁹) had in view a few **radical solutions** regarding Romanian petroleum, namely – **the destruction of the Ploiești area**¹²⁰ or **the occupation of Romania**.¹²¹ Under completely different circumstances, the same scenario was being repeated that had been applied in World War I,¹²² the objective being the same: the decision of the Anglo-French in 1916 to deprive Germany, in the conditions of the “total blockade” they imposed on it,¹²³ of the possibility to procure oil products from Romania. As it was learned later on, on November 19, 1916, the Romanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Em. Porumbaru, addressed Premier I.I.C. Brătianu, informing him that the British Minister in Romania, Sir Barclay, had solicited that measures be taken so that the oil companies “proceed to the destruction of the oil, derricks, and refineries that they own. The Allied countries [England and France] promise to compensate the Romanian government for the losses that will result from this measure.”¹²⁴ The British diplomat specified that his government attributed to the petroleum destruction issue “**primary importance, because the duration of the war** [the 1914-1918 world war] **depends greatly on it** (author’s bold).”¹²⁵ As we know, the sacrifice asked by the Allies was accepted by the Romanian government: teams of specialists proceeded without delay,¹²⁶ in the counties of Prahova, Dâmbovița, and Buzău, to the destruction of the 1 677 oil derricks (of which 1 047 in production), 26 refineries, tanks on oilfields and in factories, and to the burning of 827 000 tons of oil derivatives.¹²⁷ Appreciating the exceptional importance of the oil resources, after the occupation of most of Romania, the German General Headquarters took measures for the immediate repair of the

damages, beginning with February 1917 the first oil derricks being put back into service, and the production continued – and estimated as considerable.¹²⁸ Although later the Allied ministers in Romania, especially Sir Barclay, gave repeated assurances that the Romanian government and the oil companies would be compensated for the destructions,¹²⁹ after the end of the world war in 1918, there began the great spectacle of establishing **committees**,¹³⁰ of **evaluating the damages**,¹³¹ and establishing the **method of payment** (compensations for/against the Romanian debts).¹³²

The experience of the First World War determined the governments in Bucharest, in 1939-1940, to be extremely cautious regarding the Anglo-French propositions of destruction of the petroliferous area, because, on the other hand, Germany was interested to prevent such an upshot and, in order to avoid it, planned even the conquering of Romania. In the previous pages we presented the opinions of Grigore Gafencu, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, according to whom Romania had finalized **all the technical and military preparations** in order to take action.¹³³ Numerous and extremely well documented studies published in the last decades invalidate such a point of view, proving that the preparations were minute and important, that the decision factors in Bucharest (the King, the governments, the General Staff) picked up on the signals of the Anglo-French, that studies were performed and hypotheses were analyzed, but that **there was no question of taking action**, the variant of the oil destructions being considered a **ultima ratio** in the case of a direct military aggression by the Reich, supported by the revisionist neighbors (especially Hungary and the U.S.S.R.). As between 1939 and 1940 Romania, in conformity with the general development of the hostilities, was not confronted with such a situation, it clearly inclined towards Germany, the solution of the oil destructions was **gradually eliminated by Bucharest**, and the Romanian authorities,

while negotiating with the Anglo-French,¹³⁴ established with the Germans effective measures to prevent the possible sabotages.¹³⁵ In Bucharest it was often considered in the period 1939-1940 defending the neutrality of the country¹³⁶ implied measures for saving petroleum from destruction by the Anglo-French.¹³⁷ There is no need, of course, to discuss here the French-British preparations, examined and presented in detail in the mentioned works signed by Viorica Moisuc and Horia Brestoiu,¹³⁸ as well as in the **memoirs** left by King Carol II, Armand Călinescu, Victor Slăvescu, Grigore Gafencu,¹³⁹ or in various works published even in the first phase of the world war¹⁴⁰ on the basis of the interesting revelations made by Berlin after the capture, during the military fall of France in May-June 1940, of the French documents, especially in La-Charité-sur-Loir. As we have already mentioned, the respective documents were capitalized towards a propagandistic purpose in Berlin and, at the end of the world war, they were captured from the territory of the Reich by the forces of the Red Army and were transported and deposited in Moscow, where we had the possibility to study them in 1992.¹⁴¹ Based on the existent documentation, we can establish that there were several plans regarding the destruction of the Romanian petroliferous area in a manner as systematic as possible, to avoid, as in 1916, an action that would allow the Germans to repair the damages without too much delay. Under those circumstances, the so-called **Léon Wenger plan** from October 1, 1939 prevailed, a plan that, on October 18, 1939¹⁴² was recommended to the government in Paris by General Maurice Gamelin, the French Chief of Staff.¹⁴³ **The Wenger plan** had in view the destruction of the oil derricks and the blocking of the Danube line in order to drastically reduce or interrupt the Romanian-German fluvial connections.¹⁴⁴ In order to attain their objectives, the French and British governments maintained close diplomatic contacts, and the secret services in London

and Paris, as we have found, took action,¹⁴⁵ as did, on the other hand, Admiral Canaris's *Abwehr*, to counteract the Western plans.¹⁴⁶ Under this last aspect, the documents recently published under the care of Cristian Troncotă¹⁴⁷ prove to be truly fundamental. They prove that Mihail Moruzov, the head of the *Romania Secret Service*, was the one that **initiated**, at the end of October 1939, an "informative collaboration" with the counterpart service of the German army (the *Abwehr*), headed by Wilhelm Canaris. In general, the collaboration had in view the entire **Eastern Europe**,¹⁴⁸ but mainly – with reference to the period of the Second World War – Moruzov had in view the economic area, being known the major interest of the Reich in the Romanian agricultural and subsoil products.¹⁴⁹ In the discussions held in Berlin by the special delegate of the R.S.S., Major C.Gh. Ionescu-Micandru, the proposition of collaboration made by Bucharest was received with "great satisfaction" by the Germans.¹⁵⁰ It was established that the connections, without having an official character,¹⁵¹ should be maintained directly between the two intelligence services,¹⁵² and the *Abwehr* should delegate with this purpose Major Dr. Hans Wagner to Bucharest.¹⁵³ On November 8, 1939, Wagner arrived in Bucharest for a short visit,¹⁵⁴ and during the discussions he revealed Berlin's attention the observance by Romania of the principles of neutrality, as well as for the fulfillment with the utmost correctness of the obligations assumed towards Germany. The *Abwehr*'s delegate did not conceal the fact that Germany would soon make new proposals for "an economic cooperation as close as possible with Romania."¹⁵⁵ Returning to Romania on November 22, 1939, Wagner – with special messages from the Reich's Marshal Göring and Admiral Canaris – expressed the "considerable importance" of the cooperation between the R.S.S. and the *Abwehr*,¹⁵⁶ insisting directly on the concern for the common supervision of two objectives: **the**

port of Giurgiu and the Ploiești region, for which special people were delegated.¹⁵⁷ Both objectives were inspected and discussions were held at the *Second Section (Intelligence)* of the Romanian General Staff, the main preoccupation being to **avoid the sabotage acts** towards the oil industry and the Danubian oil transports.¹⁵⁸ On December 8, 1939, Moruzov had the surprise of receiving in Bucharest Admiral Canaris himself, who communicated to him from the first moment, in very categorical terms, the purpose of his visit and the possible reaction of the Reich in case Romania did not carry out the oil deliveries.¹⁵⁹ We extract from a note written by Moruzov soon after the departure of the eminent guest: **"First of all, the German High Command and government are in a state of extreme irritation due to the considerable importance that is given to the possible sabotage actions in Romania, having in view that this country – at this time – is the only source of supply for the Third Reich, especially with petroleum. Secondly, I considered it necessary to see personally whether the measures taken by the Romanian authorities for the prevention of the sabotage acts are sincere and sufficient, in order to offer Germany the necessary security and reassurance in this matter (author's bold)."**¹⁶⁰ On May 28-30, 1940, Admiral Canaris returned to Bucharest,¹⁶¹ after the collaboration of the Romanian-German secret services for the protection of the petroliferous area and of the fluvial and land transports towards Germany had proven effective, preventing the sabotage acts. Not without good reason, at the conference from May 29, 1940, the head of the *Abwehr* thanked King Carol II and M. Moruzov, expressing, for the "invaluable assistance", the appreciation of Adolph Hitler and "the entire Germany."¹⁶² Also, M. Moruzov traveled to Berlin,¹⁶³ as well as to Paris and London.¹⁶⁴ In the meantime, Bucharest received numerous signals from Berlin, from Hitler and Göring personally, both of whom declared themselves more than

once impressed with the "loyalty" proven by the Romanian officials regarding the economic collaboration¹⁶⁵ and who, precisely because of that, committed themselves to guarantee the "territorial integrity of Romania"¹⁶⁶ in the face of all the dangers, including the Soviet one.¹⁶⁷ Received at the beginning of March 1940 in Berlin by General Wilhelm Keitel, the head of the *O.K.W.*, M. Moruzov was shown the appreciation of the former **"for the spirit of complete loyalty in which the collaboration between the German and the Romanian intelligence services is taking place, regarding the issue of the security of the petroliferous regions and the transports from Romania to Germany (author's bold)."**¹⁶⁸ The assistance of the *R.S.S.* proved substantial in discovering and preventing the sabotage acts on the Danube¹⁶⁹ or ignored the German illegal weapon transports destined for the guarding of the refineries,¹⁷⁰ just as it cooperated in the application of a common Romanian-German plan for the protection of the petroliferous area in case of a possible Anglo-French attack.¹⁷¹ Everything unfolded normally, and M. Moruzov's credit in Berlin was permanently consolidated, until the unforeseen occurred: in June 1940, during the decisive battle for France, the German troops captured important political-diplomatic and military archives of Paris. From the immediate examination of the funds discovered in La-Charité-sur-Loire, the Germans had irrefutable proof about the **double game** of M. Moruzov, namely that, while in the winter of 1939-1940 he had assisted the *Abwehr* in the mentioned operations, he had not ceased the collaboration with *Deuxième Bureau* or with the *Intelligence Service*.¹⁷² From **that moment**, we can consider that Moruzov's destiny was determined; as it is well known, he was arrested upon the installation of Ion Antonescu's regime and executed by the Legionaries at Jilava in November 1940. Previously, in the night of July 24-25, 1940, Major Hans Wagner solicited M. Moruzov, after the publication in the Romanian press of

some of the secret documents discovered in La-Charité-sur-Loire regarding the French-British preparations for the destruction of the Ploiești petroliferous area and the blocking of the Danube traffic, to urgently proceed to the identification and expulsion from Romania of the people involved in the deal. This was immediately carried out,¹⁷³ but for the head of the *R.S.S.* it was, however, too late.¹⁷⁴

Without suspecting such an unfolding of events, M. Moruzov continued in the meantime to show himself loyal to the "German card." Thus, no later than May 20, 1940, in a meeting with Manfred von Killinger,¹⁷⁵ the future Minister of the Reich in Bucharest, he presented himself unconditionally as a Germanophile and supporter of the immediate collaboration between Berlin and Bucharest. Moreover, Moruzov assured the special delegate of the Reich that, in case the U.S.S.R. came to close to the region of Ploiești, he would personally direct the destruction of the area.¹⁷⁶ On May 17, 1940, while in Paris, Wenger officially presented to the Ministry of Public Works the purpose of his mission in Romania, asking the proper quarter to take action.¹⁷⁷ In the same sense, on May 15, 1940, A. Thierry, the French Ambassador to Bucharest, received the text relative to the destruction plan, at the same time with the assurance that he would return to Romania after 12 days, but that it was not necessary to wait for him in order to take action.¹⁷⁸ The fall of France, the efficiency of the German countermeasures, and Romania's fears regarding the immediate prospects of the war determined the quashing of the Wenger file.¹⁷⁹

In the meantime, in Bucharest and Paris, in Berlin, Moscow, and London, in Rome and Washington, sensation was created¹⁸⁰ by the revelations made, first of all by the German and Romanian agencies, about the attempts of the British, at the beginning of April 1940, to block the Danube,¹⁸¹ primarily the area of the Iron Gates.¹⁸² The discovery made at Giurgiu did not allow for any doubts that the purpose of the planned operation was "the blocking of the Romanian oil from being transported to

Germany."¹⁸³ Consequently, strict measures were imposed for the supervision of the Danube traffic, both by Romania as well as by Yugoslavia.¹⁸⁴ At one point, it was said that Germany asked Hungary for the right to patrol on the Danube,¹⁸⁵ but later on the rumor was denied by Berlin,¹⁸⁶ which declared itself satisfied with the prompt intervention of the Gh. Tătărescu government.¹⁸⁷ In March-May 1940, the delegates of the Reich to Bucharest (Fabricius, von Killinger, Clodius, Neubacher), concomitantly with the efforts to reach a **Petroleum Pact** with Romania (**Ölpakt**),¹⁸⁸ finally realized on May 27, 1940,¹⁸⁹ discussed with King Carol II,¹⁹⁰ with the Romanian Premier,¹⁹¹ and with the Minister of Foreign Affairs¹⁹² the issue of preventing the Anglo-French sabotaging of the oil industry and transportation. The strictly financial-economic issues were discussed by the German delegates with Victor Slăvescu and Mircea Cancicov, the Romanian Ministers of Endowment and of Economy, and the negotiations took place in the period February-March 1940, with certain periods of crisis.¹⁹³ Some of the agreements signed in the meantime were temporary (March 1939).¹⁹⁴ At one point, Berlin's delegates left Bucharest, and on May 27, 1940 the famous **Petroleum Pact**, also known as the **Armament-Petroleum Pact**,¹⁹⁵ was signed by Cancicov and Neubacher, establishing that Romania would deliver to the Reich the quantities of oil the latter was entitled to as state dues, and the Reich would send weapons, including those captured in Poland. For the exchange, the parties did not make payments in cash,¹⁹⁶ although prices were established on the basis of which the transactions were made. On May 22, 1940, Victor Slăvescu and H. Neubacher signed a convention, according to which the prices of the oil products were established at the level reached in March 1940 (the average price of 3 826 *lei*/ton), which during the war registered several adjustments.¹⁹⁷ Mention should be made that, in May and June 1940, in direct relation with the favorable evolution of the *Wehrmacht's* operations on the Western Front, King Carol II

and his ministers proved more and more conciliatory towards Berlin's solicitations, including or rather especially regarding petroleum,¹⁹⁸ officially admitting the cooperation of M. Moruzov with the German secret services for the safety of petroliferous area against the sabotages planned by the Allied agents.¹⁹⁹ Under these circumstances,²⁰⁰ on June 21, 1940, therefore on the even of the official capitulation of France, Minister Fabricius received from the Tătărescu government the text of a declaration that reconfirmed the assurances from May 1940, namely that Bucharest was decided to

"strengthen and extend the collaboration" with Berlin, collaboration imposed by "the geopolitical circumstances of Romania" and by the "new European order".²⁰¹ A "rapid organization" of this collaboration was intended, both at a political as well as an economic level.²⁰² As we have shown at the beginning of this chapter, **Romania began its orientation towards the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis**, the neutrality proclaimed in September 1939 being **abandoned** unilaterally by Bucharest.²⁰³ This **did not save** Greater Romania from the border disaster, just as it did not save King Carol II's regime.

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Romania's renouncing of its neutrality²⁰⁴ was only apparently a voluntary act, initiated by the rulers in Bucharest. The decision to orient towards Germany, maintaining **de jure** and **de facto** a **statute of non-belligerence** for longer than one year (May 1940-1941), took place in a certain context of the evolution of the hostilities on the European continent and with immediate repercussions on all the states, belligerent or not.²⁰⁵ King Carol II, who had a decisive role in establishing the new orientation, confessed in his *Jurnal*: "... **The danger to reattach [Romania] to Germany is great, but, if fatality is pushing us in this direction, it is better we do it at the eleventh hour.**"²⁰⁶ With regard to the context, King Carol II did not hide the consequences of the fall of the Allies on the Western Front, Great Britain remaining alone in the decisive confrontation with the Nazi Reich, benefiting, for a short time, of Italy's support: "The policy that I have wanted to carry on for the last ten years [since he had come to the throne of Romania] – wrote Carol – is collapsing, a policy of becoming friends with England, in which the latter gave me, however, no help [?!], but this collapse also comes with the first serious blow given to the British prestige [by Hitler]."²⁰⁷ In the immediately following period, Romania found itself in the position of

a patient; it was amputated, without any hesitation, losing, through the will of the winners of the moment (Germany, first of all) and due to the foolish desires of the small or big neighboring imperialisms, in less than three months, a third of its territory and as much of its population, Romanian in its majority, respectively 100 000 square kilometers and 7 million inhabitants.²⁰⁸ In the summer of 1940, the territorial seizures done to Romania's disadvantage depended to a great extent on the **petroleum factor**, intending to obtain either **closeness** to the Ploiești area (by the U.S.S.R.), either the ensuring of the security of the region (by Germany) against Moscow's expansionistic plans or the possible sabotages planned by the British. For Hitler – as he declared to Ciano on October 1, 1939²⁰⁹ – the agreement of the "spheres of influence" in Romania, concluded after August 23, 1939 between Germany and the U.S.S.R., functioned fully and, if Bucharest dared to make the wrong move, then the Führer would use "every means" to try to mobilize Moscow, Budapest, and Sofia in order to "liquidate the Romanian issue." As it is known and has been established, Romania did not confront the Reich in any way, which, in the summer of 1940, did not stop the latter from supporting one after the other the

pretensions of the U.S.S.R., Hungary, and Bulgaria with regard to Romania. Kremlin acted with priority, on June 26-27, 1940, after having obtained Berlin's approval, which had imposed on it a moderation of its pretensions.²¹⁰ By occupying Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, the Herța Region and certain cyots on the Danube, the forces of the Red Army got unacceptably close, from Adolph Hitler's point of view, to the region of Ploiești.²¹¹ The fact was all the stranger as it had been done **with the approval** of the Führer! Italy,²¹² and even Germany, felt threatened by the risk of losing the Romanian oil.²¹³ Robert Goralski and Russel W. Freeburg, frequently quoted in the previous pages, observed with good reason that **there was no coincidence between** the Soviet aggression against Romania in June 1940 and the moment when Hitler decided irrevocably to **attack the U.S.S.R.** in the shortest time possible.²¹⁴ As we know, in *Mein Kampf*, Hitler had insisted on German necessity for **vital space (Lebensraum)**, to the detriment of the East-European countries, including the U.S.S.R.: **"...We begin where it [Germany's traditional foreign policy] was ended six hundred years ago. We are ending the eternal march of the Germans towards the south and the west of Europe and are looking towards the East. We are putting an end to the pre-war colonial and commercial policy and inaugurating the territorial policy of the future [...] First we can only think of Russia and the limitrophe countries that depend on it (author's bold) ..."**²¹⁵ The intention "to liquidate" the U.S.S.R. was not abandoned by Hitler even at the moment when he decided to sign with Stalin the pact from August 23, 1939.²¹⁶ During the secret meeting from November 23, 1939 with the main commanders of the *Wehrmach*, the Führer confessed: "I asked myself for a long time whether I should **begin with an attack in the East, and then in the West** (author's bold)."²¹⁷ But since he was liquidating the free Polish state, consequently being involved in a conflict with the Western

powers, Hitler promised firmly: **"We will be able to start against Russia when we are free in the West** (author's bold)."²¹⁸ In May-June 1940, at the height of the victorious campaign in the west of the continent, Hitler made known his intentions – as General Alfred Jodl, the head of the operation section of the *O.K.W.* – to attack the U.S.S.R. in the near future.²¹⁹ Immediately after the capitulation of France, on June 25, 1940, General Franz Halder, the Chief of Staff of the German terrestrial forces, recorded in his journal the Führer's declaration from that day, namely that he oscillated between a landing on the British Isles and "an attack in the East (the attack of the U.S.S.R. – Gh. B.)."²²⁰ According to Andreas Hillgruber, Hitler decided as early as June 21, 1940 to prepare the invasion of Russia.²²¹ In the following weeks, the military intentions of the Reich were specified in Berlin, so that, on July 22, 1940, the commander of the terrestrial troops, von Brauchitsch, expressed Hitler's decision in the same firm terms: **"The Russian issue will be solved offensively. We must draw up the plan of the operation** (author's bold)."²²² Nine days later, in Berghof, at a meeting with his generals, Hitler stated: **"...Russia must be liquidated. Deadline – the spring of 1941. The sooner we crush Russia, the better** (author's bold)."²²³ Consequently, extensive preparations were made at the level of *O.K.W.*, so that, on December 18, Hitler signed **war directive** no. 21 for the attack of the U.S.S.R. no later than May 15, 1941 (**Operation "Barbarossa"**).²²⁴ Resuming the issue of the occupation of the Romanian historical territories by the forces of the Red Army, we shall find that the Soviet aggression led to a "cold war" between Bucharest and Moscow, which lasted until June 22, 1941.²²⁵ The Kremlin's move displeased Hitler profoundly, the more so as, after June 28, 1940, the Ploiești petroliferous area entered in the radius of action of the Soviet aviation or, in case of a Romanian-Hungarian conflict, caused by Budapest, the Führer was afraid that Soviet Russia could intervene and simply

occupy the eastern part of Romania. It is true that, through the secret protocol of the non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939, Bessarabia was recognized as being under the U.S.S.R.'s "sphere of influence." Then, on June 28, 1940, Moscow also occupied Northern Bukovina, the Hertza Region, and a few cyots on the Danube, which for Hitler was equal with a "betrayal" by Stalin,²²⁶ but, on November 10-13, 1940, while visiting Berlin, V.M. Molotov, the head of the Soviet government and diplomacy, explained categorically to the Nazi leaders the plans of Kremlin to not renounce the **expansion in the south-east of Europe**,²²⁷ although it was also interested in the "vast East-Asian space." Hitler found yet another argument to justify his preparations for the "liquidation of the Russian danger,"²²⁸ and the **petroleum factor** returned obsessively in his calculations.²²⁹ In Berlin, the Führer did not conceal from Molotov – on November 13, 1940 – his satisfaction for the way in which he had distributed the U.S.S.R.'s "spheres of influence" and mentioned especially Northern Bukovina ceded to Moscow beyond the limits of the "understanding" from 1939.²³⁰ The Soviet diplomat, on the contrary, replied that the U.S.S.R. was unhappy, because Germany had **guaranteed** the territorial integrity of Romania, which meant that Berlin had ignored Kremlin's interests in... the south of Bukovina.²³¹ Hitler replied to his guest that Bukovina had been a province of the Habsburg Empire and, by accepting the seizing of its northern part, he had shown understanding towards the "Russian exigencies", especially since, in cooperation with Italy, he had insisted in Bucharest, in June 1940, that Romania should cede Bessarabia. At that moment, the Führer motivated this way the presence of the **Axis** in the Romanian affairs: "... **Romania represents a real German-Italian interest by virtue of its oil resources** (author's bold) and its government asked Germany to protect it by air and by land from the terror of the British attacks. AS for the threat of a British

landing in Salonika, Germany will not allow it, but it promises to withdraw its troops from Romania as soon as the war is over."²³² Regarding the new situation that the U.S.S.R. was facing, Molotov concluded that, precisely for that reason, Moscow did not wish "to stay away from the big issues of Europe and Asia."²³³ As Joachim von Ribbentrop noted, Molotov's visit to Berlin and the exchange of opinions did not meliorate the Soviet-German relations. On the contrary,²³⁴ in December 1940, he met with Hitler, who declared that, if in the Finland issue he was willing to give in to Moscow's pressures, he did not accept to discuss the statute of the Dardanelles and the situation of Bulgaria. His reason was as clear as possible: "**If Bulgaria was subjected to the Soviet military influence, then the Balkans and especially Romania and its oil resources would necessarily fall under Soviet tutelage** (author's bold)."²³⁵ This strengthened Berlin's conclusion that the decision the Führer²³⁶ had made in the previous months to **liquidate the Russian issue** was the most convenient one.²³⁷ Goralski and Freeburg concluded: "**It was not a coincidence that, a few weeks after refusing with repulsion Russia's pretension in Romania, Hitler oriented irrevocably towards his invasion in the Soviet Union** (author's bold)."²³⁸ **THE ARITHMETIC OF PETROLEUM**, as the two authors suggestively point out,²³⁹ had a **predominant role** in defining the strategy of the Third Reich in 1940-1941, especially since Berlin was **interested not only in the oil resources of Romania, but, through the very objectives of "operation Barbarossa", aimed at drawing near the resources of "black gold" in the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus**.²⁴⁰ As far as the moment at the end of 1940, more exactly Molotov's visit and the sanctioning of **war directive no. 21**, we must mention the fact that the Reich had already managed to secure itself with regard to Romania: the action of Kremlin against Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina encouraged Sofia and Budapest, which

immediately made territorial claims, equally supported by Germany, Italy, and the U.S.S.R. and, partially, by Great Britain; I. Gigurtu's government, emanation of Carol II's regime, engaged in continuation in the direction of the integration in the "new European order" patronized by Adolph Hitler, yielded and, through the "agreements" signed in Craiova (September 7, 1940) and Vienna (August 30, 1940), Southern Dobrodgea (Cadrilater) and the north-west of Transylvania were "ceded" to Bulgaria and, respectively, to Hungary.²⁴¹ Beforehand, Romania renounced the French-British guarantees (July 1, 1940),²⁴² it withdrew from the Society of Nations (July 11, 1940),²⁴³ and King Carol II addressed Hitler – on July 1, 1940 – asking him to send a military mission to "protect us in these times from this hardship."²⁴⁴ Also, on July 6, 1940, Carol II informed, through the Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Manolescu, that Romania was willing to initiate negotiations with Hungary and Bulgaria, in order to examine their territorial claims.²⁴⁵ Further, Premier I. Gigurtu and M. Manolescu visited Berlin (July 26-27, 1940)²⁴⁶ and Rome.²⁴⁷ I. Gigurtu renewed Carol II's request for the sending of a military mission to Romania.²⁴⁸ Thus, Hitler did not miss the opportunity to reconfirm the Pharisaic character of his external orientation: he affirmed the political and territorial "disinterest" of the Reich towards the Balkans,²⁴⁹ which was not true from an economic point of view. The countries in this area, specified the Führer, were for Germany the "ideal commercial partners", for the exchange of agricultural and industrial products, and "in Romania's case for petroleum" (author's bold).²⁵⁰ Hitler himself revealed that the secret documents captured from the French – he referred to the archives from La Charité-sur-Loire – attested that London and Paris intended "to burn the Balkans", which he could not accept, acting for the peaceful solving of the problems of South-Eastern Europe.²⁵¹ Hitler urged to the solving of the "differences" between Romania and Hungary and Bulgaria, and, as far as the

Reich, he stated that he "would closely examine its interests", acting to "defend them" with weapons.²⁵² Mention should be made that, in the draft of the note on the meeting in Berghof, those interests were specified: "**the supply with petroleum and cereals**" (author's bold).²⁵³ In the following weeks, around the Vienna dictate, Franz Halder wrote in his *Journal* on August 27 and 28, 1940 that the Reich was determined to intervene at a military level to "defend its interests in the petroliferous area [Ploiești]."²⁵⁴ In August 1940, Italy and especially Germany were deeply involved in imposing the "solution" of the **Vienna dictate**, and so the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the two powers of the **Axis**, Galeazzo Ciano and Joachim Ribbentrop, asserted themselves as **authors of the odious document**.²⁵⁵ Also theirs was the formula "Szeckler inlet" that extended the area ceded to Hungary all the way to the surroundings of the city of Braşov,²⁵⁶ where the Reich could be only 1-2 hours away to keep the Ploiești area under the control of its motorized forces, in the case of a Soviet aggression against Romania²⁵⁷ or an air attack initiated from Great Britain's bases in the Mediterranean Sea.²⁵⁸ Ribbentrop and Ciano offered to the betrayed and subjugated Romania, the second day after the dictate, **the territorial guarantee** of Berlin and Rome for the integrity of the state that was practically brought back to the form of Smaller Romania **prior** to 1916, a fact that deeply upset Moscow, which, seeing its imperialist pretensions severed in the South-East, *did not* cease to protest, accusing Berlin also of ... violating the pact from August 23, 1939.²⁵⁹ The fall of Greater Romania marked the end of the regime of Carol II,²⁶⁰ not before entrusting the formation of a new government unto General Ion Antonescu, who officially became **the leader of the Romanian state** (1940-1944) and ensured the maintaining of the monarchic system by bringing back to the throne King Michael I (1927-1930, 1940-1947), the son of the sovereign who had just abdicated and left in exile.²⁶¹

NOTES:

¹ See, especially, Robert Goralski, Russel W. Freeburg, *Oil and War. How the Deadly Struggle for Fuel in WWII Meant Victory or Defeat*, New York, William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1978, *passim*; Jean-Jacques Berreby, *Le pétrole dans la stratégie mondiale*, Paris, Casterman, 1974, *passim*; George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, second edition, Ithaca (New York), Cornell University Press, 1956, p. 438 and the following; E.M. Friedwald, *Oil and the War*, London-Toronto, William Heinemann Ltd., 1941, *passim*; Benjamin Shawdran, *The Middle East. Oil and the Great Powers*, second edition, Boulder – London, Westview Press, 1985, p. 5 (petroleum – “the most decisive force in war”); F. Venn, *Oil Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*, London, Macmillan, 1986, pp. 83-104; Maurice Levêque, *Le pétrole et la Guerre*, quoted edition, *passim*; Eugen Preda, *Miza petrolului*, quoted edition, *passim*; Constantin Croutziou, *L'importance du pétrole dans la vie économique*, Paris, Librairie Sociale et Économique, 1941, p. 28 (petroleum – “vim of the war”); Jaques de Launay, Jean-Michel Charlier, *Istoria secretă a petrolului*, quoted edition, pp. 79-88; René Sédillot, *Istoria petrolului*, quoted edition, *passim*; Henri Michel, *La drôle de guerre*, Paris, Hachette, *passim*; Viorica Moisuc, *Diplomația României*, quoted edition, *passim*; Horia Brestoiu, *Acțiuni secrete în România*, quoted edition, *passim*; Maurice Pearton, *Oil and the Romanian State*, quoted edition, p. 223 and the following. During the war years, the successful works of Anton Zischka were published in Romanian, *Războiul petrolului*, București, Editura Cartea Românească, 1942; *Știința distruge monopolurile*, second edition, București, Editura Gorjan, 1942. From this last work we quote: “petroleum has become the blood of the war fleets and of automobiles, of airplanes and Diesel engines” (p. 271). In *Războiul petrolului* the author demonstrated the role of blood of economy gained by “black gold” (p. 14).

² Cf. Edmond Bloch, *1919-1939. Le pétrole mène le jeu...*, Paris, G. Durassie et C-ie, Éditeurs, 1961, p. 119.

³ *Ibidem*, pp. 116-119.

⁴ René Sédillot, *Istoria petrolului*, p. 228.

⁵ See *Introduction à l'histoire des relations internationales*, quoted edition, *passim*; Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *Tout empire péria. Théorie des relations internationales*, Paris, A. Collin, 1992, p. 129 and the following.

⁶ *Introductions...*, p. 85.

⁷ René Sédillot, *Istoria petrolului*, p. 228.

⁸ Jean-Jacques Berreby, *Histoire mondiale du pétrole*, quoted edition, p. 207.

⁹ Cf. Mihail Pizanty, *Aperçu general sur l'industrie pétrolière de Roumanie*, București, Editura Cartea Românească, 1940, p. 4; idem, *Privire retrospectivă asupra industriei petrolifere în perioada 1930-1939*, București, 1940, p. 6.

¹⁰ *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, Series D, vol. XIII, London, HMSO, 1964, p. 844. While in Berlin, at the end of November 1941, Mihai Antonescu also met with Joseph Goebbels, Joachim von Ribbentrop, and Adolph Hitler

¹¹ Cf. Cesare Alimenti, *Il petrolio nell'economia mondiale*, quoted edition, p. 62.

¹² See Stefan Th. Possony, *L'économie de la guerre totale*, quoted edition, *passim*; Edgar Faure, *Le pétrole dans la paix et dans la guerre*, quoted edition, *passim*; André Labarthe, *La France devant la guerre. La balance des forces*, Paris, Éditions B. Grasset, 1939, p. 10; V. Forbin, *Le pétrole*, Paris, 1940, p. 5 (“those belligerents who can count on a sufficient reserve of oil products hold the forfeit of victory”). A decade after the outbreak of the hostilities, R. Jouan specified that petroleum had been “the soul of the military operations”, that “owning it, once the first surprises passed, played a capital, even decisive role in the fall of Germany and, especially, of Japan” (*Le pétrole. roi du monde*, Paris, Payot, 1949, p. 155).

¹³ “Zgomotul armelor a înlocuit acțiunea diplomaților”, in *M.P.R.*, no. 18/September 15, 1949, p. 1185. On the same subject, see also “La guerre et le pétrole”, in *M.P.R.*, no. 10/1949, p. 571 and the following (commentaries on the study of General Serrigny – *L'Allemagne face à la guerre totale*); “Le pétrole dans la guerre mondiale”, in *M.P.R.*, no. 17/1940, p. 940 and the following; “Le combustible liquide au Japon”, in *M.P.R.*, no. 5/1941, p. 243 and the following; “Importanța zăcămintelor din Caucaz în industria de petrol a URSS”, in *M.P.R.*, no. 24/1941, pp. 935-944; *M.P.R.*, no. 19/1939, p. 1277; *M.P.R.*, no. 23/1940, p. 1225 (preface by G. Macovei, dated September 1940, to the work by L. Mrzecz *Le problème du pétrole en Roumanie par rapport au problème mondial en 1915*, also published in Romanian: *Problema petrolului în România față de problema mondială din 1915*, București, 1940); *M.P.R.*, no. 1.1941, p. 35; *M.P.R.*, no. 8/1941, p. 375; *M.P.R.*, no. 11/1941, p. 521.

¹⁴ See “Consumul mondial al produselor petrolifere în 1939”, in *M.P.R.*, no. 12/1940,, pp. 663-664. The situation in the last years that preceded the world war: 1935 – 212 231 000 tons; 1936 – 231 000 000 tons; 1937 – 254 500 000 tons; 1938 249 100 000 tons; 1939 – 255 786 000 tons (*ibidem*, p. 663).

¹⁵ See *M.P.R.*, no. 23/1939, p. 1472 and the following. (In the year 1938 there were 43 223 000 motor vehicles in the world, necessitating 90% of the world's gasoline consumption, p. 1473).

¹⁶ *M.P.R.*, no. 21/1939, pp. 1347-1357. In the years we are referring to, the world tonnage increased to 69.4 million commercial vessel tons; 11.4 million petroleum tons; 6.9 million war vessel tons, for all the categories of ships, the order being, generally, the same: Great Britain and its colonies or possessions, the United States, Japan, Norway, Germany, Italy, France, etc. See also Mihail Pizanty, *Le tonnage de la flotte mondiale. Situation des navires de commerce, des navires-citerne et des bateaux de guerre*, București, 1939, *passim* (excerpt from *M.P.R.*)

¹⁷ *Idem*, *La vitalité de l'industrie pétrolière roumaine*, București, Editura Cartea Românească, 1939, p. 3.

¹⁸ Cf. Joachim von Ribbentrop, *De Londres à Moscou*, București, Editura Cartea Românească, 1939, p. 3.

¹⁹ Cf. Robert Goralski, Russel W. Freeburg, *Oil and War*, pp. 324, 334. The Second World War proved "the crucial connection" between petroleum and the national security of the states, the role of "crucial pivot" of the liquid fuel in determining the general policy of all the states; Constantin Croutziou, *L'importance du pétrole dans la vie économique*, quoted edition, pp. 149-151 (about the role of fuels in the battle between Great Britain and Germany).

²⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 77-80.

²¹ In the years 1940-1944, Romania represented "the main source for supply with oil products" for the Nazi Reich (cf. S.M. Lisičikin, *Neftianiaia promišlennost stran narodnoi demokratii*, Moskva, 1960, p. 133). According to F. Venn, Romania, through the deliveries of oil products from 1939-1944, had "a substantial contribution to [the functioning] of the German war machine" (cf. *Oil Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*, quoted edition, p. 85).

²² See I. V. Stalin, *Despre Marele Război al Uniunii Sovietice pentru Apărarea Patriei*, third edition, București, Editura PMR, 1952, p. 22 (from the speech made by Stalin on the radio on July 3, 1941: "... [Germany] intends [in the war started on June 22, 1941] to conquer our land, bedewed with our sweat, to take our grain and our petroleum, obtained through our work...").

²³ For the activity of O.K.W. between 1940 and 1945, see a fundamental document, edited by the well known German historians Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Andreas Hillgruber, Walther Hubatsch, and Percy Erns Schramm, *Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtführungsstab)*, I-IV, Frankfurt am Main, Bernard Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1961-1965. See also the war directives of Adolph Hitler, edited by Walther Hubatsch, *Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegführung 1939-1945. Dokumente des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht*, Frankfurt am Main, Bernard und Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1962 (followed by the English and the French editions: Adolph Hitler, *Directives de guerre*, présentées par H.R. Trevor-Roper d'après Walther Hubatsch, Paris, Arthaud, 1965).

²⁴ Cf. Robert Goralski, Russel W. Freeburg, *Oil and War*, p. 174 and the following (chapter 11 – *Germany Bleeds for Oil: The Caucasus and Stalingrad*, with this motto: "If I do not capture the petroleum in Maikop and Groznii, then I will have to end the war", A. Hitler, June 1, 1941).

²⁵ See Dietrich Eichholtz, *Geschichte der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft 1939-1945*, I, 1939-1941, Berlin, Akademie-Verlag, 1971, p. 168 and the following.

²⁶ See Andreas Hillgruber, *Die Zerstörung Europa. Beiträge zur Weltkriegsepoche 1914 bis 1945*, Frankfurt am Main – Berlin, Propyläen, 1989, p. 219 and the following; *idem*, *Deutsche Grossmacht-und Weltmacht im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Düsseldorf, Droste Verlag, 1979, *passim*.

²⁷ Robert Goralski, Russel W. Freeburg, *Oil and War*, p. 124 and the following (chapter 8 – "Mideast Oil and the Mediterranean").

²⁸ *Ibidem*.

²⁹ "Le Combustible liquide au Japon", in *M.P.R.*, no. 5/1941, p. 243 and the following; Robert Goralski, Russel W. Freeburg, *Oil and War*, p. 141 and the following (chapter "Japan's Oil Gains").

³⁰ Robert Goralski and Russel W. Freeburg insisted on the fact that the success of the economic blockade of Germany, depending on the accomplishing of the naval blockade, "exacerbated" for Berlin the problem of liquid fuel for the entire course of the world war (cf. *Oil and War*, p. 38).

³¹ Cf. Henri Michel, *La drôle de guerre*, pp. 240-249.

³² *Ibidem*, pp. 244-245; Sir Llewellyn Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*, I, London, HMSO, 1970, *passim*.

³³ Cf. Gh. Buzatu, *Din istoria secretă a celui de-al doilea război mondial*, I, pp. 200-201.

³⁴ See W.N. Medlicott, *The Economic Blockade*, I, quoted edition, *passim*. About the preoccupations of the British government to ensure the oil quantities necessary for the war, see D.J. Payton-Smith, *Oil. A Study of War-time Policy and Administration*, London, HMSO, 1971, *passim*; W.K. Hancock, ed., *History of the Second World War. United Kingdom Civil Series. Statistical Digest of the War*, London – Neudeln, HMSO and Kraus Reprint, 1975, pp. 87-94 (*Petroleum*). Relative to the determinant role of petroleum in the specification of the strategic plans of the British Empire during the war years, cf. Sir Charles Webster, Noble Frankland, *The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany 1939-1945*, vols. I/1-3, II, III/5, IV, London, HMSO, 1961. About the blockade of the first years of the world war, cf. Marion C. Siney, *The Allied Blockade of Germany 1914-1916*, The University of Michigan Press, 1957.

³⁵ Cf. J.R.M. Butler, *Bolșaiastrateghiia*, I, *Sentiabr 1939-iun 1941*, Moskva, 1959, p. 86.

³⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 85.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 87.

³⁸ Gh. Buzatu, *Din istoria secretă a celui de-al doilea război mondial*, I, p. 209.

³⁹ Great Britain, Public Record Office, Kew, London, 766, War Cabinet 65/1, War Cabinet 13 (39) (according to A.N.R., fund *Microfilme Anglia*, roll 7). See details in the fundamental work of W.N. Medlicott, *The Economic Blockade*, I, pp. 250-251. It is worth mentioning the belief of British public opinion in the period that the economic blockade represented the "secret weapon" that could give decisive results in the war (cf. also V.G. Truhanovski, *Vnešneia politika Anglii v period vtoroi mirovoi voini, 1939-1945*, Moskva, Nauka, 1965, p. 64). It mentions the example of the famous British historian Arnold Toynbee according to whom, in the winter of 1939-1940, the Allies had the conviction that, through the blockade, Germany could be forced into moderation (*ibidem*, p. 65).

⁴⁰ Great Britain, PRO 766, War Cabinet 65/1, War Cabinet 13 (39), September 12, 1939.

⁴¹ Idem, War Cabinet 15 (39), September 14, 1939.

⁴² *Ibidem*.

⁴³ See Stephen Roskill, *Hankey. Man of Secrets*, I-III, London, Collins, 1970-1974. Sir Maurice Hankey's committee was officially entitled Preventing Oil Reaching Germany (POG), which says everything about its purpose (*ibidem*, III, p. 431). In connection with Hankey Committee (1939-1940), in the year 1940 and afterwards there functioned, with identical purposes, the so-called [Sir Geoffrey] Lloyd Committee (cf. Sir Charles Webster, Noble Frankland, *The Strategic Offensive against Germany 1939-1945*, I, pp. 158-159).

⁴⁴ Idem, War Cabinet 15 (39), September 14, 1939; Philippe Marguerat, *Le III-e Reich et le pétrole roumain*, pp. 168-169.

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 169.

⁴⁶ PRO 766, War Cabinet 15 (39), September 14, 1939; Philippe Marguerat, *Le III-e Reich et le pétrole roumain*, pp. 168-169.

⁴⁷ Idem, War Cabinet 50 (39), October 18, 1939.

⁴⁸ Cf. Philippe Marguerat, *Le III-e Reich et le pétrole roumain*, pp. 168-169.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 170-172.

⁵⁰ PRO 766, War Cabinet 65/2, War Cabinet 69 (39), November 3, 1939.

⁵¹ Idem, War Cabinet 85 (39), November 16, 1939.

⁵² *Ibidem*.

⁵³ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁴ Idem, War Cabinet 93 (39), November 24, 1939.

⁵⁵ Gh. Buzatu, *Din istoria secretă a celui de-al doilea război mondial*, I, p. 211.

⁵⁶ Cf. Gh. Buzatu, *România și războiul mondial din 1939-1945*, quoted edition, p. 7.

⁵⁷ *Ibidem*, Ion Mamina, *Consilii de Coroană*, București, Editura Enciclopedică, 1997y, pp. 176-188; N. Dașcovici, *Neutralitatea României*, București, 1939, p. 14. As the famous specialist in international law observed, Bucharest's neutrality "has nothing against any of the present belligerents" (*ibidem*), Romania being decided to defend its territorial integrity, its political (*ibidem*, p. 21) and economic (*ibidem*, p. 18) independence, including the defending of the petroliferous region against destruction, sabotage, etc. (*ibidem*, p. 24).

⁵⁸ As we have already shown, Romania's attitude was not a surprise, the most important capitals having been warned in this sense before the attack against Poland: Paris (cf. Arh. M.A.E., fund 71, France, vol. 69 bis, ff. 68-70, telegram no. 576/Paris, August 9, 1939, Franasovici to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bucharest; *ibidem*, f. 42, telegram no. 537/August 29, 1939, Franasovici to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs); London (idem, fund 71 England, vol. 40, f. 286, telegram no. 43 061/Bucharest, July 8, 1939, Gafencu to the Legation in London; Great Britain, Public Record Office, London-Kew, FO - 371/23 852, the minute of the meeting Tilea-Lord Halifax, London, August 26, 1939); Belgrade (Arh. M.A.E., fund 71 Yugoslavia, vol. 52, telegram no. 52 570/Bucharest, August 17, 1939, Gafencu to the Legation in Belgrade), Ankara (idem, fund 71 Turkey, vol. 61, *passim*); Berlin (idem, fund 71 Germany, vol. 77, ff. 312-313, the note of the meeting Gafencu-Fabricius from August 31, 1939); Rome (idem, fund 71 Italy, vol. 66, *passim*) and, also, Moscow (idem, fund 71 U.S.S.R., vol. 87, *passim*), despite the fact that, from more and more directions, more and more pressing messages arrived, in the sense that, "when the U.S.S..R. has the occasion and is able to do it, it will bring up the question of Bessarabia" (*ibidem*, f. 425, telegram no. 753/Paris, October 30, 1939, Franasovici to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bucharest; *ibidem*, f. 386, telegram no. 10 761/Washington, October 23, 1939, Irimescu to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; *ibidem*, f. 387, telegram no. 4 757/Budapest, October 23, 1939, Crutzescu to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

⁵⁹ Gh. Buzatu, *România și războiul mondial din 1939-1945*, pp. 7-8.

⁶⁰ Apud Ion Mamina, *Consilii de Coroană*, p. 184 ("... Today we are carrying on a different policy than the one we carry in our heart. It is the only one we can carry on in the present!")

⁶¹ Gregoire Gafencu, *Préliminaires de la Guerre à "Est. De l'accord de Moscou (21 Août 1939) aux hostilités en Russie (22 Juin 1941)*, quoted edition, p. 338 and the following. Until May 29, 1949, while there was still an anti-German resistance center on the continent, Romania was determined, according to the declarations of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the period December 1938-May 1940, "to defend with weapons its national independence and its

policy loyal to the European legitimate order" (*ibidem*, p. 329). Since September 1939, the army had been mobilized, Romania being capable to tolerate a first shock from the East, North, or West, afterwards retreating to defense positions. A meeting summoned by Carol II on April 19, 1940 had decided the armed resistance of Romania under any circumstances and at any price (*ibidem*, p. 336-337). Under such circumstances, "all the technical and military preparations had been finalized with a view to setting fire to, if it was necessary, the oil industry and resources (author's bold)" (*ibidem*, p. 337).

⁶² Gregoire Gafenco, *Préliminaires de la Guerre à l'Est...*, p. 338.

⁶³ Gh. Buzatu, *România și războiul mondial din 1939-1945*, pp. 8-11; Maurice Pearton, *Oil and the Romanian State*, pp. 225-226.

⁶⁴ See the notes from 1940 of the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Galeazzo Ciano (apud *The Ciano Diaries*, Garden City, 1946, pp. 269-270, 288. On August 28, 1940, before going to Vienna, Ciano was received by Hitler, who solicited that, through the prepared "arbitrage", "peace should be ensured" in the South-East. The Italian diplomat found an explanation for the Führer's wish, namely "that Romanian petroleum should continue to be pumped in his [Hitler's] tanks," (*ibidem*, p. 288); Robert Goralski, Russell W. Freeburg, *Oil and War*, pp. 59-61; Maurice Pearton, *Oil and the Romanian State*, pp. 223-224; Andre Fontaine, *Istoria războiului rece*, vol. 1, 1917-1950, București, Editura Militară, 1992, pp. 179-180; Raymond Cartier, *La Seconde Guerre mondiale*, I, 1939-1942, Paris, Larousse-Paris Match, 1965, p. 172. The French historian recorded Hitler's declaration regarding the fact that, without Romanian petroleum, "Germany could not continue the war; it must be protected from the Russian danger" (*ibidem*).

⁶⁵ See Al. Gh. Savu, *Dictatura regală (1938-1940)*, București, Editura Științifică, 1970, *passim*.

⁶⁶ Cf. *M.P.R.*, no. 19/1939, p. 1283.

⁶⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 1283-1284.

⁶⁸ *Idem*, no. 23/1939, p. 1510.

⁶⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 1511.

⁷⁰ *Idem*, no. 21/1939, p. 1392.

⁷¹ *Ibidem*.

⁷² *Ibidem*, p. 1389.

⁷³ *Idem*, no. 23/1939, p. 1505.

⁷⁴ Cf. Viorica Moisuc, *Diplomația României*, p. 274; Philippe Marguerat, *Le III-e Reich et le pétrole roumain*, quoted edition, pp. 189-190.

⁷⁵ Cf. Axente Sever Banciu, *Aspectul economic al războiului actual (Potențialul economic al marilor puteri)*, București, Editura Universul, 1941, *passim*; Marcel Livian, *L'Entente Balcanique et l'après-guerre actuelle*, Paris, Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1940, pp. 130-131.

⁷⁶ See details in Viorica Moisuc, *Diplomația României*, p. 246 and the following (with references to the Romanian-German economic agreements from September 28, 1939, containing special dispositions referring to petroleum, cereals, etc., exchanged for armament, a fact that determined the Third Reich to act for the momentary stopping of the extending of the conflict in the South-East).

⁷⁷ Ioan Basgan, *Petrolul și gazele naturale în România*, București, Institutul Român de Energie, 1940, p. 3. To be confronted with the opinions expressed in 1940 (L. Mrazec, *Problema petrolului în România față de problema mondială din 1915*, quoted edition, pp. 10-11).

⁷⁸ Cf. *Lupta pentru înlocuirea materiilor prime coloniale cu surrogate și materii sintetice*, București, Editura Cartea Românească, 1940, p. 3.

⁷⁹ Cf. G.I. Brătianu, *Roumanie et Hongrie. Considérations démographiques et économiques*, second edition, Bucarest, Editura Dacia, 1942, pp. 10-11. See also M.N. Constantinescu, *Importanța europeană a petrolului românesc*, București, Imprimeria CFR – Filaret, 1943, *passim*.

⁸⁰ See Viorica Moisuc, *Diplomația României*, p. 269.

⁸¹ Arh. M.A.E., fund 71 England, vol. 40, f. 369.

⁸² See Armand Călinescu, *Însemnări politice*, p. 432. Details in Victor Slăvescu, *Note și însemnări zilnice*, II, pp. 427-429 (The Premier relates the contents of the discussions with Fabricius which laid the basis for a future agreement – from May 1940 – based on the petroleum/armament exchange, p. 428).

⁸³ Arh. M.A.E., fund 71 England, vol. 40, ff. 369-374; Viorica Moisuc, *Diplomația României*, p. 270.

⁸⁴ Arh. M.A.E., fund 71 France, vol. 69 bis, f. 66 (telegram no. 565/Paris, September 8, 1939).

⁸⁵ See the meeting Fabricius-Călinescu from September 15, 1969, in *Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918-1945*, Series D: 1937-1945, Band VIII, *Die Kriegsjahre*, I, 4. September 1939 bis 18. März 1940, Baden/Baden – Frankfurt/Main, P. Keppler Verlag KG, 1961, pp. 57-58 (telegram no. 549/Bucharest, September 15, 1939, Fabricius to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

⁸⁶ Arh. M.A.E., fund 71 Germany, vol 78, f. 202 (telegram no. 39 665/Berlin, December 6, 1939), Crutzescu to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bucharest; *Ibidem*, ff. 188-189 (verbal note no. 7 125/November 18, 1939, Germany's Legation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bucharest).

⁸⁷ Great Britain PRO, London-Kew, FO – 23 852, *passim*.

⁸⁸ *Ibidem*, ff. 279-285 (the minute of Lord Halifax on the meeting with Tilea). Tilea replied that, in only six weeks, Germany could repair the destructions, but that the invasion of Romania would be “disastrous” for the Anglo-French allies (*Ibidem*, f. 280).

⁸⁹ *Ibidem*, f. 338 and the following (minute of the discussion from December 4, 1939).

⁹⁰ Cf. Paul D. Quinlan, *Clash over Romania. British and American Policies towards Romania: 1938-1947*, Los Angeles, 1977, p. 57; Gh. Buzatu, *Din istoria secretă a celui de-al doilea război mondial*, I, pp. 216-217.

⁹¹ On September 13, 1939, King Carol II wrote in his *Jurnal* that “Gafencu is worried because he is afraid of Clodius’s coming one of these days and making exorbitant requests [for export]” (Carol II, *Între datorie și pasiune. Însemnări zilnice*, I, p. 431).

⁹² See *ADAP*, Series D, vol. VIII, pp. 134-135 (telegram no. 673/Bucharest, September 29, 1939, Fabricius and Clodius to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs); *Ibidem*, pp. 315-316 (report of Claudius, Berlin/November 1939, about the agreement from September, 1939 through which the Reich delivered war materials to Romania in value of 100 million marks in exchange for 600 000 tons of oil products); *Ibidem*, p. 342 (report from November 21, 1939 of Wiehl); Philippe Marguerat, *Le III-e Reich et le pétrole roumain*, pp. 160-163, 178-179; Viorica Moisuc, *Diplomația României*, pp. 246-248.

⁹³ *Ibidem*, p. 250; *ADAP*, Series D, vol. VIII, p. 726-727 (von Ribbentrop to Göring, Berlin/March 16, 1940 – about the agreement from September 21, 1939, which ensured monthly 130 000 ton oil deliveries, with the prospect of their increase, starting with March 1, 1940, to 200 000 tons per month).

⁹⁴ Viorica Moisuc, *Diplomația României*, p. 250.

⁹⁵ Philippe Marguerat, *Le III-e Reich et le pétrole roumain*, pp. 168-178. The fact results from the French documents captured in the summer of 1940 by the German troops and which, after the war, reached Moscow, being returned to Paris in 1993. In 1939-1940, the Ministry of War in Paris, benefiting from the famous Bureau 2 of the General Staff of the French Army, drew up various syntheses examining the German penetration in the Romanian economy (including, if not especially, in the area of petroleum). In this sense, we refer to the synthesis *La pénétration allemande en Roumanie* (from April 21, 1940, TĠASA, Moskva, file 375, ff. 108-156) or *Activité allemande en Roumanie* (May 2, 1940, *ibidem*, f. 157 and the following). The last synthesis showed that the German expansion was “systematic” at an economic and political level, preparing in fact the military intervention (*ibidem*). Under those circumstances, the Allied response was expected (cf. Note sur la politique alliée roumain, My I, 1940, *ibidem*, ff. 159-162) (see also Gh. Buzatu, *România în arhivele Kremlinului*, quoted edition, pp. 200-201).

⁹⁶ Philippe Marguerat, *Le III-e Reich et le pétrole roumain*, pp. 169, 173, 175.

⁹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 174.

⁹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 177.

⁹⁹ About the “reorientation” of certain Allied oil companies regarding the exports to Germany we mention that, in 1940, the situation was as follows: *Astra Română* – 22 050 tons out of 564 550 tons; *Romanian-American* – 135 122 tons out of 417 656 tons; *Steaua Română* – 1 710 tons out of 228 348 tons; *Concordia* – 2 481 tons out of 206 424 tons, in comparison to *Creditul Minier* – 468 178 tons out of 517 017 (cf. *M.P.R.*, no. 6/March 15, 1941, supplement).

¹⁰⁰ See other numbers, in Andreas Hillgruber, *Hitler, Regele Carol și Mareșalul Antonescu*, quoted edition, pp. 291-292.

¹⁰¹ According to the German statistics: from 70 000 tons in October 1939 to 60 000 tons in November 1939.

¹⁰² *ADAP*, vol. VIII, p. 367 (telegram no. 835/ Berlin, November 30, 1939, Wiehl to Clodius).

¹⁰³ *Ibidem*, pp. 387-388 (telegram no. 963/Bucharest, December 6, 1939, Clodius and Fabricius to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs – they obtained guarantees for 130 000 ton oil exports per month). Under the same circumstances, the Reich’s interest for Romanian petroleum being obvious, Grigore Gafencu met with Wilhelm Fabricius, to whom he expressed his fears regarding the possible actions of the U.S.S.R. and Hungary against Romania, which would have jeopardized the security of the Ploiești area (*ibidem*, pp. 391-392, telegram no. 975/Bucharest, December 8, 1939). Fabricius received instructions, in the following days, to ensure Bucharest that Romania did not need to worry about the danger of the U.S.S.R.’s intervention in the issue of Bessarabia (*ibidem*, pp. 419-420, telegram no. 891/Berlin, December 15, 1939, Wieszäcker to Fabricius).

¹⁰⁴ Andreas Hillgruber, *Hitler, Regele Carol și Mareșalul Antonescu*, p. 119.

¹⁰⁵ About the issues of the export and of the transport of petroleum especially on the Danube in the first stage of the world war, see Mihail Pizanty, *Privire retrospectivă asupra industriei petrolifere în perioada 1930-1939*, quoted edition, pp. 29-31; “Exportul petrolifer al României în anul 1940”, in *M.P.R.*, no. 5/1941, p. 199 and the following; “Le conduits de pétrole”, in *M.P.R.*, no. 10/1941, p. 461 and the following; “La flotte marchande danubienne de la Roumanie et des pays voisins”, in *M.P.R.*, no. 7/1941, p. 339; “Le trafic sur le Danube maritime en 1940”, in *M.P.R.*, no. 3/1941, p. 122 (according to S. Foca’s commentaries in the economic hebdomadal *Excelsior*). Comparative data regarding the traffic on the maritime Danube in 1939-1940: 484 vessels/386 vessels, out of which: 72 Greek, 71 German, 60 French, 45 British, 34 Italian, 29 Romanian in 1940, compared to 134 Greek, 125 Italian, 49 British, 62

Romanian, 7 French in 1939, with a total tonnage of 552 455 in comparison to 1 037 007. In 1940, as a result of the war, the quantities of transported products decreased drastically: to 373 290 tons compared to 1 332 746 tons in 1939 (*ibidem*).

¹⁰⁶ *Ibidem*; ADAP, Series D, vol. VIII, p. 593. See also Hermann Neubacher's memoirs: *Sonderauftrag Südost 1940-1943. Bericht eines fliegenden Diplomaten*, Göttingen-Berlin-Frankfurt am Main, Muster Schmidt Verlag, 1957.

¹⁰⁷ See ADAP, vol VIII, pp. 469-473 (report of Wiehl on the meeting at Karinhall). The representatives of the Reich's Ministry of Foreign Affairs were not invited (see *Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918-1945*, Series D, Band IX, *Die Kriegsjahre*, II, 18. März 1940 bis 22. Juni 1940, Frankfurt/Main, P. Keppler Verlag KG, 1962, p. 24, telegram no. 295/Berlin, Wiehl to Fabricius, March 27, 1940). The answer of Clodius and Fabricius to the respective communication (*ibidem*, pp. 33-34, telegram no. 399 from March 29, 1940).

¹⁰⁸ ADAP, vol. VIII, p. 470.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 471.

¹¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 472. On the same theme, later on, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Reich, Joachim von Ribbentrop, suggested to Göring that he should accept the collaboration of "his personal agents", namely of the agents infiltrated in the diplomatic missions (*ibidem*, pp. 482-484, von Ribbentrop to Göring, Berlin/January 4, 1940).

¹¹² Arh. M.A.E., fund 71 Romania, General, vol. 8, f. 102.

¹¹³ *Ibidem*, f. 104.

¹¹⁴ Reconfirmed through a German-Romanian "temporary convention" on March 6, 1940 (cf. Viorica Moisuc, *Diplomația României*, p. 278).

¹¹⁵ *Ibidem*, f. 103.

¹¹⁶ *Ibidem*, f. 110.

¹¹⁷ *Ibidem*.

¹¹⁸ *Ibidem*.

¹¹⁹ They all had Romania "under supervision", politically, militarily, economically, etc, including with regard to petroleum (see A.N.R., the collection *Microfilme S.U.A.*, rolls 36-39, 43, *passim*, German documents). As far as the French, see the syntheses about Romania's fluvial lines (ȚGASA, Moskva, fund 198, opis 2, file 403), army organization (*idem*, files 419, 421, 424, 427-429), railway (*idem*, file 402), telephone lines (*idem*, vol. 401), mercantile marine and the port of Constanța (*idem*, vol. 400), petroleum (*idem*, files 395-396).

¹²⁰ ȚGASA, Moskva, fund 198, opis 2, files 395-396, *passim*.

¹²¹ See Galeazzo Ciano, *The Ciano Diaries*, p. 233 (entry from April 8, 1940: the decision of the German General Staff to occupy the Ploiești petroliferous area in case the U.S.S.R. attacked Romania).

¹²² See Gh. Buzatu, *România și trusturile petroliere internaționale până la 1939*, quoted edition, pp. 31, 39.

¹²³ Cf. Marion C. Siney, *The Allied Blockade of Germany 1914-1916*, p. 192.

¹²⁴ Apud "Istoricul chestiunii distrugerilor din 1916 (Actele și documentele oficiale), in *M.P.R.*, no. 24/1925, pp. 1983-1988.

¹²⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 1983-1984.

¹²⁶ See orders no. 1 787/November 6, 1916 of the General Command of Stages and Communications (apud Arh. M.A.E., fund 71/1914, E/2 petrol, vol. 232, ff. 20-21), no. 3 216/November 16, 1916 of the Romanian General Headquarters (*ibidem*, f. 19), and no. 3 490/November 20, 1916 (*ibidem*, f. 22), disposing the destruction of the petroliferous area even before the intervention of the Allies; the National Library of Romania, fund Al. Saint-Georges, stock XCIV/3, *passim*.

¹²⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 1984-1985.

¹²⁸ See *M.P.R.*, no. 1/1919, pp. 3-6; *M.P.R.*, no. 2/1919, p. 41 and the following; *M.P.R.*, no. 2/1919, p. 50 and the following; *M.P.R.*, no. 6/1919, pp. 182-184.

¹²⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹³⁰ The first committee met on February 9, 1922, including L. Mrazec, I. Tănăsescu, and L. Wenger.

¹³¹ In October 1922 the losses of the private companies were estimated to 9 980 527 pounds (cf. *Istoricul chestiunii distrugerilor...*, p. 1986), while the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the years 1922-1926, I.G. Duca, estimated the total value of the losses to 15 million pounds (see Arh. M.A.E., fund 71 England, 1921-1929, vol. 15/Press, f. 48-49). On March 6, 1922, L. Mrazec wrote a report that established the value of the losses to 15 537 389 pounds, compared to the sum of 8 872 998 pounds admitted by the Anglo-French (the National Library of Romania, fund Al. Saint-Georges, stock XCII/6, ff. 114-115).

¹³² See Arh. M.A.E., fund 71/1914, E/2, Compensations vol. 5, *passim*; *idem*, E/2, Compensations 7, vol. 76, *passim*; *idem*, fund 71/1914, E/2 Petroleum, vol. 231 (1916-1927), *passim* (especially about the negotiations of N. Titulescu in London in 1925-1926); *idem*, fund 71/1914, E/2 Petroleum, vol. 232 (1928-1933), *passim* (the conventions signed by N. Titulescu with the British on November 1, 1926 and the French and Belgians on November 8, 1926, ff. 221-230); *idem*, fund 71/1914, fund E/2 Petroleum, vol. 233 (1934-1940), *passim*; A.N.R., the Royal House fund, fișe 21/1925,

passim; the National Library of Romania, fund Al. Saint-Georges, stock CCCLXVIII/15, *passim*; *M.P.R.*, no. 22/1926, pp. 21663-2165; "Rezolvarea problemei despăgubirilor pentru distrugerile din ordin", in *M.P.R.*, no. 24/1926, pp. 2291-2295; *M.P.R.*, no. 1/1927, pp. 35-38; *M.P.R.*, no. 7/1929, pp. 621-623.

¹³³ Cf. Gregoire Gafenco, *Préliminaires de la Guerre à l'Est...*, p. 327 and the following (chapter XIII – *L'agonie de la neutralité roumaine*).

¹³⁴ They considered at the time that Romanian oil was "of supreme importance" for the German war economy (cf. Hamerton and collaborators, *The Second Great War*, II, London, 1945, pp. 557, 566).

¹³⁵ See, in this sense, Horia Brestoiu, *Acțiuni secrete în România. În preajma și la începutul celui de-al doilea război mondial*, quoted edition, *passim*; idem, *Impact la paralela 45. Incursiune în culisele bătăliei pentru petrolul românesc*, Iași, Editura Junimea, 1986, *passim*; Viorica Moisuc, *Diplomația României*, p. 267 and the following. An very important role in preventing the sabotages was played by the agents of the famous military espionage and counterespionage service *Abwehr*, under the command of Admiral W. Canaris (*Ibidem*, pp. 272-273), which enjoyed the cooperation of M. Moruzov, the head of the *Romanian Secret Service* (Horia Brestoiu, *Acțiuni secrete...*, pp. 247-252).

¹³⁶ Soon after the audience that Carol II had granted him on August 28, 1939, Colonel Gerstenberg informed Berlin, while the war had not started yet, that the King of Romania "rejected the Anglo-French sabotage offer against the oil fields in Romania, given the neutrality of the country" (apud Horia Brestoiu, *Impact la paralela 45*, p. 105). Carol II wrote in his *Jurnal* that Gerstenberg had come with a message – a "serious" one, in fact "an attempt of intimidation" – from Göring: the adoption of a neutral position in case of war (cf. Carol II, *Însemnări zilnice*, I, p. 415).

¹³⁷ See the opinion expressed in the daily paper *Timpul* from July 28, 1940 (apud *Acestea erau garanțiile anglo-franceze. Planurile de distrugeri ale Aliaților în regiunea petroliferă și pe Dunăre*, București, Institutul Grafic "Arta" [1940], p. 13).

¹³⁸ See above.

¹³⁹ See above.

¹⁴⁰ *Acestea erau garanțiile anglo-franceze. Planurile de distrugeri ale Aliaților în regiunea petroliferă și pe Dunăre*, quoted edition, *passim*; Paul Allard, *Les plans secrets de G.Q.G. pendant la Guerre*, quoted edition, *passim*; Rudolf van Wehrt, *Asfel s-a făcut războiul*, București, Editura Cartea Românească, f.a., *passim*.

¹⁴¹ See Gh. Buzatu, *România în arhivile Kremlinului*, cap. IX – "Arhive pierdute, arhive capturate, arhive regăsite" (p. 167 and the following). We studied the respective files only a year before they were restituted, through an agreement, to the French government (December 1993): see IĞASA, Moskva, fund 198, opus 2, file 295, 203 pages (entitled *Roumanie: Destruction des puits de pétrole*); idem, file 396, 229 pages (*Rumanien: Mission Wenger*).

¹⁴² IĞASA, Moskva, fund 198, opus 2, file 395, ff. 129-146 (*Rapport sur la destruction de l'industrie pétrolière*; two photocopies of the document, in Horia Brestoiu, *Acțiuni secrete...*, pp. 64-65). The plan of the former director of the French-Belgian consortium *Petrofina*, which controlled *Concordia* in Romania, stipulated two variants – the first one a rapid destruction (executed in 24 hours) and a methodical destruction (in 10-30 days), paralyzing the production in a proportion of 90% and the means of transportation (cf. *Acestea erau garanțiile anglo-franceze...*, quoted edition, p. 7; Horia Brestoiu, *Impact la paralela 45*, pp. 111-112). A coordinating "general staff" was constituted (Roger Sarret, Pierre Angot, Jacques Pierre Coulon, etc.), which established contacts, on the Romanian territory, with the group of officers of the *Intelligence Service* (Colonel Colin Cubbins, Major Garfit Watson, and Ted Masterson). The French-British plan was communicated to the General Staff of the Romanian army (*ibidem*, p. 113). In their preparations, the British gave attention to the "actions of sabotage" in the petroliferous area (the adopted common plan had in view that "especially the oil derricks, the production, transportation, and refining equipment needed to be destroyed", in *Acestea erau garanțiile anglo-francezilor...*, p. 6), without ignoring the paralyzing of the traffic on the Danube (see Horia Brestoiu, *Acțiuni secrete...*, p. 115 and the following). On the Romanian side, at the level of the General Staff, we know that intense preparations were made (cf. Viorica Moisuc, *Diplomația României*, p. 289), but, under the circumstances of the Reich's pressures and the orientation of Bucharest towards Berlin, of the Canaris-Moruzov collaboration in 1939-1940 precisely in the petroleum area, they were in no way materialized nor disclosed (see Horia Brestoiu, *Acțiuni secrete...*, p. 172 and the following).

¹⁴³ Apud Paul Allard, *Les plans secrets...*, p. 39; Horia Brestoiu, *Acțiuni secrete...*, pp. 95-96 (photocopy).

¹⁴⁴ Paul Allard, *Les plans secrets...*, p. 40. The strictly secret telegram no. 1 114 from September 28, 1939 sent by Adruen Thierry to his Center in Paris pointed out the following: "In my opinion, we have a decisive interest to realize, without delay, a blocking of the Danube, so that the fluvial traffic between Romania and Germany may be completely interrupted", which "would mean for us an advantage at least equivalent to the destruction of the oil fields, because it would paralyze at the same time all the oil and cereal transports" (apud *Acestea erau garanțiile anglo-franceze...*, p. 9).

¹⁴⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 41 and the following; Ian Colvin, *L'amiral Canaris*, Paris, 1952, pp. 204-205; Henri Michel, *La drôle de guerre*, p. 240 and the following.

¹⁴⁶ See Horia Brestoiu, *Acțiuni secrete...*, *passim*.

¹⁴⁷ See Cristian Troncotă, *Mikhail Moruzov și Serviciul de Informații al Armatei Române. Studii și documente*, București, Editura I.N.I., 1996, p. 177 and the following.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 300 (doc. no. 47).

¹⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 302-303.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 310 (Report of C. Gh. Ionescu-Micandru, doc. no. 48).

¹⁵¹ *Ibidem*, p. 313.

¹⁵² *Ibidem*.

¹⁵³ *Ibidem*, p. 314.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 320-324 (Report of Ionescu-Micandru on the visit, doc. no. 49).

¹⁵⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 323.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 336 (Report from December 4, 1939, doc. no. 55).

¹⁵⁷ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 336-344.

¹⁵⁹ We extract from the note written by Moruzov himself: "... I wanted very much – began Canaris – to make this trip to Bucharest, with the purpose – on the one hand – of saluting you personally, and – on the other hand – of examining, on the spot, the sabotage problem, since the German High Command and government are in a state of extreme irritation due to the proportions given to the sabotage action in Romania. Given the extreme seriousness of this matter, we considered that it was necessary to examine personally whether the measures for the prevention of the sabotage acts are sincere and sufficient, so that Germany can be offered the necessary security and reassurance: in a contrary case, Germany will act accordingly. In any case, for me, your person, as head of the Secret Intelligence Service of the Romanian army, and the organization of the Service that you lead present a complete guarantee; however, having in view that the provisioning of Germany with the necessary supplies, in accordance with the economic agreement (from March 23, 1939 – author's note), is extremely important, I was delegated to do additional investigations on this matter and, therefore, to appeal to you to give me your collegial assistance, reminding you that this issue is of equal interest to both states." (*ibidem*, p. 351, Note of Moruzov from December 11, 1939, doc. no. 58).

¹⁶⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 352 (doc. no. 59).

¹⁶¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 445-450 (Note of M. Moruzov, doc. no. 106).

¹⁶² *Ibidem*, p. 447.

¹⁶³ *Ibidem*, pp. 419-421 (Report, doc. no. 92).

¹⁶⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 389-397 (doc. no. 77), 407-415 (doc. no. 90), 416-419 (doc. no. 91), 421-425 (doc. no. 92).

¹⁶⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 368 (doc. no. 62).

¹⁶⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 369 (doc. no. 63).

¹⁶⁷ *Ibidem*.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 391 (doc. no. 77).

¹⁶⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 425-430 (doc. no. 93). Several agents of the R.S.S. ("Cg", "T", etc.) were infiltrated on the British ships that traveled loaded with weapons and explosives towards Giurgiu, with the final destination to the Iron Gates. After the blocking of the British convoy on the Danube, A. Hitler – as H. Göring communicated through Colonel A. Gerstenberg in Bucharest – declared himself "extremely satisfied with the measures taken by Romania for the prevention of the sabotage acts in general and, especially, with the occasion of the inspection of the British ships at Giurgiu" (*ibidem*, p. 403, doc. no. 84).

¹⁷⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 440-441 (doc. no. 103).

¹⁷¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 437-438, 438-439 (doc. nos. 100-101, from May 16, 1940).

¹⁷² See M. Moruzov's report on the visit to France in which he inserted the confessions of Colonel Rivet, the head of the supreme French military espionage organism, in the sense that: "The informative material that the French Intelligence Service has – especially on Germany – is in majority the material procured by our Service (author's bold)" (apud Cristian Troncotă, *Mihail Moruzov*, p. 407, doc. no. 90). In London, as well, the head of the *Intelligence Service* congratulated him "for the informative activity of our Service" (author's bold) (*ibidem*, p. 416, doc. no. 91).

¹⁷³ *Ibidem*, pp. 481-482 (doc. no. 126).

¹⁷⁴ In July 1940, Fabricius met with General Ion Antonescu, who declared that he had asked King Carol II to dismiss M. Moruzov, a "traitor". Fabricius stood up for the head of the R.S.S. (cf. A.N.R., the collection *Microfilme S.U.A.*, roll T 120-175, frames 137 086-137 088, telegram bno. 1 142 from July 9, 1940, Fabricius to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin).

¹⁷⁵ In April 1940, he was received by King Carol II, to whom he presented data regarding the role of Romanian petroleum in the continuation of Germany's war. The sovereign did not reject the importance of the issue, but he insisted on the Soviet danger in Bessarabia, alluding to the possibility, in case of emergency, of the defending of the petroliferous region by the Reich (cf. *ADAP*, Series D, vol. IX, pp. 134-135, report from April 14, 1940, Bucharest, Manfred von Killinger to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Von Killinger recommended to his Center to pay

serious attention to the collaboration of the *Abwehr* and the *S.D.* with the *Romanian Secret Service* and *General Security* for the protection of the Romanian petroliferous area from possible sabotage (*ibidem*, p. 135).

¹⁷⁶ See Larry L. Watts, *Romanian Cassandra. Ion Antonescu and the Struggle for Reform. 1916-1941*, New York/Boulder, Columbia University Press, 1993, p. 214; Gh. Buzatu, *Din istoria secretă a celui de-al doilea război mondial*, II, București, Editura Enciclopedică, 1985, p. 97.

¹⁷⁷ ȚGASA, Moskva, fund 198, opis 2, file 395, ff. 75-77.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 78.

¹⁷⁹ Among the documents found in the original Wenger "file", we mention: *Roumanie – Destruction des puits de pétrole. Pièces antérieures à la guerre* (ȚGASA, fund 198, opis 2, file 395, ff. 168-203); *Mission Wenger – Pièces de base* (*ibidem*, ff. 72-167; idem, file 396, ff. 4-191); *Pétroles – Lutte contre les achats roumains* (*ibidem*, ff. 192-229); *Note sur une politique du pétrole en Roumanie pendant sa neutralité*, study by L.W. dated November 6, 1939 (*ibidem*, ff. 59-75); the study *La politique pétrolière en Roumanie*, dated February 7, 1940 (*ibidem*, ff. 129-142); bulletins regarding the maritime traffic and the oil exports of Romania in 1939-1940 (*ibidem*, ff. 143-158); the synthesis *Sur une politique économique en Europe Orientale*, April 4, 1940 (*ibidem*, ff. 163-167); *Note au sujet de la Mission Wenger*, November 24, 1939 (*ibidem*, ff. 39-41); the official record of the "Wenger meeting" from December 28, 1939 which resulted in the decision to initiate an action that would paralyze the oil production and transports in Romania (*ibidem*, ff. 13-24). It also results from these documents that, in the month of May 1939, the French official circles tackled the issue of the oil destructions in Romania (idem, fund 198, opis 2, file 395, ff. 170-172).

¹⁸⁰ See Horia Brestoiu, *Acțiuni secrete...*, p. 167 and the following.

¹⁸¹ About the preparations for the operation, details in Horia Brestoiu, *Acțiuni secrete...*, pp. 143-167; Paul Allard, *Les plans secrets...*, pp. 42-44. On April 3, 1940, a convoy arrived at Giurgiu, formed of several tug boats and barges (Britania, Elisabeth, King George, Scotland, Lord Byron, Thermond, etc.). On the ships, served by predominantly British crews, there were important quantities of armament, with regard to which the Romanian government decided initially to "seal them on board". Informed, the German Minister in Bucharest, Fabricius, intervened immediately, soliciting firm measures for the blocking of the operation of dynamiting certain sections along the Danube and, especially, of the sluice gates (Horia Brestoiu, *Acțiuni secrete...*, pp. 163-164; Viorica Moisuc, *Diplomația României*, p. 289).

¹⁸² On April 10, 1940, the U.S. Minister to Bucharest, F.M. Gunther, transmitted to the Secretary of State Cordell Hull that the information about the intentions of the British had been intercepted by the Nazi spies, who had pervaded Romania (apud National Archives of the U.S.A., Washington, D.C., Record Group 59, Department of State, Box No. 2 113, telegram no. 118). See the special reports written by Gunther to Hull). In this period, Gunther was closely following the statistics registering Romania's oil exports – the monthly quantities and the countries of destination (cf. idem, Box No. 2 115 A, telegram no. 221/Bucharest, May 21, 1940, Gunther to Hull).

¹⁸³ Idem, Box No. 2 113 (telegram no. 95/Belgrade, April 9, 1940, Lane to Hull). At the end of March 1940, Clodius met with Premier Tătărescu, discussing among other things the issue of the oil exports to Germany. They agreed that the transportation was difficult, that measures were necessary from both sides for the prevention of sabotage (cf. *ADAP*, Series D, vol. IX, pp. 39-42, report from Bucharest/March 30, 1940, Clodius and Fabricius to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Killinger informed Berlin about the sabotage on the Danube planned by the British (*ibidem*, pp. 134-135, the mentioned report from April 1940).

¹⁸⁴ National Archives, Washington, Record Group 59, Box No. 2 113 (telegram no. 122/Bucharest, April 12, Gunther to Hull).

¹⁸⁵ Idem, Box No. 2 112 (telegram no. 76/Budapest, April 12, 1940, Montgomery to Hull).

¹⁸⁶ *Ibidem* (telegram no. 94/Berlin, April 12, 1940, Kirk to Hull).

¹⁸⁷ *Ibidem* (telegram no. 31/Sofia, April 13, 1940, Earle to Hull; telegram no. 127/Bucharest, April 14, 1940, Gunther to Hull); idem, Box No. 2 114 (telegram no. 1 027/Berlin, Kirk to Hull). The U.S. Department of State drew up a synthesis about the British attempts of sabotage on the Danube for the period April 4-11, 1940 (*ibidem*, 7400011/2384).

¹⁸⁸ See *ADAP*, Series D, vol. IX, p. 35 (telegram no. 400/Bucharest, March 29, 1940, Fabricius and Neubacher to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

¹⁸⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 375-377 (secret report from Bucharest/May 28, 1940, Neubacher to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs); Viorica Moisuc, *Diplomația României*, pp. 293-294. "The petroleum pact – in the opinion of Viorica Moisuc – represented the establishing of Germany's control over one of the main branches of Romania's industry; the exploitation, processing, and distribution of the largest part of the oil products to the German market were transferred, shortly after the signing of the pact, onto Germany; the foreign shares in the Romanian oil industry were taken over by the companies with German capital. The petroleum pact was imposed on the juridical basis of the economic treaty from March 23, 1939 and under the circumstances created by the aggravation of the international situation of Romania in the spring of 1940" (*ibidem*, p. 294). See the complete text of the *Petroleum Pact* in Mircea Mușat, Ion Ardeleanu,

România după Marea Unire, II/2, București, Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1988, pp. 1082-1084. Cf. also Margot Hegemann, *Die Grenze...*, p. 75 and the following.

¹⁹⁰ *ADAP*, vol. IX, p. 285 (telegram no. 712/Bucharest, May 16, 1940, Fabricius to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

¹⁹¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 39-42 (the mentioned report of Clodius and Fabricius from March 30, 1940).

¹⁹² *Ibidem*, pp. 354-356 (telegram no. 790/Bucharest, May 25, 1940, Fabricius to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

¹⁹³ Cf. Andras Hillgruber, *Hitler, Regele Carol și Mareșalul Antonescu*, pp. 119-120.

¹⁹⁴ Viorica Moisuc, *Diplomația României*, p. 278; Philippe Marguerat, *Le III-e Reich et le pétrole roumain*, pp. 189-191. According to the Swiss historian, through the agreement from March 6, 1940, the Reich obtained a "privileged treatment" regarding oil trade (*ibidem*, p. 190), the prices accepted by Bucharest being inferior to those of the market, which continued to be valid for the French and the British. Thus, in the period previous to the signing of the agreement, the Germans paid an average of 9 600 lei/ton, and afterwards the prices were established at 3 826 lei/ton (*ibidem*, p. 190, note 4; on page 191, note 1, the comparative prices on March 15, 1940, for essences, oil, gasoline and mazut, per categories of: prices established by agreement, prices of the market, and international prices fob Golfe, namely 4 407 lei, 8 889 lei, and respectively 3 065 lei. Also, on December 20, 1939 the rate of exchange for the lei had been established in relation to the German mark: 49.50 lei = 1 DM (*ibidem*, p. 187).

¹⁹⁵ Andreas Hillgruber, *Hitler, Regele Carol și Mareșalul Antonescu*, p. 120.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibidem*.

¹⁹⁷ See A.N.R., the Ministry of Industry and Petroleum fund, file 41/1943, f. 2. The adjustments of the prices of the oil products delivered to the Reich, to which we have referred, consisted in several increases: by 9% in June 18, 1941; by 15% on October 31, 1941; by 26% on March 12, 1943; by 30% on February 9, 1944, so that upon the breaking of the Romanian-German alliance, the total registered increase, in relation to May 1940, was of 128.69% (*ibidem*). For the coordination of the oil imports from Romania, at the request of the Reich's Ministry of Economy, the company *Rumänien-Mineralöl GmbH (Ruminöl)* was established (cf. Andreas Hillgruber, *Hitler, Regele Carol și Mareșalul Antonescu*, p. 120).

¹⁹⁸ See *ADAP*, Series D, vol. IX, pp. 382-383 (telegram no. 808/Bucharest, May 29, 1940, Fabricius to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs); *ibidem*, pp. 383-385 (report of Manfred von Killinger, Berlin, May 29, 1940).

¹⁹⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 383-384.

²⁰⁰ At the end of May 1940 the British decided to withdraw towards Istanbul their ships that had ensured the transport on the Danube. At Fabricius's intervention, Bucharest stopped the departure of 20 ships (5 tow boats, 11 barges, 2 tanks, one floating elevator and one pontoon – 73 million lei); at the moment of the signing of the armistice, on June 22, 1940, the crews of the French ships (19) solicited to be placed under British flag, which Bucharest did not accept; also, under the same circumstances, at Hârșova, the Dutch and the Belgian ships were blocked, and 27 British citizens were caught by the events on Romanian territory (engineers and clerks), who had planned the acts of destruction or sabotage of the Romanian oil industry. Finally, on July 3, 1940, the Gh. Tătărescu decided their expulsion (see Arh. M.A.E., fund 71/Romania General, vol. 8, ff. 441-450, *Diferende pentinde între România și Marea Britanie*). As far as the predispositions of the new government I. Gigurtu to "strengthen" the collaboration with the Reich, including by guaranteeing the oil deliveries, the Premier communicated to H. Göring in July 1940 that: "... We are willing to double the deliveries as far as quantity. As means of transportation we provide [...] 3 000 tank cars [...]. The same effort will be made for the delivery of the cereals... (author's bold)" (*ibidem*, f. 437).

²⁰¹ See *ADAP*, Series D, vol. IX, pp. 543-544 (text transmitted through telegram no. 957/Bucharest, June 21, 1940, Fabricius to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

²⁰² *Ibidem*.

²⁰³ Gregoire Gafenco, *Préliminaires de la Guerre à l'Est...*, pp. 343-344.

²⁰⁴ As it was pointed out in the period by N. Dașcovici, eminent specialist in international law, for Romania, neutrality had established the situation in which it had "nothing against any of the present belligerents" (cf. *Neutralitatea României*, quoted edition, p. 14). A complete analysis of the internal and external situation of Romania on the eve and at the beginning of World War II, in Mircea Mușat, Ion Ardeleanu, *România după Marea Unire, II/2, passim*. With reference to the abandoning of neutrality, *ibidem*, pp. 1085-1086.

²⁰⁵ Cf. Gh. Buzatu, *Români și războiul mondial din 1939-1945*, pp. 10-11.

²⁰⁶ Cf. Carol II, *Între datorie și pasiune. Însemnări zilnice, II, 1939-1940*, edition of Marcel-Dumitru Ciucă and Narcis Dorin Ion, București, Editura Șansa, 1996, p. 177.

²⁰⁷ *Ibidem*; idem, *În zodia satanei. Reflexiuni asupra politicii internaționale*, first edition, București, Editura Universitaria, 1994, pp. 134-135. About Carol II's attempt of "adaptation to reality", see Constantin I. Kiriteșcu, *România în al doilea război mondial*, I, ed. Gh. Buzatu, București, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, 1995, pp. 110-111.

²⁰⁸ Gh. Buzatu, *România și războiul mondial din 1939-1945*, p. 11; Constantin I. Kiriteșcu, *România în al doilea război mondial*, I, p. 116 and the following.

²⁰⁹ See *The Ciano Diaries*, p. 154; G. Cioranescu and collaborators, *Aspects des relations russo-roumaines. Rétrospective et orientations*, I, Paris, Minard, 1967, pp. 153-154; Andreas Hillgruber, ed., *Les entretiens secrets de Hitler. Septembre 1939-Décembre 1941*, Paris Fayard, 1969, p. 47.

²¹⁰ Initially, the U.S.S.R. had intended to impose on Romania through a note of the nature of an ultimatum, to immediately "transmit" not only Bessarabia, but also the entire Bukovina, but after Hitler's intervention it reduced its pretensions only to the north of the province (cf. G. Cioranescu and collaborators, *Aspects des relations russo-roumaines*, I, pp. 158-159; Valeriu Florin Dobrinescu, *Bătălia diplomatică pentru Basarabia. 1918-1940*, Iași, Editura Junimea, 1991, pp. 149-150; Ion Constantin, *România. Marile Puteri și problema Basarabiei*, București, Editura Enciclopedică, 1995, pp. 64-65).

²¹¹ Cf. Henri Michel, *La Seconde Guerre mondiale*, I, 1939-1943, Paris, PUF, 1968, p. 288; Robert Goralski, Russel W. Freeburg, *Oil and War*, pp. 59-60.

²¹² In 1939-1940, London manifested the hope that Italy might abandon non-belligerence, opting for the cause of the Allies, for which purpose, for instance, on October 1, 1939, Churchill promised it the statute of a "great and friendly power" (cf. V.G. Truhanovski, *Vnešneia politika Anglii v period vtoroi mirovoi voini*, p. 46).

²¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 61.

²¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

²¹⁵ Apud Adolph Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, translated by Maria Florea, București, Editura Pacifica, 1993, p. 465; see also Gh. Buzatu, *Din istoria secretă a celui de-al doilea război mondial*, I, p. 69.

²¹⁶ *Ibidem*, I, pp. 69-70.

²¹⁷ Apud *Istoriia Velikoi Otecestvennoi voini Sovetskogo Soiuzu 1941-1945*, vol. I, Moskva, 1960, p. 351.

²¹⁸ *Ibidem*.

²¹⁹ D.M. Proektor, *Agressia I katastrofa*, second edition, Moskva, 1972, p. 189; Gh. Buzatu, *Din istoria secretă a celui de-al doilea război mondial*, I, p. 70.

²²⁰ Cf. F. Halder, *Voennii dnevnik. 1939-1942 gg*, II, Moskva, 1969, *passim*, (the entries from July 3, 4, 5, and 18, 1940, pp. 29, 31, 37, 52). References to Romania (the entries from July 9, 11, and 14, 1940, pp. 41, 45, and 47).

²²¹ Cf. *Hitlers Strategie. Politik und Kriegführung 1940-1941*, Frankfurt am Main, Bernard und Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1965, p. 449.

²²² F. Halder, *op. cit.*, II, p. 60.

²²³ *Ibidem*, pp. 80-81 (note on the military meeting from July 31, 1940).

²²⁴ Cf. Gh. Buzatu, *Din istoria secretă a celui de-al doilea război mondial*, I, pp. 71-72; William L. Shirer, *Le Troisième Reich des origins à la chute*, Paris, Stock, 1967, pp. 848-849; Henri Michel, *La Seconde Guerre mondiale*, I, p. 228; Lieutenant-Colonel Eddy Bauer, *The History of World War II*, Leicester, Galley Press, pp. 157-164.

²²⁵ Constantin I. Kirîțescu, *România în al doilea război mondial*, Chișinău, Lyceum, 1997, pp. 59-60.

²²⁶ Cf. Ion Constantin, *România. Marile Puteri și problema Basarabiei*, pp. 64-66; Hermann Weber, *Die Bukovina im zweiten Weltkrieg*, Hamburg, 1972, p. 11 and the following; Anatol Petrencu, *Basarabia în al doilea război mondial*, Chișinău, Lyceum, 1997, pp. 59-60.

²²⁷ About the visit of V.M. Molotov to Berlin, see *Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918-1945*, Series D, 1937-1945, Band XI/1, *Die Kriegsjahre*, IV/1, I. September bis 13. November 1940, Bonn, Gebr. Hermes KG, 1964, p. 448 and the following (the minutes of the meetings V.M. Molotov – Adolph Hitler from November 12, 1940, doc. no. 326, pp. 455-461 and from November 13, 1940, doc. no. 328, pp. 462-472; the minutes of the meetings V.M. Molotov – Joachim von Ribbentrop from November 12, 1940, doc. no. 325, pp. 448-455 and from November 13, 1940, doc. no. 329, pp. 472-478). The minutes of the meetings Molotov – Hitler were published in a critical edition by the historian Andreas Hillgruber (see *Staatsmänner und Diplomaten bei Hitler*, I, 1939-1941, Frankfurt am Main, Bernard und Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1966 and the French edition – *Les entretiens secrets de Hitler*, quoted edition, pp. 399-307 (the meeting from November 12, 1940) and pp. 308-321 (the meeting from November 13, 1940). About the interest of the U.S.S.R. for the south-east of Europe, *ibidem*, pp. 306, 321. In order to attract the U.S.S.R. towards the plans of the Axis, Hitler did not exclude its adhering to the Tripartite Pact (*ibidem*, pp. 306-307).

²²⁸ Cf. G. Cioranescu, *Aspects des relations russo-roumaines*, I, p. 162.

²²⁹ *Ibidem*; Gh. Buzatu, *Din istoria secretă a celui de-al doilea război mondial*, II, pp. 253-254, Robert Golaski, Russel W. Freeburg, *Oil and War*, p. 61.

²³⁰ Andreas Hillgruber, ed., *Les entretiens secrets de Hitler*, pp. 312-313.

²³¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 311-312.

²³² *Ibidem*, p. 319.

²³³ *Ibidem*, p. 321.

²³⁴ Joachim von Ribbentrop, *Des Londres à Moscou*, p. 183.

²³⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 183-184.

²³⁶ In the letter from December 15, 1943 sent to Marshal Antonescu, Hitler wrote: "... Because, in November 1940, when Molotov arrived to Berlin, the discussions were not mostly about Germany's situation, but that of Finland,

Romania, Bulgaria, and the issue of the Dardanelles. Very aware of its European responsibility to oppose the Soviet wish, Germany entered then in the bloodiest war of all times" (Vasile Arimia, Ion Ardeleanu, Ștefan Lache, eds. *Antonescu-Hitler. Corespondență și întâlniri inedite (1940-1944)*, II, București, Editura Cozia, 1991, p. 130) (Further quoted as *Antonescu-Hitler*).

²³⁷ Cf. William L. Shirer, *Le Troisième Reich...*, pp. 846-848; David Irving, *Churchill's War*, New York, Avon Books, 1991, p. 378 and the following (Hitler's war preparations against the U.S.S.R. intercepted by the British due to the deciphering machine *Enigma*).

²³⁸ Robert Goralski, Russel W. Freeburg, *Oil and War*, p. 61.

²³⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 63.

²⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 53-67 (chapter 4 entitled "Russian Oil: The German Key"). Chapter 5 of the mentioned work ("The Russian Campaign", pp. 68-86) has I.V. Stalin's words as a motto: "The war was caused by engines and octane" (p. 68); William L. Shirer, *Le Troisième Reich...*, pp. 940-941.

²⁴¹ Cf. Gh. Buzatu, *România și războiul mondial din 1939-1945*, pp. 12-13; Constantin I. Kirițescu, *România în al doilea război mondial*, I, pp. 140-152. The cabinet that accepted and signed the documents of the territorial ceding is called "the government of the country's grave diggers" (*ibidem*, p. 134). See also Mircea Mușat, *Drama României Mari*, București, Editura Fundației România Mare, 1992, *passim*.

²⁴² Mircea Mușat, Ion Ardeleanu, *România după Marea Unire*, III/2, p. 1137.

²⁴³ *Ibidem*, pp. 1159-1160.

²⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 1137. Hitler answered on July 15, 1940 (*ibidem*, pp. 1162-1164), and Carol II on July 26, 1940 (*ibidem*, pp. 1167-1171).

²⁴⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 1147-1148.

²⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 1175-1187.

²⁴⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 1187; *The Ciano Diaries*, p. 279.

²⁴⁸ Andreas Hillgruber, ed., *Les entretiens secrets de Hitler*, p. 174 (the minute of A. Hitler's meeting with I. Gigurtu and M. Manoilescu, Berghof, July 26, 1940).

²⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 177.

²⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 178.

²⁵¹ *Ibidem*, p. 179.

²⁵² *Ibidem*, p. 181.

²⁵³ *Ibidem*, p. 181, note e.

²⁵⁴ Franz Halder, *Voennii dnevnik*, t. 2, pp. 116-118.

²⁵⁵ See details in: Aurică Simion, *Dictatul de la Viena*, second edition, revised and completed, București, Editura Albatros, 1996, *passim*; Mihail Manoilescu, *Dictatul de la Viena. Memorii. Iulie-august 1940*, edition of Valeriu Dinu, București, Editura Enciclopedică, 1991, *passim*; Valeriu Pop, *Bătălia pentru Ardeal*, edition of Sanda Pop, Nicolae C. Nicolescu, București, Editura Enciclopedică, 1992, *passim*.

²⁵⁶ In the memorandum sent to Hitler in September 1943, Marshal Antonescu examined the circumstances in which the dictate from August 30, 1940 "came into being": the ensuring of Germany's military objectives, first by creating the Szeckler corridor, which "descended towards the Romanian oil" (apud Vasile Arimia, Ion Ardeleanu, Ștefan Lache, eds., *Antonescu-Hitler. Corespondență și întâlniri inedite (1940-1944)*, II, p. 108).


²⁵⁷ Cf. Aurică Simion, *Dictatul de la Viena*, pp. 317-318; Mircea Mușat, *Drama României Mari*, p. 149.

²⁵⁸ Cf. Andreas Hillgruber, ed., *Les entretiens secrets de Hitler*, p. 319.

²⁵⁹ Prince Michael Sturdza, *The Suicide of Europe. Memoirs of...*, Boston-Los Angeles, Western Islands Publishers, 1968, pp. 171-174.

²⁶⁰ Constantin I. Kirițescu, *România în al doilea război mondial*, I, p. 157 and the following; Paul D. Quinlan, *The Playboy King. Carol II of Romania*, Westport-London, Greenwood Press, 1995, pp. 208-218; Mircea Mușat, *Drama României Mari*, pp. 234-236.

²⁶¹ See Gh. Buzatu, *România și războiul mondial din 1939-1945*, pp. 16-17.



Report on Romanian Communities Situation in Eastern Europe

A few necessary remarks

George Damian

Some countries refuse to grant specific minority rights for large communities known as Vlachs or Moldovans (in Serbia, Bulgaria or Ukraine) arguing that these communities can not be considered as Romanians. This difference among Romanians – Vlachs – Moldovans is artificially maintained due to a confusion. “Valach-Vlach” was the name given by other populations for the Romance – language speakers living in the region where Romanian state exists today. At first “Vlach” referred to Latin origin people: for example in Hungarian “Olasz” means Italian and “Olah” means Romanian – respectively in Polish “Włosi” means Italian – “Woloh” means Romanian. It should be mentioned that in all sources prior to the XIX-th century Romanians living in Transylvania were recorded as “Vlachs” in all languages used here (German “Walach”; Hungarian “Olah”; cf. lat. “Blacchi”).

The name “Vlach” was most used with reference to the region south of Carpatian Mountains – recorded as “Valachia-Vlachia” in foreign documents – while the inhabitants named it “Țara Românească – Romanian Country”. The region east of Carpatian

Mountains was named in many foreign sources “Valachi/ Little Valachia” – but the most used name was Moldova. The binding links for the people living in all regions of nowadays Romania are Romanian language, christian – orthodox religion and their common customs and traditions. Even that during the medieval period Moldova was an independent state, its inhabitants – named “Moldovans” – used to ask: “do you speak Romanian?” – clearly indicating the language they spoke. “Moldovan language” first came into being as a political initiative in 1924 when Soviet Union tried to artificially create a “moldovan” identity and state east of river Dniestr. Stalin’s idea was carried further up to nowadays by the Communist Party in Chișinău, supporting politically the existence of “Moldavian language” – which is in fact identic with Romanian language – something similar to saying that in Germany and Austria there are two different official languages. The very fact that Serbia, Ukraine and Bulgaria maintain categories such “Vlachs” and “Moldovans” – actually Romanian language speakers – proves the lack of intentions to grant those communities minority rights.

BULGARIA

Demographics

According to the first population census in Bulgaria in 1905 were living approximately 80,000 Romanians, the same figure being recorded in 1910. In 1920 the population census recorded 57,312 Romanians living in Bulgaria; in 1926 83,746. The population census in 1934 drastically reduced the number of Romanians: in 1926 only in Vidin were recorded 42,414 Romanians – while in 1934 a mere 1,213 were recorded. The last official

recording of Romanians in Bulgaria dates back to 1965, when only 6,000 were registered.

The most recent census from 2001 does not have a category for Romanians. It is worth to mention that during this census 156,119 citizens were recorded as: “others” (69,204); “without ethnic identity” (62,108); “unknown ethnic identity” (24,807). Lacking official numbers, non-governmental organizations of Romanians in Bulgaria assert that in 35 villages

in district of Vidin there is a significant Romanian language speaking population – but the real number is prone to imprecision.

Education in mother tongue

Bulgarian legislation would allow education in Romanian language for Romanian communities – unfortunately this has not happened with the support of the Bulgarian authorities. Bulgarian Constitution states in art. 36 - 2 that: “Citizens whose mother tongue is not Bulgarian shall have the right to study and use their own language alongside the compulsory study of the Bulgarian language”. The Bulgarian Education Law states in art. 8-2 that: “Pupils whose mother tongue is not Bulgarian, besides the compulsory study of the Bulgarian language, shall have the right to study their own mother tongue outside the state school in the Republic of Bulgaria under the protection and control of the state”.

The only institution to ensure some classes in Romanian language is the so - called “Romanian Highschool” in Sofia – were are taught only 2 hours a week of Romanian language, having the status of foreign language. In spite of the above mentioned legal provisions there is no continuous form of teaching Romanian language for Bulgarian citizens of Romanian origin. An initiative of Romanian NGOs put into practice a few Romanian language classes – but outside of the official curricula – for example at the elementary school “P. R. Slaveicov” in Vidin.

Added to this situation there is a constant danger of closure of the elementary schools in the villages with a compact population of Romanians. This was the case in September 2004 when Bulgarian authorities announced their intention to close down the schools in Delaina and Rabrovo villages – inhabited by Romanians – arguing that there are not enough children to motivate maintaining the schools. Still, there is a possibility for Romanian ethnics from Bulgaria to study in Romania due to some scholarships offered by Romanian government.

Mass-media in mother tongue

Bulgarian legislation allows mass-media in minority languages – according to the Law on Radio and Television, Art. 12: “The programmes of radio and television broadcasters may be transmitted in another language where: 1. they are transmitted for educational purposes; 2. they are intended for Bulgarian nationals whose mother language is not Bulgarian”. In spite of this, in Bulgaria there are no radio or TV programmes in Romanian language for the Romanian communities. Beginning with 1993 in Vidin the Romanian language newspaper “Timpul” was published, as a project of the Vlachs Association of Bulgaria, being issued irregularly due to lack of funding. Presently in Vidin there is another Romanian language publication – “AVE” – a project of Uniunea Etnicilor Români din Bulgaria – suffering from insufficient funding as well.

Religion in mother tongue

Present legislation of Bulgaria does not explicitly prohibit the practice of religion in mother tongue. Still, up to this year there was no possibility for keeping a messa in Romanian language. All attempts to have a messa in Romanian of the priest from Rabova, Valentin Ţvetanov, were met with hostility from local religious authorities. Only on 28th of March 2007, Mitropolit of Vidin Domiţian granted the freedom for Romanian language messa in churches under his jurisdiction where there are Romanian communities.

NGOs activity

In Bulgaria a few Romanian NGOs are active. In October 1991 the Committee for founding Vlach Association from Bulgaria (A.V.B.) came into being. Initially, Bulgarian authorities refused to register this association – the registration occurred however after a trial on 30 April 1992. Attempts to establish branches of this NGO in other communities were met with hostility from local authorities who were constantly trying to delay the bureaucratic procedures. Starting with 2002 a new association was founded for Romanians

in Bulgaria, named "Comunitatea Românilor din Bulgaria" (Romanians Community in Bulgaria). As well, in 2003 Uniunea Etnicilor Români din Bulgaria AVE (Union of Romanian Ethnicity in Bulgaria) was founded. This association addressed in May this year a letter to the Council of Europe and European Commission, presenting the various aspects of Bulgarian state neglecting minority rights. Romanian associations in Bulgaria have an yearly traditional dancing festival in Vidin that celebrated its tenth edition in 2007.

Public attitude towards Romanian community

Although up to now there were no violent aggressions targeted at Romanian ethnics in Bulgaria, still Bulgarian mass-media runs from time to time defamating articles for Romanians. This is the case of "NIE" newspaper in Vidin that on 1st of April 2007 issue published an article comparing the Romanian community in Bulgaria with a pack of vampires. Another feature of Bulgarian media is to present the communities living in Bulgaria as Vlachs, strongly rejecting any link with Romanian ethnicity.

SERBIA

Demographics

Romanians living in Serbia were intentionally splited by Serbian authorities in two groups: Romanians living in Vojvodina (or Serbian Banat) – that were officially recognized as Romanians – and Romanians living in Timok Valley (or from Eastern Serbia) permanently treated by Serbian authorities as Vlachs. All statistics and censuses from XIXth century recorded in Serbia a number of Romanians ranging from 120000 up to 250000.

Romanians in Vojvodina

According to the first Yugoslavian census of 1921 67,897 Romanians lived in; in 1931 – 78,000; 1948 – 59,263; 1953 – 57,218; 1961 – 57,258; 1971 – 52,987; 1981 – 47,289; 1991 – 38,832; 2002 – 30,520.

Romanians in Timok Valley

Romanians living in Timok Valley were Vojvodin registered as Vlachs – but in some statistics one can see that the number of Romanian language speakers that were registered with Serbian ethnic identity is much higher than that of those registered as Vlachs. In 1921 159,549 Romanians were registered in Timok Valley; in 1931 – 57,000; during the census of 1948 only Romanians living in Vojvodina were registered; in 1953 198,793 Romanian language speakers and only 29,000 Romanians were registered; in 1981 – 135,000 Romanian language speakers, but there was no category for Romanian ethnicity; in 1991

71,536 Romanian language speakers and only 16,539 Romanians were registered; in 2002 59,729 Romanian language speakers and 44,110 Romanians were registered.

Education in mother tongue

In Timok Valley Romanians have no possibility to study in their mother tongue with state support, in spite of the fact that Serbian Constitution asserts in Art. 32: "Members of other nations and national minorities have the right to education in their own language in accordance with law".

On the other side, Romanians in Vojvodina enjoy a fine tuned system of education in mother tongue. Therefore, in Vojvodina exist 37 educational institutions that use Romanian language as teaching language. Also there is a pedagogical school in Vârșeț and a Romanian language program at the Novi Sad University. Teaching curricula are using Romanian language from elementary school up to university level – also there is an Institut where Romanian language textbooks are prepared. There is a high-school with full curricula in Romanian in Vârșeț, "Borislav Petrov Braca", attended by 93 pupils in 2007. In Alibunar there is an economic school that uses Romanian language – "Dositei Obradovic" – with 107 pupils. Romanian language may be studied beside Novi Sad University, at Belgrad University where in 2007 23 students were registered.

Mass-media in mother tongue

In Timok Valley, Romanian language mass-media is rarely seen, due to lack of funding. There is a magazine "Vorba noastră", printed only occasionally due to insufficient funding. As well, there were many initiatives to found some electronic mass-media – TV and radio programmes – that failed for the same reason –lack of money.

In Vojvodina, mass-media situation in Romanian language is much better thanks to the fact that media outlets in minority languages here are financially supported by the government of Autonomous Province of Vojvodina – one such a publication being the Romanian language weekly "Libertatea". In Vojvodina there are two more Romanian language publications: "Tineretea" and "Cuvântul Românesc". For electronic mass-media, there are aired some Romanian language programmes by Radio Novi Sad and TV Novi Sad. In 2007 the mentioned stations use to run daily up to six hours a day of radio programmes and one hour and half a day TV programme in Romanian language. BBC programmes in Romanian are retransmitted in Alibunar community by Radio FAR. In 2005 in Vojvodina 2300 hours of radio programmes and 218 hours of TV programmes were aired. In 2006 "Victoria" radio station was founded running a 24 hours programme in Romanian, being the sole radio station of this kind.

Religion in mother tongue

Although Serbian Constitution asserts in Art. 13: "Citizens are equal in their rights and duties and have equal protection before the State and other authorities, irrespective of their race, sex, birth, language, nationality, religion, political or other belief, level of education, social origin, property status, or any other personal attribute", still on December 2004, when priest Boian Alexandrovici built a church in Malainița village where he started to held orthodox messa in Romanian language, Serbian authorities had a harsh reaction. Following the construction of this church, priest Boian Alexandrovici received death threats. On 20th of January 2005 the mayor of Malainița village

issued an order of demolition for the church. Following the refuse of Boian Alexandrovici to obey this order, the priest was trialed and sentenced to two months in prison on probation. On 23rd of April 2005 when priest Boian Alexandrovici tried to held a messa in Romanian language in Negotin with about 60 believers attending the ceremony Serbian police tried to prevent him, arguing that this was an unapproved public manifestation. Now there are under construction two more churches in Timok Valley where the parochs intend to held Orthodox messa in Romanian language. On 18th of August 2006 priest Boian Alexandrovici adressed a letter for the Deputy Patriarch of Romanian Orthodox Church, Metropolit Daniil, complainig about the fact that Serbian Orthodox priests use to name Romanian children with Serbian names in spite of the opposition of the parents.

Compared to the situation in Timok Valley, Romanians in Vojvodina enjoy a much better situation. Here 40 parishes are functioning with 42 priests under jurisdiction of Romanian Orthodox Bishopry Dacia Felix from Vârșeț, led by His Holiness Daniil Patoșanul, Bishop of Archbishopry of Timișoara. Starting with 2006 Romanian language is used in teaching religion classes in schools.

Public activity of Romanians in Serbia

In Vojvodina and Timok Valley there are many non-governmental organizations pursuing the preservation of Romanian identity in the region. There is a high number of organizations like: Romanians Community in Serbia from Vojvodina, Democratic Party of Romanians in Serbia from Timok, Romanians Alliance from Vojvodina, Democratic Movement of Romanians in Serbia from Timok, Association for Vlach-Romanians Culture Ariadnae Filum, Romanians federation in Serbia, a Center for Ethnic Studies, Orthodox Romanians Organization.

The same different treatment of Serbian authorities may be found in what regards the activity of Romanians organizations – in

Vojvodina Romanian NGOs were founded beginning with 1990, while registering a Romanian organization in Timok Valley proves to be difficult even today. A few Romanian NGOs from Timok Valley tried beginning with 2006 to register a National Council for Romanians (Vlachs). Serbian authorities – more precisely the state secretary for national minorities Peter Ladijevici – refused to register this Council arguing that its statutory act comprised the use of mother tongue in Timok Valley. Romanians Federation in Serbia – an umbrella organization for Romanians in Timok Valley went to court in order to register the Council, obtaining the registration in August 2007.

Public attitude towards Romanian minority

From time to time, public authorities and Serbian mass-media manifest hostile attitudes towards Romanian minority. Beside the pressures on priest Boian Alexandrovici from authorities, Serbian mass-media ran some aggressive articles against Romanians. This is the case of “Politika” daily, a major Serbian newspaper, that in December 2004 had an

article saying that “It is obvious that during these meetings, concerning only the cultural and religious position of Vlachs, nobody invited representatives of Serbian state, following that some Vlachs representatives are plotting with some Romanian officials”. The same Politika had in April 2007 a series of hostile articles towards Romanian minority in Serbia during the time when Romanian company CUPROM was negotiating the take over of Serbian firm RTB Bor.

The most recent incident of this kind occurred on 20th August 2007 when deputy president of Romanian National Minority Council dr. Predrag Balasevici and director of Romanians Federation in Serbia Dusan Pârvulovici, who were returning from Romania, were stopped by Serbian custom officers who tried to prevent them from bringing into Serbia 100 books written in Romanian language. Serbian custom officers argued that those books may be “propaganda materials”. Following the protests of the two representatives of Romanian community they were finally allowed to bring into Serbia the mentioned books.

UKRAINE

Demographics

Like Serbia, Ukraine artificially splitted the Romanian community in two: Romanians and Moldovans, thereby continuing a practice from Soviet times. According to the last census of 2001 in Ukraine, 258,619 citizens were registered as Moldovans and 155,130 citizens were registered as Romanians. The census of 1930 registered in the nowadays Cernăuți region 227,187 Romanians. The first Soviet census in this region of 1959 registered 151,435 Romanians, and the last Soviet census in 1989 registered here 184,836 Romanians. The first Ukrainian census registered in Cernăuți region 181,780 Romanians – among which 67,225 were registered as Moldovans. In Odessa region in 2001 123,751 citizens were registered as Moldovans. In Transcarpatia region in 2001 32,152 Romanians were registered.

Education in mother tongue

Ukraine's legislation allows education in mother tongue and there are schools using Romanian language – but Ukrainian authorities put into practice a policy of transforming Romanian schools in mixed schools, afterwards transforming them into schools with classes only in Ukrainian language. There is another policy of closing schools with classes in Romanian language under the motivation of low number of students, those existent being transferred to Ukrainian language schools. At the same time Ukrainian authorities are reluctant in allowing classes or new schools in Romanian language in places inhabited by compact Romanian communities.

In 1997 in Odessa region there were 13 schools with Romanian language classes, 4 mixed schools and other 4 schools in Russian language that had classes in Romanian. In

2003 the situation was as follows: 9 schools in Romanian language and 9 mixed schools, an evolution confirming the tendencies stated above. In 2002 in Cernăuți region there were 83 schools in Romanian language and 9 mixed schools, compared with the year 2000 when there were 86 schools in Romanian and 6 mixed schools – another case proving the policy of Ukrainian authorities. In Transcarpatia region there are 11 Romanian language schools and 2 mixed schools, the school from Slatina being transformed into a highschool in 2003.

The policy of refusing the foundation of new schools using Romanian language in places inhabited by large Romanian communities is proved by the following facts: in Hliboca administrative region, Corcești village out of 1,538 citizens 1,385 registered as Romanians; in Tureatca village out of 1,738 inhabitants 1,591 registered as Romanians – in these villages the messa is in Romanian, but the schooling language is Ukrainian. In Volcineșii Vechi village out of 1972 inhabitants 879 registered as Romanians, in Stârcea village out of 1,156 inhabitants 500 registered as Romanians, Gârbovăț village out of 933 inhabitants 282 registered as Romanians – in these villages the church messa and schooling language is exclusively Ukrainian.

On 9th of January 2007 during the meeting of the Education Directorate in the Local Council of the Cernăuți city they announced the closure of schools 10 and 13 in Cernăuți where schooling was in Romanian. The children attending those schools were to be transferred to school 29 where they should start to be taught in Ukrainian. This decision was due to be put into effect beginning with 2008. The parents and children affected by this decision signed a petition asking that schools intended to be closed should be maintained.

Mass-media in mother tongue

Mass-media in Romanian language has a pretty large presence – still confronting a lot of problems. The biggest problem is funding the publications in Romanian language – most of

these being issued irregularly. The obligation of registering written media with local authorities generates also influences from Ukrainian authorities. Among Romanian language media printed in Cernăuți there are: newspapers “Concordia”, “Zorile Bucovinei”, “Junimea”, “Arcașul”; children magazine “Făgurel”; cultural almanach “Țara Fagilor”; “Septentrion literar” magazine; “Libertatea Cuvântului”, “Clopotul Bucovinei”. In Transcarpatia region mass-media in Romanian language is represented by: daily TV programmes “Zi de zi” and weekly “Telerevista săptămânii”, daily radio programme “Plaiul meu natal” and weekly magazine “Maramureșenii”.

Religion in mother tongue

Although Ukraine’s legislation allows practicing the religion in mother tongue by art. 6 of the Law for national minorities which “guarantees the national minorities (...) the free practice of their religion”, in this respect there are still serious problems, especially in Odessa region. In Camășovka (Hagi Curda) village parish there is an ongoing conflict from a few years, during which priest Anatol Curtev was subjected to physical aggression on many occasions, Ukrainian authorities failing to protect him or to pursue the perpetrators. Priest Anatol Curtev is linked to Mitropoly of Bessarabia and Bucovina, part of the Orthodox Church of Romanian and the conflict between him and priest Alexei Grecu (subject of the Moscow Patriarchate) started because of his link to the Romanian church.

On 9th of April 2006 priest Anatol Curtev was beaten by many unidentified persons while waiting in the central station of Ismail city. The complaints forwarded to the local police were not resolved. The laic representative of the Romanian church in Hagi Curda, Vasile Iordăchescu stated that “Romanians in south Bessarabia are being discriminated, have limited rights, they are marginalized, regardless of the outcome of parliamentary or local elections, moreover when it comes to our national values: language, culture, religion”.

During the night of 18 June 2006, three persons wearing masks on their faces attacked the house where priest Anatol Curtev slept, breaking the windows and threatening to set the house on fire. Local police refused to intervene. The aggressions from the last year were preceded by many other similar acts: on 17th of June 2003 the believers were beaten; on 21st of July 2003 the priest was tied to a car and threatened to be dragged to death; on 6th of June 2004 the church door was broken and the icons on the walls vandalized; on 9th of May 2005 the believers were denied the access into the cemetery, the priest being beaten on this occasion; in 2006 during the Eastern Messa toxic fumes were introduced into the church.

Public activity of Romanians in Ukraine

Romanians in Ukraine are represented in the Kyiv Rada by Ioan Popescu, who was elected on Regions Party lists. Beside this central representative, Romanian ethnics in Ukraine have a large number of non-governmental organizations. In Cernăuți region may be found: Christian-Democratic Alliance of Romanians in Ukraine; "Aron Pumnul" Scientific and Pedagogical

Association; "Mihai Eminescu" Society for Romanian Culture; Romanian Youth League in Bucovina "Junimea"; Society for Victims of Stalinist Reprisals "Golgota"; "Dragoș-Vodă" Cultural and Sports Association; Bucovina Center for Recent Research; Charity Association "Casa Limbii Române"; Inter-regional Union "Romanian Community in Ukraine". In Transcarpatia there are active "George Coșbuc" Cultural Association; "Ioan Mihaly de Apșa" Cultural Association; Regional Union "Dacia"; Romanian Youth Society "Mihai Eminescu". In Odessa region there are: National and Cultural Association "Basarabia" of Romanians in Odessa region; Folklore Society "Dor Basarabean". The last society has the intention of founding "Odessa Regional Center for Romanian Culture". The legal steps to register this center were made beginning with 2005, but up to now the Legal Commission of the Odessa Regional Council rejected the request forwarded by the leaders of Folklore Society "Dor Basarabean" together with Inter-regional Union "Romanian Community in Ukraine", saying that the founding of a cultural center of Romanians in south Bessarabia is "useless".

HUNGARY

Demographics

According to the 2001 census in Hungary a number of 7,995 citizens registered as Romanian ethnics, while 8,482 registered as Romanian language native speakers. During the 1990 census 10,740 citizens registered as Romanian ethnics and 8,730 registered as Romanian language native speakers. Leaders of Romanian NGOs in Hungary affirm that the number of ethnic Romanians living in Hungary is approximately 20,000 citizens. The cities and villages inhabited by Romanians may be found along Hungarian-Romanian border, while 1200 citizens of Romanian origins live in Budapest.

Education in mother tongue

Hungarian legislation allows education in mother tongue. In Hungary there are 11

elementary schools using Romanian language in Aletea, Bătania, Bedeu, Chitighaz, Micherehi, Otlaca-Pustă, Apateu, Cenadul Unguresc, Lcucușhaz, Săcal, Jaca. As well in Giula there is "Nicolae Bălcescu" high-school teaching in Romanian language. At university level, Romanian language may be studied at Szegeed University where there is a Romanian Department.

In what regards the education, during 2006 there was an incident when Romanian NGOs expressed disapproval with Ministry of Education. On 10th May 2006, during the final exams in history, pupils of Romanian origins were asked to "motivate briefly the causes for which the provisions of the Trianon Treaty which modified the borders of Hungary may be considered as incorrect from an ethnic point of

view". Some organizations and institutions (as Romanian Orthodox Bishopry in Hungary, Cultural Union of Romanians in Hungary, Romanians Coalition in Hungary, Foundation for Romanian Culture in Hungary, "Foaia Românească" magazine; Romanian Self-government in Budapest; Orthodox Women Association in Budapest; Youth Orthodox Association in Budapest; Romanian Self-government in Szeged; "Conviețuirea" magazine) forwarded a protest to the Ministry of Education in Budapest. The minister of education Istvan Hiller answered in a public letter, asserting that "will take measures that the National Center for Exams and Evaluation for Public Education to draw attention the commissions in charge with exam questionnaires on this fact and in their future activity to pay more attention for a precise formulation".

Mass-media in mother tongue

In Szeged region is aired a radio programme in Romanian language supported by the Hungarian Radio beginning with 1980. Romanian redaction is located in Szeged and at present is challenged by an acute lack of personnel. Here there is also beginning with 1982 a TV redaction for a Romanian language programme aired weekly for 26 minutes. TV Romanian language programmes exist on the cable network in Bătania, Bichișciaba, Chitighaz and Giula. Romanian Television programme may be viewed in almost all Romanian communities. Written mass-media is represented by magazines such as "Foaia Românească", "Conviețuirea" and "Jurnalul".

Religion in mother tongue

In Hungary was founded beginning with 1946 a Bishopry of Romanian Orthodox Church, functioning up to this day. This bishopry has 21 subordinated parishes in Romanian communities: Aletea, Apateu, Bătania, Bichiș, Bichișciaba, Budapesta, Cenadul Unguresc, Ciorvaș, Chitighaz, Crâstor, Darvaș, Giula – Orașul Mare

Românesc, Giula Orașul Mic Românesc, Jaca, Leucușhaz, Micherechi, Otlaca-Pustă, Petred, Săcal, Seghedin, Veched.

On 23rd of July 2007 the Orthodox Church in Bichișciaba was vandalized and set on fire. The Hungarian authorities solved the case very quick: on 26th of July it was announced that the perpetrator was discovered – a young Hungarian aged 33 suffering from mental illness. The Hungarian authorities promised all necessary support in eliminating the effects of the incident.

Public activity of Romanians in Hungary

Non-governmental organizations of Romanian in Hungary are numerous and very active. In Hungary are functioning: Cultural Union of Romanians in Hungary, Romanian Researchers and Creators Community in Hungary; Cultural Society of Romanians in Budapest; Romanian Cultural Association in Chitighaz; Romanian Cultural Association in Leta Mare; Romanian Cultural Association in Szeged; Foundation for Romanian Culture in Hungary; "Pro-musica" Foundation; "Lucian Magdu" Foundation. As well Country Self-government of Romanians in Hungary, Local Romanian Self-government, Romanians Coalition in Hungary are recognized.

The meeting of Country Self-government of Romanians on 22nd of March 2007 was carried exclusively using Hungarian language, due to this representatives of some Romanian NGOs requested that they should be allowed to make their oath in Romanian language. The request submitted by Orthodox Women Association in Budapest was rejected. This provoked the protesting associations (Romanian Self-government in Bichiș, Romanian Self-government in Micherechi, Romanian Self-government in Budapest, Romanian Self-government in Giula, Romanian Self-government in Macău) to file an official complaint for the Hungarian authorities regarding the free use of minority languages.

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
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Politics in the Middle East First Half of the 20th Century

Răzvan Dincă

1. Palestine and Zionism

Marking the beginning of the political activities in Palestine proves to be a difficult and also controversial issue. With respect to this matter, two perspectives can be differentiated: according to the first one, the contemporary state of Israel is the last phase of the Jewish presence in Palestine (which had begun in the time of Abraham, the first Patriarch), whereas the second claims that the political life was determined by the confrontation of Jewish and Arabic nationalisms in the 19th century¹. Undoubtedly, both statements are based on a real, historical foundation.

The first of the two theses was adopted by the Zionist movement and it states that the history of the Jews is in exact accordance with the events described in the Bible, culminating in the establishment of the kingdom successively ruled by Saul, David and Solomon. After Solomon's death, the kingdom was divided and many Jews were killed or exiled as a consequence of the Babylonian expeditions. Other occupants of Palestine (the Persians, the Greeks, the Romans) more or less allowed a large part of the community to return, as well as to rebuild the Temple in the old capital of Jerusalem, symbol of Judaism. What is more, it is under these occupancies that the Jews achieved the right to practice their religion and a certain political autonomy. Nevertheless, except for a short period of time, between 141 and 63 BC, they did not manage to gain independence. In 66 AD, a strong rebellion against the Roman administration broke out and the Temple was

destroyed for the second time. Between 132–135, the Romans fought the rebels led by Simon Bar Kochba and, after massacring them, they decided to entirely destroy Jerusalem and exile the majority of the Jewish population. The exiled or the diaspora spread in North Africa, Middle East and Europe, but a small Jewish community managed to survive other waves of invaders: the Persians, the Byzantines, the Arabs, the Crusaders, the Turks and eventually the British ruled over Palestine. Their attitude towards the Jewish community was, with few exceptions, quite permissive.

The starting point for the second thesis that refers to the Palestinian political life is the 19th century, an important age for the formation of national states. At that time, Palestine had been under Ottoman control and it was part of the vilayet of Syria. The population, may it be Jewish or Arab, was exploited by the imperial corrupt administration.

The diaspora still comprised the biggest part of the Jewish population, with large communities in Southern and Central Europe. Almost everywhere, the Israelites raised the suspicions of both the common people and of the ruling class, which not only tolerated, but also encouraged the abuses the Israelites were subjected to. But it is in the Russian Empire that the Jews had to face the toughest treatment in Modern Times. In this state, the Israelites were not allowed to own properties, they could only have a limited number of jobs and paid excessive, discriminatory taxes. A large number of young Jews were recruited by the

Russian army, almost always sent to the front line, having to endure the abuses of the officers.

During the first half of the 19th century, large communities are forcefully assimilated or obliged to renounce Judaism. The reforms initiated by Tsar Alexander II seemed to bring all these atrocities to an end, by giving numerous rights to the Jews and culminating in the permission to actively take part in discussing and solving state affairs. The *Haskalah*, or Jewish Enlightenment, was an intellectual movement in Europe, inspired by the European Enlightenment of the 18th century, which encouraged the emancipation of the young people, by their total involvement in the Russian society. Another organization fighting for the emancipation of the Jews was also founded in France by the elites of the community: the Universal Israelite Alliance.

Following the tragic event that shook Russia in 1881, the assassination of Tsar Alexander II by a representative of the terrorist group *Narodnaya Volya*², his son, Alexander III, came to the throne, but he proved to be a fierce enemy of all the minorities in the empire. The more than five million Russian Jews fell victims to a new type of repression, called pogrom³. Millions of Jews ran across the western border, but they were not treated better as refugees in the neighbouring countries either, so many of them emigrated to the United States, Latin America or Palestine. Those who chose the territory of the old state of Israel were pushed by a complex motivation that reflected a new way of responding to persecutions, that is the development of a nationalism based on the Jewish identity⁴. What must also be mentioned is the fact that many immigrants were influenced by the writings of the rabbis Judah Alkalai and Zvi Hirsch Kalischer, who preached about the return of the Jewish people to Zion, in order to pave the way for the return of the Messiah. On the other hand, being more pragmatical and aware of the dangers of anti-Semitism, many authors of Jewish origin, like Moses Hess,

Moshe Lilienblum, Peres Smolenskin or Leo Pinsker used their writing or the press in order to encourage the mass emigration of the Jews and the establishment of a state. Towards 1890, this movement will be named "Zionism" by the Austrian philosopher Nathan Birnbaum. The term derives from the Hebrew word "Zion", referring both to the Kingdom of Heaven and to the city of Jerusalem⁵.

The first Zionist conference took place in November 1884, in Katowice. On this occasion, the first steps were taken towards the establishment of an organization having Pinsker as president and Lilienblum as secretary⁶. Political Zionism also showed its first results: with the help of the French baron Edmond de Rothschild, 17 agricultural colonies were founded in Palestine and a small number of European Jews settled down on this territory.

But the one considered by historians as the founder of modern political Zionism is the well-known author Theodor Herzl. The actions he undertook undoubtedly led to the creation of the state of Israel half a century later.

It is worth mentioning a few elements of his biography. He was born in Budapest in 1860 and he studied law in Vienna. He was very interested in literature and journalism and he concentrated on these fields of activity to the cost of his profession. In 1891, he became the Vienna *Neue Freie Presse* newspaper correspondent. He joyfully settled down in the capital of France.

Although as a youth he claimed to be an advocate of the Jews' assimilation policy, his political beliefs were radically changed after the outbreak of anti-Semitism, triggered by the Dreyfus affair.

In Paris, Herzl wrote "*Der Judenstaat*", in which he envisioned the founding of a future Jewish state. The first fragments were published in London, in the "*Jewish Chronicle*", on 17th January 1896⁷.

The work was at first harshly criticized by both the ultra-Orthodox rabbis and the Jewish elites in Europe. They were joined by the

assimilationist Jews, who considered Herzl as a traitor and a coward and publicly demanded that he should be boycotted. But there were important persons who supported Theodor Herzl: the famous Hungarian doctor and writer Max Nordau, Nathan Birnbaum – the leader of the Jewish students in Vienna and the Londonese rabbi Hermann Adler. It was Nordau who underlined that in order to avoid a conflict with the Turks, the term “Judenstatt” should be replaced with “Heimstätte”. Nordau was also the one who coordinated a big part of the actions during early Zionism⁸.

In order to mark the beginning of the Zionist activities, Herzl organized the first purely Jewish political action, using all his connections to make sure it was internationally acknowledged. In August 1897, in the Swiss town of Basel, Herzl presided at the first Zionist Congress, which brought together about 200 delegates from all over Europe. In only three days, the Congress unanimously accepted the Basel Program, which stated that the Zionism's supreme objective was to seek to establish a home for the Jewish people in Palestine secured under public law⁹. The Zionists also decided to found the World Zionist Organization, with branches in all the European states and the USA.

In order to fulfill the objective of the Basel Program, the Zionists initiated political actions and negotiations and created two financial institutions: the Jewish Colonial Trust and the Jewish National Fund. Moreover, the Action Committee was also established, aiming to turn more and more Jewish communities into supporters of Zionism.

2. The Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate

After Theodor Herzl's death, more forms of Zionism emerged, without affecting the homogeneity of the movement, though. The Russian journalist Ahad Ha-Am founded the concept of Cultural Zionism, according to which Jerusalem had to become the worldwide recognized centre of the Jewish

In only three years, the huge propaganda made by the Zionist leaders, as well as their meetings with several European leaders, made over 100,000 people adhere to the movement. Probably one of the most important was the one who would later become the first president of the State of Israel, Chaim Weizmann.

Herzl himself got involved in a real tour de force which damaged his health and actually proved to be fatal; even famous anti-Semitic leaders like Wilhelm II, the emperor of Germany or Wenzel von Plehve, the Russian minister of internal affairs, were persuaded to support the Zionist cause. But Herzl's audiences with sultan Abdul Hamid II in May 1901 and with the Grand Vizier in July 1902 did not have the expected and desired result: the recognition of the colonization of Palestine by the Jews¹⁰. Edmond de Rothschild gave up his hostile attitude towards Herzl and facilitated his meeting with the Marquis of Lansdowne, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the British Empire. Different territories were taken into consideration as possible solutions for the settlement of the Jews: Cyprus, El Arish and even Uganda, but they were all rejected at the Zionist congresses. The delegates were determined to accept only one place for the settlement of the Jews from the entire world, and that was Palestine. In 1904, Theodor Herzl passed away in the Austrian town of Edlach, but the Zionist movement was already well organized and had gained a friend: Great Britain.

In 1909, the socialist Zionists proposed the establishment of the first kibbutz in Deganya. First an experiment, the cooperative settlement will become an important instrument of rural development in Palestine. The religious Zionists hoped that Palestine would become a theocratic state.

The first half of the 20th century will bring the Zionist adherents the best results in the history of the movement: the commitment of the British Government, supported by the "Balfour Declaration" and the establishment of the state of Israel. After the fall of the Ottoman administration in Palestine, Chaim Weizmann, who had meanwhile become the president of the World Zionist Organization, started a series of negotiations with the representatives of the British Government. As a result, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Arthur J. Balfour, published a letter which was sent in November 1917 to Lord Lionel de Rothschild, after having previously been approved by the British Government. The content of the letter was the following: "His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."¹¹

Coming as an aftereffect of the Basel Program, the Balfour Declaration was approved by the great powers and subsequently endorsed by the League of Nations¹². The British Mandate for Palestine was thereby created and Great Britain undertook to provide proper conditions as to secure the establishment of the Jewish people, as well as the protection of the Arab population. When the document was published, between 85,000-100,000 of a total population of 600,000 Jews lived in Palestine¹³.

After the Treaty of Sèvres, the Ottoman Empire lost its Arab territories, England controlling the Mandates of Mesopotamia and Palestine. In July 1920, Sir Herbert Samuel, an Anglo-Jewish politician, was appointed to the position of High Commissioner of Palestine¹⁴. His responsibility was to make sure that the British Government's decisions regarding the administration of Palestine were implemented.

In 1920, Hebrew became the official language of the Mandate, together with Arabic and English¹⁵.

The Arabs' discontent caused by the new "aliyah"¹⁶ kept growing, therefore leading to conflicts with the newcomers. As minister of the colonies, Winston Churchill declared in London, in 1922, that the Jews should only occupy one part of Palestine. In order to increase the number of the immigrants, Chaim Weizmann created, in 1929, the Jewish Agency, an international body, aiming to provide the financial support for the new settlers in Palestine. Those who donated the funds were rich Jews, who did not entirely agree with objectives of Zionism. Following these actions, the "yishuv"¹⁷ grew from 50,000 to 250,000 residents in 1939¹⁸.

In the summer of 1920, the Haganah¹⁹ - a clandestine Jewish self-defense militia - was founded. Famous members of the Haganah included: Moshe Dayan, Shimon Peres, Chaim Herzog, Yitzhak Rabin or Ariel Sharon, important personalities of the future state of Israel.

The fear of the Arabs kept growing and their leaders rejected any attempt to create a Legislative Council. As a result of a large number of riots, more than 20,000 British soldiers were stationed in Palestine between 1928 and 1935. The publication of the Wilhelmstrasse Secret Archives revealed the active role of the Nazis in supporting the main organizer of the uprising, the former Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Mohammad Amin al-Husseini and his family²⁰.

After the assassination of an important Palestinian political leader, Sheikh Izz ad-Din al-Qassam²¹, the 1936-1939 Arab revolt broke out, led by the Arab High Committee²². As a first consequence, large numbers of weapons were seized and the Arab leaders were arrested²³.

In order to avert the massacre of Jews and to obtain information about the newcomers from the diaspora, an information service, "Sherut Yediot", was founded. Towards the end of the 30s, with the help of the Jewish

agents, the Haavara Agreement²⁴ was made, designed to help facilitate the emigration of German Jews to Palestine. Approximately 50,000 Jews emigrated to Palestine under this agreement.

In July 1937, another event came as a blow for the Zionists: a British Royal Commission of Inquiry headed by Lord Robert Peel recommended the partition of the territory of Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state, and keeping Jerusalem under a permanent mandate. Although the British Government rejected this decision, it tried to moderate,

unsuccessfully though, the negotiations between the two conflicting sides.

The Zionist leaders began to condemn the new policy of the mandatory power and to accuse the British Government of having betrayed the Jewish cause. In response, Great Britain issued a White Paper in 1939, stating that the Jewish immigration to Palestine was to be limited. On 28 February 1940 the British Government limited the acquisition of land by Jews. As a result of all these facts, the Anglo-Zionist Alliance came to an end.

3. Jewish Political Movements in Palestine (First Half of the 20th Century)

The political activity of the Jews in Israel dated back to the first Zionist settlements, but the political ideas and parties originated in the diaspora. In the absence of a sovereign parliament, the political parties tried to influence the local councils, may them be urban or rural, and also led the main Zionist organizations: the Histadrut²⁵, Vaad Leumi²⁶, the World Zionist Organization. All these political organizations were involved in different fields of activity, such as: education, culture creating homes for the immigrants and offering financial support and aid to the ones in need.

The first Jewish party in Palestine, Ha-Po'el Ha-Za'ir²⁷, was founded in 1905 by two representatives of the second "aliyah", Joseph Vitkin and Joseph Sprinzak. One of its objectives was that the Jews should have exclusive control of all fields of economic activity in Palestine.

Another political party, Po'alei Zion²⁸, founded in Russia and Austria-Hungary, started operating in Palestine in 1906. Two of its leaders, David Ben-Gurion and Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, worked together in order to produce a Marxist-type socialist platform. The first disagreements between the two parties soon followed, causing a group of dissatisfied people, led by Berl Katznelson and David

Remez, to publicly demand that the two parties should merge and get involved in the fight to find jobs for all the newcomers.

At its first congress in Jaffa, in the spring of 1907, Po'alei Zion set its main objective, that is the independence of the Jewish community in Palestine, and decided to send delegates to all the Zionist congresses. In order to keep pace, Ha-Po'el Ha-Za'ir contacted the socialists from the diaspora a few years later. However, in 1907, Joseph Vitkin's position caused misunderstandings among party members, in that he advanced the idea of making the farm workers independent. This step would have led to a modern agriculture and indirectly to a growth of the Jewish immigration to Palestine. The other leader of the party, Joseph Aharonovitz, was in favour of maintaining agricultural proletariat and totally supported the World Zionist Organization's plans regarding immigration. As a result, several members of Ha-Po'el Ha-Za'ir moved to Daganya in order to found the first kibbutz, whereas others chose to establish the first moshav in Nahalal.

On learning the problems the rival party was facing, Po'alei Zion informed its supporters that they would maintain the same Marxist doctrine and direct their efforts towards developing a powerful industry in Palestine.

Meanwhile, another party formed in the diaspora was becoming stronger and stronger. Mizrahi, or Merkaz Ruhani²⁹, was a religious movement which appeared in the "Holy Land" in 1912. In the same year, a left-wing faction split away from it and formed Ha-Poel ha Mizrahi, its political program combining religious and socialist elements. The only ultraorthodox party, Agudat Israel, also appeared in 1912. Its members strongly opposed Zionism, claiming that only the Divinity could determine the fate of the Jews.

At the end of World War I, the independent group of the workers led by Berl Katzenelson advocated once again for the merge of all socialist parties. Only Po'alei Zion accepted the beginning of the negotiations and, together with the independent group, founded a new party in February 1919, Ahdut Ha-Avodah³⁰. Joseph Trumpeldor advanced the idea of an alliance that would bring together all the socialist parties. Shortly after his death, in December 1920, Histadrut was created, a confederation of unions, joined both by members of Ha-Po'el Ha-Za'ir, Ahdut Ha-Avodah³¹, and members of smaller parties, such as Mifleget Po'alim Sozialistim "Mopsim"³², He-Halutz³³ or Ha-Shomer Ha-Za'ir.

The British Mandate allowed the Jews in Palestine to prepare for the election of a new body, Asfat Ha-Nivharim, which would represent the "yishuv" in front of the authorities. The year 1918 brought a set of rules for the elective process of the Jewish community in Palestine: on 18 December, in Jaffa, the legislative Forum of Eretz Israel decided that the minimum age for candidates would be 25 years old and for electors it would be 20 years old³⁴.

The labour parties, as well as the independent candidates, immediately showed their intention to participate, therefore 19 electoral rolls were created. At the elections held on 19 April 1920, only the delegates of the communities of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and a few smaller cities were able to vote. The winner, Ahdut Ha-Avodah, obtained 70 of the

314 mandates, being surprisingly followed by the Sephardic Union (54 mandates) and Ha-Po'el Ha-Za'ir (41 mandates). The rest of the mandates, inconsiderable in number, though, were won by the Farmers Union, the Progressive Party, the religious party Mizrahi and the independent candidates.

In October 1920, at the inauguration of the assembly, three different coalitions were created: the first one, a right-wing coalition, was composed of Oriental and ultrareligious Jews; the main labour parties formed the second left-wing coalition; the third centrist coalition was represented mainly by the independent candidates and those of the Progressive Party.

But until 1925, the debates of the assembly were blocked by the violent protests of the ultraorthodox and Sephardic Jews, caused by the women's participation in voting and in the decision-making bodies, but also by the discussions related to the introduction of the income tax for natural persons.

On 6 December 1925, the elections for the second Asfat Ha-Nivharim took place. A new political party emerged and gained popularity: the Revisionist Movement, led by Vladimir Ze'ev Jabotinski, one of David Ben-Gurion's rivals. Jabotinsky's intention was to have an aggressive attitude towards the British administration. Moreover, there was a need for the acceleration of the immigration of the Jews from the diaspora, so that, once it reached a significant number, the "yishuv" would be able to claim independence. These new political ideas helped the party win 15 mandates of 201, but the left-wing parties still achieved victory.

The Palestinian Communist Party (PKP), illegally established in 1921, obtained 6 mandates in the Assembly. The second Vaad Leummi, turned into Superior Chamber, had 38 seats, of which 18 went to an alliance formed by the religious parties and the Farmers Union, 14 went to the two important socialist parties, the Revisionist Party received two mandates, the rest going to the feminist and progressive movements.

The elections were only later recognized by the British, on the 1st January 1928. In 1930, a set of measures intended to improve the elective system of the bicameral body was proposed: it was decided that the total number of the members of the Assembly would be 71 and the Superior Chamber would have 23 members. As for the electors, they were divided into three colleges, according to the different types of Jewish communities: the Askenazi Jews had 53 delegates, the Sephardi Jews had 15 delegates and the Yemenite Jews had 3 delegates.

The year 1930 brought the merger of the two important labour parties, *Ahdut Ha-Avodah* and *Ha-Po'el Ha-Za'ir*, thus fulfilling the dream of the Jewish socialists in Palestine. The newly-born party was called *Mapai* (*Mifleget Po'alei Erez Israel*)³⁵. From an ideological point of view, *Mapai* was oriented towards the recognition of the middle class, without giving up the socialist program³⁶.

One year later, *Mapai* proved its superiority at the elections within the Jewish community in Palestine: on 5 January 1931, the Labour Party had 27 delegates, being followed by the Revisionists with 16 delegates and the religious party with 11. At the elections for *Vaad Leummi*, *Mapai* was also victorious, obtaining 11 mandates. The

Revisionists tried to boycott the elections for the Superior Chamber, but eventually they were content with the 5 seats they received one year later. The Assembly lasted for 13 years, the date of the elections being many times postponed because of the fights with the Arabs. The growth of the "yishuv" brought even more sympathizers for *Mapai*, and the Jewish Agency fell under the total control of David Ben-Gurion starting with 1935.

Discontent with the close relations between the Jewish Agency and *Mapai*, the Revisionists publicly accused Chaim Weizmann of cooperating with the British Government and strived to attract the representatives of the middle class on their side, so as to use their funds in order to counter-balance the socialists' domination. In 1935, most of the Revisionists left the World Zionist Organization.

The Zionist Movement was also divided between *Hitahadut*³⁷, called Group A or the "Progressives" and *Berit*, called Group B, subsequently turned into the General Zionist Party³⁸. The tensions were caused by the differences of opinion regarding issues such as: secular or religious education, income-taxing, the attitude towards the Arab community etc.

4. The End of the British Mandate and the Political Organization Until Gaining Independence

During the British Mandate, the "yishuv" grew from 50,000 to 600,000 members. Most of the newcomers were from Central and Eastern Europe and had great support from Vladimir Jabotinsky's organization. In 1942, the leaders of Nazi Germany decided at Wannsee to systematically exterminate all Jews. 9,500,000 Jews lived in Europe in 1939; in 1945, there were less than 2,750,000³⁹. The leaders of the Jews in Palestine answered back by creating *Palmach* in 1941, a commando unit that eliminated a part of the Germans from the Middle East.

Coexistence with the Arabs was becoming more and more difficult: massacres were worsening and peace seemed an impossible thing. Professor Judah L. Magnes made several attempts to establish a single Arab-Jewish state in Palestine in order to guarantee the same rights for both ethnic groups, but they were violently rejected by the radicals of the two sides.

The end of the war apparently brought peace to Palestine. The occurring events convinced the Jewish Agency to forget about the conflicts with Great Britain and focus on

the effort to save the ones in danger, especially since the British authorities continued to limit immigration drastically, even attacking the refugee ships.

For many of the Palestinian Jews, the new enemy, that is the British occupier, was becoming as dangerous as Nazism or the Muslim community. The Revisionist leaders were against the Haganah, which they considered ineffective and, in the spring of 1937, they decided to create a new paramilitary organization, Irgun Zevai Leumi⁴⁰. Irgun basically depended on Vladimir Jabotinsky and the Revisionist movement. Its main leaders were at first David Raziel, Moshe Rosenberg and Abraham Stern. They were later joined by other principals, like Robert Bitcker, an ex-officer of the British army, or Menachem Begin and Nathan Yalin Mor, two young leaders of the Jewish community in Poland⁴¹.

Begin controlled the organization seven years later and decided to involve it in the fight against the British occupier. Climax was reached in July 1946, when a blast almost destroyed "King David" hotel in Jerusalem, the headquarters of the British administration and killed 91 persons, British, Arabs and Jews. The terrorist attack was condemned by the Haganah, who would immediately develop a program meant to annihilate Irgun.

Another Jewish group involved in multiple terrorist actions was Lohamei Herut Israel or "Stern Gang", whose chief preoccupation was murdering the ones who collaborated with either the English or the Arabs.

Alyiah Hadassah, a new party formed in 1942 by the immigrants who came from Germany, aroused the indignation of most of the political parties in Palestine. Its members advocated for the continuation of the British Mandate (a successful subject after the "King David" attack) and signing an agreement with the Arabs.

On 1st August 1944, the elections for the fourth Asefat Ha-Nivharim were held. The Revisionists and the Sephards boycotted them and Agudat Israel was forbidden. Victory

belonged to the left wing: the Superior Chamber, made of 42 members, had 23 representatives of the socialist parties.

The main Arab leaders of that time met in Cairo on 23 March 1945 and created "The Arab League"⁴². All the Jewish political leaders were concerned about this action.

On 2nd April 1947, Great Britain appealed to the United Nations to initiate a series of discussions that would result in solving the Palestinian problem. On 29th December 1947, it was decided to have two independent states, a Jewish state and an Arab state, and the area to be occupied by the Jewish state was about 14,000 km². Jerusalem was placed under the control of the United Nations and the British Mandate was supposed to have ended by 1st August 1948⁴³.

The Jewish political parties had different reactions: the left-wing accepted the UN decisions, though not very enthusiastically, the far left rejected them from ideological reasons, whereas the right-wing, formed of Revisionist and ultrareligious Jews, decided to never recognize the Arab state in Palestine.

Violent manifestations of the Arabs soon followed: coexistence with a Jewish state seemed unacceptable. Moreover, their leaders claimed that it was not the Arabs who should pay for the crimes the Europeans committed against the Jews in time.

But Great Britain decided to abandon Palestine on 15th May 1948, without allowing the UN though to intervene in the territory before the 1st of May.

In January 1948, Vaad Leumi, the National Council of the Palestinian Jews, decided to proclaim the independence of a Jewish state after the British retreat, which would be organized according to the General Assembly of the United Nations. In 1948, the conflict between the newly-established state of Israel and its Arab neighbours resumed the old conflict generated by the Balfour Declaration: the situation of the Arab population in Palestine. The plan proposed a year before by the UN General Assembly Resolution 181 did not favour the Arabs.

The violent birth of the state of Israel created waves of refugees in the area designated for the Arabs: about 1.3 million Arabs lived in Palestine before the war. But towards the end of 1949, about 20% of the Palestinian Jews chose exile and moved to countries such as Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Egypt. About 200,000 of the ones who remained fled to Gaza and over 300,000 to Jericho, which would be a territory annexed to Jordan, starting with 1950. There were also the ones who did not manage to run across the borders of the state of Israel and remained there.

5. The Arabian Peninsula

Even though there were many states in this region in time, the one founded by the Saud Dynasty will survive until nowadays. The founder of the family, Muhammad bin Saud from the town of Ad-Dirrya and the Sunni cleric Muhammad bin Abd-al-Ahad established a state in the middle of the 18th century. Little by little, the Saud clan accumulated capital and influence, fighting for *autonomy with the Ottoman Empire and with the rival families in the region.*

The two Saudi states created before the beginning of the 20th century had no capacity to resist for a long time and they were not able to oppose to the Ottomans or the al-Rashid tribe. But in 1902, Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud's troops conquered the city of Riyadh, the bastion of the al-Rashid dynasty. Between 1913 and 1926, taking advantage of the British campaign against the Ottoman Empire, the Saudis gradually extended towards the regions of Nejd and Hejaz⁴⁵.

In 1924, the Sharif of Mecca⁴⁶, Hussein bin Ali⁴⁷, proclaimed himself Caliph after the Ottoman caliphate was abolished. Saud and his Wahhabite⁴⁸ army invaded Mecca and chased away the impostor. Two years later, at a pan-Islamic conference, the Saudi leader was given the authority to administer the holy Islamic sites, Mecca and Medina⁴⁹.

The dream of the Arab population to have an independent state was nipped in the bud: Egypt and Jordan refused to support this objective and Israel offered no political solution. Instead of actively supporting the Arab population in Palestine, the Arab League mostly regarded it as a weapon against the Jewish state.

It's in this period that the term „Palestinian“ received the meaning it still has today, being used to name the people of Arab origin from the ex-Mandate of Palestine, excluding Israel⁴⁴.

The risk that one leader should be replaced by another made the Saudis try to find ways of creating a distance between them and their allies from World War I, the British. On 10th May 1927, the Saudi diplomats took an important step towards achieving independence by signing the Treaty of Jeddah, according to which Great Britain ended its protectorate over Hejaz and Nejd. After five years, the whole state received a new name, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, proclaimed after eliminating the last hostile factions in the battle of Sibilla⁵⁰.

The event of 1938 is of major importance for the country even nowadays: the huge oil fields discovered made the country one of the richest in the region, due to the immense amounts of money paid by the Americans.

This way, together with the prestige among the Sunnites, Saudi Arabia managed to become the most important Arab state in Asia. But the country's biggest handicap, besides the poor infrastructure, was still represented by the low demographic number.

As for the foreign affairs, the close connections with the British Empire, based on the personal relations between the king and some members of the government in London, will continue until the end of the World War II.

6. The Levant and Mesopotamia

From an ethnic and religious point of view, the Levant and Mesopotamia are very fragmented due to the big number of communities: Sunnites, Shia, Druzes, Maronites, Jews, Armenians, Kurds, orthodox Christians, Sufis etc.

By the beginning of the 20th century, the region was only considered an area of transit towards Asia on account of the weak control of the Ottoman Empire. The Sykes-Picot Agreement⁵¹ highlighted the interest for that area shown by the world's major powers.

The end of the World War I and the fall of the Ottoman Empire brought chaos to the region. In 1920, after a short independence of Syria that was not internationally recognized, the world's major powers were given the authority to administer the different parts of the region, without taking into consideration the ethnic and religious points of view when dividing them arbitrarily⁵². This way the Great Lebanon was created to the detriment of Syria, which was split into a few autonomous states⁵³: Aleppo, Jebel Druze, the Alawite State, the Sanjak of Alexandretta⁵⁴ and Damascus. With the Levant under French control, Transjordan and Mesopotamia were incorporated into the British Mandate. France and Great Britain signed an agreement which stipulated the obligation of the English not to undermine the French mandate, preventing the attempt to establish a great independent Arab kingdom⁵⁵.

But the pressure of King Faisal's I supporters, as well as the frequent uprisings of the local population, determined the French to accept the formation of an autonomous Syrian Federation. The formation of a republic was proposed in the Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936⁵⁶, but Syrian independence was deferred until after the end of the war.

When it came to its internal affairs, Lebanon had greater freedom. On 1st September 1920, general Gouraud proclaimed the establishment of the Great Lebanon⁵⁷ under the French Mandate. Having this state

as a starting point, France formed the Lebanese Republic in 1926. In the 20's and the 30's, the first political parties were formed, some of them nationalist⁵⁸. A constitution elaborated after the French model was adopted and the ethnic and religious groups were proportionally represented in the local parliament. Taking advantage of the fact that Paris was still under Nazi occupation, Lebanon gained independence in 1943.

The Emirate of Transjordan was an autonomous political division, being initially part of the Mandate of Palestine, subsequently withdrawn from it on Great Britain's request⁵⁹. Emir Abdullah, member of the Hashemite family, became king. Great Britain now treated Jordan like an autonomous state and independence was gained in 1946⁶⁰, together with the proclamation of sovereignty and Abdullah's recognition as king.

The Treaty of Sevres led to the Partitioning of the Ottoman Empire, as a result of which the British Mandate of Mesopotamia was formed. From the beginning, this territory proved extremely difficult to administer. The secret societies often generated outbreaks, which caused great trouble to the British army. In 1920, The Great Iraqi Revolution brought together Sunnis and Shias, tribes and cities, in a common effort against the foreign occupation.

At the 1921 Cairo Conference, the British chose the ex-sovereign of Syria, the Hashemite Faisal I, as leader of Iraq, crowning him as puppet-king. One year later, the so-called Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was signed, but it was considered as being humiliating for the Arab side, because it protected the interest of the British in the region. Meanwhile, with the help of the League of Nations, the status of the city of Mosul⁶¹ was clarified in favour of Iraq. The second Anglo-Iraqi Treaty⁶² stipulated a form of military collaboration for a period of time of 25 years, but, as a matter of fact, it certified the British occupation. On 3rd October 1932, Iraq became a member of the League of Nations as

an independent state, but it was forced to obey the conditions of the treaty with London and to accept the military presence on its territory. Faisal died in 1933 and was replaced by King Ghazi. The new sovereign was accused of being a pro-Fascist supporter, interfering with Great Britain's interests in the region. After

Ghazi's mysterious death in 1939, Faisal II came to throne.

As for its internal affairs, Iraq faced many threats, culminating with the government of the premier Rashid Ali, thought to be a Nazi supporter, superseded by another British occupation in 1941.

7. Persia (Iran)

The beginning of the 20th century brought important changes to Persia. As a result of the Constitutional Revolution, which was a street protest in fact, initiated at the end of 1905, the first parliament was founded, thus limiting the shah's power. The state ruled by the Qajar dynasty had been under foreign influence for a long time. After discovering the huge oil fields in 1908, Great Britain and Russia showed a greater interest in the area, as they had already signed a convention a year before, placing parts of Persia into their indirect control⁶³.

Moreover, during the World War I, the country was occupied by the British and Russian armies, but the latter retreated after the Bolsheviks seized power and signed a convenient treaty of good-neighborhood. After a national emancipation movement, led by Reza Khan, the Qajar dynasty was superseded by the last Persian dynasty, Pahlavi, founded by Khan, who had proclaimed himself the shah⁶⁴.

The 30's were used by the shah and his collaborators for the consolidation of power. Dictatorship, the elimination of the ex-collaborators, corruption, the violences of the army against the ethnic groups were highly criticized on an internal and international level as well.

8. Egypt

From a demographic point of view, Egypt was the most populated territory in the Middle East at the beginning of the 20th century. Being under foreign occupation for a long time strongly affected the Egyptians. The

The fundamentalists opposed the modernization of the Persian society and initiated many uprisings against the state authority after actions such as granting various rights to women.

From the point of view of the foreign affairs, the relations with Great Britain were deteriorated for a while, for reasons such as the shah's suppositions regarding the British involvement in the oil industry.

On 21st March 1935, the shah issued a decree demanding that the name of the country in foreign affairs should be changed to Iran. The end of the 30's and the beginning of the war found Pahlavi more and more dependent on his troops, paying them huge amounts of money in order to be sure of their loyalty.

The attitude of the shah towards the Jews was a positive fact, though revolting for the Islamists, as his intention was to protect and integrate them.

In 1941, after his country was invaded by the Soviets and the British, he was forced to abdicate in favour of his son and was exiled, passing away three years later. Fortunately for the new shah, the Teheran Conference guaranteed the borders of Iran and the independence of the country.

1906 Denshaway incident⁶⁵ agitated the population even more. As it happened in all the Middle East, the national movement had a mainly anticolonial character, pan-Islamic, opposing the Western powers⁶⁶.

In response to the British Protectorate declared on the occasion of World War I, the Egyptian nationalists demanded that Egypt should be recognized as independent at the 1919 Peace Conference in Paris. The leader of this delegation⁶⁷, Saad Zaghlul, subsequently founded a nationalist party. His arrest triggered many violent protests, known as the First Egyptian Revolution⁶⁸. The event had victims on both sides, but it culminated in gaining independence (1922)⁶⁹ and adopting a constitution (1923). But the fact that Great Britain still maintained its troops in Cairo, Alexandria and in the territory aroused the discontent of the Egyptians, which eventually made both sides sign the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty in 1936. The treaty demanded that Great Britain should withdraw its entire army

from Egypt, except for the troops meant to defend the Suez Canal, and help with the training of the Egyptian army.

The death of King Fuad brought his son, Farouk I, to the throne and he ruled until 26th July 1952.

The appearance of the Communist Party (1925) and the Muslim Brothers or The Brotherhood (1928), the extremist political groups, generated internal political conflicts. For the Muslim Brothers, the Koran represented the true constitution and their major objective was to proclaim the Great Caliphate⁷⁰.

During the entire war, Egypt was a military base of the Allies for their World War II missions.

NOTES:

¹ Clive Jones, Emma C. Murphy, *Israel: Challenges to Identity Democracy and the State*, London, Routledge, 2002, p. 2.

² "People's Will" in the Russian language.

³ "devastation" in the Russian language.

⁴ Clive Jones, Emma C. Murphy *op.cit.*, p. 6

⁵ Iain McLean, *Oxford Dicționar de politică*, București, Univers Enciclopedic, 2001, p. 410.

⁶ André Chouraqui, *Statul Israel*, București, Corint, 2001, p. 20.

⁷ Paul Johnson, *O istorie a evreilor*, București, Hasefer, 2003, p. 314.

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 315.

⁹ André Chouraqui, *op.cit.*, p. 21.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 22.

¹¹ Original text.

¹² Claude Klein, *Israel*, București, BIC ALL, 2003, p. 13.

¹³ Paul Johnson, *op.cit.*, p. 338.

¹⁴ André Chouraqui, *op.cit.*, 2001, p. 25.

¹⁵ Claude Klein, *op.cit.*, p. 16.

¹⁶ "Immigration wave" in Hebrew

¹⁷ Term used for the Jews' settlement in Palestine.

¹⁸ Clive Jones, Emma C. Murphy, *op.cit.*, p. 10.

¹⁹ "Defence" in Hebrew.

²⁰ André Chouraqui, *op.cit.*, p. 26.

²¹ Leader of the Arab terrorist group the Black Hand.

²² Formed in 1936 from small parties and obscure Arab political groups, such as the National Defence Party, the Palestinian Arab Party, the National Bloc, Independence Party and Reform Party.

²³ Morris, Benny, *Righteous Victims*, New York, Knopf, 1999, p. 159.

²⁴ "Transfer" in Hebrew.

²⁵ Union Federation.

²⁶ Jewish National Council.


²⁷ "The Young Worker" in Hebrew.

²⁸ "Workers of Zion" in Hebrew.

²⁹ "The Spiritual Center" in Hebrew.

³⁰ "Unity of Work" in Hebrew.

- ³¹ Asher Arian, *The Second Republic: Politics in Israel*. New Jersey, Chatam House Publisher Inc, 1998, p.109.
- ³² "The Socialist Workers' Party", in Hebrew.
- ³³ Association of Eastern Europe Jews.
- ³⁴ The assembly was only formed by Zionists and ultraorthodox Jews.
- ³⁵ "Labour Party" in Hebrew.
- ³⁶ Don Peretz, *The Government and Politics of Israel*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1988, p. 91.
- ³⁷ "Federation" in Hebrew.
- ³⁸ Arian Asher, *op.cit.*, p. 125.
- ³⁹ André Chouraqui, *op.cit.*, p. 28.
- ⁴⁰ The National Military Organization.
- ⁴¹ Roger Faligot, Remi Kauffer, *Istoria mondială a serviviilor secrete*, vol. 2, București, Nemira, 2000.
- ⁴² Douglas Bokovoy, Michael Wolffsohn, *Israel*. Opladen, Leske+Budrich, 2003, p. 215.
- ⁴³ Bernard Wasserstein, *Israel & Palestine*, London, Profile Books, 2003, p. 118.
- ⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 25.
- ⁴⁵ Beverly Milton-Edwards, *Contemporary Politics in the Middle East*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2006, p. 26.
- ⁴⁶ Bernard Wasserstein, *op.cit.*, p. 25.
- ⁴⁷ Belonged to the Hashemite family.
- ⁴⁸ A conservative reform movement of Sunni Islam.
- ⁴⁹ Francois Massoulie, *Conflictele din Oriental Mijlociu*, București, ALL, 2003, p. 29.
- ⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 28.
- ⁵¹ David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East*, New York, Owl, 1989, p. 20.
- ⁵² Beverly Milton-Edwards, *Contemporary Politics in the Middle East*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2006, p. 59.
- ⁵³ San Remo Conference (1920).
- ⁵⁴ Subsequently ceded to Turkey.
- ⁵⁵ David Fromkin, *op.cit.*, p. 29.
- ⁵⁶ Not ratified by France.
- ⁵⁷ Officially L'Etat du Grand Liban.
- ⁵⁸ Francois Massoulie, *op.cit.*, p. 47.
- ⁵⁹ Beverly Milton-Edwards, *op.cit.*, p. 27.
- ⁶⁰ By the London Treaty.
- ⁶¹ The dispute regarding Mosul was clarified in 1926, after Turkey, Iraq and Great Britain had signed a treaty.
- ⁶² Signed on 30th June 1930.
- ⁶³ Roger Adelson, *London and the Invention of the Middle East: Money, Power and War, 1902-1922*. New Haven & London: Yale University Press. 1995, pp. 59-62.
- ⁶⁴ Son Mohammad Reza was named his successor.
- ⁶⁵ A fight between a few British officers and some Egyptians at a pigeon-hunt, resulting in the death sentence of one of the Egyptians.
- ⁶⁶ David Fromkin, *op.cit.*, p. 49.
- ⁶⁷ Also called "wafd" وفاق.
- ⁶⁸ P.J. Vatikiotis, *The History of Modern Egypt*, 4th edition, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1992, p. 267.
- ⁶⁹ Sultan Fuad I (1868-1936) became the first king.
- ⁷⁰ Francois Massoulie, *op.cit.*, p. 34.



Romanian Participation in Peace Support Operations

Laurențiu-Cristian Dumitru

a. Characteristics of Peace Support Operations

The historic perspective proved that conflict phenomena, particularly those related to military conflicts, generated a series of analysis addressing their physiognomy, typology, determinations as well as their complex and multiple implications.

In the field of international relations, among the states, as subjects of international law, or among different groups or factions, as regional geopolitical actors, there may be differences that, if not solved appropriately, can evolve into conflicts.

The stages following the conflicts imply measures of post conflict management, re-making and re-building of the state or the area that was affected, generated or induced that conflict.

The motivations behind the actions of the involved parties give these kinds of conflicts inter-ethnic, religious, inter-civilization etc characteristics, inducing different levels of intensity¹.

The conflict nature generated by different actions particularly characterizes the pre-conflict and during the conflict periods. The analysis of the post Cold War conflicts highlighted the fact that extremism and intolerance constituted factors contributing to the worsening of the regional situation as well as conducive to the conflicts.

The geographic assessment pointed out the existence of certain areas that might be considered traditionally conflictual, such as in the Balkans, Caucasus, Middle East, Central Asia, Africa etc.

The end of the Cold War, when the world bipolar balance of power came to an end,

generated the rebirth of some crisis situations that led to the outbreak of several armed conflicts. Within this framework, there were noticeable certain general characteristics of the post-conflict stage, as well as, a lot of particularities referring to the geographic area, geopolitical implications, the specific physiognomy of the ended conflicts, the interests of the contending parties, the effects of the conflict in the respective region, the position adopted by organizations and bodies involved in crisis management, but also the new challenges, vulnerabilities, risks and threats².

The post Cold War security environment was characterized by an active instability that was also induced by a new configuration of the security architecture in different areas and was deeply influenced by a series of events such as the process of building new political regimes in the states of Central and Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent independence of the former component states³.

Similarly, the political re-drawing of new frontiers in Europe and Asia as well as the bloody dismantle of Yugoslavia generated conflicts that necessitated important demarches to implement certain post conflict strategies.

The North Atlantic Alliance's processes of enlargement and at the same time of complex transformation endowed it with the necessary capabilities for crisis and conflict management, promoting stability within and outside of the Euro-Atlantic area. The proliferation of terrorism phenomena and

asymmetric threats led to waging the war against terrorism.

The major strategic changes having taken place during that stage necessitated a series of actions, developed in order to address in an effective way the new challenges and the need to find out valid solutions to them. The objective of these strategies aims to the global fight against terrorism and asymmetric threats, diminishing the intensity of the conflict, preventing military conflicts and successfully undertaking post conflict actions, including military ones.

The post conflict stage actually has numerous particularities, depending on the context in which the situations leading to the conflict evolved, on the intensity of the armed conflict, induced consequences, the positions of the parties and actors involved and it aims to deescalate the conflict, the undertaking and finalizing of the involved parties, re-making of the infrastructure and necessary structures for the normalizing of the situation, stabilizing and democracy building of the concerned area.

The de-escalation of the conflict is the most important stage in solving the problems that generated the armed confrontation. It relies on the will of the parties to cease hostilities, the wish of the international community to get involved in this process, to negotiate and if necessary to impose the cease of hostilities, the existence of certain specialized structures and institutions able to intervene in this process.

All these procedures were used to deescalate the existing or emerging conflicts after the Cold War. The mentioned actions are developed through political, diplomatic, economic, cultural, military means. Depending on the specificity of the armed conflict, on the parties involved, the dangers and threats associated to the conflict, the actions of de-escalation are flexible and imply a good collaboration among all the forces participating at this process: international bodies with global or regional reach, international actors, governments and non-governmental organizations, peacekeeping or peace-enforcement forces⁴.

The delivering and the finalizing of negotiations between the involved parties last a long time, as it was demonstrated by the practice of these kinds of activities. While international military structures work toward separating the forces and interposing, representatives of international bodies undertake an activity of defusing tensions between the parties and putting an end to the dispute. The activities take place right after the de-escalation of the conflict and aim to the military disengagement of forces. They mainly focus on providing the necessary conditions for rebuilding infrastructure, stabilizing the situation and passing to democratically rebuilding of the area, reconciliation of the contending parties being essential. During this stage, the main actors are the international bodies and peacekeeping forces deployed in the operations theater. These actions are included in what became known as peace-making operations that evolve toward peacekeeping operations.

The rebuilding of infrastructure and structures necessary for normalizing the situation take place after hostilities came to an end. It is one of the main economic, political and social aspects of this process and is developed under the protection of peacekeeping forces, including actions of reestablishment of communications, rehabilitation of the infrastructure affected by the conflict, rebuilding functional social, political, and economic mechanisms.

Stabilization implies the de-escalation of the conflictual situation, combating terrorism and various trafficking networks, organizing democratic elections, the transfer of authority to local structures and supporting the respective country in initiating and democratically rebuilding the state. The actions of this stage are known as stabilization operations. The role of the militaries, during this stage, is to assure optimal conditions for the development of functional state structures, to build security forces of the respective state, to prevent clashes between the former contending parties.

The democratic reconstruction of the area is a consequence of previous actions, for its accomplishment having involved in particular political, economic, information, social, and cultural means. New objectives are settled and economic and social strategies are drawn. The participant multinational forces are involved in peacekeeping operations, these operations being finalized when the situation turns normal⁵.

Although the peace support operations developed lately use in the operative and tactical fields the same categories of personnel and almost the same instruments as the previous ones, they are essentially different at strategic level through their purposes, political, military objectives and specific ways of planning, organizing, projection, deployability and sustaining, with or without host nation support (HNS) in the operations theater⁶.

NATO and EU, acting in support and in complementarities with the UN's programmes and initiatives, took over particular political responsibilities in implementing the post-conflict rehabilitation of the states or areas that went through situations of armed conflict.

Peace-making, following an armed conflict, implies more than exclusively diplomatic and military actions. Peace-building would necessitate in particular the re-orientation of military and civilian toward diminishing the risk of an outbreak in hostilities. This way, there are settled the appropriate conditions for stabilization, reconciliation and democracy building.

In post conflict societies, there should be promoted reconciliation, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and participation in the political, social and economic life.

At the same time, it is necessary a progressive and safe process of refugees return and the programmes promotion of the reintegration into societies of the former combatants. Light weapons should be collected from the population and stored in safe locations. It is necessary to clear, gather and destroy the mines, and heavy equipment should be withdrawn to the barracks under strict guard⁷.

The international intervention in the post-conflict areas is necessary to resettle and consolidate stability. The strategy of post-conflict rehabilitation contains a series of factors that should refer to the process itself: correlating the assessment of threats with the reaction, adopting an optimum model of post-conflict rehabilitation and affirming the solidarity of the states participating at the process.

The stabilization of the situation and the prevention of an outbreak in armed hostilities in the areas affected by the conflict are the priorities of the post-conflict strategy. Defining the best solutions for a state rebuilding implies planning and using a diverse range of actions. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo are the most concrete examples pointing out a model of post-conflict rehabilitation successfully applicable, including through the establishment of the missions IFOR, SFOR, KFOR, in which Romania was and continues to be an active and reliable participant⁸.

After the end of the conflict, the strategy of state functional readjustment should not aim to achieving the maximum of objectives of society rehabilitation in a short period of time but within reasonable timelines⁹. The analysis of the complexity of the post-conflict rehabilitation, reconciliation and re-building objectives implies the harmonization of the overall relations among states and groups of states which gives substance to the action of international actors participant at the reconstruction of certain states asking for their support.

The post-conflict stage is bond to the suspension of hostilities and the ending of the conflict. The international practice highlighted that the ending of armed conflicts marked an activation of terrorism and asymmetric threats that necessitate adequate strategies of combat, sometimes for a long period of time, that are defined through a large range of demarches, instruments and operations, implemented through the collaboration of the involved parties and of the actors dealing with the

respective situation. The fundamental conclusion that one can draw following the analysis of the situation specific to each operations theater refers to the fact that the results of the stabilization and post-conflict reconstruction processes can be successfully implemented only in the conditions in which the population and the host nation are not hostile and affirm their wish to cooperate.

The North Atlantic Alliance has as strategic objectives crisis and conflict management while adjusting its structures, capabilities and missions to the challenges of the 21st century. The final communiqué of the Istanbul Summit stresses that the transformation of the Alliance the defining of its orientation is on the way aiming to adjusting NATO structures, procedures and capabilities to the 21st century challenges, risks and threats. The Alliance took over a large range of missions, promoting stability where it considers necessary to defend its security and values¹⁰.

The typology and models of peace support operations have a series of characteristics inherent to the assumed objectives, as well as, to the means, resources and capabilities made available. Particularly known as military operations others than the war (non-article five operations), they are multinational operations, constituted and conducted as CJTF (Combined Joint Task Force), operational, multinational and joint forces.

The peace-making operations imply in particular the use of diplomatic means to persuade the contending parties to cease hostilities and negotiate the peaceful resolution of the conflict. The United Nations can play an effective role providing that the contending parties agree to it. Peace-making does not make compulsory using the force against one of the parties in order to impose ending hostilities. The peace-making operations are part of the stability operations (as for example the missions SFOR, KFOR, ISAF) and the support ones¹¹. These have a nonlinear character and the force structure participating at these kinds of operations has a

heterogeneous character, being composed of military forces belonging to several nations, police forces, national and international civil bodies, governmental agencies etc. A structure like this should not impede the concentration of efforts to achieve the assumed objectives.

These operations are developed according to specific principles that refer to the unity of effort, protection, restricting, clarity of objectives, legitimacy, determination, and the proportional use of force, preventing the escalation of the conflict, the diversity and complementarities of actions, flexibility, non-challenge, the transfer of power and authority to the civil structures¹².

The peacekeeping operations were developed as a way of conflict management, by deploying the multinational military personnel, in the area of interest, under the UN mandate, to control and solve the armed conflict. These operations are developed, mainly nowadays, in situation of intrastate conflict, the missions assigned to the peacekeeping forces under an UN mandate evolving from interposing between the contending parties, collecting light weaponry and heavy equipment, distribution of humanitarian assistance to the civil population, and even reestablishing cooperation between the parties previously in conflict. These operations are the most frequent, developed and complex, having an outstanding preventive function. The participating multinational forces are tasked to discourage and de-escalate the tension and conflict centers and to prevent the outbreak of new armed clashes. This kind of operations aims to discouraging the use of force, the defusing of the conflict, promoting peace and supporting the civil authorities to mitigate the consequences of armed confrontations and creating the conditions for the transition to the democratic reconstruction of the area¹³.

The peace-enforcement/peace-implementation operations are developed when the contending parties are not willing to negotiate putting an end to the conflict and continue hostilities. Virtually, in these kinds of situations, after

exhausting all the means of reconciliation and identification of the conflictual aspects as a threat to peace and international security, the UN Security Council can authorize the licit use of force to impose/implement peace. It gives the member states the authority to take all necessary measures, including military ones, in order to accomplish the adopted resolutions. This kind of operations is organized and conducted by a state, group of state, alliance or coalition and imply the use of force. Missions as IFOR, KFOR represented the accomplishment of this kind of operations. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, the solution proved to work out since it managed to put an end to hostilities and pass to the implementation of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, creating this way the conditions to make secure and pacify these areas, considered to be traditionally conflictual, should it be religious or civilizational¹⁴.

The peace-building operations refer to activities aiming to support nations building and preserve peace after a conflict came to an end. In the case of these operations, the mandate is comprehensive given by the implications of a state reconstruction. Within the framework of peace-building operations, the military and civil components collaborate on the basis of the same concept that aims to reducing the vulnerability of the newly implemented political, economic, social and military structures and to combat the asymmetric threats and the new terrorism phenomenon¹⁵. The societies previously involved in armed conflicts are generally vulnerable, therefore it is necessary that to have involved in all these processes of stabilization and post-conflict reconstruction not only security bodies, but also other political organizations, regional security structures etc.

The humanitarian actions have as main objective providing humanitarian aid in case of conflicts, humanitarian and natural disasters. The participants, UN agencies, governments, non-governmental organizations, strive to coordinate their that often necessitate the

logistical support of multinational forces, as the only way to apply and assure assistance programmes. Humanitarian actions do not represent a distinctive stage, being developed alongside peace support operations, from those of peace-making to the peacekeeping ones. The North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union pay special attention to humanitarian actions and missions. This kind of actions was developed in support of the refugees of Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kosovo etc.

The save and rescue actions are specific to the complex situations caused by natural and ecologic disasters and are developed using specialized forces and means, particularly those of civil emergency, to which multinational forces take part effectively or through logistic support.

The peace support operations are part of the strategy of crisis and conflict management by the international community through its bodies and organizations. The essential purpose of these ones is to stop in due time the armed confrontations, to impose the path toward negotiations to the involved parties, to assure the conditions for the rehabilitation and re-building of the infrastructure of the areas affected by conflict, to participate at the former contending parties' reconciliation to participate at the economic and social reconstruction, to assure the transition to normal life, to participate at the process of democracy building and to preserve peace and international security in post-conflict areas. The new challenges, vulnerabilities and asymmetric threats on the international relations arena should be treated as a priority and in appropriate way, in a participative and co-operative spirit, since the instability factors can create the premises for an international crisis that was not solved in an appropriate way, to evolve toward an armed conflict. In the post Cold War period, the armed conflicts recorded a diverse typology, becoming more numerous and more violent¹⁶.

Therefore, it is necessary to continue while implementing the preventive strategies

and policies, the demarches of development and implementation of post-conflict strategies aiming to providing the necessary forces and means.

Taking into account that some areas are traditionally inclined to conflict, the

international community should develop a specific approach for each of them in order to stop the conflicts during the early stage or to channel them towards non-violent forms, therefore adapting the strategies of combating the new threats and especially terrorism.

b. Romanian Participation in International Missions

Romania is deeply involved in the international efforts of managing the new global challenges to the international peace and security.

Consequently, Romania has participated to numerous peacekeeping, crisis response and combating terrorism operations with military and police personnel. Participation to these operations underlines Romania's commitment in combating the new risks to the international security, as part of its security policy. The strategic partnership with the United States, based on the existence of common interests in the Euro-Atlantic space, also strengthens this demarche.

NATO, adapting its missions and capabilities, demands the new member states to adapt and to intensify the process of internal reform in order to integrate in an organization that is itself found in a process of transformation. On the long run, the new risks demand multinational approaches and solutions. NATO's transformation can be placed in a wider institutional context, in which the organizations that have responsibilities in the field of security (UN, NATO, EU, and OSCE) consolidate their own capacities of preventing and managing the crises¹⁷.

The activity of the UN continues to confer the proper framework in which Romania can affirm itself as a regional and global factor of stability. In its contribution to the UN peacekeeping operations, Romania has assumed a number of commitments, such as the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding with the UN, and has participated to a number of missions, such as those from Iraq-Kuwait, Somalia, Angola, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo etc.

On October 21st, 2003, Romania became a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for a two-year mandate (2004-2005), thus actively contributing to the international peace and security, defending human rights and directly involving itself in resolving global issues. At the same time, Romania supports the internal reform of the UN, such as the strengthening of the role of the UN Security Council. During its mandate, Romania was actively involved in the debates and activities of the Security Council concerning the global war on terror, other non-conventional threats, consolidating peace, stabilization and democratic reconstruction of the states etc.

National security demands the direct involvement in maintaining the regional and international stability, as regional instability can have negative effects on the national security.

As part of its national security, Romania places a special importance on its political and military commitments in supporting the processes of stabilization and democratization in its proximity. This approach is part of a wider regional vision that includes South-East Europe, Black Sea area, Middle East and Central Asia.

Romania's involvement in the regional affairs materializes in political and military demarches with the purpose of resolving conflicts and preventing their escalation, as well as, supporting an efficient international co-operation in order to achieve these goals¹⁸.

Romanian Armed Forces participate to peace support operations under NATO and EU command and under UN and OSCE mandate with national contingents or within

multinational forces and regional initiatives of security.

Romania also contributes to actions of humanitarian assistance, search and rescue and disaster relief within multinational missions. Romanian Armed Forces take part in military operations within coalitions, alongside other states, thus supporting its allies and partners in the fight against terrorism and in ensuring the international stability.

Romania's contribution to the regional security certifies its role of contributor in the field of security, thus ensuring its own stability, on one hand, and demonstrating its willingness to act as a NATO and EU member state, on the other hand. Romania is actively involved in the regional initiatives of cooperation and participates with forces and military capabilities in peace support operations under the mandate of the international organizations. Romania has forces available for peacekeeping missions under UN and OSCE mandate and for regional multinational forces, such as the Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE) – SEEBRIG¹⁹, SHIRBRIG, BLACKSEAFOR, Romanian-Hungarian Battalion, TISA Engineers Battalion etc.

Starting from 1991, Romania has been actively involved in UN peacekeeping operations. Until now, Romania has participated with more than 11,000 military personnel to peace support operations with a wide range of forces: Infantry and Engineers Battalions, field hospital, Military Police, transport facilities, military observers, staff officers. The wide range of military operations, from humanitarian assistance and reconstruction to combat, directly contributed to the training of the personnel and to the implementation of the interoperability standards with NATO forces, but also to the defining of the integration level of Romanian Armed Forces, according to the lessons learned from the participation to multinational missions²⁰.

For instance, Romanian Armed Forces participated to already ended peace support operations under NATO command – *IFOR (Bosnia-Herzegovina)* 20.03-30.11.1996, *SFOR (Bosnia-Herzegovina)* 01.12.1996-02.12.2004; under EU command – *Concordia, Allied Harmony (FYROM)* 10.06-15.12.2003; under UN mandate – *UNOSOM II (Somalia)* 06.07.1993-26.10.1994, *UNAMIR II (Rwanda)* 09.03-15.04.1994, *UNAVEM III (Angola)* 17.05.1995-08.07.1997, *MONUA (Angola)* 30.06.1997-26.02.1999, *UNIKOM (Iraq-Kuwait)* 23.04.1991-22.03.2003, *UNMA (Angola)* 01.09.2002-01.02.2003; under OSCE mandate – *ALBA (Albania)* 14.04-24.07.1997, *GROM (Republic of Moldova)* 19.04.1992-01.02.1993, *KVM (Kosovo)* 20.08.2000-23.05.2003, *Monitoring Mission in FYROM* 15.10.2001-30.06.2003²¹ and within multinational coalitions – operation *Desert Storm* 20.02-20.03.1991.

At present, Romanian Armed Forces participate to various peace support and combating terrorism operations under NATO command – *KFOR (Kosovo)* since 01.03.2000, *NATO HQ Sarajevo* since 02.12.2004, *ISAF (Afghanistan)* since 30.01.2002 and *NATO Training Mission (Iraq)* since August 2005; under EU command – *EUFOR*, mission *ALTHEA (Bosnia-Herzegovina)* since 02.12.2004; under UN mandate, with military observers and monitors – *MONUC (D.R. Congo)* since 23.10.1999, *UNMIK (Kosovo)* since 10.06.1999, *UNMEE (Ethiopia-Eritrea)* since 09.10.2000, *ONUCI (Côte d'Ivoire)* since 15.06.2003, *UNAMA (Afghanistan)* since 25.07.2003, *UNMIL (Liberia)* since 18.11.2003, *UNOMIG (Georgia)* since 2003, *UNMIS (Sudan)* since 12.11.2005 and *UNMIN (Nepal)* since January 2007 and within multinational coalitions – operation *Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan)* since 23.07.2002 and operation *Iraqi Freedom (Iraq)* since July 2003²².

At present, summarizing the numbers of the military personnel deployed in various operations theaters, the situations looks like this: peace support operations in the Balkans –

204 military personnel; peace support operations in Afghanistan – 854 military personnel; peace support operations in Iraq – 496 military personnel; military observers and monitors in missions under UN and OSCE aegis – 62 military personnel; staff and liaison officers in the HQs assigned to led the operations in Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq – 11 military personnel, thus resulting a total number of 1626 military personnel²³.

Romanian Armed Forces are an active participant to the peace support operations in NATO and EU-led operations, under UN and OSCE mandate or within coalitions. The resulting experience can now be found in the new operational doctrines. A deeper understanding of this kind of operations, monitoring and evaluation the areas with a potential of conflict, especially those from Romania proximity (Balkans, Black Sea area, Middle East, Central Asia) constitute an important premise for the proper identification of the new challenges, risks and threats.

The continuation of Romania's involvement in this kind of operations will help better to train the forces that will take part in such operations; with or without of the host nation support.

The deployment of the Armed Forces to various operations theatres, the transformation of the classic concepts of territorial defense to expeditionary ones and the broadening of the role and missions of the Romanian Armed

Forces have definitely contributed to the gradual shaping of a new strategic profile.

From this perspective, the transformation of the defense policies is fundamental, the effort being translated from an approach based on ensuring the own security and the protection of the national territory to the embracement of a larger role in the regional security, and at present, it is witnessed the birth of new multi-regional demarches that bring together reconstruction and stabilization components in areas far from the European continent.

Romania has also fit its missions and capabilities according to its NATO membership. The range of objectives was therefore enlarged in order to include the training of the forces for common defense, the improvement of the capabilities for the entire range of crisis management operations, including those concerning the multinational operations for combating terrorism.

The role of Romanian Armed Forces in mediation, assistance and peacekeeping missions has grown significantly, being a consequence of the gradual transformation of Romania in a contributor to the regional and global security. The ended missions, as well as, the present and future ones, represent an important contribution to the professional process development of the Romanian Armed Forces personnel.

NOTES

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
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The Global Interests and the Regional Interests

Diplomacy and Confrontation

Dumitru Mazilu*

In the German resort Heiligendamm, took place, in June 2007, the sessions of a new G8 summit, characterized by “*diplomacy and confrontation*”. We cannot affirm that leaders of the “*most developed countries*” have had any summit, in particular in the last decades –under the dominion of “*perfect harmony*” and “*open agreement*” on all issues discussed. The message these leaders wanted to convey to the people around the world, was

generally an optimistic one: allowing the poor to think that very soon they “*will overcome the scarcity of their daily life*”, in which they are doomed to live in, trying to convince the “*oppressed*” that in a short while they will be set free, insisting on peacefully solving all potential conflict issues and evoking the need for mutual understanding and cooperation, desiderates of which “*they, the leaders of the rich, are very fond of*”.

#1. Why the Group of the Most Industrialized Countries?

After the Second World War, “*an international forum of Peace at United Nations*” was set, considering that through this new system they will solve the needs of the world and all the countries will be kept aside from bloody conflicts, just like the first two world wars.

Francis Fukuyama, the famous author of the analysis concerning “*The End of History*”, in which he was raising public awareness that today “*any international organization – like for instance the United Nations – has legitimacy*”, and this is why “*is due to the fact that legally constituted democratic majorities*

conferred to them this legitimacy in a negotiated governmental process”¹, and Samuel Huntington maintained that the world in which we live is characterized by violence, instability and disorder².

To give to the world “*more stability*” and for generating trust in the promotion of order, the leaders of the seven “*most industrialized countries*” made a deal to create the G7, to which, in the latter years, the Russian Federation had joined, becoming the G8. If their declared purposes are in concordance with the realities present, it is up to the “*international community*” to decide³.

#2. Global Interests, Regional Interests

Frequently the global interests are associated with the economic and military power of the United States, like the former prime-minister of France, Edouard Baladour, and the regional interests are included in the global interests through negotiations, and in any cases are contradiction with these as Fukuyama says.

Robert Kagan maintains that between global interests – often represented by the

United States – and the regional ones, represented on a wide scale by the European states, there are even discrepancies, especially concerning “*international legitimacy between the United States of America and Europe*”. “*The Europeans - underlines Robert Kagan – like laws and international norms, because they are weaker than the Americans, which are preferring unilateralism, because it is significantly more powerful than any other*

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country or group of countries (like the European Union), not only in the terms of military power, but also at the economic, technologic and cultural levels"³.

#3. The USA and the Russian Federation

If before the revolutions of 1989-1991, the Power of the East was seen as "a global, both economic and military Power", after the separation, the Russian Federation was left behind on all critical global interest issues, but still maintaining itself as force not to be at all neglected from a military point of view, due to the strategic arsenal they possess.

Considering the changes arisen in Russia - after the 1989 and 1991 revolutions, but taking into account at the same time its military potential and the perspectives of its economic development, the most industrialized countries convened to include the Russian Federation in

The convergent global interests – but more often divergent – registered between the USA and the Russian Federation, on an economic level, and more so on the military one.

their group, which turned from a G7 into a G8, fact that did not represent "a complete harmonization of interests" and the elimination of all divergent opinions.

NATO's frontiers approaching rapidly Russian Federation's borders, the emplacement of US military units originally in Germany to Bulgaria and Romania, but most of all the building of the anti-missile shield in the Czech Republic and Poland represent actions considered as "threatening signals" by the Russian leaders and even "aggravating dangers" threatening the safety of Russia.

#4. The Beginning of a New Cold War?

Before the summit of the G8 that took place in Heiligendamm, Germany, the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, evoking the analysis undertaken by the most entitled Russian experts on the issue, drew general awareness on the fact that "in the case in which the plan of the United States is to build an anti-missile shield in the Czech Republic and Poland, and this will become factual," a new race for armament will emerge, as well as the advent of "a new Cold War". The President of the Russian Federation also stated that, since the ending of the Cold War period, Russian missiles never aimed, in a special way, Europe, but, "if an American nuclear capacity arises in Europe, and, in the opinion of our military specialists, threatens Russia,

then we would have to take the necessary steps". When asked "What will those steps be?" President Vladimir Putin stated: "With certainty, we will have new targets in Europe." In his opinion, "the strategic balance of forces is at stake in Europe and, for rehabilitating it, instead of creating an anti-missile shield on the Russian territory, we will create a system to counteract it."

The military Russian analysts concluded that the affirmation stating that the American anti-missile shield was designed to counteract "possible attacks from Iran and North Korea" can't be truthful. Technical data at their disposal demonstrates that "the anti-missile shield from the Czech Republic and Poland can be only a threat to the security of Russia."

#5. The American Diplomacy at the Heiligendamm Summit

As a result of the reaction of Russian leaders, the political and diplomatic circles in Washington, as well as NATO officials tried to deny the fact that "the anti-missile shield would aim at Russian soil". The American President George W. Bush rushed to declare that "Russia is not the enemy of the USA",

and that the anti-missile shield has only a defensive role, being build not against Russia, but with the purpose of protecting Europe from "other dangers, as real as they can get". More so, President Bush invited Russia to cooperate in this American project.

Russian leaders consider that the explanation conform which the building of the anti-missile shield "*protects Europe against Iranian missiles*" does not resist to any solid

scientific analysis, because Iran "*doesn't own missiles that could reach distances between 5,000 and 8,000 kilometers*".

#6. Diplomatic Negotiations on the Proposal by the Russian Side

The invitation launched by President Bush in Prague - before the Heiligendamm Summit - for cooperation with Russia in the purpose of finalizing the anti-missile project wasn't without response. It is known that President Bush suggested to President Putin that Russia should participate "*along with the United States for accomplishing this project*". Answering to this proposal, the President of

the Russian Federation suggested that the United States and Russia should use together the Azerbaijani radar system for developing an anti-missile shield, that could "*cover the entire continent, not only a part of it*".

The American President appreciated as interesting Vladimir Putin's proposal regarding the usage of the already existing Azerbaijani installations for an anti-missile shield.

#7. An Answer is Still Pending

Many analysts of multilateral diplomacy have noted that the Russian proposal took by surprise not only the American counterpart, but the European leaders as well. As long as the Americans and the Europeans who attended the summit were prepared to plead that the anti-missile shield wasn't directed against Russia and that "*Russia is not considered an enemy of the United States*", the carefully designed diplomatic speech was interrupted by the unexpected proposal from Kremlin.

The Russian proposal, difficult to reject at the first sight, will be studied in the "*American strategic laboratories*", and an answer is still pending.

Kremlin's offer to use the radar station in Azerbaijan - rented to Russia until 2012 - is also studied by NATO. Its General Secretary, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said that "*it is still early to issue a final judgment*", but that he considered useful for "*two presidents to debate constructively over this matter*".

#8. Washington and NATO Give a Negative Answer to Kremlin's Proposal

Robert Gates, the Pentagon chief, on the occasion of the formal meeting of the ministers of defense from the member states of the North Atlantic Alliance in Bruxelles, declared that the United States of America "*will not give up their plans to place anti-missile installations in Europe*".

The Pentagon chief underlined that "*USA commit to the decision of installing a radar in the Czech Republic and of intercepting installations in Poland*". This way, Robert Gates rejected the Russian offer to jointly use the radar installations in Azerbaijan, in exchange for discarding the anti-missile devices from the Czech Republic and Poland.

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the General Secretary of NATO, also rejected the Russian

proposal. In defending NATO's position on this matter, Scheffer claims that "*the approach of the North Atlantic Alliance is based on the principle of indivisibility of security for our allies and on the principle of transparence to our partners, including, of course, Russia*".

On the same meeting of the defense ministers from NATO member states (Bruxelles, June 14-15, 2007) there was an agreement for the South-Eastern wing of the Alliance (Greece, Bulgaria, Turkey and Romania) to be protected by a short and medium range system which would become operational "*around the year 2010*".

It is obvious that tensions between Washington and Kremlin will continue to rise

after the rejection by NATO and USA of the Russian Federation proposal. There is still hope for the diplomacy of the great powers to be able to avoid "*the beginning of a new cold*

war" which could lead to catastrophic consequences taking into consideration the military technology of our age.

#9. Attempts to Reconfigure the "Balance of Powers" at a Global Level

As a reply to the American anti-missile shield, President Vladimir Putin has launched an extensive program for modernization of the Russian air defense system. This program will be finalized by 2015.

On August 12, 2007, "*the biggest Islamic assembly in the entire world*" took place in Jakarta. The adepts Hizb ut-Tahrir asked for the "*establishment of the Global Caliphate*", a single state of the entire Islamic world. Founded in 1950, the Hizb ut-Tahrir movement became **global** nowadays. The movement succeeded in gathering over 100,000 believers in the Indonesian capital city, on August 12th, 2007, on whose T-shirts it was written: "*The Islam is the alternative ideology and the solution to the capitalist exploitation and hegemony*".

Even if they declare themselves to be the enemy of no one, the Organization for Cooperation in Shanghai turned into a real force in Central Asia. This Organization was founded in 2001 by Russia and China, together

with Kazakhstan, Kirghistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The Organization was joined, as observers, by: Iran, India, Mongolia and Pakistan. These states wish to be recognized with the status of members. Since 2002, Iran has insisted on being received in the Organization with full membership rights. In August 2007, the Organization organized war games entitled "*Peace Mission 2007*". They were attended by 6500 soldiers, 500 military vehicles, and 80 planes from all the six member states. Even if the leaders of these states stated that the war games represent "*an anti-terrorist peace mission*", knowing observers consider that they want to send "a message to Washington".

A lucid analysis regarding these attempts to reconfigure the "*balance of powers*" at a global level leads to the conclusion that the "*military confrontations should be replaced by diplomatic negotiations*" led in good faith in order to install a lasting peace all over the world⁵.

NOTES:

¹ Francis Fukuyama, *State-Building Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*, p. 117.

² Samuel P. Huntington, *Political order in Changing Societies*, Yale University, 1968, p. 9.

³ About which Fukuyama maintains that "*it is fiction*", often sinonim with the will "*of the most powerful leaders of the Planet*".

⁴ Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America vs. Europe in the New World Order*, Knopf, New York, 2003, p. 31.

⁵ See Dumitru Mazilu, *Diplomație europeană*, Editura Lumina Lex, București, 2008, p. 7.

Romania's International Status from the Outbreak of World War II to the Vienna Dictate: Finnish Perceptions

Silviu-Marian Miloiu

This article focuses on the Finnish perceptions of one of the most dramatic developments affecting Romania in the first half of the 20th century history, namely the severe territorial losses experienced in the summer and early autumn of 1940. The aim is not only to read a story which has not yet been told regarding the views and perceptions of the diplomatic service of the small Nordic power and of the Finnish press on the developments leading to Romania's territorial division. Because Finland shared with Romania similar concerns on Soviet western policies and a common interest in the development of the Soviet-German relations, the changes in Romania's strategic and territorial environment and the occurrences in the Romanian-Soviet were important also from the perspective of the Finnish decision-makers who were planning Finnish foreign policy. It is also interesting to see how the anti-Soviet mindset of Finnish leaders affected their assessment of Soviet-Romanian relations. Equally interesting is to assess the extent to which the kinship between the Finns and the Hungarians influenced Finnish politicians and public opinion's appraisal of what the Hungarian historiography calls the Vienna Award and the Romanian historiography calls the Vienna Dictate of August 30, 1940. The diplomatic reports used as the main source of this article deal more with the preliminaries and circumstances leading to this outcome, the analyses concerning the actual events being less numerous. I concentrate in this chapter on the reports dispatched by Finnish diplomats accredited to Bucharest, although diplomatic reports coming from other capitals are also

considered. The newspapers, focusing on the surprising and swift developments on the Western front and on the Finnish-Soviet relations, have paid less attention to these alterations in South-Eastern Europe than it would have otherwise been the case. There are also some entries in the Finnish politicians' diaries noticing the changes taking place in South-Eastern Europe.

The signature of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact was a milestone in the destruction of the European power equilibrium, its third article giving Soviet Union free hand in Bessarabia.¹ The possible effects of the German-Soviet agreement on the in-between small European countries made the Finnish policy-makers eager to get adequate information about what was supposed to be its hidden part. Geneva was one of the diplomatic European centres where many well-informed diplomats and journalists resided. Therefore, the diplomats accredited to neutral Switzerland constituted for their Foreign Ministries an important source of information. The activity of the Finnish Legation in Switzerland is a proof of the opportunities and difficulties created by the flow of information circulating from many different and often contrasting sources. A case in point is a report of the Finnish Legation addressed to the Finnish Presidency and Foreign Ministry only a few days after the German-Soviet pact was signed. The dispatch called the attention to the interpretations gaining currency in Geneva that the agreement between the two sides provided that the USSR received the eastern quarter of Poland and at least Latvia and Estonia if not Lithuania, too. A defeated Poland was to be reduced to a

statute similar to that of a protectorate. It was also assumed that Germany was going step by step to grab hold of Hungary, Yugoslavia and a mutilated Romania. Russia was going to annex Bessarabia while Hungary the western areas of the country while remaining a German ally.² This report is remarkable for the precision of its predictions concerning the main East-Central European evolutions in the subsequent year. It is also likely that the report, one of the best documented reaching on the desk of the Finnish decision-makers, in connection with news coming from various other channels, was given due consideration at the highest levels of the Finnish foreign policy. Already this report anticipated that Romania will become one of the main victims of the new order in East-Central Europe.

The need was also felt to grasp the rationality behind the astonishing Nazi-Communist rapprochement. Shortly after what Immanuel Kant would have called and indeed many historians and analysts beginning with E.H. Carr considered as the long armistice ended and the war started to ravage again in Europe, the Finnish chargé d'affaires to Bucharest considered this issue in a diplomatic report dispatched to his foreign minister Eljas Erkko. Hiitonen was inspired in his despatch by an interview with his Soviet colleague Kukolev. In a manner that will become a doctrine in the Soviet historiography, the Soviet diplomat blamed the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact on Poland and Romania whose attitudes had allegedly forced his country to abandon the negotiations with Britain and France and conclude the treaty with Germany. The Soviet diplomat denied the rumours that the agreement with Germany included secret clauses. He justified it by the Soviet desire to stay neutral in the war. Regardless of the insistence placed by the Soviet diplomat on the fact that Soviet Union was a country content with its territory and natural riches, thus opposed to any idea of conquest, Hiitonen remarked his colleague's insistence on the fact that Moscow was judging the international developments coolly in order to draw all possible advantages from it.³

In a changing geopolitical climate, Romania tried to pursue a policy of adaptation to realities. This was visible in Romania's interest in developing trade with Germany, finding a rapprochement with its revisionist neighbours, Soviet Union included, and constructing an area free of conflicts in South-Eastern Europe, Europe's traditional powder keg. A significant part of the Romanian elite believed that oil might be turned into the trump card of Romania's neutrality. Oil was of course important and, as Hiitonen recognised, its acquisition constituted the most important goal of the big powers in Romania. The Reich was, as a consequence of its shortage of oil and limited possibilities to get it without paying an expensive political price, the most interested power in acquiring it. However, the Romanian government hindered the supply of oil to Germany for as long as possible without jeopardising the country's security. Although the average amount of oil shipped through the Danube was – according to Hiitonen's estimations – the equivalent of 500 carriages a day, during the first days of the war this amount decreased to 200 carriages a day. The official explanation was that the pipeline connecting the oilfields to Giurgiu was broken. However, as Hiitonen emphasised, there was no hurry to fix it despite the German requests for modernising the pipelines.⁴

The Finnish diplomat's understanding of Romania's stand towards the European developments during the last quarter of August and the first quarter of September coincided with the views of Romanian PM Armand Călinescu as seen in an entry in the latter's diary of August 24: king Charles II was opposed to any 'coquetry' with Germany and wanted to avoid anything which might delay a British victory against the Reich. The Germans were nevertheless alert that the Romanian Government was responsible for the delays and consequently decided to appoint an official to raise this issue in Bucharest.⁵ This fits quite well with the conclusions derived by Hiitonen in an ampler analysis of the situation in East-Central Europe shortly before the war broke

out. Hiitonen checked his views by exchanging opinions with foreign diplomats from the Bucharest diplomatic corps such as the Yugoslavian ambassador Yovan Douthitch and the Polish Legation secretary Narzumsky, the latter diplomat having formerly been accredited to Helsinki. The conclusion Hiitonen reached at was that war was held unavoidable both in the Romanian Foreign Ministry and by the Polish diplomat. Narzumsky did not illusion himself that Romania would do anything but stay neutral at least on short term. There were good reasons to do so as the alliance between Poland and Romania was but in theory *erga omnes*, in practice being limited by the fact that the military convention stipulated a military action only in case of Soviet aggression. From the conversation with Douthitch Hiitonen remained in no doubt that Romania and other Balkan states were going to stay neutral, at least in the first phase of a European war following a German attack on Poland, although such a policy would not always coincide with the public opinion expectations. Perhaps to his surprise, Hiitonen discovered that the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact was interpreted by his interlocutors rather in ideological than in security terms they stressing the meeting points between the two ideologies.⁶

The advent of the World War II caught Romania in Hiitonen's opinion socially, politically, economically and militarily poorly equipped to meet its enormous challenges. There was, however, a big national effort in which Romania engaged itself to raise the level of its army and its sources of supply. The crown was in the centre of this project, an indication of the consciousness that a lost war had the potential of overthrowing the royal house and the country's monarchical regime from power. There was also a hope that the undemanding Romanian peasants and workers, used as they were to live and labour in poor conditions, would be fitted for military action in circumstances unbearable to western soldiers. These views were shared by the Yugoslavian and Polish diplomats. The army also benefited the help of French instructors.⁷

Following an initiative by his prime minister, the king accepted on September 4th that the Council of Ministers adopt a declaration stressing Romania's intention to continue its policy of peace. Because of the rumours that the declaration combined with the partial mobilisation of the army signified that Romania, in fact, was preparing for war, the king felt that the declaration failed to clarify the country's official standing. Therefore, the Royal Council was convened to address this issue. Hiitonen believed that the task of the Royal Council was to find a solution that will avoid breaking the ties with the Western Allies and Turkey while at the same time will diminish the worries of the domestic opinion and the concern of the Axis that Romania will join France, Poland and Britain against Germany. The outcome was a Royal Council communiqué whose key is to be found in article 3: "the Council, unanimously, has decided the strict obedience of the rules of neutrality as established in the international conventions towards the belligerents in the current war."⁸

Finland shared with Romania the worries that the outbreak of war constituted a big threat on its fundamental values. Therefore, the Finnish officialdom started to turn their eyes to Romania and to show more interest in Romania's evolutions. This is true also about the statute of neutrality declared by the Royal Council. Hiitonen remarked that, at the beginning, the dominant opinion was that Romania will not proclaim neutrality with the Political Department of the Romanian Foreign Ministry supporting the view that such a document was needless. The situation was tense as Romania took some steps towards mobilisation with the largest part of its forces massed in the west against a possible German-Hungarian attack. Although springing from the Romanian worries about the Hungarian military moves towards the Romanian border, the Hungarian envoy put forward an official protest and announced that his country considered countermeasures. As Hiitonen noticed, the worries of the leading circles coincided with those of the population where

the anti-German feeling was the dominant note.⁹ Hiitonen checked his opinions on Romania's foreign policy intentions with four of his foreign colleagues in Bucharest, including the Turkish ambassador Suphi Tanriocer. He was wrong in his assessment that Turkey was ready to join the Western Allies and that military expeditions coming from these countries might be dispatched to Romania. He was nevertheless true in arguing that the king wanted to strengthen the neutrality and to end the rumours about an early Romanian joining in the anti-Axis camp.¹⁰

The outcome of the declarations on neutrality was positive at least as far as the German worries are concerned. The Nazi representative for *Bukarester Tageblatt* maintained he was satisfied with the text of September 6 communiqué. Nevertheless, this did not put an end to argumentations about the potentiality or even necessity of an Allied expedition to South-Eastern Europe. Nor did the declaration of neutrality mean the final end of the worries about the country being embroiled one way or another into the conflagration. Hiitonen reported about Romania's additional mobilisation that had chiefly taken place in order to transfer the bulk of its troops to Bessarabia which he attributed to the increased underground communist activity that had already forced the Romanians to supplement the local border guards and to start preparatory fortification works. The situation at the border with Bulgaria remained relatively calm, Sofia's neutrality being guaranteed for as long as Italy maintained its non-interventionist policy.¹¹ Hiitonen himself was unimpressed by Romania's declarations of neutrality. Quoting military experts, he argued that the end of neutrality depended on the time the Allies needed to put in motion a strong military expedition. In the meanwhile, Romania knew that it was unable to mount a serious opposition to a possible German attack were Romania to join such a venture.¹² Consequently, the Finnish diplomat was inclined to overemphasise the significance of Romania's pro-Allied feelings in decision-

making process believing that it was up to France and Great Britain to get an early Romanian joining in the war.

The weeks following the signature of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact witnessed the radical restructuring of the political space in the in-between Europe. The first victim was Poland, Romania's ally and an important actor at the Baltic Sea. As Hiitonen noticed, Romania shared with Poland not only the history of 18 years of alliance but also the difficult geopolitical position and the presence at its borders of resolute and strong revisionist powers. Romania's potential enemies in the first half of September were Soviet Union, Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria, so to say the two biggest powers east of France and two of the other three neighbours. It is no wonder then that the attention paid by the European diplomacy to Romania was bigger than ever since mid-1930s when Titulescu was in charge of his country's foreign policy gaining for Bucharest international reputation. In the meantime, however, Soviet Union had turned from a potential ally to a potential enemy. Even Germany was comparatively less feared by the Romanian political elite. The Finnish diplomat noticed that it was assumed among many leading Romanians and foreign diplomats that Germany was not going to attack Romania for as long as the Reich received the adequate quantities of grains and oil. Many also regarded Germany as a key factor in moderating Hungary and Bulgaria's revisionist aims. Similarly, Hiitonen believed that Hungary could undertake a military venture only with Germany's connivance, while Bulgaria's policy towards Romania depended on Italy.¹³

The outbreak of the European war, Poland's defeat and the Baltic States' submission in front of the extensive Soviet demands did not constitute the only dramatic developments the Romanians witnessed during September and beginning of October 1939. On September 21 Romania lost as a result of a political murder its second prime minister in six years. The assassination of the Armand Călinescu followed in line of a wave of state

and anti-state terrorism, which seriously undermined the country especially after 1933. The Finnish envoy doubted that the crime was solely due to the adversity of the right-wingers against Călinescu whom Legionnaire Movement held responsible of masterminding the assassination of "Captain" Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu. Hiitonen, a Social-Democrat and adversary of Nazism, was a supporter of the idea that Germany was involved in the crime. He quoted reliable sources in arguing that the crime was planned to take place while the German troops were occupying the Polish areas near the Romanian border. The murder of the PM would have created the pretext for an intervention of these troops in Romania. However, the murderers were late with doing their job while, on the other hand, the Red Army reached too rapidly to their assigned positions at the border with Romania.¹⁴ Hiitonen appreciated Călinescu as an energetic, pro-British politician whose activity could but bring benefits to his country.¹⁵

The Finnish diplomat had to explain however the part played by the right wing in the crime which he found easy to reconcile with the idea that Germany had ordered the action. After exchanging views with the Latvian envoy Ludvigs Ēķis and foreign journalists and learning that documents were found in the German House in Cernăuți (Czernowitz) proving that the local Germans were planning an uprising at the time when the German troops appeared at the border in order to give the Germans an excuse for an intervention Hiitonen felt strengthened in his opinion. He was convinced that the legionnaires who had previously sought refuge in Carpathian Ukraine and Slovakia committed the crime with German support on German order. The Finnish diplomat held the official denial of the Ministry of Propaganda a consequence of the German pressures on the Romanian Government. Hiitonen also believed the theory that the Spanish envoy was somehow involved in the crime.¹⁶ This scenario to which Hiitonen returned several times has however no evidence in the archives.

It is today a fact that king Charles II bore with difficulty the murder of Călinescu which was of course one of the reasons for the frequent changes of governments during the subsequent period.¹⁷ At the end of November Hiitonen reported about the third PM after Călinescu taking hold of office. Hiitonen remarked the delicate balance of the influence of foreign powers with the Anglo-French seemingly increasing their influence with the appointment of the new government, which was an indication of Romania's goal of pursuing a policy of neutrality among the big powers. Though the PM and many ministers were pro-French, there remained however pro-German ministers in the government.¹⁸

The implications of the Polish defeat for Romania were multiple. The defeat was a result of deficiencies in defence organisation leading to a military chaos for the defenders and of inadequacies of the weaponry. As such, the Polish defeat constituted a warning to small countries such as Romania and Finland of the need to improve their war preparedness. Hiitonen, as a former diplomat in Prague, was not impressed by the performances of the Polish diplomacy and he even held the Polish diplomacy responsible for their defeat. He referred back to Poland's contribution to the division of Czechoslovakia as playing in the advantage of Polish adversaries by exposing the country to a German attack and even downrightly accused Beck's foreign policy as having played against Polish most sacred interests. Hiitonen understood nevertheless that the Polish defeat adversely affected Romania's interest. The first obvious complication was the entrance of Polish active officers on the Romanian territory. They were, in compliance with the international law, interned. The Romanian government was put in a difficult situation because of the German threats that any departure of Polish officials from Romania would be considered an unfriendly action which might call a German retaliation. This warning was taken seriously by the Romanian leadership and therefore the Polish considered a contingency plan of forming a committee either in Paris or in

London.¹⁹ The demands of the Polish officials for being allowed to leave Romania for another neutral state were turned down.²⁰ Hiitonen also noticed the paradox that Romania was the country to attempt in the spring to enlarge the alliance with Poland so as the two nations act at unison both in Central Europe and in their relations with the Great Powers. In the end, Polish refusal served Romania's cause.²¹

On the other hand, as a consequence of the Red Army's advance into Poland, Soviet Union started to be considered an immediate menace on Romania's security and integrity. The Finnish chargé observed that Soviet Union's policies puzzled many a Romanian diplomat to the extent that "nobody had a clear idea but only suppositions based on certain trends." In the diplomatic circles the opinion was that Soviet Union joined the Reich in order to get, under the guise of cooperation, the possibility to close Germany's road to South-eastern Europe. On the other hand, Germany's foreign policy was considered skilful for as long as it achieved the occupation of Slavic states with the help of other Slavic nations: Poland was helpful in the occupation of Czechoslovakia and Soviet Union in that of Poland. German commercial policy was also doing its task in preventing Slavic solidarity.²² The relations between Romania and the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the Polish defeat became a key issue in Romanian and foreign political circles. Hiitonen shared the opinion of his colleagues in the diplomatic corps that the USSR was not going to undertake any military action but would hurry to safeguard her interests in case that other countries threatened Romania's territorial integrity or political independence. However, Hiitonen assessed Romania's position as a difficult one due to the lack of army materials, the poor training of the soldiers and the deficient organisation of the army. This fuelled the rumours about negotiations with Hungary and Bulgaria in the spring and summer to cede territories to these neighbours as a means to appease them. Even though the outbreak of the war silenced these rumours, the opinion was that Romania could barely oppose

a German or Western Allies' violation of her sovereignty.²³ As a consequence, the Romanian government attempted to maintain good economic relations with Germany. Hiitonen reported to Helsinki that the German economic delegation to Bucharest explained that it needed not any longer grain from Romania, because it got it from Soviet Union but oil, being prepared to import grain only with the condition that the export of oil was increased. Romania seemed not only a prisoner of the political circumstances created by the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, but also of the economic circumstances created by the German-Soviet economic agreements.²⁴

While in the first weeks following the signature of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact the mainstream opinion was that the Soviet policy was motivated by peaceful intentions, after the Red Army occupation of eastern Poland the opinion had changed. The fear was now that Soviet Union will pursue an active, perhaps aggressive policy. This view gained currency in Romania, too. Hiitonen remarked the worries the broadcast of a pirate radio station that the Russians were going in a short span of time to free their Bassarabian and Bucovinian' brothers created in Bucharest. Many believed that it was a Soviet attempt to spread a feeling of incertitude in Romania. This led to the fact that many Romanians started to consider Soviet Union as posing a more serious menace than Germany. The flow of opinion was that Hitler was prepared to respect the sovereignty of the country for as long as the Reich received the merchandises it needed from Romania. Moreover, a German push into Romania might attract an answer from the Allies. On the contrary, the Romanians were afraid that even an Allied victory would not be able to drive back Soviet Union if this power ever occupied Romania.²⁵

For these reasons, Romania started to drive the bulk of its military forces towards the border with the Soviet Union after earlier keeping them close to the borders with Hungary and Bulgaria. It also contributed to diminishing Romania's aversion towards Germany whose support was now eager to

enlist against Soviet Union. Another conclusion was that an aid from the Allies against Soviet Union was unlikely to come. This new line of reasoning, as Hiitonen remarked, was further augmented by the general opinion of the Romanian political circles and foreign diplomatic corps that the German-Soviet cooperation was short-lived. This derived from the opinion that the German-Soviet rapprochement was brought about by a series of miscalculations, the agreement being already obsolete. It was still maintained alive by Germany's attempt to end the war with the Western Powers by making use of its relations with Soviet Union.²⁶ A critic of any form of totalitarianism and imperialism, Hiitonen disputed this opinion which started to gain ground in the official circles and to influence Romania's foreign policy. He believed that Soviet Union was going to continue the German line in its foreign policy for as long as the Reich, for any new assistance, offered it a big price, mostly on the expense of its neighbouring small states. Additionally, the continuation of the war weakened Britain, a fact from which Moscow drew only advantages. Germany, on its part, was prepared for a political trade in order to gain the necessary space of manoeuvre to achieve its ends. Hiitonen now also shared the opinion that the ideological foundation of Germany and Soviet Union was more akin than it seemed at first sight. As a proof, Hiitonen quoted *Bukarester Tageblatt* which emphasised the importance of the German-Soviet friendship and appreciated that the Wehrmacht and the Red Army will once again march together if they will be ordered to do so.²⁷ Consequently, Hiitonen was not positive about Romania's chances of playing the two totalitarian powers one against another. However, Hiitonen was aware that on the long run in the German-Soviet relations may suffer because of Soviet drive toward Great Russian patriotism or Pan-Slavic imperialism with the potential of leading to clashes against the Pan-Germanic hegemonic aspirations.²⁸ Hiitonen's analysis will prove its validity in summer and autumn of 1940 when

Romania will become a victim of both the cooperation and the competition between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.

As it may have been expected, the German smooth victory over the Polish Army and the absence of a strong Anglo-French response had a profound impact on Romania. In the eyes of the general public, the prestige of the Allies was weakened. Hiitonen also observed that the determination of the political elite to strictly obey the rules of neutrality was strengthened. This went to the point that the censure supervised that the newspapers published a balanced quantity of information and pictures from both fighting camps. Romania also improved its commercial ties with the Reich and resumed the oil exports. A paradox was that the Polish defeat affected not only Romania, a country counted already before the war among Germany's enemies, but also Hungary which started to consider a rapprochement with Romania.²⁹

A month and a week following the outbreak of the German-Polish war, when Poland ceased to exist on the international arena and Soviet Union was busy with re-asserting its influence in Eastern Baltic, the Finnish charge wrote a long diplomatic dispatch concerning the Great Powers' interplay of the interests in South-Eastern Europe. As it was the case with his previous evaluations, the conclusions of this dispatch were not very promising for Romania. Borrowing an idea which Eduard Beneš had enunciated back in 1938, Hiitonen counted that the great powers interested in the Balkan evolutions were Italy, Germany and Soviet Union, each of them keeping the other's influence in check. Conversely, the interests of France and Great Britain, on whose support Romania counted, seemed rather indirect. Although Soviet Union and Germany had concluded a pact, the lack of trust between the two parties was a fact accepted in a rare concord by the representatives of the Western Powers and the Axis. The Soviet policy at the outbreak of the German-Polish war led Hiitonen to the same conclusion: the rapid advance of the Wehrmacht into Poland

determined the Soviets mobilize three-four million soldiers, conclude peace with Japan and head into Poland. When advancing into Poland, the Soviets occupied exactly the same areas which, in German hand, would have endangered the Soviet security. Moreover, in the diplomatic circles in Bucharest it was noticed that Stalin would have been disappointed were the Western Powers accept Hitler's proposal of concluding peace. Soviet Union was doing its best to strengthen its position on the expense of Germany and of the neighbouring countries. Hiitonen concluded that it was only a matter of circumstances that the two countries drew closer together.³⁰ In assessing Hiitonen's interpretations it must not be forgotten the fact that the secret provisions of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact remained concealed except for a few initiated. This contributed to him deciphering with a wrong code some of the actions undertaken by the two parties. It was however clear even for uninitiated that the astonishing rapprochement between the two opposing totalitarians will be endangered by their rivalries for influence and resources in East-Central Europe.

The competition between Italy, Germany and Soviet Union resulted in a shaky balance of power in the region. Following the downfall of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland the things have changed and the balance tilted in favour of Germany as a major actor and Hungary as a minor player in the region. Germany skilfully played its advantages by resorting to clearing agreements in order to bind the little countries of the region to the Reich taking advantage of the initial passivity of Britain and France and of Italy's limited space of manoeuvre as the weaker player in the region. Italy's remaining trump card for redressing the balance was to increase the South-Eastern European countries' resistance by encouraging them to improve their mutual relations. However, Germany, which had previously acquired only a quarter of its total imports from this region via the Danube, was increasing this percentage and was even trying to get more merchandises via the Mediterranean and the

Straits. The effect was that German political influence was once more on the increase. Germany's growing influence worried the Soviet Union and strengthened Soviet temptation to force its way not only into Bessarabia but also to Bucovina. Hiitonen emphasised that "with Bessarabia in its hands Soviet Union could oversee the Danube Delta and therefore control the traffic there". The Finnish diplomat also discovered that many diplomats and also the general public expected that Soviet Union would push its way into Romania in a short while.

The Finnish chargé concluded that Romania answered the changes taking place in its political environment with a policy of continual re-assessment and adaptation. Against all odds, the Romanian government displayed confidence and repeatedly affirmed its readiness to defend the country's territorial integrity. The government expected in case of Soviet aggression to enlist Germany's support at least insofar as the Reich might prevent Hungary and Bulgaria to join in the attack against Romania. With this goal in mind, Romania had already agreed with Hungary to mutually decrease the forces concentrated nearby the frontier so that the Romanian Army could concentrate alongside the border with Soviet Union.³¹

What the Finnish charge remarked as a feeble trend following Soviet intervention in Poland started to become more important in practical policies in the subsequent months. Once the fear of Soviet attack had amplified the antipathy towards Germany had lessened. Not everyone nevertheless believed that Soviet Union was undertaking preparations to attack Romania. The optimists still assessed that the Red Army entered in Poland for its benefits and would not intervene in Romania except for the case that it had to safeguard its interests when some other country attempted to push its way into this country. Reasons of optimism gave also the fact that the undertaking of an Allied expedition to this region seemed out of the agenda and consequently Germany was not expected to take any action in Romania for as long as it

received the merchandises it badly needed. Hiitonen was nevertheless reserved in his estimations. He did not entirely rule out the possibility of a Soviet attack and was uncertain whether Romania was going to oppose resistance in such an eventuality. If, however, Romania decided to go to war, the Red Army's quick advance into Poland showed what might result from it. Yet, according to Hiitonen, "Soviet position towards Romania depends on the relations between the Great Powers in this region." In the meantime, Bucharest tried to avoid conflicts and started to make concessions to the German and Ukrainian minorities.³²

Romania's main contribution in these circumstances was to work out projects committing the South-Eastern European states to neutrality, a policy springing from Romania's aim of preserving its territorial integrity. The tactic was to persuade Hungary and Bulgaria to renounce, at least temporarily, their revisionism so that Romania would turn its attention to east. In conjunction with this interest came also Romania's interest and estimations of the Turkish-Soviet and the Turkish-Allied relations. One of the most important issues on the agenda of the international diplomacy was the statute of the Straits which both Turkey and the Allies favoured keeping opened. This created the Allies the possibility of falling in Germany and Soviet Union's back. Hiitonen observed that this possibility influenced Romanian and Balkan policies. It also seriously lessened the likelihood that Romania granted Germany supplementary commercial advantages. It also made a Soviet attack against Romania risky. On the other hand, the opening of the Straits presented to Soviet Union both advantages and disadvantages. If Soviet Union intended to expand in the region its interest was to have the Straits locked in order to avoid the intervention of the British Fleet. On the contrary, if Germany wished to occupy Romania it was in Soviet Union's interest to allow the Straits open in order to have Germany facing an obstacle in its intentions. Hiitonen interpreted Stalin's serene reaction to the debate over the

regime of the Straits as an indicator that Stalin was not yet planning an attack over Romania on a short while. Germany was the only great power that categorically supported the idea of closing up the Straits. Keeping them open interfered with its plans of dominating South-Eastern Europe.³³

With these clouds on the horizon coming from some many different quarters, the views of the members of the Romanian government varied as about the most advantageous policy to protect their country's interests. PM Argetoianu³⁴ and many members of the government showed readiness for cooperating with Germany. Argetoianu was not perhaps uninfluenced in his policies by his position in the leadership of the local branch of a German bank. Other important figures in the government manifested a pro-Allied stance. Foreign Minister Grigore Gafencu was the most outstanding pro-Allied figure in the executive. Foreign minister's views made his position in the government difficult though not untenable. The PM and Ernest Urdăreanu³⁵, king's closest associate, wanted him removed from power. They were unsuccessful for as long as the King supported Gafencu's foreign policy line. Though a German himself and not indifferent to Germany's aspirations, Charles II was critical of Nazism. This made the Finnish diplomat conclude that the situation in Romania was unstable both internally and in respect to foreign policy.³⁶

It has been widely accepted in the historiography the importance played by Turkey throughout World War II as a regional Balkan player in avoiding spreading the instability in the region.³⁷ During the first months of war, Turkey supported Balkan cooperation. However, this state's foreign policy depended quite heavily on its relations with Soviet Union. Turkish assumption was that Soviet Union was going to maintain a defensive standing in the international relations. As Turkish ambassador Tanrıoer appreciated, if Soviet Union switched to an openly aggressive stance, his country would not expect until it fell victim to Soviet ambitions.³⁸ If Turkey was a mid-sized power,

Italy pretended to be one of Europe's great powers. Italy's interests in the Mediterranean region were widely-acknowledged. The Balkans, as a prolongation of the Mediterranean Sea, was also considered in Rome as a natural *debouche*. Italy enjoyed good relations with Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania and registered progresses in its relations with Greece and Yugoslavia, to some extent also with Turkey. Therefore, the Italians assumed quite naturally that the augurs were favourable to increase their influence in the region. Yet, Hiitonen correctly scaled down Italy as more junior player in the region in comparison to Germany and the Soviet Union. Consequently, the Finnish diplomat predicted that, in the last resort, the fate of the region depended on the relations between these two powers.³⁹

Because Soviet goals in the region stood in the centre of his attention, Hiitonen extensively reported on Soviet Union's foreign policy. He shared with the US envoy to Romania, Franklin Mott Günther, the view that the new Soviet imperialistic policy followed in Tsarist Russia's footsteps. As about the aims of this policy, Hiitonen appreciated that it envisaged the annexation of the frontier regions. Romania, one of the likely objects of this regenerated imperialism, had hoped that its situation would improve during the Moscow-held Soviet-Turkish negotiations. The talks had however broken out because of Turkish adamant opposition to closing off the Straits to outsiders. Hiitonen interpreted Soviet insistence on the Straits being closed to outsiders as a result of either a Soviet plan to attack Romania hindered by the possibility this country might receive help by the sea or as a Soviet desire to prevent the situation when itself would be a victim of an attack coming from the sea.⁴⁰

Hiitonen paid continual attention to the way Romania reacted to the swiftly changing international climate. He criticised in mid-October the Romanian diplomats for taking with relative ease the potential dangers hanging on their country. The Romanian diplomacy realistically estimated that the

opposition between Germany and the Western Powers will continue and based Romania's security on the divergent interests of the great powers. The Finnish diplomat stopped short of blaming them of wishful thinking. Yet, as Alexandru Cretzianu, the general secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs intimated to Hiitonen, the Romanians were worried because of the Soviet refused to appoint a new envoy to Bucharest. In fact, the diplomatic circles accredited the idea that the Soviets were not going to take this step until the differences with Romania were settled.⁴¹ In Romania's favour, Hiitonen accepted that Gafencu's foreign policy seemed to bear fruits in the fall of 1939. His slogan "The Balkans, to the Balkan peoples!" started to be embraced by states and politicians throughout the region.⁴² This trend was due to the desire of those nations to increase the efficacy of small states' response to bigger players' intent to increase their influence in the region. Hiitonen considered that even countries such as Hungary and Bulgaria which had previously taken a negative attitude to the stabilisation of the region had changed their minds. Bulgaria declined Germany's proposals of joining the war and looked more favourably disposed to preserve her neutrality no matter the circumstances. It was Bulgaria's revisionism aims which still prompted it to put pressure on Romania, enlisting even Soviet support. Such aspirations found a good reception in Moscow.⁴³

If in the few first weeks following Soviet incorporation of eastern Poland Hiitonen believed that it was a matter of little time until the USSR will step into Romania, by the end of October and beginning of November he continued to believe that the Soviet goal remained unchanged but its achievement was not going to happen soon. Although together with the US envoy he considered Soviet Union more of a national-imperial than a communist-revolutionary country, they were still dubious whether it considered itself as strong as to pursue a policy of aggression. For the moment Soviet Union was compelled to practice a defensive policy. Soviet Union

might be tempted to take such an action because of the likelihood that any other great power may gain one-sided authority in Romania. Like Hiitonen, Gunther also remarked something that will have a great importance in Romanian decisions over the next years: in many Romanian circles it was assumed that if need will be, Germany was ready to lend support against Soviet Union.⁴⁴ These views were shared by Romanian diplomats whom Hiitonen interviewed. A former envoy to Oslo, Dimitrie Juraşcu was recently appointed to the head of the political division of the Foreign Ministry. Although reserved in his declarations, Juraşcu believed that Soviet Union was not prepared to start any military conflict. Like many other Romanian diplomats, he appreciated that the friendly relations between Germany and Soviet Union were not long-lasting. He held different opinions on Germany's strategic choices predicting that, threatened by defeat, Germany might bind the Allies to turn together against Soviet Union.⁴⁵

Romanians' general mood was, however, defeatist. Hiitonen noticed that the general opinion was that this country was not going to put up a strong resistance except for the situation that it received help from abroad. The support of the Allies was uncertain, even in case of a German attack. Italian support, at least Italian political support, was taken into consideration in Romania. Similarly, Italy was not considered in Bucharest as equally threatening as Germany and Soviet Union.⁴⁵ In his dispatch of November 12, Hiitonen referred to Romania's weaknesses and the way the great powers were taking advantage of them. Hiitonen noticed that Germany enjoyed a bigger economic influence in Romania than the Allies. Yet, the fact that not everyone was happy with Germany's increased influence was obvious from the fact that the concessions Germany received on paper had to face many practical difficulties in being implemented into practice. The transportation of merchandises to Germany met with many difficulties not all of them caused by the Romanians but also by the limited possibilities of transportation through

Poland and on the Danube.⁴⁶ Romania's attempt in this interplay of interests to find its escape in neutrality Hiitonen found viable for as long as the other regional powers adopted a similar policy and even joined in a neutral block. The possibilities to get this block formed were, however, not very bright. Hiitonen remarked the fact that the Romanian-Hungarian relations grew once again tense after the arrest of Transylvanian Hungarians members of a secret league planning an uprising in case of a foreign attack on Romania. Moreover, Romania was aware of the fact that Soviet Union was eager to cooperate with Hungary on an anti-Romanian basis. The same was true regarding Bulgaria, another state envisaged to take part in the Romanian-planned block of neutrals, where Moscow was appealing to both Bulgarian revisionist aims and Pan-Slavism in order to prevent the birth of a neutral block. Germany was also opposed to this project, afraid of losing its own position of influence. Finally, Soviet Union was also trying to gain influence in Yugoslavia by appealing to anti-German and Pan-Slavic feelings.⁴⁷ Therefore, the chances of forming such a block were meagre already from its inception although the potential menace of the quiet competition for power between Germany and Soviet Union in South-Eastern Europe - concealed as it was under the mask of a pretended friendship - was comprehended by the political leaders in the region. The reaction was to consider Italian and especially Western Allies' increase of interest and influence into the region less damaging and even welcomed but not decisive steps were taken for the construction of the neutral block.⁴⁸

The Finnish envoy continued to analyse the evolution of the German-Soviet alliance in December 1939. According to Hiitonen, each of the two powers was attempting to covertly strike against its ally's interests but none was prepared to recourse to an open action. Especially Germany was paying attention to avoid any gesture which might prevent the Soviets deliver the raw materials the German war machine needed. Consequently, by now

the opinion of the members of the Romanian government was that Germany would not support them in the event of a war taking place between Romania and the Soviet Union. This was also what PM Tătărescu⁴⁹ believed and therefore the Romanian government multiplied their efforts of equipping the army and developing the armament industry. Additionally, the Romanian government undertook the fortification of central Bessarabia in order to protect the mouths of the Danube. The tragedy was that Romania was not threatened only from the east, Romanian policy-makers fearing also an attack coming from Hungary and Bulgaria. Finnish charge noticed in this respect the change of the attitude of the Bulgarian press toward Finland which turned from sympathetic at the beginning of the war to pro-Soviet. Hiitonen even made reference to the information circulating in the diplomatic circles regarding a Stalin proposal for giving his backing to Bulgaria in the fragmentation of Romania.⁵⁰ In reality, Soviet Union suggested in October 1939 a Soviet-Bulgarian pact of mutual assistance. In return, Soviet Union would support Bulgarian territorial demands in the Dobrudja region. The Bulgarian refusal was determined by the desire to enlist German support rather than the Soviet one in achieving this outcome.

The Finnish press showed a rather meagre interest in these developments. Most part of the information on South-Eastern Europe was constituted by short pieces of information, only seldom commented. There were however some notable exceptions. Such was the case with the conservative newspaper *Uusi Suomi* of November 13 that published an article titled *The struggle for influence in South-Eastern Europe*. The newspaper commented on the foreign policies of Italy and Turkey as preventing the strengthening of Soviet influence in the region. Turkey, the dominant country in the region, was not however prepared to join an open anti-Soviet policy, a fact which was inscribed in the treaties concluded between Britain, France and

Turkey. Germany's main scope was to increase its economic trade with the region.⁵¹

The annexation of Bessarabia in all its phases was observed with interest by the Finnish authorities. The German amazingly swift victory over France re-activated Soviet interest in taking hold of the regions assigned to it in the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. On June 24 a bulletin of intelligence of the Romanian military underscored the activation of the Soviet policy in Romania and in the Eastern Baltic and the very big preparations of the Red Army by Romania's frontiers.⁵² This information was confirmed by the intelligence gathered by the General Staff on June 27 or 28. The General Staff concluded – while the news concerning the Soviet ultimatums suddenly spread – that Soviet troops were ready for military operations against Romania.⁵³ With Romania yielding to the Soviet ultimatums, the advance of the Soviet troops was brisk, units of the Red Army reaching already on June 30 in some areas in Bucovina, on the Pruth and on the Danube, the new frontier between the two countries.⁵⁴ Already on July 2 the new border was reached by strong motorised-mechanised Soviet troops in its entirety.⁵⁵

The malevolence of the Soviet leadership in dealing with Romania was noticed in the documents of the Romanian General Staff. The documents emphasised that the advance of the Soviet troops continued also on July 2, the Red Army adopting a hostile attitude and acting according to a carefully drawn plan for achieving the disintegration and disarming of the Romanian troops. Mechanised Soviet troops outran the Romanian units and stopped them from their retreat in many spots. The soldiers originating from Bessarabia were called to leave their units and remain in their native province. Actions were taken also by some local inhabitants by encouraging the local soldiers to defect from the Romanian Army, attacking the officers and plundering the trains. All this was taking place in a situation when Hungary was unofficially mobilising her troops.⁵⁶ The Hungarian and Bulgarian pressure on Romania at a time when Soviet Union demanded the return of

Bessarabia was remarked in the dispatch of the Finnish general consul in Ankara who quoted Turkish official circles.⁵⁷

In his press report of mid-July 1940 Enescu, a press attaché of the Romanian Legation in Helsinki, analysed the impact of the Soviet ultimatum regarding Bessarabia upon the Finnish press. In general, the ultimatum made a strong impression in Helsinki. The flows of news started on June 27 at 7 o'clock by special editions of the main newspapers quoting DNB and Budapest. The press even informed about Romania giving up of naval bases in Constanța and on the Danube. The following day the press published news that created the impression that the USSR's demands enjoyed the support of the Axis, which did not see its positions weakened by the cession of Bessarabia to the USSR. Other telegrams informed that Hungary and Bulgaria, after discussions with German and Italian representatives were planning to take profit of the Soviet demands in order to have their own claims satisfied. The telegrams concluded that Romania would not put up a military resistance. The Social-Democratic Party mouthpiece *Suomen Sosialidemokraatti* of June 28 carried an article by Vaara called "the Balkans, the corner of Europe where the hate and envy foment." The article was favourable to Hungary. Finland's kin nation was considered as the Trianon Treaty's expropriate. The British guarantee to Romania was considered valueless. The article also stated that Germany wanted exclusivity in the Romanian oil industry. The main Finnish newspaper, *Helsingin Sanomat*, with Liberal leanings, informed on June 29 about Romania's acceptance of the ultimatum. The newspaper considered that there was to be expected more demands from Hungary and Bulgaria. The following day *Helsingin Sanomat* carried an article called "Bessarabia" which underscored the predominance of the Romanian population in Bessarabia, but anticipated that this province's integration with the USSR would increase Moscow's influence in the Balkans. The same newspaper observed on July 1 that

Romania looked decided to take up arms to oppose Hungary and Bulgaria's demands. Enescu concluded that the press, due to the geopolitical situation of Romania, did not consider the possibility of a Soviet-Romanian war. The Finnish press also observed that the Soviet demands were made with the Axis's acquiescence. It also doubted that Romania would resist militarily to Hungarian and Bulgarian demands. The Finnish newspapers also noticed that Romania was looking for a rapprochement with the Axis and therefore renounced the British guarantees. Interpreting the news and comments of the Finnish press, Enescu concluded that the news regarding the Balkans sprang from sources favourable to the supporters of revisionism.⁵⁸

Finnish policy-makers were perhaps equally impressed and worried by Soviet new action. However, the developments on the Western front where the entire European organisation was being revised following suit the German victory, the Soviet incorporation of the Baltic States and the Soviet request of June 27 that the Åland Archipelago be either demilitarised or fortified together with Soviet Union⁵⁹ can be held responsible for the relatively little records on their perceptions of the Soviet advance into eastern Romania. For instance, PM Risto Ryti had an entrance in his diary on June 28 simply recording the Soviet annexation of the two provinces.⁶⁰

The loss of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina did not end the Romanian diplomacy worries about the Soviet goals in Romania. Reports originating from the Romanian military attaché to Stockholm appreciated that the USSR needed in the west, for its security, a natural border, meaning in the south a line situated on the Carpathians and lower Danube.⁶¹ Other signs were also worrisome. On July 17 a bulletin of information of the General Staff remarked the intense Soviet activity in southern Bessarabia.⁶² The Soviets were gathering intelligence especially concerning the Romanian military establishment in the Isaccea-Tulcea region.⁶³ The following day the USSR closed the border with Romania.⁶⁴ In fact, the Soviets were very

active at the border with both Finland and Romania, the Romanian General Staff gathering relevant intelligence in this sense. In the meanwhile, Finland closed ranks with Germany. The reasons, as the Romanian military correctly understood, had to do with the ongoing Soviet demands on this country so that Finland sought support from Berlin. The Reich accepted this orientation and supplied Finland with weaponry, equipment, counsellors while also helping in the fortification of Åland with a small military mission headed by a colonel.⁶⁵

The day the Vienna Dictate was being imposed upon Romania, the Finnish Legation in Bucharest informed the Political Department and his minister that Romania had to agree to the loss of "almost all of Transylvania" due to the pressure coming from Italy and Germany and the fear of Soviet mixture in the events.⁶⁶ The implications of the Vienna Dictate were analysed in a series of diplomatic reports. Aaro Pakaslahti's dispatch of September 21 was considered among the most interesting ones and was brought to Ryti's attention. Pakaslahti – one of the most capable Finnish diplomats, soon to become secretary-general of the Finnish Foreign Ministry – assessed that the German and Italian Vienna decision was predictable due to the incapacity of Romania and Hungary to solve their dispute. The decision-making process was not an easy one but, when finished, it was implemented rapidly and – Pakaslahti insisted – against Romania was made use of all possible pressure and this country being threatened with destruction. The Vienna Dictate was a heavy blow to Romania, although it was more reasonable than what had been expected in the foreign diplomatic circles would happen. The result was that none of the two countries was satisfied with the decision. In Romania the dominant feeling was frustration, including dissatisfaction with the domestic situation that was likely to take a difficult turn, although the government, wisely, had invited in the Crown Council that agreed on accepting the Vienna Dictate representatives of the opposition. According

to the Finnish diplomat, the Romanians believed that the loss of such a large portion of their country was a way of paying dividends to their previous friendly relations with France and Britain. Pakaslahti appreciated that the fact that Romania was not treated even worse had to do with the fact that in the Romanian foreign policy had already acknowledged a change. He attributed to the PM Gigurtu and foreign minister Manoilescu the merits for Romania not having been treated harsher in Vienna. The Romanians were still feeling the pain for the situation when Bessarabia was given up and the Romanian troops remained insulated in that province because not having received advanced orders on the attitude to take.⁶⁷

In the critical days when Romania was exposed to this unbearable pressure, the Soviet Government presented notes to Romania on border violations. The Romanian envoy in Oslo was an eyewitness of the Soviet border violations when visiting his farm in Moldova nearby the border of the USSR. The amplitude of these violations was described by the Romanian diplomat to his Finnish colleague on August 31 as very grave. They amounted to true raids: "the Russians had transferred their despotism to Romania by crossing the border and shooting and capturing Romanian border guards." Although Pakaslahti's contacts with his Soviet colleague were distant and official, the Finnish envoy was surprised to receive on August 31 for the first time his visit at the legation. During the conversation, the Soviet minister downplayed the importance of the border incidents with Romania which he described as small clashes without any important significance. He pointed out that the border was not yet delimited, but the border commission had already started its work. Pakaslahti mistakenly interpreted the border guarantee given by the Axis Powers to Romania as a proof that Germany and Italy kept Soviet Union aware of the developments. A further evidence of this reality was considered Manoilescu's statement of August 31 that Romania did not want to use this guarantee against its

neighbours.⁶⁸ The only consolation for the state of misery felt by the Romanians was the Axis' guarantee. The fear of the Soviet intentions was general in Romania and the guarantee served to alleviate this anxiety. Pakaslahti showed a keen interest in the Romanian developments and believed that Finland should turn its eyes to their southern neighbours' policies.⁶⁹

Regarding the Finnish diplomacy's attitude towards the territorial losses experienced by Romania there is an interesting diplomatic report dispatched a year after the events had taken place by Finnish envoy to Bucharest Eduard Palin. The Finnish envoy emphasised the drama of the Romanian nation which lost in a space of a few months 101,522 km² (34% of total areas) where many of their compatriots lived. The Finnish diplomat accused King Charles's attitude of vesting all the responsibilities on himself, and publicly doing so, which in the end cost him his throne. Palin believed that it was probably that Romania had not much to hope from putting up resistance against the Red Army. When the Soviet ultimatum of June 26 was known in Bucharest, the attempts to obtain support from Germany, Italy or the Balkan Entente's states were met with advices of reaching an understanding with the Soviets. The context was sombre with no add to be hoped from anywhere, with expectances that its resistance was not to last for longer than maximum a few months and with the possibility that Hungary and Bulgaria would join the conflict in order to achieve their revisionist ends.

Although Palin believed that the decision was correct, thus the country being saved from total destruction, the king's exuberant declarations in the previous months were responsible for the fact that "the Romanian nation was not prepared to that, did not expect it and did not understand it". The expenses made for new lines of fortifications in Bessarabia seemed pointless in the new circumstances and a deep disappointment and feeling of humiliation spread out the country. Charles's reaction of appointing a pro-German government and of drawing closer to Germany

while simultaneously renouncing the Anglo-French guarantees was also a fiasco. Romania was forced at the end of August and beginning of September 1940 to yield to the pressure of the Axis' powers and give up half of Transylvania to Hungary and southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria. The Finnish diplomat correctly assessed the difference between the loss of Dobrudja which left comparatively little bitterness (except for the disappointment that Bulgaria did not agree that Romania preserved within its borders Silistra and Balci) and that of Transylvania which provoked a deep moral and political crisis ending with the abdication of the monarch. In exchange, Romania achieved a guarantee for the inviolability of its borders which was valuable but could not make the people forget about their lost territories.⁷⁰

It is important to note that while Romania crossed one of the most difficult periods of its history, Finland was not faring better. The Helsinki politicians were not free of worries regarding the USSR's political intentions. The German victory over France provoked anxiety in Finland. France was one of the great powers supporting Finland during the Winter War. A document of the Romanian General Staff pointed out to the very energetic Soviet policy in the Eastern Baltic aimed at consolidating the position of this great power in the region.⁷¹ The meaning of this policy was correctly understood in the Romanian General Staff as an attempt to consolidate the Soviet military positions towards Germany in these forward regions.⁷² Everything started with the Soviet accusations about alleged violations of the Soviet-Baltic treaties signed the previous autumn concerning actions taken in the Baltic States against Soviet interests and against the garrisons of the Red Army stationed in these countries. Moscow demanded an increase in the number of the Soviet troops garrisoned in these states.⁷³ The Romanian military observed the complicated situation in the Eastern Baltic during the annexation of the Baltic States in the summer of 1940 and did not rule out the possibility that Soviet Union was going to take a similar action against Finland, too.⁷⁴ On June

20 while the Soviet troops poured in the Baltic States, the General Staff remarked the deep concerns spreading in Finland where the situation was considered very serious. Politically, the Soviet-Finnish relation was tense. As a symptom of this tension, Soviet Union accused Finland of not complying with the peace provisions and made difficulties in the economic negotiations. The Soviets also laid blame on the Finnish authorities for destroying everything in the territories they were forced to give up to the USSR and, by doing so, not complying with the peace provisions.⁷⁵ Finland reacted to this situation by calling-up six additional military contingents and concentrating its troops in the Karelian Isthmus and in Åland.⁷⁶ The Finnish military preparations continued towards the end of April. On the other side of the border, Soviet Union concentrated troops in Murmansk and in Kuolajärvi. The Finnish Government and population rejoiced with the landing of Allied troops to Norway⁷⁷, which gave them a hope that they would not be left alone in case that the Soviet leadership decided to resume its aggression.

Sharing the fate of the small and mid-sized nations situated in-between Soviet Union and the Third Reich, Romania and Finland had to pay in 1939-1940 a big human and territorial price for the rapprochement between the two European totalitarian giants. Additionally, Romania was requested to give in significant portions of its people, territory and riches to small neighbours which choose to align themselves to Nazi Germany. The flow of information concerning the Romanian evolutions toward Finland – a distant country

according to those times' perception – was guaranteed only by the Finnish Legation to Bucharest. The press paid relatively little attention to Romanian developments having for most of the time acquiring information from third party sources. No Finnish press correspondent was present in Romania in 1939-1940. The Finnish sympathy to Romania at its time of hardship was not therefore guaranteed. Hiitonen's reports are both analytic and comprehensive concerning the interplay of interests in South-Eastern Europe and Romania's choices in these circumstances. The Finnish diplomacy and press was sympathetic toward Romania when this country had to give in Bessarabia in June 1940, which reminded the Finns their own losses a few months earlier. The loss of half of Transylvania – although correctly understood as a result of German domineering designs in Central – South-Eastern Europe – was conversely interpreted by many Finns in the light of their kinship with the Hungarians. Finland was a democratic state and therefore it is no wonder that not all of the Finns considered the situation according to this romanticist-nationalist mindset. Well-informed diplomats such as Pakaslahti and Palin understood the profound moral and political crisis which resulted from the Vienna Dictate and did not hesitate to inform the political decision-makers of their views. When the eyes of the majority of the Finns were turned to the Western front, to the Baltic States and especially to the Soviet intentions on Finland, Pakaslahti even prompted his superiors to assess more carefully the developments in Romania.

NOTES:

¹ Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie, eds. *Nazi-Soviet relations, 1939-1941. Documents from the archives of the German Foreign Office* (Washington: Department of State Publication, 1948), pp. 72-78; Ion Şişcanu and Vitalie Văratec, eds. *Pactul Molotov-Ribbentrop și consecințele lui pentru Basarabia. Culegere de documente* (Chişinău: Universitas, 1991), p. 5-7.

² Geneva Legation's dispatch no. 17 of 28.08.1939 to the President and the PM, Kansallis arkisto (hereafter, KA), Risto Rytin kokoelma 20.

³ Ensio Hiitonen's dispatch no. 7 of 6.09.1939, Ulkoasiainministeriö arkisto (hereafter, UA), 5, C 14; for the Soviet view on the failure of negotiations with Britain and France, see Gromyko and others *Soviet Peace Efforts on the eve of World War II (September 1939-August 1939). Documents and records* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976).

⁴ Hiitonen's dispatch no. 1 of 24.08.1939, UA, 5, C 14.

⁵ Armand Călinescu, *Însemnări politice 1916-1939*, ed. Al. Gh. Savu (București: Editura Humanitas, 1990), pp. 426-427; Hiitonen's dispatch no. 2 of 26.08.1939, UA, 5, C 14.

⁶ Hiitonen's dispatch no. 2 of 26.08.1939, UA, 5, C 14.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Călinescu, 428-431; Regele Carol al II-lea al României, *Însemnări zilnice. 1937-1951. Vol. II. 13 martie - 15 decembrie 1939*, ed. Nicolae Rauș (București: Editura Scripta, 1997), pp. 204-207.

⁹ Hiitonen's dispatch no. 5 of 4.09.1939, UA, 5, C 14.

¹⁰ Hiitonen's dispatch no. 8 of 7.09.1939, UA, 5, C 14.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Hiitonen's dispatch no. 9 of 12.09.1939, UA, 5, C 14.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Hiitonen's dispatch no. 12 of 23.09.1939, UA, 5, C 14.

¹⁵ Hiitonen's dispatch no. 13 of 25.09.1939, UA, 5, C 14.

¹⁶ Hiitonen's dispatch no. 15 of 30.09.1939 and no. 24 of 12.11.1939, UA, 5, C 14.

¹⁷ Ioan Scurtu, Gheorghe Buzatu, *Istoria românilor în secolul XX (1918-1948)* (București: Paideia, 1999), pp. 355-356.

¹⁸ Hiitonen's dispatch no. 27 of 27.11.1939, UA, 5, C 14.

¹⁹ Hiitonen's dispatch no. 14 of 25.09.1939 and no. 18 of 10.10.1939, UA, 5, C 14.

²⁰ Hiitonen's dispatch no. 15 of 30.09.1939, UA, 5, C 14.

²¹ Hiitonen's dispatch no. 18 of 10.10.1939, UA, 5, C 14.

²² Hiitonen's dispatch no. 14 of 25.09.1939, UA, 5, C 14.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Hiitonen's dispatch no. 15 of 30.09.1939, UA, 5, C 14.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ Hiitonen's dispatch no. 10 of 16.09.1939, UA, 5, C 14.

³⁰ Hiitonen's dispatch no. 17 of 9.10.1939, UA, 5, C 14.

³¹ Hiitonen's dispatch no. 16 of 9.10.1939, UA, 5, C 14.

³² *Ibid.*; on Romania's policy on minorities in 1939-1940, see Radu Florian Bruja, "Romania's minorities in the National Revival Front", in Silviu Miloiu and others, eds., *Europe as viewed from the margins. An East-Central European perspective from World War I to Present*, Valahia University Press, 2008, 201-212.

³³ Hiitonen's dispatch no. 22 of 25.10.1939, UA, 5, C 14.

³⁴ Prime Minister of Romania between September 28 and November 23, 1939.

³⁵ Hiitonen characterized this *homo regius* as a man who was willing to gain money from wherever and however. As an associate of Malaxa who was doing his businesses with the Germans, Urdăreanu was taking position against Elena Lupescu who was supporting Max Auschnitt, the representative of Vickers.

³⁶ Hiitonen's dispatch no. 22 of 25.10.1939, UA, 5, C 14.

³⁷ Elisabeth Barker considers Turkey "a bulwark guarding their position in the Middle East against German, Italian or Russian ambitions", see Elisabeth Barker, *British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War* (London: MacMillan Press, 1976), 3.

³⁸ Hiitonen's dispatch no. 19 of 18.10.1939, UA, 5, C 14.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² And not only, the support coming from the Western Allies, especially from Britain, being obvious. Britain considered stability on the European continent as a precondition for the maintenance of British security and economic wellbeing. This was also true about the Balkans, Anita J. Prazmowska, *Eastern Europe and the origins of the Second World War* (London: Macmillan Press, 2000), 29.

⁴³ Hiitonen's dispatch no. 19 of 18.10.1939, UA, 5, C 14.

⁴⁴ Hiitonen's dispatch no. 23 of 5.11.1939, UA, 5, C 14.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*


⁴⁶ Hiitonen's dispatch no. 24 of 12.11.1939, UA, 5, C 14.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ Prime Minister of Romania between November 24, 1939 and May 11, 1940. He was appointed at the helm of a Romanian government for the first time on January 5, 1934.

- ⁵⁰ Hiitonen's dispatch no. 29 of 9.12.1939, UA, 5, C 14.
- ⁵¹ *Uusi Suomi* of 13.11.1939.
- ⁵² Report of the 1st Bureau Intelligence of the Second Section of the Romanian General Staff no. 13243/B of 24.06.1940, Centrul pentru Cercetarea și Conservarea Arhivelor Istorice Militare - Pitești (hereafter, CCCAIM), 902/1940, 269-271.
- ⁵³ Bulletins of the 1st Bureau Intelligence of the Second Section of the Romanian General Staff nos. 13.397/B of 27.06.1940 and 13469/B of 28.06.1940, CCCAIM, 902/1940, 242-244.
- ⁵⁴ Bulletin of the 1st Bureau Intelligence of the Second Section of the Romanian General Staff no. 13.639/B of 30.06.1940, CCCAIM, 902/1940, pp. 227-230.
- ⁵⁵ Bulletin of the 1st Bureau Intelligence of the Second Section of the Romanian General Staff no. 13.790/B of 2.07.1940, CCCAIM, 902/1940, pp. 206-211.
- ⁵⁶ Bulletin of the 1st Bureau Intelligence of the Second Section of the Romanian General Staff no. 13.899/B of 3.07.1940, CCCAIM, 902/1940, pp. 197-201.
- ⁵⁷ Finland's general consul to Ankara's telegram of 28.06.1940 to Witting, KA, Witting C11a.
- ⁵⁸ Enescu's dispatch no. 4 (press report for 28 June-3 July, registered with no. 03423 of 15.07.1940), Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale (hereafter, ANIC), National Propaganda. Foreign Press 278/1930-1940, 119-128.
- ⁵⁹ See Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim, *Memorii*, ed. Dumitru Preda and Adrian Pandea (București: Editura Militară, 2003), p. 259.
- ⁶⁰ KA, Risto Ryti Diary, Notebook no. XIII.
- ⁶¹ Report of the 1st Bureau Intelligence of the Second Section of the Romanian General Staff no. 15167/B of 22.07.1940, CCCAIM, 902/1940, pp. 58-61.
- ⁶² Bulletin of the 1st Bureau Intelligence of the Second Section of the Romanian General Staff no. 14.867/B of 17.07.1940, CCCAIM, 902/1940, pp. 90-93.
- ⁶³ Bulletin of the 1st Bureau Intelligence of the Second Section of the Romanian General Staff no. 14.967/B of 19.07.1940, CCCAIM, 902/1940, pp. 74-78.
- ⁶⁴ Report of the 1st Bureau Intelligence of the Second Section of the Romanian General Staff no. 15047/B of 22.07.1940, CCCAIM, 902/1940, pp. 68-71.
- ⁶⁵ Report of the 1st Bureau Intelligence of the Second Section of the Romanian General Staff no. 15227/B of 24.07.1940, CCCAIM, 902/1940, pp. 47-50.
- ⁶⁶ The Finnish Legation in Bucharest's dispatch no. 20 of 30.08.1940 to the Political Department 2 and to Witting, KA Witting C11a.
- ⁶⁷ Pakaslahti's dispatch no. 145 of 21.09.1940 (news from Finnish representatives abroad), Risto Rytin kokoelma 19.
- ⁶⁸ *Ibid.*
- ⁶⁹ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁰ Palin's dispatch no. 23 of 8.06.1941 to Witting, UA, 5, C 14.
- ⁷¹ Report of the 1st Bureau Intelligence of the Second Section of the Romanian General Staff no. 12820/B of 15.06.1940, CCCAIM, 902/1940, pp. 330-332.
- ⁷² 1st Information Bureau of the 2nd Section of the General Staff's bulletin of information no. 12.090/B of 3.06.1940, CCCAIM, 902/1940, pp. 411-415.
- ⁷³ 1st Information Bureau of the 2nd Section of the General Staff's bulletin of information no. 11.190/B of 18.05.1940, CCCAIM, 902/1940, pp. 516-518.
- ⁷⁴ Report of the 1st Bureau Intelligence of the Second Section of the Romanian General Staff no. 15317/B of 25.07.1940, CCCAIM, 902/1940, pp. 41-45.
- ⁷⁵ 1st Information Bureau of the 2nd Section of the General Staff's bulletin of information no. 10.675/B of 8.05.1940, CCCAIM, 902/1940, pp. 572-573.
- ⁷⁶ Report of the 1st Bureau Intelligence of the Second Section of the Romanian General Staff no. 13080/B of 20.06.1940, CCCAIM, 902/1940, pp. 295-297.
- ⁷⁷ 1st Information Bureau of the 2nd Section of the General Staff's bulletin of information no. 10.106/B of 25.04.1940, CCCAIM, 902/1940, pp. 743-745.



view. The practice of listening at the end of the conference to a report about the military activity, and taking a decision that goes against the grain of the general orientation, is not the best one. For example, it was said in the Report that by 1990 we would have to double military expenditure and the armaments. We, however, discussed an altogether different orientation. In actual practice, each [socialist] country has a different policy.

Frankly speaking, this time I put my signature on the document in spite of the fact that I did not want to sign it. I did it, however, so as not to give rise to discussions on this theme, but this decision does not correspond to our general orientation. We will also have to establish policies in the field of armament development from both a qualitative and a quantitative point of view as this issue should not remain a strictly military one.

In actual fact, we do not have such a plan; we have decided to maintain expenditure at the present level – we have approved the five-year plan and we will not develop armaments further. Consequently, we signed a decision which we know – right from the outset – that we will not be able to fulfil. That is why I think that we should mobilize, we should make a number of improvements, actually to better our collaboration not only in this field, but also in all of the fields.

I agree that we have to act for the development of collaboration between the socialist countries with a view to fulfilling the economic development programs, and international policy, in all fields of activity.

As to us, next month we will have the Plenary Session of the Central Committee, the plenary session of the Great National Assembly, other plenary sessions of the democratic bodies – the Council of Agriculture, the Council of Working People – where we will debate the issues of the general development of our country, and take a decision regarding the convening of the Party's National Conference, which will take place this fall – in the second half of November – or at the beginning of December. At the National Conference we intend to make a general assessment of the way we have carried out – over the last twenty years – the decisions regarding the improvement of the economic system, the development of socialist democracy, and the application of the new economic system, of self-management and self-leadership, as well as a number of issues relating to the ideological activity of the party. In addition, we will raise the issue of drawing up, justifying, and improving the party's Program, which expires in 1990, bearing in mind the present situation.

We deem the anniversary celebration of seventy years since the Great October Socialist Revolution to be of great significance. We expect that this celebration will present the great achievements obtained by the Soviet Union, by socialism in general – naturally, also including a criticism of some shortcomings and deficiencies, but presenting the superiority of socialism and giving a new perspective to socialist development and the advancement towards Communism. In this sense, I received the direct invitation, and here the invitation has been renewed, to take part in this great celebration which I look upon as a general celebration of the socialist countries, of the whole of mankind which declares for socialism and peace.

I have no intention of addressing here some of the issues in Romania because I do not have the time. Actually, I met some of the comrades; the day before yesterday I wound up my discussions with comrade Gorbachev. We are going to discuss some issues here as well. Naturally, we have both results and issues, especially those relating to the fulfilment – in the best conditions – of the programs of upgrading and fulfilling the new technical-scientific revolution, and to the issues of cooperation and specialization in production between our countries. But, nevertheless, things are going well generally, and we have good results.

As far as COMECON is concerned, I agree that the relevant session should be postponed. There are really important issues, and we have to discuss them. However, we must start from the fact that COMECON had, and still has, an important role. There were a number of shortcomings, and we have to improve it, but let us not throw away everything that is good. On the contrary, let us keep the basic principles, the aim being to extend collaboration, including some organizational forms that proved to be viable and necessary. We should of course act to improve them and to do more to fulfil the programs and plans that we have.

The issues of a financial nature or which are related to prices are very important issues that really need a very serious analysis and an appropriate solution, and we cannot set out to take measures that are not ready yet and do not correspond to the current stage of development of our countries, and I am referring to prices, the convertibility issue, and in general to economic relationships.

Taking all of these issues into account, I take the view that maybe it would be better to consider a certain improvement of our activity in regard to the meetings of the general or of the first secretaries. As a rule, we hold a meeting more on military and international issues, bearing in mind the attributions of the Consultative Political Committee, but – in my opinion – it would be better to hold a general meeting focused on the issues of socialist development, and of the general political, economic, as well as military collaboration. It is within this framework, therefore, that we have to consider certain military aspects, letting the respective authorities take action. I think that much more important is the problem of development, of general activity, much more important are the economic issues; consequently it is these issues that we are to be concerned with, and not only with the military and international issues as we are now. In a short meeting, of two to three hours, we cannot discuss anything seriously. We must be realistic, we now discuss only very general issues, we cannot say that now we are discussing and considering certain issues in depth.

That is why I am raising the issue of drawing a conclusion relating to the necessity of holding annual meetings on general issues – a meeting only of the general secretaries and the party leaderships – to debate these issues. This does not exclude the possibility of also holding special meetings on the occasion of the conferences of the Consultative Political Committee, but in my view the issues raised now – including restructuring and general development – make it highly necessary to discuss so as to increase the role of our parties and develop our collaboration in the general field. Let us take a look at the activity of the seven so-called industrialized countries – they meet yearly and discuss the general issues of the economic and financial situation. We will also have to discuss these issues. I suggest, therefore, that we discuss not only our issues but also other, more general, issues. Our countries cannot ignore the international economic situation. The present financial system does not correspond to reality. The issue of the world economy is a very serious issue for our countries as well.

We will have, therefore, to change a little the way of approaching the issues, starting from the issues of a more global nature, more general, of the development of our society. By doing this we can only gain.

Regarding the issue of the Vienna negotiations, the solution proposed by comrade Gorbachev will surely be the best one. It is my opinion, however, that it would be good to conclude [the negotiations] with a result, even with a very small one, which does not represent anything from the point of view of military parities. It would be good, therefore, for these negotiations to wind up with a result this year. A reduction of 10,000 troops – either more on our side or on the American side – represents nothing. But now, when the GDR and Czechoslovakia propose taking certain measures in Central Europe, to wind up this conference – which refers to Central Europe – without any result whatsoever after twelve years of negotiations would have a negative effect. Consequently, I would make an appeal for us to review the situation and quickly conclude the negotiations this year, admitting some of the proposals made, because they are not issues of essence and do not affect in any way whatsoever either the situation in Central Europe or in Europe in general.

Indeed, we must take the general issues into consideration in the general context of fulfilling the decision taken at Budapest. Now, however, we must conclude these negotiations with a result. This would have a great importance from both a political and a psychological point of view. From a military viewpoint, this has no importance. But you just cannot conclude the negotiations after twelve years merely by discontinuing them.

In regard to the relationships between the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and China, we salute this process of normalization, of improvement of relationships, and we deem it very important. We also salute the improvement of the relationships between the Soviet Union and China, and hope that a high-level meeting between them will take place in the long run. In fact, the Chinese comrades have declared that they are ready to go to Moscow. In my view, this is not difficult to arrange, and the possibility exists of

some positive results being reached. Comrade Deng Xiaoping told me that although it was difficult for him to travel to Moscow, he was willing to do so.

Comrade M. S. Gorbachev: We must help [Deng Xiaoping], we can help him.

Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu: I am convinced that this can be done.

As regards Kampuchea, now there are very reasonable proposals for a national reconciliation and the formation of a government of national union with all of the forces, including the coalition government, and with Norodom Sihanouk. This would solve the problem quickly.

I think that the position of the Vietnamese comrades and of the current government of Kampuchea, of Heng Samrin, is not realistic. A national reconciliation cannot be arrived at without the most powerful force, [which is] [for the reason that it] is Pol Pot's formation.

Comrade M. S. Gorbachev: Of course, there is a question of personal relationships there.

Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu: I know this issue and the positions of some leaders in the present government and the other formation, but the issues must be solved in the general interest, ignoring any considerations of personal interest. Political solutions have to be found. In fact, one must have in mind the fact that China will not accept other solution than a coalition government for this issue. Generally speaking, many countries of the world and the non-aligned movement back the idea of a government of national reconciliation of all of the forces. This would have huge significance not only for the respective region but also for the relationships between the socialist countries, inclusively for the normalization of the relationships between the Soviet Union and China, for the general growth of the influence of socialist countries in the region. We take the view that we have to insist for [the adoption of] this solution.

I am now trying to raise, in a nutshell, the following issue. I discussed it with comrade Gorbachev, but I would like to raise it before you as well. This issue is about the relationships or, more to the point, the situation in the Communist and workers' movement. It goes without saying that we do not have the time to discuss this issue here, but we are of the opinion that we will have to discuss it at a special meeting, even only at this level, naturally with other secretaries of the central committees as well, but possibly only of these seven parties, to make an exchange of ideas on the issues of the situation in the Communist and workers' movement. We start from the fact that today the Communist parties, especially the ones in Europe, do not have a leading position in the fight for disarmament and peace, in approaching fundamental issues. Naturally, there are numerous causes, we do not have the time now [to discuss them], but I think the discussion of this issue is a "must". Being Communists, being Communist parties, we bear the responsibility – not only to our peoples but also to the world Communist movement – of discussing and finding the ways of acting better in this field and in general, in the development of collaboration with the socialists, the social-democrats, and other forces.

We stand for a broad collaboration, a broad front of peace, but we think we cannot dissolve, so to say, the Communist movement in a front where the Communists do not exist any longer. On the contrary, the Communist movement should play an active role for the very fulfilment of the mission it has in uniting all of the forces and peoples. If our parties reached this conclusion, I would salute it.

With this final point, in view of the fact that time is short, I would wind up. I repeat, in my opinion it is necessary to think about improving our meetings as to both thematic and time since in three or four hours we cannot do something of substance. In Moscow, in November last year, we had more time. This kind of practice is very good as it gives us the opportunity to discuss in detail a series of general issues.

I have finished. Thank you.

4 VI 1987

Romanian version

4 iunie 1987. Cuvântarea lui Nicolae Ceaușescu la întâlnirea de lucru a secretarilor generali și primilor secretari ai Comitetelor Centrale ale partidelor comuniste și muncitorești din țările participante la Tratatul de la Varșovia (Berlin, 29 mai 1987).

Arhiva Comitetului Politic Executiv al C.C. al P.C.R.

Nr. 1346

14 VII 1987

CUVÂNTAREA

tovarășului Nicolae Ceaușescu, secretar general al Partidului Comunist Român, președintele Republicii Socialiste România, la întâlnirea de lucru a secretarilor generali și primilor secretari ai Comitetelor Centrale ale partidelor comuniste și muncitorești din țările participante la Tratatul de la Varșovia

- 29 mai 1987 -

Stimați tovarăși,

Apreciez și cu pozitiv lucrările Consfătuirii Comitetului Politic Consultativ. I-am spus și tovarășului Gorbaciov că ar trebui să ne gândim însă la îmbunătățirea activității în ce privește latura militară. Practica de a asculta la sfârșitul consfătuirii un raport despre activitatea militară și de a lua o hotărâre, care vine în contradicție cu orientarea generală, nu este cea mai bună. De exemplu, în Raport s-a spus că până în 1990 trebuie să dublăm cheltuielile militare și armamentele. Or, noi am discutat cu totul altă orientare. În practică, fiecare țară are o altă orientare.

Vă spun drept, eu mi-am pus semnătura de data aceasta, deși am vrut să nu semnez documentul – am făcut-o totuși pentru a nu mai da naștere la discuții pe această temă, dar această hotărâre nu corespunde orientării noastre generale. Noi va trebui să stabilim și orientările în domeniul dezvoltării armamentelor, atât calitativ, cât și cantitativ – să nu rămână aceasta o problemă strict a militarilor. Realmente noi nu avem un asemenea plan, am hotărât să menținem cheltuielile la nivelul actual – am aprobat cincinalul și nu vom dezvolta în plus armamentele. Deci am semnat o hotărâre pe care, în ce ne privește, știm de la început că nu o vom realiza. De aceea, cred că trebuie să ne mobilizăm, să aducem ceva îmbunătățiri, realmente să perfecționăm colaborarea noastră și în domeniul acesta, ca în toate domeniile.

Sunt de acord că trebuie să acționăm pentru dezvoltarea colaborării între țările socialiste în realizarea programelor de dezvoltare economică, a politicii internaționale, în toate domeniile de activitate.

În ce ne privește, noi, luna viitoare, vom avea Plenara Comitetului Central, sesiunea Marii Adunări Naționale, alte plenare ale organismelor democratice – a Consiliului Agriculturii, a Consiliului Oamenilor Muncii – în care vom dezbate problemele dezvoltării generale a țării și vom hotărâ convocarea Conferinței Naționale a partidului, care va avea loc în această toamnă – în a doua parte a lunii noiembrie sau la începutul lui decembrie. La Conferința Națională ne gândim să facem un bilanț general al felului în care am realizat în ultimii 20 de ani hotărârile privind perfecționarea sistemului economic, dezvoltarea democrației socialiste și aplicarea noului mecanism economic, a autogestunii și autoconducerii, precum și unele probleme privind activitatea ideologică a partidului. De asemenea, vom pune și problema elaborării sau fundamentării, perfecționării Programului partidului, care expiră în 1990 și care trebuie să țină seama de noua situație ce s-a creat.

Noi acordăm o mare însemnătate aniversării a 70 de ani de la Marea Revoluție Socialistă din Octombrie. Așteptăm ca, într-adevăr, această sărbătoare să prezinte realizări obținute de Uniunea Sovietică, de socialism în general – sigur, criticând și unele minusuri, lipsuri, dar să prezinte superioritatea socialismului și să dea o perspectivă nouă dezvoltării socialiste și înaintării spre comunism. În acest sens, am primit și invitația directă, dar și aici ni s-a adresat invitația de a participa la această mare sărbătoare, pe care o consider ca o sărbătoare generală a țărilor socialiste, a întregii omeniri care se pronunță pentru socialism și pentru pace.

Nu am de gând acum să mă refer la unele probleme din România pentru că nu este timp. De altfel, cu unii dintre tovarăși m-am mai întâlnit – cu tovarășul Gorbaciov alaltăieri am încheiat discuțiile. Avem în vedere să discutăm unele probleme și aici. Sigur, avem și rezultate, avem și probleme, îndeosebi legate de

înfăptuirea în mai bune condițiuni a programelor de modernizare și de înfăptuire a noii revoluții tehnico-științifice, de problemele cooperării și specializării în producție între țările noastre. Dar, cu toate acestea, lucrurile merg în general bine și avem rezultate bune.

În ce privește CAER, eu sunt de acord să amânăm această sesiune. Sunt într-adevăr probleme importante, trebuie să le discutăm. Trebuie să pornim de la faptul că totuși CAER a avut și are un rol important. S-au manifestat unele lipsuri, trebuie să-l perfecționăm, dar să nu aruncăm tot ceea ce este bun. Dimpotrivă, să păstrăm principiile de bază, să păstrăm orientarea de extindere a colaborării, să păstrăm inclusiv unele forme organizatorice care și-au dovedit viabilitatea și necesitatea, acționând, desigur, pentru perfecționarea și mai buna lor activitate în înfăptuirea programelor și planurilor pe care le avem.

Problemele de ordin financiar, de prețuri, sunt probleme foarte importante care, într-adevăr, necesită o analiză foarte serioasă și o soluționare corespunzătoare și nu putem să ne propunem acolo să trecem la măsuri care încă nu sunt pregătite și nu corespund stadiului actual de dezvoltare a țărilor noastre – mă refer la prețuri, la problema convertibilității, în general la relațiile comerciale.

Ținând seama de toate aceste probleme, eu consider că poate ar fi totuși bine să ne gândim ca să aducem o anumită îmbunătățire a activității noastre în ce privește întâlnirile secretarilor generali sau primilor secretari. Noi facem, de regulă, o întâlnire mai mult pe probleme militare și internaționale, având în vedere atribuțiunile Comitetului Politic Consultativ, dar după părerea mea, cred că ar fi bine să facem o întâlnire generală axată pe problemele dezvoltării socialiste, a colaborării generale – politice, economice, dar și militare. Deci în acest cadru să vedem și unele aspecte militare, lăsând ca organele respective să acționeze. Eu consider că mult mai importantă este problema dezvoltării, a activității generale, mult mai importante sunt problemele economice decât să ne ocupăm numai de probleme militare, cum facem acum, și de probleme internaționale. Într-o întâlnire scurtă, de 2-3 ore, nu putem practic să discutăm în mod serios nimic. Trebuie să fim realiști, discutăm niște probleme cu totul generale, nu putem spune că noi acum discutăm și aprofundăm anumite probleme.

De aceea, eu ridic problema – și vă rog să reflectați asupra ei – de a ajunge la concluzia necesității unor întâlniri anuale pe problemele generale – o întâlnire numai a secretarilor generali, a conducătorilor de partid, unde să discutăm aceste probleme. Aceasta nu exclude posibilitatea de a avea și întâlniri speciale cu prilejul consfăturilor Comitetului Politic Consultativ, dar consider că problemele care se pun acum, inclusiv restructurarea, dezvoltarea generală, impun cu necesitate să discutăm pentru a crește rolul partidelor noastre și conlucrarea noastră în domeniul general. Hai să ne uităm la activitatea celor 7 țări așa-zis industrializate – ele se întâlnesc anual și discută problemele generale ale situației economice, financiare. Și noi va trebui să discutăm aceste probleme. Deci să discutăm nu numai problemele noastre, ci și altele mai generale. Țările noastre nu pot să ignore situația economică internațională. Actualul sistem financiar nu corespunde realității. Problema economiei mondiale constituie și pentru țările noastre o problemă foarte serioasă.

Deci, va trebui să schimbăm puțin caracterul abordării problemelor, pornind de la problemele mai globale, mai generale ale dezvoltării societății noastre. Din aceasta nu vom avea decât de câștigat.

În ce privește problema tratativelor de la Viena, sigur, ar fi o soluție aceea propusă de tovarășul Gorbaciov. Părerea mea este însă că ar fi bine să încheiem cu un rezultat, chiar cu un rezultat foarte mic, care nu reprezintă nimic din punctul de vedere al parităților militare. Deci ar fi bine ca aceste tratative să se încheie cu un rezultat în acest an. O reducere de 10000 de oameni – fie că este mai mult la noi sau la americani – nu reprezintă nimic. Dar acum, când R.D.G. și Cehoslovacia au propus niște măsuri în Europa centrală, a încheia această conferință – care se referă la Europa centrală – fără nici un rezultat, după 12 ani de tratative, ar avea un efect negativ. De aceea, aș face apelul de a revede situația și a încheia repede tratativele în acest an, acceptând unele din propunerile făcute, pentru că nu sunt probleme de fond și nu afectează în nici un fel situația din Europa centrală și nici din Europa în general.

Într-adevăr, problemele generale trebuie să le avem în vedere în contextul general al înfăptuirii hotărârii de la Budapesta. Acum însă trebuie să încheiem aceste tratative cu un rezultat. Acest lucru ar avea o mare importanță din punct de vedere politic și psihologic. Din punct de vedere militar, nu ar avea însă nici o importanță. Dar după 12 ani tratativele nu se încheie prin încetarea pur și simplu a lor.

În ce privește relațiile Uniunii Sovietice și ale celorlalte țări socialiste cu China. Noi salutăm acest proces de normalizare, de îmbunătățire a relațiilor și îl considerăm foarte important. Salutăm și îmbunătățirea relațiilor dintre Uniunea Sovietică și China și sperăm să se ajungă inclusiv la o întâlnire la nivel înalt. De altfel, tovarășii chinezi s-au declarat gata să meargă la Moscova. După mine, nu este greu de realizat acest lucru și există posibilitatea ca să se ajungă la anumite rezultate pozitive. Tovarășul Deng Xiaoping mi-a spus că, deși are greutăți cu deplasarea, la Moscova este gata să meargă...

M. S. Gorbaciov: Trebuie să-l ajutăm, putem să-l ajutăm.

Tov. Nicolae Ceaușescu: Eu sunt convins că se poate ajunge la aceasta.

În ce privește Kampuchia, există de acum propuneri foarte rezonabile pentru o reconciliere națională și formarea unui guvern de uniune națională cu toate forțele, inclusiv cu guvernul de coaliție, cu Sianouk. Aceasta ar rezolva repede problema.

Cred că poziția tovarășilor vietnamezi și a guvernului actual din Kampuchia, al lui Heng Samrin, nu este realistă. Nu se poate ajunge la o reconciliere națională fără forța cea mai puternică, pe motiv că este gruparea lui Pol Pot. Pentru mine este de neînțeles această poziție.

M. S. Gorbaciov: Sigur, este acolo o problemă de relații personale.

Tov. Nicolae Ceaușescu: Cunosc această problemă și pozițiile unor conducători din guvernul actual și din gruparea cealaltă, însă problemele trebuie soluționate în interesul general, trecându-se peste orice considerente de interes personal. Trebuie să se găsească soluții politice. De altfel, trebuie să se aibă în vedere că în această problemă, China nu va admite o altă soluție decât aceea a unui guvern de coaliție. În general, multe țări ale lumii, mișcarea nealinată sprijină ideea unui guvern de reconciliere națională a tuturor forțelor. Aceasta ar avea o însemnătate foarte mare nu numai pentru zona respectivă, dar și pentru relațiile dintre țările socialiste, inclusiv pentru normalizarea relațiilor dintre Uniunea Sovietică și China, pentru creșterea generală a influenței țărilor socialiste în zonă. Noi considerăm că trebuie să insistăm pentru această soluție.

Încerc să ridic, pe scurt, o problemă. Am discutat-o și cu tovarășul Gorbaciov, dar vreau să o ridic și în fața dumneavoastră. Este vorba de relațiile sau, mai bine zis, situația din mișcarea comunistă și muncitorească. Sigur, nu este timp să discutăm această problemă, noi însă considerăm că va trebui poate să facem o întâlnire specială, chiar numai la nivelul acesta, sigur și cu alți secretari ai comitetelor centrale, dar numai a acestor 7 partide eventual, pentru a face un schimb de păreri pe problemele situației din mișcarea comunistă și muncitorească. Noi pornim de la faptul că astăzi partidele comuniste, îndeosebi din Europa, nu au o poziție de frunte în lupta pentru dezarmare, pentru pace, în problemele fundamentale. Sigur, sunt multe cauze, nu este timp acum, dar consider că trebuie să discutăm această problemă. Fiind comuniști, fiind partide comuniste, noi avem răspunderea și față de popoarele noastre, dar și față de mișcarea comunistă mondială să discutăm și să găsim căile cum să acționăm mai bine în acest domeniu și, în general, în dezvoltarea colaborării cu socialiștii, cu social-democrații, cu alte forțe.

Noi suntem pentru o largă colaborare, pentru un larg front al păcii, dar consideră că nu putem dizolva, ca să spun așa, mișcarea comunistă într-un front în care comuniștii să nu existe. Dimpotrivă, mișcarea comunistă trebuie să aibă un rol activ tocmai pentru a putea îndeplini misiunea pe care o are în unirea tuturor forțelor și popoarelor. Dacă partidele noastre vor ajunge la această concluzie, eu aș saluta acest lucru.

Cu aceasta, având în vedere că timpul este scurt, eu aș termina. Repet, consider că este necesar să ne gândim să perfecționăm întâlnirile noastre și ca tematică și ca timp, pentru că în 3-4 ore nu putem face ceva temeinic. Anul trecut, în noiembrie, la Moscova, am avut timp mai mult. Practica aceasta este foarte bună pentru că ne dă posibilitatea să discutăm pe larg o serie de probleme generale.

Am terminat. Vă mulțumesc.

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APPENDIX no. 2

November 27, 1978, Bucharest. Transcript of the meeting of the Consultative Political Committee of the CC of RCP on November 24, 1978.

Archives of Political Executive Committee of C.C. R.C.P.
No. 2611 / 11 XII 1978

TRANSCRIPT

of the meeting of the Consultative Political Committee of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party on November 24, 1978

Participants in the meeting: comrades Nicolae Ceaușescu, Manea Mănescu, Elena Ceaușescu, Iosif Banc, Cornel Burtică, Virgil Cazacu, Gheorghe Cioară, Lina Ciobanu, Constantin Dăscălescu, Ion Dincă, Emil Drăgănescu, Janoș Fazekaș, Ion Ioniță, Petre Lupu, Paul Niculescu, Gheorghe Pană, Ion Pațan, Dumitru Popescu, Gheorghe Rădulescu, Leonte Răutu, Virgil Trofin, Iosif Uglar, Ilie Verdeț, Ștefan Voitec, Ștefan Andrei, Ion Coman, Teodor Coman, Mihai Dalea, Miu Dobrescu, Ludovic Fazekaș, Mihai Gere, Ion Iliescu, Ștefan Mocuța, Vasile Patilineț, Mihai Telescu, Ioan Ursu, Richard Winter.

Invited to the meeting: comrades Vasile Mușat, Marin Vasile.

The meeting began at 12.00 hrs and ended at 13.20 hrs.

Comrade Nicolae Ceaușescu: Have you managed to see the materials? You have. Let us hear what you have to say.

Cde. Manea Mănescu: Esteemed comrades, I want to refer to the intervention – firm, principled, of special patriotic and revolutionary responsibility for the present and the future of our country, and, I would say, for the other socialist countries as well – which cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu made at the Conference of the Consultative Political Committee of the states participating in the Warsaw Treaty regarding the Report on the military situation, and the decision related to this report.

As you have seen, after Marshal Kulikov presented the report, cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu took the floor and criticized the working procedure, and the technique of drawing up materials of special significance which engage the states participating in the Warsaw Treaty in the crucial issues of peace and war, the arms race, disarmament, and international détente.

Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu pointed out from the very beginning that the report and the decision did not result in a comradely collaboration of the states participating in the Warsaw Treaty, and that a decision can only be made on the basis of a common agreement, in accordance with the provisions of the acts and norms that direct the activity of the Consultative Political Committee. Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu also pointed out that the appreciations of the ratio of forces are made on the basis of erroneous, even false data, that the issues are raised as if the breaking out of a world war were imminent, which is in total contradiction with the first document and the debates that took place on it.

In fact, cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu drew very serious attention to the responsibility we have to analyze the present situation objectively, to make correct political appreciations, and not to fall prey to militarism, which would bring about incalculable consequences for the future of mankind (forcing the states participating in the Warsaw Treaty to make investments and incur exorbitant material and financial expenditures, which would constitute a heavy burden for the peoples, with negative consequences on the economic and social development, and the living standard of peoples). On the contrary, as cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu showed in his first exposé, our countries have to take the initiative in taking measures to reduce military expenditures, measures independent of those taken by the NATO countries since this would have a highly positive influence on the peoples' fight for peace and détente in the world.

Actually, the Report is a product of Soviet militarist circles, which pursue a policy of excessive arming by replacing the current weapons, and by involving the states participating in the Warsaw Treaty in the dangerous arms race, and the resultant expenditures deriving from this adventurous way of acting. The Report included such appreciations in order to justify the so-called emergency course, namely, in case of emergency, the command of the troops of the states participating in the Warsaw Treaty should be

transferred to the Soviet General Staff, with all the consequences deriving from this fact regarding the independence and sovereignty of our country and of other socialist countries participating in the Warsaw Treaty. This would give the Soviet Union the possibility of interfering in the internal affairs of our countries.

I must tell you that cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu was listened to with a lot of attention by all the participants in the conference. The other speakers who took the floor after cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu only referred to the fact that the report and the decision had to be approved because cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu's arguments were so strong that there was not even a slight attempt at formulating counter-arguments to what cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu had shown when he raised for discussion the content of the report, which was obviously subjective and made for the purpose of justifying the arms race, the so-called need to allocate high investments, to change the armaments in all of the sectors as soon as possible, and to involving the economic potential of all the countries taking part in this arms race.

I want to emphasize once more that cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu's arguments were listened to by everybody, and nobody even tried to produce counter-arguments. It was clearly apparent that things had been agreed upon in the sense that the report was good and a decision had to be taken. I must tell you that also this time cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu intervened firmly, with determination, regarding the observance of the new principles in the relationships between the socialist countries, non-interference in internal affairs, respect, and mutual esteem.

We must thank cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu from the bottom of our hearts for the way he defended the rights of the Romanian people to freedom and independence on this occasion as well.

I think that the materials containing the two exposés of cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu's must be known by our whole party, by our whole people, because it is from them that we must draw all of our conclusions about the way we must firmly militate for the defence of the holy rights of our people to independence and national sovereignty, to the independence of our party's actions.

As to the issues connected with disarmament, I would not like to retain your attention too much. I would like, however, to remark that cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu's intervention was listened to very attentively by the participants, and was – in the context of the other exposés – the most substantial, the most supported by arguments, and the one that showed – as clearly and as justly as possible – the actual ways and means we are to employ to really ensure an international climate now and in the future on the way of disarming and defending the rights of the peoples to shape their destinies freely, to ensure their economic and social development, to raise the living standard of the peoples and to ensure peace in the world. I have to tell you that, from discussions with other participants, I found that cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu's [first] exposé enjoyed a quite large audience. In fact, the second did, too, but things were of such a nature that nobody could take a critical stand but, conversely, from the way they presented [their position] it was apparent that what cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu showed in relation to the Report and the decision were just things which needed thinking over for one to be able to exemplify the way we are to take part in the solution of the major problems of international life, which can only be solved by way of understanding, coexistence, disarmament, and peace

Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu: Especially Lenin's Peace Decree!

Cde. Manea Mănescu: It was listened to attentively.

Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu: When he spoke about "a peace without annexations, and without occupation of foreign territories." Lenin said so.

Of course, first of all we should see if the Consultative Political Committee agrees with the adopted position, and afterwards to see how we are to act. (All of the comrades agree).

Cde. Leonte Răutu: We highly appreciate this stance.

Cde. Paul Niculescu: These issues are so clear that no other stance could exist.

It is very good that cde. Ceaușescu spoke about all of these issues. It is very good for both our party and the general cause.

Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu: Then I understand that you agree. (All of the comrades totally agree). How are we to proceed now?

First of all, I think it would be good to issue a communiqué of the meeting of the Consultative Political Committee, in which it is pointed out that they listened to the information and how they appreciate the activity of the delegation, obviously, emphasizing these issues. In addition, the position adopted by

them on the issues of collaboration development and on the military issues, without mentioning what we think should be done in that respect. It goes without saying that we understand the necessity of dealing with the issues of defence strengthening, but rationally, without panicking and taking excessive measures.

Cde. Leonte Răutu: It is very clear.

Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu: In the decision it was stated that the expenditures should be increased, and the investments should be increased. It is not stated that measures are to be taken, only that expenditures should be increased substantially. And, in comparison with the current five-year period, it stipulates that the investments should be increased.

Cde. Paul Niculescu: And in the Declaration it is stated that we clearly declare ourselves against the armament policy. How can this be explained?

Cde. Leonte Răutu: It is a decision to stimulate the arms race, and to stimulate NATO to do the same thing.

Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu: The difference lies in the fact that NATO's decision is public, and ours is secret.

Cde. Manea Mănescu: It is a bellicose decision.

Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu: We said that we agreed to provide the measures to be taken, we did not reject any measures.

We said that we agreed for a Statute to be drawn up, but we were not in a position now to establish how this Statute would look like based on what a general or a marshal said since we did not even discuss this issue. In addition, Article 6 is inadmissible.

Cde. Paul Niculescu: During the [Second] World War there was an anti-Hitler coalition also comprising capitalist states, but they did not choose this solution. The General Staffs of the respective states collaborated.

Cde. Leonte Răutu: Particularly as now we are not in wartime.

Cde. Manea Mănescu: It is not possible for their General Staff to draw up such materials, and align all the others.

Cde. Ilie Verdet: We expressed our wish to find a solution to this issue several times, but they did not agree.

Cde. Manea Mănescu: Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu proposed a break during which a discussion could be held, but they did not accept.

Cde. Ion Coman: I would like to show the Consultative Political Committee how these materials were brought to Bucharest. On Saturday, at 13.00, Marshal Kulikov called us up and told us he wanted to come to Bucharest with the report's theses and the decision. I told him to send us the materials in advance so that we could translate them with a view to discussing them. He said he would not send them but bring them along. When he came with the materials, I told him at least to wait until we translated them but neither did he accept this. This is the way the materials for the meeting of the general secretaries were prepared.

Cde. Ceaușescu, this morning a few of our generals asked me about the issues [raised] at the Conference of the Consultative Political Committee of the states participating in the Warsaw Treaty. I told them that I only knew the decision that had been published. Some of them asked to be received by you so that they can be informed by you about the military issues. If you can spare the time, you might meet part of the generals of our armed forces tomorrow or on Monday at the latest.

Cde. Paul Niculescu: This is the most brutal expression of the subordination policy.

Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu: Today I have received a telephone call [informing me] that the miners intend to send a delegation to Bucharest.

Cde. Virgil Cazacu: The Writers' Union and the Plastic Artists' Union intend to send a delegation to you in order to be informed [about the situation].

Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu: In fact, this decision was made by the army and it is known. In this case the principle is valid that if two people know something, everybody knows it.

Cde. Janoš Fazekas: Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu, in my opinion you very honourably fulfilled the mandate you had, supporting the stance of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party on these important issues.

It goes without saying that, taking into consideration the way things turned out, a total lack of receptivity and democratic sense in listening to another opinion than the outlined ones is clearly apparent. What you said was so strong, so serious, that any man in his right mind could see the wish of our delegation to find a compromise solution. The total united front of all those who were not able to do anything to reach a compromise solution is clearly visible. We did it without impairing the independence and sovereignty of any country, without meddling in the internal affairs of other countries.

I also thought about the following thing. Taking into consideration the exposé you made, the positions adopted, along with the fact that the decision under point 2 is in total contradiction with point 1, and with what you said – namely that we make a commitment to fulfil our obligations within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty as long as NATO exists since NATO clearly is a military organization against socialism and not only against socialism, but also where there is no socialism, where there are capitalist countries, especially in the developing countries which have just gained their independence and are weak from an economic point of view, and where a great many unsolved issues from the colonialist period still remained. We agree with the rational modernization of the armed forces, with their adequate equipping. We agree with the drawing up of the envisaged Statute, but in the conditions of democratic working norms to be established.

In view of the fact that under point 2 there are very serious infringements of a number of procedures and norms, I do not know if it would not be better that after our positive appreciation of the way in which you acted at this Conference was published, that after this Communiqué, to have the Consultative Political Committee of our party send a letter to all of the parties that signed, also using what was said under point 1, to help them ponder more on these issues. I feel that this could create a certain possibility of discussion within these parties, of enabling them to see that the decision adopted by their leaderships is wrong. Afterwards, we could see what their reaction to this letter is.

I wholly agree with the stance taken by our delegation, headed by cde. Ceaușescu, and the way it acted.

Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu: Of course, it is clearly pointed out in the Treaty that the decisions are to be adopted by common agreement. In the Committee of the Ministers of Defence as well, the decisions regarding the recommendations and the proposals made in relation to the main military issues are made by common agreement and afterwards they are submitted to the governments and the Consultative Political Committee for consideration and approval. Consequently, even the proposals and recommendations of the Committee of the Ministers of Defence are mandatory subject to common agreement. They cannot be adopted on a majority basis.

Cde. Paul Niculescu: A decision adopted on a majority basis is not valid.

Cde. Leonte Răutu: In other words, we do not recognize this to be a decision of the Consultative Political Committee since it is in contradiction with the basic documents.

Cde. Manea Mănescu: It is null and void.

Cde. Leonte Răutu: Nor was the invasion of Czechoslovakia an act of the Warsaw Treaty.

Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu: Of course, let us however convene a plenary session of the Central Committee, independently from the common session, because nevertheless within the framework of the common session we cannot make these decisions as they are looked upon as being secret, and in the plenary session we can make them. We can hold the plenary session on Wednesday so that we do not have to convene people twice. At the common session we will also have to adopt a common proclamation, where these very issues should be underlined. In fact, this common session could serve as a substitute for a session dealing with international issues. It will be a common one: the Central Committee, the Socialist Unity Front, and the Great National Assembly; it includes them all.

Let us think, the Consultative Political Committee or the Central Committee should address a letter in that respect to the Central Committees of the other parties. I think that in this letter we should insist on the necessity of abiding by the treaties and decisions stipulating that the decisions can only be made in common, otherwise they cannot commit the Consultative Political Committee of the states participating in the Warsaw Treaty, and represent an infringement of these norms. Naturally, if – over the years – more democratic practices took root in the political domain, in the military field no such thing has been noticed.

We must draw attention to the fact that collaboration presupposes democratic relationships in the military field as well, that such relationships cannot be conceived of as relationships from a subordinate to

his superior. Even within the framework of an army, the principles of democracy and conscience [must prevail], but especially when independent national armies are concerned, the decisions can only be made by common accord. It is also in the interest of collaboration, of brotherhood in arms, to completely renounce such soldierly practices. I was tempted to say Stalinist or dictatorial, but it is so. But let us call them soldierly and stress the fact that we must introduce in practice relationships that really are socialist. Only thus can the collaboration relationships be strengthened, and the friendship and brotherhood in arms be consolidated between our armies as representatives of the peoples, which must be subordinated to the parties and execute the line of the parties, and not try to counterpoise it. Let us see the formulation.

Cde. Manea Mănescu: Or that we must not take them outside the prerogatives of parties and states.

Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu: The fact must be understood that the army is responsible to the people, and it is subordinated to the parties and the states. That between the armies of the socialist countries there must clearly exist such relationships, which cannot be removed from the attributions of parties and peoples. That it is in the very interest of the development of collaboration and of the strengthening of cooperation and brotherhood to reconsider this decision that infringes the Warsaw Treaty and the decisions we already have, and to act accordingly. We are doing this starting from our decision to fulfil our obligations, to cooperate and so on.

That is approximately the way we are to proceed to take this matter further.

(All the comrades agree).

Cde. Ilie Verdet: And to say that we do not think this is a decision of the Consultative Political Committee of the states participating in the Warsaw Treaty.

Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu: We have already said so.

Cde. Elena Ceaușescu: At least the Warsaw Treaty should be observed.

Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu: Indeed, improvements are necessary, but they should contribute towards deepening the collaboration, the brotherhood so that a new model of cooperation between the socialist countries can be offered.

Then on Wednesday we will hold the plenary session. By then, we must get both the letter and the decision ready. As to the military, I will see if I shall receive them, especially as they know the draft decision.

Cde. Leonte Răutu: It is a justified request.

Cde. Ion Coman: I propose that they be received eventually.

Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu: Let us think about it some more.

Cde. Petre Lupu: Directly after the plenary session of the Central Committee and the session of the Great National Assembly we should hold meetings with the party active in the counties, in which members of the Consultative Political Committee take part.

Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu: After the plenary session, we will inform the party active. We must clearly reaffirm our position, namely that we deem the Declaration acceptable. In this sense it was discussed that the press should also reflect the general approval, emphasizing the issues of essence – disarmament, and détente.

Everybody took the floor, even Brezhnev, saying that we must do everything for peace. In general, everybody was for peace, for détente. The Chinese were criticized for not being for détente. I did not notice that they were very much concerned with this decision. But, obviously, we will see.

It goes without saying that the issue of the development of collaboration within COMECON is one thing, and these issues are quite another thing.

Let us debate [these issues] seriously, calmly within our party, pointing out what our position is. It is normal for people to wonder what has happened since these issues cannot be kept secret: are we for subordination or not? We must tell people clearly that if we accepted such a policy, it would be impossible for us to continue either the achievement of the Program of the 11th Congress of economic and social development of our country or the achievement of the program of raising the living standard because such a thing is hard to achieve. Stalin himself said, in 1948, that one cannot carry on, at once, a policy of armament and a policy of raising the living standard. Irrespective of what he was at the time, he could still reason. The armament policy has a negative impact on the growth of economy even in the developed countries, which have an altogether different national income. It is obvious, however, that for the socialist countries, for example Romania and the Soviet Union, this negative impact is much stronger. In fact, most

of the metal raw materials go to the military sector. That is, if you want to keep improving things in this field at all costs. How much is a MIG-25 [fighter] plane.

Cde. Ion Coman: It costs six million roubles.

Cde. Ion Ioniță: It will amount to somewhere about 50-55 million Lei.

Cde. Cornel Burtică: A missile costs 25 million Lei.

Cde. Ion Coman: The T-72 [tank] missile [sic!] is one million roubles.

Cde. Ion Ioniță: Cde. Ceaușescu, since I totally agree with your position, the position of our delegation which was in Moscow, there is a question that keeps tormenting me:

At this level of the Consultative Political Committee no decision was ever made with a majority of votes. Of course, at other levels this was the rule, which – in fact – we accepted via our separate points of view on very big issues. I only want to give an example: the unification of fleets. The fleets of the socialist countries are unified, are under a common command. Maybe in this sense an attempt was made at the level of the Consultative Political Committee.

Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu: These are not common decisions. They can do anything amongst themselves, and we cannot prevent them from doing so, but within neither the framework of the Consultative Political Committee nor the framework of the Committee of Defense Ministers can such decisions be made. We cannot accept that such decisions be taken, and recognize them as being decisions of the Warsaw Treaty. For example, the Command of the Black Sea Fleet does not function, although they insist on that. Obviously, they act together with the Bulgarians. [The Command] does not function, and is not an organism approved and recognized by the Warsaw Treaty. Of course, I cannot prevent them from doing what they want, but as states.

Cde. Virgil Trofin: I would like to say also before the Consultative Political Committee that I wholly agree with the position presented within the framework of the Consultative Political Committee of the states participating in the Warsaw Treaty, as well as with the stance adopted regarding the proposals made by Marshal Kulikov. The firm and clear positions expressed by cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu in regard to the contemplated proposals and measures were not in fact discussed within the framework of the Consultative Political Committee since, if I take into consideration the positions adopted there by the other delegations, it is apparent that they asserted their support for the relevant draft [document], but have no argument to oppose what cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu rose as issues of essence and procedure. I do not attribute this only to the fact that they had agreed beforehand on these issues. I would attribute it also to the fact that they did not know that our powerful arguments would be put forward there, and did not dare to think otherwise.

I think that the idea of sending the Central Committees of the respective parties a letter in which to put forward clearly the point of view of our party on the relationships between the armies of the socialist countries, and on the way the statute of this organization is to be observed is of great importance. The letter will give the leaderships of these parties the chance to reflect on the issues, to trigger discussions, and to find solutions, to the extent of their accepting what the letter contains.

In point of fact, the functioning principles of this body were infringed. The most they could have done would have been to postpone this discussion so that in the meantime solutions could be found. Actually, the Statute of the Warsaw Treaty is not heeded any longer. It goes without saying that nobody can stop them from doing what they want to do in the relationships in the military field, but as long as we participate in this Military Pact it is normal that everything that is to be done should be agreed upon [with us]. You remember that we were not consulted in regard to Czechoslovakia; we were only sent a letter announcing us that they would enter Czechoslovakia that night. Otherwise, this Pact cannot have any validity whatever. If the general issues may still be discussed, in the military field very dangerous unilateral actions can also be undertaken. That is why in the letter we are going to send we will have to explain the importance of carrying out the activity of this body on the basis of the principles on which we agreed, and of observing these principles to the letter.

I also take the view that it is very good to hold a plenary session of the Central Committee. I think that it would be good to hold, within the framework of the plenary session, a wider debate about our party's position on these issues.

In addition, I also agree that in the solemn assembly these issues be debated as well. Debates should be held about the issues of creating the Romanian national unitary state, but the main debate should focus on what we have established.

Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu: I said from the very beginning that we must underline what we have to do, and not from a historical point of view. It is clear that we evoke the moment, the significance, but we must emphasize what we have to do.

We will have to ponder in the future as well about the agenda of the Consultative Political Committee of the states participating in the Warsaw Treaty. This report should not come from the Commander-in-Chief, but from the Committee of the Ministers of Defence. Actually, the meeting of the Committee of the Ministers of Defence will take place in the beginning of December. They probably will come with issues there, too.

Cde. Ștefan Andrei: As I said yesterday, as one who took part in the delegation that was in Moscow, I express my full approval of and adhesion to the position of our delegation, of cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu, at the Conference at Moscow. It is my firm conviction that the stance adopted by cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu there was a reaffirmation of the independence policy of our party.

It was apparent from the way things unfolded there that the Statute of the Warsaw Treaty had become uncomfortable for the Soviets. Even during the discussions here they said they would come with a series of issues outside the Warsaw Treaty. In fact, they also told me that the 1965 formulation was not adequate, and that with the other socialist countries they actually act like that. This is one issue. This is uncomfortable for them because, in fact, in their relationships with the other socialist countries they attained a degree of integration and domination that conflicted with the principles in 1955.

The second issue: It is a fact that we must expect that they will try these actions of domination in other respects as well. In foreign policy, and on both party line and state line, the socialist countries are trained how to coordinate themselves, what to do even in Ghana, and also in Angola. It all boils down to what Brezhnev said as far back as 1974, namely they want to force the so-called "getting-closer" of the socialist countries in accordance with the prototype of the relationships existing between the republics of the Soviet Union. Brezhnev said it clearly in 1974.

In connection with the way they received our objections yesterday. They were expecting it. What shocked me was this position of force of the military in the sense that they do not want to change anything. I had the conviction that they knew that Romania would not agree, and the stance of the military was not to change anything.

On the other side, we can expect a number of difficulties on the economic line, too, going on the line of armament. They already have an increase of 4.6% in group A, and in group B – an increase of 4.2%; if the armament plan is added, difficulties will really appear in the development of economic relationships as well. That is why we must adopt the line of diversifying our economic and political relationships. From here also stems the need for us to develop our relationships with the developing countries. With this end in view, I will do my best to fulfil the tasks we have proposed ourselves in this field.

Cde. Ion Dincă: I express my full accord with the activity carried out by our delegation, by comrade general secretary in person, at this session of the Consultative Political Committee of the states participating in the Warsaw Treaty. I am convinced that our whole people and party will approve from the bottom of their hearts the activity carried out by you, cde. Ceaușescu, and by our delegation. This will bring about the strengthening of the party's and people's ranks around their leadership, first of all around you, cde. Ceaușescu.

As far back as March 1962, when the COMECON issues were being discussed (I was working in the army at the time), it was proposed to us to create a series of bodies which were to function under the direct command of the Soviet army. The need was felt to exist at the time of a propaganda section of the Warsaw Treaty. All these were nothing else than attempts to take the military organs from under the leadership of the respective parties and subordinate them to the Soviet army. It is now apparent that they did not give up all these aims. In 1968 it was not easier either. Then, too, you carried out a prodigious activity. The decision of the Great National Assembly is still valid today. The way you acted this time as well proves to us to be a model of the manner in which we all are to militate further on this line.

I agree with the proposals made.

Cde. Ceaușescu, three big enterprises in our capital – 23 August, Grivița Roșie, and Vulcan – asked us to tell them what had been discussed at the Conference of the Consultative Political Committee. Consequently, this issue preoccupies people. I do not know what will be initiated, but working people wish to know these issues in more detail. I think that it is good for these issues to be discussed at the plenary

session of the Central Committee, at the plenary session of the Socialist Unity Front, and in the Great National Assembly, but – in my opinion – it is also good to discuss them with working people.

Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu: Of course, comrades, the issues of integration are not new from economic, political, and military points of view. Undoubtedly, such attempts are made on both the propaganda line and the press one, and their scope will become even greater. In fact, [Todor] Jivkov has already said that they no longer correspond to the current forms of economic collaboration, that they have been overtaken by realities, and that new ones have to be created. From this point of view, the activity will be intensified. To a number of questions we gave answers in due time, and we have decided that we will only participate in those actions in which we take an interest. This in regard to the issues of economic collaboration within the framework of COMECON. Naturally, the wish to integrate militarily, to set up a common DSPA, a common brass band and so on, including a common large-size cooking-pot will not disappear.

Cde. Ion Coman: The proposal was made to introduce a common type of uniform for all of the armies of the states participating in the Warsaw Treaty.

Cde. Nicolae Ceaușescu: It seems that these issues are not new. It seems that we are now in a period, where the so-called complicated international situation is used, also taking advantage of the lack of a clear political leadership in the Soviet Union due to Brezhnev's illness, and everybody tries to demonstrate that they can do more. We must keep the policy established by the party's congresses, the Central Committee, and the Great National Assembly, a position that is wholly just and valid and we must apply it with all firmness. We must, however, act calmly but with all firmness, without closing our eyes, and answering firmly where necessary; we must not keep silent, but adopt a firm stance. Calmness is one thing, and firmness is quite another, they are two different things. You know that I have a rather bellicose nature where these issues are concerned, but in Moscow I presented our position regarding the debated issues very calmly. In fact, Brezhnev himself only said a few words.

Then let us proceed as we have established. Do you agree? (All the comrades agree).

This meeting is adjourned.

27 XI 1978

CHNA, CC of RCP – Chancellery Collection, file 89/1978, pp. 14-25.

Romanian version

27 noiembrie 1978, București. Stenograma ședinței Comitetului Politic Executiv din ziua de 24 noiembrie 1978, referitoare la desfășurarea Consfăturii Comitetului Politic Consultativ al Tratatului de la Varșovia (Moscova, 22-23 noiembrie 1978).

Arhiva Comitetului Politic Executiv al C.C. al P.C.R.

Nr. 2611 / 11 XII 1978

STENOGRAMA

ședinței Comitetului Politic Executiv al C.C. al P.C.R. din ziua de 24 noiembrie 1978

Au participat tovarășii Nicolae Ceaușescu, Manea Mănescu, Elena Ceaușescu, Iosif Banc, Cornel Burtică, Virgil Cazacu, Gheorghe Cioară, Constantin Dăscălescu, Ion Dincă, Emil Drăgănescu, Janoș Fazekaș, Ion Ioniță, Petre Lupu, Paul Niculescu, Gheorghe Pană, Ion Pățan, Dumitru Popescu, Gheorghe Rădulescu, Leonte Răutu, Virgil Trofin, Iosif Uglar, Ilie Verdeț, Ștefan Voitec, Ștefan Andrei, Ion Coman, Teodor Coman, Miu Dobrescu, Mihai Gere, Nicolae Giosan, Vasile Patilineț, Ioan Ursu, Richard Winter.

Au fost invitați tovarășii Vasile Mușat și Marin Vasile.

Ședința a început la ora 12.00 și s-a terminat la ora 13.20.

Tov. Nicolae Ceaușescu: Ați reușit să vedeți materialele? Le-ați văzut. Să auzim ce aveți de spus.

Tov. Manea Mănescu: Stimați tovarăși, doresc să mă refer la intervenția fermă, principială, de o deosebită răspundere patriotică și revoluționară pentru prezentul și viitorul țării noastre – eu aș spune și

pentru celelalte țări socialiste – pe care a făcut-o tovarășul Nicolae Ceaușescu la Consfătuirea Comitetului Politic Consultativ al statelor participante la Tratatul de la Varșovia, pe marginea Raportului cu privire la situația militară și a hotărârii aferente la acest raport.

După prezentarea raportului, cum ați văzut, de către mareșalul [Viktor G.] Kulikov, a luat cuvântul tovarășul Nicolae Ceaușescu care a criticat procedeul de lucru, de elaborare a unor materiale de însemnătate deosebită care angajează țările participante la Tratat, în problemele cardinale ale păcii și războiului, ale cursei înarmărilor și războiului, ale dezarmării și destinderii internaționale.

Tovarășul Nicolae Ceaușescu a arătat de la început că raportul și hotărârea nu au rezultat din conlucrarea tovarășească a țărilor participante la Tratat și nu se poate lua o hotărâre decât pe baza unui acord comun, în conformitate cu prevederile actelor și normativelor după care se conduce activitatea Comitetului Politic Consultativ. Tovarășul Ceaușescu a arătat că aprecierile cu privire la raportul de forțe sunt făcute pe baza unor date eronate, chiar false, că se pun problemele ca și cum am fi la un pas de declanșarea unui război mondial, ceea ce este în totală contradicție cu primul document și cu dezbaterile care au avut loc pe marginea acestuia.

În fond, tovarășul Nicolae Ceaușescu a atras foarte serios atenția asupra răspunderii ce o avem de a analiza obiectiv situația actuală, de a face aprecieri politice juste, de a nu cădea pradă militarismului, cu consecințe incalculabile pentru viitorul omenirii, antrenarea țărilor participante la Tratat la investiții, la cheltuieli materiale și financiare exorbitante, ceea ce constituie o grea povară pentru popoare, cu consecințe negative asupra dezvoltării economico-sociale, asupra nivelului de trai al popoarelor. Dimpotrivă – așa cum a arătat tovarășul Nicolae Ceaușescu în prima sa expunere – țările noastre trebuie să dea primele exemplu cu privire la măsuri de reducere a cheltuielilor militare, independent de măsurile care le iau țările NATO, pentru că aceasta va avea o influență deosebit de pozitivă asupra luptei popoarelor pentru pace și destindere în lume.

De fapt, raportul este o emanație a cercurilor militariste sovietice, care urmăresc înarmarea excesivă prin înlocuirea armelor actuale, antrenarea țărilor participante în cursa periculoasă a înarmărilor și la cheltuielile care decurg din această cale aventuristă. Raportul cuprindea asemenea aprecieri, încât să justifice așa-zisul curs de necesitate, în caz de necesitate trecerea comandai (sic!) trupelor țărilor participante la Tratat sub comanda Statului Major sovietic, cu toate consecințele care decurg de aici privind independența și suveranitatea țării noastre și a altor țări socialiste participante la Tratatul de la Varșovia. Prin aceasta s-ar deschide calea de imixtiune în treburile interne ale țărilor noastre de către Uniunea Sovietică.

Trebuie să vă spun că tovarășul Ceaușescu a fost ascultat cu multă atenție de către toți participanții la consfătuire. Ceilalți vorbitori care au urmat după tovarășul Ceaușescu s-au referit numai la faptul că raportul și hotărârea trebuie aprobate, pentru că argumentele tovarășului Nicolae Ceaușescu erau atât de puternice încât nu s-a încercat nici măcar o schițare de argumente la ceea ce a arătat tovarășul Ceaușescu atunci când a pus în discuție cuprinsul acestui raport, care era vădit subiectiv și făcut în scopul de a justifica cursa înarmărilor, de a justifica așa-zisa necesitate de a se aloca investiții foarte mari, de a se schimba cât mai urgent posibil armamentele în toate sectoarele și a antrena potențialul economic al țărilor participante la această cursă a înarmărilor.

Vreau încă o dată să subliniez faptul că argumentele tovarășului Nicolae Ceaușescu au fost ascultate de toți și nu a încercat nimeni să aducă contraargumente. Se vedea clar că lucrurile erau puse de acord în sensul că este un raport bun și este necesar să se adopte o hotărâre. Și de această dată trebuie să vă spun că tovarășul Ceaușescu a intervenit ferm, hotărât în ce privește respectarea principiilor noi în relațiile dintre țările socialiste, neamestecul în treburile interne, respectul și stima reciprocă.

Noi trebuie să mulțumim din inimă tovarășului Nicolae Ceaușescu pentru felul cum a apărut și de data aceasta drepturile poporului român la libertate și independență.

Cred că materialele care conțin cele două expuneri ale tovarășului Nicolae Ceaușescu trebuie să fie cunoscute de întregul nostru partid, de întregul nostru popor, pentru că de aici trebuie să tragem toate concluziile asupra modului în care trebuie să milităm cu fermitate pentru apărarea drepturilor sfinte ale poporului nostru la independență și suveranitate națională, independența acțiunilor partidului nostru.

În legătură cu problemele legate de dezarmare, nu aș vrea să rețin atenția dumneavoastră în mod deosebit. Aș vrea însă să remarc că intervenția tovarășului Nicolae Ceaușescu a fost ascultată cu multă atenție de către participanți și a fost, în contextul celorlalte expuneri, cea mai substanțială, cea mai

argumentată și care a arătat în modul cel mai clar, cel mai just căile și mijloacele reale care să le urmărim pentru ca într-adevăr să se asigure un climat internațional astăzi și în viitor pe calea dezarmării și a apărării drepturilor popoarelor de a-și făuri în mod liber destinele, de a-și asigura dezvoltarea economico-socială, ridicarea nivelului de trai al popoarelor și asigurarea păcii în lume. Eu trebuie să vă spun că, discutând și cu alți participanți, expunerea tovarășului Nicolae Ceaușescu s-a bucurat de o audiență foarte largă. De altfel și cea de a doua, însă lucrurile erau de așa natură încât nimeni nu a putut să ia o poziție critică ci, dimpotrivă, prin modul cum ei au expus, a reieșit că ceea ce tovarășul Ceaușescu a arătat și în legătură cu raportul și în legătură cu hotărârea sunt lucruri juste care trebuie să dea de gândit, pentru a putea da exemplu de felul cum trebuie să participăm la rezolvarea marilor probleme ale vieții internaționale, care nu se pot rezolva decât pe calea înțelegerii, coexistenței, dezarmării și păcii.

Tov. Nicolae Ceaușescu: Îndcosebi Decretul păcii al lui Lenin!

Tov. Manea Mănescu: A fost ascultat cu atenție.

Tov. Nicolae Ceaușescu: Când a vorbit de „o pace fără anxii și fără cōtōpīrea de teritorii străine”. Lenin a spus așa.

Sigur, în primul rând ar trebui să vedem dacă Comitetul Politic Executiv este de acord cu poziția adoptată și pe urmă să vedem cum trebuie să acționăm. (toți tovarășii sunt de acord).

Tov. Leonte Răutu: Dăm o înaltă apreciere acestei poziții.

Tov. Paul Niculescu: Sunt probleme atât de clare încât altă poziție nu poate exista.

Este foarte bine că tovarășul Ceaușescu a spus toate aceste probleme. Este foarte bine și pentru partidul nostru și pentru cauza mai generală.

Tov. Nicolae Ceaușescu: Atunci, înțeleg că sunteți de acord. (toți tovarășii sunt total de acord). Cum să procedăm acum?

În primul rând, cred că ar fi bine să dăm un comunicat al ședinței Comitetului Politic Executiv, că a ascultat informarea și cum apreciază activitatea delegației, sigur, punând accent pe problemele acestea. Și, de asemenea, poziția adoptată față de problemele dezvoltării colaborării și poziția față de problemele militare, fără a ne referi la ce considerăm că trebuie să se facă. În felul acesta. Sigur, subliniind necesitatea că noi înțelegem să ne ocupăm și de problemele întăririi apărării, dar în mod rațional, fără a intra în panică și a lua niște măsuri excesive.

Tov. Leonte Răutu: Este foarte clar.

Tov. Nicolae Ceaușescu: În hotărâre a fost așa, să se mărească cheltuielile, să se mărească investițiile. Nu spune să se ia măsuri, ci mărirea însemnată a cheltuielilor. Și în comparație cu cincinalul actual să se prevadă sporirea investițiilor.

Tov. Paul Niculescu: Iar în Declarație se spune că ne pronunțăm clar împotriva politicii de înarmare. Cum este aceasta?

Tov. Leonte Răutu: Este o hotărâre de stimulare a cursei înarmărilor și de stimulare a NATO să facă la fel.

Tov. Nicolae Ceaușescu: Deosebirea este că hotărârea NATO este publică, iar a noastră este secretă.

Tov. Manea Mănescu: Este o hotărâre belicoasă.

Tov. Nicolae Ceaușescu: Noi am spus că suntem de acord să prevedem măsuri, nu am respins orice măsuri.

Am spus că suntem și pentru elaborarea Statutului, dar că nu putem acum să stabilim cum va arăta acest Statut, pe ceea ce spune un general sau mareșal, când nici nu am discutat această problemă.

Plus că articolul 6 este inadmisibil.

Tov. Paul Niculescu: A fost războiul mondial când a fost o coaliție antihitleristă unde au fost și state capitaliste și n-au mers pe această soluție. Statele majore ale țărilor respective au colaborat.

Tov. Leonte Răutu: Mai ales că acum nu suntem în război.

Tov. Manea Mănescu: Nu se poate să se facă astfel de materiale de către Statul lor Major și să-i alinie pe toți ceilalți.

Tov. Ilie Verdet: A fost dorința noastră de mai multe ori de a se găsi o cale de rezolvare a acestei chestiuni, dar n-au acceptat.

Tov. Manea Mănescu: Tovarășul Ceaușescu a propus o pauză în care se putea discuta, însă ei n-au vrut.

Tov. Ion Coman: Eu aş vrea să arăt Comitetului Politic Executiv cum s-a venit cu materialul la Bucureşti. Sâmbătă la ora 13.00, mareşalul Kulikov a dat un telefon că vrea să vină la Bucureşti cu tezele raportului şi cu hotărârea. I-am comunicat să ne trimită materialele cel puţin pentru a fi traduse pentru a le putea discuta. El a spus că nu le trimite şi că vine el personal cu ele. Când a venit cu materialele, i-am spus să aştepte cel puţin să le traducem şi nici de data aceasta nu a vrut. Acesta este felul în care s-au pregătit materialele pentru întâlnirea secretarilor generali.

Tovarăşe Ceauşescu, astăzi dimineaţă câţiva generali de la noi m-au întrebat de problemele care au fost la Consfătuirea Comitetului Politic Consultativ al statelor participante la Tratatul de la Varşovia. Le-am spus că eu cunosc numai hotărârea care a fost publicată. Unii dintre ei au cerut să fie primiţi la dumneavoastră pentru a le face o informare pe problemele militare. Dacă timpul vă va permite, poate mâine sau cel mai târziu luni, să aveţi o întâlnire cu o parte din generalii forţelor noastre armate.

Tov. Paul Niculescu: Este cea mai brutală expresie a politicii de subordonare.

Tov. Nicolae Ceauşescu: Şi eu am primit un telefon că minerii se gândesc să trimită o delegaţie la Bucureşti.

Tov. Virgil Cazacu: Uniunea Scriitorilor şi Uniunea Artiştilor Plastici se gândesc să trimită o delegaţie la dumneavoastră pentru a fi informaţi.

Tov. Nicolae Ceauşescu: De fapt, hotărârea aceasta a fost la armată şi este cunoscută. Aici acţionează principiul că dacă o ştiu doi, o ştiu toţi.

Tov. Janoš Fazekas: Tovarăşe Ceauşescu, eu consider că aţi îndeplinit cu cinste mandatul care l-aţi avut, susţinând poziţia Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist Român în aceste probleme importante.

Sigur, având în vedere felul cum s-au desfăşurat lucrurile, se vede clar o lipsă totală de receptivitate şi de simţ democratic de a asculta şi o altă părere decât părerile care au fost conturate. Cele spuse de dumneavoastră au o putere aşa de mare, aşa de serioasă, încât orice om cu mintea sănătoasă poate să vadă dorinţa delegaţiei române de a găsi o soluţie de compromis. Se vede frontul total unit al celor care nu erau capabili ca să facă acest pas de a găsi o soluţie de compromis. Noi am făcut aceasta fără a afecta independenţa şi suveranitatea vreunei ţări, fără a ne amesteca în treburile interne ale altora.

Eu m-am gândit şi la următorul lucru. Ținând seama de expunerea care aţi făcut-o, de poziţiile adoptate, ținând seama de faptul că hotărârea de la punctul 2 este în contradicție totală cu punctul 1, cu cele spuse de dumneavoastră, că noi suntem pentru a ne îndeplini obligațiile care le avem în Tratatul de la Varşovia până când există NATO, care este clar că este o organizație militară împotriva socialismului și nu numai împotriva socialismului, dar și acolo unde nu este socialism, unde sunt țări capitaliste, mai ales în statele în curs de dezvoltare care sunt slabe din punct de vedere economic, care abia și-au cucerit independența lor și unde au rămas foarte multe probleme nerezolvate din perioada colonialistă. Noi suntem de acord cu modernizarea rațională a forțelor armate, pentru înzestrarea și dotarea lor. Suntem de acord să se elaboreze Statutul despre care se vorbește, dar în condițiile unor norme democratice de lucru care sunt stabilite.

Ținând seama că la punctul 2 sunt încălcări foarte grave ale unor proceduri și norme, nu știu dacă nu ar fi bine ca după ce apare aprecierea noastră pozitivă privind felul în care ați acționat la această Consfătuire, ca după acest Comunicat să facem o scrisoare a Comitetului Politic Executiv al partidului nostru către partidele care au semnat, folosindu-ne și de ceea ce s-a spus la primul punct, pentru a le ajuta să reflecte mai mult asupra acestor probleme. Mă gândesc că aceasta ar putea să creeze o anumită posibilitate de discuție în aceste partide, de a vedea că hotărârea adoptată de conducerile lor este greșită. Am putea vedea după aceasta care va fi reacția lor la această scrisoare.

Eu sunt complet de acord cu poziția și felul cum a acționat delegația noastră în frunte cu tovarășul Ceauşescu.

Tov. Nicolae Ceauşescu: Sigur, în Tratat se spune clar că hotărârile se adoptă de comun acord. Şi la Comitetul miniştrilor apărării, recomandările şi propunerile care se fac privind principalele probleme militare se iau hotărâri puse de comun acord şi apoi se prezintă spre examinare guvernelor şi Comitetului Politic Consultativ pentru aprobare. Deci, chiar propunerile şi recomandările Comitetului miniştrilor apărării trebuie puse de comun acord. Ele nu se pot adopta cu majoritate.

Tov. Paul Niculescu: O hotărâre adoptată cu majoritate nu este valabilă.

Tov. Leonte Răutu: Adică noi nu recunoaştem că aceasta este o hotărâre a Comitetului Politic Consultativ, pentru că contravine documentelor de bază.

Tov. Manea Mănescu: Este nulă şi neavenită.

Tov. Leonte Răutu: Şi în ce priveşte cotoşirea Cehoslovaciei nu a fost un act al Tratatului de la Varşovia.

Tov. Nicolae Ceauşescu: Sigur, să facem totuşi o plenară a Comitetului Central, independent de sesiunea comună, pentru că totuşi în sesiunea comună nu putem să dăm aceste hotărâri fiind considerate secrete, dar în plenară trebuie să le dăm. Probabil şi deputaţilor trebuie să le dăm să le vadă. Poate facem plenara miercuri, ca să nu chemăm oamenii de două ori. La sesiunea comună va trebui să adoptăm şi o proclamaţie comună, în care accentul să cadă tocmai pe aceste probleme. De fapt, să ţină loc şi de o sesiune pe problemele internaţionale. Va fi comună: Comitetul Central, Frontul Unităţii Socialiste şi Marea Adunare Naţională, le înglobează pe toate.

Să ne gândim, fie Comitetul Politic Executiv, fie Comitetul Central, să se adreseze Comitetelor Centrale ale celorlalte partide cu o scrisoare, în acelaşi sens. Cred că trebuie să insistăm în scrisoare pe necesitatea de a se respecta tratatele şi hotărârile care prevăd că hotărârile nu se pot lua decât în comun, pentru că ele, altfel, nu pot angaja Comitetul Politic Consultativ al statelor participante la Tratatul de la Varşovia şi este o încălcare a acestor norme. Sigur, dacă în domeniul politic, în decursul timpului, s-a ajuns la o încetăţenire a unor practici mai democratice, în domeniul militar nu se observă acelaşi lucru.

Trebuie să atragem atenţia că colaborarea presupune şi nişte relaţii democratice şi în domeniul militar, că ele nu pot fi concepute ca relaţii de la subordonat la superior. Chiar în cadrul unei armate, principiile democraţiei şi conştiinţei, dar mai cu seamă când e vorba de armate independente, armate naţionale, hotărârile nu se pot lua decât de comun acord. Este şi în interesul colaborării, al frăţiei de luptă să se renunţe complet la practicile acestea cazone. Mă gândeam să le spun staliniste sau dictatoriale, dar aşa este. Dar să spunem cazone şi că trebuie să introducem practic relaţii cu adevărat socialiste. Numai aşa se pot întări relaţiile de colaborare, se poate cimanta prietenia şi frăţia între armatele noastre, ca reprezentante ale popoarelor, care trebuie să se subordoneze partidelor, să execute linia partidelor şi să nu încerce să se contraponă acesteia. Să vedem formularea.

Tov. Manea Mănescu: Sau că nu trebuie să le scoatem în afara prerogativelor partidelor şi statelor.

Tov. Nicolae Ceauşescu: Trebuie să se înţeleagă că armata are răspundere faţă de popor, este subordonată partidelor şi statelor. Că între armatele ţărilor socialiste trebuie să se reflecte clar aceste relaţii care nu pot fi scoase din atribuţiile partidelor şi popoarelor. Că este tocmai în interesul dezvoltării colaborării, al întăririi conlucrării şi frăţiei să se revină asupra acestei hotărâri care încalcă Tratatul şi hotărârile care le avem şi să se acţioneze în această direcţie. Facem aceasta tocmai cu dorinţa, pornind de la hotărârea noastră de a ne îndeplini obligaţiile, de a conlucra ş.a.m.d.

Cam aşa să procedăm. (toţi tovarăşii sunt de acord).

Tov. Ilie Verdeţ: Şi să spunem că noi nu considerăm aceasta ca o hotărâre a Comitetului Politic Consultativ al statelor participante la Tratatul de la Varşovia.

Tov. Nicolae Ceauşescu: Noi am spus.

Tov. Elena Ceauşescu: Respectarea cel puţin a Tratatului.

Tov. Nicolae Ceauşescu: Într-adevăr este necesară perfecţionarea, dar aceasta trebuie să meargă în direcţia adâncirii colaborării, a frăţiei, ca să ofere un model nou de conlucrare între statele socialiste.

Atunci, miercuri să facem plenara. Până atunci pregătim şi scrisoarea şi hotărârea. Sigur, cu militarii să vedem dacă îi primesc, mai cu seamă că ei cunosc proiectul de hotărâre.

Tov. Leonte Răutu: Este o cerere justificată.

Tov. Ion Coman: Eu propun ca cel mai târziu să fie primiţi.

Tov. Nicolae Ceauşescu: Să ne mai gândim.

Tov. Petre Lupu: Imediat după plenara Comitetului Central şi sesiunea Marii Adunări Naţionale să facem adunări cu activul în judeţe, la care să participe membri ai Comitetului Politic Executiv.

Tov. Nicolae Ceauşescu: După plenară să informăm şi activul de partid. Trebuie să reafirmăm clar poziţiile noastre, că Declaraţia noi o considerăm acceptabilă. În acest sens s-a şi discutat ca şi presa să oglindească aprobarea generală, punând accentul pe problemele de fond – dezarmare, destindere.

Toți au vorbit, inclusiv Brejnev, că trebuie să facem totul pentru pace. În general, toți s-au pronunțat pentru pace, pentru destindere. Au criticat pe chinezi că nu sunt pentru destindere. Eu n-am observat că și ei sunt prea preocupați de această hotărâre. Dar, sigur, vom vedea.

Desigur, una este problema dezvoltării colaborării în CAER și altele sunt problemele acestea.

Să prelucrăm serios, cu calm în partidul nostru, arătând poziția noastră. Este normal ca oamenii să întrebe ce s-a întâmplat, pentru că problemele acestea nu pot fi ținute secrete, suntem sau nu pentru subordonare. Trebuie să spunem oamenilor clar că dacă am accepta o asemenea politică ar fi imposibil să continuăm realizarea Programului Congresului al XI-lea de dezvoltare economico-socială a țării și n-am putea realiza nici programul de creștere a nivelului de trai pentru că este greu de realizat așa ceva. Însuși Stalin a spus, în 1948, că nu se poate duce o politică de înarmare și de ridicare a nivelului de trai. Cât era el, dar tot mai judeca. Politica de înarmare se reflectă negativ în creșterea economiei chiar la țările dezvoltate, care au totuși alt venit național. Dar este evident că pentru țările socialiste, cum este România și chiar Uniunea Sovietică, aceasta se reflectă și pregnant. În fond, cea mai mare parte din materiile prime, din metal, merge în domeniul militar. Dacă vrei o ții permanent cu perfecționarea. Cât costă un avion MIG-25?

Tov. Ion Coman: Costă 6 milioane ruble.

Tov. Ion Ioniță: Ajunge la 50-55 milioane lei.

Tov. Cornel Burtică: O rachetă costă 25 milioane lei.

Tov. Ion Coman: Racheta T-72 (corect : tancul T-72 – n.n.) costă 1 milion de ruble.

Tov. Ion Ioniță: Tovarășe Ceaușescu, fiind de acord total cu poziția dumneavoastră, a delegației care a fost la Moscova, mă tot chinuiește următoarea idee:

La nivelul acesta al Comitetului Politic Consultativ nu s-a mai luat niciodată o hotărâre cu majoritate de voturi. Sigur, la celelalte niveluri aceasta fost o regulă, care de fapt noi am acceptat-o prin punctele de vedere separate pe probleme foarte mari. Eu vreau să dau un exemplu: unificarea flotelor. Flotele țărilor socialiste sunt unificate, sunt puse sub o comandă unică. Poate că în sensul acesta s-a încercat și la nivelul Comitetului Politic Consultativ.

Tov. Nicolae Ceaușescu: Nu sunt hotărâri comune. Ei pot face orice între ei și nu-i putem împiedica, dar nu pot nici în cadrul Comitetului Politic Consultativ și nici în cadrul Comitetului miniștrilor apărării să se ia astfel de hotărâri. Nu putem admite să se ia asemenea hotărâri și să le recunoaștem ca fiind hotărâri ale Tratatului de la Varșovia. De exemplu, Comandamentul din Marea Neagră nu funcționează, deși ei insistă asupra acestui lucru. Sigur că ei acționează împreună cu bulgarii. El nu funcționează și nu este un organism aprobat și recunoscut de Tratatul de la Varșovia. Sigur, eu nu-i pot împiedica pe ei să facă ce vor, dar ca state.

Tov. Virgil Trofin: Eu aș vrea să spun și în fața Comitetului Politic Executiv că sunt întrutotul de acord cu poziția expusă în cadrul Comitetului Politic Consultativ al statelor participante la Tratatul de la Varșovia, precum și cu poziția adoptată față de propunerile făcute de mareșalul Kulikov. Pozițiile ferme, clare exprimate de tovarășul Ceaușescu în legătură cu propunerile și măsurile preconizate de fapt nici nu au fost discutate în cadrul Consfătuirii Comitetului Politic Consultativ, pentru că uitându-mă la pozițiile luate acolo de celelalte delegații rezultă că au afirmat sprijinul lor față de proiectul respectiv, dar n-au nici un fel de argument la tot ceea ce tovarășul Ceaușescu a ridicat ca probleme și de fond și de procedură. Eu nu pun aceasta numai pe seama faptului că ei s-au înțeles înainte de aceste probleme. Eu aș pune și pe seama faptului că ei nu cunoșteau aceste argumente puternice ale noastre care s-au adus acolo și nici n-au îndrăznit să gândească altfel.

Consider că ideea să facem o scrisoare care s-o adresăm Comitetelor Centrale ale partidelor respective, în care să expunem clar punctul de vedere al partidului nostru cu privire la relațiile dintre amatele țărilor socialiste, cu privire la modul cum trebuie respectat statutul acestei organizații, are o mare importanță. Aceasta va înlesni posibilitatea ca în conducerile acestor partide să se reflecte, să deschidă calea inițierii de discuții și să se găsească soluții, în măsura în care vor accepta aceasta.

În fond, s-au încălcat principiile de funcționare ale acestui organism. Puteau cel mult ca această discuție să fie amân timer pentru a se găsi soluții. De altfel, de Statutul Tratatului de la Varșovia nu se mai ține seama. Sigur, nimeni nu-i poate opri să facă ce consideră ei în relațiile care le au pe linie militară, dar atâta timp cât noi facem parte din acest Pact militar este normal ca tot ceea ce se face să se pună de comun acord.

Vă amintiți că și în legătură cu Cehoslovacia nu numai că nu ne-au consultat; s-a primit o scrisoare că în noaptea aceea intră în Cehoslovacia. Altfel, acest Pact nu-și poate avea valabilitatea. Dacă în problemele generale se mai poate discuta, în acest domeniu se pot întreprinde și acțiuni unilaterale foarte periculoase. De aceea, în scrisoarea pe care o vom trimite să explicăm importanța desfășurării activității acestui organism pe baza principiilor asupra cărora am căzut de acord și respectarea întocmai a acestora.

Și părerea mea este că este foarte bine să se facă o plenară a Comitetului Central. Cred că ar fi bine ca în plenara Comitetului Central să facem o dezbatere mai largă privind poziția partidului nostru în aceste probleme.

De asemenea, sunt de acord ca în adunarea solemnă să se dezbată și aceste probleme. Ar trebui să fie o dezbatere a problemelor făuririi statului național unitar român, dar principiile dezbaterii să se axeze pe ceea ce am stabilit.

Tov. Nicolae Ceaușescu: De la început am spus că trebuie să punem accent pe ceea ce trebuie să facem, nu pe latura istorică. E clar că evocăm momentul, evocăm însemnătatea, dar trebuie să punem accentul pe ce avem de făcut.

Noi va trebui să reflectăm în viitor și la ordinea de zi a Comitetului Politic Consultativ al statelor participante la Tratatul de la Varșovia. Raportul acesta nu ar trebui să vină din partea Comandantului șef, ci din partea Comitetului miniștrilor apărării. De altfel, la începutul lunii decembrie va avea loc ședința Comitetului miniștrilor apărării. Probabil că vor veni și acolo cu probleme.

Tov. Ștefan Andrei: Așa cum am spus și eu, ca unul care am făcut parte din delegația care a fost la Moscova, îmi exprim deplina aprobare și adeziune cu poziția delegației noastre, a tovarășului Ceaușescu la Consfătuirea de la Moscova. Consider că poziția care a adoptat-o tovarășul Ceaușescu acolo este o reafirmare a politicii partidului nostru de independență.

Din felul cum s-au desfășurat acolo lucrurile, a reieșit că pentru sovietici a devenit incomod Statutul Tratatului de la Varșovia. Chiar în discuțiile care le-am avut aici au spus că vor să vină cu o serie de probleme în afara Tratatului de la Varșovia. De fapt, ei mi-au și spus că formularea din 1955 nu este corespunzătoare și în fapt cu celelalte țări socialiste așa și acționează. Aceasta este o problemă. Pe ei îi incomodează pentru că de fapt în relațiile lor cu celelalte țări socialiste au mers la un grad de integrare și dominație care contravine cu principiile din 1955.

A doua chestiune. Este un fapt că trebuie să ne așteptăm că și pe alte planuri vor încerca aceste acțiuni de dominație. În politica externă, și pe linie de partid și pe linie de stat, țările socialiste sunt instruite cum să se coordoneze, chiar în Ghana ce trebuie să facă, în Angola la fel. Este de fapt ceea ce a spus Brejnev încă în 1974, ei vor să forțeze așa-zisa apropiere a țărilor socialiste după prototipul relațiilor existente între republicile Uniunii Sovietice. Aceasta a spus-o clar în 1974.

În legătură cu felul cum au primit ei ieri obiecțiunile noastre. Ei se așteptau la aceasta. Ceea ce pe mine m-a șocat este poziția aceasta de forță a militarilor de a nu schimba nimic. Eu am avut convingerea că ei știau că România nu va fi de acord și poziția militarilor era de a nu schimba.

Pe de altă parte, putem să ne așteptăm la o serie de dificultăți și pe linie economică, mergând pe linia înarmării. Ei și așa au o creștere de 4,6 la sută la grupa A, iar la grupa B o creștere de 4,2 la sută, dacă se mai adaugă și planul de înarmare, efectiv vor apare dificultăți în dezvoltarea relațiilor economice. De aceea, noi trebuie să mergem pe linia diversificării relațiilor noastre economice și politice. De aici decurge și necesitatea dezvoltării relațiilor noastre cu țările în curs de dezvoltare. În acest sens, eu voi face totul pentru realizarea sarcinilor ce ni le-am propus în acest domeniu.

Tov. Ion Dincă: Eu îmi exprim deplinul acord cu activitatea desfășurată de delegația noastră, personal de tovarășul secretar general, la această sesiune a Comitetului Politic Consultativ al statelor participante la Tratatul de la Varșovia. Sunt convins că întregul nostru popor și partid va aproba din toată inima activitatea desfășurată de dumneavoastră, tovarășe Ceaușescu, de delegația noastră. Aceasta va duce la înlăturarea rândurilor partidului și poporului în jurul conducerii sale, în primul rând în jurul dumneavoastră, tovarășe Ceaușescu.

Încă în 1962, în martie, când se discutau problemele CAER, eu lucram atunci la armată, ni s-a propus să creăm o serie de organisme care să lucreze nemijlocit sub conducerea armatei sovietice. Se simțea atunci nevoia să existe o secție de propagandă a Tratatului de la Varșovia. Toate acestea nu erau altceva decât încercări de a scoate organele militare de sub conducerea partidelor respective și a le subordona armatei sovietice. Acum se vede că ei n-au renunțat la toate acestea. Nici în 1968 nu a fost mai ușor. Și atunci

dumneavoastră ați desfășurat o activitate prodigioasă. Hotărârea Marii Adunări Naționale a rămas valabilă și astăzi. Felul cum ați acționat și de data aceasta ne dovedește un model de felul cum trebuie să milităm noi toți, în continuare, pe această linie.

Eu sunt de acord cu propunerile făcute.

Tovarășe Ceaușescu, trei mari întreprinderi din capitală – „23 August”, „Grivița Roșie” și „Vulcan” ni s-au adresat să le spunem ce s-a discutat la Consfătuirea Comitetului Politic Consultativ. Așa că există această preocupare la oameni. Nu știu ce se va iniția, însă există această dorință la oamenii muncii să cunoască mai pe larg aceste probleme. Eu consider că este bine ca aceste probleme să fie discutate la plenara Comitetului Central, la plenara Frontului Unității Socialiste și în Marea Adunare Națională, dar consider că este bine să se discute și cu oamenii muncii.

Tov. Nicolae Ceaușescu: Sigur, tovarăși, problemele integrării nu sunt noi și pe linie economică, și politică și militară. Fără îndoială că asemenea încercări se desfășoară și pe linie de propagandă și pe linie de presă și acestea vor lua și mai mare amploare. De altfel, Jivkov a și vorbit că nu mai corespund actualele forme de colaborare economică, că ele sunt depășite de realități și trebuie create altele noi. Din acest punct de vedere se va intensifica această activitate. La o serie de lucruri am dat răspuns la timpul respectiv și avem hotărârea că nu vom participa decât la acele acțiuni unde suntem interesați. Aceasta în ce privește problemele colaborării economice în CAER. Sigur, nu va dispărea dorința de integrare militară, de a face un D.S.P.A. unic, o fanfară unică ș.a.m.d. Inclusiv cazanul unic.

Tov. Ion Coman: S-a propus să se introducă o uniformă unică pentru toate armatele statelor participante la Tratatul de la Varșovia.

Tov. Nicolae Ceaușescu: Se pare că problemele acestea nu sunt noi. Se pare că acum suntem într-o perioadă când se folosește și așa-zisa situație internațională complicată, profitând și de lipsa unei conduceri politice clare în Uniunea Sovietică datorită bolii lui Brejnev și fiecare încearcă să demonstreze că poate face mai mult. Noi trebuie să păstrăm politica noastră stabilită de congresele partidului, de Comitetul Central, de Marea Adunare Națională, poziție care este pe deplin justă, valabilă și trebuie s-o aplicăm cu toată fermitatea. Însă trebuie acționat calm, dar cu toată fermitatea, fără a închide ochii și a răspunde ferm acolo unde trebuie; nu trebuie tăcut, ci trebuie luată poziție fermă. Calmul este una și fermitatea este alta, sunt două lucruri deosebite. Dumneavoastră știți că eu sunt o fire mai bătaioasă în problemele acestea, dar la Moscova am expus părerea noastră în problemele în discuție foarte calm. De altfel și Brejnev a spus numai câteva cuvinte.

Atunci să procedăm așa cum am stabilit. Sunteți de acord? (toți tovarășii sunt de acord).

Ridicăm ședința.

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Office of Strategic Services en Yougoslavie pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale

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L' historiographie et la tradition populaire portent rarement le même jugement sur des faits historiques. L'une des rares exceptions est la notion généralement répandue que le premier ministre britannique Winston Churchill avait, lors de ses discussions avec Staline d'octobre 1944 à Moscou, divisé les Balkans dans des sphères d'influence et ainsi décidé entre autres de l'avenir de la Yougoslavie. Ces deux types de connaissance historique continuent de s'accorder sur le fait que le gouvernement américain et le président Roosevelt ont généralement démontré peu d'intérêt pour la région, et qu'ils ne se sont pas d'avantage sentis concernés par le destin du pays. L'étude de l'expérience yougoslave nous a obligé à nuancer cette image trop parfaitement concordante.

Il est bien connu que le potentiel économique et humain des Américains leur permettait, dès l'année 1943, de déterminer la stratégie des alliés occidentaux. En effet, une fois les opérations en Afrique du Nord terminées, les Américains ont démontré un certain intérêt pour les Balkans en général et pour la Yougoslavie en particulier. Néanmoins, le fondement de leur stratégie en Europe restait toujours le projet du débarquement en France, à tel point que toute autre opération était considérée par l'État Majeur américain comme un gaspillage inutile de forces et d'hommes. Ainsi, lors des consultations entre le président Roosevelt et l'État Majeur américain en août 1943 à Washington il a été décidé que l'armée américaine ne participera en aucun cas à un débarquement allié dans les Balkans.¹ Par conséquent, il a été convenu que l'agence des

renseignements Américaine, OSS (Office of Strategic Services) sera chargée d'assurer la présence américaine en Yougoslavie.² La tâche de l'OSS était facilitée par la conclusion de l'accord sur la division des champs d'action, entre son directeur le Général William Donovan et le directeur de l'agence des renseignements britanniques, SOE (Spécial Operations Executive), le Général Colin Gubbins, le 26 Juillet 1943 à Londres. Selon cet accord, les actions en Yougoslavie auraient été sous le commandement de l'SOE, mais l'OSS a obtenu le droit d'envoyer ses officiers sur le terrain sous conditions qu'ils restaient soumis aux ordres des chefs des missions militaires britanniques déjà dans le pays.³ Vu que Donovan avait démontré un vif intérêt pour le pays, car il était considéré à la fois comme une source des informations mais aussi comme une base pour l'envoi des missions dans le territoire du Reich, en Autriche particulièrement, il est possible d'avancer l'hypothèse que l'engagement de l'agence américaine en Yougoslavie avait sensiblement influence l'issue de la guerre civile et l'orientation politique du pays après la guerre.

Nous proposons donc d'évaluer l'influence américaine sur le déroulement de la guerre en Yougoslavie en analysant les quatre principaux volets d'engagement de l'OSS en Yougoslavie: 1) le plan compréhensif des actions de l'OSS dans les Balkans établis par Donovan en août 1943; 2) l'aide matériel apporté depuis les bases en Italie au mouvement de résistance communiste dès septembre 1943 à avril 1944, connu sous son le nom de code, opération

Audrey; 3) la mission du Major Richard Weill, et son influence sur l'orientation de la politique américaine envers la Yougoslavie; 4) l'opération **Shepherd**, dont l'objectif était de promouvoir Ivan Šubašić, ancien gouverneur de la Croatie, au poste d'interlocuteur du chef de la résistance communiste Josip Broz, dit Tito, lors des pourparlers sur le règlement du conflit politique intérieur.

La situation en Yougoslavie en été 1943, lorsque l'agence américaine avait envoyé ses premiers officiers sur le terrain - le Lieutenant Walter R. Mansfield qui s'était joint à la mission britannique du Colonel William Bailey auprès du mouvement royaliste, et le Capitaine Melvine Benson qui avait intégré la mission du Colonel William Deakin chez les partisans - était déjà très complexe.⁴

Après la défaite de l'armée yougoslave en avril 1941, le roi Pierre II et son gouvernement s'étaient exilés à Londres. Sur le terrain, en Yougoslavie, plusieurs conflits intérieurs s'étaient entremêlés à l'occupation allemande et italienne. Les difficiles rapports entre les deux plus grands peuples yougoslaves, Serbes

et Croates, qui dataient de la création du pays, avaient dégénéré avec la création de l'État indépendant Croate le 10 avril 1941 par les ultra-nationalistes croates, les Ustashi, en une véritable guerre inter-éthnique, provoquée notamment par la volonté des Ustashi de purifier le sol Croate des, selon eux, « races inférieures », Serbes, Israélites et Tziganes.⁵ En même temps en Serbie s'étaient créés deux mouvements de résistance: le royaliste, très vite reconnu par le gouvernement en exil, mené par les officiers de l'armée yougoslave avec le colonel Dragoljub Mihailović à leur tête; et celui des partisans, dirigés par le secrétaire général du parti Communiste yougoslave, Tito.⁶ Inévitablement, les orientations politiques opposées des deux mouvements les conduisirent au conflit armé, et la Yougoslavie devint, dès automne 1941, la scène d'une guerre civile féroce. L'imbroglio yougoslave illustrait bien la difficulté de la tâche devant laquelle se trouvait général Donovan lorsqu'il essaya d'élaborer un plan compréhensif des actions de l'OSS dans les Balkans.

1. Le plan de Donovan pour les Balkans

En août 1943 Donovan a proposé à l'État Majeur américain son plan dont l'objectif était d'inciter les alliés allemands dans les Balkans de se retirer de la guerre. Le général américain Donovan croyait que la capitulation italienne, qui paraît imminente, et le retrait de ses troupes des Balkans, aurait convaincu les dirigeants balkaniques que les Nazis allaient perdre la guerre. Dans ce cas, la peur de l'avancée des troupes soviétiques aurait obligé les pays balkaniques qui soutenaient jusqu'alors les Allemands à se tourner vers les puissances occidentales. C'était le moment, selon Donovan, de leur demander de se retirer de la guerre ou de provoquer des sérieux problèmes aux Nazis. Les objectifs immédiats de son plan étaient: 1) l'organisation des réseaux de renseignements dans les Balkans; 2) l'établissement des contacts avec les mouvements de résistance; 3) la destruction du réseau des

communications des Allemands dans les Balkans.⁷

Ce projet ambitieux était fondé sur l'analyse selon laquelle les Allemands ne jouissaient d'aucun soutien réel dans les Balkans. En fait, les gouvernements restaient au pouvoir exclusivement à cause de l'appui armé des Allemands. D'ailleurs, Donovan croyait que les systèmes politiques balkaniques n'étaient que des dictatures à peine dissimulées des élites dirigeantes (les professions libérales, les fonctionnaires d'État, et les officiers) qui étaient intéressés seulement par la préservation de l'ordre social existant. Ainsi, selon Donovan, ils avaient accepté de collaborer avec les Nazis car ils avaient cru pouvoir en tirer des profits territoriaux pour leur pays ou simplement pour préserver le statut social qui était le leur. Maintenant quand il était évident que les Allemands n'étaient plus en mesure de les

protéger des révolutions sociales que l'arrivée des Soviétiques inévitablement aurait provoquée, ils n'auraient pas eu d'autre choix que de se tourner vers les alliés occidentaux.⁸ Dans ce cas Donovan prévoyait que les dirigeants balkaniques auraient pu demander des garanties pour que leur engagement à côté des Alliés empêchât qu'une dictature communiste s'installe dans la région. Mais selon lui, c'était impossible vu que :

« Il est évident que la Grande Bretagne et les États Unis ne peuvent pas donner de telles garanties. On ne sait pas quelles sont les intentions actuelles des Russes pour l'avenir des Balkans. Néanmoins, on peut présumer qu'ils ne vont pas se féliciter d'un accroissement considérable d'influence anglo-américaine dans une région pour laquelle le Gouvernement russe avait depuis toujours un intérêt particulier.

C'est étude a été fondée sur la supposition qu'il ne sera pas possible, à présent, d'envoyer des contingents américains importants dans les Balkans.

Le problème est donc de prévoir des mesures qui peuvent amener à la fin de la guerre dans l'Europe du Sud - Est sans l'emploi des importants contingents américains, et sans prendre des obligations militaires ou politiques de long terme envers les pays balkaniques, et surtout sans provoquer le mécontentement du gouvernement russe. Les projets donc devront être établis avec l'objectif d'assurer la défection d'un ou des tous les pays balkaniques qui collaborent maintenant avec les Nazis, et de les persuader d'utiliser leurs forces militaires pour essayer d'isoler l'armée allemande dans les Balkans et dans la région de la mer Égée, de sorte qu'il soit possible

d'établir des gouvernements relativement stables, non-communistes mais en même temps non anti-russes dans les Balkans ».⁹

Le projet balkanique de Donovan fut approuvé par l'État Majeur américain le 7 Septembre 1943 sous condition que le Département d'État américain et le gouvernement soviétique fussent mis au courant du projet avant qu'il ne soit mis en oeuvre. En plus, Donovan reçut le 7 septembre 1943 les instructions de choisir les mouvements de résistance avec lesquels il aurait collaboré seulement sur la base de leur contribution à la lutte commune contre l'ennemi et jamais en utilisant comme critère leur orientation politique.¹⁰ Cependant, Donovan dut demander aussi l'accord du commandant allié en Méditerranée. Lorsqu'il l'obtint finalement en novembre la situation en Yougoslavie fut complètement changée. Depuis le début de septembre, le commandant Lyn Farish, faisant partie d'une mission aliée commandée par le brigadier anglais McLaine, fut reçu dans le quartier général des partisans. Dès qu'il sortit de la Yougoslavie en novembre, Farish, en sa capacité d'expert, suggéra que le projet de Donovan soit modifié.¹¹ Finalement, lorsqu'en janvier 1944 le projet arriva à Caire, le colonel John Tulmin, chef du centre des opérations de l'OSS en Méditerranée, le jugea dépassé par les événements. Les chefs de la coalition alliée à Teheran avaient désigné Tito comme commandant des opérations alliées en Yougoslavie.¹² Ainsi, le problème de collaboration avec des élites yougoslaves ne se posait plus. Tito et les partisans obtinrent cette position privilégiée, grâce à l'initiative des officiers de l'OSS à Alger, qui, à partir de septembre, avaient organisé une vaste opération d'envoi d'aide matériel aux partisans.

2. Opération Audrey

Après la capitulation italienne, le Capitaine Hans V. Tofte et le Lieutenant Robert S. Thompson avaient proposé à Donovan d'organiser, à partir de Bari, l'envoi par la mer de l'aide aux mouvements de

résistance en Yougoslavie. Il s'agissait pour la première fois d'organiser une opération indépendante de l'OSS, car jusqu'alors c'était le SOE qui s'occupait exclusivement des contacts avec les résistants yougoslaves.¹³

Donovan, non seulement a donné son accord et nommé le Major Lois Huot à la tête de l'opération, mais il lui a facilité la tâche en lui procurant l'accord du commandant allié en Méditerranée le Général britannique, Maitland Wilson et du commandant allié en Italie, le Général américain Dwight Eisenhower.¹⁴ À cause d'un heureux concours de circonstances les partisans, fuyant la côte dalmate reprise par l'armée allemande après la capitulation italienne, étaient arrivés en ce moment même à Bari, d'où leur chef Sergije Makijedo avait été envoyé à Alger où il a aussi rencontré le Major Huot.¹⁵ Une fois établis le contact avec les partisans, le projet initial devenait plus crédible et Huot réussit à obtenir plus de 400 tonnes de matériel pour les partisans. Dès le 9 Octobre Huot se trouvait à Bari et quelques jours plus tard il reçut les bateaux yougoslaves confisqués au début de la guerre par la marine italienne. Or, puisque les partisans avaient envoyé de Yougoslavie des hommes pour charger les bateaux, sa base était opérationnelle déjà à la mi-octobre.¹⁶ Après un premier voyage à l'île de Vis pour s'assurer de la capacité des partisans de recevoir de l'aide, Huot envoya la première cargaison de matériel le 15 Octobre. Le succès initial poussa Huot de s'avancer jusqu'à la côte dalmate où il rencontra le commandant partisan de la région et lui dit qu'il sera en mesure d'envoyer 500 tonnes de matériel par mois, à condition qu'on lui fournisse des listes du matériel nécessaire.¹⁷

L'importance de l'aide proposée a valu à Huot l'invitation de se rendre à la ville de Jajce au l'État Major des partisans pour rencontrer Tito en personne. De sa propre initiative et sans l'autorisation préalable ni de ses supérieurs ni du chef de la mission alliée en Yougoslavie, le Brigadier britannique, Fitzroy McLean, et en évitant les patrouilles allemandes avec ses guides locaux Huot réussit à parcourir 250 kilomètres qui séparaient la côte dalmate de la ville de Jajce où il fut reçu par Tito. Leurs conversations permirent de mettre sur pied un programme d'aide, qui a duré sous le commandement américain jusqu'au avril 1944.¹⁸

Les conséquences de l'opération Audrey furent très importantes. Les partisans étaient devenus pratiquement, sans qu'une décision politique eût été prise, les alliés privilégiés et les seuls interlocuteurs de l'armée américaine en Yougoslavie, tandis que la diplomatie américaine entretenait toujours des rapports exclusivement avec le gouvernement yougoslave en exil. L'OSS a fourni d'octobre 1943 jusqu'à avril 1944, quand le SOE a pris le contrôle sur l'envoi de l'aide en Yougoslavie, plus de 11 000 tonnes de matériel de guerre, d'armes et de munitions aux partisans.¹⁹ A titre de comparaison dans la même période le SOE avait envoyé par air seulement 450 tonnes d'aide aux partisans.²⁰ L'importante aide reçue permit aux partisans de continuer de mobiliser et de pouvoir disposer ainsi des réserves considérables d'hommes et de munitions en vue de la confrontation finale avec le mouvement royaliste. Nombreux étaient les témoignages des officiers américains sur le fait que, de l'été 1944, dans les combats contre les ennemis les partisans n'utilisaient pas des armes reçues mais ils les cachaient pour le règlement de compte avec leur adversaire dans la guerre civile.²¹ Ce fut donc partiellement grâce à l'aide fournie par l'OSS, que les partisans gagnèrent la guerre civile en automne 1944 en s'assurant le contrôle de la Serbie.

Ce soutien involontaire à une des parties dans la guerre civile en Yougoslavie, fut la conséquence de l'inexpérience des officiers américains envoyés en Yougoslavie, qui ne furent pas des spécialistes de renseignement. Leur devoir principal fut d'aider les partisans à saboter les lignes de communications allemandes, et de gérer l'arrivée de l'aide alliée. Ils avaient donc la formation appropriée. A titre d'exemple, le Commandant Farish était par profession ingénieur.²² En effet, Farish et ses collègues ne pouvaient pas évaluer avec précision l'orientation politique des partisans ni les intentions des communistes qui contrôlaient leur mouvement. C'est pourquoi, le Commandant Robert Weill, fut envoyé en Yougoslavie à la tête de la première mission

complètement indépendante américaine afin d'évaluer: 1) le soutien populaire dont jouissaient les partisans, 2) le rôle des

communistes au sein du mouvement, 3) le type d'organisation politique qu'ils voulaient mettre en place après la guerre.²³

3. La Mission du major Richard Weill

Les membres de la première mission indépendante de l'OSS arrivèrent le 27 février 1944 à Drvar dans l'État Majeur des partisans. Lors de son séjour à Drvar jusqu'au 19 Mars, Weill eut la possibilité de mener plusieurs longues conversations avec Tito et ses proches collaborateurs, et de se faire une idée précise sur le caractère du mouvement. Selon lui Tito se trouvait à la tête d'un mouvement de guérilla qui ne disposait pas de moyens de se transformer dans une armée moderne. Comme dans chaque guerre de guérilla il n'y avait ni des lignes de front ni des territoires libérés. Ce que les partisans appelaient les « territoires libérés » n'étaient en effet que des régions envers lesquelles, à ce moment, l'ennemi ne démontrait pas un intérêt particulier, puisqu'il aurait pu y entrer dès qu'il aurait voulu car les partisans évitant, comme toutes les guérillas des conflits frontaux, les auraient déjà évacuées. Par conséquent, il a considéré comme fausse les déclarations des partisans qu'ils ont immobilisé par leurs actions plus de 17 divisions ennemies dans le pays. Selon lui les partisans n'étaient capables ni de chasser l'ennemi de leur pays, ni de l'empêcher de retirer ses troupes, ni de les détruire.²⁴

En revanche, il les a considérés plus que capables de gagner la guerre civile contre les royalistes une fois que l'ennemi eût quitté le pays. Leur victoire dans la guerre civile avait été due à leur supérieure organisation, à cause de l'existence d'un noyau des communistes qui occupaient les postes de commandement. Ils étaient l'élément le plus discipliné et le mieux organisé capable de mettre en place une politique d'entente entre les différentes ethnies du pays, ce qui leur avait permis d'assumer la direction politique du mouvement. Weill se croyait en mesure de prévoir le déroulement de la guerre civile en Yougoslavie en affirmant que:

- « 1) Les partisans allaient accroître leur emprise politique sur le pays et leur puissance militaire.
- 2) L'importance de leurs rivaux allait diminuer même s'ils n'allaient pas disparaître complètement.
- 3) Même au prix de provoquer un bain de sang lors des conflits internes, les partisans auraient contrôlé le pays entier à la fin de la guerre.
- 4) Les partisans gouverneront au moins une année après la fin des hostilités.
- 5) Il est probable qu'ils seront restés au pouvoir pendant plusieurs années.
- 6) Ils respecteront leurs promesses, les élections seront organisées sur tous les niveaux, et une pyramide du pouvoir sera organisée dès comités locaux, provinciaux et régionaux jusqu'au comité national. Autrement dit, une forme du gouvernement représentatif sera organisée ».²⁵

La nature du pouvoir que les partisans avaient l'intention d'instaurer ne faisait guère de doutes pour Weill. Lorsque Tito l'assura que les partisans auraient respecté la volonté politique du peuple, il en tira la conclusion suivante:

« Les partisans naturellement resteront au contrôle, car cela sera leur manière d'exprimer la volonté du peuple dans les affaires nationales ».²⁶

Les conclusions du premier officier américain de renseignement envoyé en Yougoslavie ont, donc, évoqué la possibilité d'une sanglante guerre civile après le départ des Allemands. Cette éventualité était prise très au sérieux par le Général Donovan, - il a tout de suite transmit le rapport de Weill au président Roosevelt - car il existait la crainte que les alliés des Américains se mêlent à cette guerre vu que les Soviétiques accordaient leur soutien incondtionnel aux partisans et que,

d'autre part, les Britanniques se sentaient responsables pour le sort du jeune roi yougoslave dont le chef des royalistes, Mihailoviæ était toujours, malgré les protestations du Foreign Office, le ministre de la guerre. Il était donc, indispensable de trouver une solution pour le conflit intérieur yougoslave car il menaçait la stabilité de la coalition anti-allemande.

Les conclusions de Weill avaient apporté un élément de la réponse, car il soulignait que les partisans auraient respecté du moins la forme, sinon le contenu, du processus démocratique après la guerre. Cela fut plus que suffisant pour l'administration américaine car elle était, dès 1943, disposée à tolérer la création d'une "sphère d'influence ouverte" des Soviétiques en Europe de l'Est. Ce concept, sous-entendait la disposition de

l'administration du président Roosevelt à admettre que l'Union Soviétique, afin de protéger son territoire, contrôle les systèmes de défense des États de l'Europe de l'Est, à condition que ceux-ci gardent le droit de la liberté de commerce et la liberté du choix du régime politique intérieur.²⁷ Weill justement confirma l'intention des partisans de respecter le minimum de démocratie exigée par l'administration du président Roosevelt.

Il restait à trouver l'homme qui, jouissant de la confiance du roi, aurait été accepté comme interlocuteur par des partisans. Sa tâche aurait été de désamorcer la crise et d'éviter la guerre sanglante, en facilitant un compromis entre le roi et les partisans. Avec cet objectif en vue, un vieux projet de l'OSS, l'opération **Shepherd**, fut repris en printemps 1944.

4. L'Opération Shepherd

Shepherd était le nom de code que l'OSS avait donné à Ivan Šubašić après qu'il s'était proposé, lors de sa première rencontre avec le Général Donovan en août 1943, pour partir, avec l'aide de l'agence américaine pour la Yougoslavie, avec l'objectif d'unir les partisans avec le mouvement de résistance sous la direction de son parti, le parti agraire croate (HSS).²⁸ Il croyait comme d'ailleurs tous les hommes d'État yougoslaves en exil, que les Alliés, après la capitulation de l'Italie, allaient continuer leur avancée vers l'Est et auraient débarqué en Yougoslavie.²⁹ Une telle perspective aurait ouvert des possibilités inattendues surtout pour les Croates. N'ayant jamais véritablement accepté la Yougoslavie telle qu'elle avait été créée à la Conférence de Versailles, ils n'ont pas cessé de lutter pour la création d'une Croatie autonome au sein de la Yougoslavie ou d'une autre forme étatique confédérative; mais avant tout ils bataillaient pour la création d'un État croate indépendant. Les prémisses d'une solution de la question croate avaient été déjà posées par l'accord d'août 1939 entre le président du gouvernement royal Dragiša Cvetkoviæ et le chef du parti agraire croate Vlatko Maček.

Selon cet accord Šubašić était devenu le gouverneur d'une Croatie autonome disposant de son parlement, de ses revenus, d'une autonomie culturelle et économique. L'arrivée de la guerre, et la création de l'État Indépendant Croate par des Ustashis sous l'égide de Mussolini et de Hitler avait considérablement affaibli la position croate, car un courant politique croate, les Ustashi, c'est de son plein gré rangé du côté de l'adversaire. D'autant plus, au moment où il existait la possibilité d'un débarquement allié sur la côte dalmate, il fallait qu'un représentant de la Croatie démocratique soit là pour les accueillir, de préférence en capacité du chef politique de tous les mouvements de résistance en Croatie.³⁰

Lors de leur deuxième rencontre, le 16 octobre 1943 à Washington, Šubašić présenta à Donovan une nouvelle mouture de son plan initial.³¹ Maintenant son objectif était d'établir le contact avec Tito, et de persuader les commandants de l'armée croate à abandonner les Allemandes et à s'unir avec les partisans.³² La parfaite concordance entre ses idées et l'objectif du plan balkanique de Donovan, lui valut le soutien incondtionnel du directeur de

l'OSS. Quelques jours plus tard, le 21 octobre, le président américain prit connaissance de ce projet.³³ Il y voyait une possibilité d'accroître le rôle de l'OSS en Yougoslavie, et il écrit à Churchill en lui demandant son accord pour que Donovan devienne le chef des opérations de renseignements des alliés occidentaux dans les Balkans.³⁴ Comme on pouvait s'y attendre, la réponse du Premier ministre britannique était résolument négative.³⁵ Puisque le Département d'État estimait qu'il fallait patienter pour connaître d'abord la position des Soviétiques avant de lancer une opération d'une telle envergure, il fut décidé d'attendre les décisions de la conférence de Téhéran sur la Yougoslavie.³⁶

L'accord global avec l'URSS, fut le but principal du voyage présidentiel à Téhéran. Il y déclara d'emblée le 28 novembre 1943 qu'il souhaitait surtout qu'à la réunion, les trois grands discutent des mesures qu'il aurait fallu prendre pour obliger au moins 30 à 40 divisions allemandes à se retirer du front oriental vers d'autres fronts. Durant la séance plénière des trois grands, qui immédiatement suivit, Roosevelt posa le problème avec encore plus de précision en disant qu'il fallait décider de la manière dont les armées anglo-américaines en Méditerranée pourraient aider le mieux les progrès de l'Armée Rouge sans menacer le débarquement dans la Manche. Dans ce sens le président proposa que des troupes alliées débarquent au nord de l'Adriatique pour avancer ensuite avec les partisans vers le nord-est, vers la Roumanie, et rejoindre les troupes soviétiques avançant depuis Odessa.³⁷ De sa part Staline résolut dans sa réponse toutes les équivoques des stratégies américains. Il ne voulut pas de débarquement en Adriatique, car il était d'avis que l'opération *Overlord* (débarquement en Normandie) était de la plus grande importance. Seul un débarquement sur la Côte d'Azur, aurait pu être envisagé parallèlement au débarquement en France du nord.³⁸

La question des Balkans réglée, Roosevelt, lors de leur seconde rencontre le 29 novembre pût entretenir Staline de son projet

majeur des Nations-Unies. Le président exposa à Staline le projet de la structure des Nations-Unies.³⁹ La seconde réunion Roosevelt - Staline se termina à la satisfaction des deux parties. Staline acceptait les bases de la nouvelle organisation internationale, tandis que le Président laissait pressentir que le retrait des troupes américaines ouvrira l'espace en Europe à la domination militaire et politique de l'URSS. Puisque la délégation américaine était arrivée à un accord avec l'URSS, elle ne désirait plus s'attarder trop sur le problème de l'Europe de l'Est.

Roosevelt fit savoir à Staline, à Téhéran, que seule la victoire dans la guerre et l'organisation des Nations-Unies l'intéressaient. Laissant le règlement du contentieux européen à Churchill et Staline, le président américain, tenant compte du rapport réel des forces dans la grande coalition, avait donc donné son accord à la création de la zone d'influence soviétique en Europe de l'Est. Dans le cadre d'un tel accord global, le sort de la Yougoslavie n'avait pas provoqué de litige. Les trois parties avaient approuvé les envois du matériel, des armes et des munitions aux détachements de Tito.⁴⁰

Une fois qu'à Téhéran il fut décidé d'envoyer de l'aide seulement aux partisans, l'OSS obtint, au début décembre l'accord du Département de l'État pour procéder avec l'opération **Shepherd** sous condition que les deux autres puissances alliées fussent consultées préalablement, aussi bien que le principal intéressé lui-même, le commandant en chef des partisans, Tito.⁴¹ Vu que les Soviétiques et les Britanniques n'y voyaient pas d'inconvénients,⁴² le major Farish était chargé, lors de sa deuxième mission en Yougoslavie à partir du 20 Janvier 1944, de demander à Tito s'il était prêt à recevoir Šubašić pour discuter avec lui de la possibilité de persuader l'armée régulière de l'État indépendant Croate de s'unir avec les partisans contre les Allemands.⁴³ Au même moment le gouvernement britannique essayait aussi de trouver une solution pour la situation en Yougoslavie. Ainsi le premier ministre

britannique proposa à Tito, dans sa lettre personnelle transmise par le Brigadier McLean, de nouveau à la tête de la mission alliée dont Farish faisait partie, de recevoir le jeune roi yougoslave pour discuter directement avec lui sur l'avenir du pays.⁴⁴

Sollicité par les anglo-saxons, Tito suggéra sa solution pour la crise politique yougoslave. Dès le 15 février il communiqua aux Américains qu'il était prêt de recevoir Šubašić,⁴⁵ et le 2 mars il proposa aux Britanniques que le comité exécutif de l'AVNOJ (l'assemblée représentative du mouvement partisan) fût reconnu comme le gouvernement yougoslave par intérim une fois que les représentants de roi y aient été inclus. Parmi les personnes qu'il souhaitait voir dans ce gouvernement il a notamment cité Šubašić.⁴⁶ Les modalités du désamorçage de la crise avaient été ainsi fixées. Finalement, en échange de la reconnaissance de l'aile politique de son mouvement, Tito était prêt à discuter avec des personnages de son choix, dont Šubašić, qui avait en plus le soutien du gouvernement américain. Il faut souligner que Tito était en connaissance que Šubašić, lors de son séjour aux États-Unis de 1941 à 1943, c'était publiquement déclaré favorable à la coopération avec les partisans sans aucune condition préalable.⁴⁷ La proposition britannique que l'interlocuteur de Tito fut le roi lui-même, avait été catégoriquement repoussée.⁴⁸ La seule possibilité restante pour la diplomatie britannique était de persuader le roi de nommer un des personnages qui avaient l'aval de Tito au poste de premier ministre pour qu'il puisse mener à son nom les pourparlers avec le chef des partisans. Šubašić était la seule personne parmi ceux proposés par Tito à laquelle le roi n'était pas opposé, et de leur part les diplomates américains firent savoir à leurs collègues britanniques qu'il jouissait aussi du soutien du président Roosevelt.⁴⁹

Dans cette perspective l'opération *Shepherd* prit une nouvelle importance. Il s'agissait maintenant de persuader le jeune roi yougoslave de renvoyer le gouvernement royal

de Božidar Purić, et ainsi de se démarquer de Mihailović, pour nommer Šubašić à la tête du nouveau gouvernement qui devrait mener les pourparlers avec Tito.⁵⁰ Churchill et son ministre des Affaires Étrangères, Anthony Eden, menèrent une campagne de persuasion durant des mois, mais ce fut seulement après que le roi Pierre reçut la lettre du président Roosevelt l'invitant à nommer Šubašić, et que le Général Donovan en personne l'ait invité de confier le destin de son royaume à l'ancien gouverneur de Croatie, qu'il se décida, le premier juin 1944, de nommer Šubašić comme président et seul membre du nouveau gouvernement royal.⁵¹

L'ingérence de l'OSS ne s'était pas limitée aux recommandations, car, avec Šubašić, l'OSS avait dépêché à Londres l'un de ses officiers, Bernard Yarow pour lui prodiguer des conseils officieux et en même temps pour informer Washington sur le déroulement des négociations entre le roi et le gouvernement britannique. Puisque le roi yougoslave était au courant de la mission de Yarow, les autorités britanniques étaient en effet les seules à ignorer l'existence de l'opération *Shepherd*, laquelle d'ailleurs ne s'arrêta pas avec la nomination de Šubašić.⁵² Šubašić et Yarow rédigèrent ensemble le programme de nouveau gouvernement, et l'envoyé américain participa aux discussions décisives entre le roi et Šubašić avant que le Pierre II ne l'accepte.⁵³ Les contacts entre Šubašić et l'agence américaine à travers Yarow ont continué, après une pause pendant l'été 1944 due aux réserves du Département d'État, lors des séjours de Šubašić dehors de la Yougoslavie jusqu'au moment où il se retira de la vie politique en septembre 1945.⁵⁴

L'analyse ainsi faite démontre que c'était le manque d'intérêt de l'armée américaine pour la Yougoslavie qui a le plus influencé son avenir. Dans une alliance alliée devenue dès 1943 effectivement bipolaire et non comme jadis tripartite, la décision américaine de laisser l'Armée Rouge entrer dans le pays, signifiait que l'influence soviétique y aurait été prédominante, et que le mouvement de

résistance dirigé par les communistes aurait gagné la guerre civile. Dans cette perspective tous les efforts du premier ministre britannique ne pouvaient plus changer le cours des événements. Surtout parce que l'agence américaine de renseignements avait considérablement aidé les partisans d'abord militairement, et ensuite en leur accordant avec le rapport de Weill, ce qui fut d'ailleurs beaucoup plus important, leurs lettres de créances démocratiques. Par conséquent, la seule influence directe du président américain sur les événements en Yougoslavie, fut de promouvoir l'homme de confiance américaine, à savoir Šubašić, au poste de premier ministre yougoslave. Néanmoins, il

n'était pas censé mettre en œuvre une politique américaine autre que de trouver un accord avec Tito. L'enjeu principal de cette opération pour la diplomatie américaine n'était pas le sort de la Yougoslavie mais la stabilité de la coalition anti-allemande. L'avenir politique de la Yougoslavie dans cette manière ne dépendait ni de l'issue de la guerre civile, ni de l'efficacité des mouvements de résistance dans leur lutte contre l'ennemi, mais des rapports dans la coalition alliée, où le manque d'intérêt des Américains était nettement plus important que tous les efforts et les gesticulations diplomatiques du premier ministre britannique.

NOTES :

¹ Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy 1932-1945*. New York 1979, pp. 410-411.

² Mauric Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1943-1944*, vol. I, Washington 1959, p. 229

³ L'accord entre Donovan et Gubbins, Londres le 26 juillet 1943, Archives nationales des Etats Unis à Washington, (par la suite NAW), fond 226, boîte 88/1, fichier 190.

⁴ Kirk Ford, *OSS and the Yugoslav Resistance 1943-1945*, Austin 1992, p. 12.

⁵ Bogdan Krizman, *NDH između Hitlera i Mussolinija*. (L'Etat indépendant croate entre Hitler et Mussolini), Zagreb 1983, pp. 117-137.

⁶ Mateo Milazzo, *The Cetnik Movement and the Yugoslav resistance*. Baltimore 1975, pp. 14-17; Karchmar, *Draza Mihailovic and the Rise of the Cetnik Movement, 1941-1942*, New York 1987, pp. 80-81; Vladimir Dedijer, *Josip Broz Tito, Prilozi za biografiju*, (Tito, éléments d'une biographie), Belgrade 1953, p. 295.

⁷ Donovan à John Deane, secrétaire de l'Etat Majeur des armées, Washington 20 août 1943, NAW, fond 226, boîte 88/1, fichier 190.

⁸ *Idem.*

⁹ *Idem.*

¹⁰ John Dean à Donovan, Washington le 7 septembre 1943, NAW, fond 226, microfilmes groupe M 1642, rouleau 131.

¹¹ Buxton au colonel Othank, Washington le 9 novembre 1943, NAW fond 226, microfilmes groupe M 1642, rouleau 131.

¹² Note du centre de l'OSS à Caire, le Caire le 31 janvier 1944, NAW fond 226, microfilmes groupe M 1642, rouleau 131.

¹³ Mémoire de l'OSS, *OSS contacts avec Tito via Italie*, *Idem.*

¹⁴ William, R. Roberts, *Tito, Mihailovic and the Allies 1941-1945*, New Jersey 1973, p. 148.

¹⁵ Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici SFRJ 1941-1945, (Documents sur la politique étrangère de la République Socialiste Fédérative de Yougoslavie), série rouge, vol. I, Belgrade 1984, pp. 396-402.

¹⁶ A.C. Brown, *The Last Hero. Wild Bill Donovan*. New York 1982, p. 445.

¹⁷ Memoire de Huot, *Trip to Tito's Headquarters in Jajce 20-27 October 1943*, NAW, fond 226, groupe 648, boîte 71, fichier 144.

¹⁸ *Idem.*

¹⁹ Hans Tofte à Edward Buxton, collaborateur et substitut de Donovan, Washington le premier avril 1944, NAW, fond 226, M1642, rouleau 131.

²⁰ Roberts, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

²¹ Ford, *op. cit.*, pp. 79, 80.

²² Farish à Hout, Bari le 29 octobre 1943, NAW, fond 59, série 860.H.01/644.

- ²³ Le rapport de Weill sur sa mission en Yougoslavie, Washington le 27 avril 1944, NAW, fond 226, M 1642, rouleau 131.
- ²⁴ *Idem.*
- ²⁵ *Idem.*
- ²⁶ *Idem.*
- ²⁷ Eduard Mark, "American policy towards Eastern Europe and the origins of the Cold War, 1941-1946: an alternative interpretation". *Journal of American History*, 68 (2), 1981, p. 320,321; Warren F. Kimbal, *The Juggler. Franklin Roosevelt as a Wartime statesman*, Princeton, 1991, p. 102, 169; Bruno Arcidiacono, "L'Europe balkanique entre guerre et paix, relations interalliées et partage en sphères". *Relations internationales*, 47, (3), 1986, pp. 352-354.
- ²⁸ John Hughes à Edward Buxton, New York le 26 août 1943, NAW, fond 226, dossier 160, boîte 26, fichier 167.
- ²⁹ Ante Smith Pavelic, *Dvije akcije bana Subasica*. (Deux actions de Subasic), Hrvatska revija, Buenos Aires 1960, année X, vol. 4, p. 633.
- ³⁰ *Idem.*, p. 634, Bernard Yarow à John Hughes, New York le 21 septembre 1943, NAW, fond 226, dossier 160, boîte 26, fichier 167.
- ³¹ John Hughes à Whitney Shepardson, Washington 16 octobre 1943, NAW, fond 226, dossier 160, boîte 26, fichier 167.
- ³² La lettre de Subasic à Roosevelt, Washington le 19 octobre 1943, NAW, fond 226, dossier 160, boîte 26, fichier 167.
- ³³ Donovan à Roosevelt, Washington le 21 octobre 1943, NAW, fond 226, dossier 160, boîte 26, fichier 167.
- ³⁴ Roosevelt à Churchill, Washington le 22 octobre 1943, Lowenheim, Langley, Jonas, *Roosevelt and Churchill. Their Secret Wartime Correspondence*, New York 1990, pp. 384-385.
- ³⁵ Churchill à Roosevelt, Londres le 23 octobre 1943, *Idem.*, pp. 385-386.
- ³⁶ Edward Stettinius à Roosevelt, Washington le 30 octobre 1943, Les papiers de Cordell Hull, dossier 49, fichier 378, La Bibliothèque du Congrès à Washington.
- ³⁷ Compte rendu de la conférence entre Roosevelt, Churchill et Stalin, Teheran le 28 novembre 1943, *FRUS, Conférences at Cairo, and Teheran, 1943*, Washington 1961, p. 494.
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 494.
- ³⁹ Sainsbury, *The Turning Point, Roosevelt, Churchill and Chiang-kai-Shek, 1943. The Moscow, Cairo, and Teheran Conferences*. Oxford 1986. pp. 240-241.
- ⁴⁰ Compte rendu de la conférence entre Roosevelt, Churchill et Stalin, Teheran le 28 novembre 1943, *FRUS, Conférences at Cairo, and Teheran, 1943*, Washington 1961, pp. 493-496.
- ⁴¹ Hugh Wilson à Whitney Shepardson, Washington le 21 décembre 1943, NAW, fond 226, dossier 160, boîte 26, fichier 167.
- ⁴² Hugh Wilson à Whitney Shepardson, Washington le 29 janvier 1944, NAW, fond 226, dossier 160, boîte 26, fichier 167; Eden à Stevenson, Londres le 7 février 1944, Public Record Office (par la suite PRO), Foreign Office (par la suite FO), 1816/195/92 44924.
- ⁴³ La centrale de l'OSS à Washington au bureau régional à Caire, Washington le 23 décembre 1943, NAW, fond 59, série 860.H.01/619A.
- ⁴⁴ Churchill à Tito, Afrique le 8 janvier 1944, Dusan Biber, *Tito, Churchill strogo tajno*. (Tito, Churchill, très confidentiel), Zagreb 1981, p. 75.
- ⁴⁵ John Tummin à Whitney Shepardson, Caire le 15 février 1944, fond 226, dossier 68, boîte 6, fichier 90.
- ⁴⁶ Maclaine à Eden, le 2 mars 1944, Biber, *op. cit.*, p. 97.
- ⁴⁷ Dragovan Sepic, *Vlada Ivana Subasica*, (Le gouvernement de Ivan Subasic), Zagreb 1983, p. 101.
- ⁴⁸ Tito à Churchill, le 9 février 1944, Biber, *op. cit.*, pp. 86-87.
- ⁴⁹ Roberts, *op. cit.*, p. 210; Ilija Jukic, *The Fall of Yugoslavia*, New York 1968, p. 232.
- ⁵⁰ Note sur l'entretien entre le roi Pierre II et Churchill, Londres le 14 avril 1944, PRO, FO 371, 44269/3051/1192.
- ⁵¹ Jukic, *op. cit.*, p. 232; Roosevelt à roi Pierre II, Washington mai 1944, Foreign Relation of the United States, 1944, vol. IV Europe, pp. 1366-1368.
- ⁵² Donovan à Roosevelt, Washington le 22 mai 1944, Les Archives de Président Roosevelt, Hyde Park, les Papiers de Secrétaire de Président, boîte 4.
- ⁵³ Yarow à Shepardson, Londres le 2 juin 1944, NAW, fond 226, dossier 168, boîte 26, fichier 160.
- ⁵⁴ Note sur l'entretien de Yarow et Shepardson avec sous-secrétaire d'Etat, Cloyce Holmes, Washington le 8 juin 1945, NAW, fond 59, 860.H.00/6-845.

Peace Versus War in the Contemporary Age and in the International Relations' Theories

Petre Daniel Viorel

In the current state of the growing of the human sciences of any kind, including historical ones, and of their bounding it has become almost an axiom the fact of appealing to a science that can easily be inferred from this enumeration, that is sociology, founded around the 50's of the XIX-th century by the French Auguste Comte, which, as seen from its title and definition studies the very totality of the interhuman relations. If the subject of international relations, appeared around the middle of the next century, the XX-th, can be included among sciences, despite some controversies which have continued until almost nowadays, then, logically one of its methods of analysis, keeping therefore the scientific and empiric research instrument, it is based on sociology.

Nevertheless, the international relations had become an university department, shortly after First World War (1914-1918), for starters at Aberystwyth (Wales), when, on one hand, the new geopolitical reality of the world regarding the increase of the international arena players (states), and, on the other hand, by trying to find some truthful explications regarding the causes of the great conflagration from which mankind had just escaped, the study of these relations became directly necessary. The theoretical studies were based on a science which was at its peak, history, but also on other complementary ones: international law, diplomacy, philosophy etc.¹ At the same time, after the setting of its identity and subject, sociology found itself in a stage of experiments and adjustments, already at the beginning of the second decade of the XX-th century, Max Weber published a book that has become emblematic since then, *The Protestant*

Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. And, in 1929, The Annales School began its activity through Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch, being "responsible" for the changing of the historical paradigm by introducing new approaches: economical, social and regarding mentalities. What is to be noticed, in this context are the initiatives of the interwar Romanian school of sociology, authors like Dimitrie Gusti, Traian Herseni, Henri Stahl etc., didn't find themselves on another level or in another setting, many of their assumptions being taken over in that age or appearing in the later Western works, facts that allowed the synchronization of the Romanian social science with the European one.

However, the new school of international relations, totally outstripping the old diplomatic practices which, according to its investigations, had fatally led at the breaking out of the First World War, centred round exactly on the sharp criticism of these policies: the increase of power and of the potential of power, the power balance, the exaggerated promotion of the national interest, including through the creation of offensive alliances or the practice of secret diplomacy. Having all these in consideration, which areas of the foreign policies did the interwar specialists insist upon? Indeed, they didn't have to do anything but unconditionally promoting the liberal ideas, which have been circulating in that age even since during the war, as a result of being put forward by the American president (democrat) Woodrow Wilson, and which found themselves in the constitution principles of the League of Nations Pact, signed at Versailles-Paris in 1919.² That is why, these liberal ideas have

been called "wilsonian" or "idealistic", precisely because their preponderant pacifist feature, being borrowed from the American home policy. At the same time, other specialists consider them too utopic regarding their transposition in reality, especially regarding the attempt of elimination the war from the international life (nonetheless, in the League of Nations Pact was laid down its existence, but only after the crossing, as a preliminary, of about nine months of negotiations between sides and/or other third parties). Moreover, the presence of the League of Nations was steted as being in the centre of international relations, which were based on cooperation both through the "power" of world opinion's moral force – completely rallied to the Pact's principles –, and also through the alleged settlement by the organization, according to the same Pact, through its members, states, of the possible international conflicts, thus setting up the new system of collective security and attempting the definitive removal of old-power, balance, secret diplomacy policies etc.³

As, in spite of this theory or idealistic (liberal) practice not only the elimination of disputes was not successful (the Manchurian, Rhenish, Abyssinian crises), but the devastating experience of World War repeated in an unhoped for and much more severe manner (1939-1945), not for anyone was a surprise the fact that in the academic world and not only, the entire idealistic theory was repudiated, developing a new, "superior", realistic one, by the British Edward Carr (in 1946, through the publishing of *Twenty Years' Crisis*⁴), and especially by Hans Morgenthau (German Jew who emigrated in the United States – through his monumental *Politics Among Nations*,⁵ appeared in the same year).⁶

In fact, this realistic theory which seemed to be a new one, had been developed by Carr and Morgenthau by studying the old policies put into practice by states until First World War, from the very beginning of the modern international system, set up by the Westphalic Peace of 1648, a system whose initiator was the French cardinal Richelieu (1624-1642), who put forward the concept of *raison d'État*.⁷ In

the same way, another reason that can be brought in favour of this paradigm changing in international relations, in fact, having into account the development and the amplitude these studies knew after Second World War we can somewhat talk about the constitution of international relations science, was announced even since the end of the XIX-th century and the beginning of the XX-th century, at first in Sweden, afterwards spreading in Germany too (within the framework of the Haushofer School), when the bases of the subject of geopolitics were built, therefore it was intended to go back to the power politics. But this latter (semi) science, which rallied on the role played by the geographical space in influencing the political decision in a state, was conceived, quite alike international relations as a matter of fact, not only for putting forward pertinent explanations regarding the involvement of the players in the fundamental changings of the international milieu, but also for forestalling these changings. But as these anticipations were not "translated" into reality, they legitimately started the series of complaints aimed at the so-called sciences. In other words, in international relations (or in other human science) a theory built on the grounds of geopolitics (centred round the study of players), if it is not recognized as a scientific subject, it surely is an useful work method, quite alike the sociological one (centred round relations), or other methods: systemic (centred round structure), historic, analytic, empiric etc., being able to be valid, becoming scientific, as long as it may be verified or confirmed in the future in the reality field, otherwise remaining just a descriptive information, to tell the truth, valuable from the historic point of view.

Despite all these, many of the assumptions of the realistic theory, which from certain angles intersects with geopolitics (or more correctly said the latter can be included as a method of study within the framework of realistic theory), and which because of the relinquishing of the idealistic theory seemed to be confused with the subject of international relations itself, have become not only pertinent devices of international relations analysis, but also valid ones, that can be verified in practice

– in the postwar international relations based upon the bipolar confrontation US-Soviet Union, respectively. But how did Morgenthau define the assumptions of this theory and how were they able to be confirmed by reality? Firstly, by completely subverting the liberal principles, he emphasized in a scientific manner for the first time, the old diplomatic standards of the late XIX-th century dominated by the German *realpolitik*, identifying in analyses a series of stages or valid principles in the state practice of foreign polities. The first of these principles, emphasized again, the state-nation as main player of international relations, whose fundamental goal was the increase through any means of its power and power potential (second principle), having in mind the attainment of national interests with regard to foreign policy: independence, security, sovereign working etc. (third principle). Further on Morgenthau's drawing up, the international milieu in which states were fighting for power was completely anarchical, being able to lead including to their clash since each one of states looked after the maximization of power, that is why, the ingenious mechanism of settlement of their divergent objectives and, therefore, of maintaining postwar peace, was exactly outlined by the policy of the distribution of the balance of power: the more a state would increase too much the power necessary to own interests satisfaction, being liable to use it to the prejudice of others' interests, the more it would become impending the diplomatic coalition of the threatened states in a military alliance meant to discourage the potential aggressor⁸ (which thus represented a premise to the NATO setting up and also a peace measure through the despondency of the Soviets).

On the other hand, the context in which Morgenthau developed his theory is known by all of us, as being marked by the starting of the Cold War (1947-1989), without having a classical war declaration, more exactly, when observing the real attempts of spreading of the Soviet influence in Iran and in the Balkans, in 1946, diplomat George Kennan could form a perception as adequate to reality as it gets, by sending to the American Department of State

and publishing in mass-media, in 1946-1947, documents that urged to the *containment* of the Soviet actions, while the old labels concerning Nazi leaders and symbols were now applied to the Soviets.⁹ Moreover, considering these Soviet attempts as a menace to America's security interests themselves, the Truman administration not only did it step in by politically and economically endorsing the concealed assaulted countries, but, through the Marshall Plan, preventively offered Western Europe, another area aimed at by the Soviet expansion, a solid financial aid so that the influent local Communist parties which speculated the postwar severe economic situations be diminished, and, at the same time, in order to discourage any possible Soviet invasion. In counterpart to the Soviet intention, dating from 1947-1948, of breaking up at least the Western forces in the Western Berlin, USA and Western Europe states reacted in a way even more firm, by founding in April 1949, in Washington, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), particularly in order to counterbalance Soviets' aggressiveness (they latter had already imposed Communist, pro-Soviet regimes in the occupied countries of Eastern Europe) and to restore the global balance of power,¹⁰ thus the reasoning of the substantiation of realistic theory becoming obviously for all the specialists of the foreign evolutions.

Consequently, all these thoroughly reckoned foreign policies were able to confirm Morgenthau's almost entire political realism theory, the analyst who also found a "philosophical" explanation concerning the domination instinct of human groups, precisely in human's biological side,¹¹ that is why, can have or have not (!) a rational, scientific feature, moreover, in the absence of other theories, they have been confused with the subject of international relations itself. On the other hand, all the realistic studies, in fact very well argued, have refuted the existence of that contemporary *reality* – irrelevant, in their opinions, as it is subordinated to the idealistic theory –, which must have been taken into account more and more in the international arena, certainly implying the UNO. Indeed,

this new universal organization of sovereign states not only did it facilitate USA and other democratic states' intervention in the stopping another Communist aggression happened in the context of the Korea War (1950-1953),¹² by blocking the extension and the generalization of the hotbed of war, but UNO was endowed, like its forerunner, League of Nations – but at a superior level –, with those economical components (World Bank, IMF), social (ECOSOC, ILO) and cultural (UNESCO), which, if they still were not able to compete with the political dements that were involved in the Cold War confrontation, nevertheless, this didn't mean that they didn't exert a certain pacifist influence in the international system, in order to, subsequently, make room for their impulsion in its centre, as the idealists admitted.

Nonetheless, in the atmosphere of the dreadful bipolar confrontation East-West of the 50's, nobody had the courage to approach such realities, essentially sociological, the realistic theory continuing to dominate the scientific climate, especially in the USA where most of the analysts were massed together, and, simultaneously, trying to provide diplomats those conduct elements able to allow them the knowledge of as many variants of action as it gets in a given situation. And, only from these perspectives the existence of those similitudes between realism and geopolitics can be asserted, or, otherwise said, the integration of the latter in the realistic theory, because geopolitics, besides the object of studying the impact of the space over the politics, is centred on two pure realistic concepts, power and interest respectively, only a third one, players' perception being somewhat different.

Transcending the dispute realism vs. idealism, or these interrealistic shades, merely entering the 60's, a second important debate was put forward regarding the directions as part of the realistic school, this time genuine scientific. On one hand, it was the matter of the influence of the economical and social realities, mentioned above, which were grasped by certain realists, like M. Kaplan, H. Bull and T. Parsons. They conceived *behaviorism*, where

the accent was not put only on the increase of the power of states in the anarchic milieu and on the promotion of national interest of security, but also the development by the players of that behavior that could allow them the obtaining of some complementary results, or even more favourable than in the case of promoting the other two principles. It can easily be established the influence of a beginning of cooperation in the international system, because, if we look back retrospectively the events, there were still players who promoted their interests in the classical, realistic direction. But, similarly, there were other players who also holding the capacity of promoting these classical interests, so having a perception adequate to reality thinking that they would surely obtain them, but the attention towards other areas of the reality, like the home society, wouldn't have urged them to the satisfaction of some immediate doubtful interests, but proving a flexible, strategic behavior would rather choose the stability of the system and the peace.¹³ For instance, it is the case of what happened in the Suez crisis, in the fall of 1956, when three main allies of the US Great Britain, France and Israel tried to retrieve through force the Suez Channel from Egypt, which the latter had just nationalized it, but the decided intervention of the US wasn't meant to back the interests of its allies, although in other occasions they would have backed them especially the ones of the Israel; but, this time, thinking with good reason at the Soviets' clear intentions of backing Egypt, the US have almost summoned the three countries to evacuate the Channel.¹⁴

On the other hand, coming back to the debates which took place in the 60's as part of the theory, it was impossible for the classic partisans of the political realism not to maintain a traditionalist spirit. For example, the French Raymond Aron somehow extended Morgenthau's initial assumptions, in the sense that between the home and foreign politics wouldn't exist any kind of relation, only the foreign politics alone being able to contribute to the exhibition of the power of the state, to the obtaining of its prestige and to the setting in order the international relations.¹⁵

Notwithstanding, these serious controversies concerning the interrealistic conception, which opposed behavioralists to traditionalists, or the latter to those from geopolitics, have not stopped when entering the 70's, but, on the contrary, they amplified giving birth to other trends, or, more than that, even other theories, that were subject to a real inner crisis of realism, and this one was also amplified by at least three reasons coming from the outside of the theory. First of all, the 70's marked one of the few famous military defeats, if not the only one, of the most important democratic power, USA, where the subject of international relations was asserted and developed, particularly in its great universities: Harvard, Massachusetts, Princeton etc. This is not the place of searching all the causes that led to the American failure in Vietnam – as this is the conflict we're talking about –, but the sociological research have established just an apparent or insufficient developed perspective, that is the legitimate point of view of the American public opinion, overexcited through the impact of mass-media, that surely had the decisive role in the American retreat from Indochina.¹⁶ If these social or sociological implications represented a matter of home politics for the White House administrations, a fact that couldn't have been taken into account by the realistic theorists, especially by the ones belonging to the traditionalistic school, then, the second reason for the reformulation of some of their assumptions was undoubtedly represented by the first effects of the long economical recession which fell upon the world starting with 1973 (the year of another Arabian-Israeli conflict, ended with the almost exponential increase of the oil price on the international market),¹⁷ and this happened after almost three decades of unprecedented boost of economy. The last, but not the least, the third reason was represented by Henry Kissinger's appointment as US president's adviser for national security matters, then as State Department secretary, him being a well-known conservative realist of international relations. This appointment that can seem irrelevant, in fact couldn't remain without any effects among realists, regardless of the trend they would have

belonged to. As Kissinger, besides the fact that he was one of the first important theorists of international relations, thus becoming a probationer of them, but, through a realist, in an age of necessary relaxation of the East-West terms – overloaded with the huge destruction power of nuclear weapons –, usefully contributed, alongside of president Nixon, to the decrease of bipolar tension, by using evidently ...behavioralistic cooperation methods, if not semi-liberal ones, but without abandoning the basic realistic principle of containment.¹⁸ Even the classic realists, who had previously invented the "sum zero game" concept,¹⁹ have become useful to the democratic and strategically American pacifist policy, through the utilization of this concept by the American diplomats in the nuclear disarmament negotiations had with the Soviet persons in charge.

Of course, the development of these changes made that the complex realities of that time to be fundamentally different of those of the interwar age, when the basis of the liberal theory were built, or of those tense realities of the 40's and the 50's, when political realism was elaborated, but a series of important theorists of the latter didn't take into account the effects of the relaxation and the reasons mentioned above – continuing to think in the classic logic, or searching for other possible, structural causes in the middle or at the extremities of the system.

But, a sure thing is the fact that the analyst who truly revolutionized the way of working out international theories was Immanuel Wallerstein, who started publishing in 1974, in New York, the series of volumes called *The Modern World-System*. Thus, in these works, he offered another approach, a structural one of international relations, close in a way to the School of Annales, exclusively based on the social components doubled by those spatial and temporal of the system centre-semioutskirts-outskirts. What comes out of these volumes? No matter how many negotiations of the liberal conferences will take place, or no matter how many interests promotions, including war like, made by realistic politicians, these cannot and are not able to change the current international

structure established through chains of social relations around the year 1500. According to Wallerstein's structural (systemic) theory, the impossibility of deconstructing the system globally connected through liberal interconnections is due to the discovery of America by the nations of the Western Europe, these ones representing the regions that form the centre of the system. They are followed, like in an image of concentric circles, by the regions of the semi-outskirts (South and East Asia and Eastern Europe nations) and by the ones of the outskirts, but without being necessarily established a principle of the position exchange between them, especially of the ones from the semi-outskirts.²⁰ In other words, Wallerstein's important theory revealed in fact "the long durations" of history, according to which if in the Ancient and Medieval Ages the human activities were carried on at a local level, on the other hand, in the Modern Ages they interact at a global level, and they are supposed to become more prominent in the next centuries, even if the author doesn't use the general term of "globalization".

The appearance, in actual fact, of the third much more complex and, at the same time, more complete international theory based upon social problems, obviously occurred simultaneously with an international situation which found itself on the brink of changes. Hence, on the grounds of Nixon's and Kissinger's openness, more and more Western companies not only did they want to avoid the effects of the global economy recession announced by the oil shock and by the abandoning of the US the dollar-gold standard (established in 1944, through the Bretton-Woods Agreements²¹), but they were also offered the possibility of orienting towards the finding of solutions through "various capital associations", appearing the great transnational corporations, that, through their activity, determine elusion measure, even if partial, of the state control and accumulate more and more capital (power). Against the background of the stagnation of the behavioralistic trend – that previously had insisted on the interconnection of the home

policy with foreign one –, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, realists at the beginning, perfectly observed the new evolutions and generated the first great breach within the already extended framework of their theory, formulating the new theory of *complex interdependence*, by publishing the book *Power and Interdependence*, in 1977. Being inspired by the economical theories, the two authors included in their paradigm the multiplicity of the causal factors that are acting at an international level, taking both some close to the realistic theory concepts, such as the general balance of power and its application, and especially the factors related to the liberal theory, that is the pattern of international organization and the economical and technological process. Even if, in this way, they didn't totally abandon the realistic thought, but through the concessions made to the liberal idealists, at least formally, they restored that school, by understanding through complex interdependence the channels that connect the societies: the inter- and transnational relations (players-corporations) and the varied use of force by the state-players depending on situations.²²

As a reaction towards this refreshing of liberalism, even if partial, but also towards the identity crisis which characterized the classic realistic theory, in 1979, Kenneth Waltz published the work *Theory of International Politics*,²³ through which not only did he want to defend the theory and the subject of international relations in front of the rise of the social and economical sciences, reminding of Morgenthau's *Politics among Nations*, but he built the foundations of another scientific paradigm *neorealism*, that could use the purposes of Reagan administrations in the taking again of the harsh confrontation with the USSR, at the beginning of the 80's. But what did the neorealistic theory bring new comparatively speaking with the classic one conceived by Morgenthau? Generally speaking, this controversial work didn't bring too many innovations, indeed, Waltz analyzing in a new formula the traditionalistic, "materialistic" concepts of the states' politics: the anarchy of the international system, the

power and balance of power, adding just a economical pattern based methodology, and finally comparing the balance of power with the individualistic laws of the market.²⁴

Even if, despite the little revisions, the neorealist theory seems anchored still in the past, however, the appearance of all these new theories, even reformulated, didn't do anything else than preparing the ground for the development of international studies in the 80's and the 90's, in the new particular international context, almost exclusively liberal generated by the fall of communism, and marked by the continuation of the economical and social interdependencies and by diffusion of power of that classic national states to other transnational players: economical, organizational, mediatical. This new transnational global vitality, that is located mainly in the US, the host country at UNO structures, but also in countries, is permanently fed with the capital streams invested in "the third-world" recently decolonized countries, but -also in more developed, former communist regions; these facts being shown also in the analyses of theorists. Moreover, trying to offer most adequate explanations and potential solutions for surpassing difficulties and crisis as well, they have started not to follow anymore the already superficial demarcation established for the methodologies and basic concepts of the three main theories, but they often borrow syntagm from rival theories, or, from case to case, reject the terms of their own theories, this happening according to their redefined conceptions.

We are now, thus, witnessing not only the converging point of some once irreducible posttheories or paradigm of international relations: neorealist (now, also called neoconservative), liberal (or, after the amplitude of current nonclassic reshaping, neoliberal) and structural (neomarxist), but also the conceptual interpenetration of what is still left clotted in each of them (thus, a traditional controversy is nowadays present between neoconservative Samuel P. Huntington²⁵ and neoliberal Francis Fukuyama,²⁶ or another one between partisans

of globalization and those of regionalization). But we are not too much mistaken if we consider every present-day theorists as the banner of his own scientific approach. On such theoretical defined background the future international relations will surely evolve, some based on peace, understanding and cooperation between the democratic capitalist players (the developed, former communist states, transnational companies), regulated under mutual agreements, and other based on tensions or even conflicts likely to continue, as nowadays reality clearly prove, on the relation East-West (the open antiterrorist wars in Afghanistan and Iraq), but all these must be governed by the UNO Charter, that keeps its actuality.

And for exemplifying these new realities we will just present, in the closing part of this essay, some of the assumptions of a very interesting work *The Retreat of the State*, written by a contemporary theorist of international relations, Susan Strange. Right from the beginning of the book, she points out than "the territorial borders don't coincide anymore with the extension or the limits of the political authority exercised on economy or society". Further on, the author identifies four substructural forces of the world society: security, credit, knowledge and production, each and every one exceeding, therefore, the borders. From all of these, the State authority governs only the security force, although speaking in terms of percentage the real power of state increased, having 60% revenue from the brut gross national product, as opposed to about 30% a century ago (thus, we can draw the conclusion concerning the duration continuity of this kind of players), the retreat of the state being a qualitative one, not a quantitative. Thus, the state still offers security, work and education conditions, administrative and juridical control, and regarding international organizations control, these are generally national rule tools of the dominant states.²⁷

Consequently, there are sufficient reasons with regard to the theoretical connections between the different paradigms debated by these contemporary authors, that is why, a good

and thorough schooling of our country's diplomatic personnel, that must commit themselves either to the democratic peace core or to the hard core of a still possible war, requires a feature of all these recently – become

– complementary theories, and that are easier and better to be acquired only through the knowledge of basic classic and nonclassic concepts, the reason of the present study.

NOTES:

¹ Stefano Guzzini, *Realism și relații internaționale, Povestea fără sfârșit a unei morți anunțate: realismul în relațiile internaționale și în economia politică internațională*. Iași, Institutul European, 2000, pp. 36, 45.

² Martin Wright, *Politica de putere*, București, Editura ARC, 1998, pp. 212-215.

³ Stefano Guzzini, *quoted work*, pp. 46, 48-51; see also Constantin Bușe, Gheorghe Bădescu, *Relații internaționale în acte și documente*, București, Editura Didactică și Pedagogică, 1974, vol. I (1917-1939), pp. 16-25.

⁴ See Edward H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, London, Macmillan, 1946, 2nd edn.

⁵ See Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York, Knopf, 1948.

⁶ See also Stefano Guzzini, *q. w.*, pp. 47, 53-56.

⁷ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomatia*, București, Editura BIC ALL, 2003, pp. 15, 20, 50-57.

⁸ Martin Wright, *q. w.*, pp. 176-193; see also Stefano Guzzini, *q. w.*, pp. 31, 60-62, 65-71.

⁹ Henry Kissinger, *q. w.*, pp. 389, 393-395, 398-400.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 395-398, 401-404.

¹¹ Stefano Guzzini, *q. w.*, pp. 63-64.

¹² Henry Kissinger, *q. w.*, pp. 417-429; see also Martin Wright, *q. w.*, pp. 233-236.

¹³ Stefano Guzzini, *q. w.*, pp. 35, 75-85, 94-97.

¹⁴ Henry Kissinger, *q. w.*, pp. 457-476.

¹⁵ Stefano Guzzini, *q. w.*, pp. 32, 101-103.

¹⁶ Henry Kissinger, *q. w.*, pp. 585-599; for other details, see further *Ibidem*, pp. 600-611.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 642-644.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, pp. 615-617, 619-621, 624-631, 641, 645-662.

¹⁹ Stefano Guzzini, *q. w.*, pp. 83, 129-131, 187-188.

²⁰ Immanuel Wallerstein, *Sistemul mondial modern, Mercantilism și consolidarea economiei mondiale europene 1600-1750*, București, Editura Meridiane, 1993, vol. IV, pp. 5-61. The rest of volumes were published, in translation, by the same publishing house, starting with 1991.

²¹ Stefano Guzzini, *q. w.*, pp. 269-270.

²² *Ibidem*, pp. 215-219.

²³ See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, The McGraw Hill Companies, Inc., 1979.

²⁴ Stefano Guzzini, *q. w.*, pp. 213, 233, 237-246, 251-267.

²⁵ See Samuel P. Huntington, *Ciocnirea civilizațiilor și refacerea ordinii mondiale (The Clash Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order)*, Oradea, Editura Antet, 1998.

²⁶ See also Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York, The Free Press A Division of MacMillan, Inc., 1992.

²⁷ Susan Strange, *Retragerea statului, Difuziunea puterii în economia mondială (The Retreat of the State. The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy)*, București, Editura Trei, 2002, p. 7-15.

Andrei Miroiu and Radu-Sebastian Ungureanu (eds) - *International Relations Textbook (Manual de relații internaționale)*, Polirom, Iași, 2006

The *International Relations Textbook* is the first comprehensive and remarkable Romanian textbook on international relations theories and approaches. The book is written by a team of Romanian international relations (IR) researchers – Andrei Miroiu, Radu-Sebastian Ungureanu, Daniel Biro, Lucian-Dumitru Dardala, Olivia Todorean, Ionut Apahideanu, Simona Soare and Stanislav Secieru – with Romanian and international academic background. Their endeavor and deep knowledge on IR theories confirm that we have in Romania a mature IR research community. Moreover this textbook opens up the perspectives for the development of various research programs by our research community in this field. It will certainly inspire the IR Romanian students to contribute to the widening of regional and global studies. It is also a useful textbook for future and actual practitioners of foreign affairs.

The readers can detect a thematic-based sequence of the chapters, although the editors did not explicitly divide the book into main parts. Thus I present the three main groups of chapters as they become salient during reading:

The first chapters introduce the reader into the history of modern states' international relations and into considerations on actors and levels of analysis in IR. Placing the actors and levels of analysis in the first chapters is a noteworthy choice because it shows the variety of angles from which we can approach the research. The second group of chapters depicts and explains the IR research programs: Liberalism, Realism, IR English School, Marxism, Neo-liberalism, Neo-realism, Constructivism and Feminism.

And the third group of chapters examines various IR concepts and processes such as security, security regime, democratic peace, balance of power, causes of wars, globalization etc.

A small shortfall of the textbook is that the connection and coordination between the second and the third groups of chapters is sometimes vague or poorly managed. It is probably an assumed flaw since the editors explain in the preface that "every author had complete freedom regarding the choice of presenting the information." For instance, the chapter on balance of power (Miroiu, Soare) has no theoretical base. The authors prefer illustrating different definitions of this concept without embedding them in any theoretical frameworks. This is not the best approach since concepts cannot be disconnected from the theoretical frameworks that use them. It should be noted that the same authors make some theoretical references on the balance of power in the next chapter, which regards military alliances.¹ However, these references are inexplicit and incomplete. The authors mention Morgenthau's classical realism approach, Walt's balance of threat theory and Schweller's balance of interests theory. First, the description is not explicit because Walt's theory of balance of threat is a refinement of the structural realism balance of power theory, and Schweller's theory is actually an application of the neo-classical realism. The authors miss here a good opportunity to link these theoretical lines with the chapters on realism and neo-realism. Walt's theory is a good case to show how neo-realism evolves through research (research programs are not static). The same can be applied to Schweller's theory that develops

¹ Since balance of power and military alliances are profoundly interconnected, it could have been better to join the two chapters in a single one.

the neo-classical extension of realism focused more on foreign policy decision-making than on systemic phenomena.

Second, the presentation is incomplete for the reason that the authors contain their assessment to the realist tradition. The recent academic puzzles on the balance of power are generated by research questions such as: Why still exists NATO after the Cold War? or Why is no balance behavior in the present international security landscape? On these puzzles there is an ongoing academic debate that involves not only realist but also liberal, institutionalist and constructivist accounts.²

A major contribution of this textbook is the description of relatively new theoretical approaches such as constructivism and feminism (chapters by the same author: Todorean). There is a striking difference between the two chapters in the way they are formulated. While the chapter on feminism is very coherent and well structured – with specified theories and approaches that constitute the feminism in IR studies – the chapter on constructivism is less explicit regarding coherent approaches. This difference is generated by the complexity of constructivism as a theoretical framework that is applied in IR.

Todorean points out accurately that constructivism in IR is characterized by methodological eclecticism, including “quantitative, qualitative, positivist, post-positivist or their combination *sui-generis*.” Yet, the merit of a textbook lies in making explainable things that do not appear so structured, such as constructivism, in this case. The author insists too much on illustrating constructivism (at the beginning and the end of the chapter) as a loose meta-theory with an excessive methodology or as a hard to classify meta-theory along the lines of rationalism, critical theory and postmodernism. Possibly this blurred image of constructivism – that raises the legitimate question of “how can we use such a thing in research?” – can be clarified by outlining some models or a typology of constructivist research.³ Of course that is very hard to abstract models of research when one deals with such an “eclectic” or “lax” theoretical framework, but when one persists in showing the complicated nature of constructivism, the outcome is an unbalanced presentation. Thus, I would point out two models, which do not encompass all the IR constructivist accounts but that could be both the starting point of an inventory and a way to substantiate and articulate the meta-theoretical nature of constructivism in IR studies.

First, *the antinomy model: ideational versus rational*. For instance, a group of IR researchers – Risse, Engelmann-Martin, Kopf and Roscher⁴ – argue that the Euro and the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) do not originate in the material economic⁵ or geopolitical interests, but in the vision of the European order that is informed by the politics of collective identity. The same line of interpretation – identity versus interest – is applied regarding transatlantic security agreements that persist after the Cold War. Western Europe and the United

² For a wide-ranging positions in this debate see Ikenberry, John G. (ed.) (2002) *America Unrivaled. The Future of Balance of Power*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. A fine example of a neo-liberal institutionalist approach on military alliances is Haftendorn, Helga, Celleste Wallander and Robert O. Keohane (eds) (1999) *Imperfect Unions: Security Structures Over Time and Space*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Regarding theoretical developments on security cooperation (which includes also military alliances) comprising realist, institutionalist, liberal and constructivist perspectives see Muller, Harald (2003) “Security Cooperation” in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds) *Handbook of International Relations*, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications.

³ It should be outlined that the textbook has distinct chapters that describe specific constructivist theories (see “Security Community” and “The Extension of the Security Concept” by Ungureanu).

⁴ Risse, Thomas, Daniela Engelmann-Martin, Hans-Joachim Knopf and Klaus Roscher (1999) “The Euro or Not to Euro? The EMU and Identity Politics in the European Union,” *The European Journal of International Relations*, 5(2): 147-187.

⁵ One of the authors’ arguments is that the rational economic interest can go against EMU.

States remain allied even after the direct military threat has vanished, because they form a pluralistic security community that is based on collective identity and shared values.⁶ The merit of this model is that it clearly describes the lines of meta-theoretical divisions between the rationalist and constructivist theoretical frameworks. Rationalism envisages actors that act under the logic of pre-given preferences based on self-interest and utility maximizing. In contrast, constructivism considers that actors act according to collectively constructed inter-subjective beliefs based on identity, norms and ideas.

The second model is *norms formation: building bridges between constructivism and rationalism*. This line of research emphasizes the origin and genesis of international norms within a process that converges ideational and rational processes. It is theorized and applied empirically mainly by Finnemore.⁷ She explains that norms formation does not imply necessarily an ideational versus rational construction of arguments, but rather a complementarity of both. The researchers that employ this model start from a constructivist perspective on norms, but they consider rationalist insights within different stages of norms dynamics: for example, at compliance and promotion levels. Exploring empirically the cases of citizenship/membership norms compliance by Germany and Ukraine, Checkel concludes that compliance with norms is a process that encompasses on one hand social learning, socialization or internalization of norms (constructivist perspective), and on other hand cost-benefit mechanism or instrumental choice (rationalist perspective).⁸ In the case of international norms that are promoted by transnational actors, Price focuses on how non-governmental organizations advance the norms on prohibiting land-mines and convince governments to agree for international conventions on land-mines ban.⁹ This paper is a constructivist undertaking, but it should be noted that Price points at instrumental action employed by transnational actors that promote anti-personnel land-mines ban.¹⁰ The merit of this model is that it shows how constructivist research can be employed as a research tool without ontological strictness regarding social processes.¹¹

Concluding, this textbook represents a major undertaking of the Romanian IR studies. However, I extended this review in order to explain the nature of the minor shortfalls of this textbook. These remarks should not alter the merits of this book, which represents a comprehensive and elaborated textbook of IR theories. Its authors master and employ soundly their theoretical knowledge. The textbook is comparable in terms of academic standards with widely known IR textbooks edited in Western countries. It also raises an expectation regarding the future development of Romanian IR research using different strands of theoretical orientations.

Sava Diamandi

⁶ See Risse, Thomas (2002) "U.S. Power in a Liberal Security Community" in John G. Ikenberry (ed.) *America Unrivaled. The Future of Balance of Power*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

⁷ Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization*, 52(4): 887-917.


⁸ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2002) "Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change," *International Organization*, 53(3): 553-588.

⁹ Price, Richard (1998) "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines," *International Organization*, 52(3):613-644.

¹⁰ *idem.*, 631-637.

¹¹ I draw here on Fearon, James, and Alexander Wendt (2003) "Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View," in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds) *Handbook of International Relations*, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications.

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