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CONTENTS

The European Union of 25-27. The Enlargement Towards Central and Eastern Europe. The Romanian Case

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The enlargement represents the second major dimension of the European construction. It is part of the European integration and of Europe's federal unity plan devised by the founding fathers.

Theoretical considerations

In the specialized literature the enlargement is defined as "an organization as a process of gradual and formal horizontal institutionalization of organizational rules and norms" (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2005: 5).

Institutionalization means a process through which the actions and the interactions of certain social actors become normative models.

In other words, the enlargement is the process through which the political, economic, normative system of an international organization, for example the European Union, was and is horizontally extended to other member states. The difference between horizontal and vertical in this process is comparable to "widening" and "deepening", these concepts being used in the European integration process.

This is a step by step process because it is based on several stages, which begin for the countries in Central and Eastern Europe with the accession demands, the negotiation process established by the Copenhagen criteria (1993) and continue after the accession when the new members put into practice their commitments and the Union's policies.

This process is based on the Rome Treaty (A. 237), which states that any European country can apply for becoming a member of the European Communities. The Treaty was reinforced by the Maastricht Treaty (1992), without clearly defining the term "European".

The failure of Marco to become a member of the European Economic Community showed that to be "European" means at least to be geographically in the North of the Mediterranean Sea (Coffey 2003: 5-7).

A better definition of the "European" term was given by the European Commission at the Lisbon European Council (1992), when were underlined the geographical, cultural and historic aspects of the term (Vesa, Ivan 2001: 16).

The historical-cultural dimension of the integration process was a constant aspect of the enlargement, especially as it corresponded to the diversity and pluralism that characterized and characterizes Europe. One of the European Union's founding fathers said "We have to foster Europe not only for the free nations, but also for the ones in the East who need our assistance and moral support" (Dumont 1997:81).

The enlargement process was based on various reasons coming from the European Union and the candidate countries (Wallace 2005: 292-294).

The integration vectors were economic and political for the first wave of enlargement (Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark) or political (security) for the last one (Central and Eastern Europe).

The success or the failure of the Union's enlargement can be measured according to its costs and benefices. If the Union succeeded to integrate new members, thus reducing *the marginal cost in favor of certain net benefices (common norms and rules, a bigger market, competitiveness, a greater negotiation capacity in international relations)* the enlargement was a success. We will find out the answer in the following years, after the transitions periods offered to the new members.

We think that the European Union is the present answer the founding countries of the European Communities and those who acceded after their creation gave to the European unity plan, presented by Robert Schuman on 9 Mai 1950.

The European Union tends to become a more important global actor, who can and has to offer to its members the framework for a modern economic development, an integrated market based on economic and monetary union, but also security.

The Union had to respond to the division consequences caused by the Cold War, the transition in the former communist countries through a coherent policy, gradual, determined by economic relations (market relations), political and security ones (the management of the European crises) in which the enlargement was an important element, underlined by Jacques Delors, Romano Prodi, Gunther Verheugen, etc.

The enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe will confront the Union with numerous nationalisms and transition problems, but will also bring numerous competitive and dynamic economies, a large number of consumers and qualified workers, which might represent the comparative advantage of the United Europe with respect to its global competitors (Kok 2005).

The accession reasons for one state or another were determined by economic, political, security interests, etc. For some states like Great Britain, Ireland or Denmark, which represented the first enlargement wave (1973), it was not about coming back to Europe or reuniting with the European family because they've never left the Liberal Europe.

As Desmond Dinan showed, for Great Britain, the economic reason was the most important (Dinan 2004:7). The best example in this respect was the moment when Great Britain, realizing the damages caused by the restrictions its products had on the European economic market, did not hesitate to abandon the European Free Trade Association, an organization it had created in 1959.

Moreover, the British guessed the global potential the European Community had, especially in the commercial area.

On the contrary, the Irish saw the integration as a possibility to affirm their European identity as a way of keeping their national identity and a way of fighting against the English hegemony. As the author says, acceding to the EEC Ireland did not become more European, but less British (Dinan 2004: 8).

As for the next group of countries that acceded to the Community: Greece (1981) Portugal and Spain (1985), the accession motives were rather political, taking into consideration the authoritarian regimes from which they liberated themselves at the end of the '70s. Their accession was a guarantee for the consolidation of democratic regimes, but also a support for economic development and modernization.

The next group, made up of Austria, Sweden and Finland, integrated in 1995. All the tree countries corresponded to the "European" definition of the integration criteria, having sound economics and consolidated democratic regimes. However, their *neutrality,* so important during the Cold War, risked now to jeopardize their international position. They need to immediately join a security community, without underestimating the role the Internal Market had in their external options.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the enlargement was part of a European geopolitics different from the one of the '90s. The variables that influenced the change were determined either by the "Kosovo crisis" and the "Austrian crisis", or by the reversal of the federalist movement at the end of the 20th century and at the beginning of the 21st century, as well as by a more profound crisis of the nation-state.

If until the Kosovo crisis (1999) the discontent of France and of other member states towards the United States was still timid, after this crisis we witness a stronger criticism towards the American foreign policy, distinguishing a group of states that were interested in developing a military component of the European Union (the creation of an integrated army). The number of those who sustained the affirmation of the European Union not only as a provider of economic stability and modernization, but also as a security provider increased in after 2000.

The enlargement trend announced by the Helsinki European Council (December 1999) was surely influenced also by the effects of the economic globalization- mass migration, conquest of markets, the dynamic commerce with Central and Eastern Europe, which was in a transition period, and the positive political and economic reforms from this region.

The Nice institutional reform (2000) will include in the European institutions' structure 12 of the 13 candidate countries. Moreover, the European Convention will have representatives from Central and Eastern Europe.

In 2004 the European Union enlarged with ten new members, the biggest and maybe the

most challenging enlargement in the history of the European construction.

All in all, the enlargement had *general motives* like the issues related to economic independence and global policies, geopolitical interests (the German case in Central Europe, security interests or the European Union's interest to have states with democratic political regimes and market economy in order to reduce the risks that other interethnic conflicts, like the one in former Yugoslavia, might outburst).

On the other hand, the process had *specific motives,* different from one country to another and might vary from socio-economic problems to security issues and identity preservation.

The enlargement process was not a linear one. It was based on the European Union's conditions expressed in the Copenhagen criteria:

1. politic criterion: rule of law, stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, human rights and respect for and protections of minorities;

2. functional market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; the adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union;

3. implementation of the community acquis (European Council, Presidency Conclusions para. 7 A (iii), Copenhagen European Council, 21-22 June 1993).

The enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe. Reasons and conditions

The integration reasons for the countries in Central and Eastern Europe were more complex, concerning security, economic, political and socio-cultural issues. There is no other ideological alternative or systemic paradigm for Central and Eastern Europe than the one related to the "return to Europe", presented in the studies on the European Union's enlargement (Hughes, Sasse, Gordon 2004: 1-2).

The accession of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe was characterized by certain conditions imposed by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, which determined certain analysts to be more critic regarding the Union's policies towards the median area and equality principle in the accession negotiations,

However, as Paul Magnette said:

"The enlargement of the European Union with ten new states is the event of the decade. The accomplishment of the Big Europe from the Baltic to the Mediterranean Sea and soon from the Atlantic to the Black Sea represents an essential stage in the history of this region" (Magnette 2004: 6-7).

The enlargement issue represented an important subject for the international relations' theoreticians, especially for those interested in the European integration issue. The writings on this matter were oriented on three dimensions concerning the EU's enlargement policies: the policies of the candidate countries, the policies of the member states as regards the enlargement, the policies of the EU and the enlargement's impact (Shimmelfennig, Sedelmeier 2005: 6-7).

In this respect, the analysis concentrated on the decision making process, the formal acts or the horizontal institutions. In the enlargement analysis we can identify two theoretical currents: rationalism and institutional constructivism.

The rationalist explanations are based on two steps: 1. explanation of the preferences of the candidate countries and of the member states; 2. explanation of organizational collective enlargement decisions at the macro-and policy levels (Shimmelfenning, Sedelmeier 2005: 11).

The institutional-rationalists describe a world where the actors are preoccupied by the maximization of their economic and security preferences. In the event of an interest conflict, the actors turn to negotiations, which have the aim of finding equilibrium between costs and benefits. From this point of view the enlargement is a test to show the power distribution among the members of the EU, but it also shows, according to the game theory, the organization's capacity to maximize its economic, political and security benefits and in the same time to reduce the economic, budgetary and institutional costs of the enlargement (Moravscik 1993, 1998).

As for the EU members, they also try to maximize their share of the collective benefits and to reduce their contribution to the enlargement's costs.

Sonia Piedrafita and Jose I. Torreblanca consider that there are three logics of the EU's enlargement policy; *efficiency logic, identity logic and argumentation logic* (Sonia Piedrafita and Jose I. Torreblanca 2005: 32-35).

The efficiency logic is based on the rational choosing theory. Based on agreements, the EU's member states define their preference a priori taking into consideration their particular interests and in accordance with the main technical medium, expressed in a common procedure. The power relationships established among the actors are based on coercion, compensation and conviction. The limit of the power relations takes into consideration the particular interests of the actors and their negotiation capacity. In this case, the political institutions are the consequence of the political actions, of agreements practical plans and of the collective actions' resolution of dilemmas. This type of logic considers that the governments of the EU's member states are the most important actor within the European Union, which, on the basis of their interests and expectancies of their political actions, define their preferences before the final phase of the common decision making process, acting for the maximization of their benefits.

The *"argumentation"* logic (Habermas) is based on the *communicative action theory*, on the *"power of language"* and on the discourse effects. Thus we talk about a collective communication process, opposed to negotiation, which seeks consensus in the logic of discourse actions and collective norms- finding the "better argument" starting from the discourse and norms logic. The actors are considered to be rational not only when they act in accordance with their interests, but also when they obey the norms and principles accepted by all the others and when they can explain and justify their actions. Thus, legitimacy is determined more by *argumentation* than by *identity* and *efficiency*.

The *"identity"* logic belongs to the institutional - constructivism, starting from the premise that norms and principles influence the negotiations between the member states and the candidate countries, between them and the Union's institutions. According to this theory, the actors' rationality is rather contextual than instrumental, coming from the *community identity* to which the actors belong.

On the other hand, a very important role in the EU's enlargement was played by the democratic values and the cultural context. The decision making process takes into consideration the creation of a *common identity*, based on the promotion of common objectives and visions of the member and candidate countries. Thus, the

collective decision is rather the subject of *identity* than of efficiency. It seeks to develop and protect *"the sense of weness"* and to establish the solidarity limits.

The sociological current, **the institutional constructivism,** also known as the sociological institutionalism, deals with the *systemic* analysis of the organizational level of the enlargement (the actors, the relationships among them, the principles that determine the actors actions, the norms, the common values). Moreover, the constructivism relies on the ideative and cultural factors of the enlargement- like *"community"* or *"cultural matrix"* of the candidate countries, concepts like "socialization" and "Europeanization" (European identity). It is also interested in the degree of the actors' participation (from within or from outside the organization) in the *collective identity* or *fundamental beliefs* definition process (Shimmelfenning, Sedelmeier 2005: 14).

If we compare the enlargements of the European Communities and of the European Union we can notice that for the EFTA countries the proper theory was that of the rational institutionalism- Great Britain, Denmark, Ireland, Austria, Sweden and Finland wanted to maximize their economic and security benefits through the organization - while for the Central and Eastern countries we can notice a constructivist logic - these states wanted to get out of the *"Eastern identity"* and to "return to Europe". For these states the democratic norms and the values of the European Union were more important than the logic of the maximization of economic and security benefits.

We can not neglect the preferences of the Union and of the member states if we take into consideration some variables like the geographical proximity of Central and Eastern Europe (economic and geopolitical interdependencies) and the socio-economic structure (market access competition, investments and budgetary collections).

The dissolution of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe was soon accompanied by major political and economic changes of the states in the region, which were confronted with the transition from a centralized economy to a market economy (Ghilhaudis 1993: 137-150; Pop 2000; Kornai 2000; Tismăneanu 2001). The only hope of these states was the integration in the Euro Atlantic (NATO) and

European structures (the European Communities - the European Union). Consequently, these countries showed, ever since the beginning of the '90s, an increased interest in joining the European Communities. The institutions of the 12 did not formally make commitments to these states, but they showed their will to support their efforts towards a democratic regime and a market economy.

Thus, the European Communities proposed to the countries in Central and Eastern Europe several association agreements, known as "European agreements" (Ramses '96: 273-283; Lesquene 1994: 111-136). The first such agreements were signed in 1991 with Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland. They were followed in 1993 by the association agreements between the European Communities and Romania and in 1994 by the one with Bulgaria. The last agreements were concluded with the Baltic states. Based on the general principles of market economy, political pluralism and human rights, "the European agreements" replaced the intermediary agreements from 1988-1989, aiming at creating a free-exchange area between the EEC and the countries from Central and Eastern Europe.

The agreements were very profitable for these countries as the EEC eliminated quantitative restrictions, customs fees to some products and provided constant support for the implementation of the community acquis in this region. The agreements enjoyed great support in these states although they were not immediately followed by concrete promises of accession.

In Romania, the lack of professionalism inherited from the totalitary regime, the dissolution of the alliances which Romania was part of, such as CAER and the Warsaw Treaty (1991), had an impact upon Romania's foreign policy.

Shortly after the revolution of December 1989, Romania's image credit was seriously damaged facing a potential threat of isolation in terms of foreign affairs.

Like its neighbours in the Central Europe (The Czech Republic and the Slovac Republic, Hungary and Poland), Romania stated out its firm desire to 'return to Europe', to integrate in NATO and the European Union.

Nevertheless, this approach was more likely a formal one as the Romanian state was far from the 1993 Copenhagen criteria (rule of law, human rights and ethnic minorities protection, functional market economy able to cope with the competition on the Single European Market and the adoption of the community acquis).

In order to respond to these exigencies, Romania had to implement rapidly a radical reform of its economic system which required with priority the privatisation of state owned companies.

The 7 January 1990 Declaration highlighted Romania's desire to set off a collaboration with the EEC. The first results of this new orientation emerged in October 1990 when Romania signed the *Trade and cooperation agreement with the EEC* which became operative in 1991 (Gog 2001: 203). Although this was supposed to be a 10-year agreement, Romania signed it for a five-year term. It applied to all the products originating from the Community except for coal and steel, and agricultural products.

In the second stage, Romania signed a *Treaty of EU Association* (1 February 1993) which was part of the European agreements (see the European association treaty between Romania and the EU posted on the Internet site of the Foreign Affairs Ministry).

This treaty set out an important juridical framework for surpassing the gap between Romania and the civilisation space embodied by the European organisation. The EEC committed to support Romania on its way to a new political and economic system which would respect the rule of law and human rights, including minority rights, practice a multiple party system based on free democratic elections and build up a market economy.

The association agreement also created an institutional framework aimed at developing closer relations between Romania and the EU: the Association Council (political-national level) and the Association Parliamentary Committee (a Commission for Romania's European integration was created) and the Association Committee. The latter is composed of high officials of the Romanian government and the European Council and Committee and assists the Association Council.

The new framework between Romania and the EU allowed a structured dialogue between the two parts at all levels, improved access of the Romanian products on the community market, participation of the Romanian state at all the development projects of trans-European infrastructure networks – transport, communica-

tion, energy, participation in community programs (research, industrial cooperation, energy, environment protection, transborder cooperation, support in the formation and training of staff). The essential component of this agreement was the economic one, seriously affected in previous years and even by the delays in the harmonization of the Romanian legislation with the community legislation.

. The European Council from Copenhagen (June 1993) pointed out more clearly the exigencies of the European Union towards the candidate countries, the structures and the synthetic guidelines of evaluation at the political, economic and social levels.

A new step ahead was made through the publication of the White Book in 1995 and, particularly, through the 2000 Agenda, acknowledged in 1997.

The abovementioned documents were preceded by the *Pre-accession strategy* adopted by the European Council from Essen (December 1994), aimed at preparing the economy of the candidate countries for the rules of the EU internal market. This strategy made the distinction between the alignment to the internal market and the EU accession. The EU accession involved thorough acceptance of the community acquis.

Romania's answer to the abovementioned documents was the working out of a 'Declaration' (Snagov Declaration from 21 June 1995 signed by most of the Romanian political forces) which supported the *'National strategy for Romania's pre-accession to the EU'* (From Essen to Cannes 1995: 145-227).

The flaws of the document consist in the lack of understanding of the European integration phenomenon by overlooking the economic and social costs of this action. We find ourselves again in the *'mimesis'* era as the government pleaded for a *'Europe of the countries'* in which the transfer of sovereignty is limited.

In 1995 Romania submitted the application in view of accession. The change of the political regime in 1996 forecast the improvement of Romania's image abroad but this was soon damaged by the lack of coherent policies of Ciorbea government. The application was analysed by the European Commission which worked out and published its *'Opinion'* on 22 June 1997 (Agenda 2000. Avis de la Commission sur la demande d'adhésion de la Roumanie à

l'Union Européenne, suppl. 8/1997, OPOCE, Luxembourg, p. 92).

The Commission analyzed in depth the situation of our country on account of the Copenhagen criteria (1993). They pointed out that the political action was on the right track, still there were gaps to fill in the field of privatization, the enhancement of the juridical regime and the coherence of the economic policies, competition and the adoption of the community acquis. The conclusions of the Commission stated out in its 'Opinion' was highly detrimental to Romania. According to the Commission, Romania could fulfill the medium term economic obligations.

The Government of Romania answered to this 'Opinon' in September 1997 by criticizing the Commission's lack of sympathy with the economic and social transformations in Romania. The Executive of Bucharest also criticized the EU enlargement strategy which, allegedly, created two groups of countries treated differently, although the EU had committed to respect the principle of equal treatment of the candidate states. At the same time, they criticized the Commission's proposal that the reform of the European institutions, stated out in the new Amsterdam treaty, cover only 20 states (Herlea 1997: 9-27).

In 1997, Romania replied to the Commission by launching the *'National Program for the Adoption of the Community Acquis'* with support from all political parties. In this document, Romania stated out its intentions to create a functional market economy, the strict control of the borders, a stable macroeconomic climate, the consolidation of the legislative framework with regard to property consolidation etc. The modest achievements of the Romanian government in the following period were disappointing to the EU. Consequently, Romania was left out of the group of 'Luxembourg countries' (1997) (Decisions of European Council from Luxembourg, 12-13 December 1997:2)

The European Council from Luxembourg (1997) decided to call out the bilateral Intergovernmental Conference in the spring of 1998 in order to start negotiations with Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, The Czech Republic and Slovenia.

Despite the failure in Luxembourg, the *'National Program for the Adoption of the Community Acquis'* allowed further negotiations

between the Romanian institutions and the EU. The European institutions committed to support Romania in several fields: the modernization of the infrastructure, environment protection, the development of small and medium enterprises, the reform of the public administration and statistics. Unfortunately, the report presented by the Commission in 1998 highlighted the weak economic performance of the governments acting between 1996-1998.

Romania's historical moment was 10-11 December 1999 in Helsinki when the European Council decided to organize bilateral intergovernment conferences in February 2000 for setting off negotiations with Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Bulgaria and Malta (Regular Report from the Commission on Progress towards Accession by Each of the Candidate Countries, *European Commission*, IP/99/75: 1).

On this occasion, the 13 candidate countries were grouped in a unique framework meant to ensure full equity.

The preparations for the European Council from Helsinki took place in Wien (11-12 December 1998) when the Council requested the Commission to work out a *Report* on the candidate countries. The Commission chaired by Romano Prodi was more responsive to the problems of the Central and Eastern Europe. The *Report* concerning Romania stated out the need for Romania to fulfill two criteria: the mobilization of financial resources, the implementation of structural reform of childcare institutions and improvement of the macroeconomic climate. The 1999 Commission Report was earmarked by the Kosovo crisis. The Commission stated out in the forefront the positive political issues in Romania as a consequence of the attitude showed by our country towards the bombing of Yugoslavia. The acceptance of the negotiations with Romania was a step forward on the way to the EU accession.

The negotiations with Romania started on 16 February 2000. On 26 May 2000, the Romanian government closed 5 chapters: small and medium enterprises, science and research, education, training and youth, foreign relations and common foreign and security policy. Position documents were issued for competition, statistics, the law of trading companies, consumer protection, culture and media, telecommunications and information technology, customs union and transport policy. The negotiations with the EU revealed once again

that the Romanian institutions lacked knowledge and specialists in different areas of European integration. The insufficient coordination among ministries and the shortcomings of the 1999-2000 government were also unsatisfactory. However, since 2001, negotiations have improved following a clearer strategy, which was constantly expressed in the reports from the European institutions. (Puşcaş 2004: 5-11).

The Helsinki decision was a political one as Romania claimed serious economic, administrative and juridical delays. The situation worsened in 1999-2000. Romania's official position towards the future European architecture to be discussed in Nice (November 2000) was favorable to a 'United Europe of the Nations'. This position was very much close to Great Britain's, a country which showed very little willingness to give up sovereignty in favor of the Union.

The reform of the European institutions drawn up in Nice (2001) included Romania in the future enlarged Europe (Vese, Ivan 2001). Romania became more active in its relation with the European Union, which shared Romania's opinions with regard to the Constitution of the future united Europe (Jinga 2002: 118-134).

Regrettably, the weak economic performances and the lack of a juridical and economic framework meant to comply with the EU's exigencies, have been delaying Romania's term of accession. In early 2002, the removal of the obstacles from the free circulation of the Romanian citizens in the Schengen area was a positive signal that Romania started to make progress, especially in the field of border control and the uniformization of the Romanian legislation with the European legislation in this field. In 2002, the European Commission's Country Report pointed out the economic progress achieved by Romania. However, contrary to Bulgaria, Romania's status was not labeled as functional market economy, which was an important criteria to finalize the negotiations with the EU. The 2003 Report did not bring any change in this respect using an ambiguous formula which stated that Romania could be considered a functional market economy if they continued the satisfactory progress achieved to date (2003 Regular Report on Romanian's progress towards accession: 121).

Romania continued to fulfill the political criteria, made economic progress, worked out

structural reforms, made progress in the adoption of the community acquis, took anti-inflation measures but was still facing the threat of generalized corruption across the entire society and had little administrative capacity to implement the legislation adopted. At the same time, the Commission criticized the lack of total reform in the field of energy, agriculture, environment protection, mining etc. Nevertheless, the Commission stated out the positive measures taken in the area of inflation and corruption (see Anticorruption National Prosecutor's Office) and ethnic minority protection, especially in respect of the Roma population.

On the whole, the 2003 Report was positive allowing the continuation of the negotiations with the EU. However, the forecast for 2004 was not very encouraging given the general elections which were expected to slow down the pace of the structural reforms.

It is remarkable, however, that ever since 1995, when Romania submitted the application for accession to the EU and until 2003, the country has made significant progress towards finalizing the negotiations and signing the pre-accession treaty with the EU in 2005.

Nevertheless, important negotiation chapters, such as agriculture, competition policies, regional development policies, energy, justice and home affairs, financial and budgetary forecast etc. remained open as they required political will and immediate reforms.

We believe that the accession of the 10 states in May 2004, the greatest enlargement in the history of the European integration, have hampered Romania's negotiations with the EU. In this respect, Romania can build up a new negotiation strategy mainly because the perspectives of immediate enlargement do not always bring up positive effects. For instance, in the field of agriculture, Romania will have to negotiate the statute of over four million individual households for which subsidies will cease starting from 2011-2012. At the same time, we believe that the price of energy will be difficult to liberalize because of the social consequences it draws. Also, there will be delays in public administration, mostly as a result of the fact that the Romanian state lacks sufficient specialists who can implement the community legislation.

Romania managed to finalize the accession negotiations in December 2004, shortly after it received the status of functional market economy. However, 11 conditions were stated out with regard to the reform of the justice, corruption fighting, the reduction of steel production, environment protection etc. The accession treaty was signed in April 2005.

A difficult implementation process of the community acquis will follow and, in our opinion, Romania is not duly prepared. The continuation of the reform in the field of justice and home affairs is, nevertheless, a must.

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
La nature impériale de l'Union Européenne: entre modèle étatique et réseau transnational (II)

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Introduction

Si le traité de Maastricht se borne à donner une **définition assez ambiguë** sur la nature de l'Union Européenne, en disant qu'il s'agit d'une union fondée sur un *„dualisme structurel"* déjà instauré par l'Acte Unique (la dimension *communautaire* représentée par le premier pilier, les Communautés; la dimension *intergouvernementale*, représentée par les deux autres piliers, la „Politique étrangère et de sécurité commune" et „la coopération dans les domaines de la Justice et des Affaires Intérieurs"[1]), les débats sur la vraie nature de l'Union sort loin d'être réglées. La réforme apportée par *„l'étape Amsterdam"* garde la structure *originelle de l'Union (,,les piliers"),* mais modifie leur contenu, en renforçant, en même temps, la tendance commencée avec le traité de Maastricht, *d'accroître le niveau d'interdépendance entre l'Union et la Communauté*[2]. Les piliers de la construction européenne, construction qui est un système politique et économique englobant des sous-systèmes *(transformés ou pas en „piliers de l'Union"* – comme c'est le cas des Communautés; ou comme l'Union Economique et Monétaire[3]) sont l'expression d'une nouvelle architecture (post-Maastricht).

Pourtant, le traité de Maastricht (en vigueur à 1 Novembre 1993) **n'a pas contribué**, en créant l'Union Européenne, à la définition de la nature juridique de cette Union qui est devenu ainsi, *une réalité politique*, une entité *basée sur les Communautés* et sur des *mécanismes de coopération intergouvernementale*, sans possibilité d'être encadrée dans les formes traditionnelles d'organisation politique (l'Etat, l'organisation internationale, la confédération, la fédération). Mais l'Union peut être regardée également *comme un processus doublement*

motivé (par la nécessité **d'intégration** au niveau interne ; par la nécessité **d'élargissement** au niveau extérieur). L'idée est que l'Union ne peut pas être *considérée comme une construction finie,* comme *„une tâche accomplie",* car elle *est en permanente évolution.*

Mais, en second lieu, l'Union est *la construction politique brisant toutes les typologies de répartition du pouvoir,* parce qu'elle est fondée sur une base mixte concernant tant la **communitarisation** que la dimension classique (celle de coopération interétatique) ; la base politique de l'Union n'est pas un seul Etat, mais tant des organisations d'intégration (la Communauté Européenne ; l'EURATOM) que des différentes formes de coopération établies entre les Etats membres.

Le traité de Nice **n'adopte pas une position claire** concernant la définition de la nature juridique de l'Union Européenne, mais cette omission totale d'élaborer une disposition expresse concernant l'Union Européenne comme telle *est de façon à traîner le processus de consolidation de l'Union jusqu'à la ratification de la Constitution Européenne* (adoptée en mai 2004) *par tous les membres*[4]. Le traité de Nice seulement se borne à dire que l'Union va faire l'objet d'une importante réforme, tant institutionnelle et fonctionnelle qu'une réforme visant l'élargissement vers des nouveaux Etats.

Ces aspects sont *interdépendants*, parce que *l'élargissement de l'Union* ne peut pas être accompli sans une véritable *adaptation* de la structure, des objectives, des compétences de l'Union à des nouvelles réalités politiques.

La Constitution Européenne qui ne représente (à cause de son refuse par les referendums négatifs de 2005, en France et en Pays Bas) du droit applicable, apporte quelques

éléments novateurs pour la définition de l'Union Européenne, comme la personnalité juridique de l'Union. Mais l'article premier de la Constitution ne se réfère pas expressément à *la nature politique et juridique de l'Union*; il ne dit pas si l'Union est un Etat, une organisation internationale, une fédération ou une zone économique de libre échange. Cette absence d'une définition expresse de la nature de l'Union signifie un manquement (probablement temporaire) de *volonté politique des Etats membres de s'engager formellement sur une voie fédérale ou supra étatique.* C'est intéressant d'apercevoir qu'on n'est plus reprise dans l'art. 1/Constitution, la formule consacrée par le traité de Maastricht („l'Union sans cesse étroite entre les peuples européens"), ce qui ne doit pas signifier qu'après le refus de la ratification de la Constitution en 2005, l'évolution de l'Union cessera et que cette entité „se gèlera" dans une forme fixe, rigide, celle établie par les textes actuels.

Art. 1, aligné 1/Constitution établit une nouvelle „Union Européenne"[5] qui **n'est plus basée sur la structure des trois piliers** (une autre grande évolution structurelle) ; ça signifie qu'on est disparu seulement *un modèle d'organisation du système unional* mais pas les domaines de compétence „communautaire" et de compétence de „coopération intergouvernementale". Dans une première interprétation (historique et systématique, en vertu de la définition de l'Union donnée par le traité de Maastricht), l'Union englobe, dans sa nouvelle structure, les anciens piliers II[éme] et III[éme] (« l'Union coordonnera les politiques que serviront aux Etats membres pour qu'ils peuvent accomplir les objectives *fixées en commun par eux-mêmes* ») mais aussi, l'ancien pilier communautaire („l'Union exercera, dans une modalité communautaire[6], les compétences accordées par les Etats"). Cette dernière phrase se réfère directement au transfert de compétences du niveau étatique au niveau européen de gouvernance.

La „définition" de la nature politique et juridique de l'Union, telle comme est stipulée

dans la Constitution Européenne, *n'est pas une définition classique* („dénomination" de l'Union) mais une définition *fonctionnaliste* (elle explique *indirectement cette nature* de l'Union, en prévoyant qu'est ce que l'Union *peut concrètement faire :* coordonner des politiques intergouvernementales ; exercer les compétences accordées par les Etats membres). Cette définition *ne se réfère pas à une „structure de l'Union",* mais on découle de la stipulation claire de ses attributions, que l'Union actionne **à deux niveaux différentes :** l'un intergouvernemental („les politiques") et l'un communautaire. Alors, on peut dire que *le premier pilier n'est pas abrogé qu'en apparence: le secteur communautaire, dans cette vision, est maintenu* parce qu'il est fonctionnel, efficace et parce que l'Union n'a pas abouti encore à l'étape fédérale pour *renoncer à la communitarisation[7].*

Si le problème de la nature politique et juridique de l'Union n'est pas encore solutionné d'une manière claire et officielle (par voie d'un traité ou par voie de la Constitution) on nous reste seulement la variante d'essayer *d'identifier les éléments et les attributions de l'Etat et du réseau transnational, après avoir défini ces deux notions politiques et voir comment elles s'articulent avec l'acception d'une Union détenant une nature impériale.* En fixant les points de comparaison pour définir les deux notions (le modèle étatique et le réseau transnational) on peut dire que la vraie problématique imposée par un tel sujet difficile est de savoir *si la nature impériale de l'Union est compatible avec le modèle étatique ou avec un réseau transnational et également, en quoi consiste une telle compatibilité.* C'est-à-dire, on va analyser les éléments **étatiques** et les éléments d'un **réseau,** qui peuvent établir des liaisons de *pouvoir,* des liaisons *hiérarchiques,* des *caractéristiques* et des *compétences* qui puissent ensemble diriger vers une conception impériale sur la nature de l'Union.

Pour opérer cettes distinctions, il est nécessaire *de définir d'abord l'empire,* comme concept politique et historique.

1. Le concept d'„Empire"

Selon les auteurs de droit constitutionnel[8], la terme d'„empire" est arrivé avec l'éveil de la Rome impériale, mais *l'organisation politique impériale est plus ancienne que la Rome* ; l'apport essentiel de la Rome c'est d'offrir justement *le*

modèle impérial valable et plus efficient, qui représente une „formule de succès" pour tous les formations politiques aspirant à devenir des „empires". Dans cette perspective, un autre juriste, Maurice Duverger, ouvre *une classification ayant*

comme critère de comparaison le modèle roman : des empires qui *sont attachés au modèle roman* (les « empires orientaux » », comme la Russie et, d'autre coté, les « empires occidentaux », comme le Saint Empire Romano-Allemand) et des empires *qui ne respectent pas* (ou, mieux dit, qui sont en dehors de) *ce modèle*[9]. Mais, comme ces auteurs avertissent, *on ne peut pas réaliser une classification impériale valable*, parce que la *définition même de l',,empire'' ne peut pas être l'une généralement valable, unanimement acceptée.* En essayant, pourtant, de donner une définition plus précise à cette entité politique, les auteurs préfèrent de la qualifier en vertu des éléments qui peuvent être rencontrées *dans le cas de l'Etat* (un *territoire*; le *pouvoir politique* exercé par la *même autorité* sur tout le territoire ; le caractère *unique du pouvoir*) ou qui sont spécifiques *à une fédération des Etats* (*territoire* vaste; *plusieurs peuples* englobés dans la structure politique ; la création d'une *grande entité politique, distincte* par rapport aux Etats membres). En plus, *l'empire est une entité qui doit avoir des objectifs expressément expansionnistes*[10], d'hégémonie et également, l'ambition de représenter et d'imposer une loi universellement valable, l'ambition de se confondre avec l'idée de « loi », d' « ordre parfaite » (même si cette ,,loi suprême'', impériale est en fait, une politique de maintenir l'équilibre régional/mondial *favorable aux intérêts impériaux* ; même si cette loi est imposée avec *la force des armes*).

L'empire est basé sur *l'idée d'hiérarchie entre le centre impérial* (l'Etat ou l'entité qui exerce le rôle politique exclusif / ou partagé, pour les formes d'empires plus subtiles, qui essayent de garder des certains attributs démocratiques) et les autres composantes englobées dans sa structure[11]. Cette hiérarchie politique est très développée dans l'ordre politique impérial, c'est le *fondement même de l'organisation impériale.*

Une autre caractéristique de l'empire réside dans l'existence *d'une armée propre*, capable d'assurer **l'implémentation concrète de la politique expansionniste de l'empire,** politique justifiée pour garantir à cette énorme construction les ressources nécessaires pour exister, pour se développer, pour se maintenir et pour promouvoir ses valeurs dans les périphéries[12] et également, pour maintenir un équilibre entre les autres centres rivales de pouvoir, équilibre qui doit être favorable à l'empire et à l'accomplissement de ses objectifs stratégiques.

La nature impériale de l'Union Européenne ne peut pas être révélée qu'après *une analyse attentive des éléments politiques et juridiques caractéristiques à l'Etat* (presque toutes les empires dans l'histoire ont été fondées sur *un Etat* ou *ont crée un Etat*). On doit, plus précisément, combattre tous les grands arguments qui soutiennent l'opinion que *l'Union n'est pas un Etat*[3], pour montrer, au contraire, que *cette entité originelle a des éléments étatiques illustrant un certain degré d'impérialisme dans le sens classique* (comme processus qui vise la création d'un empire en partant d'un Etat ou ayant comme but de former une entité classique). *Dans la deuxième partie de l'exposition, on doit accentuer le caractère* originel de l'Union, entité qui *ne doit pas être confondue ni avec un Etat westphalien, ni avec un empire historique.* L'Union est en train d'évoluer **vers un type de réseau qui utilise des composants étatiques** (populations, territoire, gouvernement, pouvoir politique) et également, qui utilise l'idée d'hiérarchie pour se consolider et pour s'étendre (le processus dit ,,d'élargissement'', qui n'est pas propre à un Etat, par définition encadrée dans des frontières détermines, rigides, reconnues par des traités internationaux).

Dans cette deuxième partie on verra dans quelle mesure on peut considérer les *éléments d'un réseau transnational* (comme potentiel acteur global, avec une existence *distincte* sur le plan des relations internationales) comme des *arguments pour accréditer l'idée de la nature impériale de l'Union* et pourquoi il n'y a pas de contradiction entre l'idée de hiérarchie et la notion politique de réseau.

2. L'Union Européenne : un nouveau type d'Etat ?

L'Etat, comme phénomène historique, politique et juridique[14] n'est pas une réalité qui ne se change pas avec le temps. Si la plus large définition de l'Etat (comme une ,,communauté nationale particularisée par son passe et par une certaine unité'') met en valeur le critère *historique* d'appréciation, le sens *westphalien* de l'Etat (la condition que la communauté *forme une nation, qui fait la spécificité de cette communauté*) peut correspondre à l'Union (conçue comme ,,une

communauté multinationale », qui a une *histoire propre*, commencé en 1993, avec sa proclamation officielle par la traité de Maastricht). En même temps, l'Union dispose d'un degré d'unité politique jamais atteint par une organisation internationale intergouvernementale comme type d'entité avec lequel l'UE a risqué souvent d'être confondue.

Si ce type de définition juridique de l'Etat peut correspondre à ce qu'est la nature de l'Union sans poser des grands problèmes, une *autre définition de l'Etat* semble plus spécifique mais en opérant toujours **dans le cadre du concept étatique westphalien**: ainsi, il faut que l'organisation assumant la direction de l'Etat dispose, par délégation de pouvoir, *du monopole d'édicter les règles de droit et de l'emploi de la force publique*[15]. Or, dans l'Union Européennes, la spécificité c'est qu'il n'y a pas un *seul corps politique ayant ces deux types de monopoles*[16], situation qui est une conséquence de la dispute d'ailleurs pas tranchée définitivement, entre *les souverainistes* (soutenant l'idée que, dans le système de l'UE, *les Etats sont ceux qui détiennent les deux monopoles*, leurs intérêts étant représentés au niveau de l'Union, par le *Conseil de l'Union Européenne* et par le *Conseil Européen*) et *les fédéralistes* (pour lesquels l'UE doit recevoir, comme un Etat fédéral, le monopole de créer et d'interpréter le droit européen comme un droit fédéral et également, le monopole de l'exercice de la force publique sur les territoires des Etats membres ; les fédéralistes sont des adeptes de la vision *d'un Parlement Européen puissant*, qui utilise la codécision pour s'affirmer progressivement comme véritable législateur dans l'Union, et de la *Commission* comme véritable institution politique *représentant l'Union et l'intérêt européen*).

Intéressant de remarquer c'est que **le système politique de l'UE ne respecte pas la définition classique de l'Etat** : des plusieurs institutions sont dotées dans l'Union avec un certain pouvoir impliquant d'assumer une fonction similaire à **la direction de l'Etat** : cette fonction principale peut signifier, pour les institutions de l'UE, des choses comme :
- de fixer les **lignes directrices** de la politique de l'Union, les orientations générales dans ses politiques intergouvernementales (le Conseil Européen).
- de représenter **l'intérêt européen** dans les relations entre les institutions de l'Union et

aussi, entre l'Union et les Etats membres ; d'être **le gardian du respect des traités communautaires** ; d'avoir le pouvoir **d'initiative législative** (Commission Européenne).
- de représenter **les intérêts des Etats membres, qui sont prééminentes** dans le système de l'UE, ce qui signifie que l'institution qui est la représentante des Etats assume implicitement, **la direction de l'Union** (Conseil Européen, Conseil de l'UE).
- L'Etat suppose l'existence d'un organe qui détient, **à la fois, le monopole** *d'édicter des normes juridiques* **et qui dispose également, du monopole** *sur l'emploi de la force publique*. Or, dans l'UE il n'y a pas un tel „organe" (le Conseil de l'UE édicte des normes juridiques, mais dans co-décision avec P.E. ; quant à l'emploi de la force publique, elle est une fonction régalienne, assumée par les Etats membres, conformant à leurs règles internes).
- **l'entier cadre institutionnel de l'Union**, qui représente, en lignes générales, l'équivalent d'un *appareil étatique*[17] ; les institutions appartenant au niveau européen de gouvernance forment ensemble un sort „*d'appareil politique*" *distinct* par rapport aux appareils politiques de Etats membres, appareil qui exerce *la direction de l'Union* par des moyens spécifiques et dans la composition duquel on retrouve le législatif, l'exécutif, le pouvoir judiciaire.

Selon les différentes interprétations qui peuvent être données à la syntagme *organe assumant la direction de l'Etat* (dans notre cas, de l'Union), on peut apprécier la nature étatique ou non du système politique de l'UE.

Par l'apparition de l'Union Européenne, *le pouvoir politique ne s'exerce plus exclusivement dans le cadre de l'Etat*, mais aussi dans le cadre d'un système politique fonctionnant sur des multiples niveaux (régional, étatique, européen).

Mais une autre spécificité de l'Etat, considérée comme un trait essentiel pour son existence, est *la souveraineté (ou „la compétence de ses compétences")*. Selon la doctrine juridique[18], l'Etat fonde et détermine son ordre juridique national (défini comme „l'ensemble de règles qu'il se donne et de règles internes qui en procèdent"); *l'Etat établie dans sa loi suprême ses compétences et les règles de base* auxquelles doivent se conformer toutes les règles internes de

droit, leur respect étant assure par *la capacité de l'Etat d'engager la force publique.*

La souveraineté, dans la conception classique, *se trouve en étroite liaison avec la capacité unique de l'Etat de détenir le monopôle de la contrainte armée.* Or, dans l'opinion des auteurs sceptiques à l'égard d'une éventuelle „nature étatique" de l'Union, on considère que celle-ci *ne dispose pas de souveraineté*, qui reste, même dans l'époque de la mondialisation, *l'attribut exclusif de l'Etat, qui le différencie par rapport aux autres sujets de droit international et de droit interne.* Dans les critiques[19] apportées actuellement à la doctrine souverainiste, on est utilisée *la théorie de la divisibilité de la souveraineté,* qui permet *aux Etats d'aliéner, par leur propre volonté, des « parties de cette souveraineté »* (dans ce point-là, on doit mentionner des autres opinions : *soit les Etats peuvent aliéner seulement l'exercice de la souveraineté*[20], cas dans lequel l'Union dévient un sort d'exécuter fidèle et limité de la volonté des Etats, soit l'aliénation regarde des *„morceaux" de leur souveraineté*, situation qui va aboutir à la conclusion que *l'Union est douée, progressivement, avec la souveraineté étatique nécessaire* pour finir de devenir elle-même un Etat (le dépassement implicite de l'étape communautaire). Avec la grande évolution de l'Etat westphalien (comme entité tendant à garder sa souveraineté) vers l'Etat post-modern (Etat qui partage sa souveraineté avec des autres entités qui sont elles-mêmes en train de s'étatiser, on se trouve dans la situation de ne pas affirmer avec fermeté que la souveraineté constitue un « attribut » caractérisant seulement l'Etat-nation.

Dans le cas de l'Union Européenne (entendue comme „Etat post-moderne"), la *souveraineté européenne*[21] *en train de se former* représente un trait spécifique de l'Union, en la distinguant par rapport avec les organisations internationales. En parlant de „**souveraineté européenne**", on doit tenir compte *du processus de transfert des parties étatiques de souveraineté au niveau européen*, parties auquel exercice est confié aux institutions de l'Union. D'ailleurs, le tribunal constitutionnel allemand (par son jugement du 12 Octobre 1993) a été implicitement d'accord avec cette conception qui affirme que l'Etat fédéral allemand peut transférer « des droits de souveraineté »[22], en admettant que l'Union este „apte à des actes de souveraineté"[23]. Mais, pour ménager la susceptibilité des Etats, très attachés à leur souveraineté (comme attribut essentiel certifiant leur existence), les instances judiciaires internes des Etats membres de l'Union utilisent fréquemment le syntagme „*faisceaux de compétences*" (désignant „les pouvoirs dont disposent, au nom des peuples, les gouvernants d'un Etat"). Selon cette opinion, **les compétences peuvent être divisées sans affecter l'intégrité et l'essence de l'Etat**, qui peut aliéner certaines „compétences" dans des domaines limités, aux organismes fédéraux on supranationaux ; d'ailleurs, la loi constitutionnelle française de 25 Juin 1992, ajoutant à la Constitution le titre XIV („des Communautés Européennes et de l'Union Européennes"), dans l'art. 88-1 se réfère explicitement aux „Etats qui ont choisi librement, en vertu des traités, *d'exercer en commun* certaines de leurs compétences". On trouve ici l'idée que **les Etats ne transfèrent pas**, mais seulement exercent à un autre niveau (européen) et d'une manière spécifique (en commun), pas de „souveraineté", mais „des compétences" (pour ne pas affecter la position prééminente, occupée par le modèle d' «Etat westphalien » dans la typologic des formes d'organisation politique). La vision du tribunal constitutionnel allemand est au moins contradictoire : il affirme d'une part, que l'Etat fédéral allemand transfert „*des droits de souveraineté*" (une phrase révolutionnaire, qui reflète le passage vers la forme post-moderne de l'Etat, conclusion qui est basée sur le fait que „les souverainetés" ne peuvent pas être transmises qu'à une autre entité, *en train de s'étatiser*). D'autre part, il indique expressément que *les Etats membres restent souveraines* et que *l'Union est un groupement d'Etats, que ne s'agit pas d'un Etat* reposant sur un peuple. De cette interprétation on découle le caractère original de l'Union, qui n'est pas qualifiée comme un „organisme international" ou comme une „fédération d'Etats", ni même comme une „association d'Etats", pour ne pas léser les susceptibilités des Etats membres qui se considèrent basés sur l'idée de souveraineté **classique, indivisible** : l'expression „les Etats **restent** souverains", utilisée par le tribunal constitutionnel allemand, signifie *qu'il n'y a pas de véritable transfert vers l'Union*, parce que „l'Union est tout simplement, un groupement d'Etats" (c'est-à-dire, un sort de « *conglomérat pluri-étatique* », sans identité politique propre, dans lequel la souveraineté est présente au niveau

des Etats, une entité qui ne forme pas progressivement et définitivement „une souveraineté européenne"). En fait, le tribunal a essayé de concilier les deux conceptions opposées (la divisibilité de la souveraineté ; la souveraineté classique) sans réussir qu'augmenter les controverses sur la nature juridique de l'Union, sans offrir une réponse claire et précis.

Pour soutenir *notre thèse sur le caractère étatique de l'Union*, il suffit de retenir *les deux affirmations du tribunal constitutionnel allemand*, qui admet la possibilité du „*transfert des droit de souveraineté*" par l'Etat à Union et d'autre part, la capacité de cette entité d'„*effectuer des actes de souveraineté*". Pour mieux illustrer la nature étatique de l'Union, on doit s'appuyer sur *la conception de la divisibilité de la souveraineté*. Ça veut dire que les Etats membres sont libres a céder *des parties de leur souverainetés* (ou nommés, dans les autres décisions, des „*compétences*" ou des „*pouvoir souveraines*") à l'Union, un fait original, qui ne peut pas être rencontré[24] chez les organisations internationales. Mais le transfert *est partiel, limité* („les Etats *restent* souverains"; ils „*conservent*" leur identité nationale"; art. 6, paragr. 3/TUE ; art. 1-5/Constitution), ce que signifie que les entités exerçant la souveraineté sont de deux types : les Etats membres et l'Union. L'idée de base pour admettre que l'Union a une *souveraineté propre*, c'est de suivre *la direction de ce transfert : le niveau politique européen, l'exercice de la souveraineté appartenant aux institutions de l'UE*. Le fait que certaines institutions de l'UE représentent l'intérêt des Etats n'affecte pas l'idée qu'il y a déjà un transfert de souveraineté étatique dirigé vers un échelon de décision supérieur où elle va être exercée au nom des Etats et des peuples européens, par des institutions distinctes par rapport avec celles nationales.

Deuxièmement, l'existence même de ce transfert illustre l'idée que l'Union acquiert *progressivement une souveraineté propre, qui ne peut pas avoir les bases identiques avec une souveraineté traditionnelle* (de type *étatique*): c'est-à-dire, d'être **inconditionné** (au contraire, la souveraineté de l'UE provient de souverainetés des Etats membres, par voie du transfert progressif, par l'effet des traités internationales conclus), d'être **suprême** (au contraire, la souveraineté européenne est *limitée, conditionnée* par l'existence des souverainetés *étatiques*[25] que doivent être respectées).

Vue *l'origine de ces deux types de souveraineté* – qui proviennent, toutes les deux, de la volonté des peuples européennes –, il ne s'agit pas d'hiérarchie. La souveraineté, transférée ou pas, signifie un type spécial de pouvoir (qui fonde un ordre juridique, qui *est suprême par rapport aux tiers dans toutes les cases*, au niveau *national* qu'en niveau *européen*, indifféremment de l'entité qui l'exerce : l'Etat ou l'Union). Le paradoxe est que, *dans le cas de l'ordre juridique communautaire*, qui est *distincte* par rapport *aux ordres nationales des Etats membres* et par rapport à l'ordre juridique internationale, et qui *s'impose* aux ordres juridiques des Etats membres (effet direct, applicabilité directe, primauté), la source de cette ordre nouvelle réside dans *les volonté des Etats. L'Union n'est pas à l'origine de l'ordre juridique communautaire*, si on le regarde comme un ordre formé seulement par des traités constitutifs et modificateurs (conception restrictive). Dans l'interprétation extensive, **l'Union peut se trouver à l'origine de son propre ordre juridique**[26] (la condition nécessaire pour que la souveraineté européenne ait l'attribut de « **suprématie** ») si l'ordre juridique communautaire signifie pas seulement *les traités fondateurs* (traités des Communautés ; traité de l'Union) mais aussi *les actes juridiques édictés par les institutions de l'UE*, les décisions de la Commission, les arrêts de la CJCE, *les principes de droit communautaire* identifiés par la Cour de Justice des Communautés Européennes (la seule habilité pour interpréter les traités) qui est, également, une institution de l'Union. Dans ce sens là, on regardant *l'émitent de la norme juridique communautaire*[27] et *l'effet direct et la primauté* (de certains actes juridiques communautaires), on peut reconnaître l'existence de la suprématie d'une „*souveraineté européenne*" également, comme „*pouvoir de droit distinct par rapport aux pouvoirs nationaux*".

Si l'Etat est, traditionnellement, *à la source du droit*[28], on peut dire qu'aujourd'hui, avec l'apparition de l'Union Européenne, une autre entité politique s'ajoute **à la formation du droit communautaire** ; l'originalité c'est que *les deux types de souveraineté* ne concurrent pas entre elles, étant *complémentaires*, chaque représentant un *pouvoir de droit mis à l'origine d'un ordre de droit distinct*.

Si on admet que *l'Union dispose*, comme entité en train de s'étatiser, *d'une souveraineté*

propre (mais également, une souveraineté *en train de se former* ; une souveraineté limitée pour le moment, complémentaire avec les souverainetés étatiques), on admet implicitement, qu'*elle est capable d'avoir le pouvoir d'établir pour elle-même ses compétences*. Si on entend par „souveraineté" la capacité de l'Union d'émettre, par voie de ses institutions, des actes juridiques avec une force contraignante pour les Etats membres (réglementations, décisions ou même des directives obligatoires dans leur but), c'est-à-dire, de former (*lato sensu*) l'ordre juridique communautaire, ça signifie que l'Union dispose réellement *d'un pouvoir de droit assimilé à la notion westphalienne de «souveraineté»*. La grande innovation est que la souveraineté européenne se forme progressivement, à la fois par voie *de transfert du niveau étatique* (par la volonté des Etats) et *par voie de création d'une ordre juridique distincte* (ordre qui ne peut pas être réduit seulement aux seuls les traités fondateurs exprimant la volonté des Etats) par les institutions européennes (les règlements du Conseil de l'UE, les directives de la Commission et les décisions de la Cour de Justice).

En ce qui concerne la *définition westphalienne de l'Etat* (vu comme entité dotée „d'un *pouvoir de commandement et du monopole d'édiction des règles de droit*", on doit premièrement noter que, dans le système de l'Union Européenne, *il n'y a pas du monopôle législatif*, parce que *la répartition des pouvoir politiques entre les institutions européennes ne respecte pas le modèle étatique d'organisation des pouvoirs conçu par Montesquieu*. Ainsi, on peut parler d'un „*couple législatif*" (Conseil de l'Union Européenne, Parlement Européen) qui peut „décider" dans des domaines établis par les traités ; on peut aussi, mentionner *le pouvoir d'initiative législative de la Commission Européenne (qui est considérée, par certains auteurs*[29], comme „un exécutif européen").

L'théorie westphalienne soutient que *seul l'Etat doit avoir le monopole législatif* (dans un territoire déterminé, sur une population vivant entre les frontières de son territoire) et pas d'autres collectivités infra- étatiques ou supra-étatiques. C'est une idée traditionaliste, qui traite comme *prééminent le rôle de l'Etat*, par rapport aux autres collectivités (inclusivement, les associations des Etats).

De ce point de vue, l'Union **n'est qu'un groupement interétatique**, n'imposant pas aux Etats ses règles de droit ; pourtant, cette hypothèse n'est pas vérifiée par la réalité complexe du système unioniste où les Etats confient, par leur propre volonté, des „droits souverains" en vertu desquels l'Union peut former progressivement, une ordre juridique propre. Dans ce système, *les normes de droit communautaires sont édictées par des institutions appartenant à une autre entité politique* (l'Union) *que les Etats. L'existence* et les *caractères* de cette ordre juridique (primauté, effet direct, applicabilité directe) sont *des arguments contre l'idée westphalienne* selon laquelle seulement *l'Etat* peut édicter des règles de droit sur un certain territoire et en regardant une population déterminée. La norme juridique communautaire *s'applique directement aux citoyens* des Etats membres et, dans certaines aspects, a *priorité* par rapport à la norme nationale de droit. La conséquence est que l'ordre juridique communautaire „s'infiltre" dans l'ordre nationale de droit. En participant au système de l'Union, l'Etat n'est plus *le seul édicteur des règles juridiques applicables pour ses citoyens*.

Mais *l'Union n'a pas une „compétence-compétence„ intégrale. Parce que la souveraineté européenne est en train de se former*, l'Union étant une création *des Etats qui lui fixent des compétences*[30] dans les traités constitutifs (Maastricht) on assiste à un certain *paradoxe* : l'Union peut *édicter*, par ses institutions spécifiques, des règles juridiques *prééminentes* et *applicables dans l'ordre étatique*, mais, pour le moment, *elle n'est pas un Etat „westphalien" (capable de s'auto- organiser)*.

3. L'Union Européenne, un réseau transnational ?

Comme construction politique *sans précédent* dans l'histoire des organisations politiques, l'UE peut être, également, individualisée sous la forme d'un acteur globaliste de nouveau type: le réseau transnational[31]. L'Union Européenne, de ce point de vue, tend à s'approcher d'un sorte „*d'empire néo-médiéval*"[32] (selon les opinions émises par des auteurs comme Ole Waever, Jan Zielonka). Les empires d'une telle forme ne sont pas constitués en partant d'une idée hiérarchique, mais

embrassent plutôt *le modèle dit de „cercles concentriques" placés sous l'influence d'un centre „organisé d'une manière plus hiérarchique"*[33] par rapport aux autres cercles de pouvoir.

Ole Waever soutient, par exemple, comme illustrant cette tendance, que l'UE est construite « autour d'un *centre* socialement structuré, manifestation d'une volonté politique *d'avoir un centre* ». La particularité de ce fait se réfère à **l'absence d'un développement de ce centre „comme une force autonome, capable d'imposer sa volonté"**, déterminant ainsi la comparaison entre l'UE et l'empire Sumérien, plutôt que l'assimilation de l'Union à un „empire néo-médiéval". Toutefois, Waever ne donne pas la définition d'un „centre", parce qu'il considère qu'il y a différentes manières de construire l'Europe et, par conséquence, „des différentes volontés politiques d'avoir un centre".[34]

Conformément à l'Ecole Anglaise de Relations Internationales, la métaphore de l' « empire » est considérée comme un début approprié d'expliquer la vraie nature de l'Union Européenne, vue comme un *„centre* appartenant à une société internationale plus large". Cette Ecole soutient également que l'UE a une nature impériale à cause de *sa organisation interne* (son centre étant à Bruxelles) et, en second lieu, l'Union constitue elle-même *le centre d'un empire plus large* (bicéphale, qui est « l'empire transatlantique » ou « occidental »). De même, l'Ecole Anglaise utilise l'expression „société globale" (« world society") ou „société transnationale" pour montrer que nous sommes en présence d'un „sous-système international spécifique" où les „relations transnationales de la société globale sont plus denses en ce qui concerne les sociétés de l'UE. C'est une définition expresse que cette Ecole emploie, en exprimant *l'idée d'une nature post-moderne, impériale, de l'Union Européenne* („UE – société transnationale"), comme entité basée sur une histoire européenne commune, sur une culture intellectuelle commune, sur une „conscience européenne" en train de se former, également, sur des valeurs politiques communes (le libéralisme de marché avec une forme sociale; le respect des droits de l'homme) et aussi, sur des activités transnationales entre les „frontières internes de l'Union" (programmes de coopération culturelle, échanges interuniversitaires, partis politiques européens etc.).

Tous ces éléments, auxquels s'ajoute **la citoyenneté européenne** (véritable aspect supranational de la gouvernance européenne)[35] forment la dimension *transnationale de l'UE* (dans le sens d'une construction politique à l'horizontale, sans impliquer l'idée *d'hiérarchie* politique, construction basée sur des liaisons et des mécanismes de coopération au-delà des frontières des Etats). De ce point de vue, l'Union Européenne diffère, comme *„empire post-moderne"* (selon l'Ecole Anglaise des Relations Internationales), par rapport aux vieux types d'empires (structurés sur l'idée de prééminence politique, de supériorité économique, militaire et culturelle du *centre* impériale par rapport aux périphéries)[36]. Une autre particularité de l'Union c'est *l'originale combinaison* entre les éléments *d'hiérarchie* (qui forment „le niveau politique de gouvernance européenne", en se basant **sur le cadre institutionnel de l'Union, particulièrement sur des institutions ayant une claire nature juridique et politique supranationale** comme le Parlement Européen, la Commission, la Cour de Justice, la Banque Centrale Européenne –; en se basant, également, **sur le caractère supranational de la citoyenneté européenne et du droit européen**), des éléments apportant la dimension supranationale dans la nature juridique et politique de l'Union et, d'autre part, les éléments „transnationales" (qui sont *projetés* à rejoindre les peuples et les Etats de l'UE dans un espace commun culturel, économique et politiques, en train de se former).

En dépit de sa originalité structurelle, l'Union Européenne reste, selon notre opinion, „un empire pas fini", car les *Etats sont les maîtres de l'Union*[37], ils gardent leur souveraineté, ils décident les compétences à accorder pour les institutions de l'UE, ils sont les sujets de droit international et pas l'Union. Pourtant, on ne peut pas être niée une certaine évolution de l'Union, qui peut aboutir à lui conférer une position plus forte par rapport aux Etats membres (l'accroissement progressive des compétences accordées à l'Union; la reconnaissance d'une personnalité juridique *de fait* pour l'Union, qui peut conclure des accords internationaux dans son propre nom[38]). Ainsi, la particularité de l'Union Européenne, comme „société transnationale", est la participation de l'Etat « dans une structure dense de normes et de réglementations juridiques, reconnue par tous les participants », mais sans que

les Etats abandonne leur dernier droit d'établir ces normes et réglementations[39].

Le rôle des Etats dans l'Union est plutôt de donner **une forme concrète à cette „société européenne transnationale"** que les autres auteurs ont décrit comme „un système de gouvernance basé sur des multiples niveaux"[40]. De ce point de vue, l'Union s'éloigne du modèle étatique westphalien structuré sur l'idée **d'un seul centre de pouvoir étatique ayant l'entière responsabilité du système gouverné**; l'Union a été comparée également, dans la doctrine de l'intégration européenne, avec „un système de gouvernance type réseau", „une forme de gouvernance décentralisée, contrastant avec le gouvernement d'un Etat moderne.[41]

L'Union Européenne **dépasse, dans ces opinions, le système étatique,** en formant un original système de gouvernance politique, en renonçant (partiellement, après notre opinion, parce que l'Union préserve certains éléments étatiques et d'hiérarchie politique et institutionnelle – par exemple, la *prééminence* du Conseil Européen et du Conseil de Ministres, deux institutions intergouvernementaux, représentant les intérêts des Etats membres dans le cadre institutionnel de l'UE, après Maastricht –) à la séparation entre une ordre rigoureusement *hiérarchisée*, à l'intérieur de l'Union et une ordre *anarchique* au niveau international. Avec l'apparition de l'UE, la frontière entre ces deux ordres tend à disparaître, car *les systèmes internationaux ne respectent pas la condition de territorialité rigide comme les Etats,* en oscillant entre l'indépendance complète et la subordination totale. Etant caractérisée comme „sous-système transnational", l'UE trouve sa place « dans le milieu d'un sous-système international différent par rapport au système interétatique classique, territorial ».[42]

Si on peut trouver *des éléments impériales classiques* dans le cas de l'Union Européenne (la *citoyenneté* européenne, comme type de „citoyenneté impériale"; le *droit* européen comme prééminent par rapport aux ordres juridiques des Etats membres, et directement applicable dans les territoires des Etats membres; *une structure politique cohérente de gouvernance* au niveau européen, *distincte* par rapport aux organes politiques appartenant aux Etats membres; des politiques communautaires (appartenant au premier pilier de l'Union) formulées par des institutions européennes; une stratégie cohérente d'expansion de l'Union vers l'Est du continent, qui montre la volonté claire de sécuriser ses frontières extérieures, de construire „un cercle des amis" autour de ses frontières et une sphère d'influence, comme toutes les empires classiques), on aperçoit également, **des éléments spécifiques à un empire transnationale, post-moderne.** Ainsi, on doit préciser que la citoyenneté européenne est complémentaire à celle nationale, en ne la remplaçant pas; l'Union est la création politique des Etats membres, par leur volonté souveraine, des Etats qui ne deviennent pas des „simples provinces impériales subordonnées au centre impérial"; l'expansion progressive de l'Union vers l'Est n'utilise pas la méthode impériale classique *„manu militari"*; en plus, l'Union ne dispose pas du monopole de „violence légitime" pour imposer sa volonté face aux Etats membres; l'Union n'a pas formé une „armée impériale" capable d'implémenter une stratégie impériale de subordination des périphéries; la construction européenne est basée sur l'égalité juridique entre les Etats membres, qui sont en plus, *les maîtres* de l'Union, en décidant les grandes évolutions et les orientations générales de l'Union par l'institution intergouvernementale, qui est le Conseil Européen).

Comme un empire *de nouveau type,* l'expansion de l'Union vers des nouvelles zones d'intérêt stratégique (les Balkans de l'Ouest; l'espace ex-soviétique; la politique spéciale avec les pays méditerranéens) est réalisée par des moyens diplomatiques et financières (aides spéciales, instruments structurels de pré/adhésion; instruments européens de voisinage), par un processus complexe de négociation en vue d'adhésion (visant les pays candidats), de préparation pour les *potentiels* candidats ou de conclusion des relations diplomatiques privilégiées avec certains Etats qui ne seront pas des „futurs candidats". Tous ces aspects sont des éléments *post-modernes* d'une Union impériale, soulignant la particularité de cette originelle entité politique d'être un „ordre de droit" et pas „un ordre formé et maintenu par la force" (le cas des anciens empires). Cette particularité *post-moderne* de l'Union („la force du droit" en lieu d'utiliser „le droit impérial de la force") est destinée de garantir, dans le futur, la stabilité intérieure et extérieure de l'empire européen.

Conclusions

À la fin, on doit préciser que l'Union Européenne représente un type spécifique de construction politique, impossible d'être qualifiée pleinement comme „Etat" ou comme „réseau"; plutôt, l'Union se révèle comme un type de réseau transnational ayant des certes éléments étatiques, comme un type de communauté crée par les Etats, contrôlée par les Etats membres (mais pas dans toutes les domaines). L'Union se refuse à une définition juridique et politique précise (Etat, fédération, association d'Etats, organisation internationale, réseau), puisqu'elle *combine* des traites spécifiques avec des diverses formes d'organisation politique.

La deuxième particularité de l'Union se réfère au fait que la nature impériale de l'UE est à la fois, une nature mixte, formée tant des éléments spécifiques aux empires classiques (comme on a été montré au-dessus) que des éléments impériales post-modernes.

L'Union Européenne n'est que *partiellement* un empire *classique* (contrôle politique exercé sur un territoire vaste, déterminé, sur des populations diverses), car cette entité originelle est également, *un empire post-moderne* reposant sur une *double „structure"*: *supranationale* – le niveau européen de gouvernance politique –, et *transnationale* – les contacts, les interdépendances, les modalités diverses de circulation et les activités des acteurs sociaux dans le territoire de l'Union, dans le sens fonctionnel).

Notes :

[1] Après la ratification du traité d'Amsterdam, le pilier „JAI" est devenu le pilier „CPJP" (coopération policière et judiciaire en matière pénale), comme effet du transfert d'une partie de ce pilier („Visas, asile, immigration...") dans le pilier communautaire.

[2] Dans le sens dans lequel l'Union „a englobé" dans le premier pilier de sa architecture politique (parce qu'elle est une entité *politique*, avant tout) les Communautés (avec la mention que le traité CECA, en créant la Communauté Européenne de Charbon et Acier, a expiré en 2002). Les deux Communautés en fonction (EURATOM et CEE – la dernière a devenu par l'effet du traité de Maastricht, la « Communauté Européenne ») **gardent leur personnalité juridique expressément reconnue par les traités fondateurs**, paradoxalement, sans que **l'ensemble politique auquel ces organisations d'intégration appartiennent, ait une personnalité juridique expresse**. Pourtant, on ne doit pas confondre l'Union avec les deux Communautés Européennes qui représentent seulement le premier pilier (intégrationniste) de cette entité politique originelle.

[3] L'Union Européenne et Monétaire ne constitue pas un „pilier" distinct de l'Union Européenne à coté des Communautés, de PESC et de CPJP. Il s'agit d'un type d'espace intégrationniste, **fonctionnel** (et pas politique), proposant des objectives précises pour consolider l'intégration européenne dans le domaine économique (la coordination des économies des Etat membres) et monétaire (convergence des monnaies nationales ; l'introduction d'Euro, la monnaie unique pour les Etats membres respectant certaines conditions). Selon une opinion, l'UEM fait partie de I-er pilier (cf. Roxana Munteanu, « Drept european. Evoluție, instituții, ordine juridică », Ed. Oscar Print, București, 1996, pag. 108).

[4] Le traité établissant une Constitution Européenne, signé à Rome (2004) a été rejeté par référendum, en 2005 (dans deux pays fondateurs de l'UE : France et Pays-Bas). Ça signifie qu'on reste avec une Union Européenne structurée encore sur trois piliers (CE ; PESC ; CPJP), sans être dotée d'une personnalité juridique expresse et sans une définition précise de sa nature juridique et politique consacrée dans un traité fondamental pour l'Union.

[5] Cf. François-Xavier Priollaud, David Siritzky – „La Constitution Européenne. Texte et commentaires"; La Documentation Française ; Paris ; 2005 ; pag. 46-47 (la „nouvelle UE" est crée à partir de la reconnaissance expresse de la personnalité juridique de l'UE par le texte constitutionnel européen ; par la fusion entre la „vieille" Union Européenne et les Communautés ; par la disparition de la structure en piliers de l'Union). Mais, comme la Constitution Européenne a été rejetée en 2005, on ne peut pas parler d'„une nouvelle UE" dans cette acception.

[6] À cause de la suppression des piliers, dans la vision de la Constitution Européenne, importante, dans ce cas-là, est la manière dans laquelle l'UE va exercer ses compétences (une *méthode communautaire*, c'est-à-dire, qui repose sur le monopole du droit d'initiative législative de la Commission, et également, sur la procédure législative ordinaire – co-décision du PE et voté à majorité qualifiée au Conseil-; sur le contrôle juridictionnel de la Cour de Justice). Cf. François-Xavier Priollaud, David Siritzky – *op.cit.*, pag. 32.

[7] La suppression de la structure en piliers (qui est une construction doctrinale) de l'Union, conséquence de la **fusion des traités**, n'entraîne pas la communautarisation complète des matières tenant du IIème et du IIIème piliers. Cf. François-Xavier Priollaud, David Siritzky – *op.cit.*, pag. 48. On peut parler d'une conservation *fonctionnelle* (et pas

doctrinale, formelle) du premier pilier (communautaire), quand „la nouvelle UE" dotée d'une personnalité juridique expresse va exercer des compétences autrefois accordées par les Etats aux Communautés.

[8] Olivier Duhamel, Yves Mény – „Dictionnaire constitutionnel", PUF, Paris, 1992, pag. 397.

[9] Idem, pag. 399.

[10] „Le dispositif impérial" ou „l'impérialisme", dans son sens géopolitique, se réfère à „une construction territoriale dominante, soumise seulement à une logique de l'expansion territoriale", qui se manifeste par „agrégation et annexion des territoires, en partant de l'Etat-centre de l'Empire ; „une administration souvent centralisée, mais toujours placée sous le contrôle du centre impériale, qui a comme tâche principale d'organiser la soumission politique et l'exploitation économique des territoires vaincus". Cf. A. Champrade, Fr. Thual – „Dicționar de geopolitică: state, concepte, autori", Ed. Corint, Buc., cités dans Silviu Neguț – „Introducere în geopolitică", Ed. Meteor Press, Buc., 2005, pag. 133.

[11] Marie-Claude Smouts, Dario Battistella, Pascal Vennesson – „Dictionnaire des relations internationales. Approches, Concepts, Doctrines", Dalloz, 2006, pag. 190.

[12] Il s'agit d'une caractéristique de l'empire de type classique qui est visible jusqu'à présent, dans le cas d'unipolarité, en ce qui concerne la super-puissance américaine (voir l'entière école doctrinaire sur l'impérialisme américain) ; cf. à Niall Fergusson, „Colossus The Rise and Fall of American Empire", Penguin Books, 2005, USA, pag. VIII-IX ; voir également Chalmers Johnson – „Gustul amar al imperiului", trad. Ion Vlădoiu ; Ed. Antet, 2005.

[13] Loukas Tsoukalis – *Ce fel de Europă ?*, trad. par Lena Călinoiu ; Ed. All, 2005, Buc., pag. 34. Voir également, „Studiu Introductiv : Constituționalismul european si capcana suveranității" par Ruxandra Ivan (Introduction au livre de Paul Magnette – „Europa, Statul si Democrația : Suveranul îmblânzit", Institutul European, 2005, Iași, pag. 17-18. Pour Paul Magnette, l'Europe a réussi (grâce au projet de l'Union Européenne) de dépasser la piège de la souveraineté, « d'apprivoiser le Souverain », c'est-à-dire, de faire plus forts les Etats, dans le même temps « en les supprimant les aspects les plus agressifs de leur souveraineté » (Paul Magnette – *op.cit.*, pag. 29).

[14] Pierre Pactet – *Institutions politiques. Droit constitutionnel*; Armand Colin ; 2002, Paris, pag. 40-41.

[15] Idem, pag. 41.

[16] On ne peut pas affirmer que l'Union Européenne a le monopole sur la „violence légitime" (qui reste aux Etats membres, comme un trait marquant de leur souveraineté). Deuxièmement, l'UE, par ses institutions, dispose d'un autre type de monopole (de créer et d'interpréter le droit communautaire), monopole lié d'un ordre juridique de nature supranationale, qui s'impose aux ordres juridiques des Etats membres.

[17] Dans le sens qu'on peut trouver dans le cadre institutionnel de l'UE des institutions dotées avec des fonctions législatives et budgétaires (Parlement Européen ; Conseil de l'UE) ; des institutions qui exercent une fonction exécutive (Commission ; Conseil de l'UE ; Conseil Européen) ; des institutions avec des fonctions judiciaires et d'interprétation du droit communautaire (préjudicielle) comme la Court de Justice. Selon des autres opinions, les institutions de l'UE ne peuvent pas être encadrées facilement dans des catégories comme „législature", „exécutif", „judiciaire", car il n'y a pas de véritable „séparation de pouvoirs" dans la construction européenne. La compétence de chaque institution ne reste pas statique, grâce à l'effet novateur des traités successifs modifiant continuellement la balance de pouvoir entre les institutions. Voir John Fairhurst – „Law of the European Union" ; Pearson – Longman, UK, 2006, pag. 80. Dans le même sens, Roxana Munteanu – „Drept european. Evoluție – instituții – ordine juridică"; Ed. Oscar Print, Buc., 1996, pag. 191 („le principe d'organisation des Communautés n'est pas celui de la séparation des pouvoirs mais plutôt, celui de la représentation des intérêts").

[18] Pierre Pactet – *op.cit.*, pag. 44-45.

[19] Genoveva Vrabie – *Drept constituțional și instituții politice contemporane* ; Ed. Ștefan Procopiu, Iași, 1993, pag. 82-87.

[20] Idem, pag. 83.

[21] Par le syntagme „souveraineté européenne" on comprend un pouvoir cvasi- étatique de commande, qui n'est pas absolue (contrairement à la théorie de Bodin), qui est conféré à l'Union par les Etats membres, partiellement par voie de transfert progressif et définitif des „droits souveraines" vers l'échelon européen de gouvernance.

[22] Pourtant, par les traités constitutifs, l'Union ne se transforme pas dans un Etat fédéral, parce qu'elle a aussi, l'obligation expresse de respecter l'identité nationale de chaque Etat membre et ses traditions constitutionnelle. Chaque Etat reste maître de son organisation constitutionnelle et administrative; l'Union ne peut pas affecter la répartition des compétences entre l'Etat et les entités infra- étatiques, ni imposer à un Etat de changer sa forme de gouvernement. Cf. François-Xavier Priollaud, David Siritzky- *op.cit.*; pag. 43.

[23] Pour des autres auteurs, l'Etat perd la maîtrise de son système juridique, à la fois dans le plan normatif et institutionnel, l'UE ayant le pouvoir de déterminer quels sont les actes juridiques applicables dans l'ordre juridique interne. Deuxièmement, l'Etat perd le monopole de la production normative dans le système juridique national (principe de primauté, principe d'immédiateté). Attribuer des compétences à l'UE vient, en troisième lieu, à déposséder le pouvoir législatif national ; le principe de la séparation des pouvoirs est affecté dans sa dimension horizontale et les équilibres étatiques entre le gouvernement central et les entités locales sont également bouleversés par l'UE. L'Etat, selon cette opinion, n'est plus souverain, il est passe sous le contrôle de l'UE. Voir Olivier Dubos- *op. cit.*, pag. 36-49.

[24] Le principe de primauté (Costa v.Enel/1964) est stipulé dans l'arrêt de la CJCE, où la Court utilise les syntagmes "pouvoirs réels résultant **d'une limitation de souveraineté ou d'un transfert de pouvoir** des Etats membres à la

Communauté". Voir également, John Fairhurst- "Law of the European Union", Pearson and Longman, GB, 2006, pag. 233. Le principe de l'effet direct est également consacré dans l'arrêt Van Gend en Loos (1962) dans lequel on precise que "les Etats ont limité leurs **droits souverains** dans des domains limités", en faveur d'un nouveau ordre juridique communutaire (Cf. Fairhurst, *op. cit.*, pag. 235).

[25] Philippe Manin, pag. 69

[26] Voir Olivier Dubos – " L'Union Européenne: Sphynx ou énigme?", dans " Etudes en l'honneur de Jean Claude Gautron", "Les Dynamiques du droit européen en debut du siecle", Pédone, Paris, 2004, pag. 36.

[27] Comprise ici comme pouvoir de commande de l'Etat qui doit s'exercer en conformité avec le droit (condition essentielle, chez Léon Duguit, pour que la souveraineté soit légitime). Cf. Genoveva Vrabie – *op.cit.*, pag. 80-81. Voir aussi, Pierre Pactet – *op.cit.*, pag. 44.

[28] Selon la conception de Léon Duguit, l'Etat, en élaborant la loi, est obligé de la respecter, d'actionner seulement dans la limite fixée par la loi, pour être un „Etat de droit". Voir Genoveva Vrabie – *op.cit.*, pag. 49-50. Voir aussi, Pierre Pactet – *op.cit.*, pag. 44.

[29] Pour l'idée d'un „*exécutif européen polycéphale*" (Conseil ; Commission ; Conseil Européen), voir Bernard Chantebout – *Droit constitutionnel* ; Armand Colin, 2004, Paris, pag. 372-373. Pour des autres auteurs, la Commission est un corps politique administratif dépassant les frontières normales du modèle de la séparation des pouvoir, ayant tant des attributions législatives que des attributions judiciaires ou exécutives. Cf. Clive H. Church, David Phinnemore – „The Penguin Guide to the European Treaties", Penguin Books; 2002; pag. 398.

[30] Les Etats, comme **maîtres de l'Union**, même dans la variante proposée par le traité constitutionnel, restent les détenteurs de la „compétence – compétence", (Cf. François-Xavier Priollaud, David Siritzky – *op.cit.*, pag. 438).

[31] Quelques auteurs utilisent le terme de „politiques réseaux", pour exprimer l'idée du remplacement des fonctions de gouvernance avec « les réseaux de négociations englobant également des acteurs gouvernementaux que des acteurs privés ou des représentants de la société civile ». Voir la théorie du „système avec des plusieurs niveaux de gouvernance" (Tanja A. Börzel, Thomas Risse – „Who is Afraid of a European Federation ? How to Constitutionalise a Multi-Level Governance System" ; http://jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers

[32] Le „Néo-médiévalisme" représente une conception dans les relations internationales qui a été premièrement exposée par Hedly Bull – „The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics" (Mac Millian Press, 1977, G.B.). Ce type de système politique ou „d'organisation moderne et séculaire, équivalente à l'organisation politique universelle spécifique à la Chrétienté Occidentale durant le Moyen Age" est basé sur la prémise de la disparition des Etats (Bull, *op.cit.*, pag. 254). Cependant, cette chose ne peut pas être appliquée comme telle au système politique de l'UE, dans lequel les Etats membres **restent souverains**, en dépit des transferts de „droit souverains" vers le niveau européen de gouvernance. Le système néo-médiéval supposes „qu'aucun gouvernant ou Etat soit souverain ou suprême sur un territoire déterminé, devrant partager l'autorité avec les vassaux au-dessous et avec l'Empereur et Le Pape, au-dessus"; „la réincarnation séculaire d'un système des autorités superposées ou fragmentées, qui caractérisait la Chrétienté médiévale" (idem, pag. 264). Dans le même sens, voir Graham Evans, Jeffrey Newnham – „Dictionnaire de relations internationales" ; Ed. Universal Dalsi, 2001; trad. Anca Irina Ionescu, pag. 380-381.

[33] Voir Thomas Diez, Richard Whitman – „Analysing European Integration. Reflecting on the English School: Scenarios for an Encounter"; COPRI; Working Papers; 20/2000, pag. 7-9.

[34] Idem, pag. 7-8.

[35] Au contraire, dans le sens „transnational" de la citoyenneté européenne, voir Elvire Fabry – „Qui a peur de la citoyenneté européenne ? La démocratie à l'heure de la Constitution" ; PUF ; Paris, 2005 ; pag. 184.

[36] Voir également, pour la définition d'un „empire traditionnel", Olivier Duhamel, Yves Mény – „Dictionnaire constitutionnel", PUF, Paris, 1992, pag. 397-399. Aussi, voire David Held, Anthony McGuw, David Goldblatt, Jonathan Perraton – „Transformări globale. Politică, economie, cultură"; trad. Ramona-Elena Lupaşcu, Adriana Ştraub, Mihaela Bordea, Alina-Maria Turcu ; Polirom, Iaşi, 2004, pag. 57-58.

[37] Olivier Dubos, *op. cit.*, pag. 32-35.

[38] Francois Priollaud. David Siritzky – *op. cit.*, pag. 47

[39] Thomas Diez, Richard Whitman – *op.cit.*, pag. 7-8.

[40] Helen Wallace, William Wallace – "Procesul politic in Uniunea Europeana", Ed. Arc, trad. Genoveva Bolea, Chişinău, 2004.

[41] Idem, pag. 7-8. Voir également, Paul Magnette – *op.cit.*, pag. 156-157.

[42] Thomas Diez, Richard Whitman – *op.cit.*, pag. 7-8.

La sécurité régionale du Sud-Est de l'Europe
- De la Petite Entente et l'Entente balkanique à l'OTAN -

Dragoş Preda

Introduction

Au début du XXème siècle les nations de la région de l'Europe Centrale et de Sud-Est se trouvaient dans une lutte constante pour leur indépendance ou pour le parachèvement de leur Etats nationaux. Leurs aspirations se sont toujours heurtées des trois Grandes Puissances situées dans leur proximité – les empires Ottoman, Austro-Hongrois et Russe. Ceux-ci, chacun ayant ses propres intérêts, se disputaient depuis deux siècles la suprématie dans la région et avaient réussi à entretenir de permanentes dissensions internes et rivalités entre les diverses factions politiques, entre les Etats voisins – exacerbées par leur caractère ethnique prononcé. Toutes ces contradictions de la région développées pendant les nombreuses crises internes et internationales, amplifiées par la politique expansionniste des Grandes Puissances de l'époque (y compris la Grande-Bretagne) ont conféré aux Balkans l'image d'une aire d'instabilité politique et militaire et la nomination de "**poudrière de l'Europe**».

L'expérience blessante des guerres des Balkans et ensuite de la Première Guerre mondiale imposa – au moment de la conclusion de la paix (1919-1920) – un examen global des relations dans toute la région, ainsi qu'un effort diplomatique multilatéral et intense pour trouver des nouveaux moyens de coopération en partant du respect des intérêts fondamentaux de toutes les Etats, et surtout des nations de la région.

Dans ce contexte, entre les Deux Guerres mondiales (1920-1939), la Roumanie, Etat lié par beaucoup de racines historiques et intérêts aux Balkans et au pays du Centre-Est du continent, a continué à représenter un facteur catalyseur pour le renforcement de la sécurité et le développement de la coopération entre les Etats du Sud-Est de l'Europe, qui se trouvèrent bientôt menacés par la politique des Puissances révisionnistes. Le but de ces démarches prolongées, concrétisés dans l'organisation de la Petite Entente et plus tard de l'Entente balkanique, était la préservation de la paix et le maintien des capacités propres de défense de cette zone. Cet effort remarquable sous l'égide de la Société des Nations, appuyé surtout par la France – comme on le sait très bien – devait faillir à l'aube de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Il n'a pas réussi d'impliquer tous les Etats de l'Europe Centrale et de Sud-Est, d'éliminer les tendances centrifuges et ainsi de soutenir les relations politiques par des moyens matériaux qui étaient indispensables. Ainsi, une nouvelle expérience, plus blessante que les précédentes, avait éclaté: la Seconde Conflagration mondiale.

A la fin de celle-ci, le monde se trouvait divisé en deux blocs antagoniques, à *savoir* le bloc communiste totalitariste, sous la domination de l'Union Soviétique, et le bloc de l'Ouest, sous la domination indirecte des Etats-Unis, situation qui a duré presque un demi-siècle et qui fut connue sous le nom de la «**Guerre froide**».

Dans les problèmes majeurs de la scène internationale, les pays de l'Europe Centrale et de Sud-Est devaient poursuivre la politique des «Grandes Puissances» et permettre la présence des troupes et des bases militaires étrangères sur leur territoire, même si souvent cette situation, conséquence directe de la guerre et des nouveaux rapports de forces établis sur le plan international, était en contradiction avec leurs intérêts nationaux. Toutefois, pendant la *Guerre froide* il faut mentionner quelques initiatives prises au début des années '60 qui confirmaient que les hommes d'Etat de la région étaient conscients de la nécessité de donner un cours nouveau et se montraient disposés à surpasser les moments difficiles éprouvés par leurs pays, en ouvrant des négociations et découvrant de

nouveau la voie de la coopération les uns avec les autres, sans aucune immixtion directe des Grandes Puissances.

La fin du XXème siècle et du millénaire avait beaucoup changé la configuration politique de l'Europe Centrale et de Sud-Est, du monde entier. L'unification de l'Allemagne, l'effondrement du système communiste en Europe, la dissolution de l'URSS et du Traité de Varsovie vont mettre fin à la Guerre Froide, en ôtant le risque d'une confrontation militaire entre l'Est et l'Ouest, ainsi que les barrières artificielles dressées sur la route des relations normales entre les deux parties du continent européen.

Pourtant, le processus de construction d'une Europe unie, basé sur les valeurs de la démocratie, de l'économie de marché, etc. va se heurter, dans un premier temps, des difficultés des pays de l'Europe Centrale et de Sud-Est en transition vers les nouvelles structures politiques, sociales et économiques, processus aussi prolongé qui va affecter la sécurité régionale et internationale. Une véritable zone grise de sécurité a été créée après la chute du Rideau de Fer, comme conséquence

directe des profondes transformations géopolitiques, ce qui a favorisé la réouverture des anciens conflits de nature territoriale, ethnique, confessionnelle, économique. La guerre et la violence politique sont réapparues et le manque d'une action bien concertée des Grandes Puissances, de l'ONU pendant les premiers ans a sérieusement affecté la stabilité de la zone.

Devant un tel danger inattendu, qui risquait à déstabiliser non seulement la région balkanique, mais aussi le continent entier et les zones limitrophes, la communauté internationale a réussi se mobiliser en oeuvrant ensemble avec les forces responsables de tous ces pays pour le rétablissement de la paix et la consolidation des relations démocratiques entre les pays de toute l'Europe. Ainsi, les organisations occidentales, comme l'OTAN et l'Union Européenne, ont promu une politique du consensus et de la solidarité. L'élargissement de l'OTAN vers le l'Europe de Sud-Est représente, comme solution, un fort vecteur de stabilité prolongée vers la Mer Caspienne.

A. La Petite Entente, l'Entente Balkanique et la stabilité régionale entre 1919-1939

La fin de la Première Guerre Mondiale a apporté des changements fondamentaux sur la charte politique de l'Europe et aussi dans le cadre des relations internationales. L'environnement militaro-stratégique en Europe, en général, et en Europe Centrale et du Sud-Est, en particulier, est devenu plus complexe à la suite de la décomposition en 1918 de l'Empire austro-hongrois et, dans une certaine mesure, de l'Empire russe, et l'apparition dans la région des Etats unitaires et indépendants.

L'émergence de ces nouveaux Etats est devenue immédiatement une affaire importante pour la pensée et l'action politique et militaire des cabinets et des cercles influents des Grandes Puissances. Ils considéraient que l'effondrement de l'Empire des Habsbourg avait créé un *vacuum* de pouvoir dans l'aire de l'Europe Centrale et de l'Est, et la question était quelle entité va le remplacer. Partant de ce concept, l'idée de «*Balkanisation*» de l'Europe Centrale et du Sud-Est et de la création dans cette région d'un groupement (alliance) des Etats jusqu'alors instables et faibles, où l'Etat et la nation ne se sont pas soutenues l'un avec l'autre à cause des diversités ethniques, va marquer, inévitablement, pour une période étendue de temps, les opinions et les actions de la région considérée encore comme instable et conflictuelle.

Parmi les stratèges américains il y avait et sera répandu le préjugé que la Double Monarchie aurait été un vrai fourneau des Etats de l'Europe Centrale, nécessaire pour la stabilité de toute l'Europe[1]. Le roumain Vasile Stoica[2] signalait, entre 1919 et 1920, pendant sa mission diplomatique aux Etats-Unis, l'existence des groupes «effrayés» et même convaincus que «*les Roumains, les Yougoslaves, les Tchéco-Slovaques et les Polonais, une fois libérés et laissés sans maître [...] auraient tiré les uns contre les autres, comme il s'était passé pendant la Guerre de Balkans [...]»*[3].

A son tour, le ministre roumain à Londres, Nicolae Titulescu, envisageant la scène politique britannique, appréciait dans un rapport envoyé le 27 mars 1925 que «*n'importe pas du quel parti ils appartiennent, . consciemment ou inconsciemment, d'une façon ou de l'autre, tous les chefs politiques ne font pas confiance dans la stabilité politique du nouvel ordre établie dans l'Europe Centrale et de l'Est [...]»*[4].

La théorie du «**vacuum de pouvoir**» dans l'Europe Centrale et de Sud-Est fut nourrie par les changements engendrés dans les relations entre les Etats de la région, pendant et surtout après la Conférence de la Paix de Paris (1919-1920).

Il faut préciser, comme les nombreux documents l'ont prouvé, que dans les réunions qui avait eu lieu à Londres, Paris ou à Washington pendant la Grande Guerre, les dirigeants des différents mouvements nationaux de la Roumanie, la Tchécoslovaquie, la Serbie, la Pologne et la Grèce, conscients des difficultés d'établir le trajet des nouvelles frontières, se sont décidés sur une stratégie commune dans le but d'entraver les Grandes Puissances de prendre des décisions, en se concertant sur leur statut politique et territorial. «*Ainsi poussés par un seul désir* – va expliquer Take Ionescu, l'un des artisans de la Petite Entente – *la prochaine Conférence de Paix doit nous trouver avec tous les litiges résolues par nous-mêmes ou par un arbitrage choisi par nous-mêmes. [...] Parce que* – continuât-il – *une réconciliation amiable est toujours meilleure qu'un jugement souvent injuste pour les deux parties impliquées»*[5].

Les pas entrepris par Take Ionescu, comme ministre des Affaires étrangères pendant les années 1920-1921, pour dresser une **Petite Entente** en Cinq, composée par la Roumanie, la Tchécoslovaquie, la Pologne, le Royaume serbo-croto-slovène (la Yougoslavie) et la Grèce, pays alliés de la France pendant la Grande Guerre, visaient de résoudre toutes les différences et de créer une alliance politique et militaire durable entre la Mer Baltique et la Mer Egée, capable de résister aux tentatives révisionnistes des Etats qui s'opposaient aux réglementations internationales et au statu-quo territorial et politique établi par les traités de paix entre 1919-1920.

Pourtant, les Etats vaincus, à l'exception du nouvel Etat de la Turquie – il s'agit de l'Allemagne, l'Autriche, la Hongrie et la Bulgarie, auquel s'étaient joints l'Union Soviétique et l'Italie – incriminant les «diktats» de la Conférence de Paris, vont contester de plus en plus ouvertement ces traités de paix, en demandant leur révision, la récupération des territoires cédés et ainsi le rétablissement de leur «prestige national». Il est bien de noter que tous les Etats révisionnistes ont réclamé ces changements territoriaux au compte des nouveaux Etats constitués ou achevés au Centre et Sud-Est du continent.

Les litiges territoriaux ou économiques existantes entre certains de ces Cinq Etats de l'Europe Centrale et de Sud-Est, la proximité des Etats révisionnistes et les évidentes tendances de non-implication manifestées par les Puissances occidentales ont réussi faire rater l'«*alliance des Cinq*».

Toutefois, suite aux tentatives répétées des cercles politiques hongrois et autrichiens d'installer l'ancien Empereur et Roi Charles Ier (IV) de Habsbourg sur le trône de la Hongrie, les gouvernements de Bucarest, Prague et Belgrade, considérant cette restauration comme un premier pas vers la reconstruction de la Double Monarchie, ont réagi cette fois, et, entre 1922-1923, ont mis le fondement de la Petite Entente, une première association des Etats destinée à conserver la paix et défendre la configuration politique récemment établie.

Pour la Roumanie la situation avait été plus menaçante après l'instauration, en mars 1919, d'un régime communiste en Hongrie et suite du plan d'action militaire jointe de Moscou et Budapest. La jonction de deux Armées Rouges a failli suite à la forte réponse de l'armée roumaine,

qui sans être contaminée par les idées anarcho-communistes, a prouvé d'être capable de résister au péril bolchevique, de l'Est et de l'Ouest. Dans la lumière de ces événements, l'alliance politique et militaire conclue entre la Roumanie et la Pologne à Bucarest, le 3 mars 1921, ne représenta seulement une garantie pour la défense de l'intégrité de ces deux Etats, mais également elle avait un rôle de protection contre l'offensive communiste vers les parties centrale et occidentale de l'Europe (le fameux «cordon sanitaire»).

C'est dans ce contexte international que la Roumanie, après 1918, a développé une politique destinée à assurer un réseau d'alliances régionales «entièrement défensives». Cette orientation politique s'intégrait dans les efforts déployés à l'échelle de toute l'Europe pour sauvegarder la paix, considérée indivisible, consolider la sécurité collective du continent et constituait pour les pays intéressés un instrument essentiel d'amplifier la défense de leurs droits fondamentaux (indépendance, souveraineté et intégrité territoriale) et de dissuasion les tendances des éventuels agresseurs.

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La principale Puissance gagnante, et aussi le supporter traditionnel de la Roumanie moderne, a été la France. Pendant 1919 à 1939 la politique de la France est fondée par l'adoption d'une stratégie défensive, dans laquelle les alliances conclues avec la Pologne, la Roumanie etc et l'appui donné à la Petite Entente et à l'Entente balkanique ont joué un rôle importante. Le Traité franco-roumain signé en 1926 a été accompagné par une convention militaire secrète, qui stipulée que les Etats Majeurs des deux pays pouvaient avancer des discutions ultérieures concernant les conditions techniques d'une possible coopération[6]. Mécontent avec le contenu rassurant du traité, car il offrait à la Roumanie

«presque les mêmes obligations» que la France devait remplir «en Nicaragua ou Guatemala en vertu de la Société des Nations», Titulescu le regarda toujours comme un instrument diplomatique absolument privé d'un contenu réaliste. Dans les années '30, ses efforts de la transformer dans un «instrument sérieux» n'ont pas abouti, et non plus ceux qui visaient un pacte unique signé par la France et la Petite Entente, alliance vue comme un bloc et projeté d'être une protection réelle contre toutes les agressions. De toute façon, pendant toute l'époque, la France est restée le principal allié de la Roumanie, puisque – comme Titulescu l'avait dit – «*chaque Roumain porte la France au fond de son coeur*»[7].

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Au milieu des années '30, au moment que l'autre alliance balkanique se forgeait, la Petite Entente fut le sujet d'une réorganisation. Le nouveau Pacte, négocié en 1932, signé le 16 février 1933, assignait une dimension supérieure à l'alliance: en vertu du celui-ci les trois Etats ne pouvaient plus à l'avenir conclure des traités avec d'autres, ni faire des actes qui changent leur

situation internationale sans le consentement de tous les composants de la Petite Entente. La même clause de l'obligation des consultations des Etats membres fut introduite aussi dans le Pacte de L'Entente balkanique, un second système d'alliance, signé à Athènes, le 9 février 1934, par les représentants de la Grèce, la Yougoslavie, la Roumanie et la Turquie. (Les

essais de Titulescu de déterminer l'entrée de la Bulgarie dans l'alliance, ou encore de l'Albanie, échouèrent). Il est bien à souligner que ce processus n'a jamais exclu l'amélioration permanente des relations avec les autres Etats, y compris l'URSS.

Ce remarquable effort d'organisation du continent européen à l'époque, et compte tenu des dangers graves qui le menaçaient – dans les circonstances de l'ascension des régimes totalitaires et l'amplification des violations de la loi internationale – a obtenu certains résultats appréciables surtout sur le terrain économique, financier et culturel.

Mais devant les oscillations fréquentes de la politique des Grandes Puissances et leurs propres indécisions et faiblesses, vers la fin de la quatrième décennie, pendant la crise généralisée de l'écroulement du système versaillaise, la Petite Entente et l'Entente balkanique ont subi un échec. La chute de la Tchécoslovaquie en 1938-39 devait compromettre l'existence de la Petite Entente. La signature de Pacte Ribbentrop-Molotov, le 23 août 1939, et l'éruption de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale accompagnée bientôt de la capitulation de la France, en juin 1940, vont mettre fin à l'autre alliance.

Les nations et les pays de l'Europe Centrale et du Sud-Est, la Roumanie même, isolée, avec ses frontières nationales déchirées, viennent passer, encore une fois, des épreuves très difficiles et sanglantes.

La Petite Entente et l'Entente balkanique ont été des structures politico-militaires, qui ont réuni les pays de l'Europe Centrale et du Sud-Est et qui ambitionnaient de défendre leurs intérêts dans un système intégré de sécurité collective européenne. Même si elles n'ont jamais réussi à répondre à toutes les attentes, leur mémoire a été et reste suffisamment puissante pour générer, dans des moments historiques ultérieurs, même sensiblement différents du point de vue politique et stratégique, d'autres tentatives de reconstruction. Malgré l'échec des deux expériences, on a pu constater la complexité des relations politicomilitaires de la région et le besoin de coopération ressenti par ses anciens partisans.

B. Quelques remarques sur la période de la Seconde Guerre mondiale

Pendant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, la Hongrie, l'ancien adversaire devenu allié de la Roumanie à la suite des événements contrôlés par le IIIème Reich, va constituer encore une fois un pôle catalyseur pour des nouvelles alliances dans la région.

L'évolution dramatique des affaires dans la Péninsule balkanique dans le printemps 1941 détermina l'émergence d'un «nouveau Etat croate indépendant» proclamant, le 10 avril, son indépendance, sous la direction de Ante Pavelić, le chef du Parti fasciste. Deux mois plus tard, le 9 juin, la Hongrie par l'annexion de la contrée de Medjumura, habitée exclusivement par des Croates, va réveiller le vieux ressentiment croate transformé dans une adversité ouverte.

Les mêmes circonstances qui ont bouleversé la carte de l'Europe Centrale, ont rapproché la Roumanie de la Slovaquie, qui s'était déclarée indépendante le 14 mars 1939. Dans telle situation compliquée, les relations entre les trois Etats furent rapidement établies. Après la signature du Pacte Tripartite (la Roumanie – le 23 novembre 1940, Slovaquie – le 24 novembre et la Croatie – le 15 juin 1941) ils se trouvaient dans la même alliance et, ce qui était plus important, tous les trois avaient des relations tendues avec la Hongrie, dues aux annexions faites par celle-ci au détriment des trois autres (le sud de la Slovaquie et la Ruthénie subcarpatique – 1939, le nord-ouest de la Transylvanie par le Diktat de Vienne – 30 août 1940 et le territoire croate susmentionné). De ce fait, la question de la coopération tripartite et, virtuellement, la reconstruction d'une autre Petite Entente, fut posée.

La première étape s'est développée de l'été 1941 jusqu'à l'hiver du même an, période pendant laquelle entre les trois capitales de nombreux contacts ont eu lieu. Une deuxième tentative, entre 1942 et le début 1943, fut plus féconde: des échanges économiques, culturels, scientifiques, sportifs, ainsi que sur le plan politique et militaire entre la Roumanie et la Slovaquie, la Roumanie – Croatie, la Croatie-Slovaquie sont enregistrés. Dernièrement, une troisième phase peut être placée entre l'été 1943 et le 23 août 1944, mais le niveau de la coopération est bien affaibli, chacun des trois pays étant préoccupé à résoudre ses propres problèmes. Pourtant, Bucarest n'a jamais abandonné l'idée, en s'efforçant de la maintenir au premier rang.

Finalement l'idée de la Petite Entente ne fut jamais façonnée dans un accord politique et militaire qui aurait reconstruit, légalement et institutionnellement, l'organisation antérieure. Il y a eu, normalement, beaucoup de raisons, tout d'abord les positions de l'Allemagne et de l'Italie.

C. De la Guerre Froide vers l'OTAN[8]

A la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, en 1945, l'Europe est sortie ruinée et transformée. Les frontières de l'Europe Centrale et du Sud-Est furent redessinées avec le consentement des Grands Alliés occidentaux: l'Union Soviétique annexa de nouveau la Pologne orientale, la Bessarabie et la Bucovine du Nord; les Pays Baltes sont restés dans les frontières soviétiques, quoique leur annexion ne fût jamais reconnue par la Grande-Bretagne et les Etats-Unis. La Pologne recevait en échange la Poméranie, la Silésie et le sud de la Prusse orientale; la nouvelle frontière germano-polonaise longeait ainsi les fleuves Oder et Neisse. Les Soviétiques rattachèrent la Prusse orientale et la ville de Königsberg à la République Socialiste Soviétique Russe. En vertu du traité d'amitié signé avec la Tchécoslovaquie restaurée (1945), l'Union Soviétique annexa la Transcarpathie, la province orientale du pays.

Les autorités soviétiques étaient déterminées à instaurer partout dans les pays «libérés» (occupés) et contrôlés en Europe Orientale et Centrale des régimes amis ou soumis à l'Union Soviétique. Avant même la reddition des Allemands, les troupes soviétiques d'occupation aidèrent les communistes locaux à installer des dictatures communistes en Roumanie et en Bulgarie. En 1945, les mouvements communistes autochtones instaurèrent des dictatures en Yougoslavie et en Albanie. En septembre 1947, à Varsovie, le Kominform, le bureau des partis communistes soviétique, polonais, yougoslave, bulgare, roumain, tchécoslovaque, albanais, italien et français était constitué dans le but de mieux diriger la propagande communiste et accélérer l'installation au pouvoir des nouvelles démocraties populaires. La Roumanie est proclamée République populaire le 30 décembre 1947. La Tchécoslovaquie et la Hongrie deviennent communistes en 1948. En octobre 1949, dans la zone d'occupation soviétique de l'Allemagne était créée la République Démocratique Allemande (RDA), après que les Alliés occidentaux avaient encouragé la création d'une République Fédérale d'Allemagne dans leurs zones d'occupation. Ainsi, en quatre ans seulement, sur la «protection» de l'Armée Rouge toute l'Europe Centrale et Orientale passa sous la coupe soviétique. L'Europe est désormais partagée en deux, par le rideau de fer qui s'étend "de Stettin, sur a Baltique, à Trieste, sur l'Adriatique", comme l'a dit W. Churchill le 5 mars 1946, à Fulton.

L'accroissement des contradictions et les désaccords répétés entre les anciens Grands Alliés ont ainsi transformé les espoirs d'un retour à une vie internationale normale et ont instauré une atmosphère de méfiance et de crises prolongées, non seulement en Europe, mais partout dans le monde. Un monde, et surtout une Europe divisée en deux blocs opposés, se disputant la suprématie quatre décennies.

Le système international s'est stabilisé dans les années 1950, le mécanisme fondamental de cette stabilité bipolaire résidant dans la dissuasion nucléaire. Le rôle des autres Puissances, donc également des pays de l'Europe Centrale et du Sud-Est, était déterminé par leurs relations particulières avec l'une des superpuissances et leur appartenance à une alliance. En dépit de quelques altérations dans les années 1970, le système a survécu jusqu'au milieu des années 1980.

Dans ce contexte complexe, vers le milieu des années '60 cependant, on pourra constater un vif désir de rétablir les anciennes relations de bonne coopération entre les pays des Balkans, les démarches accomplis surtout dans les domaines de ·· la coopération culturelle-sportive et économique produisant des résultats bénéfiques, y compris sur l'ensemble politique. Un peu plus tard les essais pour l'édification d'une maison européenne commune, ne puissent exclure les nations et les Etats balkaniques, qui font partie intégrante de l'Europe. Si la stabilité régionale représente une condition indispensable du mouvement vers l'intégration, la coopération interactive et multilatérale des Balkans s'avéra indispensable.

En même temps, il est bien de mentionner que pendant le «Printemps de Prague» (janvier-août 1968), il y ont eu des rumeurs concernant la reconstruction de la Petite Entente, même si on se trouvait dans un contexte entièrement différent des époques précédentes. On le sait très bien que depuis janvier 1968 la Tchécoslovaquie a

expérimenté un processus réformateur, qui viser la «démocratisation» du socialisme, en lui conférant un «visage humain». Confronté avec ce défi et ayant le soutien des gouvernements de Varsovie, du Berlin, de Budapest et de Sofia, Moscou a choisi de rejeter les reformes, culminant avec l'intervention armée des cinq pays (le 20-21 août 1968). La Roumanie (membre du Pacte de Varsovie) et la Yougoslavie ont décidé de soutenir le processus réformateur en progrès en Tchécoslovaquie, le niveau de cette coopération trilatérale étant vraiment haut. On peut se poser la question ici si le trois pays n'ont pas pensé à la résurrection de la Petite Entente. Cependant on doit le reconnaître qu'il n'y a aucune évidence pour soutenir l'existence d'un plan pour la reconstruction d'une coopération politico-militaire mutuelle.

Dans les années '80 la politique d'ouverture à l'Ouest de Gorbatchev et l'émancipation des pays de l'ancien bloc soviétique ouvraient la voie à la construction d'une «Grande Europe». Celle-ci fut pensée dans trois domaines: la sécurité, le développement de la démocratie et l'intégration économique. Plusieurs organisations y ont travaillé: la *Conférence sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe* (CSCE) réunissait périodiquement depuis sa création à Helsinki, le 1er août 1975, 35 pays – tous les pays européens sauf l'Albanie, y compris les plus petits, en plus les États-Unis et le Canada. La CSCE a contribué à la détente entre les deux blocs et a joué un rôle

utile pour le progrès des *Droits de l'homme* et des libertés dans les pays communistes. Plus tard, elle va offrir, dans cette perspective, un cadre d'accueil aux pays issus de la dislocation de l'URSS.

Avec la chute de l'URSS («l'empire tsariste sous sa forme communiste») l'équilibre bipolaire va disparaître. L'Ouest gagnant va penser qu'avec l'absence du communisme et l'instauration future de nouvelles démocraties on pourra assister à l'instauration d'une paix éternelle, démocratique[9]. Pourtant, les Balkans et le Sud-Est ont représenté, après 1990, le théâtre majeur des conflits sur le continent européen. On peut très bien affirmer que le déséquilibre produit par la fin de la bipolarité a créé un nouveau *vacuum* de pouvoir dans la région, une vraie zone grise de sécurité, comme les spécialistes l'ont dénommée.

C'est à la demande de Gorbatchev, qui va relancer le rôle de la CSCE dans le but de consolider la démocratie et d'accélérer le désarmement, que pendant le Sommet organisé dans la capitale de la France (19-21 novembre 1990) sera adopté la *Charte de Paris* pour une nouvelle Europe. Rappelant le respect de l'intégrité territoriale des États, le non-recours à la force, le règlement pacifique des différends, la Charte saluait «*la fin de l'ère de la confrontation et de la division*» et proclamait la volonté d'«*édifier, consolider et raffermir la démocratie comme seul système de gouvernement*».

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Les Guerres de l'ex-Yougoslavie ont réanimé l'héritage de l'idée de poudrière de l'Europe. Le conflit de 1991 va révéler l'intérêt des Grandes Puissances dans la région. Dès septembre 1991, les Nations Unies s'y sont impliquées activement, par l'adoption de Conseil de Sécurité, à l'unanimité, de la Résolution 413; celle-ci imposait un embargo sur les armes pour la Yougoslavie, puis, à la demande du gouvernement yougoslave, la création d'une force de maintien de la paix (UNPROFOR – *United Nations Protection Force*).

Mais sur le terrain les choses ne marcheront pas très bien. Tenant compte des circonstances aggravées de la situation, le Conseil de Sécurité va décider qu'une intervention de la part de l'OTAN était nécessaire, comme la seule organisation militairement capable de résoudre la

situation. Le 14 décembre 1992 le Secrétaire Général de l'OTAN, Manfred Wörner, a reçu une lettre de la part du Secrétaire Général de Nations Unies, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, par laquelle un éventuel support de l'Alliance était demandé pour mettre en application les prochaines résolutions concernant l'ex-Yougoslavie. En acceptant la demande, l'Alliance a confirmé en effet sa volonté politique de consolider le rôle de l'OTAN en tant que vecteur de stabilité hors des responsabilités stipulées par le Traité, en concordance avec les nouvelles missions définies par le *Concept stratégique* adopté à Rome.

La présence de l'OTAN ne fut pas un acte d'option volontaire, mais l'effet de coopération avec les Nations Unies dans le cadre du système de sécurité commun défini par la Charte des Nations Unies. Conformément à ses capacités, les

Nations Unies reconnaissaient ne pas être prêtes ou capables de surveiller tous les conflits dans le monde.

L'Organisation pour la sécurité et la coopération en Europe (OSCE) constituait un cadre utile – comme une organisation régionale des Nations Unies – mais d'une efficacité limitée.

Les pays de l'ex-Pacte de Varsovie[10], soucieux pour la stabilité de leurs frontières en raison du réveil des nationalismes en Europe Centrale et Orientale et d'une possible résurgence de l'impérialisme russe, avaient besoin d'une garantie crédible, qu'ils ne pouvaient trouver ni dans le cadre de l'OSCE ni de la part de l'Union Européenne, mais du côté de l'Alliance atlantique et, à travers elle, des États-Unis. La Tchécoslovaquie, la Pologne et la Hongrie – qui forment depuis le 15 février 1991 le *groupe de Visegrad*[11] (du nom d'une petite ville à la frontière hongroise-tchèque) pour la coordination des positions de politique étrangère des trois pays – ont demandé une association institutionnalisée avec l'OTAN. Ils affirmaient, le 6 mai 1992, que «leur objectif à long terme est une adhésion pleine et entière à l'OTAN».

De son côté, l'Alliance atlantique avait tenu compte des profondes transformations survenues à l'Est et la *Déclaration de Londres sur une Alliance de l'Atlantique Nord rénovée* visant à établir avec les pays de l'Europe Centrale et Orientale un nouveau type de relations fondées sur la coopération (6 juillet 1990).

Il n'était pas question alors d'étendre l'Alliance vers l'Est pour ne pas inquiéter la Russie. Alors, l'Alliance va adopter un nouveau

concept stratégique. Il n'y avait plus de menace militaire globale en Europe et le danger venait désormais des conflits régionaux liés à des facteurs politiques, économiques, sociaux aussi bien qu'à des considérations de défense. D'où la nécessité, tout en maintenant un potentiel de défense collective, de développer le dialogue et la coopération afin de contribuer – avec les autres organisations – à résoudre pacifiquement des crises touchant à la sécurité de l'Europe. A l'initiative des États-Unis et de l'Allemagne, il sera créé le *Conseil de Coopération Nord-Atlantique* (CCNA) qui dès le 20 décembre 1991, réunit périodiquement des ministres, ambassadeurs et experts militaires pour discuter les questions de défense et de sécurité. Le nombre d'États membres – 25 au début (les 16 de l'OTAN, la Russie représentant l'URSS, la Tchécoslovaquie, la Pologne, la Bulgarie, la Hongrie, la Roumanie et les trois pays baltes) – augmentera par l'inclusion, en mars 1992, de 11 autres Républiques de la nouvelle *Communauté des États indépendants*, auxquelles s'ajoutent l'Albanie et la Géorgie. Aujourd'hui il compte au total 38 membres.

La coopération s'est développée dans tous les domaines et s'intensifie dans le cadre du *Partenariat pour la Paix*[12]. Ce Partenariat est considéré comme un mécanisme qui doit jouer un rôle important dans le processus d'élargissement de l'OTAN, désormais envisagé par les gouvernements de l'Alliance. Cet élargissement s'est progressivement produit quelques années plus tard.

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Dans la même direction on peut inscrire la création de *l'Initiative pour l'Europe de Sud-Est* (SEEI), qui représente une série des programmes et initiatives visant de promouvoir la coopération régionale et une stabilité de long terme dans les Balkans. Conformément aux appréciations du Secrétaire Général de l'OTAN de l'époque, Lord Robertson, il s'avérait nécessaire de donner à la région une perspective pour rejoindre le courant dominant européen, parce que la plus évidente leçon qui demeure des dernières 50 ans est que **l'intégration fait naître de la confiance, de la stabilité et de la prospérité.**

Lancé au Sommet de Washington en 1999, pendant la campagne aérienne au Kosovo,

l'*Initiative* était destinée de se joindre aux autres relations de coopération extensive avec les pays partenaires dans le *Conseil du Partenariat Euro-Atlantique* (EAPC) et du *Partenariat pour la Paix* (PPP). En plus, elle a inclus des pays qui ne faisaient partie de ces institutions et programmes (la Croatie, en 2000, suivie par la Bosnie-Herzégovine, en 2006 aux côtés de la Serbie et du Monténégro), et ainsi elle a conjecturé la trajectoire pour l'élargissement prévu vers les pays de l'ex-République Fédérale de la Yougoslavie, pour parvenir à la tant brigué stabilité et prospérité de l'Europe tout entière.

Conclusions

Les Balkans et l'Europe du Sud-Est représentent une aire très importante dans le processus de consolidation du cadre de la sécurité euro-atlantique. Les évolutions internes des sociétés de ces régions témoignent une transformation démocratique fortement encouragée par les démocraties occidentales et leurs organisations. Pourtant, la façon dont les pays de cette région accomplissent leurs critères est très relevante pour leurs performances et leurs efforts pour devenir des membres de l'OTAN et/ou de l'Union Européenne. Certains d'entre eux ont réussi d'accomplir les deux, d'autres juste une partie; malgré cela la coopération régionale connaît encore des changements remarquables.

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D'après Kenneth Waltz l'un des paradoxes de l'ère bipolaire était que dans les alliances asymétriques les petits Puissances «exploitaient» les Grandes Puissances: les efforts auxquels celles-ci étaient condamnés les faire étaient d'abord d'ordre intérieur; ainsi les alliés de l'URSS ou des États-Unis réalisaient moins d'efforts que leur grands partenaires en terme de sécurité (Olson: *Théorie de l'action collective*). Deux États peuvent se rééquilibrer par des efforts internes ou externes donc.

Le commentaire de K. Waltz ne veut dire seulement que les Petits nombres ont des vertus qui manquent aux Grands nombres; ça conduit en fait vers une énonciation plus ambitieuse: plus le nombre est réduit plus les vertus évoquées s'accroissent. Notamment en ce qui concerne la *stabilité du système*, nous ne pouvons pas nous débarrasser entièrement de ce qui semble bizarre comme formulation parce que dans ce cas nous sommes confrontés à l'effondrement de l'URSS. Ce qui pourrait nous conduire à conclure qu'un système bipolaire aurait été plus stable qu'un système multipolaire.

Prenant en compte les idées de Kenneth Waltz, il faut espérer qu'il s'est trompé dans ses considérations et que les futures évolutions des Balkans et de l'Europe du Sud-Est vont stabiliser la vieille «poudrière de l'Europe» et transformer le combat dans une compétition pour le développement en Europe. Il faut essayer, à travers l'avenir de l'«enclave» Kosovo, d'offrir un exemple de réconciliation, de respect des droits de l'homme et de l'identité culturelle de chacun, ainsi de donner une référence pour la postérité, non seulement de l'Europe tout entière, mais certainement de l'humanité... *ensemble*.

NOTES :

[1] Comment le système international peut conditionner, influencer, déterminer la fabrication sociale, l'émergence des politiques étrangères ? Comment le système international *détermine*-t-il les politiques étrangères ? Voilà certaines questions qu'il doit poser concernant notre sujet. Pour répondre à ces interrogations, nous devons penser, inévitablement, au concept d'*équilibre de la puissance* (*balance of power*), idée développé par les travaux de Hans Morgenthau (*Politics among nations*, 1949), Raymond Aron (*Paix et Guerre entre les nations*, 1962), volume dans lequel ce dernier a pris l'essentiel de ses idées, ensuite le livre de Morton Kaplan (*System and Process in International Politics*, 1957), qui a structuré et structure encore le mode de penser les R.I., et qui a été «repris» par quelqu'un qui a eu une ambition fantastique au plan intellectuel, le «père» du néoréalisme: Kenneth Waltz (*Theory of International Politics*, 1979) etc.

[2] *Vasile* (Basile) *Stoica* (1889-1959), écrivain roumain de Transylvanie, ancien officier pendant la Grande Guerre, ami et collaborateur ces années-là de Thomas G. Masaryk et Edvard Benes, ensuite diplomate proche de Ion I.C. Brătianu et Nicolae Titulescu.

[3] Apud Constantin Botoran, *The European Scope of the Political and Military Alliances of Romania in the 20's*, in *Geopolitics and History at the Crossroad between Millennia*, coordinators: colonel Dr. Alesandru Dutu, colonel Dr. Petre Otu, colonel Gheorghe Vartic, Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 1999.

[4] *Ibidem.*

[5] *Ibidem.*

[6] Pendant 1926-1939 la coopération franco-roumaine s'est développée surtout dans le domaine des fournitures de guerre et de la formation des cadres militaires.

[7] Apud Dan Berindei, *The Fundamental Features of Romania's Foreign Policy in the Interwar Years*, in *Geopolitics and History at the Crossroad between Millennia.*

[8] L'Alliance Nord-Atlantique a été conçue par le souci des Etats-Unis d'allier l'Europe à la défense du camp occidental et cela malgré les tendances isolationnistes existant aux Etats-Unis mêmes. Les Européens ont donc pris l'initiative: en 1947 la France et la Grande-Bretagne signaient le Traité de Dunkerque. Ensuite le 17 mars 1948, au lendemain du «Coup de Prague» (février 1948), un accord est passé entre la France, la Grande-Bretagne et le Benelux: par le Traité de Bruxelles *l'Union de défense occidentale* était née. Mais les signataires se sont bien rendus compte qu'ils ne pourraient résister à une éventuelle invasion soviétique. Ces Puissances vont donc solliciter l'aide américaine. Cela n'a pas été facile en raison du courant isolationniste susmentionné et de la démobilisation des Américains dans l'après-guerre. Mais, le 4 avril 1949 est signé le *Traité de l'Atlantique Nord* ou Traité de Washington, à l'origine par 12 pays: les Etats-Unis, le Canada, la France, la Grande-Bretagne, le Benelux, l'Islande, le Danemark, la Norvège (pas la Suède neutre), le Portugal (sous tutelle britannique), l'Italie, la Grèce et la Turquie. Certains Etats restaient en dehors du Traité tels que l'Espagne, mais dès 1953 les gouvernements de Madrid ont eu des relations privilégiées avec Washington. En plus, la RF d'Allemagne n'a pas été comprise dans le Traité que plus tard. Le traité prévoyait une alliance politique et militaire destinée à défendre les valeurs démocratiques occidentales. Mais, à ses débuts, son organisation était très réduite notamment sur le plan militaire. Or, pour que le traité ait une efficacité réelle, il fallait que les membres signataires aient une stratégie commune, une armée commune et des moyens matériels pour mettre en oeuvre une telle politique. Ce sont les défis de l'époque suivante qui vont déterminer son évolution jusqu'à l'OTAN d'aujourd'hui. En parallèle avec les processus développés en Occident, autour de l'Union Soviétique, le bloc communiste a réussi organiser ses propres instruments: en 1949 on est créé le *CAEM* (Conseil d'Assistance Économique Mutuelle) et en 1955 le *Traité de Varsovie*, qui répondaient au Plan Marshall et à la création de l'OTAN, quelques années auparavant. La Yougoslavie fait figure d'exception car Tito, bénéficiant d'un grand prestige dans son pays, rêvait de créer une fédération balkanique et plus tard de diriger le mouvement des Etats non-alignés.

[9] Emmanuel Kant, *Pour la Paix perpétuelle: projet philosophique*, 1795 (trad.), Lyon, 1985.

[10] De l'autre coté de la Guerre Froide, le Pacte de Varsovie établie le 14 mai 1955 entre l'URSS et ses satellites, était une alliance militaire. Il faudra attendre 1955 pour que soit établie une organisation militaire qui soit la balance de ce qu'est l'OTAN à l'Ouest. Cette apparence était cependant trompeuse car l'OTAN ne faisait pas disparaître la politique extérieure de ses membres alors que le Pacte de Varsovie prévoyait une intégration très poussée sur le plan militaire et politique. L'objectif de Staline est de disposer en Europe orientale d'armées qui soient fidèles à l'URSS.

[11] Au lendemain de la «révolution de velours», la Tchécoslovaquie s'est prononcée en faveur du regroupement régional informel qui comprenait déjà la Hongrie, la Yougoslavie, l'Autriche et l'Italie, et qui prit le nom d'«initiative pentagonale». En juillet 1991, la Pentagonale devint Hexagonale avec l'adhésion de la Pologne, mais ce projet semble compromis par la guerre dans les Balkans.
Plus active et plus concluante avait devenir l'association entre les trois Etats centraux. La première réunion à Bratislava, en avril 1990, n'avait rien donné de concret, sinon un nouveau sommet, le 15 février 1991, dans un château des rives du Danube, près de Budapest, à Visegrad. Un lieu symbolique, puisque six siècles plus tôt les rois de Pologne, de Bohême et de Hongrie y avaient signé un traité d'amitié. Deux autres sommets (Cracovie, octobre 1991; Prague, mai 1992) du «Triangle de Visegrad» ont rapproché les points de vue.

A Visegrad, il s'agissait de proclamer un objectif: «l'intégration complète au sein de l'ordre politique, économique, législatif et du système de sécurité européen» (déclaration commune).

En fait, le triangle a surtout fonctionné comme moyen de négocier ensemble avec d'autres partenaires quand ceux ci le demandaient. L'intention a été la même dans le domaine de la sécurité: les responsables militaires des trois pays ont insisté à chaque occasion sur leur volonté d'être intégrés à l'OTAN et à l'Union de l'Europe occidentale et de ne pas constituer une nouvelle alliance militaire. Cette nouvelle architecture, moyen du «retour à l'Europe» tant proclamé et espéré, est sans doute la plus réaliste.

Le Triangle de Visegrad est finalement la seule construction sérieuse dans cette région de l'Europe. Elle est portée par une conviction inégale mais réelle des gouvernements. Elle n'était cependant pas considérée par des cercles plus larges comme une solution à la crise de la région.

[12] Le 10 janvier 1994 à la réunion des chefs d'état et de gouvernement membres de l'OTAN de Bruxelles, les pays partenaires de l'Alliance sont invitées pour forger un vrai partenariat – un Partenariat Pour la Paix. L'idée de la création de ce programme a été lancée pour la première fois par le général John M. Shalikashvili, ancien commandant suprême des Forces Alliées en Europe (SACEUR). La Roumanie a été le premier pays avoir signé le Document Cadre du PPP, le 26 janvier 1994, après que le 20 décembre 1991 avait devenu membre fondateur du Conseil de Coopération Nord-Atlantique.

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The Geopolitical Paradigms Within the Analysis of the International Relations

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We think we can outrun the "tunnel historian's condition appealing also to the paradigm of geopolitics and geostrategy. These can open new prospects and angles of approach within the immediate history analysis. Using specific to geopolitical analysis methods one can find answers to some hardly to solve questions by example, using inductive or deductive methods pre-eminently present in historical analysis. Using the geopolitical method it is possible to find why an actor (player) – state or politico-military organization etc. disputes his interests within a certain geographical space and not elsewhere. Geostrategic analysis emphasizes the ways and means this player is or is not able to impose his interests in that space.

For defining specific paradigms of the geopolitics and geostrategy there is needed a definition and certain elucidation in contents of two disciplines as well as a separation of their object. Frequently these become in some specialists" works synonyms despite their objects of analysis are different[1] .

Geopolitics has to be observed, considered and analyzed at least from three perspectives:

1.1 The Geopolitical Paradigms Within the Analysis of the International Relations

a) geopolitical phenomenon as o part of the power relations established between the players disputing their interests in a certain geographic space;

b) geopolitic theory and analysis as a result of examination, research and systematization of the information regarding the disputed by the players interests in hat geographic space, the ability to enforce/negotiate with the other partners/ competitors, the type of behavior they practice in order to materialize their interests etc.;

c) Geopolitics propagandistic cartography as a way and an instrument the players use to justify their interests and behavior in a target – geographic space. The geopolitical maps and other products (iconography, graphic representations, statistics etc.) are not necessarily meant only to inform the target – public, but especially to persuade him of justice, morality or usefulness of an action carried on by a player or another in respective geographic space[2].

The rigid geographic determinism which has governed the geopolitical theory and analysis at the beginning of the 20-th century and unfortunately, is present yet in some works has to be abandoned. The value of a space for the actors of the contemporary international system materializes in the sphere of economics, politics, war and possibly ideology. The resources of a certain space, its infrastructure or its economical structure, the strategic-military objectives it contains etc. are the elements determining one or more actions to be oriented towards that geographic space and not the geographic environment as such. The space is not any more an "actor" of the history determining in a way or another the development of political events, but it is a background/ an environment where the involved in the contemporary geographic phenomenon players dispute their interests. The assertion made by Napoleon Bonaparte according to which "the politics of states consists in their geography" was justified and supported by the political reality of the 19-th century, but today it has only a historical value. The geographic location of the Great Britain, for example,

compared with European continental powers during Napoleonian wars or even U.S. position compared with Europe during the World War I created some advantages of strategic importance. In the present, when the means of transportation to the target are so improved can we talk about advantages/disadvantages for a state disputing interests with some other actors?

The object of study for geopolitics has been not defined yet in unanimously accepted terms because there is a multitude of angles the discipline itself is seen. I think that the study object of geopolitics can be Kjellen's "planettarischer Zustand" or a part, a certain zone of it observed and examined with specific for geopolitics means but belonging also to some other disciplines, having in view that the geopolitics is a border discipline between history, economics, demography, politology, geostrategy and geography[4]. It has to take into account "everything that is organized within a hierarchy of powers especially political, but also economical and cultural, the states and their alliances-destiny and purposes – in all aspects of the force and its evolution, of the law and its application"[5].

The approached by geopolitics topic can consequently be more or less ample and it is linked with the policy of the states and other actors' on the scene of the international life. It contributes to description of the interest they have or manifest globally or in a certain space.

The geopolitics must observe and examine the occurred changes in the power relations and the dispute of interest at a global level or in a certain space. The balance or misbalance of power is what ultimately provides the state of international relations system, consequently, of the geopolitical environment at a given moment. The balance has always been associated with peace and security. The intensity and degree of misbalance occurred at a certain moment within the power equation led to crisis and conflicts of all kind – diplomatic, economic, ideological etc. – and, in the last instance, to the war.

The paradigms of the geopolitical analysis allow to the researcher of the immediate history of the international relations to decrypt also the tendencies in development of contemporary political phenomenon, its future status in the system[6]. The geopolitical method in comparison with the historical one offers to the annalists the opportunity to express "his will of anticipation of

the way the world will function in a logical development"[7]. With this purpose he has to identify the player's position and role – states and other political, military, economic etc. organizations – within the equation of power, to establish the nature and intensity of the interest the players have in the analyzed geographical space and to observe the nature of perceptions the players have on their own power capability or on their's adversaries/ competitors in that space[8].

In the immediate history of the international relations the place and the role a player has within the power equation is important, despite the present tendency is that the force of the principles and public international law to replace the law of force.

In this respect, the fact, that the great players of the international life didn't give up the strategy of constraint in order to impose their will, including the case of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia's space is eloquent[9]. Barry Buzan considers that in the present system of the international relations where certain rapports get into the classical pattern of the fight for power and other ones into that of the fight for security, the states "need military power both for their own defense and for larger security purposes regarding the management of the system"[10]. Robert Osgood asserted that "the force has to be as essential in the international policy as the elections are in domestic policy, in a well organized democracy"[11]. Another researcher of the international relations, Hedley Bull expresses the same thing, but seen from another point of view, asserting that "the international order notoriously does not have mechanisms for peaceful change and is simply dependent on war as an agent of the change"[12]. Michael Howard is more categorically asserting that "the force is a key-element of the international relations not because some inherent human being's tendency to use it, but because the possibility to use it exists. So that it must be deterred, controlled and if anything else fails, used with discrimination and retention"[13].

The conclusions drawn by the analysts who put in the centre of the international relations the power are founded on the observance and analysis of the existing military arsenals. Deployment of the military force generates the fear that those who renounce of its use will depend themselves on the pitiful ness of those who do not renounce"[14].

Consequently analyzing the geopolitical field and understanding the different players' behavior in their dispute for enforcement of their interests, the establishment of the player's place and role within the equation of power becomes a key – element of research.

The player's place and role within the equation of power are given by his power potential. Trying to decrypt some player's potential the definition and identification of sources, the perception and quantification of power are of special importance. Alvin Toffler thinks that no matter how collisions, cuts away with the saw or hardware the players do, the balance of power "will depend less on their words than on the quantity and quality of power each of them brings at the negotiations table"[15].

The power as a notion has a very reach semanthycs and it is used for an extremely diversified area of social, economic, military etc. reality. Alvin Toffler considers that "the power implies the use of violence, fortune, and knowledge (in the largest meaning) in order to make people act in a given direction"[16]. Robert A.Dahl sees the power as "the ability to make the others do something that otherwise they would not"[17]. It can be noticed that two definition have in common one player's will enforcement to another/ the others. But it can be realized only if that player has also the capability to impose his will, in other words, if he has a potential.

Traditionally, the potential of power has been appreciated as a sum of human resources, economic territorial area, the size and quality of military forces. Since the ancient times till the Industrial Revolution within economy of the first Tofflerian Wave the potential of power was given by the size and the quality of the population of a state. This fact was governing and has been taken into account when the and of the confrontations between the players was to be assessed[18]. The entrance with the 17-th century into economy of the second wave made the industry and modern means of transportation because the dominant peaces in projection / assessment of the certain player's potential of power. The unequal rates of development and the application of the achievements of the industrial revolution to the production of arms have disturbed the balances and hierarchies of power.

The weight of the world system of power started to migrate from the states with enormous demographic potential – Rusia, Otoman Empire

for example – to European states in the course of industrialization dominating the specific for the first wave players[19].

During the cybernetic era, specific to the third wave, that player who will understand the importance of the quality in power potential, given by the economic growth, political stability and national will/cohesion, will have au important strategic advantage in the equation of power.

Today, the highest quality power comes from the application of knowledge. This has the advantage in a confrontation, not to impose its will traditionally under constraint. The knowledge, in Alvin Toffler's opinion can be used "to punish, to reword, to convince and even to transform. It can transform the enemy into ally"[20]. This has been also emphasized during the Gulf War by a military analyst from CNN who mentioned that "the military planners must see behind the use of bombs and missiles if they want to attack the targets precisely. The technology will make possible soon to destroy key – components of a military objective without destroying completely the target"[21].

The knowledge propelled information as an extremely important component of the player's power potential. The American military analyst Larry Seaquist appreciated that the power potential must be re-defined because up to now it has been conceived narrowly with an express reference to "arms, systems of their application and to certain space systems". Technology, educational system and economic growth are more important measures of the player's power potential then the population and the size of geographic area he has. Numerically controlled machinery – asserted Larry Seaquist – may be found now in many countries belonging to the Third World. A pharmaceutical plant they need has the inherent capability, to produce biological weapons. Numerically controlled installations producing automobiles of good quality in the Third World can produce good quality missiles too"[22]. It is appreciated from this point of view that "the flow of certain electronic information over the borders can put security problems as serious as the deployment of troops"[23].

The present misbalance in the field of global communication and information generates spectacular changes in the equation of power. That actor who dominates the informational flow is able to impose his aspirations and his own

image of the world, is able to produce heavy damages to the other/ others who from the view point of the classical power potential identifies itself with the enemy. The information precisely targeted is of the same importance as the weapons of precision are and the new means of information will make it efficient in an unprecedented degree[24].

Decision in winning the "Cold War" was given by the rifle loaded with images and information, not with bullets. If Nicolae Ceausescu would have understood the impact of the revolution in mass-media and would have studied the role of mass-media in Ferdinand Marcos overturn in the Philippine Islands[25], maybe in Romania would have been taken place also a "velvet revolution" as in the most of the former communist countries.

The battle for "informational space" in so-called imagistic (imagologic)/ mass-media (mediatic) war" the victory is recorded neither by the enemy's physical elimination nor his sovereignty space conquest, but by "occupying his mind" with those representations and convictions able to transform the enemy into an ally.

In order to precisely use the weapon of information a player must have the most performant carrying to the target technologies. The economic power as a fundamental mark of the players power potential for the future is also not measured any more only in tangible resources, but especially in those resources dealing with performances which are intangible. The quantity, as in many other domains, does not necessarily accumulate power. Many states having huge primary economic resources are not necessarily the biggest economic powers in the world too. This is also valid for the part of economic resources of the power potential of a state.

The competition for controlling the intangible resources within the power potential tends to push out the military technique and weapons accumulation. As the military threats will decrease the competition/conflicts for economic resources will intensify. In Edward N. Luttwak's opinion the fear of a nuclear war will determine a transfer from the military means to the economic ones in solving the conflicts between states. The "Economic" weapons have worked in the Gulf Conflict as well as in the former Yugoslavia's space[26]. More and more frequently is promoted the idea according to which "the commercial methods are replacing the

military ones – the available capital instead of the fire capacity, civil innovation instead of technical military progress and market penetration instead of garrisons and military bases"[27].

The achievement by a country of a more rapid rate of the economic growth is reflected in its power potential and also in its position within the world hierarchy[28]. Besides the quantitative marks of assessment of the economic potential of a state, the dynamics of production and the added value of the manufactured goods are of great importance in perceiving the economic developments.

The military dimension of the power potential is even yet considered to give at a certain moment the player's place and role within the equation of power in the international relations system.

In the same way, nobody could ever eliminate completely the importance of the raw materials or of the unskilled labor within the process of production, so it would be a nonsense to ignore the material components of the military potential. The idea that the Gulf War was a high –tech one where the human component has been eliminated in the battle is fancy in Alvin Toffler's opinion[29]. Superior Officers Rosane Bailey and Thomas Kearn, participants in the Gulf confrontations stated: "The critical factor leading to successful operation of technology remains the human component, typically quoted as an example by pilot's performance in fight, who made use of air-to-air missile AIM-7. It was an over than 5 times bigger progress than the performance in Vietnam as a direct result of the improved training[30]. The smart weapons request smart soldiers properly trained in order to be able to operate with highly sophisticated technology.

The quality is essential too in assessment of human dimension of the military factor. In the present day an aircraft is the equivalent of a super computer with wings. Its efficiency depends almost entirely on knowledge comprised in avionics in armament, but also in the pilot's brains. The same thing at a smaller scale is happening with the fighters of the other services. The Gulf War has demonstrated it. The famous French military theorist and analyst Pierre Gallois asserted that "the United States have sent 500,000 soldiers to the Gulf, keeping between 200,000 and 300,000 in the rear guard for logistical purposes. But, in fact, the war has been won by only 2,000 soldiers[31]. On the other side,

Saddam Husein opposed to them an army of more than 1 million people, with an experience of war of almost 10 years, but of an inferior quality as it concerns instruction and the general level of training. More then 98% of American volunteers in the Gulf were graduated from the secondary school and a lot of them had even more advanced education.

The nuclear factor played a major part within the power potential after the WW2. It not only gave consistency to security policies of the states, but finally influenced their behavior in the geopolitical field. Barry Buzan appreciated that "the nuclear weapons clearly stimulated an important leap within the historical tendency towards an increased fear of war"[32]. F.H.Hinsley states that the fear of a nuclear war, and consequently the end of legitimacy of war as a major instrument within relations between the big powers led to a desirable transformation of the nature of the international system. In other words, the existence of the nuclear defense has created an inhibition of states for an aggressive behavior within geopolitical field, but without excluding disputes for their interests.

To notice that the actor's force neither depends on, nor correlates with his power[33]. Powers with reduced potential as Austria, Norway, Singapore etc. are powerful state, but some states considered to be important powers as Argentina, Nigeria, Brazil, Pakistan, Indonesia are rather weak. In Barry Buzan's opinion the difference between the force and the power of the state is given by the quality of the basic idea of the organization of the state and it's institutions as well as by degree of their adherence/ rejection by the citizens[34]. For example, Soviet Union, but China also in a certain measure, failed to convince till the end of '80 the big number of nationalities living within their borders to adhere to the ideological identity of the communist state. Both of them have confronted an increasing crisis linked with the basis of the ideological identity of the state and finally the "first socialist state" and big nuclear power collapsed by implosion[35].

On the ruins of the former Soviet Empire the newly appeared states have other organizing ideologies at the basis of their identification agreed by the citizens and not imposed by force.

When the political power and ideology as an organizing basis of the state are contested from the interior, that state looses capacity to coherently act and to defend its interests in the geopolitical field even it owns an impressive power potential. The case of former Soviet Union and of its satellites – countries is more than conclusive.

The actors' behavior within the contemporary international relations system knows a great diversity and complexity regarding orientation, attitude and intensity they manifest themselves in the international life, including their interests. Depending on the aimed targets, on the initiated actions and promoted values the interests can be manifested within the economic, political or spiritual spheres or even in the military field.

In geopolitics the interest can be considered as such only if the actor as an element of the international relations system has the capability to achieve its materialization. If this is not possible, there are no interests, but only aspirations which can be proclaimed and clamed.

In American analyst Hans I.Morgenthau's opinion, if we will consider all states "political entities following their own interest defined as power, we'll be able to make justice for all in a double meaning: we'll be able to judge other nations in the same way we judge ours own and by doing so we are able to elaborate strategies that respect other nations' interest, protecting and promoting our own interests"[36]. Making use of historical analysis, Morgenthau ascertains that these ideas have been noticed in action since the ancient times till the present day. Thucydides, by example, asserted that the identical interests are the most reliable link between states and between individuals. This idea has been taken over in the 19-th century by lord Salisbury, who mentioned that "the only lasting link between nations in the absence of the opposite interests"[37].

In James Rosenau's vision, the interest has a double quality. It is an instrument of analysis for the researcher of the contemporary international political phenomenon, but at is also an instrument of action for the players (actors). "As an analytical instrument – stated James Rosenau – it is used to describe, to explain or to estimate the sources of the nation's foreign policy or its proper character. As an instrument of political action it is a tool in proposing, justifying or blaming policies"[38].

Within the geopolitical field the interest can be seen in a triple perspective. Within the geopolitical phenomenon the interest determines and orientates a player to act in a certain space and not in some other one. Within the geopolitical theory and analysis the category of interest

becomes an instrument approximately measuring
and establishing how much a player is involved in
solving a problem which can appear in a certain
region of the world. Within the propagandistic
geopolitical cartography the interest can be very
well a tool for influencing and manipulating
domestic or international public opinion.

In a world more and more dominated by the
mass-media "the guns" loaded with information
and image can very easily convince the public
opinion of the "justice", the enterprise action
represents and not necessarily of truth or goals
determining that action.

The criteria of classification and assessment
of the interests the players promote in the system
of international relations, including geopolitical
field are multiple and very diversified. This fact
generated extremely large and even contradictory
definitions of the interest.

From the point of view of political action
within the contemporary geopolitical
phenomenon a certain ambiguity in defining and
classifying the interests is accepted for some
researchers.

It is appreciated to be extremely difficult to
get an agreement with a partner if one of our own
interests has been defined so precisely, that could
make it inflexible, and consequently
unnegotiable[39], but in geopolitical theory the
analyses and appreciations would be lacking in
realism and objectivity if the ambiguity is
maintained.

From the geopolitical perspective at least two
elements are relevant for specifying the nature
and dimension of the interest: the payers' nature
and the geopolitical value of disputed space. To
begin with the players (actors), their interests
may be classified according to the aimed
purposes within the international relations
system, and they can be economic, political,
territorial, ideological, strategic. In the second
turn, the actors' interests differ according to the
priorities they establish in a certain moment and
in this case they may be considered as vital or
secondary ones. According to the intensity or
permanence of the goals in their action in the
geopolitical field the interest are defined as being
stabile, variable, general or specific[40]. The
interests can be identified by the actors' position
within the international relations system. These
can be common, if the objectives and goals
followed by two or more players in the same
space are the same complementary, if the

strategic objectives are not antagonistic and one
of the actors can renounce of a specific interest in
contradiction with another one of the same
category, and conflictual, when the aimed by an
actor strategic goals in a certain space are
irreconcilable with some other actor's interests.

The time is important factor in actors'
interests' identification. For a short term, the
interests expressed by two or more actors may
coincide, but they can differ or even be
irreconcilable for a long term. England, USA and
USSR, during the World War II had a common
interest for a short term – to eliminate Germany
from the power equation of the European
Continent. After they reached their objectives in
the war the partners in UN Coalition have placed
themselves on irreconcilable positions because
the USSR strategic objectives for a long term
were completely different from those of the big
western democracies. This generated a
completely new aspect of the confrontations
between actors, the actual geopolitical
phenomenon known as the "Cold War"[41].

The actors in their action on the geopolitical
ground can promote in the short term indirect
interests in fact instruments of promotion of
some completely different, but not so obvious
interests. The Statement of Romanian
Government of February 1998 regarding
participation with all the means, including
military ones in the operation "Desert Thunder"
has been determined by the need to make the
White House sensitive to Romania's application
to join NATO, but also to reshape the country's
image abroad and its credibility on the
international scale.

The intrinsic geopolitical value achieved or
attributed to a geographic space has an important
role for the orientation, hierarchy and intensity the
players dispute their interests in a certain moment
in that space. We take into account only the
geographic space – that territorial framework
where the natural circumstances make possible
human life and activity[42] – not the space on the
whole. The geopolitical value of the space is given
by its natural, human and economic potential.

The actors of the contemporary geopolitical
phenomenon, according to the interests they
promote, are attracted in a different way by a
region or another of the world. Ion Conea drew
attention 50 years ago on the fact that the political
map of the world had "points and regions of
maximum or minimum political interest". He

defined the first as being "regions of intense political life" and the last ones as being zones "where the political rate of the planet is slow"[43]. The famous Romanian theorist and analyst has specified for the fourth decade of the 20-th century several regions "of friction or convergent interests and disputes": Mediterranean Sea, Red Sea, Pacific Ocean[44].

In the present day such zones of friction have been coagulated around the big basins of energetic resources and strategic points. The serious crisis in the Gulf region and the dispute for controlling the oil routes from Capsicum Sea are only two of the multiple zones of maximum interest for the actors of this end of century and millennium.

The perception, as a result of the geopolitical phenomenon, but also as an analytic paradigm completes and increases the efficiency in knowledge of the immediate history of the international relations. Depending on the nature of perception the actors have on the geopolitic ground upon a geographic space, upon their place and role within the equation of power as well as the perception on their own interests or on their opponents' interests they choose a certain type of political, military, economic or of other nature behavior. The problem of perception is a basic one because it affects/ the entire informational basis sustaining the decision making process, the actors' behavior on the geopolitical field inclusive[45].

A proper perception, for example, on the own potential of power or on the opponent's one in a geographic space of interest can determine an efficient action in the geopolitical field for that actor. An oversized perception on the own potential of power correlated with an undersized one on the opponent's in a space of interest leads often to some risky policies and actions on the international relations plan. Among the big number of examples the history kept in mind the cases of Germany for the first half of the 20-th century for unleashing the World War Two in order to impose his supremacy on the European Continent and all over the world[46], and of Argentina in the early '80 for trying to get Falkland Isle by force are typical.

If an actor has an undersized perception on the own power potential in a space of interest and his action in the geopolitical field in uncertain, he is predisposed to compromises affecting his fundamental interests in the short a long term. The France and Great Britain's behavior, by example, against the force action initiated by Germany on the European political scene during the period 1936-1939 is eloquent in this sense.

The distortion of perceptions appears as a consequence of the methods and instruments used in collecting and analyzing the information about the quantity and quality of the component's of the power potential and of the interest or because all needed information cannot be collected. Even the biggest powers can collect only a small part of this information for a background of the analysis of the actors' behavior in the geopolitical field[47]. Frequently the errors in perception are mutually induced by competitors themselves by different methods starting from usual ones till manipulation using mass-media[48]. The classical example is that of informing domestic and international public opinion about the nuclear weapons by the two superpowers during the "Cold War". Each part accused the other of increasing quantitative and qualitative force of missiles as well as of intention to use them in order to get world supremacy.

At the beginning of the "Cold War" Moscow in his propaganda against the West was very sternly pedaling on American imperialism's aggressively and on the imminent attack from the U.S. In fact, Stalin was extremely well informed about the capitalist adversary's intentions and policies due to his very efficient intelligence net and he "stretch the rope" of the fight against capitalism within his foreign policy so that to reduce the risks up to the lowest levels[49].

The perception is an important component of the contemporary geopolitic phenomenon. This becomes in the geopolitical theory and analysis a product of observation and knowledge of the relations of power as well as of the interests determining two or more actors to dispute/negotiates their presence or control in a certain geographic space. From this perspective, the perception within the analysis of the contemporary geopolitical phenomenon is materialized in a set of information accompanied or not by cartographic or iconographic representations. Very frequently we meet the situation when a "hot" geopolitical zone is presented in mass-media as a map indicating the actors, friendly forces or adversaries, the space of crisis and conflict. The geopolitical drama is staged by using maps making of territories the real "actors of the history"[50]. If it is accepted the fact that perception is a component of the contemporary geopolitical reality and[l] in the

same time an element of the methodology of analysis within the geopolitical theory, legitimately rises the question: what is this and how can be it defined?

When it analyses an aspect or other of the relations of power or the different actors interests in a geographic space, the geopolitics operates with notion of perception, but it has a different meaning of that offered by psychology. The reality of perception is easily to be seen in geopolitical studies and analyses because it accompanies/ is a part of geopolitical phenomenon but the concept is not yet clearly defined and specified.

From the viewpoint of the signification the term "perception" used in geopolitics is close to what the psychology defines as "social representation". The term in this case exceeds the "perceptive side" and contains informative cognitive, ideological, normative components, beliefs, attitudes, opinions and images we can find in a form or other in the definitions of the social representations.

The researches in the field of the social representations has been resumed rather recently by Serge Moscovici. He brought into specialists' attention a concept launched at the end of the 19-th century by Emile Durkheim: the collective representation. In the famous sociologist's concept this formed a very general class of psychological and social phenomena including also consciences, myths, ideologies. The collective representations belong to the social category because they were results of some common characteristics of a group or of a society but also of the psychology, stated E.Durkheim, because the perception of the reality and the organization of thought are an individual work[51].

Going further than the E.Durkheim's vision, Serge Moscovici considers that the social representation is "a system of values, notions and practices regarding objects, aspects or dimensions of the social environment allowing not only to establish the life framework of the individuals and groups, but equally is an instrument of directing perception in a certain situation and elaborating the answers"[52].

According to S. Moscovici three circumstances are needed for the appearance of social representations. The dispersion of information regarding the object of representation, the social group's position related to the object of representation and, the third is

concerned with people's need to produce coherent behaviors and discourses regarding an object they know rather badly[53].

Synthesizing the definitions largely circulating, in the specialized literature, Adrian Neculau considers that "the social representations, designate an estimating apparatus, a scale of reading the reality, a location in the world of values and the own interpretation of this world".[54] It means to remake and to rebuild the reality from the view point of the individual's life philosophy because it is located at the "crossroad" between the objective thinking, "scientific", and the effective reflection of the environment. Equally the social representation is an instrument helping social actors to mutually regulate their relations but also a mechanism for elaborating theories and ideologies about the social environment.

Within geopolitics the perception incorporates a component we cannot find in the definition given by psychology or psycho-sociology – the interest seen in all its aspects of materialization. As an illustration we 11 make use of perception the main actors of the international relations system had about the crisis in Kosovo, and especially of the way they saw its solution. The chief of the Russian diplomacy/ percept the way out of the situation by "negotiations between the Serb authorities and Albanian minorities, but respecting the Yugoslavia's territorial integrity".[55] The State Secretary Madeline Albright asked for international involvement for getting a solution and imposing sanctions to Belgrade. European Union sees a way on through an international mediation, but having reserves as it concerns the sanctions the U.S.A. thought to be necessary[56]. The Ambassador of the Federal Republic Yugoslavia in Bucharest, Desimir Ieftic, referring to these differences in perception of the way of solving the situation stated: "It is certain that the most important international actors know very well the real situation in Kosovo and Metohia, but when some decisions on it have to be taken, they are often guided by their own political interests and not by the rules and principles of the international law"[57].

In geopolitics, the perception has to be approached from the perspective of the way it becomes objective in geopolitical reality phenomenon, in geopolitical theory and analysis, but also in geopolitical cartography of propaganda.

In geopolitical reality the perception is a psycho-socio-cognitive process for getting information by the actors about the economic and strategic characteristics of a certain geographic space and forming a coherent image on their own position or on their adversaries/competitors' one within the equation of power as well as a functional vision on the international relations system in order to impose/defend their own interest in that space.

The actors of the geopolitic field by the help of perception get an image more or less adequate according to the nature and quality of information on economic and strategic resources, benefits/facilities a certain geographic space offers. The obtained image, correlated with the actors' functional needs form a stimulus. This determines or not the respective actor's orientation in that geographic space.

In the geopolitic field, the actors' perception is oriented to knowledge of the sensitive or hard opposants' points from the economic, political or military perspective.

If an actor wants to be in a favorable position within the international relations system and to intervene into a certain space of interest, he has to know (to have an adequate perception) the competitors '/partners' weak sides or forces. From this view point the actors tend to mutually analyze their deficiencies of potential in order to occupy an as better as possible position within the equation of power. During the "Cold War" this permanent correction of the perception on the own potential, but especially on the enemy's one led to the start of the armament contest between the superpowers[58]. The analysts of the contemporary politico-military phenomenon affirm that the end of the "Cold War" didn't put an end to this correction and to the improvement programmers of the "Nuclear force of the big powers.

Perception in the contemporary geopolitical field is a component decisively influencing the actor's behavior. It contributes to a certain state of mind and finally to their behavior within the international relations system. By perception, the actor forms a functional vision on the geopolitical reality allowing to make sense and to correlate it to his own capability of action. He adapts and defines his place within the dispute for a space or another.

From the view point of the geopolitical theory the perception is an instrument of work, an estimating apparatus, a scale of reading

geopolitical reality/phenomenon helping to obtain an image more or less adequate, depending on the descriptor's quality. The perception so understood is closer to what Denis Jodelet defined as representation as a form of practical knowledge linking a subject to an object. The subject in this case is the geopolitical but can equally be the politician or the journalist interested in a problem/crises in a geographic space and the "perceived" object is the geopolitical reality itself.

The perception in the geopolitical analysis is always the representation of something – either it's about the power potential or the established among the action relations in a certain space – and belongs to somebody: the political analyst or even the simple man on the street. So it has with it's object symbolizing (it is a substitute) and interpreting (it gives meanings) relations.

As a form of knowledge, the perception will materialize in a speech, press news, or in the most complex form/geopolitical scenario and will introduce itself as a form of modeling geopolitical reality being adequate in different degrees. The obtained by a journalist, for example, image about the crisis in Kosovo will be almost always more approximate then the image built by the researcher or the politician because the information (stimulus) differs from qualitative point of view.

On the other hand we find a perception also at the public opinion's level. This is very close to what the specialists in psycho-sociology define as "naive knowledge" which should not be rejected as a false one[59]. It is only mediated and filtered through mass-media according to the interests the actors have in a space or another. The reasons of the conflict, but especially the culprits guilty of crime and terrorist actions during the crisis in Bosnia, by example, have been presented in a different way by media in the west and in Moscow.

From this angle it can't be an identical perception for all actors in the geopolitical field. As the social representation for an individual/group, the actor's perception on the geopolitical field is not a simple reflection of the reality, but a reflection of a reality significantly organized. The signification is determined by the context. Firstly, by the informational context, because, in the most of cases, the ordinary people form a perception regarding an event in the geopolitical field appealing to an amount of press

news or politicians' speeches. In these
circumstances it is necessary to carefully analyze
the circumstances generating news, speeches,
information because in the biggest number of

cases they are destined to a target-audience who
must be convinced and to whom if follows to be
presented some arguments.

NOTES:

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[2] See at length Francois Caron *"Geopolitique et geostrategie"* in "Geostrategique", No.58, February, 1995, Institute de Strategie Comparee, Paris, pp. 32-33; Zbigniew Brzezinski, *"The Big Chess Plate The American Supremacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives"*, translated by Amelia Ionescu, Univers Enciclopedic, Bucharest, 2000 pp.49-53

[3] Constantin Hlihor *"History and Geopolitics in Europe of the 2oth century. Theoretical and methodological considerations"*, AISM, Bucharest, 1999, pp. 124-126.

[4] Frank Debie, *"Is Geopolitics a science? An aspect of the Peter Tayloris political geography"* in the volume E.I.Emandi, Gh.Buzatu, V.S.Cucu *"Geopolitics"*, Jassy, 1994, p.316. Sterie Culache *"Influences upon the perceptions of the political world"* in the mentioned – above volum, p.326.

[5] Apud Herve Coutau – Begarie, *"Geostrategie: le mot et la chose"*, in "Strategique", no.58, February, 1995, p.65.

[6] I.E.Emandi, Gh.Buzatu, V.S. Cucu, mentioned above, pp.61-62.

[7] *Ibidem*, p.302.

[8] Constanton Hlihor, mentioned above work, p. 127.

[9] *Ibidem*.

[10] Constantin Hlihor, *"The Role of Geopolitics in the Analyses of the Contemporary Political Phenomenon"* in "Euro-Atlantic Studies", 2, 1999 pp.25-33.

[11] Lawrence Freedman, *"Strategic Coercion"* in "Strategic Coercion, Concepts and Cases", edited by Lawrence Freedman, Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 15-36.

[12] James Gow, *"Coercive Cadence: The Yugoslav War of Dissolution"* in the volume "Strategic Coercion", pp.296-297.

[13] Barry Buzan, *"The peoples states and fear"*, second edition, translated into Romanian by Vivia Sandulescu, Cartier Pinting House, Chisinau, Codey 2000, Bucharest, 200o, p.274.

[14] Robert Osgood and Robert W.Tucker, *"Force Order and Justice"*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1967, p.32 apud Barry Buzan, above mentioned, p.274.

[15] Hedly Bull, *"The Anarchical Society"*, Macmillan, London, 1977, p. 189, apud Barry Buzan, quoted work, p.274.

[16] Michael Howard, "Studies in War and Peace", Temple Smith, London, 1970, p.11, apud Barry Buzan, quoted vide, p.275.

[17] Barry Buzan, quoted vide, pp.274-276.

[18] Alvin Toffler, *"Powershift/Puterea in miscare"*, translated into Romanian by Mihnea Columbeanu, Bucharest, 1995, p.24.

[19] *Ibidem*, p.32.

[20] Robert A.Dahl, *"Who Governs? Democracy and Power in American City"*, Yale University Press, 1961; quoted abore Mihail E.Ionescu "After hegemony. Four security Scenarios for East-Europe in the 90", Bucharest, 1993, p.11.

[21] Mihail E.Ionescu, q.v., p.11.

[22] Alvin Toffler, q.v., p.33-34.

[23] *Ibidem*, p.24.

[24] *Ibidem*, pp. 155-156.

[25] *Ibidem*, pp. 135-136.

[26] *Ibidem*, p.236.

[27] Iames N.Rosenau, *"The turbulence in the world politics. A theory of the change and continuity"*, Bucharest, 1994, pp.156-157.

[28] Sergiu Tamas *"Geopolitica"*, Alternative, Bucharest, 1995, pp.220-221.

[29] Alvin Toffler, q.v. p.203.

[30] *Ibidem*, pp. 347-348.

[31] Sergiu Tamas, q.v. p.228.

[32] Constantin Hlihor, q.v. p. 135.

[33] Sergiu Tamas, q.v. p.230.

[34] Alvin Toffler, q.v. p.93.

[35] *Ibidem*, p.94.

[36] *Ibidem*, p.95.

[37] *Ibidem*, p.94.

[38] Barry Buzan, q.v., pp.292-294.

[39] Apud Barry Buzan, q.v., p.292.

[40] *Ibidem*, pp. 106-107.

[41] Helene Carrere d'Encousse, *"Imperiul spulberat"*, Bucharest, 1993; *Ibidem "Triumful natiunilor sau sfarsitul imperiului sovietic"*, Bucharest 1993; M.Tatu *"Gorbatchev URSS va-t-elle changer?"* Paris, 1987; F.Thom, "Le moment Gorbatchev" Paris, 1989.

[42] Hans J.Morgenthau, *"Politics, Armony, Nations. A Realist Theory of International Politics"*, in "Documentary booknote", vol.2, no.4, 1981, p. 15.

[43] *Ibidem*, p. 12.

[44] Apud Sergiu Tamas, q.v., p. 166.

[45] Constantin Hlihor, q.v., p. 147.

[46] *Ibidem*, p. 148.

[47] *Ibidem*, p. 149.

[48] Armand Tremond, *"Histoire d'une recherche distences et espaces"* in "Espaces vecu et civilisations", Paris, 1982, pp.25-27.

[49] I.E.Emandi, Gh.Buzatu, V.S.Cucu, q.v. p.59.

[50] *Ibidem*.

[51] Barry Buzan, q.v., pp.344-345.

[52] See at length, Jaques de Launay, *"Big decisions of the World War 2"*, vol.1, Bucharest, 1988; A.P.I.Taylor, "The Origines of the World War 2", Bucharest 1977; Andre Maurois, "The reasons of the war in 1939", Bucharest, 1939.

[53] *Ibidem*, p.345.

[54] See at lenght Pierre Raimond, *"L'Art de manipuler"*, Ulrich, 1996; Francois Thorn, *"La langue de bois"*, Julliard, Paris, 1987; Thiery Wolton, L'Histoire interdite", Lattes, Paris, 1998; Vladimir Volkoff *"Tratat de dezinformare. De la calul troian la Internet"*, translated into Romanian by Mihnea Columbeanu, Antet, Bucharest, 1999.

[55] Martin Mc.Cauley, *"Russia, America and the Cold War"*, 1991, translated into Romania by Mihaela Barba with an introductory study by I.Ciuperca, Polirom, Jassy, 1999, p.58.

[56] Sergiu Tamas, q.v., p. 174.

[57] Serge Moscovici, *Psihologia socială sau maşina de fabricat zei;* 3rd edition, Polirom, Jassy, pp.27-58.

[58] Serge Moscovici, *La psychanalyse, sa image et son public*, P.U.F., Paris, 1976, p.43.

[59] Adrian Neculau, preface to *Psihologia câmpului social: Reprezentări sociale*, Bucharest, 1995, p.44.

La paix et la guerre dans le milieu international de sécurité après la guerre froide

Olimpiodor Antonescu

Le problème de la paix et de la guerre a été abordé au cours de l'histoire de plusieurs points de vue et elle a constitué l'objet d'étude pour les théoriciens et les spécialistes qui appartiennent à un large spectre de domaines, depuis la philosophie et l'histoire jusqu'à la sociologie, les sciences militaires, la polémologie et plus récemment des relations internationales.

Après la guerre froide, tout le monde a cru que va commencer une ère de paix et de sécurité. Les choses n'ont pas évolué dans le sens espéré et à partir de ce moment-là des questions plus anciennes ou plus nouvelles, concernant la guerre, les crises et les conflits sont apparues aussi bien au niveau de l'opinion publique que dans les milieux académiques et universitaires.

A la question *si maintenant peut exister de la paix, là où nous avons eu autrefois de la guerre,* Kenneth N. Waltz affirme que la réponse est, la plupart des cas, pessimiste[1]. Herfried Munkler, concernant cet aspect, disait : «A une premier regard il semble que la guerre et la paix soient deux états politiques clairement différents : alors quand il y a de la paix, on ne peut pas parler de la guerre et l'inverse... La guerre et la paix, deux concepts séparés par les déclarations de guerre et les traités de paix sont, par conséquent, deux états politiques qui s'excluent réciproquement : seulement l'un d'entre eux peut exister à un moment donné – soit la guerre soit la paix, il n'y a pas un troisième état. Que nous pensons à la Guerre Froide : ce concept présente que la réalité politique est plus complexe que la construction binaire guerre – paix[2].

1.1. Des théories, des concepts et des préoccupations concernant la paix et la résolution des crises dans les relations internationales

Il y a seulement deux opinions qui présentent que, en fait, les études sur la paix et la guerre ont offert des visions et des perspectives différentes concernant ces phénomènes qui ont accompagné l'histoire de l'Humanité[3].

Il y a des auteurs qui considèrent qu'il n'existe pas la même définition pour la paix et la guerre. Lothar Brock, par exemple, attire l'attention sur les difficultés de compréhension du concept de paix et il propose *une société mondiale non-violente* comme objectif qui ne peut pas être atteint, mais qui peut aider à l'orientation des activités.

A son avis, ces difficultés de compréhension viennent de différentes réponses qui sont données aux suivantes questions : la paix signifie-t-elle le cessez le feu ? Mais pour combien de temps ? La paix va-t-elle pouvoir perdurer après la fin de la dernière guerre ? Tout le reste du temps est seulement une grande période entre des guerres, seulement un armistice ? Pendant les périodes de paix, la vie des individus et des peuples est préservée face aux interventions militaires violentes, mais aussi face aux autres formes de violence ? La paix sera seulement alors quand sera la justice ? Il semble que l'Europe Occidentale a oublié ces guerres ? Mais la paix peut s'y installer une longue période pendant que dans d'autres régions les conflits se déroulent avec une grande violence ? La paix est divisible ou peut-elle exister seulement comme une paix dans le monde entier ?[4]

La préoccupation scientifique concernant la guerre et la paix est, probablement, aussi vieille que la science. Malgré cela, seulement dans les années '50 du XXème siècle, la recherche dans le domaine de la paix et des conflits est apparue comme une discipline de science autonome, dans le but d'analyser les différents aspects des conflits et des guerres, ainsi que les conditions nécessaires pour la paix[5]. Les essais de créer une science spéciale pour chercher la paix ont été remarqués plusieurs fois pendant le XXème siècle. Cependant, c'est seulement après la Première

Guerre Mondiale, quand le monde a compris les crimes et les destructions massives que sont apparus des instituts pour les relations internationales aux Etats-Unis et en Grande Bretagne auprès la Société des Nations et la Court International de Justice, qui avaient comme but la recherche des conflits et des guerres internationales, des révolutions et des guerres civiles, ainsi que les conditions pour installer une paix mondiale dans la duré[6]. En revanche, dans les années 1920, il y a eu peu d'auteurs qui désiraient introduire la guerre et la paix dans le cadre des relations internationales. La nouvelle discipline est devenue rapidement un facteur de légitimation qui servait aux politiques étrangères nationales et aux intérêts militaires et de pouvoir des différents pays.

Les tensions accumulées dans les relations internationales, les crises qui n'ont pas pu être résolues dans le cadre des institutions de sécurité, fondées sur le nouveau concept de paix et de guerre, ont conduit à l'apparition de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale qui a affecté le système des Etats et aux crimes commis par les politiques staliniste et fasciste. Mais, c'est notamment la perspective d'une guerre atomique, qui pouvait tuer des peuples entiers, qui a déterminé la recherche dans le domaine de la paix à la fin des années 1950 comme une réaction à l'idéologie imposée par la Guerre Froide[7]. Elle est apparue tout d'abord dans les universités et dans les instituts privés du Canada, des Etats-Unis et de Norvège.

En parallèle avec ce développement, la polémologie (l'étude des guerres et des conflits), pour laquelle seulement quelques personnes de France et de Hollande étaient intéressées, est concentrée sur la recherche systématique des guerres et des conflits.

Le but des recherches dans le domaine de la paix n'a pas été représenté seulement par le monitoring, la délimitation et la restreinte du phénomène de la guerre, mais aussi par l'élimination de celle-ci comme relation sociale et interétatique. Ainsi, la recherche dans le domaine de la paix reprend les idées considérées antérieurement comme utopiques concernant l'instauration de la paix mondiale. Ce courant qui se concentrait plutôt sur le monitoring des guerres et sur la maîtrise des conflits, a fonctionné tout d'abord en parallèle avec la recherche dans le domaine de la paix, dans le

cadre d'étude des guerres et notamment sur le territoire des Etats-Unis.

Les deux domaines de recherche ont été réunis dans les années 1960 dans une discipline qui mélangeait la recherche dans le domaine de la paix avec celle du domaine des conflits[8].

Pendant la détente des tensions internationales, en 1964, a été créée le *International Peace Research Association*[9] de Groningen. Aussi, en 1964 a été crée à Oslo le *Journal of Peace Research*[10], qui a eu une contribution particulière pour la diffusion dans le monde des études consacrées à la paix et à la guerre.

Par l'apparition des organisations régionales latino-américaines et asiatiques à la fin des années 1970, consacrées aux études d'irenologie, la recherche dans le domaine de la paix a dépassé les frontières de l'Amérique du Nord, de l'Europe Occidentale et du Japon, en ayant ainsi une diffusion mondiale. La recherche dans le domaine de la paix a connu une augmentation extraordinaire après la création d'*International Peace Research Institute*[11] de Stockholm. Cet institut a été crée sur la proposition du Premier Ministre suédois de cette époque, Tage Erlander, le Premier Juillet 1966, à l'occasion de la fête nationale (150 années) de Suède. Il avait comme but la création à Genève, auprès de l'ONU[12], des bases de science pour les diplomaties suédoise et internationale dans le domaine du désarmement. Les analyses concernant les dépenses dans le domaine de l'armement et des systèmes d'armement, les études concernant les causes de la guerre et des crises dans le domaine des relations internationales ont été publiées et sont publiées dans la publication renommée **SIPRI Year Book** qui apparaît dans six langues de circulations internationales, en attirant ainsi l'attention de l'opinion publique du monde entier sur la nécessité de développer la recherche dans le domaine de la paix[13].

La détente du conflit Est-Ouest, la fin de la guerre du Vietnam et la diminution de l'intérêt face aux problèmes du développement du Tiers Monde, ont muté l'attention de l'opinion publique sur la problématique Nord-Sud. Ainsi, a été imposé un élargissement des paradigmes de la recherche dans le domaine de la paix, au-delà des préoccupations antérieures en ce qui concerne la dynamique de l'armement, des systèmes terroristes, la maîtrise du processus d'armement et le monitoring du processus de désarmement.

Dans le contexte du développement, respectivement de la reprise des concepts comme par exemple *conflit asymétrique, conflit d'intérêts, conflit latent – conflit ouvert,* cet élargissement des paradigmes se trouve notamment dans le concept *de la violence structurale* développée par Johan Galtung[14], un concept adopté rapidement par les segments libéraux et même par ceux socialistes de l'opinion publique occidentale, qui ont commencé à attirer l'attention sur le problème de la réforme du système des relations internationales contemporaines. Galtung offre la définition de la paix comme l'opposition à la violence, mais dans sa conception, la violence et la paix ne consistent pas directement dans l'utilisation de la violence par les hommes, mais elles sont *«tout ce que empêche l'autoréalisation humaine et tout ce qui peut être évité»*[15].

De ce point de vue, Johan Galtung distingue quatre types de violence dans la politique mondiale. Le premier est la violence *classique* de la littérature de spécialité, qui parle de la provocation de souffrance par l'intermédiaire de la guerre, torture ou punitions inhumaines et dégradantes. Deuxièmement, Galtung parle de la pauvreté, comme une faute des conditions matérielles de vie qui provoquent les mêmes souffrances aux gens. Troisièmement, la répression consiste dans la perte de libertés des individus pour choisir et pour exprimer leurs propres convictions. Enfin, Galtung traite l'aliénation comme forme de violence structurale contre l'identité de l'individu et contre les besoins des gens de vivre dans une communauté et d'établir les relations avec des autres êtres humains[16].

Le caractère diffus du concept de la violence structurale a développé énormément le domaine de la recherche de la paix, en signifiant que ce domaine a été trop sollicité, en connaissant une augmentation à peu près illimitée et en prenant les proportions d'une science universelle. Dans les années 1970, cette expansion a été ressentie comme une délivrance, notamment parce que les anciennes méthodes d'approche, appliquées à des problèmes modernes comme par exemple le développement international de la société humaine, de son système d'Etat et de son environnement, n'était pas du tout approprié.

La recherche dans le domaine de la paix a laissée son empreinte notamment sur les sciences politiques, la psychologie (l'étude de

l'agression), la théologie, la pédagogie et la géographie, en ayant une influence sur d'autres disciplines comme par exemple la physique, la biologie, l'informatique, la philosophie, l'histoire, le droit et les sciences militaires (études stratégiques). Elle a affecté moins le domaine sociologique dans le cadre national et de l'Etat[17] – à cause de la limitation traditionnelle de la notion de société par ce domaine.

A partir de la crise de la détente de la fin des années 1970, quand le conflit Est-Ouest dans l'équation de la sécurité, et y compris la possibilité d'une nouvelle guerre de destruction massive sont apparus dans l'attention des diplomates et des chercheurs[18], on a eu une réitération des principes de la recherche dans le domaine de la paix, plus précisément l'étude des conditions nécessaires pour la prévention de la durée des guerres, des causes des guerres, des informations conflictuelles et de la dynamique du processus d'armement, sans perdre de vue la violence structurelle, qui, pour la plupart des gens, a un potentiel de menace plus élevé que les guerres conventionnelles.

Aussi bien dans l'usage quotidien que dans l'usage académique, les gens essayent de dépasser les difficultés de compréhension de la paix en utilisant des attributs : ils parlent de la vraie paix, positive, ou de la paix négative, incomplète, et même de la paix *des cimetières*[19]. Le problème n'est pas résolu ainsi, mais peut-être, dans le meilleur cas, seulement évité. Reinhard Meyers affirme, en liaison avec les problèmes de la paix et de la guerre, qu'il y a *«deux types d'arguments traditionnels : la paix peut être comprise comme un principe ordonnateur cosmique, comme une expression concentrée d'un ordre mondial qui trouve son dernier rempart et sa dernière légitimité en DIEU, et, un peu plus tard, suite à la sécularisation de la pensée politique après l'époque de la Réforme, dans la pensée naturelle des gens*[20]*»*.

En analysant ces deux concepts d'un autre point de vue, Reinhard Meyers considère que *«la paix peut être comprise comme une expression des convictions des gens, comme un produit culturel qui peut être justifié du point de vue politique, qui doit reposer sur des accords signés (traité de paix, accords sociaux) et qui doit être défendu par l'autorité publique. En liaison avec ces deux structures d'argumentation, il y a la question concernant les connexions qui existent entre la paix et la justice, pax et iustitia : soit la justice se*

trouve au-dessus de la paix et dans cette situation la paix devient le fruit naturel de la justice, soit la paix devra tout d'abord consolidée et maintenue dans une société avec le soutien des forces d'autorité de l'Etat : ainsi, la justice, en tant que principe le légitimation d'un ordre social donné, qui offre à chacun la partie qui lui appartient, est subordonnée à la paix, bien que la paix doit exister avant d'être réalisée[21] ».

Voici que dans la première argumentation, la guerre apparaît comme une censure, comme une interruption de l'état naturel de la paix : *bellum ruptura pacis*, mais dans la deuxième, la guerre apparaît suite aux faute commises par les gens et suite à la liberté péchée de la volonté. Elle peut être regardée comme l'état normal aussi intra-que inter social. La paix est non guerre : *pax absentia belli*. Restons au mot paix et aux problèmes qui sont posés par la transformation de ce mot dans un concept. De ce point de vue, pour le chercheur du domaine des relations internationales trois provocations apparaissent : la conception des gens sur la paix ne doit pas devenir un lien idéologique qui peut les conduire vers des nouvelles guerres (des guerres contre d'autres guerres) ; la paix ne doit pas être instrumentalisée pour légitimer un commandement (comme réalisation de la paix) ; elle ne doit pas prendre en soi-même les tendances réelles du passé historique et du présent, pour ne pas rester au niveau de la fantaisie[22].

L'origine moderne des études sur la paix (irénologie) se trouve à la fin du XVIIIème siècle dans la philosophie kantienne. En 1975 celui-ci publie l'ouvrage *Zum ewigen Frieden* qui est à la base de toutes les disputes et les controverses concernant les possibilités et les moyens d'instauration d'une paix durable dans la société humaine[23]. D'après la conception de Kant les sociétés démocratiques ne se battent pas entre elles. L'analyste Ionel Nicu Sava identifie les thèses principales de la réflexion kantienne, qui appliquées au milieu international créeraient les prémisses d'obtenir ce que le philosophe allemand appelait la paix perpétuelle[24] : aucun Etat indépendant, grand ou petit, ne doit pas se trouver sous la domination d'un autre; les armées permanentes doivent être abolies au fur et à mesure ; aucun Etat ne doit intervenir par la force contre la constitution ou le gouvernement d'autres Etats ; la constitution civile de tous les Etats doit être républicaine; la loi des Nations doit reposer

sur une fédération des Etats libres. Les instruments par lesquels un tel idéal se réaliserait dans la communauté internationale étaient identifiés avec « la liberté à l'intérieur de l'Etat et l'arbitrage (le droit) dans la relation entre les Etats » [25]. En d'autres mots, Kant croyant que l'évolution de la société, conformément à la suprématie de la loi, créait les prémisses pour un état de moralité et d'équité dans les relations entre les gens. Aucun gouvernement qui est contrôlé par le peuple n'entrera en guerre sinon il sera obligé à la faire. L'expérience politique relevée du système des relations internationales affaiblit cette conception.

Il faut remarquer le fait que Emmanuel Kant a été suffisamment réaliste lorsqu'il observait que la société du XVIIIème siècle n'était pas prête et elle ne pouvait pas mettre en œuvre une telle paix[26], mais il a cru que les temps ultérieurs seront plus appropriés à un tel système de sécurité. De ce point de vue l'illustre penseur allemand a eu raison, parce que ultérieurement sa conception a été le fondement de plusieurs écoles de réflexion qui se sont encadrées dans le courant libéral. Sa philosophie a influencé la réflexion et la pratique des relations internationales dans la période suivante. D'après l'un des fondateurs principaux de la théorie sociologique, Herbert Spencer, le conflit était un principe permanent « qui anime toute société et institue un équilibre précaire entre celle-ci et son milieu ; les incertitudes de la survie, ainsi la peur que celle-ci donnent naissance quand même a un contrôle religieux qui se transforme en pouvoir politique organisé en une forme militaire ; l'intégration sociale favorise dans ce cas-là la différence des fonctions et des rôles, en permettant, au bout de cette évolution, la création d'une société industrielle, enfin pacifiée[27]. Dans cette vision, le conflit a un caractère passif et donc il ne produit pas de conséquences non désirées pour la société humaine.

D'autres auteurs ont placé le conflit dans le cadre d'une lutte acharnée pour l'espace et la survie des «races supérieures» contre celles «inférieures». Arthur de Gobineau et Vacher de Lapouge, en France, à côté de H.S. Chamberlain ou Francis Galton, en Grande Bretagne, ainsi que Wagner et Marr en Allemagne se sont inscrits dans cette conception à côté d'autres théoriciens ont été utilisés par la propagande nazie en vue de justifier le génocide et le crime dans les années antérieures et pendant la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale[28]. La plupart des libéraux anglais, ainsi

que le président des Etats-Unis, W. Wilson affirment que le spécifique autoritaire et militaire de l'Etat allemand a déterminé l'Allemagne de commencer la guerre qui s'est très vite répandue dans l'ensemble du monde. C'est ainsi que le courant libéral (l'idéalisme) est apparu en tant qu'école de réflexion et d'analyse du phénomène de la guerre dans les relations internationales. Les idéalistes ont formulé leurs conceptions sur la guerre et la paix à la base de trois assomptions. La première d'entre elles affirme que la nature humaine n'est pas réductible à des raisons égoïstes et des intérêts matériels. La deuxième hypothèse relève de la perception du comportement humain qui dérive de la suite des idéaux et des aspirations généralement humaines. La dernière assomption, parmi celles qui sont considérées fondamentales pour définir ce courant, se rapporte à la corrélation entre le caractère inhérent bon de l'homme et la possibilité d'harmoniser les intérêts des Etats dans le système international[29].

Dans le cadre de la réflexion roumaine, la question de la paix et de la guerre a été abordée parmi d'autres par Dimitrie Gusti en deux excellentes études sur la sociologie de la guerre publiée dans l'Avant - Guerre[30]. Le sociologue roumain percevait «la guerre comme une réalité sociale (…) l'un des phénomènes sociaux les plus complexes» [31]. La perception de Gusti sur la guerre en est une intégrateur, parce que d'après son opinion celle-là comptait toute l'économie, la culture, la technique d'un moment. La nature et la façon spécifique dans laquelle se manifeste la guerre étaient, d'après la conception gustienne, directement influencées par le cadre dans lequel celle-là se déroulait. Ce cadre avait quatre dimensions : cosmique (le terrain/la géographie et le climat) ; biologique (donnée par la race et la sélection) ; historique (les causes) et psychologique. De cette perspective, pour D. Gusti les façons d'une guerre de se manifester étaient perçues au niveau économique, spirituel (l'aspect moral), politique (le pouvoir) et juridique (le Droit)[32]. Les raisons pour lesquelles une Nation fait recours à la Guerre ont un caractère historique et dépendent du contexte social et politique où vit cette collectivité humaine. Pour le sociologue roumain le but de la guerre détermine aussi le genre de guerre auquel une collectivité humaine est confrontée. En suivant le critère défense/conquête il fait la distinction entre deux catégories de conflits : de libération (nationales) et de conquête (impériales) ; d'après le type d'acteurs impliqués en conflit les guerres peuvent être : civiles, révolutions, interétatiques et celle-ci se déroulent à l'intérieur d'un Etat, entre une partie de la société et l'Etat et finalement, entre les Etats en tant qu'entités souveraines[33].

1.2   Les caractéristiques de la coexistence d'un conflit armé avec la paix

Chaque collectivité humaine sur la scène internationale des Etats, dit

Dimitrie Gusti, est liée par des intérêts communs, qui peuvent aboutir à des relations de coopération, mais aussi à des conflits. Donc, elle va plaider pour la création d'une science par l'intermédiaire de laquelle seront étudiées non seulement l'état des Nations, mais leurs aspirations de mieux se connaître, afin de savoir et comprendre les caractéristiques du milieu international.

Connaître ces réalités du milieu international pourrait entraîner la diminution des taux de probabilité de guerre. Acquérir une bonne connaissance entre les nations pourrait déboucher sur une meilleure collaboration entre celle-ci, autrement dit, sur une augmentation du degré de socialisation. « *La socialisation en progression,* affirmait D. Gusti en 1913, *est une condition nécessaire de la conversion de la guerre en concurrence culturelle*[34]. Nicu Sava a tout à fait raison lorsqu'il affirme que cette perspective avancée par le savant roumain au début du XXème siècle finira par s'imposer vers les années 1970 en tant que l'une des plus modernes théories dans le domaine des relations internationales : la théorie *d'augmentation de l'indépendance* sur la scène internationale.

Dans la théorie de la paix, la modalité préférée de la majorité des analystes et des théoriciens dans le domaine, d'articuler une définition de ce phénomène est de la mettre en corrélation avec la définition de la violence et du conflit. Autrement dit, la paix est comprise comme l'effort d'éliminer ou, au moins, de diminuer la violence et les conflits[35]. L'existence du domaine d'étude du phénomène de la paix se justifie par la persistance des conflits survenus après la fin de la guerre froide. L'opinion publique internationale se demandait si, après la disparition des régimes communistes qui promouvaient la violence politique et qui

généraient des conflits, on n'assistera pas à leur disparition complète.

Une brève analyse sur les conflits survenus au cours des dernières décennies et qui se trouvent gelés pour l'instant, néanmoins avec un degré de probabilité élevé de renouveau, ainsi qu'une analyse sur les 36 conflits, voire plus, qui se déroulent dans le monde à l'heure actuelle, sont en mesure de contredire et d'apaiser l'élan des plus optimistes des analystes. Les forces armées de la Fédération de Russie, impliquées dans le conflit de Tchétchénie se trouvent dans la situation de ne plus pouvoir respecter leurs promesses d'annihiler une petite république indépendantiste. Le conflit armé dans la République Démocratique du Congo, où 8 autres pays africains avaient été impliqués (Angola, Namibie, Zimbabwe, Tchad, Soudan, d'un côté, et Rwanda, Ouganda et Burundi, de l'autre côté) a recommencé à cause des violations des dispositions de l'accord de cessez le feu par l'un des groupes insurgés[36]. Malgré l'attaque aérienne de 78 jours organisé par l'OTAN contre la République Fédérale de Yougoslavie afin d'imposer l'arrêt du génocide de Kosovo, suivi par le déploiement de très importantes forces de maintien de la paix (environ 50000 militaires), la haine entre les ethnies continue à faire des victimes, des homicides aléatoires. Même si le conflit dans le Timor Oriental entre les troupes indonésiennes, alliées avec les groupements paramilitaires, et les habitants du Timor Oriental est fini, la paix n'est pas instaurée dans la région.

Par ailleurs, uniquement sur la base d'une brève analyse du milieu international de sécurité, on observe que la plus longue période de paix ne dépasse pas 20 années, ce qui permet d'affirmer qu'aujourd'hui le conflit est associé avec la civilisation, tout comme la civilisation est associée avec le confort et la prospérité[37]. Il est très difficile de soutenir l'idée que plus de prospérité équivaut à plus de temps de paix, qui est d'ailleurs l'une des idées centrales dans l'anthropologie américaine. Du 1945 jusqu'au 2000, le monde n'a connu que 26 jours sans faire de la guerre. De 1945 jusqu'àu 2005, 132 guerres se sont déroulées dont 7 qui se sont finies de commun accord entre les deux parties, 18 qui se sont finies avec un accord obtenu après une période de négociation et 38 qui se sont finies par l'intervention d'une tierce partie qui a joué le rôle de médiateur du conflit[38].

Les analystes qui ont étudié les conflits après la clôture de la *guerre froide* ont conclu que la plupart de ces conflits ne sont pas plus entre des acteurs classiques des relations internationales, mais ils ont caractère de conflit interne. Eduardo Posada a remarqué que dans l'époque moderne, 43 conflits se sont déroulés à l'intérieur des Etats[39], et 1960 à 1996 ont été enregistrés 60 cas avec les minorités ethniques en tant que victimes[40].

Il en résulte que les conflits actuels ne se déroulent pas entre les armées ennemies de deux Etats, mais, dans la plupart des cas, entre les troupes gouvernementales et celles rebelles, qui représentent des intérêts différents au sein du même Etat. Les motivations sont religieuses, ethniques ou rarement de nature économique. En même temps, celle-ci est l'une des causes pour lesquelles la balance des victimes militaires-civils a changé dans les dernières années, le pourcentage des pertes au sein de la population civile arrivant à 90% du total. Les exemples présentés à ce titre pourraient continuer[41] : les essais des groupes rebelles nord irlandais d'enfreindre l'accord « *Good Friday Agreement* », si difficilement obtenu en 1998 ; l'attitude des séparatistes de Corse de décliner l'offre française d'indépendance ; l'interruption par ETA de l'accord concernant la violence dans la région basque de l'Espagne ; le refus de l'Armée Nationale de Libération (ELN) de se joindre à la suspension des hostilités convenue entre les Forces Armées Révolutionnaires de Colombie (FARC) et le Gouvernement ; les actions des musulmans séparatistes de l'Ile Luzon (Philippines) regroupés dans la Nouvelle Armée Populaire, qui comptait plus de 25.000 personnels ; les essais, sans succès jusque là, du Gouvernement Turque d'annihiler le Parti des Travailleurs du Kurdistan (PKK) ; la guerre civile de l'Algérie, dans laquelle sont impliqués deux groupes gouvernementaux, le Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) et le Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) ; le maintien ouvert du conflit indopakistanais de Cachemire ou le conflits qui se sont déroulés après la chute de l'URSS, en Asie Centrale.

Pour éliminer les conflits de la vie internationale, il est nécessaire de les connaître très bien. Comme la guerre, la théorie des conflits a connu un développement et une approche de plusieurs perspectives, par conséquent leur définition a connu une grande diversification. Les approches théoriques sont encadrées dans un

paradigme dichotomique. Certains commencent de la prémisse que dans la société moderne le conflit peur être traité comme rationnel, constructif et même bénéfique pour l'autoréglage social, tandis que d'autres théoriciens le voient comme quelque chose de négatif et avec des conséquences néfastes pour l'évolution de la société moderne[42].

Il faut remarquer le fait que, dans la théorie des relations internationales, le conflit este perçu et analysé par rapport à l'Ecole de pensée à laquelle est associé celui qui analyse ce phénomène social. Les adeptes du courant *behaviouriste,* par exemple, affirment qu'on peut comprendre la nature et le rôle des conflits, si l'on étudie le comportement de l'être humain lorsque celui-ci agit pour procurer ce qui est nécessaire pour survivre et pour s'assurer le prestige au sein de la communauté[43]. D'un autre côté, les adeptes du courant psychologique affirment que l'être humain a dans sa matrice, inclus, l'instinct de l'agression. Un groupe de sociologues et de psychologues espagnols ont essayé d'expliquer, à la moitié de la IXème décennie du siècle passé, par la recherche interdisciplinaire, le comportement agressif dans le milieu urbain, par l'intermédiaire d'une étude de cas à Séville[44]. Leur conclusion est que l'apparition du conflit dans les communautés humaines n'est pas déterminée par la nature humaine, mais par le caractère et le type de relations entre les individus, d'un côté, et des groupes humains, d'un autre côté[45].

Le spécialiste réputé de la théorie de la paix et de la guerre, R.J. Rummel affirme qu'au sens philosophique, le conflit peut être défini en tant qu'une confrontation entre un pouvoir et un autre pouvoir en essayant de détruire tout ce qui apparaît manifestement contre soi. Dans le sens social restreint, le conflit peut être vu comme une relation de confrontation entre deux parties qui désirent mutuellement la même chose[46]. Les analystes Kenneth D. Bush et Robert J. Opp montrent que la société moderne est, par sa nature, conflictuelle et qu'en fait les conflits violents sont ceux qui affectent d'autant la structure que sa façon de fonctionnement[47]. En faisant référence au paradigme de Fukuyama, pour décrypter le sens des évolutions internationales après la clôture de la guerre froide, le regretté général Nicolae Uscoi montre que la nature des conflits dans le monde après la guerre froide a dramatiquement changé. Certains

conflits dans la société sont causés par l'égoïsme et non par les doléances. Là où la guerre affecte généralement la société, les autres peuvent en tirer profit. Dans ces cas-là, est souvent en danger le contrôle des ressources naturelles, lès drogues sont impliquées dans la plupart des cas : les conflits sont appuyés sur des voisins et le secteur privé est complice – achetant des buts malades, contribuant au blanchissement d'argent et fournissant de l'armement dans les zones de conflit[48]. C'est pourquoi il est important de savoir quel type de conflits peut surgir dans le système des relations internationales et, surtout, comment peuvent-ils se manifester en tant qu'intensité et délai de déroulement.

Selon Galtung, pour pouvoir connaître les types de conflits dans l'histoire du XXème siècle il est nécessaire de connaître la structure de la violence dans la société moderne. Il fait la liaison entre l'instauration de la paix et la diminution des violences (le traitement) et son évitement (la prévention)[49]. Il fait aussi la différence entre conflit, attitude conflictuelle et comportement conflictuel[50]. Selon les types de besoins de l'homme dans la société, Galtung identifie deux types de violence : *directe,* particularisée dans des assassinats, pauvreté, sanctions, répression, détention, expulsion, déportation et *structurelle,* particularisée dans exploitation et marginalisation[51].

Les sociologues J.M.G. van der Dennen & V.S.E. Falger trouvent au moins trois domaines lorsqu'ils opèrent pour la classification des conflits : biologique, socio-historique et psychologique. D'autres auteurs partagent les conflits selon la nature des causes produisant des crises et des disputes. De cette perspective, dans la société moderne et contemporaine on trouve des conflits identitaires, économiques et géostratégiques[52]. Selon le type d'auteurs impliqués dans le déroulement des conflits, ainsi que des domaines où se passe la dispute, ceux-ci peuvent être classifiés dans deux grandes catégories[53] : *homme vs. homme* et conflits *homme vs. nature.* A leur tour, les deux classes peuvent être divisées. La première comprend les conflits entre les pauvres et les riches ou ce que les analystes, appartenant à l'école marxiste ou néo-marxiste, ont appelé le conflit entre le Nord riche et le Sud sous- développé ; conflits pour les ressources naturelles brutes ; conflits pour des ressources naturelles de consommation ; conflits pour les marchés ; conflits pour le contrôles des

voies d'accès vers les ressources ou les marchés ; conflits pour les zones stratégiques d'une importance particulière. Le deuxième grand volet comprend une chaîne entière d'agressions de l'homme contre la terre, les forêts, l'eau, l'atmosphère etc.

Selon d'autres auteurs, l'état de conflit peut être rapporté aux repères intérieur, extérieur (lorsqu'il s'agit du milieu international), économique, politique, militaire, culturel etc. De cette perspective, le type de conflit le plus souvent analysé est la guerre. En tant qu'état de l'ensemble de la société, **la guerre**, par la mise en évidence des types de relations sociales qui la soutiennent, représente de façon incontestable, une forme spécifique de conflit dans la société, c'est pourquoi elle est appelée « *conflit armé* » ou « *conflit militaire* ». La guerre représente *«un tel état de la société dans laquelle un conflit aigu avec un groupe extérieur quelconque ou un conflit intérieur aigu trouve son expression dans une confrontation armée"*[54]. On peut considérer que *„au cours de l'Histoire de vraies révolutions militaires se sont produites seulement deux fois et il existe des raisons solides à voir que la troisième révolution – qui va commencer – sera la plus profonde. Car certains paramètres clef de l'art de la guerre n'ont atteint leurs limites finales que dans les dernières décennies. Ces paramètres sont l'envergure, la force de meurtre et la vitesse»*[55]. La guerre de l'avenir sera « */.../ un phénomène fortement individualisé encadré dans un contexte par les conditions historiques, géographiques, économiques et stratégiques spécifiques, avec beaucoup d'éléments et événements non répétables /.../*[56]

Qui « *sur un plan conceptuel ne va pas supporter des évolutions spectaculaires, en restant une partie d'un ensemble, celle-ci restant la politique /.../ exigeant une approche concrète, multilatérale* »[57].

La conflictualité militaire actuelle a son origine dans les phénomènes et les manifestations antagonistes, qui sont produits par différents états de développement économique et technologique, aux niveaux desquels se trouvent les Nations composant la société humaine, à la fin du XX siècle et au début du XXème. En tant que phénomène social, le conflit militaire a évolué en ce qui concerne son contenu et sa physionomie, en étroite liaison avec l'évolution de la société.

Dans ce contexte, l'état de conflit militaire est produit par plusieurs conditions, dont

dépendent le succès ou l'échec d'une confrontation. Cela peut être considéré comme le produit simultané de certaines forces matérielles, morales, intellectuelles, économiques, politiques, diplomatiques, militaires, psychologiques et informationnelles, représentant plus qu'un simple problème de stratégie, de logistique ou de technologie.

En partant de l'expérience acquise et conformément à quelques critères spécifiques, les spécialistes militaires américains ont classifié les conflits armés en trois grandes catégories[58] :

· *le conflit de grande intensité* – un affrontement armé à grande échelle entre les Etats ou les coalitions (alliances), où les parties impliquées utilisent tous leurs moyens et les forces à leur disposition, pour accomplir les buts proposés ;

· *le conflit de moyenne intensité* – un affrontement armé entre les Etats (coalitions) où sont utilisés l'ensemble des moyens et des forces (à part les armes de destruction massive) ayant pour but la réalisation de certains intérêts politiques limités ;

· *le conflit de petite intensité* – une somme d'actions politiques, militaires, à caractère limité, réalisées pour soutenir un Etat ami, accomplir certains buts politiques, économiques et psychologiques.

Ce tableau du phénomène conflictuel dans le monde de la période « *post-guerre froide* » n'est ni exhaustif et il ne comprend pas l'ensemble des approches théoriques des dernière années. Depuis la fin de la « *guerre froide* » un nombre considérable de visions conceptuelles ont été lancées, concernant la physionomie des futurs conflits. Dans le contexte actuel, la plus souvent mentionnée est la théorie de Huntington. Au début des années 1990, celui-ci a affirmé que l'adversité idéologique entre les deux superpouvoirs sera peu à peu remplacée, pour différentes raisons, par un « *choc entre les civilisations* »[59]. Il a apprécié que « *les principaux conflits dans la politique globale auront lieu entre nations et groupes appartenant à des civilisations différentes* »[60].

Huntington a défini les civilisations, d'abord en tant qu'entités culturelles et il a dit qu'entre celles-là il y avait un conflit inhérent, ce qui conduit aux violentes confrontations dans des régions où elles se superposent, elles s'interpénètrent ou viennent en contact géographique direct. C'est ainsi qu'il a donné une

explication plausible, selon son avis et celui des autres, aux conflits armés des Balkans, du Moyen Orient, du Cachemire, du Caucase e. a.[61].

Le modèle de Huntington a été contesté et critiqué pour différentes raisons, spécialement à cause de l'usage de certains critères, plus que discutables, pour définir « *la civilisation* », ainsi pour la tendance de voir un choc entre les civilisations dans certains cas particuliers, dans lesquels celle-là n'est pas à l'origine du conflit. Malgré tout, les observations de Huntington ne manquent pas de logique et de fondement concernant ce qui est perçu comme un conflit entre la civilisation occidentale et « *le reste du monde* ». Il dit que l'Ouest utilise ses institutions, le pouvoir militaire et les ressources économiques pour conduire le monde moyennant des voies qui assurent la préservation de la domination occidentale, sauvegardent les intérêts occidentaux et promeuvent les valeurs politiques et économiques occidentales. Ce comportement exige des réponses de la part des sociétés et Etats qui refusent d'accepter et de s'approprier les valeurs et les croyances occidentales, comme la démocratie libérale ou les droits de l'homme.

L'une de ces réponses est le *terrorisme international,* phénomène qui apparaît aujourd'hui comme une menace globale, à cause de l'assimilation de certaines technologies et méthodes qui l'on rendu beaucoup plus dynamique et difficile à contrecarrer. Dans les conditions de l'extraordinaire asymétrie de rapport des forces, il est devenu l'instrument préféré de certains groupes qui n'ont pas d'autres moyens de faire usage de leur pouvoir, celui-là étant le plus utilisé et attirant moyen de lutte, pour les groupes radicaux et fondamentalistes[62]. Ainsi, le progrès technologique a assuré aux groupes terroristes non seulement de nouvelles capacités, mais une extension considérable des cibles et des objectives visés. C'est un paradoxe, puisque les théoriciens tirent pleinement leur profit des avantages dans un monde incapable d'accepter la voie post-moderne de vise et les valeurs sociales promues par la globalisation. On tient compte des possibilités d'utilisation, dans des buts illégaux et évidement hostiles, des systèmes ouverts aux communications, libre mouvement des moyens financiers et les nouvelles technologies qui sont à la base du processus de globalisation[63]. Ainsi, les groupes terroristes ont acquis une mobilité sans précédent et la capacité de pouvoir frapper partout dans le monde. La capacité d'entreprendre des actions violentes a bien augmenté, grâce aux nouvelles armes et tout particulièrement, grâce à l'accès aux explosifs très puissants et aux dispositifs sophistiqués de détonation. Ce que réjouit les terroristes sont la possibilité d'être au milieu de l'attention publique, de réaliser leurs désirs, presque pathologiques, d'être au premier plan de l'attention des medias.

Un autre genre de conflits, qui est fortement apparu depuis la deuxième moitié du XXème siècle et continue virulemment dans les premières années de l'actuel siècle, est interethnique. Il est issu d'un processus à double dynamique dans la société post-guerre froide : la fragmentation politique et l'intégration régionale. L'analyste Dimostenis Yagcicoglu estime qu'il y a au moins trois perspectives d'analyse des causes qui provoquent des conflits interethniques dans les sociétés non homogènes : psychanalytiques, socio-identitaires et la théorie du réalisme[64]. Ce processus est évident, surtout dans les anciennes sociétés socialistes multiethniques, où ont été redécouverts et réaffirmés les principes et les droits qui ont fait « carrière » après la Première Guerre Mondiale. La revitalisation de l'ethnicité et de la recherche de l'identité de soi a été considérée par certains auteurs comme possible[65], mais, lorsqu'ils touché les droits des autres communautés, celles-là ont dégénéré et ont produit des effets négatifs. L'analyste Svante Cornell apprécie qu'il faut abandonner l'idée selon laquelle le conflit identitaire est l'expression d'un état de primitivisme politique et qu'il est spécifique seulement au monde sous-développé. La réalité montre que de telles manifestations apparaissent aussi dans des régions et Etats considérés développés et ayant un haut standard de civilisation[66]. La manifestation de ces conflits d'une violence extrême, dans la plupart des cas dans les zones caractérisées par le sous-développement économique et dans les Etats multinationaux anciennement communistes, a déterminé certains analystes à associer le phénomène avec ces régions.

NOTE

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[6] Ionel Nicu Sava, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

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[11] Pour des détails supplémentaires voir http://www.sipri.org/contents/about

[12] http://www.sipri.org/contents/about/sipri/history.html

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[21] *Ibidem.*

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[28] *Ibidem*, p. 259.

[29] Stefano Guzzini, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

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[31] Ionel Nicu Sava, *op. cit.*. p. 94.

[32] *Ibidem*, p. 95.

[33] *Ibidem*, p. 96.

[34] Dimitrie Gusti, „Sociologia războiului", vol. *Sociologia militans,…*p. 351.

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
The Nature of War. Unjust War. Justified Wars. Preventive Wars

Dumitru Mazilu

Defining the law of war means providing a prerequisite for a thorough study made on this phenomenon as such, followed by the analysis of the different meanings it acquires. Thus, it makes possible to avoid a frequently met confusion, especially in the literature of popularisation that often dwells upon this subject. Notional explanations help us understand the place and role that war detains in human history as well as the modalities in which the idea of peace worked its way, asserted itself and developed in opposition to violence, confrontation and war.

§1. What is war?

War is usually defined as a violent conflict. By war it is not action that is being assigned, but the state of those who confront in a violent manner. Filon showed that: "enemies are considered to be not only those who attack on land or by sea but also people who bring war machines in harbours and place them in front of city walls, even if they did not resort to fight"[1].

The denomination of war[2] is attributed only to designate a conflict already started, here including preparations and the fight as such. Servius pointed out that "*bellum* includes preparation and concord (*consilium*)"[3], while armed facts "imply only the action of opening warfare"[4]. War (*bellum*) represents the entire interval during which all means necessary to fight are prepared or fight itself is carried on. Battle (*proelium*) is the very action of hostilities.

From earliest ages, in times of conflict and hostilities it has been invoked and it is still being invoked the most different reasons *de iure* and *de facto* in favour or against violent and warlike actions. It is later on, long time after hostilities have taken place and peace has been concluded, that objectivity, usually, worked its way and the causes of violent actions as well as the purposes had in view by belligerents appeared in their true colours. The analysis of events and especially that of causes allows to outline some *criteria* of evaluation, thus facilitating to acquire the right understanding of this particularly complex phenomenon called war. Such an analysis is to be found in a treatise published at Frankfurt on Main between 1670-1734[5], as well as in the works of Gaston Bouthoul[6] and R. Carrère[7] and other researches who were deeply engaged in studying this issue. In a more complete vision – seen not only as an act of will or as a military phenomenon – Karl von Clausewitz defines war as being a social phenomenon, a real political instrument, the *continuation and maintenance of political relations through other means*. In his opinion, political intention is the purpose while war represents the means[8].

Beyond the speculative analysis of this complex phenomenon, particularly met in Spencer's, Tarde's and Gumplowicz's studies, Quincy Wright examines war under the complexity of its military, political, juridical, sociological and psychological aspect[9]. Moreover, the famous Romanian sociologist, Dimitrie Gusti, defines war as being the means, often used by a community to achieve certain goals, while he considers peace reachable only as a consequence to the disappearance of the phenomenon of submitting one nation by another[10].

Therefore, war is a socio-political phenomenon, determined by a complex causality, consisting in the violent confrontation of certain communities, peoples or states[11]. Only after having understood war in the multitude of its determinations and manifestations[12], it becomes possible to understand the ways and means of achieving peace[13]. Juridical research represents, undoubtedly, such a means – as long as it takes into account the results obtained by other branches of science.

§2. Defining senses

The law of war can acquire at least two meanings. One of them, the *right to a certain action* represents the substance and finality of war, the goals had in view by means of the given armed conflict. Moreover, it is the initial sense, met in the definition made to a violent action, especially in the primitive communal system as well as the slave and the feudal system.

A. The nature of war

With its first meaning, that of *right to action*, it has been questioned within several studies made in the course of time, whether war were justified and what was exactly that explained and grounded the feature of war. In philosophical and politico-juridical thinking, "arguments" were given in order to accredit the "right" to conquest new territories and subdue other peoples as well as the "right" to *maintain* the occupation of other territories and people. The idea of conquering new territories was closely related to that of detaining their control. The powerful would impose his point of view to the subjected and any act of insubordination would be severely punished. The conquest of other territories and the submission of other peoples used to be extolled in hymns and poetry, while conquerors were praised in hymns of fame in which bravery and gallantry proved in battles was highly glorified. The defeated were deprived of their goods and subordinated to the conquerors who established their domination on the submitted peoples and territories.

The complex problems on the nature of war were thoroughly examined and conclusions that proved their viability in time were, consequently, formulated. The debate focused on gaining knowledge of those *defining* elements and criteria that allowed us to characterise violent and warlike action. The most significant contribution, brought, by far, to the act of defining the character of war and to the study, made from this perspective on the law of war, is due to the eminent Dutch thinker Hugo Grotius. From the very beginning of his work, *On the Law of War and Peace*[14], he stated: "by entitling this research *On the Law of War*, I meant – as already mentioned – to make sure first whether a war was fair and, then, what is considered to be a right in war"[15]. Explaining his position and proving the

The other meaning would be that of *set of rules* on starting conflict and engaging in warfare, concerning rights and obligations of the parties involved, or the third party, permissible and impermissible means and methods of waging war, as well as conduct applied towards prisoners etc.

need of making such an analysis[16], Grotius showed that a complete elucidation on the character of war belonged to the very essence of the study made on the Law of War, "because the word 'law' does not mean anything else but what is right and rather in a negative than in an affirmative meaning, so that right is seen as something that is not wrong"[17]. This analysis has in view the requirements of the idea of justice and has in view "the very question of knowing whether there is a *just war* at all, and what kind of war could be called so"[18]. It is clear that such an approach drew attention to the fact that wars *were justified* or *unjustified*. Therefore, suppression it was only on grounds of *precise criteria* that the character of each and every war could be established.

a. Unjust wars

Despite statements and controversies on this topic[19], all wars that have in view the invasion of foreign territories, the subordination and submission of other peoples, as well as suppression of peoples' struggle for national and social liberation are *unjust wars*. Undoubtedly, *there is no right* to such a war, it is not and it could not be considered legitimate the act of subjugating, looting and invading other territories.

a.1. It has been considered, for many years – and some people still consider – the act of conquering other territories and subordinating other peoples to be a right of the powerful. Indeed, it may be the most conspicuous expression of the well known formula of right to force, the very conception according to which force generates the right. In order to understand these tendencies it would be sufficient to make reference to the appearance of war and the reasons that caused it.

From the dawn of times "virtues" of violence were connected to the covetousness and subjection of foreign territories. The desire of obtaining new territories, as a corollary to their role but mainly as a means of production, explains violent action, prepared minutely and carried on under various conditions, according to the given historical age[20]. At the inferior stage of mankind's development, actions of force would break out on account of certain compelling needs that primitive peoples had. Having realised that in the neighbouring communities there were stores accumulated for life and living, certain actions were directed to appropriate and use other community's wealth for their own benefit. Violent action was related to certain economic requirements and to territories where resources flourished to a greater extent. Most authors dwelling on primitive community issues outlined the *economic significance* acquired by the motivation of violent actions, the founding and the attempts of explaining recourse to force and actions implying violence, in general[21].

If at a given evolution phase of the primitive community, picking and hunting could not assure the accumulation of a minimal stock to constitute the object of a violent action of spoliation and possession, it was in time that the development of human subsistence means as a corollary to the increasing work productivity, on terms of tools' improvement, determined the concentration of violent actions, thus becoming the main target for robbery and looting. Gradually, more and more people join the most powerful, by participating in systematic actions of conquering new territories and appropriating the harvest made by the defeated. The act of conquering stems from a multiple economic and social causality; the concern for further achievements and for material well-being materializes, during this historical period, in the act of conquering other territories and bringing other communities under domination. Researchers, such as R.B. Textor, W. Eckhardt, Q. Wright, R. Naroll, were preoccupied with these complex causes by stressing the frequency of violent actions and their reasons under the conditions of the primitive community[22]. Among the ultimate objectives of violent actions, several scientists pointed out the achievement of a. some goods of subsistence, as well as of b. some prestigious assets, exquisite values, precious metals. Within archaic society, there was a great competition for the attainment of these goods. It is

known that in case that violent action ended in the success of the initiators, it was they who benefited of the additional resources for subsistence, larger territories, and thrived – even for a limited period – by making less effort than during the preceding phases. Hence, violent action appears as the expression of a permanently renewed competition to obtain more means and assets for the sake of welfare, with no effort or paying lower effort than usual. This competition concerned both production sphere and the sphere of distributing goods for subsistence. It is easy to follow and explain conflict between communities, on a scientific level, provided ample researches are made on the constitution and evolution of each and every group and the relations between them. Analysing these phenomena, E.W. Russell draws the conclusion that all aggression forms specific to primitive social life are linked to war[23]. Competition and conflicts generate instability. Inequities gradually appear and deepen, in time, wearing most violent forms during the evolution of human society. Winners in the battle waged against a community or social group place more and more emphasis on *force consolidation*, turning the act of conquering and subordination of other territories into a quasi-permanent instrument. With time, preoccupation for violent action comes to have an *organised* character, as a consequence to a better understanding of the importance played by force in life and living structures within community. This concern is reflected in the preparations made before the eruption of war and even in the specification of certain elements of tactical and strategic nature. Gradually, a mechanism is constituted dealing with the preparations and initiations of warlike actions. Many authors inferred in their analyses made on primitive community the characteristic features of a military power, based on the military tendencies of certain groups and their will to live easier on account of the conquered and looted ones. The conquerors become the masters and subordinate the conquered turning them into slaves.

Researches concluded that within slave society, the organization of violent actions such as conquering and controlling new territories occupied a particularly important place"[24]. Initiating *wars of conquest and subordination* was one of the major concerns during the age of slavery. Slavery gains ground. Certainly, this evolution on the military plane, preoccupation for weapon modernization, acts of organizing and

waging battles, looting and subduing other territories and communities root from a complex economic causality[25]. New relations of political character are strictly related to the subordination and occupation of other territories, goods and assets. It is, therefore, in the 3 and 2 millennium B. Ch. that Sumerians, Egyptians, Chinese, Indians, Assyrians, Babylonians, Phoenicians and Israelis developed significantly the means of productions by improving tools and creating civilizations that were constantly capturing the particular attention of generations of researches along history. Undoubtedly, the evolution of these communities is linked to important discoveries such as bronze, iron, writing, astronomy, architecture etc. What should be really stressed is that elements of progress as well as steps forward in the modernization and development of production means often depended on the community's ability of subordinating new territories, using other communities' means of production and subsistence and even their members in self interest[26]. This comes to explain that spoliation, looting and domination exercised upon other peoples, enslavement and the exploitation of others were considered acts of bravery, for they were praised in the literary works of those times and presented to younger generations as an ideal manner of conduct worth to promote in their relationships with the subjected communities or those that were to be conquered[27]. It is well known that actions taken by Ramses were welcomed, his conquests were extolled in numerous writings and folk songs. In the conception of the inhabitants living on the borders of the Nile during the third millennium and the first half of the second, the conquests made by the Egyptian army were considered to be the ideal of bravery. "Just like a devastating storm would Ramses pass through the unsubmitted possessions, destroying fortresses, woods and seizing inhabitants"[28]. Acts of robbery exercised upon foreign territories, bringing whole populations, living in primitive conditions, into slaves, turned Egypt into a society of opulence surrounded by impoverished areas. Previously robbed and deprived of all valuable possessions, these were consequently brought within the borders of the Empire.

Gradually they resorted to organize an armed force of their own, consisting both in members belonging to the given state community and those recruited from other territories. That is, for instance, the way that Egyptians recruited

"Barbarians" (Ethiopians, Libyans etc.). In this view, Tutumes I decides upon setting up the Egyptian global state. Therefore, he adds new conquests to former ones, important amounts of gold are accumulated within the country; temples of unrivalled splendour are erected. Under his ruling as well as the years to follow, during the reign of Tutumes III and Amenhotep II large architectonic and military constructions were made. It is needless to recall the significance of Tutankhamen's thesaurus that would demonstrate the level of wealth and luxury concentrated at great aristocratic courts. The huge riches robbed from neighbour populations were kept under the shield of their own army or that of recruited armed forces. It is between the Tigris and Euphrates that a great civilization center develops. The right to punish the unsubmissive was considered a natural right. Battles waged against neighbours were marked by unprecedented cruelties[29]. With Assyrians, prisoners and slaves were branded with hot iron. The Assyro-Babylonean art praises force, the sense of violence and puts emphasis on the special merit of the conquerors.

We witness the same complex causality, the same conception and vision with the explanations given regarding wars of conquest carried on by Ancient Greece, Rome and the Ottoman Empire.

Ancient Greece has developed due to the conquest and submission of certain "Barbarian" populations. In order to render as clearly as possible the dominant conception of Ancient Greece on the right to conquer, subject, loot other peoples and maintain them in slavery, we have only to mention Aristophan's assertion: "The place that confers welfare, is the land where one should find home"[30]. Prosperity becomes obvious in Attica, Beotia, Polyphones, in Greek colonies, but it does not belonging to "Barbarians", only to those who subdued them. In his famous work, entitled *Politics*, Aristotle shows that states neighbouring Greece are inferior both as intelligence and ability, and, therefore, "these peoples are unable to organize themselves, govern and conquer surrounding countries"[31]. As known, good skills in organizing conquests and war, as such, were considered to be essential virtues. Concomitantly painful consequences were suffered following the plunders and conquests of war. Thus, Tucidide considered that robberies made by Athens in detriment to Corinth "brought about tension, nothing but pain and troubles"[32].

An attempt to "motivate" the right to conquest is to be found both in declarations of war and in military actions carried on by greatest conquerors. This is the case with Alexander the Great who claimed the "need" to edify a universal empire of Hellenic civilization. The god of war controlled the minds and energy of Macedonians; peoples were submitted; their goods were appropriated and they served exclusively the interests of the conquerors. Alexander Macedon's warriors entered Asia Minor, Middle East and Egypt until they reached Indian borders. As a consequence to previous conquests, certain governing groups ruled over entire populations by constantly subjecting and exploiting them.

Greek and Macedonian experience has been studied and taken into consideration, later on, by Romans. They sought to attain world domination that they eventually obtained, indeed, by most different means. In this purpose, Romans used alliances that were finally turned into actions of including allied countries. They resorted to the occupation and submission of other provinces and territories, the assassination of kings and other methods of the sort. Roman conquests aimed to achieve huge amounts of riches, on the grounds of which the famous Roman civilization began to develop. Romans would loot great quantities of gold from Thrace, silver from Spain, copper from Cyprus, iron from Gallia, lead from Britannia, marble from Greece. All these captures of great value were brought to Rome that had to become, as Romans said, the center of the universe. The main dominating idea in the conception and action undertaken by Roman warriors was that Rome had to subordinate all other peoples. Romans yearned for *eternal and universal* glory they believed to achieve by building an empire with no precedent in the world. *Urbi et orbi* meant the worldwide domination of Rome for the benefit of the imperial metropolis's patriciate. In the conception of the time there was the prevailing idea, as it appears in the writings of many philosophers, historians and poets, namely that war had to be waged against the "Barbarian" world. Such a civilization meant the subordination and submission of provinces, their transformation into territories made, ulteriorly, part of the Empire[33]. It is during Roman age that a series of regulations appear on the organization and the proceedings of war, concerning both

preparations to violent interventions and its very practical modalities and means. The act of civilizing achieved in this manner was concretized for Romans in the subordination of other peoples and the elaboration of certain norms and regulations meant to impose the conquerors' will. We may very well mention here that during that period kings created edicts that set relations between Romans and provincials. For instance, by the edict of Caracalla all free inhabitant of the Empire could become a Roman citizen. Still, it should be added that under the Roman slave ruling there were really few free people compared to the mass of the subdued and the exploited.

As for the conquest and subordination of other peoples, it proved to be a rather difficult endeavour. Romans, for example, had to face strong resistance in Dacia. It was one of the most flourishing ancient countries – a kingdom of military democracy, with cities having consolidated trade and forts as well as good contacts with most advanced ancient civilizations – Greek, Roman, and Persian etc. According Vasile Pârvan asserted it, "popular instinct made Dacs avoid any form of cezarism, namely imperialism"[34] and "just the way that Burebista was the adversary of Cesar, Cotiso became the enemy of Augustus"[35].

The "right" to conquest was also vindicated by the campaigns that Ottomans would organize as well as under the banner of battles waged against heathens. Historians describe mass slaughters and the destruction made upon East-European countries where Ottomans organized their conquests. Romanian, Bulgarian, Greek, Serb, Albanian, Hungarian, Macedonian and Croat peoples were seriously harmed by the proceedings of these wars[36]. It is clear that the "right" to conquest was justified by ideologists belonging to the ruling classes that acted for the promotion of violence, takeover, subordination and oppression of other peoples in order to achieve world domination. Seen from this perspective, the "right" to conquest was directly related to the right to establish an empire, under single domination and control. Moreover, the authors of those times insisted in their works on the "need" of building a · universal empire, having a unique center where conquerors were responsible for the organization and the ruling of the whole empire. War represented the main means for the edification of such an empire and the maintenance of imperial

relations. Recourse to war was considered natural, the conquerors being allowed to prepare, organize and conduct it, for their own benefit, against the oppressed peoples.

a.2. Starting from primitive community and, later on, during slave and feudal society, then, during the capitalist system, the "right" to conquer was directly related to the "right" to subject, oppress and exploit other peoples and nations. In order to justify this "right" the so-called "civilizating" action of the conquerors undertaken in the subordinated provinces and territories was invoked. Such a conception is to be met with the Ottoman Empire as well as the actions undertaken by European countries in the process of establishing colonies in Africa, America and Asia. Historical analysis proves that it was neither the civilizing nor the Christian reasons that pushed Europeans to Africa, America or Asia but it was the activity of subordination and oppression undertaken against these peoples, certain States' race for enrichment on other peoples' account by spoiling and appropriating their riches[37].

War represented the main instrument whereby the subordination, exploitation and subjection of other peoples were performed. That is the way King Henry, the sailor, organized an unprecedented gold rush doubled by slave trade.

In the XVth century, Western Africa became the land of first colonial conquests, while slave hunting hastened the rhythm of discoveries made on Western African coasts. Portuguese disembarked, usually at a river mouth, whole detachments that forayed seaside settlements, spoiled them, violated women and set their houses on fire. Their warlike actions would create a particularly tensional frame of mind, native inhabitants being terrified by the civilization that Europeans tried to bring to their territories. After Christopher Columbus had discovered America, Pope Alexander VI Borgia, by making use of the authority he had been conferred, on grounds of the 1493 Bulla decided the extension of two colonial empires, Spain and Portugal, on both parts of the 68 meridians. As already known, other Europeans have disputed the validity of this decision. Still, the documentary value of the Bulla remains.

In order to illustrate the ends that warlike actions were aiming to attain during colonial age it is sufficient to present some elements of the agreement made between the Kingdom of Castile

and Christopher Columbus[38]. Thus, in the first part of this convention, their majesties, *as masters of the seas and oceans*, pledged to award don Christopher Columbus the title of admiral of all islands and continents "that he, himself, due to his great abilities would discover or reach by these seas and oceans". On the other hand, Columbus committed himself by the same document to take control – for the benefit of the Castilian Crown – of southern seas, lands, harbours and islands, with everything belonging to them. "It is they who own – as the contract states it – the power and control of these Indies, the islands and the northern and southern continents with their seas, from the North Pole to the South Pole, on both sides of the Capricorn and beyond, now and ever, as long as there is life on Earth". It is stated in the same convention that "from all the valuables of any sorts, should it be pearls, gems, gold or silver, or other goods and merchandise, Columbus will have and will keep the tenth part of all, while the rest of nine he will put at their majesties' disposal". As it is well known, by the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas, Portugal and Spain divided and shared the world. This Pact on dividing all territories of the entire world stirred the reaction of England, France and those of the Italian states.

There is no doubt that discoveries made by Christopher Columbus, like those achieved, later on, by Bartolomeo Diaz, Vasco da Gama, Cabral, Almeida, Albuquerque and Magellan were of an indisputable scientific value. Opening the ways to Asian Indies, by reaching, during the first two decades of the XVIth century, the islands of Polynesia and Southeast China, represented a paramount scientific achievement. While, one side this aspect of the problem being the subject of numerous tomes published and republished in developed countries, on the other side, subordination, oppression, domination and the spoliation of colonial peoples was, mainly, kept under silence[39]. It has been proved these wars, besides their contribution to great geographical discoveries, had to pay their tribute with blood the conquered peoples. Spoliation was a basic objective of these civilizing actions in entire areas and continents, in provinces all over the world. Thus, for instance, with the discovery of the town of Malacca, Albuquerque obtained out of a single spoliation 3.500 kg of gold. Following the discovery of Indian lands, Vasco da Gama demanded solid convoys in order to transport the

riches found on those wealthy lands. Some discoverers obtained, in exchange of some important material values, a so-called right to conquest and colonization. For example, the Welser bankers, in Venezuela, for great loan accorded to Carol the Quint, obtained such a right in South America. For the activity undertaken by John Cabot in 1497, England considered to have priority over others as far as North American territories were concerned[40]. It is also to be said, that this was the way that immeasurable riches flooded certain European countries. Loot, robbery and spoliation go together with actions carried on by great colonial powers. He discloses the role that slave trade played within those operations. Conquered territories were given as presents or even sold. Thus, in 1540, Carol the Quint offered the Ducat of Milano to his son Philip, while in 1564, Henry VIII, king of England, was rewarded 800.000 of scuzi for having evacuated the French invaded territory. In this respect, the assertion of Henry IV, king of France, is really significant: "They did not give me this kingdom, they sold it to me"[41]. Therefore, it becomes clear that conquered territories could easily constitute the object of all sorts of transactions between kings, conquerors or between those who organized the colonization process of so many peoples and territories of the world. Gold seized from subordinated colonies was used to organize wars and buy mercenaries, who became an almost permanent component of each military action undertaken by the conquerors. Spies were paid and sent all over. The corruption of consciences by means achieved from conquered territories and areas became a quasi-permanent habit. It is easy to demonstrate that *there is no* such thing as the right to subordination, oppression, domination and exploitation of other peoples. The attempt to justify *the right to war* by the "need" for the "civilizing" actions of the conquerors does not resist to a scientific analysis. Depriving another person for one's own benefit is against nature, as Cicero put it, and if so, "society and human community would collapse inevitably"[42]. The act of conquering, subordinating and dominating other peoples proved to be contrary to truth and justice. Science has proved that such acts could not motivate "right" to war. Furthermore, in case a war implied the conquest and oppression of other peoples, that war became unjustified, it got an *unjust* character. Hugo Grotius – in the

research he made on the nature of war – showed that "unjust is everything that is against nature, society and beings endowed with reason"[43], while Florentius proved that it was a crime for man to trap his fellow beings[44]. The injustice of acts like subordination and oppression is the outcome, according to the Aristotle's analysis, of inequality existing between master and servant[45].

b. Justified Wars

Thorough analysis and research made in the course of years led to the conclusion that the only justified wars were those of defence against invaders, outside aggressions, wars against national enslavement and those of national liberation aimed to break the chains of foreign slavery and gain independence.

b.1. The right to defence has been evoked and constantly motivated in studies of epoch-making value. Cicero demonstrated that right to defence *has the character of law* "that is not written, but we were born with, something that we did not learn, did not receive or read. We took it, drew it out, and squeezed it from the very essence of things. For its observance we are not learned but made, not prepared but born. It is the law according to which, should our life be jeopardized...by foemen's weapons, *any means making possible our salvation becomes good and fair*"[46]. Quintilian also claimed "all in all, *defence* merits prior attention, as it is natural that our rescue pass before the enemy's annihilation"[47]. As it has been well said, "it is in accord with law, that what someone does in one's defence... be considered as justified"[48] (Florentinus).

Grotius pointed out that this right was unchallengeable, that justice of those defending themselves could be questioned not in the least. "This principle – he explained – is based on a. *justice so obvious*, that even with animals which do not grasp the significance and nature of law only somewhat its appearances, we should distinguish between violence that causes injustice and violence[49] that rejects it". War of defence as well as the act of rejecting invasion is fully justified. A person in defence "cannot commit an act of injustice"[50]. It is proved, in recent research, that right to defence is founded on the very need to "prevent or diminish a threat exercised on a State's security"[51] in order to turn away a foreign attack that imperils the national being of the given people. The right to exist as a nation and to defend against invaders has been exercised by all

peoples along history. This right has been assumed, for instance, by the Romanian people against wars of spoliation and invasion it had to face. Romanians – showed Jules Michelet – "have often stopped Barbarians, often defeated them, by doing away with the fury of God's enemies and by enduring so much"[52]. Karl Marx also evoked the courage Romanians made proof of in the war of defence against Turks and showed that despite their significantly smaller army, they succeeded in crushing Turkish invasion completely:.it is only few Turks that escaped death; four subdivisions of a pashalik and one hundred flags had been captured[53].

b.2. Furthermore *the justified* character of wars of national liberation carried on to escape foreign yoke and gain national independence was also proved.

In the researches of those times the need to do away with injustice by means of war was motivated: against those who installed themselves, by using force, on territories that did not belong to them. Thus, Cicero underlines that force has to be opposed by force itself[54], while Cassius says that it is allowed to "reject weapons by weapons"[55]. According to Cicero's reasoning, it is not allowed "to increase our wealth, riches and welfare by spoliating others"[56]. In socio-political and philosophical thinking they demonstrate the *unjust character of actions* – such as occupying foreign territories and looting other peoples or by pointing out the modalities that led to situations based on such deeds[57]. This came to motivate the need of *eliminating injustice*[58] obtained this way, and to show that a war aiming to attain a certain objective was *entirely justified*. Therefore, the fight of slaves led by Spartacus, in the I[st] century B.Ch., against the oppression exercised by slave owners becomes justified. It is also the case with the German 1525 Peasant War, the 1877 Independence War, the war of the antihitlerist coalition states against German fascism etc.

c. Preventive War

Some authors of International Law claim that International Law would admit the so-called preventive war[59]. Provided a state considering itself threatened by an imminent armed danger coming from another state, it would be justified to resort – preventively – to armed force. It is stated that engagement in such a war would represent a licit act of self-defence as imminent threat represents an act of aggression[60]. There are attempts to accredit the thesis according to which a threatened State would have the right to undertake "urgent actions to counteract perils"[61], fact that would explain war preparation and conducting. Actually, it is an attempt that aims to prove the necessity of punishing the aggressor before it has got the aggression started. Such a thesis might be considered unjustified from a theoretical point of view and dangerous under its practical aspect. It represents a source of tension and instability in international relations. A war organized on such grounds – far from being a defence war – proves to be a war of aggression with serious consequences in international relations.

This conception runs counter to norms and principles generally acknowledged in contemporary International Law. It is known that in conformity with art. 51 of the UN Charter, the right to individual or collective self-defence may be exercised provided an armed attack has occurred. Under the pretext of the imminent nature of such an attack, military action may be easily initiated, considering the fact that – mainly in certain regions of the world –a certain state of strain, tension and conflict is maintained. When establishing the imminent nature of attacks, certain elements of subjectivity intervene but they are not likely to resist to an ample analysis based on the objective set of data on the given situation. Assuming a correct interpretation of the provisions stipulated in the UN Charter on the right to self-defence, most jurists proved that war was justified only when carried on against an effective armed aggression and not a supposed one[62]. According to Professor Grigore Geamanu's reasoning, the theory of preventive war "has to be vehemently rejected"[63] as mere threat to peace is not a sufficient reason for the initiation of such war.

NOTES

[1] Filon, *De special.* leg., II (111, 15).
[2] The word *bellum* (war) originates from the old world *duellum*. According to Hellenes, bellum is connected to the presence of a crowd that fights in a battle.
[3] *Aeneis*, Chorus 1 (I, v. 545).

[4] *Ibidem*, Chorus VIII (I, v. 547).

[5] See Mattheus Merian, Irenico – *Polemographia sive Theatri Europaei oder Historischer Chronicken Beschreibung Alter Vernembsten und Denck würdingsten Geschichten so sich hin und wieder in Europa, sonderlich im Reich Deutscher Nation von A. 1633 bis in A. 1715 begeben und zugetragen*, Frankfurt am Main, 1670-1734.

[6] Gaston Bouthoul, *L'infanticide différé*, Paris, Hachette, 1970; idem, *Traité de Sociologie. Les guerres. Eléments de polémologie*, Paris, Payot, 1951.

[7] R. Carrère, *La guerre, cette inconnue: découverture et avenir de la polémologie*, in "Guerres et paix", nr. 1, 1969.

[8] Karl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Ed. Militară, Bucharest, 1965, pp. 17-19; 88; 593-596.

[9] See Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1965.

[10] Dimitrie Gusti, *The Sociology of War*. Edit. C. Sfetea, Bucharest, 1915, pp. 66 and next.

[11] See researches made on this phenomenon by Professor Valter Roman: *On the Theory of War*, Edit. de stat, Bucharest, 1948; *On Contemporary War*, Edit. de Stat, 1948; *Contemporary Military Problems*, Edit. de stat, Bucharest, 1949 etc. An ample analysis is also made on this subject by Vasile Secares in his work entitled: *Polemology and Peace Issues*, pp. 11 and next.

[12] See Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf Publisher, 1967, pp. 31 and next.

[13] See Vasile Secares, *cit. work*, pp. 232-239.

[14] Hugo Grotius, *De iure belli ac pacis*. Libri tres, Privilegio Regis, Parisus 1625.

[15] Hugo Grotius, *On the Law of War and Peace*. Edit. Științifică, Bucharest, 1968, p. 104.

[16] *Ibidem*, pp. 104-105.

[17] *Ibidem*, p. 104.

[18] *Ibidem*; Hugo Grotius, *De iure belli ac pacis libri tres in quibus ius naturae et gentium item iuris publici praecipue explicatur*, 1993, Rev. by P. Haggenmacher, Tijds Regeschied 62,'94, pp. 403 and next.

[19] See Robert Ardrey. *The Territorial Imperative*. New York, Atheneum Publishers, 1966; idem, *The Social Contract. A Personal Inquiry into the Evolutionary Sources of Order and Disorder*, Atheneum Publishers, New York, 1970; Konrad Lorenz, *On Aggression*, Bantam Books, New York, 1967 etc.

[20] In the literature of speciality they have shown that economic relations and those of production laid, mediately, at the origin of war; it is only through political action, under its political expression – an extremely complex one, in most cases – that economy brings about armed conflicts (see P. Ciuhureariu, "War as a Specific Conflict Situation", in *Socio-political Studies on the Contemporary Military Phenomenon*, vol. 2, Edit. Militară, Bucharest, 1972, pp. 161-163.

[21] See William G. Sumner, "War", in *War and Other Essays*, New-Haven, Yale University Press, 1911, pp. 3 and next; M.R. Davie, *Les Guerres dans les sociétés primitives*, Paris, Payot, 1931 etc.

[22] Quincy Wright, *cit. work*, p. 39; R. Naroll, *Does Military Defence Deter?*, in "Transaction", vol. 3, nr. 2/1996, pp. 14-20.

[23] E.W. Russell, *Factors of Human Aggression*, in "Behavior Science Notes", vol. VII, 1972, pp. 275 and next.

[24] "Force has got the mission of maintaining and enhancing living and domination conditions as far as the privileged class is concerned" (Vasile Secares, *cit. work*; p. 145).

[25] Researches prove the existence of a direct relation between the interests of slave owners and the causes of wars of conquest and loot (see H. C. Greiman, K. Finsterbuch, *Modernization of Warfare*, in "Social Science and Modern Society", nr. 4, 1973, pp. 54-57.

[26] Researches lead to the conclusion that there is a complexity of causes at the origin of violent actions. Quincy Wright proves that "War has politico-technical, juridico-ideological, socio-religious and psychoeconomic reasons". (Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*. University of Chicago, Chicago, 1942, II, p. 739). Following the synthesizing of a whole research, the author concludes "in reality, war finds its origin in a general situation, which finally involves almost all 9 reasons invoked by humanity until the very moment that the given war erupts" (*ibidem*, I, p. 17).

[27] F.H. Denton and W. Philips draw attention to the significant correlation between social antagonisms within a community and resort to force in external relations (*Some Patterns in the History of Violence*, in J.C.R., 1968, nr. 2, pp. 182 and next). Other author, like R.J. Rummel and R. Tanter tried to demonstrate that this correlation would not have been significant (see R.J. Rummel, *Dimensions of Conflict Behaviours within and between Nations*, in J.C.R., 1966, nr. 1; R. Tanter, *Dimensions of Conflict Behaviours within and between Nations*, in J.C.R., 1966, nr. 1, fact invalidated by the researches made by M. Hass and J. Wilkenfeld (see M. Hass, *Societal Approaches to the Study of War*, in J.P.S., 1965, nr. 2; J. Wilkenfeld, *Domestic and Foreign Conflict Behavior of Nations*, in J.P.S., 1968, nr. 1).

[28] E.M. Jukov and collective, *World History*, vol. I, Ed. Științifică, Bucharest, 1959, p. 352.

[29] Certain historians considered this phenomena to be the outcome of "an active instinct of hate and aggression" (Sigmund Freud, *A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, Boni & Liveright, New York, 1920; William Mc Dougall, *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, Luce, Boston, 1926, p. 30 and next).

[30] *Ubi bene, ibi patria*, in its complete from *Patria est ubicumque est bene*, as Marcus Pacuvius put it.

[31] Aristotle claimed that wars against Barbarians *were justified* (see Aristotle, *Politics*, Cultura Națională, Bucarest, 1924, pp. 21, 30 and next). In his analysis, Aristotle showed, further on, that "Barbarians, though born to serve, do not accept to be ruled over" (*ibidem*, p. 34).

[32] Tucidide, *The History of the Peoloponiac War*, Ed. Științifică, Bucharest, 1966, Book I, chap. 23, p. 160.

[33] *Pax Romana* (Roman Peace), idealized in those times' writings contained obvious contradictions. Population was made up of governors, preceptors and soldiers. It was by military means that domestic order was preserved and external battles were waged against Barbarians.

[34] Vasile Pârvan, *Dacia*, Ed. Științifică, Bucahrest, 1967, p. 100.

[35] *Ibidem.*

[36] See P.P. Negulescu, *The Destiny of Humanity*, Biblioteca de filosofie românească, Bucharest, 1939, p. 15 and next.

[37] For a more thorough analysis, see Titu Georgescu, *The Arguments of History for a New International Order*, Edit. Științifică și Enciclopedică, Bucharest, 1977, pp. 51-57.

[38] Philippe Delaunes, *Les libérations de l'Amerique latine*. Ed. Rencontre-Lausanne, 1969, pp. 10 and next.

[39] See Titu Georgescu, *cit. work.*, pp. 53/57.

[40] Philippe Delaunes, *cit. work.*, pp. 11 and next.

[41] See Jacques Madaule, *The History of England*, Ed. Politică, Bucharest, 1973, pp. 254 and next.

[42] Cicero, *On Duties*, Ed. Științifică, Bucharest, 1957, p. 1965.

[43] Hugo Grotius, *cit. work*, pp. 104.

[44] Florentius, *Digeste*, I, 1, p. 3.

[45] Aristotle, *Ethic. Nicom.*, VIII, 8.

[46] Cicero, *Speech in the Defence of Titus Amnius Milo*, in Romanian by V. Greciuc.

[47] Quintilian, *Inst. Orat.*, VII, 2, p. (underl. en.).

[48] Florentinus, *cit. work*, XI, 2, p. 4 (underl. en.).

[49] Hugo Grotius, *cit. work*, p. 124 (underl. en.).

[50] *Ibidem.*

[51] Elton B. McNeil, *The Nature of Human Conflict*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Prentice-Hall, 1965, p. 81.

[52] Jules Michelet, *French Confessions on the 1848 Romanian States*, Ed. Științifică, 1968, p. 47. "How should I call Romania, the Vlachs and Moldavians? – wandered the eminent historian. And it was still him who answered: "The sacrificed nation... Eight millions of the same language and race, one of the world great nations" (*ibidem*, p. 47).

[53] The analysis made by Marx refers to the battle of Vaslui.

[54] Cicero, *De Offic.*, I, 11, p. 34.

[55] *Digeste*, XL, III, 16, 1, p. 27.

[56] Cicero, *De Offic.*, III, 5, 22.

[57] See Charles Seignobos, *Histoire compare des peoples de l'Europe*, Editions Rieder, Paris, 1938; Emile Wanty, *L'art de la guerre.* Marabout Unibersity, Verviers (Belgique), 1967 etc.

[58] See Quincy Wright, "On political Utility of War", in *A study of war*, II, pp. 853 and next.

[59] G. Gold, *An Introduction to International Law*, New York, 1957, pp. 585 and next; A. Rölling, *The Question of Defining Aggression*, in *Symbolye Verzjil*, Haga, 1958, p. 315 and next.

[60] A. Rölling, *cit. work.*, pp. 314 and next.

[61] D.A. Bowett, "Self-Defence", in *International Law*, London, 1958, p. 270, see Quincy Wright, *The Prevention of Aggression*, in A.J.I.L., nr. 3/1956.

[62] See A. Verdoss, *Idées directrices de l'Organisation de Nations Unies*, in R.C., vol. 83, pp. 59 and next; H. Wehberg, *L'interdiction du recours à la force*, in R.C., vol. 78, pp. 81 and next.

[63] Grigore Geamânu, *Contemporay International Law*, vol. II, Edit. Științifică și Enciclopedică, Bucharest, 1975, second revised and completed edition, p. 360.

The Propaganda War in the Balkans: A Deaf-Mute Dialogue

Călin Hentea

At the turn of the millennium, the Balkans showed all the signs of a "deaf-mute dialogue" – especially the territory of the former Federated Republic of Yugoslavia. On one hand, the natives enthusiastically claimed their historical, ethnic, religious rights and ignored the similar rights of their neighbors. On the other hand, the leaders of the international community – be they world powers or NGOs – continued to advance their utopian theories of democracy, tolerance, compromise, multi-ethnicity, and prosperity. The metaphor of the deaf-mute dialogue stems from the fact that none of the conflicts that erupted in the Balkans in the 1990s were deterred by argument or talk but were ended through armed force. More precisely, after the unfortunate experience of the Blue Helmets, neither diplomatic negotiations nor even informational pressure stopped the murderous ground conflicts in Bosnia or Kosovo; military action did. In the years that followed both conflicts, it was not the PSYOPS or the INFO OPS that maintained a relative peace in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia but rather the presence of thousands of NATO military who were deployed to former or potential battlefields of the Balkans. Military personnel and even politicians who had or have lived for some months in the respective theaters of operations recognize that the day after the SFOR or KFOR troops withdraw from the military enclaves in Albania and Macedonia, the interethnic conflicts will resume, probably even more fiercely. As has been the case for the past 200 years, neither the Balkans nor Western individuals have learned how to talk to each other; in fact, they do not even talk among themselves – each involved with their own self-interests, which often clash with those of others. In the era of cutting-edge real-time communications, all the actors on the Balkan stage keep talking to themselves and remain totally deaf to what the other has no say. The situation appears hopeless. But a way to resolve this may lie in identifying the differences not only in the ethnic and religious mix of the Balkans but also in the European civilizations divided into Catholic and Orthodox after the Great Schism in 1054. Only the exasperating murderous conflicts that have periodically burst out have obliged the Euro-Atlantic allies to really start to try to know and understand the troublemaking Balkan peoples.

THE REAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE BALKANS AND THE WEST

The mold for the futile opposition between the poor and backward Balkan states and the prosperous and civilized Western countries was formed early on, when the Balkans began to be viewed by the European powers of the 19th century as crucial to their own interests. The instinctive and clear division between the "good guys and the bad guys", rooted in the values of the heirs of the Western Roman Empire, as opposed to those of their Eastern Orthodox "brothers", became the foundation of the Western political approach to Balkan problems: the Balkan people should follow Western prescriptions, otherwise they will be punished. This attitude of superiority has dominated over the past 200 years whenever West Europeans talked to East Europeans, especially the Balkan people. After the end of World War I, the memoirs, diaries, and considerations of Westerners, those who read *The Times, Le Temps, La Stampa,* or *Berliner Tageblatt* at the breakfast table, the Balkans seemed to be an exotic though boring land that would not be voluntarily visited by Westerners. Even though World War I had started there, the Balkans had

never been perceived as part of the Euro-Atlantic civilization.

There were ample arguments to support that attitude 200 years ago, and they still exist today. First of all, because of the successive regimes of occupation or suzerainty (Ottoman-Islamic, Austrian-Hungarian-Catholic, Russian-Orthodox, Phanariot), the population of the Balkan states have enjoyed their independence only beginning with the second half of the 19th century. Thus, they had a different view of the respect for law, order, and authority than did the Western Europeans. For centuries, each successive suzerain power or occupier imposed its own values, laws, common laws, and leaders. The occupied people were always on standby, ready to fight wars with foreign authorities to defend cultural, ethnic, religious, and linguistic identities.

Westerners consider the Balkan rebelliousness and seeming indifference to law, order, and discipline to be aberrant and at odds with the values that formed the cornerstone of the entire Euro-Atlantic civilization. The corruption and mass infractions that exist in all Balkan states are rooted in the secular hiatus that occurred between the foreign occupiers and citizens, between the imposed law and those who were supposed to obey it. With such a history, it is no wonder that immediately after the demise of the authoritative communist regimes, corruption and crime blossomed. It may be that a re-enforcement of law, order, and authority can take place only through an intense long-term program designed for a new generation that is not encumbered by the

nightmares of the past, social constraints, endemic poverty, and ethnic and religious violence.

A second aspect is that of education; it has been, for hundreds of years, a barrier between the Balkans and the West, and that barrier has become increasingly visible over the last two centuries. At the beginning of the 19th century when Western Europe already had established academic and educational traditions, primary school education in the Balkans had been provided only in institutions controlled by churches or mosques. If the 19th century was for the West the century of the industrial revolution, with its huge accomplishments and accumulations of wealth, for the Balkans it was the century of dramatic wars for independence. Those sons of wealthy families and meritorious young people who were sent abroad to attend famous universities in the great capital cities of the West returned to their homelands to become revolutionary leaders fighting for the emancipation of their countries and early advocates of nationalism. Despite Western influence, the huge economic and social differences could not be overcome. One of the consequences was a low average level of education and civic awareness for the majority of the Balkan citizens. Explanation for the squalor in the streets of some Balkan villages and cities and for the bad roads and poor hygiene are the low level of education and the "go with the flow" mentality typical of *homo Balkanicus*. However, this mentality has been induced by centuries of disastrous damage brought by Tatar, Ottoman, or Hapsburg invasions and wars.

THE PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE OF THE BALKAN PEOPLE IN THE 19TH CENTURY

The first generations of young Balkan citizens who were educated in Western countries and their successors who lived in the 19th and 20th centuries both sought to understand and be a part of the host national's system of values, but they also worked to make the problems of their countries known in whatever cultural, journalistic or political environments they entered. Except for

the Greeks, who enjoyed the beneficial effects that their cultural heritage had had on the British, the Balkan people for the most part were unsuccessful in bringing their history, culture, and civilization to the attention of the Western Euro-Atlantic civilization, despite their propagandistic efforts of two centuries, Bulgarian historian Ivan Ilcev writes:

> At the beginning of the 19th century the Balkan people were practically unknown to Europeans. Their names evoked historical memories, but usually they have not been considered peoples able to live an independent life. After the inevitable fall of the Ottoman Empire, their destiny was rather one of the states to be included in an already existing European state...The knowledge or information about Romanians was poor, even if they have been engaged in the Central-European politics since the 16th century. Similarly, the Serbs remained unknown, too. The 1806-1815 Serbian riot was to a great

extent an internal problem of the Ottoman Empire. For a long time, the image of an ordinary Serb was one of a blind fiddler, sitting under a tree, singing joyful songs in front of a brandy-longing audience. To a certain extent this image was also the effect of a literary mystification, well known in the 19th century – Ilyro-Serbian songs of Prosper Mérimée. The information about Serbs emphasized their brutality and spirit of warriors – qualities that were both delightful and disgusting for Europeans[1].

The same is true today, except for a few who have briefly visited or experienced life in a Balkan country. Compared with the Bulgarians, Serbs, and Albanians, the Romanians – probably because of their Latin origin – have succeeded best in making themselves known to and supported by the West. They succeeded because of the persistent promotion of their values and interests starting with the second half of the 19th century. This brought them the first union in 1859 and the second in 1918, independence in 1877, and state and national identity earlier than their neighbors south of the Danube. On the whole, the Balkans of the 19th and 20th centuries, situated somewhere between the borders of Europe and Asia, came to the attention of the Euro-Atlantic area very slowly and not in a favorable way. Consequently, the propagandistic obstinacy of the Balkan states' foreign affairs seems justified. It began in the 19th century and continues at the present time. The emphasis of Balkan foreign affairs at the eve of the 21st century remains on arguments for a European status.

The explosive ethnic and religious differences in the Balkans have repeatedly been exacerbated by the interference of European powers – the same powers that today contribute the largest number of troops in SFOR and KFOR: Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. On the other hand, the Balkan people have repeatedly turned to the same great powers during the last two centuries for solutions to various territorial problems. But these post-conflict solutions have not destroyed the germs of conflict because they have been temporarily "fixed" or simply compromises – often imposed by force – between the divergent local interests and those concerned with the balance of power at a given moment.

TITO'S YUGOSLAVIA: AN EXAMPLE AND AN EXCEPTION

The case of Tito's Yugoslavia is at the same time an example and an exception. Conditions at the end of World Wars I and II were similar in the Balkans. Both historical moments lacked the strong German and Austrian influences since those powers had lost successive wars. The Wilsonian liberal and democratic principles of self-determination or those of the Atlantic Charter were paramount, and one of the winners was the power in Belgrade that could not be divested of territories or dictated conditions. In 1945, neither the Slovenians, who had never had an independent state, nor the Croatians, bearing the guilt of the fascist genocide, could count on Germany or Austria. At the same time, the three neighboring countries – Greece, torn by a bloody civil war, Bulgaria, newly freed by the Red Army and sheltered by Moscow, and Hungary, freed by Romanian troops but controlled by the Kremlin – could not afford to discuss the expansion by means of territories taken from Macedonia and Vojvodina. Likewise, Albania was also under the control of the partisans, led by the communist leader Enver Hodja and greatly helped in World War II by Tito. When the Red Army entered Belgrade, it only replaced the German army in a territory that had been freed by the considerable military force of Tito's communist partisans, ending the war as a cobelligerent, winner, and ally of London.

From the beginning of the war, Tito had not recruited his partisans based on ethnic or religious considerations but rather on social ones, offering his partisans one empowering slogan: liberation of their motherland. Consequently, the draft constitution that Tito proposed provided a balance of ethnic liberties and vanities superior to those of the countries under the domination of Moscow. The well-known Yugoslav schism of 1948, when Tito, having a better geostrategic position than Moscow, dared to say "No" to Stalin, brought the people of the new Popular Federative Republic of Yugoslavia closer than ever. The new federation became a socialist paradise from the viewpoint of quality of life. Tito's enormous prestige (eliminating opponents in the Stalinist manner and firmly controlling the hegemonic tendencies of the Serbs), the

permanent Soviet threat during the governments of Hrusciov [Khrushchev] and Brezhnev, and the Western material support and capitalist economic elements who provided aid to the Yugoslavs, were elements that preserved the peace and cohesion of the federation; whatever feeble nationalist bursts did occur were extinguished immediately. Albanians living in Kosovo and Macedonia were perfectly aware that Yugoslavia provided a better life for them than their co-nationals endured in the autarchic Albania of Enver Hodja.

The end of the Cold War totally changed Yugoslavia's position in Western strategy. Until 1990, a united and stable Yugoslavia represented an important deterrent and strategic element against the Soviets. The dissolution of the Soviet Union changed the interest criteria of the West, which began to demand a free market economy, rule of law, and respect for human rights from the East Europeans. Yugoslavia was unable to comply with those requirements. Moreover, there were moves for secession by Croatia and Slovenia and the independence of other federation peoples.

Comparing the situation of 1990 with that at the end of the World War II, a significant evolution of Yugoslavia's neighboring international environment has to be taken into account. Between 1990 and 1991, ten years after Tito's death, the reunited Germany and the neutral Austria had once again become attractive potential allies for the emancipated Croatians and Slovenians. The Soviet Union was on the brink of collapse and was no longer a threat. The age - old rivals, Greece and Turkey, both having interests in the Yugoslavian area, were prevented from

pursuing those interests because of their membership in NATO. Albania was emerging from the totalitarian communist night, while Kosovo had begun to strain against the nationalist pressure of Milosevic. The considerable economic differences among the Yugoslav republics had reached a critical juncture, with both Croatians and Slovenes no longer wishing to have their revenues redistributed to the poorer Kosovars or Macedonians.

President Milosevic was one of the most violent and ambitious nationalist leaders of the Balkans of the 1990s. A comparison with Nicolae Ceauşescu, the Romanian Dictator, could show many of the lethal viruses generated by the communist system. Unable to replace the disintegrating communism, many political leaders of the central and east European countries – former members of the communist nomenclature – chose instead to promote the acceleration of nationalism, even to extremity and violence. When the Iron Curtain fell, the West was content to happily applaud the deadly starvation of the enemy but did nothing to compensate for the economic and political confusion that resulted. Moreover, in Yugoslavia's case, between 1990 and 1992 the West sent a series of contradictory messages that contributed to the violent dissolution of the federation. The balance of power that had been maintained during the Cold War was disrupted but was not replaced by the necessary economic and social intervention of the wealthy Western countries. The poorer region of the Balkans, with its hot spot, Yugoslavia, quickly became the new European confrontation arena.

RIVALRIES AND ALLIANCES

Analyzing the whole spectrum of interests manifested in the Balkans at the beginning of the millennium, Maj. Valentin Vasile, a military analyst[2] identified an array of possible rivalries and alliances that have the potential to generate a conflict at any time. While Greece (a NATO and EU member) and Turkey (only a NATO member but an EU aspirant) continue fighting for supremacy in the Aegean Sea and the bi-ethnic island of Cyprus, Bulgaria – NATO member and another country that aspires to EU membership – still considers the Macedonians to be Bulgarians, although the territory shelters a significant Turkish minority. The tensions among these three-

countries erupt from time to time, and it is only by the membership control instruments and responsibilities that their belligerent tendencies are curbed. Neighbored by these countries, Macedonia survives, a country that is recognized by Greece under the intriguing name of Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), but only Turkey recognizes Racidonie under his constitutional name, a country that can be suffocated by its neighbors who are noisily claiming historical rights or protection for ethnic communities. The Albanian minority in Macedonia is the most aggressive enemy of that country and has formed the newest and most

active terrorist organization in the region, Albania National Army, or AKSh in the Albanian acronym. It strikingly resembles the former KLA and has expanded its area of operation up to the north of Kosovo, more precisely in all of the territories inhabited by Albanians but not dominated by them. The new Union of Serbia and Montenegro is only a new and fragile construction formed of two state entities weakened by wars, internal rivalries, and almost-ruined economies. They are trying to shed their dictatorial past and find their own way toward the European style democracy.

The old hegemonic nostalgia and the ethnic and historical problems cannot simply vanish, and Kosovo remains an open wound. Now, as was true 200 years ago, depending on international developments, these endless Balkan rivalries can emerge as alliances of mutual interests against one or several actors. It is not only because of common Orthodox faith but also because of its special position toward, Macedonia and the disputes with Turkey, that Greece seems to be a possible ally of the Serbia-Montenegro Union. Similarly, Israel, by supporting Belgrade, can counterbalance the influence in the Balkans of rich Muslim states such as Iran or Saudi Arabia, that try to strengthen the Albanian bridgehead. At the same time, Serbia and Montenegro maintain adverse positions against

Turkey, Bulgaria, and especially Albania. Italy and Germany are also very much interested in controlling the Albanian matters in Macedonia and Kosovo and even the evolution of the situation in Albania. Their aim is to defend themselves against the massive flow of emigrants and the huge problems they create, including organized crime. Because of the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina, Hungary does not have a comprehensive attitude toward Serbia. Romania alone seems not to have any interests or territorial claims against its Balkan neighbors, although it is hard to believe that Hungary will ever forget its claim of the rich Transilvania or that Bulgaria will ever stop sighing for the southern Dobrudja.

From the viewpoint of this study, it is important to make the point that only the aspirations of these countries for full integration into the wealthy Euro-Atlantic area makes them refrain, for the moment, from violence. After World War II, only NATO membership and Euro-Atlantic pressures stopped the outbreak of armed conflict between Greece and Turkey. It was only by looking toward NATO and EU membership that Hungary and Bulgaria abandoned their traditional territorial claims in Romania and Serbia. Extremely weakened by years of war and dependent on European economic support, Serbia is also expected to put any hegemonic aspirations aside.

A POSSIBLE SOLUTION: FULL EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION

From this perspective, logical deduction leads to the conclusion that only by more rapid integration of the Balkan states into the economic, political, and military Euro-Atlantic structures can the current, latent, or potential conflicts be averted. Such an integration – perfectly possible and achievable – would be something new in the history of Europe, divided for more than a thousand years by the frontier of the Great Schism. In fact, it encompasses the complementary interests of West and East: security and prosperity. It is not about rewriting the old communist slogans of the Cold War or reviving the antagonisms between North and South, but about the same process that was developed for Western and Eastern Germany in the 1990s, except on a larger scale this time. Even if at present there are discussions and debates over the ethnic and religious conflicts in the Balkans, when the generation that did not

fight wars reaches adulthood and has a quality of life and the hopes for prosperity comparable to that of the Western Europeans, the older generations will no longer think in terms of guerilla warfare or armed riots. They will be preoccupied with the prosperity of their families and the success of their jobs or businesses and will no longer accept losing these or the threat of war. Unlike their parents and grandparents, the young people of the Balkans, like their Western counterparts, are more selfish and pragmatic and want first of all to have a good life, to enjoy life without historical, ethnic, or religious inhibitions. That is why they long for the Western system, where this life is truly possible. However, if they are confronted with an ongoing social and economic frustration, they will follow their parents' path – the path of war. Integrated into a prosperous and tolerant Europe, it is they who will not allow the winds of war to ruin their lives.

This Euro-Atlantic integration project for people of the former Yugoslavian area would be difficult to implement not only because of Europeans' obtuseness and cupidity but because of the considerable social and political problems that exist there despite the sincere desire to integrate the former Yugoslavian citizens. Nemanja Nenadic, Chief of the Transparency International Office in Belgrade, told about the Serbian citizens' attitude toward Europe in 2004:

> The current situation is rather bizarre. The reforms did not have the expected results; that is why a constant threat from the extremists or populists does exist. Serbia still has a lot to do to join the European Union, and the politicians are not ready to implement those reforms. There are times when they understand the reforms, but they do not want to undertake the necessary measures, as they fear not to increase the popularity of the nationalist and populist parties even more. At their turn, ordinary people are not very satisfied with the democracy. Many of them have the nostalgia of Tito's times. There is a large consensus with regard to EU integration, but people are scarcely informed on what that action means. They see only the chance to be part of a large community, after such isolation and the chance to use the common market (in fact the labor market). The negative effects are less known (because of the competitiveness), and the serious discussions on that topic take place only in academic groups[3].

WHO ARE THE CITIZENS OF TODAY'S BALKANS?

Today in the Balkans and the southern territories of the former Yugoslavia, amazing wealth exists alongside abject poverty and high unemployment. Culture and education continue to be interrupted by warlike and revenge propaganda. The appetite for ethnic and religious revenge remains. Former and current rivals cannot hear each other – totally deaf and constrained by a mutual and inborn lack of trust. It is impossible to separate the warlike past from the current politicians. There are people who fought the most murderous wars in Europe since World War II, who are part of the generation formed and educated during Tito's communism, who are still mentally imprinted with communist propaganda and its warlike and totalitarian elements and who were and still are the main target of Western information operations. The way these people think and the way they relate to human and social values is marked by the clichés of the communist ideology and with the capitalism and the nationalism of the early 20th century, augmented by several democratic slogans. The result is a hybrid mentality – an amalgam of concepts neither communist nor democratic, that brings together the ghosts of the past and the frustrations of the present. When those complex and unique psycho and social realities erupted in armed warfare, they began to be sifted through the sieve of Western values. The result is an extremely damaging deaf-mute dialogue, which in the final analysis explains the poor results of the information operations in the Balkans of the 1990s. Such hybrid mentalities had to be fought by the Blue Helmets of UNPROFOR, armed only with a labile political mandate and an even poorer informational system that produced humanitarian and peace-seeking clichés that nobody listened to. Only the demonstration of force by IFOR in the spring of 1996 slowed the nationalism that was brewing and the savage ethnic and religious intolerance among Serbs, Croatians, and Muslim Bosnians whose parents had been the most solid supporters of Tito's communist Yugoslavia.

CAUSES OF WESTERN INFORMATIONAL FAILURE

Perhaps the most clear informational failure of the West (be it only in terms of the lack of real effects) was that of the war of 1999 between NATO and Yugoslavia. Lt. Col. Steven Collins, former Chief of PSYOPS Branch in Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, acknowledged that "Despite a tremendous amount of money and energy, the NATO PSYOPS effort was not effective during Allied Force. The Serbs proved very resistant to the NATO PSYOPS effort"[4].

The same Serb citizens who opposed Milosevic joined him against NATO strikes and proved to be more sensitive to the nationalist and

anti-Western propaganda of the regime. That was another example of a deaf-mute dialogue, of mutual inability to understand and communicate.

Additionally, the former SACEUR, Gen. Wesley Clark, who led the allied forces in 1999, recognized Serbian superiority in exploiting every NATO raid error or incidence of collateral damage, which seriously affected not only the political spheres but the allied command as well[5]. Military strategists called this counter-reaction an asymmetric one, and it was not the asymmetric response that was new but the transfer of that counter-reaction from the military conflict area to the informational field.

Unlike the medieval armies that had employed the "scorched earth" strategy (everything was burned and destroyed on enemy's was so that it lacks any supplies), a staple of warfare for six centuries, the Serbs could not use this tactic against an enemy that struck only from the air. Instead, they used informational strikes and skilfully controlled the ground, where the Allies did not have any independent video cameras and where journalists were guided to the sites of collateral damages caused by NATO bombing errors. Even Gen. Clark recognized that only one NATO video camera on the ground would have been worth as much as striking a dozen Serbian army vehicles[6].

NATO's informational inferiority was due not only to the absence of a free and independence media on the Serb territory bur also to their failure to understand the reactions and the mechanism of the Serb psychology. For example, as previously noted, British Prime Minister Tony Blair's anger with BBC correspondent John Simpson when the latter, broadcasting from Belgrade, related collective actions of resistance, spontaneous or organized, such as weddings celebrated collectively in the central square of Belgrade, rock concerts, volunteer human shields on bridges or close to potential targets, and target-marked badges and banners[7]. In fact, it was the West's inability to predict the Serbs' reactions, something quite similar to the aftermath evolutions in Iraq after the Second Gulf War. The Serbian media counter-offensive was much more efficient, and the Serbian propaganda struck more effectively the sensitive points of Western public opinion. The encounter of the Euro-Atlantic and Serbian informational systems led to the crash of the NATO informational superiority myth, emphasizing instead the dangers generated by informational saturation and asymmetric response. A deaf-mute dialogue took place in 1999 because the Serbs, whether leaders or ordinary people, were not impressed with NATO messages. Neither were the NATO/Western leaders impressed with the rhetoric and diplomatic and propagandistic moves of Belgrade, with the exception of the effect on the public of the reports of collateral damage.

KOSOVAR REALITIES

The same lack of cultural and historical understanding is present in KFOR informational campaigns. For instance, in June 2003, the informational branch of KFOR HQs Main in Pristina, together with PSYOPS structures of the four multinational brigades, organized a multi-ethnic market day in Mitrovitza, a town divided between the Serbian and Albanian communities, that was intended to attract and bring together the small traders and other Albanian and Serbian ordinary people. The military distributed small gifts (hat, pens, note-books, and other trinkets), in which PSYOPS messages were inserted, and newspapers and magazines filled with PSYOPS stories. Despite the significant KFOR investment, the event failed since the number of the organizing military present outnumbered the targeted visitors, most of whom were poor kids who were attracted by KFOR presents. Officially,

the failure was recognized only at the level of KFOR HQs, but the true cause of the failure was not understood: the former communist Yugoslav citizens simply declined to take part in a propagandistic demonstration that had nothing in common with the reality of a society profoundly divided both ethnically and religiously, in which each side harbored intense hatred for the other.

In accordance with their mandate, both the SFOR (replaced by EU after December 2004) and KFOR troops in Bosnia and Kosovo continue to preach the utopia of a multi-ethnic, tolerant, and prosperous society, as did Sir George Robertson, NATO Secretary General, on the occasion of his visit to Pristina, on June 26, 2003. Attainment of the three objectives appears more likely in Bosnia than in Kosovo, but the normalization of the situation and the implementation of Robertson's three requirements – multi-ethnicity, tolerance,

and prosperity – are still far from consolidation. Minorities and their churches survive only in enclaves guarded by the military of the international force in Kosovo. Only with the strong protection of KFOR do the Serbian orthodox churches, or what remains of them, still exist. Inter-ethnic hatred is fomented in local newspapers, and murders are commonplace. There is no prosperity, except through some mafia-like clans that are politically represented and supported. In Kosovo, the threat of a major social riot is imminent because of the high unemployment rate (65 percent in 2003), poverty, and lack of hope for jobs, and also because of the progressive reduction of the military and international organizations presence. Even the prime minister of the Kosovar embryonic government acknowledged on June 23, 2003, before the North Atlantic Council, that the extremely fragile presence of local small business is totally dependent on the Western presence in the province.

As in the war of 1999, the emphasis of KFOR international campaigns based on tolerance and multi-ethnicity (even if they are well hidden behind some PSYOPS programs against extremism, organized crime, and violence) has only a tenuous connection with the Kosovar reality and has been dictated by political events. The military that commands the PSYOPS and INFO-OPS structures seems not to perceive the amplitude and the secular subtleties of the conflict between the warrior culture of the Serbs and Albanians, the legitimacy of revenge under Albanian *Kanun* (medieval customary law), or the Serbian mentality of winning war through resistance. The Albanian or Serb Kosovar adults are not interested in multi-ethnicity or tolerance. They would gladly slaughter each other immediately upon the departure of the international military. They are interested only in the future of their province and worry only about surviving tomorrow or the next day. Four years have passed since the end of the conflict, and none of these problems has been clearly addressed by the international community. Billions of euros from the European Community have been wasted on unfinished houses with no central heating, electricity, or running water, and for equipping the Kosovo police. Several modern mosques, generously sponsored by the Arab community, are virtually ignored by the Muslims in the area. Local Albanians survive day to day

more from the aid sent by a diaspora that grows thinner and thinner as most of the European states send the Albanian refugees back, or from smuggling rather than from working in private companies or international organizations. In the north, the Serbs survive with the help of Belgrade and the support of a more intense manufacturing activity. In spite of this situation, KFOR has not initiated any campaign to stimulate or educate the population but keeps pushing new amnesties for illegal weapons possession and encouraging the return of refugees.

The issue of the future status of Kosovo is a source of violent passions between the Serbs and the Albanians. The province currently survives as a kind of UN protectorate even if, from the standpoint of international law, it remains part of Serbia. The Albanians claim full independence and reject firmly any form of authority from Belgrade. The division of the province, granting the north part to Serbia, would set a dangerous precedent that could again inflame fragile Macedonia, where Albanian extremism was reborn under the name of the National Albanian Army (AKSh). The alternative of a Kosovo full of cantons does not seem to be satisfactory to anyone. The obvious solution is a compromise negotiated and based on a fair and realistic division of the ethnic, demographic, economic, and cultural patrimony, since a potential divorce between the Serbs and Albanians has been obvious for many years.

The international community seemed caught by surprise by the violent riot of the ethnic Albanians in March 2004 emerged in Mitrovitza, the ethnically divided town in the north of Kosovo. The riot ended with tens of dead and hundreds of injured, and it was perfectly predictable for any observer or participant involved in Kosovar matters. The riot had clear objectives of ethnic cleansing, and the rioters were intent on singling out and attacking any physical or symbolic Serbian element. Thus, not only the Serbian enclaves were attacked and set on fire but also the multi-secular Orthodox churches certifying the historical rights of the Serbs. Triggered by a minor and unclarified incident (the deaths of some Albanian children from Mitrovitza supposedly at the hands of some Serbian kids), the revolt, regardless of whether or not it was urged by Albanian extremist and terrorist organizations, resonated with the Albanian Kosovars, most of them unemployed

and with little or no future, who rapidly provided a flexible mass subject to manipulation. The waves of young Kosovars who attacked not only the Serbian enclaves but also the UNMIK police units and the KFOR barracks had nothing to lose economically or socially and thus were extremely susceptible to the perspective of a different future emerging from battles fought for the independence of a province ethnically cleansed. Not only the low level of culture and education with origins in the Albanian *Kanun* filled those young people with blind hatred and made them kill, set fires, and cast stones. Equally to blame were poverty, social frustrations (most of them had been expelled from Germany, Austria, or Italy), and the lack of purpose or a credible hope for a better life. In their minds, such ethnic cleansing would simplify and open the way for an international political decision with regard to the independence of Kosovo and would lead to total separation from the Serbia and Montenegro Union. In their minds, that would attract economic prosperity, as well. The guilt for such a rationale lies equally with the international community that, in spite of its legal and moral obligations and responsibilities, has left the Kosovar problem unsolved for five years. If Bosnia and Herzegovina have enjoyed peace since 1996, this is not due to the presence of SFOR troops but to the Dayton Agreement, which set up an administrative and political formula that made peace possible, achieved

through negotiations conducted in the presence of all the parties involved. Kosovo does not have such an agreement; consequently, the Albanian Kosovars may resort to violence.

Under these circumstances, the limits of the KFOR INFO OPS and PSYOPS became obvious: they did only what they were allowed to do. Also, it is possible to assume that the intelligence reports of the services acting in the area were ignored or minimized by the decision-makers, leading finally to the riot of March 2004. Only when the political geography of the province is decided will the KFOR INFO OPS find a clear and efficient way of action by aligning its objectives with the Kosovar reality. Maybe only then will the West accept as the only possible solution the rapid integration of the Balkans into the social, political, and especially the economic system of the European Union, effective for both parties. For the time being, however, more than half a decade after the end of the 1999 conflict, the great powers seem to consider the Balkans problem as quasi-solved and are much more concerned with the Iraq war and the war against terrorism. Even the North Atlantic Alliance has fundamentally changed its concepts and strategies, accepting to replicate the mandate of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan and thus stepping outside the limits of its classic area of responsibility for which it was created almost 55 years ago.

MYTHS AND CONTEMPORARY INFORMATIONAL REALITIES

After the widely reported success of the American PSYOPS during the first Gulf War in 1991, the Western military had great expectations for this new military specialty. Things went so far that within a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) command the PSYOPS was placed on the same level with the ground, naval, air, and special operations components. PSYOPS politics, doctrines, and specialized structures have been created at various levels of command and execution, and they act in all national and international theaters of operations. Subsequently, the Americans launched the information operations concept as a breakthrough solution to the challenges of the global village and real-time communications. It was received with reservations by some Europeans but was integrated by NATO.

The informational disaster suffered by the military in relations with the local Somalian population and war lords and later internationally by withdrawal or the American contingent during Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1994 was somewhat rehabilitated by the success of the American diplomatic and psychological pressures in the Haitian crisis. The challenge to prove the real efficiency of PSYOPS and information operations came with Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia in 1996 and with the 1999 conflict between NATO and Yugoslavia. After those military campaigns, in which much was invested both from psychological and information operations points of view, the questions is how efficient were they really, and to what extent did they contribute to achieving the objectives of the respective missions?

A precise analysis of the results is difficult and questionable, as are the conclusions for the half-failures of those campaigns that could be drawn from this book. All that has happened in the former Yugoslavia during this bloody decade should trigger a serious warning against over-estimation. For the military, it is clear that neither INFO OPS nor PSYOPS can perform short-term wonders, except for some spectacular imagologic events. At the sale time, a legitimate question may be asked: Would Operation Joint Endeavor (1996) or Operation Allied Force (1999) or the SFOR and KFOR missions have had the same level of efficiency without any PSYOPS contribution? Nor even the efficiency or lack of it that derived from the intervention of the guiding political factors within INFO OPS or PSYOPS can be evaluated except from the perspective of the passage of time. However, it is virtually impossible to imagine that wars, in their actual violent and murderous form, would ever be totally replaced with techniques or super-sophisticated attack and informational defense strategies.

People have used propaganda since ancient times to legitimize their political or military approaches because people must be persuaded, and effective persuasion is hard to resist. The enhanced communications technology has led to the amplification and complication of this phenomenon. Thus, the excessive planning of PSYOPS and INFO OPS could have unintended consequences, as we have already seen in the spring of 1999. The limits born of selfishness, meanness, self-interests, and human superficiality – be they at the level of government leaders or military commanders in the field – will always weigh heavily within the psychological and information operations. This does not mean that the spiritual evolution of human society, of civilization's standards and requirement will not imprint the political and military persuading focus. The question is at what price, at what level, and how that will happen.

NOTES

[1] Ilcev, Ivan, *Even if He Has Right or Not, She's My Country* (Bucharest: Curtea Veche Publishing House, 2003), 32-33.

[2] Valentin Vasile, "Between independence and partition – A personal essay concerning the situation in Kosovo in the aftermath of Yugoslav crises", presented to J3-RO MoD), 2003.

[3] Quote from analysis published by the Romanian magazine *Dilema* in 2005.

[4] Steven Collins, *NATO and Strategic PSYOPS: Policy Pariah or Growth Industry*, a personal point of view in [in press, 2002; to be published by *INFOCOM*, the Romanian Military PSYOPS magazine].

[5] Wesley Clark, *Waging a Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Comba*, (New York: Public Affairs), 441-43.

[6] Clark, *Waging a Modern War.*

[7] In May 1999, the Yugoslav Army Press Center published under the military control of Col. Milivoje Novkovic a photo album, called *Resistance and Victims*, carrying photographs of collateral damages and spectacular moments of individual and collective resistance of Serbs under NATO air raids. However, this issue was not obviously anti-Western or anti-American, as there were the vitriolic comments on Serbian post-cards published in the same period.

1968 – Romania and the Czechoslovak Crisis. Political and Military Implications

Laurenţiu-Cristian Dumitru

1. Romania's political and military relations within the Warsaw Pact during the period preceding the invasion

Dynamically pursuing its own political line, the regime of Bucharest found itself in the situation of being excluded from the debates and decisions adopted within the Warsaw Pact. An outstanding case was the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the troops of the Pact in August 1968, the Romanian "ally" having not been informed of this action.

During the gathering of the Consultative Political Committee of the Warsaw Pact, that took place in Sofia in March 1968, it was decided the establishment of the Statutes that were to enforce the reform of the alliance, already initiated since 1966. In May 1968, these documents arrived at Bucharest and were submitted to be analyzed by military experts. They remarked that only some of the Romanian proposals had been included[1]. Namely, there had been taken into account the aspects referring to the establishment of the Military Council, the appointment of the chief of the Unified Staff as well as of the deputies of the Supreme Commander for air defense and endowment, by the governments of the Treaty's participant states, from the armed forces belonging to the Treaty's any member state, the direct subordination to the ministries of defense of the troops due to be part of the Unified Armed Forces; the proportional representation of the Treaty's participant armies within the Unified Command etc[2]. Among the issues raised in the drafts of the Statutes which distinguished them from a certain point of view, repeatedly expressed by the Romanian delegations, there stood out the ones regarding the right of the Supreme Commander to command, control and order the troops composing the Unified Armed Forces.

The Romanian military experts assessed the provisions of the projects in relation with the stipulations of the alliance's founding Treaty and came to the conclusions that: there had been attributed extremely large prerogatives to the Consultative Political Committee which was in contradiction with its role of an consultative structure as settled in the Treaty; the draft of the Statute of the Unified Command of the Armed Forces comprised stipulations in contradiction with the principles of collaboration and mutual assistance on the basis of respecting the sovereignty and national independence, of the non-interference in the internal affairs, as settled in the Treaty and also affected the essential attributes of the member states' governments; the Statute of the Military Council of the Unified Armed Forces stipulated that its recommendations and proposals should be adopted by simple majority. It was assessed that this principle could not be applied to the relations between parties and states. It was not acceptable to have it applied to international relations; it was affirmed that the adoption of the Statute of an integrated air defense system "would actually lead to their subordination to the Commander of the air defense troops of the Warsaw Treaty's participant states"[3].

The final part of the analysis made up by the Romanian experts highlighted "particularly the changes in the position of the Soviet side, namely by having included in the documents provisions that allowed the Supreme Commander, Staff, Commander of the air defense troops of the Warsaw Treaty's participant states to command and control the troops due to joint action"[4].

The Romanian Ministry of Armed Forces requested within the framework of its mandate

the followings: to keep supporting its own point of view previously approved by the state's leaders in 1966; to agree to the draft of the Statute of the Military Council, specifying that the recommendations and proposals made by the Military Council should be adopted with unanimity; to support the elaboration of the draft of Statute regarding the establishment of an integrated air defense system in accordance with the same principles previously supported by the Romanian side.

Assessing in a realistic way this situation, minister Ion Ioniță's report stressed that it was likely that the point of view of the Ministry of the Armed Forces' delegation could not be agreed on. In this context, it was proposed that the Romanian delegation's position be consigned in a protocol "stating that Romania (...) would not work according to the provisions" of the adopted documents "since these ones were disrespectful of the principles of equality between the alliance's states, of independence and national sovereignty as well as of the non-interference in internal affairs and made up of the Consultative Political Committee and the Unified Command supranational bodies"[5].

The report, using the same realistic arguments, came to a surprising political conclusion: "Following the adoption of this position, the Socialist Republic of Romania, without affirming the possibility to leave the Treaty of friendship, collaboration and mutual assistance, actually positioned itself, in which concerns the military issues, outside the joint military structures of the Warsaw Treaty"[6].

One of the earlier principles affirmed within the framework of the Treaty that benefited of increased support after 1968, despite the Soviet pressures, referred to the exclusive subordination of the Romanian contingent participating at the Unified Armed Forces to the supreme national command[7]. Romania constantly opposed the actions of military integration, which could have affected state independence and sovereignty. It could also have subordinated the national armed forces to some foreign command. An effective instrument of the integration aiming to the training standardization of military and civil personnel and of the allied armies' troops was the annual Directive of the Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces that the Romanian armed

forces, differently from the armies being part to the Treaty, did not apply. By putting in practice this document, the Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces extended its authority, even partially, on the allied armies, while the military training of the armed forces could have faced quite an ambiguous situation: part of the armed forces were to be trained in accordance with the Directive of the Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces, and the rest of the armed forces in accordance with the guidelines received from each national command. Consequently, the Romanian state steadily opposed the military integration and stressed on the principle of cooperation instead of subordination, position that was to become Romania's path of action within the Warsaw Pact.

There were less than three months until the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact's troops, in fact, Romania having been excluded from the decision regarding the invasion. The Romanian communist leader, Nicolae Ceaușescu, and the other members of the Bucharest leadership were surprised that they were not consulted when it was made up the decision on the undertaking of a large scale action of the Pact[8]. Allegedly Ceausescu was aware that he had pushed things too far and actually he found himself, on August 21st, 1968, at a crossroad of his political strategy. He had thereby to make a choice: either to continue on the political path he was following at that moment, and to assume all its consequences, or to leave it earlier or later, aiming to a compromise as flexible as possible. The subsequent events would prove that he was hesitant in making an option and this situation gave way to a risky balance between the two alternatives, namely both pursuing an independent way of action, as well as, adopting a more flexible attitude by accepting to make some compromises[9].

The Czechoslovak crisis, that took place all along 1968, generated substantial reconsidering of the political and military relations within the Eastern bloc. The failure in dealing with this crisis led to a predictable final that marked the first and, at the same time, the last military intervention under the aegis of the Warsaw Pact, except for Romania, precisely against a socialist state, Czechoslovakia, member of this alliance.

1968 – Romania and the Czechoslovak Crisis. Political and Military Implications

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2. The attitude and measures adopted by Romania during the Czechoslovak crisis

Following the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, that took place between the 3rd and the 5th of January 1968, the hardliner Antonin Novotny was replaced by the reformer Alexander Dubcek. Dubcek was strongly motivated by the idea of building the "socialism with human face" in Czechoslovakia, being supported to a larger extent by students, intellectuals and other social categories of the country.

Despite the periodical and large consultations with the new Czechoslovak leadership, at Cerna nad Tisou, Bratislava, Dresden and Moscow, when it was firmly assured that Czechoslovakia would remain a communist state member of the Warsaw Pact whose only intention was to pursue its own path to building socialism, the Kremlin leaders decided the military intervention. Under the mask of serious concern for the faith of socialism in a "brotherly" country, Brezhnev, as an adept and initiator of the "limited sovereignty" doctrine[10], alongside with the other leaders of the Warsaw Pact's member states, eventually decided, at the secret meeting of Crimea, a large scale military invasion in Czechoslovakia, that was to be initiated fast and by surprise, to defend the "conquests of socialism" in this country[11].

The military exercise "SUMAVA", undertaken in Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact, between the 20th and 30th of June 1968, constituted an excellent occasion to prepare in detail the conditions and other features of the August intervention[12]. The other three military exercises undertaken by the Warsaw Pact aimed to the same objective. In July 1968, it took place the military exercise "NEMEN" at which participated units and large units of the armies of the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union. Between the 5th and 19th of July, it took place in the Northern area of the Atlantic Ocean and in the Barents and Baltic Seas the naval military exercise "NORTH", attended by the naval forces of the German Democratic Republic, Poland and the Soviet Union. The last military exercise preceding the invasion in Czechoslovakia took place on the territories of Eastern Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union, counting on the participation of ground and air forces of the three states. It contributed to the finalization of both operative and strategic disposition of the intervention[13].

It is worth to highlight that all along 1968, there took place eight rounds of consultation during which the socialist states debated on the aspects referring to the situation in Czechoslovakia, not attended until the end or even at all by the Romanian representatives. The evolution of the events in Czechoslovakia was assessed with sympathy and understanding by the Bucharest regime, and similarly by the Yugoslav leader, Iosip Broz Tito. It is within this framework, that one can understand both Tito's visit to Prague between the 9th and 11th of August and Ceauşescu's one between the 15th and 17th of August, as well as the signing of the Romanian – Czechoslovak Treaty, that were perceived by Moscow as an attempt to establish a socialist "Little Entente"[14]. Referring to the position adopted by the three states, Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev qualified it as some sort of "Danubian collusion"[15]. Moreover, the entire series of political actions of 1968 undertaken through its official representatives highlighted that Romania had clearly individualized its position towards both the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

As it had been planned, on August 20th/21st, 1968, at midnight, the Warsaw Pact's forces, representing the Soviet Union (that provided the command and the majority of the invasion troops), the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria, accounting for almost 600,000 troops, totalizing 29 divisions, supported by 7,500 tanks and more than 1,000 fighting and transportation aircrafts invaded Czechoslovakia within the framework of the operation "DANUBE", following the itineraries identified by the recce units during the military exercise "SUMAVA" and undertaking air and ground operations, including airborne troops, they occupied or blocked the areas and strategic points also identified during the mentioned exercise: airports, airfields, Party and governmental institutions, barracks, hubs and centers of communication[16]. The Czechoslovak leaders were taken to Moscow to be "worked on", and upon their return to the country, Alexander Dubcek and President Ludvig Svoboda addressed the nation, on August 27th, to make the people "understand" the situation. Subsequently, the Soviet Union's and Czechoslovakia's leaders have set up the legal bases for Soviet military presence regime in this country, the Soviet forces beginning the proceedings of the withdrawal only after 1989.

The events of Czechoslovakia obviously took by surprise the Bucharest leader that urgently summoned the Party's and State's decision-making structures to assess the situation and settle the necessary measures. At the same time, he addressed the Romanian nation, on August 21st, 1968, strongly condemning the invasion and asking for the support of the population to his actions. Most probably it was the only moment when the Romanian nation willingly stood by its leader, during the entire period of the communist regime. At the same time, there were taken measures at military level to strengthen and enhance the armed forces combat capacity, given that at Romania's Eastern[17], Western[18] and Southern[19] frontiers, the intelligence services warned on concentrations of troops having been assigned possible offensive missions directed against the Romanian territory.

The concentration of troops so closely to Romania's frontiers had been evaluated at around 10-12 large Soviet units, 4-5 large Bulgarian units and 2-3 large Hungarian units[20]. All these undoubtedly constituted an important political and military factor of pressure on the Romanian state, since it had the characteristics of a genuine force demonstration.

Taking into account the probability of military hostilities to be unleashed against Romania, Ceauşescu met Tito at Vrşet, and asked him to allow the Romanian leader to transfer the government and the Romanian armed forces to Yugoslavia, in case of the national territory would have been occupied. Tito consented providing that the Romanian armed forces be disarmed and interned on Yugoslav territory. Facing this alternative and the obvious political isolation of the country, the Bucharest leader moderated his position and the following days he normalized his relations with the Soviets[21].

Referring to the difference in military capabilities between a potential aggressor and Romania, General Earle Wheeler, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States Armed Forces stressed that "19 Soviet divisions could be entered into Romania with a two to three days earlier notification. These forces could rapidly defeat any Romanian opposition"[22].

The reaction of the West towards the events of August 1968 of Czechoslovakia was reserved which may be explained by the geopolitical and security configuration and settlements established in Europe after the end of the World War II[23]. In

accordance with the "Sonnenfeldt" doctrine[24], the United States considered the Czechoslovak issue as a "family matter" of the socialist camp and Warsaw Pact, and "the Russians' invasion in Czechoslovakia should not be perceived as a tragedy since it only represents a flat tire on the road of cooperation between East and West"[25].

The moment 1968 was deciding since it marked a turning point in Romania's military policy and for its relations within the Warsaw Pact. After 1968, Romania elaborated its own defense doctrine in accordance with its national interest and operated substantial changes in the structure, endowment and training of the national defense system. The establishment of the "patriotic guards" implied putting in practice, among many other things, the doctrinaire concept of the "entire people's war"[26].

In this context, the Romanian communist authorities set up a specific military doctrine, unprecedented within the alliance and without counterpart one, and which colligated to the endorsed conduct in its foreign and military policy field (however, formally the Romanian state requested never the abandonment of the alliance), made without meaning Romania's *de facto* membership in the military structures of the Warsaw Pact.

The underlying principle of Romania's security strategy was the outright rejection of any foreign troops and joint exercises of the Warsaw Pact forces on its own national territory. The country's strategy aimed at relying on Western and Chinese support to successfully counter any pressures made by the Soviet Union. The careful assessment of the Czechoslovak crisis provided for the Romanian authorities the ideas and means of establishing and applying a military doctrine, particularly defined as a defensive one, focused on countering any military threat concerning "all azimuths" implied posed by the neighboring states and especially by the Soviets. A possible confrontation with an enemy of superior manpower and military technology led to the establishment of so-called "patriotic guards", irregular forces set up during the Czechoslovak crisis and that were to be employed alongside with the regular armed forces and paramilitary ones[27].

The Romanian doctrine was underlying to its military tactics and strategy the concept of the "entire people's war". Defined as a main way to wage the war, with an especial stress to the allocation of all national resources in order to

repeal the aggression, this kind of military hostilities approach was likely to be an eloquent example of a total war or of a "people's war" and in the temporarily occupied territory the only option was to unleash the resistance or guerilla fighting actions[28].

By adjusting to the definite Romania's realities, fundamental aspects of the Yugoslav military doctrine and also of the Chinese one in which regards waging the people's war, the Romanian military doctrine reflected the political and military options of the national-communist regime of Bucharest, the whole system tried to inculcate the Romanian people with nationalist and patriotic feelings[29]. Although it did not evolved into an official document codified according to the legal norms unanimously accepted, the Romanian military doctrine emerged from Law no. 14/1972 concerning the national defense of communist Romania, and its directives were to be found in the general and specific provisions of the military rules, instructions and regulations.

The very preamble of the Law on the Romanian national defense decried on the one hand imperialism as the promotion of an aggressive policy, hostile to socialism, progress and civilization, and on the other hand it stated the necessity to reject any aggression. This text made it more than obvious that, whereas its beginning was clearly an ideological one, re-asserting Romania's faithfulness towards the alliance to which it belonged as a full member, its ending pinpointed the country's determination to fight back any aggression, regardless of its origin.

The purpose and the nature of the war that Romania was supposed to wage could be exclusively defined as a defense anti-imperialistic war, and victory was possible only through engaging in the fight the whole people, the country's citizens being forced to participate at specific military training and fight for the defense of the country up to the extreme sacrifice.

The Law stipulated, among many other aspects, the interdiction to accept or recognize any action undertaken by a foreign state or any situation that could encourage it to occupy the national territory, or general surrender. By having included into the text of the law these provisions, Ceausescu intended to prevent any attempt, in time of peace or war, undertaken in order to remove him from power, irrespective of whether or not his decision would have had disastrous

consequences for the Romanian nation once it was engaged in a people's war[30]. According to this important normative act, the national defense distinguished itself from the Warsaw Pact and it was implicitly affirmed that Romania would not send troops outside its national frontiers.

However, Romania also understood that it was necessary to gradually moderate its intransigent position previously displayed and to adopt a compromise. In the new international context, this estimation proved to be realistic. The military thinkers of that period defined communist Romania's military doctrine as being the ensemble of thesis, ideas, and principles adopted by the Romanian state, of its options regarding the organizing, endowment, training and command of forces as well as the necessary means to ensure the military defense of the country's political system, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity against any possible aggression[31].

The military strategists considered that the people's war fell entirely in line with the conjuncture of forces in which Romania could find itself in the event of aggression. This conjuncture of forces, analyzed in a realistic manner at regional level and taking into account the main operative directions, was clearly unfavorable for Romania in which regards the regular armed forces, both in terms of manpower, weaponry, and military technology, logistical support, as well as geostrategic disposition. Under such circumstances, the inferiority could be overcome only through extra forces that the people's war might supply, as well as through the effective implementation of specific ways and procedures of fight, including those referring to low intensity conflicts, all this aiming to avoid being taken by surprise by the aggressor. At the same time, it was argued that people's war strategy created favorable conditions for taking a superior advantage of the time factor, which could impede the aggressor to quickly attain the war objectives and force it to engage in a long confrontation that might trigger prolonged efforts, significant losses and massive costs. A prolonged war could set the premises for a change in the conjuncture of forces, as well as increased international support given to Romania. The preparation of the national defense system to wage a long people's war turned into an important deterrent factor of a possible aggression, the enemy facing high risks that were not worth to be assumed[32].

At the same time, in April 1968, there were set up the basis of the national defense industry that was planned to ensure 70-80% of the necessary endowment of the Romanian armed forces while the rest was to be imported[33].

It was made the decision that the Romanian armed forces should not participate any longer with troops in military exercises outside the national territory. It could only participate to command and staff military exercises, but without providing troops and it was underlined that during the exercises the adversary should not be nominated.

Similarly, Romania did not any longer accepted foreign troops on its territory or the over flight of foreign aircrafts transporting troops or military equipment. It was suspended the practice of sending officers and Generals to study in the Soviet Union, and those having pursued studies in Moscow were appointed in functions of little importance, being gradually removed from the military institution, through a clever personnel policy[34].

Meanwhile, it was stressed the development of the military relations also with other socialist states non members of the Warsaw Pact, with capitalist states members and non members of NATO, and with developing states[35]. The ensemble of measures adopted by the Bucharest leadership made up conspicuous the distinct position held by Romania within the Warsaw Pact.

3. The evolution of the political and military relations between Romania and the Warsaw Pact after the events of August 1968

The period that followed after the Czechoslovak crisis marked the beginning of the national military doctrine elaboration, with a specific content, in line with the then situation and with the political and military perspectives within the Pact. A relevant case in point directly referring to the event of 1968 is also the fact that Romania was neither asked to participate in the military intervention or informed about preparing it, the Soviet Union's leaders being pretty aware of the Romanian position within the Warsaw Pact.

One can assess that a possible intervention in Romania, immediately after the one in Czechoslovakia, would have generated significant international complications potentially increased by the protests of the world public opinion, which would have harmed the Soviet Union's interests and image in the field of international relations. In this context, one can also take into consideration the fact that the Romanian territory was bigger than Czechoslovakia's one. At the same time, since there were no Soviet troops stationing in Romania and military exercises with the Warsaw Pact's troops did not take place any longer on Romanian territory, an aggression by surprise was not possible[36].

Similarly, the Soviet intelligence agencies acting in Romania had been uncovered ever since 1962, and their activities were largely observed and counteracted by the Romanian counter-intelligence structures[37].

Given the current stage of the possibilities to have access to the information contained by the Moscow archives, it is extremely difficult, if not even impossible, to assess the intentions of the Kremlin leaders in which regards Romania all along the Czechoslovak crisis. One may conclude that these factors, acting together, as well as the decision made by Romania's political and military leadership to oppose military resistance in the event of aggression, finally entailed the withdrawal of the troops surrounding the country and the return to normality in this part of Europe.

The events of the 1968 summer guided Romania in defining directions for its future political and military position in its relations with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact as a whole. In accordance with these necessities, it came out the idea that the military doctrine could not and should not be anything else than a strictly defensive one, clearly different from the Soviet doctrine. Given the mentioned context, the national defense could be provided only through Romania's own forces. There is record of declarations of moral support for Romania. The President of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson asked Leonid I. Brezhnev „not to let free the dogs of war" against Romania, and the Chinese Prime-Minister, Zhou Enlai stated that „an attack against Romania would be considered an attack against China"[38].

It is also worth mentioning the episode of August 23rd, 1968, when the Soviet ambassador

to Washington, Anatoly F. Dobrynin, was warned during a meeting with the US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, on the Soviet Union's possible aggressive intentions directed against Romania. Dobrynin denied the existence of any piece of information regarding the issue approached, adding that he personally did not believe that Moscow would act in this way in which concerned Romania[39]. The geographical distance and particularly the geopolitical and geostrategic conditions of that moment did not allow the United States or China to provide effective military support to Romania. However, these declarations demonstrated that the Romanian decision-makers had a correct perception of the geopolitical situation and consequently they were acting to ensure the national security.

Under such conditions, it gained momentum the option of following an inflexible policy and assumes up to the end the position that drew Moscow's annoyance and its decision of not informing the Bucharest authorities on the military action of Czechoslovakia. This attempt manifested through public protest against the invasion and the determination to resist using military means in case a similar action would have taken place against Romania too[40].

It is difficult to assert that the Soviet Union and its satellites within the Warsaw Pact could afford to undertake two simultaneous operations, not only because of the international public opinion, but also for reasons of military capabilities. In Romania's case, it would have lacked the pretext of military maneuvers under the aegis of the Pact. At the same time, there was no indication of a scission at the level of the communist leadership. The lack of these conditions made that a possible intervention be associated to a typical aggression that could have been condemned by the United Nations Organization.

Ceauşescu reacted in a disproportionate way precisely in order to capitalize on the international support and, in perspective, to put the country at shelter in case of the Soviets' counter-reactions. At the same time, he used the compromise to prevent an irremediable rift with the Warsaw Pact[41]. During those moments, it stood out the need to consolidate the armed forces combat capacities and capabilities, given its role as a main component of Romania's national defense system.

It was within the framework of the political action dealing with consequence management of the Czechoslovak crisis, that the Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces, the Soviet Marshal Ivan I. Yakubovski and the chief of Staff of the Unified Armed Forces, General S. M. Shtemenko visited Romania at the end of September 1968[42]. On this occasion, the Romanian leader pronounced himself in favor of the establishment within the Pact of the structures proposed in May 1968, but he raised two major objections. The first one referred to the need to reach consensus between the Pact's member states in the event of a decision to dispatch forces on other member states' territory. In this case, the invasion in Czechoslovakia was illegal. The second one referred to the fact that the recommendations and proposals of the Military Council should be made on the basis of unanimous agreement of the Warsaw Pact's members. It results that the Romanian side was deeply affected by the recent experience of Czechoslovakia and stressed on the need to reach unanimity in the military decision-making process. The exclusion syndrome had strongly affected Bucharest. The subsequent attitude of the Bucharest regime confirmed this hypothesis.

As a case in point, a "Note of Conversation", of February 19th, 1969, regarding the meeting between Nicolae Ceauşescu, accompanied by his subordinates Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Romanian Prim-Minister, Colonel-General Ion Ioniţă, minister of the Armed Forces, Corneliu Mănescu, minister of Foreign Affairs, Lieutenant-General Vasile Ionel, deputy of the minister of the Armed Forces, and Marshal Ivan I. Yakubovski, Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces, V. Kuznetzov, prime-deputy of the Soviet Union's minister of Foreign Affairs provides several hints in this regards. The usefulness of the word "all" was at the core of the discussions. While the Romanian side requested that it should be included in article no. 12 of the Warsaw Pact's Rules of procedure, with reference to the rights of the Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces, the Soviet side argued that this word could be left apart when editing the article that referred to the assessment of war danger as considered by Warsaw Pact's allies. The Romanian side underlined that it was imperious to have this word included in order to express the will of all of the Pact's members. In his memorandum, Maurer estimated that: "The

situation is clear: in the case of this problem that can unleash the military mechanism of the Warsaw Treaty, consensus cannot be reached. But you are right that the word "all" would signify kind of a "veto", and some countries, for example six out of seven, may ask: why shouldn't we, six countries, behave as we agreed, only because the seventh country refuses to share the same opinion as us ? However, it does not mean that the seventh country has to accept the other six countries' decision"[43].

It is obvious that the Romanian side requested that it should be compulsory to have the possible "dissidence" in the case of a conflict consigned in the Rules of procedure of the Warsaw Pact's mechanism and thereby legalized. The most surprising fact is the Soviet side's opposition to the Romanian request and the weak arguments supporting this opposition. The Romanian position was presented in the aftermath of the Warsaw Pact's invasion in Czechoslovakia. Ceauşescu even alluded to this event when he pointed out that: "And, I will speak frankly, openly and not diplomatically, vaguely: there were meetings that Romania was not summoned to attend and not even consulted about", because in Bucharest, the communist leadership was surprised by the invasion in Czechoslovakia of the Warsaw Pact's military forces. The Bucharest regime intended to impose on Moscow any pretext of legality regarding a possible military intervention.

The Bucharest leadership focus on the need to have the word "all" included in the document, in which regards the unanimous assessment of war danger and therefore of the decision to wage, it can be also perceived from another point of view. This issue could be defined as an attempt to give legal ground, agreed in advance, so that a nation to avoid being engaged in a war against the national will. Besides, Ceauşescu remarked at the end of the conversation that "it is difficult to assume that a Treaty's member country would not be in danger if another country is in danger. But it underlines even more the need to accept the member countries' obligation to act only after previous consultations and mutual agreement on the existence of the danger"[44].

Subsequently, in order to ensure the practical coordination of the military problems, at the gathering of the Consultative Political Committee of the Warsaw Pact, that took place on the 17th of March 1968, at Budapest, it was decided the establishment or the improvement of several bodies and structures belonging to the Pact: the Defense Ministers' Committee, the Command of the Unified Armed Forces, the Staff, the Military Council, and the Technical Committee. The Defense Ministers' Committee composed of the defense ministers of the Warsaw Pact's member states, the Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces and the chief of the Staff of the Unified Command was assigned as main attributions the analyzing of the main problems regarding the organizational aspects, tactical, operative and strategic training, the operative and mobilization levels of the troops and headquarters previewed in the Treaty, infrastructure aspects, the European and international political and military situation, the development and improvement of the Unified Armed Forces, and not in the least, the debate, approval and executing procedures of the budget of the Unified Armed Forces' Command. In the communiqué issued at the end of the session, it was stated that "the states having participated at the gathering examined in detail and adopted by unanimity the Statute of the Defense Ministers' Committee of the Warsaw Treaty's participant states, the new Statute of the Unified Armed Forces and Unified Command, and other documents, aiming to the ongoing improvement of the leading structures and bodies belonging to the defensive organization of the Warsaw Treaty"[45].

One of the Warsaw Pact's military decision-making structure was the Military Council of the Unified Armed Forces, set up at the session of the 9th and the 10th of December 1969, at Moscow, on the basis of a decision adopted by the Consultative Political Committee at Budapest, in March, the same year. The Military Council was composed of the Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces, the chief of Staff of the Unified Armed Forces, the defense ministers' deputies (the chiefs of General Staffs) of the Treaty's participant states, the deputies of the Supreme Commander for air defense as well as of the air forces, navy, and the chief of the Technical Committee whose activity referring to the endowment with technique, equipment and armament of member states' armies was regulated in 1973 through a special convention. Among the attributions of the Military Council there were the evaluation of the issues concerning the combat capacity and the operative level of the Unified Armed Forces and

their endowment with armament and fight technique. The activity of this structure was consultative and it held semester reunions presided by the Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces[46].

Within the political climate characterizing the communist bloc, during the period post 1968, when the Bucharest regime became highly suspicious to Moscow's possible intentions to remove the leading team, Ceauşescu chose to adopt somehow a more inflexible policy line in the bilateral relations. Regarding the overall policy based on the binomial approach intransigency-compromise, the Bucharest appraised that an increased inflexible attitude would be more profitable both for the political survival of Romania's leading team, as well as, for preserving the freedom of action that Romania earned at international level. It was the period when Nicolae Ceauşescu played the role of intermediary between China and the United States and also put efforts to be accepted as a mediator in the case of the Vietnam War[47].

It was in the context of this general trend of Romania's foreign policy, particularly after the Czechoslovak crisis, that it took place the United States President, Richard Nixon's visit to Bucharest, during the summer of 1969. The visit, a real triumph for the Bucharest regime, visibly irritated Moscow and was followed by other similar episodes meant to demonstrate to the Soviet Union, Romania's will to be considered as having the same rights as the other international actors.

After Romania was excluded from the only common action of the Warsaw Pact, namely the invasion in Czechoslovakia of 1968, the Bucharest communist leadership gave substance to its own political option, launched in April

1964. This was to become obvious in the military and security policy fields. After August 1968, to the temptation of sticking to the behavior line of April 1964, and in order to enhance and give ground to it, there were added Moscow's veiled menaces. This is the reason why the Bucharest regime's intransigency towards the Soviet hegemony was most evident in the military field. Romania's military link with the Warsaw Pact gradually receded. One can affirm with certitude that the political binomial action assumed by the Bucharest regime towards the Soviet Union and implicitly towards the Warsaw Pact, respectively intransigency-compromise, did not manage to diminish Kremlin's vigilance in which concerns Romania's possible desertion[48].

Subsequently the 1968 events, it became clear that Romania adopted two positions towards the Warsaw Pact. The first position indicated the deepening of the Pact's political component and the diminishing of the military one that should be based, from Romania's perspective, on cooperation and not subordination. The second position referred to Romania's decision to accomplish the obligations assumed within the alliance, and at the same time it settled as a mandatory principle that the Romanian army would be totally subordinated only to the national military command, that it would not obey to orders received from abroad and would not take part to aggressive actions against other states.

This way, "accomplishing the obligations assumed" within the Pact remained a general perspective, and any concrete engagement was to be decided, depending on each situation, by the political and military leadership of the Romanian state.

NOTES

[1] Alexandru Oşca, *Divergenţe româno-sovietice privind statutul Tratatului de la Varşovia*, in *Magazin Istoric*, no. 2/2001, pp. 18-20.
[2] Arhivele Militare Române – Romanian Military Archives (RMA), fund V2, vol. 3, file 12/35, p. 55.
[3] *Ibidem*, ff. 56-57.
[4] *Ibidem*
[5] *Ibidem*, f. 64.
[6] *Ibidem*
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An Analysis of the Macedo-Romanian Issue Within the Romanian–Greek Relations During the First Decades of the Twentieth Century (1900-1926)

Radu Tudorancea

From the beginning, we should mention that the Romanian – Greek relations have followed, since the establishment of diplomatic relations, in 1879 and until the outbreak of the Second World War, a sinuous and wavering path, marked by various incidents, some of them of serious impact, even leading to a temporary break of diplomatic relations between the two states. Among the issues which have affected, in a significant way, the Greek-Romanian diplomatic relations was the situation of the Macedo-Romanians and the stand taken by Greece regarding this ethnic group. Based on the idea that Macedonia in its whole belonged to Greece, the local Greeks initiated various actions, going as far as to send over armed bands to „*defend their interests*" in the area, a fact which affected the local population of the area, especially the Macedo-Romanians. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Macedo-Romanians made up a considerable ethnic segment, more exactly almost a quarter of the population of Macedonia[1], within an extremely varied ethnic conglomerate which included Turks, Bulgarians, Serbs, Macedo-Romanians, Albanians and Jews.

Apart from the actions taken by the Greek authorities, a religious authority, namely the Ecumenical Patriarchate was also employed as a lever in order to prevent or limit the aspirations of the Macedo-Romanians for a cultural and ecclesiastic life of their own.

In 1878, an order of the Grand Vezir acknowledged the right of the Macedo-Romanians to enjoy Ottoman protection and to found their own schools. Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century, there were 118 such establishments, namely 114 primary schools, two business schools, a school preparing schoolmasters and a high school[2]. Later, in 1900, 6 high schools and 113 public schools for the Macedo-Romanians were recorded in Macedonia[3].

After a four year period (1892-1896) with no diplomatic relations between Greece and Romania, due to the argument over the estate left by V. Zappa, the diplomatic relations were resumed and, moreover, three more consulates were opened, at Pireu, Patras and Corfu. During the Crete crisis of 1897, although at the official level Romania assumed a neutral position, in order to avoid causing any discontent in Constantinople that could affect Romanian campaign for the official recognition of Romanian nationality in the European part of the Ottoman Empire, the Greek-Turkish war was regarded with sympathy by the authorities in Bucharest, which have supported many Greek volunteers in their action to leave for Greece.

The stand of Greece and Romania on the issue of the Macedo-Romanians was addressed at Abbazia, in the spring of 1901, during the meeting between King Carol of Romanian and King George of Greece. On this occasion, King Carol I of Romania tried to eliminate the suspicions of the Greek monarch regarding the Romanian propaganda in Macedonia, while King George promised that Greece would offer support by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and insisted on a solution to be given to the Zappa issue[4]. Despite the above mentioned meeting, the Greek authorities continued to show their irritation in relation to the Romanian actions in Macedonia, while the authorities in Bucharest were criticizing the part played by Athens in delaying a solution to the ecclesiastic issue of the Macedo-Romanians who were subjects of the Ottoman Empire[5].

Once with the outbreak, in 1903, of a strong revolt in Macedonia, with assistance coming from Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia, a revolt which was eventually stopped by the Ottoman troops, the authorities in Constantinople have reconsidered their attitude regarding the Macedo-Romanians

living in the Ottoman Empire. Thus, on 9/22 May 1905, Sultan Abdul Hamid II, issued an *iradea* recognizing the nationality of the Macedo-Romanians living in the Ottoman Empire, as well as the fact that they had equal rights with those of the other Christian subjects in the Empire (Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbs, Albanians). Some of the Greek historians have opined that this success of the Romanian authorities in Bucharest came also as a result of the backstage plots and actions of the Romanian representative in Constantinople, Alexandru Lahovary and also due to the intervention of Austria-Hungary, Italy and Germany, member states of the Triple Alliance, by the Sultan[6]. The above mentioned *iradea* stipulated that *„His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, who, by his sense of high justice and out of concern for all his peoples, extends his blessing and favors over all his loyal subjects, no matter their race or religion, taking in consideration the request addressed lately to the Imperial Throne by his Vlach subjects, is willing to decide that, by virtue of the civil rights the aforementioned are enjoying, like all the other non-Muslim subjects, their communities are allowed to elect muhtari (mayors), in agreement with the laws in force, such as done on a customary basis by the other communities: the Vlachs should also be accepted in the administration councils, the Imperial authorities should enable the appointed teachers of these communities to inspect their schools, and allow the fulfillment of all the formalities required by the laws of the Empire so as to open new schools[7]*. Although Romania made significant efforts that she wished to improve her friendly relation with the Greek State, and that the official document issued by the Sultan did not affect the interest of the Greek State, still, the reaction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and of the Greek government was very strong and intensive[8]. That kind of negative attitude of the Greek authorities and of public opinion towards the *iradea* was fuelled by the idea that Macedo-Romanians (the Vlachs) had nothing to do with the Romanians, and that the Greeks had to defend their interests in Macedonia[9]. Despite Romanian efforts made in order to appease the discontent of Greece regarding the *iradea*, very soon a press campaign was launched in Athens, with virulent articles, criticizing the Romanian State, which determined Romanian authorities to ban, for a while, the introduction of Greek newspapers in the country[10].

Since the action undertaken by the Greek partisans, and not only, against the Macedo-Romanian communities in Macedonia intensified, the diplomatic representative of Romania in Athens, Papiniu, requested the firm intervention of the Greek Government, especially as the Romanian side was convinced that most of the groups of Greek fighters were assembled on Greek territory, while the Greek authorities, although well aware of these activities, remained passive. The situation continued to deteriorate, and after the reception by the Greek diplomatic representative to Bucharest, of the official order to leave the capital of Romania, on a vacation of imprecise duration, a similar order was given to the Romanian representative in Athens, Papiniu. Before his withdrawal from the legation in Athens, Papiniu had informed the authorities in Bucharest about the memoirs addressed by the Greek Government to the Greek Powers, in which Greece was declaring that in absence of firm support to the Greek State, the break of diplomatic relations seemed almost imminent[11]. Given the situation, the Romanian Government notified Greece that the denunciation of the commercial convention signed by the two states and of the appended protocol which offered a legal statute to the Greek communities living in Romania, were taken into consideration.

The correspondent of a Dutch newspaper to Constantinople made an excellent description of the strained relations between Romania and Greece. Thus, the issue of October 11, 1905 of the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant informed about the unfavorable position held by Greece in relation to Romania.

Given the geographical location, a war could not break out, which was all the better for the Greeks, since „the very-well organized Romanian army would teach them a lesson more difficult to take than the one they had been taught bz the Turks in 1897; however, Romania could inflict upon Greee huge economic losses in the areas of trade, navigation and other branches of the economy"[12].

The situation grew worse in 1906, and most of the diplomatic signals given by various European capitals seemed to approve the stand taken by the Romanian officials. The Greek side, on the pretext that several Greeks had been expulsed from Romania, eventually took the decision to break diplomatic relations, and on May 30, 1906, the attaché d'affaires of Russia to

Bucharest, Lermontov, notified George Gr. Cantacuzino, the President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania, that Greece had decided to call back her diplomatic representatives, including the consuls, and that the interests of the Greek State would be further defended by Russian diplomacy[13]. Soon, Romania decided to have Italy represent her interests in Greece[14].

The Greek Telegraphic Agency issued a press communicate regarding the meeting of the Greek Parliament on the subject of the official break of diplomatic relations between Greece and Romania, which came as a surprise to the govermental circles and to the public opinion in Romania, due to the distorted image that was being given of the causes and evolution of the Greek – Romanian conflict[15]. Soon, the Romanian Telegraphic Agency presented the point of view of the Romanian party, emphasizing that the Greek government had taken violent action, „sparing no means in the effort to block the application of the Imperial *iradea*[16] regarding the situation of the Macedo-Romanians living in the Ottoman Empire. The Romanian side mentioned also that several armed bands, organized on Greek soil, with financial support from an association located in Athens, had crossed the borders of the Empire on several occasions, while the Greek authorities did not try to prevent them. The above mentioned armed groups were accused by the Romanian side of „*committing odious acts of violence and terrorizing the Romanian populations by arson, looting and murders*"[17]. Romania underlined also that the Ecumenical Patriarchate backed the Greek action, in an „issue not in the least related to religious principles or dogmas, by odious persecution inflicted on the Orthodox priests and population using Romanian language in their churches"[18].

For the Romanian party was even more outrageous the fact that Rhallys, the President of the Greek Council of Ministers, after being informed about the situation, had retorted that he could not advise the Patriarch, but if he were to advise him, he would have asked him „to be consistent in his stand"[19]. Rhallys declared even that he did not recognize the existence of Romanians in Macedonia, and had no knowledge of the „existence in Athens of a secret association organizing the bands operating in the neighboring provinces of the Ottoman Empire"[20]. The Greek Government, through its Minister of Foreign

Affairs, had declared in the Greek Parliament, in early June, that the Romanian party, in its boldness, was accusing the Greek State of acts „*which are being undertaken abroad, on Ottoman territory, and against some Ottoman subjects, acts that have nothing to do with the Greek State*"[21]. As for the activity of the Patriarch in Constantinople, the Greek party declared that it could not interfere within a strictly religious matter, and that it waved all the responsibility for the relations between „*the autocephalous church, the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the populations under the jurisdiction of the Ottoman Empire*"[22]. Moreover, the Greek Parliament believed that the pretensions of the Romanian State were „*completely absurd and unfounded*" and that their rejection by the Greek party led to the retribution against the Greek population living in Romania, „*long concocted by the Romanian State*"[23].

The Romanian officials have replied that they were not reproaching Greece with not exerting control on the Ottoman territory, but rather with „closing an eye" to the organizing and supporting on her territory of various bands or armed groups undertaking repeated raids into Macedonia and committing crimes, often under the leadership of Greek army officers[24]. The authorities in Bucharest decided to react to the „*violent actions leading to violent crimes*", so they denounced the Trade Convention and even expel some of Greeks established in Romania, whose presence was deemed „*incompatible with public order and security*"[25].

We should also mention that both Romania and Greece experienced the unpleasant effects of the denunciation of the Trade Convention signed in December 1900. Thus, Romanian imports from Greece fell from 1 653 997 lei in 1905 to 944 788 lei in 1906, and to 497 706 lei in 1907[26].

At the beginning of 1911 it seemed the things were getting better regarding the future of the Greek-Romanian diplomatic relations. Thus, the head of Italian diplomacy, San Giuliano, which represented Romanian diplomatic interests in relation with Greece, stated in January 1911 that a reconciliation between Greece and Romania was important „for the interests of the both states"[27]. Eventually, on April 1906 the diplomatic relations were resumed and A.F.Florescu was appointed the new Romanian representative in Athens, while Caruso was appointed as Greek representative in Bucharest.

Thus, the Romanian – Greek diplomatic relations, interrupted in 1906, were resumed five years later, in the spring of 1911.

Subsequently, before and during the Balkan wars, new Romanian – Greek arguments reoccurred in relation to the many excesses committed by some Greek armed bands, or even regular troops, against the Macedo-Romanian population living in Macedonia and the Epirus. Thus, a first signal of alarm was given by the General Consul of Romania to Salonika, who, in a report dated 21 July 1911, was informing the authorities in Bucharest about the intensification of the activity of the Greek bands, which had crossed over into Turkey *„in their Evzoni uniforms, and under the command of army officers"*; this had made roads dangerous, and had forced the Vlach population *„either not to travel at all, or to take great precautions when going from one place to another"[28]*.

Another report sent to Bucharest by the General Consulate of Romania in Monastir, dated 31 January 1912, the assassinates *„against the Romanians were committed after the instructions of some Greeks of Grevena, who call in a band head established in Greece, in the villages near the border"*, as declared to the Romanian consul by the Head of the Gendarmerie of the vilayet himself, Colonel Iusuf Bey[29]. The Romanian Consul G.C.Ionescu also noted in his report that the measures taken at the border by the Turkish authorities would have been effective if the Greek authorities had acted in a similar way, *„arresting the band heads, and punishing their host on Greek territory"[30]*. There were also various memoirs addressed to the diplomatic representative of Romania in the Empire, such as the report of 18 July 1912, by which the Macedo-Romanian inhabitants were complaining about having their lives threatened by Greek bands, *„unless we give up our mother tongue, that is eliminate it from schools and churches"[31]*.

A suggestive image of the persecutions suffered by the Romanian population is given in a report by the Royal Consulate of Romania at Janina, dated 8 March 1913, which includes a list of Macedo-Romanians who had been murdered, or had had their houses looted and burned down, or again had been forced to take refuge in Romania, as a result of the persecutions suffered from the Greek bands and troops[32]. In their turn, fleeing Macedo-Romanians, upon their arrival in Romania, addressed memoirs to the Romanian

authorities, such as the one filed by schoolmaster Nicu Balamotti, who noted that, *„the Greek atrocities assure the Government that they are not laying a finger on the authorities Macedonian Romanians"*. Balamotti requested the Romanian Government to intercede by the cabinet in Athens, *„so that they should put an end to the systematic persecution of the families of my co – nationals, otherwise I will be forced to take revenge on the Greeks established in the country"[33]*.

The intercessions of the Romanian party at diplomatic level were made as early as 1912, through approaches to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs in protest against the treatment dealt to the Macedo-Romanians. The Greek party, more exactly Foreign Minster Koromilas seemed somewhat irritated by the fact that the Romanian representative to Athens, Florescu, had accurate information on the developments in Macedonia and the persecution of the Macedo-Romanian subjects[34]. The talks between Florescu and the Foreign Minister in Greek Government gave the Romanian representative the conviction that Koromilas was *„the most arrogant xenophobe"*, with *„a biased and hostile attitude towards us"[35]*. As a rule, the talks between Florescu and Koromilas would begin with the considerations on the origin of the Macedo-Romanians, source of new arguments between the two diplomats, such as mentioned in a report sent by Florescu to Bucharest. According to this report, Koromilas had asserted that the population referred to by Florescu as Macedo-Romanian was, in fact a Hellenized Latin population that had nothing to do with the Romanians, *„such as the French, albeit of Latin origin, were not Romanian"[36]*.

As to the protests of the Romanian party against the actions of the Greek bands against the Macedo-Romanian populations, the Greek Foreign Minister, after having denied for some time the existence or the nature of their activity, tried to persuade the Romanian representative that the armed groups in question would vanish. Which did not prevent the Romanian diplomat from noting in his report to Bucharest that, *„now, that the project to assassinate so many prominent Romanian leaders has almost been carried through, and the terror has served its purpose, the bands can indeed vanish"[37]*.

The question of the Macedo-Romanians would be settled, to some extent, at the end of the second Balkan War, when by the peace Treaty of

Bucharest (more exactly by a series of pledges made by the delegations of the Balkan states and included in several letters appended to the peace treaty), the Greek State bound itself to observe the rights of the Macedo-Romanians. In fact, during the negotiations, Eleftherios Venizelos had exchanged letters with Titu Maiorescu on the future of the Macedo-Romanians. Thus, Venizelos mentioned, in his letter, that „Greece consents to offer autonomy to the Koutsovlachic schools and churches existing in the future Greek territories and to allow for the constitution of a committee for the Koutsovlachs, while the Romanian Government may sponsor under the supervision of the Greek Government the existing or future religious and national institutions"[38]. The above mentioned development was possible due to the fact that Greek diplomacy (Venizelos) wanted to assure Romania's support in various unsettled issues, of great importance for Greece, such as the future of Kavala or the status of the Aegean islands.

Despite this big step forward regarding the rights of the Macedo-Romanian population, the putting into practice of these stipulations would be long and difficult. Thus, assaults and acts of violence on a number of communities continued to occur during the First World War. Moreover, during war operations, a number of Koutsovlachic villages such as Megala Livadia, Koupa, Archangelos have been evacuated and suffered huge damages. During the first years after the end of the First World War, the stand taken by Romania regarding the issue of the Macedo-Romanians softened and Romanian authorities discouraged the Macedo-Romanian communities on the basis that many of the reports they were receiving were based on exaggeration of actual facts[39]. Another moment of tension regarding the situation of the Macedo-Romanian communities occurred once with the settlement of the refugees, after the exchange of population between Greece and Turkey[40]. Soon, the idea of migrating in Romania, as a way of solving the situation, gained support among Macedo-Romanian communities in Greece, although at the beginning, the authorities in Bucharest did not offer a positive answer to this proposal.

In the meantime, there has been a significant change on the Greek political arena, namely, Greece became republic. After the moment in which Romania had recognized this political change in Greece, and a new representative of

Romania took his office in Athens, in autumn 1924, the issue of the Macedo-Romanians was again raised, by the Romanian minister, Constantin Langa Răşcanu. During the very first meeting with the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, G. Roussos, the Romanian diplomat told Roussos that the only thing which could jeopardize the future of Romanian – Greek relations was precisely the „situation of the Aromanians in Ellada"[41]. The Romanian diplomat stressed that it was for the benefit of the Greek government „not only to protect the Romanian minority, but also to offer it all the assistance in order to improve its situation", especially since „unlike Bulgarian, Serbian or Albanian minorities, Aromanian population was the only one with no irredentist feelings"[42]. Roussos answered that he never contested the fact that „some local Greek authorities, too zealous or even overstepping their duties, have committed actions that affected the Aromanians"[43], although, in his opinion, many of the complaints were unfounded. Given the situation, Roussos committed himself to take rapid action in order to „heal the bad things and protect Romanian communities".[44] Soon, the Romanian diplomat met with „the father of Hellenic Republic", Papanastasiou, and during the meeting he brought into discussion, once again, the issue of the rights and the treatment of Macedo-Romanian population, stressing that, although they were „the most peaceful and hard worker population, the Greek clergy and school masters were agitating the Hellenic population against them"[45].

In the meantime, the idea of migrating into Romania gained more and more support, and as a result of the pressure coming from various Macedonian–Romanian Committees, the Romanian government decided to take into consideration a solution consisting in offering to all those who wished to settle in Romania lands within the area of Dobrudja. According to an article of the Romanian newspaper Lupta[46], the Romanian government had promised to give 10 acres, a building –plot, timber and bricks for building a house worth 50000 lei, a pair of oxen, a plow and seed to every family that wished to migrate to Romania, with a period of pay-off consisting of 30 years. After the moment in which the Romanian government had asked the Greek government to allow the migration of those Romanians who wished to settle into Romania.

Although the exact number of the people who left is not known, T. Capidan assessed that about 12000 Koutsovlachs have settled in regions in Dobroudja, but they were coming not only from Greece, but also from Albania and Bulgaria[47]. However, there are documents attesting the arrival and the settling of these populations in Dobroudja. Thus, professor M.Pinetta, described, in an article written in the autumn of 1926, the arrival of a group of Macedonian colonists in Dobroudja. According to professor Pinetta, the colonists were welcomed at Silistra by a warm and numerous public and by representatives of Romanian authorities, willing to offer them full support in order to diminish their suffering and help them integrate easier, on Romanian soil[48].

During the next years, the issue of the Macedo-Romanians continued to be on the agenda of the Romanian-Greek relations, although in a lesser extent than before, while the bilateral relations continued to improve along the interwar years.

NOTES:

[1] Al. Rubin, *Les roumains de Macédoine*, Bucarest, 1913, p. 98.

[2] Ibidem, p. 282.

[3] Th. Capidan, *Les Macédo-Roumains. Esquisse historique et descriptive des populations Roumaines de la péninsule Balkanique*, Bucarest, 1937, pp.66-67.

[4] Michel Lhéritier , *L'évolution des rapports gréco-roumains depuis un siécle (1821-1931)*, Paris, 1933, p. 585.

[5] *Ibidem*.

[6] See, for instance, Spyridon Sfetas, Cadrul istoric al relaţiilor greco-române 1866-1913, în Interferenţe româno-elene în secolele XV-XX, Iaşi, 2003.

[7] *Ibidem*, pp. 202-203.

[8] Constantin N. Velichi, "Les relations roumano-grecques 1879-1911", in *Revue des études sud-est européennes*, t. VII, 1969, 3, p. 535.

[9] Spyridon Sfetas, *op.cit*, p. 203.

[10] Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (from now on, AMAE), Fund 71/ 1900-1919, file 71/1905

[11] *Ibidem*, file 71/1905 M, f. 32.

[12] *Ibidem*, ff.101-106, the article Les Koetzo-Vlacques, in „Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant" of October 11, 1905.

[13] AMAE, Fund 71/1905, letter M, ff. 4-10.

[14] *Ibidem*, f. 22.

[15] AMAE, Fund 71/1900-1919, file 71/1906, letter M2, p. 30.

[16] *Ibidem*.

[17] *Ibidem*.

[18] *Ibidem*.

[19] *Ibidem*.

[20] *Ibidem*.

[21] AMAE, Fund 71/1906, M 2, pp.44-62.

[22] *Ibidem*.

[33] *Ibidem*.

[24] *Ibidem*, p. 32.

[25] *Ibidem*.

[26] Comerţul extern al României şi mişcarea porturilor în 1910, Bucharest, 1912, pp. 6-7.

[27] AMAE, Fund 71/R/100, p. 25.

[28] AMAE, Fund 71/1900-1914, R 4, Vol. 94, Report no.927 of July 21, 1911, by the General Consulate of Romania at Salonika, pp. 78-79.

[29] *Ibidem*, Report of the Romanian Consulate, Monastir, 31 January 1912, p. 110.

[30] *Ibidem*.

[31] *Ibdem*. Memoir addressed to the General Consul of Romania at Salonika, included in report no. 776/18 July 1912, pp. 119-122.

[32] AMAE, Fund 71/1900-1919, B/17 is, Report no. 44, of 8 March 1913, addressed to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers by the Royal Consulate of Romania at Janina, pages not numbered.

[33] *Ibidem*. Memoir addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on May 16, 1913, by the schoolmaster Nicu Balamotti.

[34] AMAE, Fund 71/1900-1919, Vol. 19, Report no. 645 of December 5, 1912. From the Romanian Legation in Athens, pp. 172-173.

[35] *Ibidem*.

[36] *Ibidem*, Report no. 682 of the Romanian Legation in Athens, dated 19 December 1912, pp. 200-203.

[37] *Ibidem.*

[38] E. Averoff, Ή πολιτική πλευρά του Κουτοβλαχικου Ζητήματος (*The political side of the Koutsovlachic Question*), Athens, 1989, pp. 65-66.

[39] See Vlasis Vlasidis, *Consequences of the demographic and social rearrangements to the Vlach-speaking element of Greek Macedonia*, in the „Revue des etudes sud-est europeennes, Danube-Balkans-Mer Noire, Tome XXXVI, 1998, Nos. 1-4, pp 155-171.

[40] Many reports describe the above mentioned situation, which affected communities such as Dovra, Turcohori, Kustohori, Lujiți, Cumanița, Topleani, Târcoviani and so on. See, for instance, the report issued by P. Marcu, the Head of Romanian Schools and Churches Service from Balkan Peninsula, addressed to dr.C.Anghelescu, Minister of Public Education of Romania. The report mentioned that due to the settlement of Greek refugees coming from Asia Minor, the Macedo-Romanians were dispossessed of their private properties. (See AMAE, Fund 71/Greece, Vol. 84, Note 55869/923 of June 22, 1923 addressed to the Ministry of Education- The Service of Romanian Schools and Churches from Balkan Peninsula, pp. 25-26).

[41] *Ibidem,* Report 1286, of 17 September 1924, from the Romanian Legation in Athens, signed Constantin Langa Rășcanu, p. 47.

[42] *Ibidem.*

[43] *Ibidem.*

[44] *Ibidem.* Roussos even asked the Romanian representative to forward any future complaint directly to the Office of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, so that this way, to solve rapidly any situation.

[45] *Ibidem,* Report 1523, of 26 October 1924, from the Romanian Legation in Athens, signed Langa Rășcanu, p. 55.

[46] See newspaper Lupta, issue of August 7, 1926.

[47] See T.Capidan, *op.cit.,* pp. 72-73. All those Macedo-Romanians who decided to Migrate into Romania lost their Greek citizenship and were erased from the Municipal Records of the towns and villages in which they had been registered.

[48] See Mihail Pinetta, *Coloniști aromâni în Cadrilater,* în „Tribuna românilor de peste hotare", Bucharest, II, issue 9-12, September-December 1926, p. 37.

Les ententes et les traités Roumano – Polonais concernant la garantie du *statu quo* Est – Européen entre 1919 et 1929*

Cezar Avram, Roxana Radu

L'apparition de nouveaux États, le rétablissement territorial d'autres, l'écroulement des empires d'Europe Centrale et Orientale, ainsi que l'instauration des régimes politiques totalitaires à la fin de la première conflagration mondiale ont déterminé de substantielles modifications géopolitiques, avec de durables conséquences portant sur les affaires étrangères de la Roumanie épanouie. L'adoption d'une stratégie flexible dans *la politique étrangère s'est ainsi imposée*, dans le but de maintenir les traités de paix, dans le système de Versailles, telles quelles, et de par cela, sauvegarder le *statu quo*. Les Puissances victorieuses avaient tracé des zones d'influence à travers les espaces qui, jusqu'alors, avaient orbité autour des États vaincus et avaient tenté d'imposer aux États vaincus des clauses visant à éliminer la concurrence politique et militaire. Toutefois, elles avaient été réduites à reconnaître aux États du centre et de l'Orient Européen le droit à une vie indépendante et souveraine. Parlant des premières années de l'après-guerre, Nicolae Titulescu illuminait: «le mélange de vérités anciennes vouées à la mort et de vérités nouvelles, encore pas assez claires»[1], le fait que le monde «doit s'habituer à considérer les créations politiques issues de la Grande Guerre comme des réalités en croissance continuelle, qui ne demandent plus à personne leur droit de vivre»[2]. *Dans ce contexte nouveau*, la Roumanie a formulé les principes de sa politique étrangère visant à respecter l'indépendance et la souveraineté, l'égalité, l'indivisibilité de la paix et de la coopération internationale, dans le but d'assurer le respect du *statu quo* territorial, celui des traités internationaux, voulant éliminer *comme aussi* la guerre en tant que moyen instrumental à employer dans la politique étrangère. Le grande diplomate cité ci-dessus affirmait que la politique étrangère de la Roumanie « est dominée par la parfaite concordance qui existe entre les intérêts Roumains et *les intérêts Européens ... La Roumanie est* avide de paix comme la plupart des nations qui ont été éprouvées par la guerre mondiale ... mais il n'y a pas d'ordre sans une absolue confidence faite à la pérennité de celle-ci »[3].

Dés la début, les traités de paix, et leurs résultats surtout, ont mécontenté non seulement les vaincus, mais tout aussi bien les vainqueurs. Le danger du révisionnisme, celui du communisme, du fascisme et du nazisme comme aussi, bien sûr, «les commandements de notre unité nationale»[4] ont déterminé l'intégration de la Roumanie aux «associations» internationales et régionales qui prônaient la coopération pacifique, le respect des souveraineté et dignité nationales. Le système de sécurité au centre et au Sud européen a reposé sur les ententes bilatérales avec la France, l'Italie, la Pologne, la Tchécoslovaquie et la Yougoslavie, sur des organismes régionaux tels la Petite Entente, suivie par l'Entente Balkanique, sur l'activité poursuivie dans le cadre de la Ligue des Nations.

La reconnaissance des frontières naturelles de la Roumanie et de la Pologne, en tant qu'États indépendants, par la Conférence de paix de Paris et par les pays membres de la Ligue des Nations a constitué l'instrument juridique utilisé pour s'organiser et assurer leur consolidation politique intérieure, comme pour se faire reconnaître, à l'extérieur, en tant que parties dans l'élaborations des traités de paix et des agréments qui avaient pour objectifs la mise en place des systèmes de sécurité de leur zone d'Europe.

Dans l'immédiat après-guerre, la politiques extérieure des deux pays a porté sur l'identification des méthodes les plus efficaces dans la coopération bilatérale et multilatérale avec tous les pays qui reconnaissaient la validité des traités de paix conclus en 1919-1920 et acquies-caient au rapide et permanent changement des rapports entre les forces de l'Europe et du monde.

Dans le nouveau contexte, la Pologne comme la Roumanie ont ressenti le besoin de resserrer leurs rapports réciproques, de trouver les voies adéquates pour résister aux pressions politiques, économiques et militaires existantes, les modalités de faire garantir les frontières par la communauté européenne.

Dès les préliminaires de la Conférence de paix, les discussions ont commencé pour la constitution de la Petite Entente, pour édifier *une confédération danubienne*. Au début de la troisième décennie du XXeme siècle, la Roumanie a pris l'initiative de créer une organisation des états du centre européen où participassent la Pologne et la Grèce, en pensant que la capacité de résistance des petits états ne pouvait s'accroître et que le respect des traités de paix ne pouvait être imposé que seulement de cette manière[5]. Mais la situation internationale s'est compliquée à cause de la guerre soviéto-polonaise, bien que la France ait milité pour l'organisation des états du bassin danubien et d'autres encore dans un bloc voué à former un « cordon sanitaire » autour de la Russie bolchevique.

Après le voyage de Take Ionescu dans certaines pays européens, Pologne comprise, et après qu'il eût tenté de résoudre par des pourparlers les litiges entre la Pologne et la Tchécoslovaquie, de nouvelles formules, bien prometteuses, ont été acquises pour les négociations concernant le plan d'organisation de la Petite Entente à cinq, réalisable par étapes. Une première étape aurait dû être l'alliance polono-roumaine. La 11 février 1921, Take Ionescu informait les représentants de la Roumanie dans les capitales, européennes et pas seulement, au sujet de la décision prise par les gouvernements de Varsovie et de Bucarest « de garantir les frontières de l'Est des deux États »[6] par ledit traité.

Le 3 mars 1921, à Bucarest a été signée *la Convention d'alliance défensive entre le Royaume de Roumanie et la République de Pologne*, par les ministres des Affaires Etrangères Take Ionescu et le prince Eustachy

Sapieha, conformément à la décision « du chef de l'état de la République de Pologne et de Sa Majesté le roi de Roumanie »[7]. En même temps, le général Constantin Cristescu et le général Rozwadowski, les chefs des Grands Etats Majors des deux armées, ont signé *la Convention militaire*. Les deux documents ont été ratifiés le 25 juillet 1922. Suivant les stipulations de l'article 1-er de la Convention politique, la Roumanie et la Pologne « s'obligent à s'aider réciproquement au cas où l'une d'elles serait attaquée, sans provocation de sa part, sur leurs frontières communes de l'Est », situation où l'autre partie se considérait en état de guerre et était obligée à lui porter « un concours armé ». Les sept autres articles soulignaient la nécessité de conclure une convention militaire, la durée de la convention de 5 ans « commençant depuis sa signature », l'obligation qu'aucune des parties contractantes « ne traitât ni ne conclût d'armistice ni de paix l'une sans l'autre », qu'aucune « des Hautes parties ne pourra conclure d'alliance avec une tierce puissance sans s'être préalablement concertée avec l'autre partie », la reconnaissance, par le gouvernement polonais de la validité des traités de Trianon et Neuilly comme aussi, par le gouvernement roumain, de la validité des accords de la Pologne avec la République française etc. Le traité comprenait aussi un point par où les deux parties s'engageaient à communiquer « à la Société des Nations, conformément au Traité de Versailles » le contenu entier dudit engagement. A la Convention ont été annexés les Protocoles A, B et C et une déclaration du 25 juillet 1921. L'article 4 du Protocole C stipulait que les deux gouvernements étudiassent « ensemble les moyens par où l'on pourrait arriver à une alliance défensive avec les états voisins » qui avaient signé les traités de Versailles, Trianon et Neuilly, dans le but d'une garantie réciproque « contre une quelconque agression ».

La Convention militaire, partie intégrante de la Convention politique, signée par les généraux Constantin Cristescu et Tadeusz Rozwadowski, prévoyait les moyens défensifs de garantir les frontières d'Est des deux parties, en spécifiant « l'ensemble des mesures à initier au cas où les territoires des deux états, séparément ou en même temps, aient en à supporter des agressions dans les parties orientales »[8]. Le 26 novembre 1925, un accord sera conclu entre les représentants des Grands Etats Majors des armées Roumaine, Polonaise et Yougoslave, en vue du transit des moyens de guerre entre les trois pays, de

l'amélioration de l'infrastructure dans leurs territoires nationaux etc.

La Convention, qui, dans la vision de Take Ionescu, ne constituait qu'une étape dans l'action d'organisation de la Petite Entente, est restée en vigueur jusqu'au 26 mars 1926, lorsqu'elle a été remplacée par le Traité de garantie entre les deux états.

Durant l'entière troisième décennie du XXème siècle, la Roumanie comme la Pologne ont joui de l'appui et des fermes garanties de la France. A Paris, l'ont avait discuté des projets du maréchal Pilsudski de « réorganiser l'Europe centrale et orientale » certains parmi eux ayant même suscité l'approbation. Les plans français préconisaient l'organisation de l'état polonais « comme un contrepoids à l'action allemande, une barrière entre la Russie et l'Allemagne, un rempart contre le bolchevisme »[9]. Dans la vision française « assurer le bon voisinage entre la Pologne et la Roumanie » constituait un principe fondamental d'une future Pologne indépendante et souveraine. Dans les premières années de l'après guerre, la France a agi en vue de renforcer la Grande Roumanie en tant que puissance stabilisatrice au centre et Sud-est européen. Dans le but d'accomplir ce desideratum, la France garantissait la connexion « territoriale entre la Pologne, la Tchécoslovaquie et l'état roumain ». Bien sûr, le choix de cette politique régionale par l'état français à été influencée tant par l'importance même des états cités que par la compétition économique et politique entre la Grande Bretagne et la France. Dans l'économie du choix français la démarche concernant l'établissement de la frontière polono-roumaine a aussi tenu une grande place, vu l'intérêt de constituer et de consolider le « cordon sanitaire » voué à s'opposer à la Russie soviétique et à permettre à la France une influence politique, économique et militaire.

En 1919-1920, le nouvel Etat, la République Polonaise, était regardé par la France et l'Angleterre comme une garantie de stabilité et de paix dans la région. Les milieux politiques de Varsovie comme aussi les milieux de l'exil polonais à Londres et Paris ont promu l'idée d'un système d'alliances impliquant, en premier lieu, les rapports avec les voisins, ou la Roumanie était regardée comme « une amie et alliée à toute épreuve ». Le comte Sobranski, représentant du courant national polonais, soutenait l'idée d'une Grande Pologne, limitrophe à la Grande Roumanie »[10]. En même temps, Ionel Brătianu, en contact avec le nouveau gouvernement de Varsovie, assurait que « la Roumanie est prête à développer des relations politiques et économiques des plus intimes »[11] avec la République Polonaise. L'intervention armée roumaine dans la Pocutie, en mai-août 1919, n'a pas détérioré les bons rapports existant entre les gouvernements des deux états. L'établissement des frontières entre la Roumanie et la Pologne, ayant pour base l'Accord de Lemberg de juillet 1919 et le Traité de Sèvres du 10 août 1920 ainsi que, bien sûr, la stratégie bilatérale stipulée par la Convention du 3 mars 1921 a eu lieu dans des conditions amiables, bien qu'il y ait eu des options des deux parties du sujet de rectifications locales de frontière (l'échange de territoires en vue d'assurer la liaison entre la Bucovine et le Maramures – le bout du Sud de la région Kosow etc.). Les discussions ont continué jusqu'en juillet 1926, lorsqu'on a fondé la *Commission mixte de délimitation polono-roumaine*, siégeant à Cernăuţi et Sniatyn, qui procédera à l'établissement de la frontière sur le terrain ». Simultanément avec les discussions concernant l'établissement de la frontière polono-roumaine, les deux états ont conclu des conventions postales, sanitaires, des accords sur la circulation des marchandises, sur l'interdiction des publications obscènes etc.

La coopération entre les gouvernements de la République de Pologne et du Royaume de Roumanie à été aussi visible durant les débats de la Société des Nations sur les moyens d'assurer la sécurité nationale par le désarmement et de garantir le *statu quo* d'après-guerre. Les représentants des deux pays ont soutenu le « Rapport concernant les conditions de l'arbitrage, de la sécurité et de la réduction des armements », présenté par le juriste et l'homme politique hellène, Nikolas Politis, dans la V^{-ème} session de l'Assemblée Générale de la Société des Nations, de septembre-octobre 1924. La Roumanie et la Pologne ont comté parmi les états signataires du Protocole de Genève, adopté le 2 octobre 1924, document qui précisait, en avant-première, «la connection indissoluble entre arbitrage, sécurité et désarmement »[12].

Un pacte de garanties conçu par le Foreign Office a encore rapproché les gouvernements des deux pays. La Roumanie a tenté de déterminer la Grande Bretagne à admettre l'inclusion du Pacte de la Pologne et de la Tchécoslovaquie. Le chef de la diplomatie roumaine, I. G. Duca, s'est prononcé contre le choix d'A. Chamberlain, le secrétaire d'état au Foreign Office, visant « l'entente avec l'Allemagne », en affirmant que l'exclusion de ces deux pays accroître « l'insécurité de l'Europe »[13]

en partageant le monde entre « des états aux frontières garanties et des états laissés du gré de leurs propres moyens »[14].

D'importants moments dans l'ensemble des rapports entre les deux pays ont été les débats de la Conférence de Genève, du 10 avril au 19 mai 1922, les échos de la Conférence de Locarno, du 3-16 octobre 1925, lorsque la Roumanie et la Pologne ont eu des avis similaires concernant les garanties données par l'Allemagne au sujet des frontières avec la Belgique et la France. La conclusion du Traité entre l'URSS et l'Allemagne, le 26 avril 1926 à Berlin a constitué une autre occasion de rapprochement réciproque entre les deux pays, qui ont demandé le respect des stipulations des articles 16 et 17 du Pacte de la Société des Nations. Les politiques polonais et roumains pensaient que le traité représentait un moyen de chantage employé par l'Allemagne et un secours inespéré offert à la Russie soviétique « à réclamer la révision des traités du système de Versailles », c'est-à-dire la rectification des frontières fixées dans l'après-guerre entre les pays du centre, de l'Est et du Sud-est européen.

La signature du Traité de garantie polono-roumain, le 26 mars 1926, où, à l'initiative roumaine, a été incluse la clause « *erga omnes* », a représenté une preuve indubitable des relations d'amitié entre les deux états. Par ce Traité, les deux parties s'engageaient réciproquement à respecter et maintenir leur intégrité territoriale, indépendance politique et dignité nationale contre les agresseurs extérieurs. Au cas où l'un des deux états aurait été attaqué sans provocation de sa part, la Pologne et la Roumanie s'engageaient à se prêter tout de suite réciproquement secours et appui, suivant les stipulations de l'article 16 du Pacte de la Société des Nations. Suivant l'article 3 du Traité, les deux parties contractantes s'engageaient, si elles en venaient à l'état de guerre préventive, à ne point traiter, ne point conclure d'armistice ni de paix l'une sans l'autre. Elles s'engageaient à se concerter sur toutes les questions de politique étrangère d'intérêt commun pour les deux gouvernements, à ne point conclure d'alliance avec une tierce puissance sans consultations réciproques, à coordonner leurs efforts pacifiques etc.[15]. Conformément à cet accord, un « Arrangement technique » a été aussi signé entre les Etats Majors des armées des deux pays, où la Convention militaire a été élargie « erga omnes ». L'article 1-er du Traité montrait que l'obligation d'entraide « subsiste même au cas où l'une ou les deux Parties Contractantes se trouveraient en guerre avec une

autre puissance, au moment où l'une d'elles serait attaquée par un ou plusieurs voisins orientaux »[16]. Par rapport à la Convention de mars 1921, l'ajout est remarquable lorsque l'on y spécifie: « L'intervention de l'une des deux Parties Contractantes à la faveur de l'autre sera faite dans les même conditions, quelle que soit la qualité et la situation politique internationale des adversaires »[17]. Ce paragraphe élargit l'alliance contre tout agresseur, la Roumanie et la Pologne entendant à assurer leur indépendance et intégrité territoriale contre les tendances révisionnistes qui, dès cette étape, commencent à se manifester puissamment en Europe. L'engagement des deux parties consistait aussi dans le fait que l'état non attaqué s'obligeait, en dehors des stipulations prévues par le Traité de garantie, à donner cours a l'Accord relatif au transit des matériaux de guerre, conclu en novembre 1925. Les documents paraphés en novembre 1925 et mars 1926 stipulaient aussi des mesures à prendre au cas d'incidents ou de conflits aux frontières orientales. En l'occurrence, les gouvernements alliés « chargeaient les organismes militaires à initier les contre-mesures requises pour éviter le handicap de l'initiative stratégique ennemie et à développer les moyens de la défense nationale, à mettre du point la coopération des industries de la défense »[18]. L'on stipulait aussi l'obligation « de protection des frontières » pour que l'on puisse passer à la concentration des forces militaires en vue de rejeter les agresseurs. Il y avait aussi des stipulations sur les échanges d'armement, le développement de l'industrie de la défense, le développement des services de transmissions, l'amélioration de l'infrastructure etc.

Le traité, conclu pour une période de 5 ans, allait être renouvelé le 15 janvier 1931, moment où l'on a ajouté la clause du renouveau automatique, pour un terme de 5 ans, si l'une des parties ne le dénonçait pas avec une année d'avance. En 1936, le gouvernement roumain proposera au gouvernement polonais l'extension de la clause « orga omnes » contre une attaque éventuelle de l'Hongrie horthyste. Mais le ministre des affaires étrangères polonais, Joseph Beck, rejettera la proposition en raison du fait que la Pologne n'avait pas ratifié le Traité de Trianon. En 1938 et 1939, le gouvernement roumain a encore fait des propositions similaires, mais le gouvernement polonais s'y est opposé espérant à une conciliation avec l'Allemagne et la Hongrie.

Dès la seconde moitié de la troisième décennie du siècle dernier, les états petits et moyens pris

entre l'Allemagne et l'U.R.S.S. on commencé à ressentir leur vulnérabilité, accentuant leurs sentiments d'incertitude et d'insécurité, bien que la France ait initié plusieurs actions diplomatiques dans le sens d'assurer la paix et la sécurité dans cette partie du continent. Un premier pas dans cette direction a été fait par l'adoption, en septembre 1927, par la Société des Nations, de la résolution condamnant la guerre d'agression, soutenu par l'entrée de l'Allemagne dans cette organisation, l'année antérieure, en septembre 1926. Une fois avancée, par Aristide Briand, l'idée de conclure un pacte d'amitié perpétuelle entre la France et les U.S.A., à l'occasion du dixième anniversaire de l'entrée des U.S.A. en guerre, l'étape de la coopération pacifique s'est ouverte, permettant de trouver des modalités de contrecarrer le danger de la guerre et d'entraver le courant révisionniste. Les diplomaties de Bucarest et de Varsovie ont montré de l'intérêt pour la proposition du gouvernement de Washington au sujet d'un pacte multilatéral de renonciation à la guerre. I. G. Duca, Nicolae Titulescu et d'autres politiques roumains ont soutenu le projet, bientôt connu sous le nom de Briand-Kellog. Le 26 août 1928, le Pacte Briand-Kellog à été signé à Paris par une série d'états, parmi lesquels la Pologne. Ainsi, les états signataires s'engageaient à résoudre tout conflit, de quelque nature il soit, par des moyens pacifiques. En 1929, plus de 60 états allaient adhérer à ce pacte. La Roumanie a répondu affirmativement à l'invitation d'y adhérer, mais a exprimé une séries de réserves, générées par le désir de ne pas porter atteinte à ses alliances. Le 4 septembre 1928, Roumanie déposera, par son chargé d'affaires *ad intérim* à Washington, Mihail R. Sturdza, au Département d'Etats des U.S.A., l'acte d'adhésion de la Roumanie, le traité étant ratifié par le Parlement roumaine le 26 janvier 1929[19].

La Pologne, comme la Roumanie, étaient convaincues que le Pacte Briand-Kellog correspondait pleinement à leurs propres intérêts, car il « concordait totalement avec le Pacte de la Société des Nations et avec les obligations comprises dans les autres conventions de sûreté conclues jusqu'alors »[20]. Pour la Roumanie et la Pologne, la chance était apparue d'améliorer leurs rapports avec l'Union Soviétique, un autre « isolé » par le monde démocratique, qui avait déjà affirmé ses tendances révisionnistes. Les négociations soviéto-roumaines de mars-avril 1924 n'avaient pas fini positivement. La Russie soviétique a d'abord condamné le Pacte Briand-Kellog pour qu'ensuite le commissaire aux

problèmes extérieurs, Maxim Litvinov, soumît aux gouvernements voisins, le 29 décembre 1928, un protocole indépendant, valable pour l'Europe orientale. La Roumanie, liée à la Pologne par le Traité de 1926, a proposé que le protocole soit négocié et signé en commun par tous les pays voisins à l'Union Soviétique. Le gouvernement de Varsovie s'est déclaré totalement d'accord avec la proposition roumaine.

Le protocole de Moscou a été signé le 9 février 1929 dans la capitale de l'U.R.S.S., consacrant ainsi le désir de plusieurs états de renoncer à la guerre et de tenir conseil, pour chaque problème « litigieux ». Ainsi, les gouvernements de Varsovie et de Bucarest ont considéré que le Pacte Briand-Kellog, comme le Protocole de Moscou, étaient des pas importants dans l'établissement de la paix entre les peuples civilisés, dans l'exclusion de la guerre dans la résolution des différends, dans l'établissement d'un climat de bon voisinage avec l'Union Soviétique et, pourquoi pas, avec l'Allemagne et l'Hongrie. Mais ni le Pacte Briand-Kellog, ni le Protocole de Moscou n'ont point été accompagné par des garanties, ce qui a fait qu'ils ne puissent pas constituer d'impéditions à même d'entraver l'agression déchaînée par les états révisionnistes.

Le 24 octobre 1929, dans le sens du rapprochement des deux états, la Roumanie et la Pologne, à été conclu à Bucarest *le Traité de conciliation et d'arbitrage entre la Pologne et la Roumanie*, fondé sur l'article 6 du Traité de garantie polono-roumain. Le nouvel engagement stipulait que les parties signataires acceptassent de se soumettre à la procédure de conciliation ou d'arbitrage dans la discussion «de toute question qui ne pourrait pas être résolue par les procédés diplomatiques »[21]. Les parties s'engageaient à constituer une Commission Permanente de Conciliation, composée de trois membres chargés de trancher sur les questions litigieuses et d'agir en vue de la réconciliation des parties. Le tribunal arbitral était constitué par l'accord des parties lorsqu'un différend était soumis à l'arbitrage, la sentence étant obligatoire et exécutée « de bonne volonté par les parties ». Ce qui est important à mentionner est que les parties s'engageaient à s'abstenir de tout action qui aurait pu avoir des répercussions sur l'acceptation des propositions de la Commission Permanente de Conciliation où sur l'exécution de la sentence arbitrale[22].

Le 9 novembre 1929 à Prague a eu lieu la signature de la convention qui devait faciliter la liberté du transit ferroviaire entre la Bucovine et le Maramures, par le territoire polonais et

tchécoslovaque. Le document a été signé par Francisc Moskwa – Pologne, Cezar Mereuță – Roumanie et Jaroslav Uřednicek – Tchécoslovaquie. Suivant ce document, structuré en 30 articles, la Pologne comme la Tchécoslovaquie accordaient des facilités pour le transit spécial de voyageurs, bagages, messagerie, marchandises et poste dans les secteurs jalonnés par les gares de Grigore Ghica Vodă – Roumanie et Sniatyn, Załucze, Woronienka – Pologne, Jasina – Tchécoslovaquie et Valea Vișeului – Roumanie. Aux voyageurs des traînes roumains était accordée l'exemption des formalités douanières, mais il leur était interdit de monter ou de descendre se trouvant sur le territoires polonais ou tchécoslovaques. En 1929-1930 les discussions ont continué au sujet de la délimitation des frontières polono-roumaines. L'alliance stratégique des deux états a tenu un grand poids dans la prise des décisions, bien que les pourparlers aient été tergiversés jusqu'à la durée de 9 ans. La divergence d'interprétation sur le secteur de frontière au long du Tchérémisse, de Visnitza-Kuty jusqu'au Prut (les revendications des propriétaires polonais au village de Serafince) a été dépassée et, en mai 1935, à Bucarest, l'on a signé les documents qui parachevaient l'action de délimitation des frontières entre les deux états. Le protocole final de délimitation de la frontière a été signé par Alexandru Iacovaky, le chef de la Délégation Roumaine dans la Commission mixte de délimitation et par Miroslaw Arciszewski, ministre polonais à Bucarest[23]. Le texte avait 9 articles qui partageaient la frontière commune en 5 secteurs principaux, la ligne de la frontière ayant 346.603 km de longueur[24].

On a porté d'importantes discussions du sujet de l'adoption d'un projet concernant la facilitation du trafic local à la frontière. Ainsi, ce projet a été avancé par la partie polonaise le 7 mars 1929, autorisant les citoyens des deux états à obtenir de laissez-passer locaux pour leur libre circulation dans une zone de 10 km autour de la frontière. Le 7 décembre 1929, à Varsovie a été signé *la Convention bilatérale au sujet de la facilitation du trafic local de frontière*. Le document contenait 33 articles et statuait qui pouvait jouir des permis de passage de la frontière, délimitait les propriétés, nommait les propriétaires des exploitations agricoles situées dans la zone de frontière et facilitait la libre circulation des ouvriers, des artisans, des membres du clergé, des vétérinaires etc. de la zone de frontière.

Les conseils agraires de Varsovie, en août 1930, comme aussi l'activité de la Société des Nations en 1929-1930 et la Conférence de Hague de l'été 1930, qui adoptera le plan Young, ont rapproché la Pologne de la Petite Entente, en général, et de la Roumanie, en particulier. La Pologne et la Roumanie ont discuté au niveau d'experts dans leur essai d'adopter des mesures pour remédier aux effets négatifs de la crise mondiale de surproduction. Les décisions des deux états ont été déposées à la Société des Nations pour aider à l'adoption d'un plan de mesures à même de redresser l'économie des états affectés par la crise.

Durant la décennie nommée « la belle époque », les rapports des deux pays ont été dominés par les intérêts économiques et politiques. Soit la partie roumaine, soit la partie polonaise ont proposé maintes solutions au sujet des liaisons commerciales entre les deux pays. L'on a même avancé des projets de construction d'un canal entre les Mers Baltique et Noire, avec la facilitation des transports ferroviaires et la pénétration des intérêts commerciaux polonais dans les Balkans.

Les activités de la communauté polonaise en Roumanie, les contacts entre les autorités de Cernăuți et de Lwów, entre société, écoles, associés et personnalités etc. se sont avérés importants.

Par leur politique de l'époque, autant la Roumanie que la Pologne ont participé à l'effort de la communauté internationale visant à préserver les indépendances nationales et les intégrités territoriales, pour remédier au danger de l'éclatement d'une nouvelle guerre, pour défendre la paix générale. C'est pour la réalisation de ces desiderata que les deux états ont conçu, ultérieurement, dans la IVème décennie du XXème siècle, tout leur système d'alliances. Nicolae Titulescu imaginait l'entier continent européen couvert de pactes régionaux « reliés les uns aux autres et constituant les barbelés de la paix »[25]. Dans le contexte des dix premières années d'après la Grande Guerre, la Roumanie a tenu un grand rôle dans la Petite Entente, par ses rapports amicaux avec les deux partenaires, comme aussi avec les états voisins possiblement intégrables à ce système, comme la Pologne, la Grèce, la Turquie et l'Albanie.

La crise économique de 1929-1933 a aiguisé les rivalités entre les grandes puissances, mais aussi celle entre les pays révisionnistes et ceux qui militaient pour la sauvegarde du *statu quo* européen. Tout le système géopolitique bâti sur

les traités de paix du système Versailles et sur les contacts directs entre les gouvernements concernés allait sombrer, suite à une évolution négative du climat de paix et d'entente. La complémentarité des objectifs et des stratégies de l'Allemagne et de l'U.R.S.S. allait causer l'application des stipulations du protocole secret du Pacte Ribbentrop-Molotov, qui mettra une fin brutale à l'existence de la réalité politique et géographique établie à la fin de la Première grande conflagration mondiale. Durant l'entre-deux-guerres, la Roumanie et la Pologne ont milité pour la création d'un système de traités et d'accords destinés à offrir les garanties requises par une évolution pacifique en Europe. Malheureusement, ce projet d'organiser la sécurité collective a échoué, l'humanité se voyant confrontée à une nouvelle guerre, beaucoup plus dévastatrice et nuisible que celle de 1914-1918.

Les pays à régimes dictatoriaux de souche fascisme, avec des aspirations et des programmes révisionnistes, se rapprochant et se regroupant, ont dû rencontrer l'opposition des états à régimes démocratiques, membres actifs et supporters de la Société des Nations, intéressés au maintien de la paix et à la sauvegarde du *statu quo* territorial et politique. La Roumanie et la Pologne ont tenu de grands rôles parmi ces états désireux de paix et de prospérité, leur politique étrangère étant dominée par « une parfaite concordance entre leurs intérêts nationaux et les intérêts européens »[26]

NOTES :

[1] Archives Nationales, Bucarest, fonds Maison Royale, D. 3, sans auteur, f. 14.

[2] *Ibidem.*

[3] Nicolae Titulescu, *Discursuri (Discourses)*, Editura Științifică, Bucarest, 1967, p. 295.

[4] *Ibidem*, p. 407.

[5] Mémorandum du 19 août 1920, Bucarest (sans signature).

[6] Eliza Campus, *Mica Înțelegere (La Petite Entente)*, Editura Științifică, Bucarest, 1968, p. 44 (télégramme 2910 du 26 septembre 1920, depuis la légation de Rome, signée Take Ionescu).

[7] *Monitorul Oficial*, nr. 89 du 26 juillet 1921; Petre Bărbulescu, Ionel Cloșcă, *Repere de cronologie internațională. 1914-1945 (Détails de chronologie internationale. 1914-1945)*, Editura Științifică, Bucarest, 1982, p. 200-201.

[8] *Istoria Românilor (Histoire des Roumains)*, vol. VIII, Editura Enciclopedică, Bucarest, 2003, p. 434.

[9] Séance du Quai d'Orsay du 29 janvier 1919 (Apud, Florin Anghel, *Despre o problemă aproape necunoscută: frontiera româno-polonă în perioada interbelică, 1919-1939(Une question quasivement inconnue*, dans "Revista Istorică", nouvelle série, tome VIII/1997, no. 3-4/mars-avril, Editura Academiei Române, Bucarest, p. 255).

[10] A.N.B., fonds Ministère des Affaires Etrangères; dossier 63/1919, p. 72 (Télégramme de Ion I. Brătianu à M. Phereckyde, du 26 avril 1919).

[11] *Ibidem.*

[12] Mihai Iacobescu, *România și Societatea Națiunilor. 1919-1929 (La Roumanie et la Société des Nations. 1919-1929)*, Bucarest, 1988, p. 162.

[13] *Istoria Românilor (Histoire des Roumains)*, tome VIII, ..., p. 447.

[14] *Ibidem.*

[15] Petre Bărbulescu, Ionel Cloșcă, *oeuvre citée*, p. 204.

[16] *Istoria Românilor (Histoire des Roumains)*, tome VIII, ..., p. 435.

[17] *Ibidem.*

[18] Nicolae Dascălu, *Relațiile româno-polone în perioada interbelică (Relations roumaino-polonaises dans l'entre-deux-guerres)*, Bucarest, 1991, p. 44.

[19] *Istoria Românilor (Histoire des Roumains)*, tome VIII, ..., p. 461.

[20] *Ibidem.*

[21] Brătianu G., *La politique extérieure de la Roumanie*, Bucarest, 1937, p. 36.

[22] Matei Gheorghe, *Reflecții asupra problemelor securității internaționale în perioada interbelică (Reflections sur les questions de la securité internationale dans l'entre-deux-guerres)*, dans „Anale de istorie", no. 3/1973, p. 81.

[23] Florin Anghel, *article cité* dans « œuvre citée», p. 267.

[24] *Ibidem.*

[25] Nicolae Titulescu, *Documente diplomatice (Documents diplomatiques)*, Editura Științifică, Bucarest, 1967, p. 187.

[26] Nicolae Titulescu, *Discursuri (Discourses)*, Editura Științifică, Bucarest, 1982, p. 125.

Les relations politiques roumano-polonaises reflétées dans l'historiographie roumaine après décembre 1989

Veniamin Ciobanu

Commencées dès le début de la seconde moitié du 14è siècle les relations roumano-polonaises se sont développées, ainsi que l'on connaît déjà, sur les coordonnées par les intérêts spécifiques a chacun des deux peuples, en même temps que par ceux imprimes par l'évolution des relations internationales, en général, par ceux de l'Europe Centrale et d'Est, en particulier. Comme conséquence les périodes de conflit ont alternées avec ceux de collaboration dans tous les domaines possibles. Cette dernière caractéristique des relations en discussion a connue une grande ampleur spécialement après la fin de la première conflagration mondiale.

Donc, étant donnée leur importance dans l'histoire du peuple roumain, la recherche de l'évolution de ses relations avec les Polonais a constitué l'une des préoccupations constantes de l'historiographie roumaine qui a essayé de les déceler et d'en expliquer les ressorts, bien sur en fonction de nombreux facteurs objectifs mais aussi subjectifs.

En reprenant cette fructueuses tradition, l'historiographie roumaine après décembre 1989 a produit une riche littérature de spécialité dont la valeur est donnée par son ampleur sans précédent, par l'horizon de recherche conséquence de l'ouverture offerte dans ce domaine aussi par la chute du système communiste dans l'Europe Orientale. L'ouverture en discussion est concrétisé par l'accès illimité, dans la plupart des cas aux plus diverses sources d'information entre lesquels une grande importance ont grande importance ont les fonds d'archives. C'est ainsi qu'on s'explique, donc la mise dans le circuit scientifique des recueilles de documents, de monographies, des études etc., dont les auteurs appartiennent en grand partie a la jeune génération d'historiens qui n'ont plus les complexes imposés a leurs prédécesseurs par l'idéologie marxiste – léniniste.

La richesse de la production de l'historiographie de la période après décembre 1989 rend extrêmement difficile son analyse, dans les pages d'une intervention de ce genre. Comme conséquence, le vais me limiter seulement a passer en revue quelques « pièces » qui la composent et auxquelles j'en ai eu accès.

J'en commencerai par signaler un recueil de documents intitulé *Romania-Polonia. Relații diplomatice, I, 1918-1939, (La Roumanie et la Pologne. Relations diplomatiques I, 1918-1939)* paru en 2003, sous l'égide du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de la Roumanie, la Direction des Archives Diplomatiques[1]. Dans *l'Introduction,* qui préface les 126 documents du volume, le premier étant daté à Berne, 26 septembre/9 octobre 1918, et le dernier à Varsovie, le 1 septembre 1939, ses auteurs, Florin Anghel et Dumitru Preda ont esquissée le cadre dans lequel se sont développées les relations roumano-polonaises dans la période chronologique couverte par les documents sélectés et inclus dans les pages du volume. L'une des premières constatations des auteurs qui retient l'attention est «qu'étant strictement déterminée, à leur début, par quelques objectifs majeurs et pragmatiques (la défense devant l'Armée Rouge soviétique, une politique défensive dans l'Est de l'Europe, la reconnaissance réciproque de l'intégrité territoriale)», les relations roumano-polonaises ont évolué « constamment au sens positif, à partir de 1919 dans tous les domaines : politique, militaire, culturel, spirituel et des relations humaines »,en dépit des certaines différences d'optique et des oscillations des « facteurs de décision de Varsovie et de Bucarest »[2].

La reconnaissance internationale des Etats, à partir de 1921 a donné une grande impulse au développement et diversification des rapports bilatérales y compris dans le domaine des

rapports interhumaines, de moment qu'il ont favorisé la connaissance réciproque et la perception correcte des « options » et des « évolutions » de chacun des deux peuples. Les éditeurs du volume on passé en revue ensuite les principaux moments qui ont marqué l'évolution des rapports roumano-polonais, illustrés par des documents inclus dans le volume. Or, ils mettent en évidence le fait qu'en dépit de toutes les différences dans le domaine des traditions, de l'évolution culturelle, « *l'alliance roumano-polonaise* (fondée en 1921 – n.n.) *a représentée dans la période d'entre les deux guerres un résultat immédiat (mais extrêmement durable) de la philosophie politique versaillaise, un pas important... dans la direction de la normalisation et pacification des relations entre les Etats de la région* » (s. n.)[3]. Voilà, donc, seulement quelques indices qui suggèrent la valeur scientifique de ce volume, dont la consultation est facilité, à part *l'étude introductif,* par une *liste des documents, un index de noms* et une série de 22 photographies et facsimilés comprenant des textes explicatifs.

Comme j'ai déjà mentionné, l'historiographie roumaine des relations roumano-polonaises de la période après décembre 1989 a mis à la disposition des chercheurs scientifiques aussi quelques monographies. Lune d'elle est signée par le déjà connu historien des relations roumano-polonaises de la période d'entre les deux guerre, Nicolae Dascălu, qui en a consacré la monographie intitulée *Relaţii româno-polone în perioada interbelică (1919-1939)*[4]. Du point de vue méthodologique l'auteur a abordé les relations roumano/polonaises de la perspective politiques, économique et culturelle. *Les relations politiques (Relaţiile politice)* font l'objet du premier chapitre, en donnant aussi le nom du chapitre (p. 13-92), les relations économiques ont étaient analysées dans les deuxième chapitre, nommé *Liaisons économiques (Relaţiile economice)* (p. 93-170) et les relations culturelles dans le troisième chapitre intitulé *Interférences culturelles (Interferenţe culturale)* (p. 171-226).

En ce qui concerne l'analyse de la composante politique des relations roumano-polonaises, l'auteur a commencé à partir du moment du rétablissement des relations diplomatique roumano-polonaises en 1919, en s'occupant ensuite des *agences diplomatiques* et de l'évolution de la coopération politique et

militaire. L'une des conclusions formulées par l'historien, que j'ai retenu, est qu'au/delà des nombreuses aspérités, la collaboration politique roumano-polonaises « a enregistré quand/même un cours ascendant. Celui-ci a été déterminé par l'absence des litiges territoriales aussi que par l'identification de certains intérêts partiels communs »[5]. Tout de même, « *on n'est pas arrivé, au-delà des déclarations officielles formelles, à l'intimité qui a caractérisé, par exemple, les rapports polono-hongrois* » (s.n.)[6].

D'ailleurs, Nicolae Dascalu constatait que « *les mêmes intérêts limité et la même collaboration partielle on va les rencontrer dans la sphère économique mais provenant d'autres causes* » (s. n.)[7]. C'est une conclusion à laquelle l'auteur est arrivé après la recherche des liaisons économiques entre la Pologne et la Roumanie, à partir du *potentiel économique* des deux Etats, en continuant avec le *fondement des liaisons économiques,* consacrée par les *conventions économiques, par la dynamique des échanges commerciales, par les efforts pour l'amélioration des voies de communication entre les deux pays,* pour qu'à la fin il s'occupe *d'autres domaines de la coopération économique.*

Pour conclure, le domaine des relations culturelles roumano-polonaises a été illustré dans la période d'entre les deux guerres par *la propagande culturelle, par les associations culturelles roumano-polonaises.* Etant donnée l'intensité des relations culturelles, la création d'un *cadre juridique* qui réglemente *la coopération intellectuelle* entre la Roumanie et la Pologne, configuré par la Convention de 1936 s'est imposé. On n'a pas négligé les autres domaines des interférences culturelles roumano-polonaises enregistrées dans la période chronologique prise en discussion.

Après avoir parcouru cette monographie, on ne peut que s'approprier, sans resserves, les opinions de l'auteur concernant la valeur scientifique de sa contribution, car « *par la base documentaire et structure, par la conception scientifique qu'elle a la base, le présent volume peut offrir une image globale vaste et suggestive de l'évolution des rapports roumaines-polones dans la période d'entre les deux guerres mondiales au niveau des domaines fondamentales de l'existence humaine* » (s. n.)[8].

Une autre manière d'aborder les relations politiques roumano-polonaises de la période d'entre les deux guerres mondiales a été entrepris

par un autre chercheur avisé du domaine, le mentionné, déjà Florin Anghel, dans les pages d'une monographie intitulée *Construirea sistemului „Cordon sanitaire". Relații româno-pòlone, 1919-1926*[9] *(la Constitution du système „Cordon sanitaire" Relations rumano-polonaises 1919-1926)*. En ce qui concerne le titre de la monographie, l'auteur l'expliquer par le fait que *« l'alliance fondée sur la Convention politique et militaire de 3 mars 1921, ayant des évidentes prémisses stratégiques évidentes dans la période de la fin de la première guerre mondiale, a réalisé la plus importante axe géopolitique de l'espace compris entre l'Allemagne et la Russie Soviétique/URSS. La liaison territoriale roumano-polonaise et la collaboration entre les deux Etats ont configuré ce que la science de la géographie politique française a nommé « le cordon militaire », le front défensif devant les Soviets pour la défense des valeurs historiques, politiques, culturelles et civiques de l'Europe'* (s. n.)[10]. Par conséquent, *"les relations roumano-polonaise développées pendant les décennies 3 et 4 du 20è siècle concernent un entier espace régional et elles ont mit en évidence la balance de forces de l'Europe Centrale et Orientale »* (s. n.)[11]. Un sujet extrêmement intéressant que l'historien Florin Anghel a traité comme par conséquence au long des huit chapitres précédés par *Avant propos* et *Introduction*.

Le premier chapitre s'intitule *Considerații istorice privind relațiile româno-polone (Considerations historiques concernant les relations roumano-polonaises)* (p.13-38) ; le deuxième, *Rațiune și pragmatism: interese regionale comune și închegarea alianței, 1919-1921 (Raison et pragmatisme: des intérêts communes et la constitution de l'alliance)* (p. 39-83); le troisième, *Problema Pocuției și administrarea militară românească în provincie (mai-august-1919) (Le problème de la Procutie et l'administration militaire roumaine dans la province, mai-août 1919)* (p. 84-104), le quatrième, *Alianța militară: strategii și realizări (L'Alliance militaire: stratégies et résultats)* (p. 105-138) ; le cinquième, *Proiecte de drumuri comerciale polone spre Balcani și Marea Neagră, 1919-1926 (Projects concernant la construction des voies commerciales vers Balcans et la Mair Noire, 1919-1926)* (p. 130-158) ; la sixième, *De la încheierea Convențiilor de alianță (1921) la Locarno (A partir de la*

conclusion des Conventions d'alliance(1921) à Locarno (p. 150-190) ; le septième, *Un divorț politic unilateral: Polonia și Mica Înțelegere (Un divorce politique unilatéral : la Pologne et la Petite Entente)* (p. 191-226), et finalement, le huitième *Împreună pentru viitorul alianței: noul tratat româno-polon (1926) (Ensemble pour l'avenir de l'alliance: le vouveau traité roumano-polonais)* (p. 227-268). *Concluziile (Les Conclusions)* (p. 270-273) et Bibliografia generala (la Bibliographie générale) (p. 274-295) finissent ce ample et intéressant parcours historiographique qui apporte une nuance d'inédit dans le paysage de l'historiographie roumaine de la question, sous aspect méthodologique en même temps que sous l'aspect de l'intérpretation du vaste et extrêmement divers fond documentaire qui a été a la base de l'élaboration de cette monographie. Une base documentaire qui étant valorisée avec une évidente compétence scientifique a permis à l'auteur de tirer les conclusions qui mettent en évidence, une fois de plus, la nécessité de tels abordations pour connaître un segment si important dans l'histoire des relations roumano-polonaises dans la période d'entre les deux guerres mondiales qui constitue en même temps un segment de l'évolution de l'histoire des relations internationales de l'Europe Centrale et d'Est de la période déjà mentionnée, car d'un part elles ont été influences et, d'autre part, elle ont influencé 'évolution mentionnée dans le paramètres pris en considération par l'historien Florin Anghel.

La recherche de l'histoire des relations entre Roumanie et le Pologne pendant la période d'entre les deux guerre mondiales a constitué le sujet des autres monographies, deux d'entre eux étant signées par Daniel Hrenciuc. La première est intitulée *România și Polonia – 1916-1931. Relațiile politice, diplomatice și militare (La Roumanie et la Pologne. Relations politiques, diplomatiques et militaires)*[12] et met en évidence la complexité des rapports roumano-polonaises de la période chronologique prise en discussion, complexité imprimée aussi par le fait que « étant située dans une zone géopolitique marquée de manière déterminante par le péril bolchevique « la Roumanie et la Pologne ont du collaborer étroitement « pour la défense de leur indépendance et intégrité territoriale »[13]. Les formes sous lesquelles s'est concrétisée cette collaboration ont été suivies par l'auteur en cinq chapitres, qui à leur tour ont été divisés en

paragraphes correspondant au spécifique de la thématique de chacun d'entre eux. L'une de cette forme a été la Convention d'alliance défensive, signée en 1921, qui a eu comme motivation immédiate « la position de l'Union Soviétique concernant la question de la Bessarabie, aussi que « ses prétentions sur la Galice, territoire polonais »[14]. Or, l'importance de cet acte, telle qu'elle a été recepée par l'auteur, a une *connotation symbolique*, du moment qu'il était pour la première fois quand les deux Etats garantirent réciproquement leurs frontières. L'analyse des relations roumano-polonaises de cette période a conduit à la conclusion qu'elles ont connue un cours sinueux, marqué par des « moments de collaboration étroite, mais aussi de passivité ». Ainsi, par exemple, « si la période des années 1918-1921 peut être caractérisée comme une étape dans laquelle les relations roumano-polonaises ont été extrêmement étroites, après 1923, quand la Pologne a réalise une détente dans ses relations avec les soviétiques, l'intensité des rapports a été plus basse »[15]. La prise du pouvoir par Jozef Pilsudski a signifié aussi une impulsion données aux relations roumano-polonaises », concrétisée par la traité de garanties signé en 1926. Et si au début des années '30 on a enregistré un certain éloignement de la Pologne vis-à-vis la Roumanie, fait qui coïncide, d'après l'opinion de l'auteur, « avec le refroidissement des rapports polono-françaises », quand même l'alliance d'entre elle a été renouvelée en 1931. Puisque « l'alliance réciproque roumano-polonaises restait très importante dans le système défensif oriental, dans l'opinion des leaders de Bucarest ou de Varsovie, dans les conditions que Pologne considérait l'Union Soviétique son ennemi principal »[16]. Finalement, il faut aussi mentionner le fait que *l'apport documentaire* de la monographie à la recherche de l'histoire des relations roumano-polonaises dans la période chronologique abordée dans ses pages est mise en évidence aussi par le 11 annexes qui accompagne le texte (p. 193-213).

Mais Daniel Hrenciuc a continué , les recherches dans le domaines des relations roumano-polonaises aussi pour la période 1932-1939, mais seulement pour la composante politique et diplomatique, qu'il a mis dans le circuit scientifique dans les pages de la monographie entitulée *România și Polonia - 1932-1939. Relații politice și diplomatice (La Roumanie et la Pologne 1932-1939. Relations*

politiques et diplomatiques)[17] qui contient 11 chapitres. Avec cette occasion, l'auteur a accordé la bien méritée attention au cadre politique international dans lequel se sont développée les relations roumano-polonaises. Sa conclusion est qu'elles ont évolué « *dans le contexte de la dérive de l'Europe Versaillaise,, visible dans la seconde moitié des années '30, quand a eu lieu, sur le plan européan, l'ascension des forces nationalistes détermination à résoudre les objectifs territoriales par le déclenchement d'un conflit mondial »* (s. n.)[18]. Dans ce contexte, « les intérêts roumano-polonaises ont coincidés en plusieurs cas, mais la période analysée a relevé aussi assez de moments de mécontentement on de tension »[19] Et entre les causes qui ont déterminé ces malentendus et tensions se trouve aussi le fait que « *essayant de dépasser sa propre condition, sous l'attraction d'un passé romantique, la Pologne a taché, déçue par la vulnérabilité du système de la sécurité collective, d'aborder un registre de grand pouvoir, posture qui lui sera fatale finalement »* (s. n.)[20].

L'ampleur des recherches roumaines dans le domaine le l'histoire des relations roumano-polonaises de la période d'entre les deux guerres mondiales est illustré surtout par des nombreuses études, de divers ampleurs, mises dans le circuit scientifique après 1989. A cause de cette raison, je ne me suis proposé même de faire inventaire, mais seulement mettre en évidence quelques/unes d'entre eux, suffisantes, à mon avis, pour illustrer le degré de préoccupation de l'historiographie roumaine dans le domaine. Le fait s'explique, à part les motivations déjà mentionnées au début de ces pages, en égale mesuré, par la connaissance de la langue polonaise donc l'appropriation d'un instrument de travail extrêmement important pour la valorisation de la littérature de spécialité polonaise et tout de même des sources d'archives d'origine polonaise. L'un de ceux qui ont bénéficié et bénéficié encore de cet avantage est le même Florin Anghel, présenté déjà les lignes antérieurs. Voilà quelques/unes de ses contributions de cette catégorie que je mentionne dans l'ordre chronologique de leur apparition dans l/intention de suggérer l'évolution du spectre de ses préoccupations dans ce domaine.

Le début des relations roumano-polonaises a été supris par l'historien Florin Anghel dans les pages une étude nommée. *O dilemă teritorială și un debut diplomatic. Ocuparea Pocuției de către*

armata română (24 mai-începutul lunii august 1919) şi debutul relaţiilor româno-polone (Une dilléme territoriale et un début diplomatique. L'occupation de la Pocutie par l'armée roumaine (24 mai/le commencement d'août des relations roumaino-polonaises)[21]. La nécessité d'établir une frontière commune avec la Roumanie est devenue une préoccupation majeure des cercles dominantes polonais, « *dès les premiers mois de l'existence du nouveau Etat* »[22] polonais. Car elles *sont devenues propres objectifs politiques et stratégiques* »[23]. Par conséquence, « *la collaboration roumano-polonaise se présentait comme un élément indispensable du front unifié de lutte contre l'influence du bolchevisme en Europe* » (s. n.)[24]. L'importance de la délimitation d'une frontière commune roumano-polonaise était appréciée de la même manière à Bucarest, de moment que, en cas contraire, il était possible de se créer « un corridor bolchevique entre la Pologne et la Roumanie en Galice », par lequel se faisait « la liaison entre la Russie Soviétique et l'Hongrie de Bela Kun »[25]. Or, constatait l'auteur – observation extrêmement importante de la perspective de l'encadrement des rapports roumano-polonaise dans le contexte international – dans une telle éventualité, très probable, d'ailleurs, dans les conditions du ce temps-là il auraient été menacé non seulement la sécurité de la Roumanie et de la Pologne, mais aussi même « *l'équilibre fragile instauré dans le premiers mois de paix en Europe* » (s. n.)[26]. Dans ce contexte – l'initiative du maréchal Pilsudski et ayant l'approbation du gouvernement roumain, la 8e Division de l'Armée Roumaine, commandé par le général Iacob Zadic est entrée en Pocutie[27].

Dans les pages suivantes de l'étude ont été analysées les implications de cette occupation sur les rapports roumano-polonaise. L'une de celles-ci résidait dans le fait que *pendant la collaboration militaire en Galice et peut-être en fonction d'elle, entre Varsovie et Bucarest se sont établis des rapports diplomatiques au niveau de légation, en juin - juillet 1919* (s. n.)[28].

Les rapports politiques roumano-polonais ont été marqué aussi par les tendances fédéralistes de la Pologne, tendances que Florin Anghel a analysé dans une autre étude nommé. *O componentă a sistemului federalist polon: despre alianţa strategică dintre Varşovia şi Bucureşti, 1919-1921 (Une composante su système fédérative polonaise : sur l'alliance stratégique d/entre Varsovie et Bucarest)*[29]. En ce qui

concerne les projets polonais d'union ou de confédération, l'auteur en a surpris trois sur la base des sources documentaires polonaises à savoir *une union entre la Pologne et la Hongrie; la fédération polono-baltique à laquelle on s'ajoutait, obligatoire les territoires de Belarus et d'Ukraine; alliance entre la Pologne, la Hongrie et la Roumanie* (s. n.)[30]. C'est intéressant que dans ce contexte Florin Anghel a surpris aussi d'autre objectifs poursuivis par les cercles dominantes du temps, dans les relations avec la Roumanie, comme « un contrôle ou au moins une limitation de la pénétration de l'influence allemande à Bucarest ; un réduisissent du prestige de la Tchécoslovaquie au niveau de la classe politique roumaine (et bien sur une affaiblissement du projet de la Petite Entente) ; *un combat de la russophilie dans les Balkans (par l'intermédiaire des Roumaines); le détournement de l'attention des dangers bulgares et hongroise et le direction de la sécurité exclusivement vers l'Est* (s. n.)[31].

Un chapitre sensible dans l'histoire des relations politiques roumano-polonais de la période d'entre les deux guerres mondiales a été constitué par l'attitude de la Pologne envers La Petit Entente et par conséquence envers la Roumanie, en qualité de membre de cette alliance. Etant donnée son importance, la question a attiré de l'historiographie roumaine après décembre 1989, préoccupation illustré aussi par Florin Anghel qui lui a consacré une étude intitulé *Intermarium contra Micii Înţelegeri. Sursele refuzului polonez de aderare la alianţa dintre Bucureşti, Praga şi Belgrad (Intermerium contre la petit Entente. Les sources du refus d'adhésion à l'alliance d'entre Bucarest-Prague et Belgrad)*[32]. La cause du refus de la Pologne d'adhérer à la Petit Entente, en dépit des invitations répétées de la Roumanie, surtout, réside, d'après l'opinion de l'historien en tradition historique des relations polono-hongroises. Par conséquence, la Pologne a avancé plusieurs projets - certains d'entre eux ont été analysés dans les pages de l'étude - qui *essayent de trouver une réponse à une véritable frustration nationale polonaise, le drame de l'isolement politique de l'Hongrie* (s. n.)[33]. Par conséquence, *la séparation définitive de la Pologne de la Petit Entente, en 1923-1924, et le développement de l'alliance trilatérale (roumano – yougoslavo - tchécoslovaque) jusqu'à sa transformation dans une communauté*

diplomatique a delimité, quelques années après la fin de la guerre mondiale, deux bloques d'Etats vainqueurs dans l'Europe Centrale – Orientale et de Sud-Est, centrés sur Vistule (l'alliance roumano-polonaise) et sur le Danube (la Petite Entente) (s. n.)[34].

La complexité des rapports roumano-polonais a été mise en évidence par l'auteur au long des autres études aussi, par exemple *Cronica unui eşec programat: România, Rusia Sovietică şi Polonia la Conferinţa de la Varşovia (1921) (La chronique d'un échec programmé: la Roumanie, la Russie Soviétique et la Pologne à la Conférence de Varsovie (1921)*[35], conférence dominée par la question de la Bassarabie. L'échec de la conférence a signifié l'échec de l'idée centrale des bolcheviques qui était *de provoquer le dérèglement de la relation Bucarest – Varsovie et du front commun inspiré par les Alliés, et spécialement par la France* (s. n.)[36]. *Influenţa polonă în abordările baltice din diplomaţia românească (L'influence polonaise dans la politique baltique de la diplomatie roumaine)*[37] représente une autre contribution de Florin Anghel. Finalement, la complexité des relations roumano-polonais de la période d/entre des deux guerres est illustrée aussi par leur composante économique, aspect recherché par l'historien Florin Anghel dans son étude *stratégique* roumano-polonais intitulé *Un model strategic româno-polon: Canalul Marea Baltică – Marea Neagră în perioada interbelică (Un modèle*: le canal d/entre la mer Baltique et la Mer Noire pendant la période d/entre les deux guerre mondiales)[38]. L'échec du projet – qui aurait eu comme résultat *la création d'une de communication sure Nord – Sud qui assure en même temps l'indépendance de la Pologne et une voie d'accès sur les marchés balkaniques et orientales* (s. n.)[39] – a été du, après les constatations de l'auteur, aux plusieurs causes, entre lesquelles les difficultés financières avec lesquelles la Pologne et la Roumanie se sont confrontées, mais aussi aux nombreuses *divergences politiques, militaires, économiques et stratégiques entre les Etats qui formaient l'espace central – européen* (s. n.)[40].

La série des contributions de l'historiographie roumaine d'après décembre 1989 dans la recherche de l'histoire des relations roumano-polonaises dans la période d'entre les deux guerres mondiales est bien plus vaste. C'est pourquoi je me limiterai seulement à mentionner certaines d'entre eux, ordonné d'après le critère alphabétique, dans le cas des études spéciales aussi que dans le cas de ceux à caractère générale mais qui contiennent les analyses péremptores de l'évolution de ces relations dans un contexte plus élargi, européen premièrement. On peut encadrer dans la première catégorie les études signées par le regretté historien des relations internationale de l'époque contemporaine, Valeriu-Florin Dobrinescu[41], aussi que Nicolae Mares[42] Oana Anca Otu[43], Dumitru Preda[44], Alexandru Ştefănescu[45] Gheorghe Vasile[46] etc. De la deuxième catégorie on mentionne les contributions signée par Gheorghe Barbu, Solache Ioan[47], Dan Berindei[48], Elisa Campus[49], Valeriu – Florin Dobrinescu[50], Petre Otu[51].

Nous avons passé en revue une série de contribution de l'historiographie roumaine après décembre 1989 qui ont déterminé de manière évidente un élargissement de l'horizon de recherche de l'histoire des relations roumano-polonaises de la période d'entre les deux guerres mondiales. En général, ont été utilisées des informations d'archives dont la valorisation a été facilitées, comme je mentionnais au début de ces lignes par les transformations profondes produites par la chute du système communiste dans l'Europe Orientale, auxquelles se sont ajoutées les réalisations enrégistrées déjà surtout par l'historiographie roumaine et polonaise. Comme il était normal, on n'a pas ignoré l'historiographie universelle de la question à laquelle on a fait appel chaque fois qu'on a considéré nécessaire dans le procès de recherche scientifique des divers aspects de la problématique concernée. Les auteurs des travaux cité sont des chercheurs avisés de la période d'entre les deux guerres mondiales, fait qui les confère une indiscutable valeur scientifique qui les assure une place bien mérité dans l'ensemble de l'historiographie universelle. Sans doute, beaucoup d'aspects des relations roumano-polonaise de la période d'entre les deux mondiales n'ont pas encore été recherches et approfondis par divers causes, plus ou moins subjectives. C'est un « passif » qui sera « liquide », sans doute, dans les années à venir.

NOTES :

[1] Ministerul Afacerilor Externe. Direcția Arhivelor Diplomatice, *România-Polonia. Relații diplomatice, I, 1918-1939.* Cuvânt înainte de Mircea Dan Geoană, Ministrul Afacerilor Externe al României. Editura Univers Enciclopedic, București, 2003.

[2] Loc. cit., p. XVI.

[3] Loc. cit.

[4] Nicolae Dascălu, *Relații româno-polone în perioada interbelică (1919-1939),* Editura Academiei Române, București, 1991, 230 p.

[5] *Ibidem*, p. 92.

[6] *Ibidem.*

[7] *Ibidem,.*

[8] *Ibidem,* p. 12.

[9] Florin Anghel, *Construirea sistemului „Cordon sanitaire". Relații româno-polone, 1919-1926.* Editura Nereamia Napocae, Cluj-Napoca, 2003, 295 p.

[10] *Ibidem,* p. 270.

[11] Ibidem.

[12] Daniel Hrenciuc, *România și Polonia – 1916-1931. Relațiile politice, diplomatice și militare.* Ediția a II-a revăzută și adăugită, Editura Septentrion, Rădăuți, 2003, 254 p. (la premiere edition a ete a Botosani, l'année 1991, Editura Axa, 258 p.).

[13] *Ibidem,* p 183.

[14] *Ibidem,* p. 186.

[15] *Ibidem,* p. 188.

[16] *Ibidem,* p. 190.

[17] Idem, *România și Polonia - 1932-1939. Relații politice și diplomatice,* Editura Universității Suceava, 2005, 268 p.

[18] *Ibidem,* p. 226.

[19] *Ibidem,* p. 227.

[20] *Ibidem,* p. 228.

[21] Florin Anghel, *O dilemă teritorială și un debut diplomatic. Ocuparea Pocuției de către armata română (24 mai-începutul lunii august 1919) și debutul relațiilor româno-polon,* în „Revista istorică", Tom, VI, nr. 9-10, 1995, p. 761-772.

[22] *Ibidem,* p. 763.

[23] *Ibidem.*

[24] *Ibidem.*

[25] *Ibidem,* p. 765.

[26] *Ibidem.*

[27] *Ibidem,* p.766.

[28] *Ibidem,* p.771.

[29] Idem, *O componentă a sistemului federalist polon: despre alianța strategică dintre Varșovia și București, 1919-1921,* in vol. *Concepte și metodologii în studiul relațiilor internaționale.* Coordonator Mihai Timofte, Iași, Editura Antheros, 1998, p. 300-310

[30] *Ibidem,* p. 302.

[31] *Ibidem,* p. 305.

[32] Idem, *Intermarium contra Micii Înțelegeri. Sursele refuzului polonez de aderare la alianța dintre București, Praga și Belgrad,* în „Studii și Materiale de Istorie Contemporană", Serie Nouă, Vol. I, 2002, p. 23-40.

[33] *Ibidem,* p. 24.

[34] *Ibidem,* p. 39.

[35] *Ibidem, Cronica unui eșec programat: România, Rusia Sovietică și Polonia la Conferința de la Varșovia (1921)* în „Studii și Materiale de Istorie Contemporană", Serie Nouă, Vol. II, 2003, p.5-14.

[36] *Ibidem,* p. 10.

[37] Idem, *Influențe polone în abordările baltice din diplomația românească(1920-1930),* în vol. *Istorie și diplomație. Omagiu istoricului Tahsin Gemil,* Coordonatori: Daniel Flaut, Iolanda Ighilin. Ovidius University Press, Constanta, 2003, p. 396-405, l'étude a été publié premierement en langue anglaise sous le titre *Polish Influences on the Baltic Démarches of Romania Policy, 1920-1930,* dans le volume *Lithuanian Istorical Studies,* 4, 1999, p. 83-94.

[38] Idem, *Un model strategic româno-polon: Canalul Marea Baltică – Marea Neagră în perioada interbelică,* în „Revista Istorică", Tom VII, nr. 7-8, 1996, p. 581-590.

[39] *Ibidem,* p. 589.

[40] *Ibidem,* p. 589-590.

[41] Valeriu-Florian Dobrinescu, *Înainte și după furtună. Regele Carol al II-lea în Polonia,* în „Document", 1998, I, nr. 2-3, p. 8-13.

[42] Nicolae Mareş, *Alianţa cu România trebuie să existe. Începutul relaţiilor diplomatice polono-române*, în Magazin Istoric, 1999, 33, nr.10, p. 51-54.

[43] Oana Anca Out, *Relaţiile româno-polone, 1919-1921*, în vol. *România în ecuaţia păcii şi dictatului*, Piteşti, Bucureşti, Braşov, Cluj-Napoca, 2001, p. 228-233.

[44] Dumitru Preda, *Relaţiile româno-polone, 1918-1933*, în Magazin Istoric, 2001, 35, nr. 1, p. 49-55, nr. 2, p. 26-30.

[45] Alexandru Ştefănescu, Polish-Romanian Military Relationships in the Inter-War Period, în Analele Universităţii Valahia, 2002-2003, nr. 4+5, p. 195-198.

[46] Gheorghe Vasile, Consideraţii *cu privire la relaţiile militare româno-polone în perioada interbelică, în* vol. *Omagiu istoricului militar Jipa Rotaru*, Constanţa, 2001, p. 187-191.

[47] Barbu Gheorghe, Solache Ioan, *Schimbarea alianţelor României: de la Titulescu la Antonescu*, Iaşi, Institutul European, 1995, p. 312.

[48] Dan Berindei, *La politique extérieure de la Roumanie pendant les années 1920* , în vol. *Une occasion manquée, 1922 : La reconstruction de l'Europe*, Berlin-Berlin-Wien, 1995, p. 441-449.

[49] Eliza Campus, *Elemente fundamentale ale securităţii României în perioada interbelică*, în Revista Istorică, 1994, 5, nr. 9-10, p. 1005-1012.

[50] Valeriu-Florin Dobrinescu, *Poziţia Marilor Puteri faţă de ajutorarea Poloniei în contextul politicii de neutralitate a României*, în Analele Universităţii din Craiova, Istorie, 1996, 1, nr. 1, p. 141-149.

[51] Petre Otu, *Istorie şi Geopolitică. România şi problema Strâmtorilor (1923-1939)*, în Anuarul Institutului de studii Politice, de Apărare şi Istorie Militară, Bucureşti, 1999, p. 199-206.

Role of China in Strangling the Hungarian Revolution From 1956

Alexandru Purcăruş

I. Introduction

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was one of the most important moments in the history of world's communism. For the first time in a state with popular democracy, a satellite-country of Moscow, the communism regime was threatened. From the point of view of inter-socialist relations, the brutal military intervention of the Red Army was in fact "the first war between two socialist states."[1] Moreover, the violent repression of the Hungarian revolution clearly pointed out the limits and concessions the Soviets were willing to accept in the relationship with the states of the socialist block.

Moscow's decision to handle the crisis *manu militari* based on important strategic, political and ideological reasons was the result of a difficult and sinuous process, the Soviets initially leaning toward a Polish-like solution. The rapid development of the situation in Hungary that heads to the "finlandization" as well as the acknowledgement the West is not to intervene, absorbed by the simultaneous crisis of the Suez,

leaned towards this solution. The Soviets were supported by the leaders of communist countries, following Khrushchev's consultations.

China ranks an important position among the factors influencing Moscow's stance toward the Hungarian crisis. Hence, the role of Beijing in the decision-making process of the Soviet leaders is still hard to establish, mainly because that most of Chinese documents are hardly accessible.

Most of the specialty studies diminish China's stance and its impact upon the events deployment. These facts are obvious and stressed out in exceptional monographs dedicated to the Hungarian revolution in 1956. Thus, Johanna Granville[2] scarcely mentions China, while A.S. Stykalin mentions it in half a page.[3] This does not exclude the outstanding contributions in the field, such as Chen Jian's work.[4] The value of his work relies on Chinese sources completing the materials in Soviet and European archives. Some of the most recent and significant articles are those of Shen Zhihua[5] and Péter Vámos.[6]

II. First Soviet intervention in Hungary

Subsequent to Stalin's death in 1953, the latent conflict between the Soviet and Chinese leaders started to develop. In a new conjecture, Mao Zedong claimed for himself a much more *important* position within the international communist movement, instigating to the equality with Moscow. Throughout 1956, various adversities arose as regards the destalinisation announced by the 20th Congress of CPSU.[7] For a better stance arguing, the Chinese communists tried to draw in their game the states on the European orbit of the Soviet Union, stressing upon it should give up "great-power chauvinism" in the relationship with fraternal parties.

Mao enforced such an attitude during the events in Poland, in the autumn of 1956, whom he perceived as anti-soviet, and not threatening

the solidity of the communist camp. China consequently insisted upon the fact an eventual use of the force by Kremlin would seriously violate the principles of "proletarian internationalism" and set against Moscow's intervention in Warsaw's internal affairs.[8]

Mao sent to the Soviet Union, at the suggestion of Kremlin, a delegation led by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping that aimed to mediate the situation between Polish and Soviets. Vladislav M. Zubok said the event was significant, China undertaking for the first time the role of mediator between Moscow and its European satellite countries.[9]

Mao's representatives arrived at Moscow on October 23, 1956, namely on the day of bursting the Hungarian revolution. Khrushchev himself

welcomed them at the airport. The bilateral discussions started during the same evening, right after the setting up of the Chinese representatives in the guests' room. The dialogue was suddenly interrupted by the telephone of Marshal Zhukov announcing the burst of the revolt in Hungary. Khrushchev ceased the meeting with the representatives from Beijing, whom he briefly informed about the crisis in Budapest, to take the advice of the other members of the Soviet leaders.[10]

CPSU Presidium met by emergency to analyze the situation. Most of the participants agreed with Khrushchev's suggestion on the military intervention, which was very necessary. Kaganovich explained "the government is being overthrown. There's no comparison with Poland."[11]

The decision of the first Soviet military intervention in Hungary was made without consulting the Chinese delegation.

The next day, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping took part in the session of the Soviet Presidium, being informed about the operation of the Red Army in Hungary. Khrushchev said the Hungarian crisis is different from the Polish one,

considering a counter-revolution was developing in Budapest. Without any information about the events in Hungary, Liu Shaoqi told the lesson he learned back home when referring to Poland, stressing that Moscow should mitigate the issues with Warsaw in a "comrade-like" way. He could not overlook the events in Hungary, which made him say the tension in the European-satellite countries are fueled by USSR's "chauvinism of great power".[12]

Another meeting between the Chinese delegation and the Soviet leaders was held on October 26, the Polish issue being on the top of the agenda.

The reduced attention to the Hungarian file has two explanations: first of all the Soviets said the order is about to be reestablished in Budapest and induced this perception to the Chinese. Secondly, the representatives from Beijing were neither updated upon the evolutions in Hungary, nor authorized by Mao to discuss upon such a topic. The Chinese leader had no information in the field as the Chinese embassy in Budapest had practically interrupted all communications with China, after the startup of the conflict in Budapest.[13]

III. Influence of China upon the Soviet decision on the revolt strangling

On October 29, Khrushchev, Molotov and Bulganin paid a visit to Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping at the guests' house. Between October 24 and 29, things turned more complicated in Hungary. The dialogue was much more consistent this time, the Chinese focusing the discussions towards the overall issue of the Moscow's relationships with the countries in Eastern Europe.

While Khrushchev communicated the Chinese emissaries Hungary's request on withdrawing the Soviet troops, fearing that a similar request from other satellite countries would originate the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, Mao himself phoned Liu Shaoqi.[14] Based on his instructions, Liu Shaoqi resumed the debates with the Soviets and expressed "a fundamental sugestion" from the Chinese leader.[15] According to Liu Shaoqi, the relationship between Moscow and the states with popular democracy in Eastern Europe should have been governed by the principles from "Pancha Shila". Thus, Kremlin should not intervene in the internal affairs of the satellites and should comply with the

independence goal of Hungary and Poland as well as of the other communist countries. Liu Shaoqi raised the stake and pointed out that as regards the Warsaw Treaty, Kremlin should counsel the satellite-countries as regards the statute of the Soviet troops.[16]

In his memoirs, Khrushchev accounts for the confused and indecisive environment of the consultations, focusing upon the option of the military intervention in reestablishing order in Hungary. "I don't know how many times we changed our minds back and forth. Every time we thought we'd made up our minds about what to do, Liu Shaoqi would consult with Mao Zedong. It was no problem for Liu to get in touch with him on the telephone because Mao is like an owl; he works all night long. Mao always approved whatever Liu recommended. We finally finished this all-night session with a decision not to apply military force in Hungary. Once we had agreed on that, I went home. Liu and his delegation stayed on at the dacha".[17]

On October 30, USSR' official newspapers "Pravda", said "Budapest turned quiet again."

But in fact things aggravated in Hungary. Under the pressure of revolutionaries, Premier Imre Nagy announced on radio that a pluriparty government was establishing: "In the interest of the further democratization of the country's life, the Cabinet abolishes the one-party system and places the country's Government on the basis of democratic cooperation between the coalition parties, reborn in 1945".[18]

Moscow felt the major shock was coming from China. The impact of the October 29 meeting was devastating for the Soviets. The following day, during the session of the Soviet Presidium, Khrushchev said, talking about the discussions with the Beijing's representatives, "we should adopt a declaration today on the withdrawal of troops from the countries of people's democracy (and consider these matters at a session of the Warsaw Pact), taking account of the views of the countries in which our troops are based.".[19]

The participants unanimously agreed with his proposal. Molotov himself agreed with this stand, adding Hungarians must be urged to start the negotiations on withdrawing the Soviet troops. On his turn, Voroshilov said Moscow is making self-criticism, "but on good grounds".[20]

The minute of the session on October 30 leaves the impression of general panic among the Soviet leadership, doubled by a defensive, resigned position. This was probably the most difficult moment of the entire crisis and one of the most important in the history of world communism. The Soviet leaders were willing to "search for other modes of relations with the countries of people's democracy" (Furtseva), to acknowledge "it's impossible to lead against the will of the people" (Saburov) or that "Anti-Soviet sentiments are widespread" (Shepilov) and that "we should withdraw troops from Budapest, and if necessary withdraw from Hungary as a whole", as well as the Soviet counselors (Marshal Zhukov). Kaganovich showed a different stance, being reticent towards the "principles of Pancha Shila" and claiming no self-criticism is required.[21]

For the first time since the burst of the Hungarian revolution, Moscow acknowledged the stake was no longer to solve the crisis and to maintain Hungary in the Soviet orbit, but to keep the stability of the entire communist block. The events in Poland, the Hungarian riot, the uncertain stance of Tito's Yugoslavia and the Chinese shock all led to this effect. The session

mainly resulted in enacting the declaration on equal relations between the socialist states asked by Mao's representatives.

In parallel with the drama from the CPSU Presidium, the representatives of the Communist Party of China met Pavel F. Yudin, the ambassador of Moscow to China, who discussed about the statute of the Soviet counselors in the socialist states. Liu Shaoqi believed they should be withdrawn for not knowing the features of the respective countries and because their presence could have negative meanings. The situation between Poland and Hungary was finally analyzed, the Chinese delegate saying this should be "a serious lesson for the entire communist movement." He said nothing about a way to settle the conflict.[22]

According to the minute of the Soviet Presidium's session on October 30, Yudin joined the other Soviet leaders whom he presented the content of the discussions with Liu Shaoqi. He said the Chinese asked him who is Nagy, if Nagy could is trustworthy and whether Hungary abandons the socialist camp. This proves that China had little knowledge on Hungary.[23]

During the same session, after Moscow passed the declaration proclaiming the adhesion to the principle of full equality in the relations between the states that belong to the socialist family, other discussions followed on the Hungarian issue, joined by the Chinese emissaries. Meanwhile, they had received several information on the events, based on which they acknowledged the Hungarian phenomenon was not triggered by Soviet chauvinism, and unless ceased, it might generate "reactionary restoration."[24] They analysis was alike Mao's who had given them new instructions. Liu Shaoqi subsequently expressed the point of view of the Presidium with the Communist Party of China , according to which "troops must remain in Hungary and in Budapest."[25]

On October 31, the Soviet Presidium witnessed a dramatic change. The new reports from Mikoian and Suslov warned upon the rapid deterioration of the situation in Hungary. The information overlapped with those regarding the operations started by the French and British in Egypt. Moreover, the Hungarian revolution menaced with contaminating other satellite countries. Thus, only the public opinion in Poland and Yugoslavia as well as the communist media in these countries started to support the

Hungarian cause. The Soviets had found out that in Romania, the students in Bucharest and Timisoara had organized solidarity manifests towards the Hungarian revolution, similar events taking place in the Czechoslovakia.[26] In evaluating the situation, the Soviets took into account the vision change of the Chinese.

The session of the Soviet Presidium consequently took the opposite turn. Thus, Khrushchev proposed the situation in Hungary should be solved by using military force, giving as example the events in Egypt. Everybody agreed and Marshal Zhukov was charged to draw up "a plan of measures on Hungary, which was due to inform CPSU Presidium.[27]

During the session, marshal Konev reassured the Soviet leaders that in three-day period, "the counter-revolution forces will be crushed".[28] Moreover, Khrushchev and Malenkov were charged to "negotiate with comrade Tito".[29] Immediately after the session, Khrushchev went directly to the airport to inform the Chinese delegation coming home about Moscow's decision.[30]

Khrushchev said the Chinese unconditionally supported the Soviet plan, and Liu Shaoqi was confident the sending of the Red Army's troops is correct and Mao will approve it.

The question is how much did the Chinese strategy-change influence the Soviet military intervention. Shen Zhihua believes that Mao's influence was the "key factor" in Moscow decision to strangle the Hungarian revolt.[31]

Zhu Ankang, former Chinese ambassador in Hungary and Yugoslavia has a more detailed point of view: "When the Liu Shaoqi delegation was about to leave Moscow, the Soviet politburo held a meeting and decided to send troops to Hungary. We were informed of the decision under these circumstances, and we supported the decision. Later the story would be distorted as if we insisted on Moscow's sending troops to Hungary. This is not right. Our analysis of the situation led to a different perspective of the Hungarian development. In retrospect, at the time we did not know the whole process of the Hungarian incident. But even if we had not supported use of force, the later development of the Hungarian situation would probably still have caused the Soviets to use force."[32]

This could seem a paradox but the thesis according to which China made the leaders of Kremlin to use force in solving the Hungarian

issue was officially supported by Beijing in the 60s, when the Chinese-Soviet breakup got worse. On September 5, 1963, "Renmin Ribao" (People's Daily) published a devastating article against Khrushchev and USSR. Within the "indictment" drafted by the the Chinese against Moscow, the defeatist attitude towards the Hungarian revolution held an important place: " (...) The two events were different in character. But the leadership of the CPSU made grave errors in both. By moving up troops in an attempt to subdue the Polish comrades by armed force it committed the error of great-power chauvinism. And at the critical moment when the Hungarian counter-revolutionaries had occupied Budapest, for a time it intended to adopt a policy of capitulation and abandon socialist Hungary to counter-revolution. (...) We insisted on the taking of all necessary measures to smash the counter-revolutionary rebellion in Hungary and firmly opposed the abandonment of socialist Hungary."[33]

The Chinese leaders subsequently presented this version of the events. On October 8, 1964, Mao himself, during a discussion with Gheorghe Maurer, who led a Romanian delegation in Beijing, stressed upon the same point of view: "Western countries realized that Khrushchev fears his people. The events in Hungary are an example in that respect. At Imre Nagy's counter-revolution, Khrushchev was confused. The entire Political Bureau with CPSU believed the Soviet troops should be withdrawn from Hungary. This was against our party's belief, against the opinion of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping' comrades who had been to Moscow in that respect. We thought it was necessary to maintain our positions there and to strange the rebellion. The Soviets wanted the Soviet troops to withdraw from Hungary. In this case, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping's comrades decided to leave the next day. The following day, all members of CPSU's Political Bureau came to the airport and announced their intention not to withdraw the troops from Hungary but on the contrary, they threatened with sending reinforcement. All these actions happened in two-day period. The first day they said one thing, the second they changed their minds."[34]

This interpretation constantly supported by Chinese leaders[35] is very different from Khrushchev's, who ignored the Chinese inflow in his memoirs, undertaking the entire responsibility

for the decision.[36] Vladislav M. Zubok analyzed these differences, and explained them through the subsequent disputes between Beijing and Moscow.[37]

In Conclusion: Beijing displayed a contradictory stance towards the Hungarian revolution in 1956, which influenced the decisions of the Soviet leaders. Thus, on one hand, China had in a first stage the role of inhibitor factor of a military settlement of the Hungarian crisis. CPSU Presidium consequently enacted the famous declaration on October 30. In a second stage, after Beijing was briefed upon the events in Hungary, Mao has formed a firm opinion regarding a real danger of Budapest "escaping" from the socialist camp and about the necessity of using force. Even if it was not the "key factor" in Moscow's intervention, we believe that Beijing played an important role in making Kremlin to end the Hungarian revolt.

NOTES:

[1] Bélá Király, "The Hungarian Revolution and the Soviet Readiness to Wage War", in Bélá Király, Barbara Lotze, and Nándor F. Dreisyiger, (eds.), *The First War Between Socialist States: The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and its Impact*, New York, Brooklyn College Press, 1984, pp. 3-30.

[2] Johanna Granville, *The First Domino. International Decision Making During the Hungarian Crisis of 1956*, Texas A&M University Press, College Station, Texas, 2004.

[3] A. S. Stykalin, *Prervannaia Revoliutsiia: Vengerskii Krizis 1956 Goda i politika Moskvy*, Novyi Khronograf, Moskva, 2003, pp. 157-158.

[4] Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill & London, 2001.

[5] Shen Zhihua, "China's Role and Influence in the Revolts in Poland and Hungary in 1956", in Dan Catanus, Vasile Buga, *Putere și societate. Lagărul comunist sub impactul destalinizării – 1956*, Romanian Institute for the Study of Totalitarianism, Bucharest 2006.

[6] Péter Vámos, *Evolution and Revolution: Sino-Hungarian Relations and the 1956 Revolution*, Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Working Paper no. 54, November 2006.

[7] Chen Jian, *cit work* pp. 63-65.

[8] *Ibidem*, p. 147.

[9] Vladislav M. Zubok, "«Look What Chaos in the Beautiful Socialist Camp!» Deng Xiaoping and the Sino-Soviet Split 1956-1963", in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, no. 10, p. 152.

[10] Chen Jian, *cit.work*, p. 151. Also see Shen Zhihua, *cit.work*, p. 352.

[11] "The «Malin Notes» on the Crises in Hungary and Poland, 1956", Translated and annotated by Mark Kramer, in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* no.8/9, Winter 1996/1997, p. 389.

[12] Chen Jian, *cit work*, p .153.

[13] Shen Zhihua, *cit work*, p .352. Also see János Radványi, *Hungary and the Superpowers. The 1956 Revolution and Realpolitik*, Hoover Institution Press, Standford, California, 1972, p. 21.

[14] Shen Zhihua, *op. cit*, p. 350.

[15] Chen Jian, *cit work*, pp .153-154.

[16] *Ibidem*, pp.153-154.

[17] Strobe Talbot, *Khrushchev Remembers*, Andre Deutsch, London, 1971, p. 418.

[18] Csaba Békés, Malcolm Byrne, János M. Rainer (ed.), *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents*, Central European University Press, Budapest, New York, 2002, p. 290.

[19] "The Malin Notes", p. 392.

[20] *Ibidem*, p. 392.

[21] *Ibidem*, p. 392.

[22] Péter Vámos, *cit work*, p. 14.

[23] "The Malin Notes", p. 393.

[24] Chen Jian, *cit work*, p .155.

[25] "The Malin Notes", p. 393.

[26] For the events in the autumn of 1956 in Romania please see Ioana Boca, *1956. Un an de ruptură. Romania intre internationalismul proletar si stalinismul antisovietic*, Foundation Civic Academy, Bucharest 2001. Also, Mihaela Sitariu, *Oaza de libertate. Timisoara, 30 octombrie 1956*, Polirom, Iasi 2004. For the situation in Czechoslovakia, see for example Juraj Marusiak, "Slovakia and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956", in Alexandru Zub, Flavius Solomon (ed.), *Sovietization in Romania and Czechoslovakia*, Polirom, Iasi, 2003, pp. 95-111.

[27] "The Malin Notes", p. 393.

[28] Strobe Talbot, *cit work*, p. 419.

[29] "The Malin Notes", p. 393.

[30] Chen Jian, *cit work*, p .157.

[31] Shen Zhihua, cit work, p. 359.

[32] Xiaoyuan Liu and Vojtech Mastny (eds.), *China and Eastern Europe, 1960s–1980s. Proceedings of the International Symposium: Reviewing the History of Chinese–East European Relations from the 1960s to the 1980s, Beijing, 24–26 March 2004*, Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung Nr. 72, Zürich, 2004, p. 50.

[33] "The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves". Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU by the Editorial Departments of Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) and Hongqi (Red Flag), September 6, 1963, from the collection *The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement*, Foreign Languages Press, Peking 1965, p. 69.

[34] Romulus Ioan Budura, *Relațiile româno-chineze, 1880-1974. Documente*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Archives, Bucharest, 2005, p. 597.

[35] Ciu En-Lai: "In 1956-1957 I sent two delegations to the Soviet Union, led by comrade Liu Shao-qi and Deng Xiao-ping. I counseled then Khrushchev to make peace with the Polish, not to send the armed forces to Poland and not to interfere in their internal affairs. On the other hand, I advised him to strangle the counterrevolution in Hungary, as on the contrary reactionary troops from those countries could enter Hungary. Under these conditions, the Soviet government published a Declaration in which it recognized the Soviet Union witnessed great power chauvinism and that will undo this mistake, particularly improving the relations with the fraternal parties and countries. This declaration was published on October 30, 1956, and on November 1, our Government answered through a public declaration supporting the Soviet declaration. Both declarations were published in "Pravda" newspaper, but now Khrushchev stopped talking about them and claims he never proved great power chauvinism." Dan Catanus, *Intre Beijing si Moscova. Romania si conflictul sovieto-chinez*, vol.I, National Institute for the Study of Totalitarianism, Bucharest, 2004, p. 374.

[36] Strobe Talbot, *cit work*,pp. 418-419.

[37] Vladislav M. Zubok, *cit work*,pp. 153-155.

The Romanian Economy During the Second World War

Oana Turcu

At the moment of the historiographical development, the choice of any subject with economic valences necessarily involves a re-evaluation of the positions of the historiography during the communist period, a whole set of documents which constituted the basis of the works from the respective period, but not implying the reconstruction of the economic history of the time as a goal in itself.

The analysis of "The Romanian Economy during the Second World War" (as a Ph.D. in History, University of Craiova, 2007) represented for me a real provocation; it involved both an effort of identification, of analysis and synthesis of an extremely ample documentary material and a historiographical basis not less dense.

The main idea from which I began and which I tried to substantiate documentarily was that of the Romanian economy from 1938 until the end of the war, developing ascensionally on the trajectory which had as a terminus its transformation from an economy of peace into an economy of war, adapted to the European conditions of the moment. Therefore, I attempted to re-analyze the idea on an economy seen as a system of fragments separated by the internal political lines, where the poles would be embodied by the year of reference 1938 – the maximum development of the interwar period – and, respectively, 1940-1944, as a real economic "dark age" of the interval, with the emphasis on the total and multilateral feudalism under Germany and Italy!

In order to ground this idea, I first appealed to the funds of the archives of the country, respectively to the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where I studied the funds of Romania, Germany and England, The Economic Archives, within the National Central Historical Archives, for the Funds of the Ministry of National Economy, the Ministry of the National Propaganda, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the personal funds of Constantin Argetoianu, the Royal House, the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, but also the collections of SUA Microfilms, Germany Microfilms. I identified a rich material at the funds of the Ministry of Endowing the Army and of the War Production, at the Secretariat of the Superior Council of National Defense, the Minister's Cabinet, the Leader of the Great Major State – Sector 7 of the Foreign Relations. This fundamental documentation was completed and analyzed in relation with the historiographical literature on this subject.

Taking the theme on the whole, I divided the work into six large chapters, to which I added the documentary annex and the biographic list.

In the first chapter, "Introduction – Argument", I stressed the key-ideas which supported my attempt, respectively the one related to the unitary economy from 1938 until 1944/1945 and the one of adapting and integrating it into the national economies of war, within the economic system of the Axis. The economic development of Romania took into account the international developments, constituting for Germany, in fact, for the development of the ops on the whole, its great stake, by the geographical position and, especially, by the fact that it had the essential elements for the parts within the conflict: oil and cereals.

I also underlined the fact that, for creating a panorama of the Romanian economy from that period, we do not find essential the appeal to the political temporal demarcation, but the emphasis on its general characteristics, in relation with the international development, of Romania's effort to adapt to the conditions created by the war, respectively for the transition from an economy of peace to one of war, within the general temporal frame whose limits are 1938-1944, for which we are trying to prove there is a continuity from the economic perspective, that transcends the breaking-off within the internal policy. This

does not exclude the focus on the general features of the internal and international policy, under the conditions they seriously affected the economic development.

For emphasizing these features of unity, it was necessary to go beyond the temporal limit imposed by the general structure of the subject and to connect it with the very previous period, the year 1938. Thus, Chapter II, "General Features of the Economic Period 1940-1944", includes the subchapter "Policy and Economy during the Period 1938- 1944".

The year 1938 brings a gloomy economy and, in order to coordinate the whole economy, Carol II disposed to set-up a Ministry of Economy, which represented an important guiding mark within the process of the economic development, aiming to direct, organize and develop the national economy of Romania at the specific historic and economic moment.

It is also essential to underline the fact that there were taken certain important measures for facilitating the export-import, there were established economic bounties for the export of the forest products, for encouraging the export of animal produces, facilitations made to the oil companies.

The political events of the summer and the autumn of 1940, respectively the major territorial loss from the last period of the Carlist regime had a remarkable impact upon the economic development, so that I considered absolutely necessary a subchapter in which to analyze this problem, mostly related to the economic system: "The Impact of the Territorial Loss Upon the Romanian Economic System". The territorial loss implicitly led to the whole confusion of the Romanian economy, through the numerous material damages (at the level of the natural resources, of the installations, of the invested capital, the labor, the industrial and farming production providing the turnover of goods, satisfying the material needs for organizing the national defense etc). In this way, Romania lost 38, 5 per cent of the resources of gold, 87,6 per cent of the silver ones, 64,7 of the copper production, 97,6 of the lead production and the stock of zinc.

The industrial production decreased from 75,5 to 63,6 billion Lei, the most serious lost being within the food industry (34,3 per cent), the leatherworking industry (82,5 per cent), the industry of building materials (24 per cent), the

woodworking industry (22,8 per cent). Concerning such an approach which I took into account, there were also opinions which, without denying the importance of the territorial loss and their impact on the general economic development, led to the theory of the "national economy" that, in fact, would have won or could have won even from the territorial loss.

What should be underlined, at least for the inevitable 1940-1941, is the fact that the Romanian economy knew one of its hardest ages. The war found it without any plan for production or for goods circulation. The economy of war required standards for militarizing and mobilizing the whole nation. The transition to the economy of war developed gradually, beginning in 1934 and being characterized by the increase of the state's role in economy, concerning supply, production and merchandising by changing the center of gravity towards the industrial branches and the sub-branches whose production was purposed for the armies, concomitantly with the increase in the production for the civil consumption and with the transition to the standard production purposed to cover the consumption of most of the Romanian population.

I consider Chapter III, "The Economic Legislation ", an innovative one, as I have not found any complete and comprehensive work on this fundamental aspect of the Romanian economic development during the mentioned period. I would especially underline here, as briefly as I can, the subchapters related to "The Laws of Romanizing "and to "The Economic Legislation with a Repressive Character". The Laws of Romanizing promoted by the Government from September 1940 – January 1941, continued by the period of Antonescu's Governing, cannot be seen only from an ethnic, anti-Semitic perspective. Besides, there should be taken into account the purely economic considerations. Taking the power under extremely difficult internal and external conditions, and governing the most of the time during the period of war, General Ion Antonescu used an extremely harsh repressive legislation. A whole legislation was hold to struggle against the economic sabotage and against jobbery. The repressive legislation created the frame of a governing which could allow the authorities act almost without any restriction for repressing the opponents, among the repressive measures the most largely used being

the interment camp. Chapter IV, "The Dynamics of the National Economic Branches", is the nucleus of the whole work, because here I tried to underlie concretely the hypotheses exposed initially. The subchapter which treats the general frame of the transition to the economy of war is the basis on which I structured the following development: "Romania's Effort for Endowing the Army", "The Dynamics of the Industry During 1938-1945", "The Agriculture", "The Financial-Banking System"; "The Romanian Trade as a Component of the War Effort". What might be stressed, very generally, is the fact that the transition from the economy of peace to the one of war was financed by the state, that covered most of the war's costs, the fact that within the agriculture there were felt the consequences of the enforcing of the law for farming mobilization, which, under the circumstances of the deficit in labor, result of the mobilization for the front, aimed at replacing it, and the organization of the agricultural production for the new conditions. Moreover, there was seriously arisen the problem of rationalizing the of the farming produces consumption, so that the supply of the army and of the population to suffer less as possible, on one hand, and on the other hand, to be able to insure the quantities of product that had to be delivered to Germany and to the other external partners of Romania's.

A chapter which, according to the re-evaluation of the documents of archives, is the fifth, "The Foreign Economic Policy", with the mention that, since 1938, the position Romania had planed for was as clear as possible: the economic relations with the Reich, but still meeting the national independence and sovereignty, as well as the fact that the Romanian-German relations during the Second World War cannot be supported strictly by the so popular nowadays' slogan, of Germany's satellite- state. Analyzing the documents, both internal and external, there can be shown the complexity of the relations between the two states from September 1940 to August 1944, the fact that both parts based on the national interests- in the case of Romania, "international" interests concerning Germany, directly expressed or only contained in all the bilateral papers, either mutual or of foreign policy. Within the system of the Romanian economy, the economic exchanges between Romania and Germany beneficially influenced the industry and the transports. The documents of the archives come to contradict the old theses according to which "Within the <new economic order> drawn up by the Nazi supporters, the Romanian industry did not find its place. Consequently, I considered it necessary to analyse in a subchapter -- "The Causes of. Romania's adhesion to the New German Order" and to underline that fact that Romania's orientation toward Germany is not necessarily connected to the name Ion Antonescu, but they have their origin within the major political evolutions from Europe – beginning with the year 1938 – which determined an stronger and stronger orientation of the Romanian policy towards Germany. According to the examination of the documents of the archives, of the works of synthesis, I attempted a hierarchy of the importance of the different thematic episodes within the Romanian-German relations, noticing that, during the period 1940-1941, these were dominated from a chronological point of view and from the perspective of the content, by the economic problems, by Ion Antonescu's constant desire of canceling the Vienna Award, but also by the beginning of the proper military collaboration, by starting the commune war against the Soviet Union. Consequently, I also stress the insertion of the subchapter "Romania's Policy of Economic Independence towards Germany. Theoretical Attitudes and Practical Positions". The Romanian-German economic relations from the respective period are not the ones established between the defeated and the winner. In spite of Germany's dominant position, Romania knew, by its representatives authorized to sustain the economic interests with their maximum of efficiency possible within that conjuncture and, from here, the political interests, respectively the treatment of the country as a sovereign state.

In order to create a frame as complete as possible for the economic relations set-up by Romania, under the conditions of a functioning system imposed by Germany, I took into consideration our country's relations with France and England. Within an extremely difficult international context, Romania tried to maintain the traditional relations with England and France, especially in what concerns Romania's acquiring of material for the war between the two countries, delivering, on its turn, oil and cereals, even if not the same quantities from the previous period, with Italy and, not the least, with other states, might they be within the Axis' economic system or not.

What is generally not underlined obviously enough is that, in spite of the manifest economic migration towards Reich, Romania did not neglect, all along the war, the economic relations with the other states, clearly fewer in number in comparison with the previous period, even though they had been kept the trade relations with more than 35 states from Europe, Africa and Asia. The value of the bilateral commercial exchanges between Romania and other more than 24 states, including England, France, Canada, Belgium, Holland, Greece, The United States, Spain, Czech Republic, Japan, used to be under 1 per cent. Practically, the Romanian exterior trade used to develop almost entirely with the Axis' states, to which there could be added some neutral countries, like Switzerland, Sweden and Turkey.

The last chapter, the VIth, "The Influence of the Economic Situation upon the Population's State of Spirit", supposes a new approach of a direction not to be neglected at all for re-creating the wholeness of a society on which there are grafted the war's deficiencies. The years 1938-1939 meant, through the politico-military consequences – the aggravation of the general economic situation – the appreciation and the deepening of the masses' pauperism, visible at the level of the dynamics of the prices and salaries. The situation deteriorated mostly because of the starting of the Second World War. The decrease in the industrial and agricultural production from 1943, the rise in prices, the diminishing of the employees' purchasing power, the increase in the work time, all these had important consequences on the population's standard of life, but, unlike many other European countries directly involved in the conflict, in Romania, after 1944, the population did not suffered from the food loss. The economic collapse of a country which had recently come out of a three years' war was deliberately expedited by the Soviet occupant' s measures of imposing its own economic system. The national income which was of 11,582 Lei per inhabitant, in 1938, come to 7,299 Lei, in 1945.

The work is completed by a documentary annex from which I would underline as a novelty "The Excerpt from the Report of Activity of the National Economy Directorate containing its achievements from the setting-up to July 1, 1943", referring to Bucovina and Basarabia, but also "The Report of Activity of the General Department for Romanization for the period between November 16, 1940 and March 1, 1943".

The Romanian-German Relations (1940-1944) Reflected Within the Documents From the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania

Vlad Hogea

The work (as a Ph.D. in History, University of Craiova, 2007) is structured on four chapters, which are completed by the conclusions, the documentary annexe and the bibliographical list. The choice of the theme presented here – "The Romanian-German Relations (1940-1944) Reflected within the Documents from the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania" – can be motivated, on one hand, by the necessity of an objective approach concerning "a top subject" from the period of development of these relations immediately previous and during the second world war, and, on the other hand, by the necessity of a synthetically and analytically publishing of certain extremely important documents in order to debate upon them. My attempt has been equally facilitated and burdened by the abundance of information, works, studies, articles published over the time on this theme. Consecuently, within the first chapter of the work – "The History of the Problem. Approaching and Using the Sources from the Archives" – I inserted the subchapter "Romanian-German Relations – History and Historiography" as a fundament for approaching though the documents from the diplomatic archives concerning the topic in discussion. What I consider that there should be stressed from the very beginning is that the works until December 1989 should be consulted and analysed very critically, but for the evident politicizing of the discourse and for the utility of the documents of archives, either Romanian or from abroad, often incomplete, but interpreted in a distortional manner. Concerning the literature after 1989, there could be noticed a curious abstentation from treating this period in a distinct and exhaustive manner, even through the primal sources, the memoirs, abundantly permit this approach. We refer here, first of all, to the collections which include the documents of the archives, to the collections including the contemporaries' memoirs, to the writings of the ones which that had been both partners to the overrunning for a short period and enemies for ever, to the official documents of the time, all of them nominated and analysed – within the limits of the work contained by this chapter. The second chapter represents – I can affirm this at the very moment of my work – a first attempt in inspecting and analysing the main funds of the archives, owned by the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania, which refer to the problem of the Romanian-German relations during the second world war; therefore, I appealed to a classification, even if this might be found arbitrary, subjective, in order to clarify at least from a methodological perspective the limits of the new movements within the mentioned problem. At a first stage, I made the general presentation of the funds of the archives: for creating a global image of the extremely complex problem related to the Romanian-German relations during 1940- 1944, I studied the funds that could be integrated within the category "main", but also a series of "secondary" (adjacent) funds, and in what concerns the documents within these funds – I classified and analysed them into the subchapters "Categories of Documents" and "Categories of Problems". In order to accomplish a general frame of the development of the relations between the two states there might be taken into account especially "the by-monthly tolls" edited by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the secret "informative analyses" , the daily ones made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and "the weekly memoirs". From the perspective of the question included within these papers, trying to make a classification as efficient as possible, in order to form, in this way, a base for the whole analysis of the respective relations, I came to the following

sorting of the problems, without its possibility of constituting an immutable fact: political, military and of espionage, economic, cultural, territorial/ethnic/of the minorities. As a methodology, it is necessary to study on the whole a problematical or chronological segment of the data mentioned or deduced from the context, of the similarities or of the resolutions on the papers, the connection of the documents located on different funds, or which can be found within the synthesis made at the end of the studied period. I would make a special mention concerning the extremely complex problem of the theme in discussion, but not sufficiently or exhaustively, and which could be finalised through a monograph, by using the documents to which I refer now: "The Romanians beyond the Borders within the Context of the Romanian-German Relations". At the same time, less taken into account was the cultural dimension of the Romanian-German relations. In attempting to present, under the light of the documents, the complex of the Romanian-German relations, I preferred to refer to this question rather thematically than chronologically. Thus, Chapter II refers to "The Romanian-German Economic Relations"; for a better comprehension and a larger orientation of their real sense, I made an analysis of their history during the interwar period, beginning with the agreement on the Protocol related to the liquidation of the German financial debts to Romania, on November 10, 1928, including the "Protocol on the Romanian-German Collaboration to accomplishing a plan for 10 years in order to recover the Romanian economy", signed on December 4, 1940: seen within the pre-Decembrist literature as a total economic subjugation towards the Nazi Germany, the consequences of this on the Romanian economy should be re-evaluated, through the documents of the archives. The direct consequence of this Protocol, within the so well-known international context, caused our country's integration within the economic system of the Axe, an aspect which I treated within the subchapter with the same name. The integration was set out by numerous official acts signed between the two parts, and which I also consider that have not been sufficiently analysed in the works edited so far. Consequently, I introduced a special subchapter – "Economic Romanian-German Agreements", beginning with the one signed in December, 1940. Although it is a

subject which has been discussed in numerous works, among which the ones of reference are Professor Gh. Buzatu's, in order to record a complex frame of the mechanisms which determined the development of the Romanian-German relations, I considered it necessary to insert a subchapter referring to "The Fuel's Problem"; during the campaign from the East, the fuel's problem – as I have already mentioned-was constantly on the agenda of the Romanian-German relations. Under the new circumstances, Berlin and Bucharest came to certain important agreements. There was no arbitrariness that all the known Romanian papers mention the fact that the bilateral agreements were advantageous for Germany. The firm position of the Romanian diplomacy within this question is very clearly expressed by one of the documents from the diplomatic archives – "Instructions for the negotiations from Berlin"- sent by the leader of the Romanian diplomacy, Professor Mihai Antonescu, on **December 21, 1942, but also** "The Note on the Romanian-German Economic Relations from October 1, 1940 until 1942", which represents, in fact, a synthesis of the Romanian-German economic relations during the respective period. The documents of the archives also emphasize a quite important aspect for the policy of economic independence that Romania tried to sustain in front of Germany: placed within the sphere of German influence and adapting to the new politico-military realities, Romania acted in such a manner that it would not lose the contact with the old partners of affairs, so that it succeeded in maintaining the commercial relations with more than 35 European, African and Asian countries. Following the approaches of the problem also from the perspective of the documents enumerated in the introduction, Chapter III takes into discussion the "Political Romanian-German Relations" from the viewpoint mentioned above. The national fundament of these relations is very clearly stressed in all the studied documents: beyond the general politico-military context which determined Romania's adhesion to the system of the states from the Tripartite Pact, there was Ion Antonescu and his close partners' desire to recover the Romanian territories lost after the arbitrary decisions of the summer of 1940. The analysis of the Romanian-German political relations, based on the historical works but also the re-evaluations of the sources of the archives

can lead to only one conclusion: Romania was not an occupied country, but it had the statute of an allied country. The 91 official documents between the Romanian Government and the German one between March 23, 1939 and February 9, 1944 prove once again the fact that the economic agreement took place between the allied states, where each of them promoted and protected its interests, by accepting only those concessions ordered by the logics of supporting a common war. Moreover, the politico-diplomatic papers, beginning with the one that used to certify Romania's integration within the political system of the Axe, the notices of the Romanian-German discussions, the analyses and the syntheses accomplished by the Romanian representatives to Berlin, all these come to prove once again the special position of Romania concerning its relations on all the plans with the German Reich. "Romania's Position within the New German Order" is the title of the subchapter where I analysed the variants taken into account so far by the Romanian and the foreign historians: either an allied country or an occupied one! The historic controversies on this theme date from the years of the war and they are subscribed, in most of the cases, to certain political interests. Romania's inclusion among the countries occupied by Germany was a constant of the allies' politics during and after the Second World War. The official politics of the United Nations guided on the same criteria as the USA that, in October, 1940, after the German Military Mission Troops came in Romania, they disposed to block the Romanian goods from their territory, on the reason that our country would have become, from that moment, a territory occupied by Germany. Passing over the statements – often dictated by the momentary political or personal interests, manifested on both sides – there should be taken into account the data from the documents of the archives and analysed the works on this theme, in order to draw some coherent conclusions. The analysis of the agreements, of the protocols and of the conventions excludes the acceptance of the assertion that focuses on the idea of a certain army of occupation which might have come to Romania on October, 1940. All is sustained by the content of the subchapters "The Fundamental Coordinates of the Foreign Affairs of Romania within the German System" and "The Romanian-German Disputes"; from the very beginning, the

relations between the two parts proved to be pretty sinuous, marked by numerous problems which either asked for a rapid solution, from the point of view of the Romanians, or could be postponed, from the German perspective, the latter taking into consideration "the general situation and the great common interests": the Romanian-Hungarian disagreement, the problem of Danube, the problem of the Romanians from the Balkan Peninsula, the problem of the Legionaries, and, not the least, Germany's intrusion within Romania's internal affairs. Normally and necessarily for a period of war, the analysis of the Romanian-German relations also includes the component of the military relations established between the two parts. Chapter IV, "The Romanian-German Military Relations 1940-1944", begins with the analysis of the causes of their coming to Romania, of the collaborations and of the disagreements established between the troops of the German Military Mission from Romania and of the Romanian troops. Besides the support it would offer, the German Military mission represented, at the same time, one of the points of divergence between the authorities of the two countries, especially concerning the supply and the illegalities made by the German soldiers on the Romanian territory. Concerning the behaviour of the German Military Troops in Romania, the documents reveal the existence of numerous abuses and conflict between these and the population or the Romanian troops. The subchapter "The Commandment Relations" takes into account Romania's integration within a coalition of the second conflagration as an inevitable act, with the mention that, from 1940 to 1944, unlike the First World War, there was neither any convention nor any agreement that would have regulated the politico-military relations between Romania and Germany; the problems concerning the operative leading of the troops were solved by the personal discussions between Ion Antonescu and Hitler, which left to both of them a certain freedom of action, by which there was taken profit according to the evolution of the military and political situation. From a military perspective, Germany assumed from the very beginning to lead the ops, the possibilities of the national commandments to influence, the decisions being reduced. The errors of the German commandments reverberated negatively on the allied armies, the concrete

example being the one of the battles from 1942-1943 on Don and Volga rivers, when the Romanian Armies 3 and 4 suffered serious defeats. The ops which took place on the battlefields from Basarabia and Bucovina, in the summer of 1941, distinguished the collaboration between the Romanian and German commandments and troops. But the serious problems started with the ops from Don to Stalingrad. The problems which turned up at the level of the commandments were part of the ones with general character which characterized, from the very beginning, the Romanian-German collaboration on all the plans. The leading forums from Bucharest interfered, with the occasion of all the meetings, at the highest level, or at the level of the ministers of resort, for regulating the disagreements appeared but for the common military actions, but also because of the way in which the German authorities would understand by respecting the agreements and the treats with Romania. In this sense, it is significant – in fact a summary of all these aspects – the Memorandum settled by Mihai Antonescu on January 9/10, 1943. The last subchapter is entitled "The Deterioration of the Romanian-German Military Relations". Even though there could be especially noticed after the ops from the winter of 1942, the discrepancies manifested within the Romanian – German military relations had existed from the beginning of the collaboration. Initially, they had not had such proportions and they had not affected in a sensitive manner the military relations established between the two parts. From the winter of 1941, the situation began to deteriorate, because of the way of subordination of the Romanian units. The intrusion of the

German commandments within the leading of the great Romanian departments generated unacceptable situations for the Romania part, such as: the non – observance of the prerogatives of the great Romanian units; the great German units on the battlefield, instead of subordinating to the Romanian army which acted in the region, took the command of the Romanian units and, through measures and orders, provoked "confusions and troubles", aspects revealed through the notes, the reports and the informative syntheses, which can be found through the diplomatic archives. The initial examination through the diplomatic documents or the ones which are under the custody of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ample and difficult due to the large number of the archived sources and of the complexity of the subject whose historic basis should have been confirmed or should have been, on its turn, the basis for a possible re-interpretation of certain facts, events, relations almost intangible from an historiographic perspective, might lead to a series of preliminary conclusions which, partially, confirm the assertions I have already referred to, and partially nuance the facts that had been already known or supposed, stressing a series of data and, finally, coagulating an image not quite clear upon what represented the Romanian-German relations in the period 1940- 1944. Mentioning the fact that the whole image we refer to cannot be naturally obtained unless we use the connected documents found not only through the diplomatic archives, but also through the ones from the Military Archives, the National Archives or the German Archives, as far as the access to them is permitted or possible.

About Strangers and Unknowns. Romanian political Elites Towards Lithuania in the First Years of Independence After 1918

Florin Anghel

Checking a good introduction it can place, also, a truly conclusion: February 16, 1918 – *Independence Act* in Lithuanian Taryba – undoubtely quoted any impression or kind of reaction in the Romanian so-called public opinion or in political elites milieus. None of 1918 Prime Ministers – General Alexandru Averescu (January 29 - March 18) and Alexandru Marghiloman (March 18 – November 6) – had no references in their political diaries about the Vilnius event.[1] Of course, because German occupation in the South (and non-existence of a naming *media*, except official *Bukarester Tageblatt*) and censorships in free North (Iaşi/Jassy), near Russian border, also none of newspapers can't announced the rebirth of Lithuanian state.[2]

In the very beginning of 1918 free-Romania (in the North of country) was in dangerous and complicated political and diplomatic situation. Together with French - trained Romanian armies, Russian (Tsarist) troops of General Scherbachev remained, too, in Moldova because their Allied qualities. Internal evolutions in Russia – March 1917, renewal of Romanian national movement in Bessarabia (seized from Moldova in 1812)[3] and Bolsheviks *coup d'état* – seriousely disturbed political and domestic life of Romanians in Iaşi just because fast Bolshevization of the Russian soldiers and radical propaganda inducing from part of them[4].

All the news from neighbouring Europe, even from Romanian occupied territories, were seriously gap and unconsistents. Critical starvation, epidemics, lack of houses, thousands of hurts and deads, Bolshevik perils, all of them were stopped a good interest for *the others*. Also, from the end of 1917, on the other side of Pruth, Romanian-Russian border from 1812, is settled a Moldavian Republic, Romanian in form, but yet linked from Russian Federation structure and opportunities. Together with little Romanian language elites from Chişinău, Romanian troops and Prime Minister Marghiloman statuated the Union between so-called Democratic Republic of Moldova (Bessarabia) and Kingdom of Romania at March 27, 1918. Decision was voted in a provisional Parliament of Bessarabia, *Sfatul Ţării*, in the same day. A very distinct interests from part of Romanian was coming from part of Bessarabia and its issues linked to Russia and Bolshevik regime and propaganda: it was no **strength** inside a population strictly concerned with domestic life and Russian or German occupation perils.

What were Romanian knewing about Lithuania and Lithuanians before 1914? No more it suppose, except some Medieval incidents regarding Moldavia. So, it was common sense that Voivode (Prince) Alexandru (1400-1432) were married with a sister of a Grand Duke Vytautas, Ringailla. Also, Lithuanian leader preserved a strategic military and commercial fortress on Moldavian Black Sea coast (in Bessarabia), built probably in 1420-1421, near Cetatea Albă city. Vytautas managed its efforts to do an accurate controle of the very important strategic ways between Baltic and Black Sea[5]. Any knowledges about emerging modern Lithuanian nation and state, at the end of XIXth century and beginning of the XXth, not existed in domestic or elitist political debates. A lot of common views about Lithuanians were comes from Polish side – novels, historical poems or writings – and induced a common nation, the so-called *Rzeczpospolita*: many of Romanians still thinked that Lithuania was nothing but a province of Polish *Commonwealth*, as it was Bessarabia for them.

After December 1918, when Romania gained its national unity (by Transylvania's annexation), political elites from Bucharest started to show Entente policies meant to build a *cordon sanitaire* between Baltic and Black Sea towards Red Russia. Most important neighbour became, after one century and a half, Poland: together with Warsaw's Eastern interests, Romanian looking at Russia, Ukraine and the three Baltic States[6]. Also, without any special limits, Romania accepted Poland's inimical policy toward Lithuania. A lot of common information about Baltics arrived in Romania from Warsaw official and scientific milieus. Romanians were heavy conviction induced by their neighbouring ally in the first years after 1918. For example, studying internal or public documents from Foreign Affairs Ministry in all Inter War it can clearly observe Polish semantics for Lithuanian geographical locations such as *Wilno* (and rarely *Vilna*) and not *Vilnius*, *Kowno* and never *Kaunas*, *Druszkieniki* and not *Druskienikai*. A summarily explanation is compulsory: all European regions, cities or other geographics, without special or historical relations with Romanians, have a native semantic in Romanian language. Locations from Sweeden or Latvia, from Finland or Slovakia are, all of them, in these kind of lingvistic solution. Loans are coming, as a rule, from French or Italian (*Londra* in Romanian for *London*, *Praga* for *Prague/Praha*, *Viena* for *Wien*, all of them from French : Londres, Prague, Vienne) and just in Lithuania's case it came, only in Inter War, from Polish. Also, in first months after 1918 end of World War I, Bucharest newspapers and officials made articles and speeches with term *Litva* (from Polish *Litwa*)[7] and no *Lithuania*, common using in Romanian historical discourses.

In 1919-1922 (maybe till 1923, when Pilsudski's projects were failed), Romania ignored the establishment of the independence and international legal status of Lithuania. Because its, Bucharest diplomacy was opened relations with Finland, Latvia and Estonia, with a Legation in Helsinki: it showed, commonly, Polish suggestions. In many times, in 1921-1923, Warsaw tried to convince and to obtain Bucharest's agreement for a military action against Kaunas's army, in accordance – from Polish points of view Lithuania was nothing all but a Soviet pawn – with the stipulations of

defensive bilateral Convention from March 3, 1921, which exclusively regarded Soviet Russia.[8]

Between the summer of 1923 and the next summer, of 1924, several preliminary contacts were made through the legations in Prague between the Romanian and Lithuanian ministers, with Kaunas insistently asking for the establishment of diplomatic relations. Romania, in their part, ended to build its military and diplomatic security projects. From 1921-1922 had threesome alliance in *Little Entente* (together with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia) and a political-military treaty with *Poland*. Also, all of its frontiers (also the Eastern, with Soviet Russia) were recognized by the Allies and, in treaties of St. Germain, Neuilly and Trianon, also from neighbours. Because all of positive these, on August 25, 1923, in answering to a report received from Prague, from Minister Dinu Hiott, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, I.G. Duca, was making that "the other day, Poland requested that we should not resume our relations with Lithuania for the time being"[9] and personally suggested to had a negative position.

Driven to despair by the insistence of Lithuania – government of Kaunas probably hoping that a benevolent attitude from part of Bucharest can somehow release Polish pressures – the Romanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, consulted with much experienced Minister in Warsaw, Alexandru Florescu, in search for a solution, be it partial: "Lithuania has been asking for the establishment of diplomatic relations for a year now. Given her difficulties with Poland, I have postponed an answer. I think it will be difficult for us not to yield to her request now. On the other hand, we do not wish to offend the Poles"[10]. Duca wanted a query made among the officials in Warsaw, in order to prove the reasons for which Romania was recognizing the Lithuanian state were, practically, non existent. "Undoubtely should the Poles continue to object, we shall act on their wish", added the same Romanian Minister for Foreign Affairs[11].

On August 24, 1924, Romania recognized Lithuania officially, being the last Europe state to do so, barring Poland.[12]

Despite this event, the new independent Lithuania preserved a really negative image inside Romanian political elites. Few days before Bucharest recognizing Kaunas officially, in August 2, 1924, the Minister in Warsaw (also credentialed in Riga and Tallinn), Al. Florescu

had a confident appointment with Al. Skrzyński, Under Secretary of State in Foreign Affairs Ministry and former Minister of Poland in Bucharest. Polish official strongly insisted to convince Romanian diplomat to agreed a common military and political action against Soviet Union and Lithuania together, because they were threated Eastern borders (it is on the spirit of Defensive Convention, signed by Take Ionescu and Prince Eustachy Sapieha, on March 3, 1921). Florescu invited to more calm in relations with Kaunas government and rejected the offer to collaborate, denied also a so-called "Sovietisation" of Lithuania. "For me – told Florescu to Skrzyński, noticed any sympathies for Baltic – is now more clear that Lithuania is a very dangerous location in which it should be born the flame of a possible great conflagration, in this corner of Europe. Romania have the sole objective to take away Lithuania from political forces which trying to push Kaunas government in the arms of *together* Germany and Bolshevik Russia".[13]

Not only Al. Florescu perceived in a negative matter Romanian-Lithuanian relations but also his successors in Warsaw (and in most Baltic capitals) and inside Foreign Affairs Ministry. In August 1925, Alexandru Iacovaky, Minister in Warsaw, described to I.G. Duca his distase for all Lithuanian activities: Iacovaky was in Warsaw from 1919 and had a good and important Polish education and relations in political and aristocratic milieus. His letter to Duca is more suggestive because it reflected a common opinion – proposed only by Poland – inside Romanians. "Xenophobe Lithuanians – wrote Iacovaky -, who induced complete nationalist principles, had no interests to encouraged a development for German trading in Memel. Contrary, the Lithuanians had more interest to manage an economic and social impoverishment for the Germans of the city. If in future these Lithuanians will have even a little success on the way of economic development of the country, all German influences surely will disappear and losing its importance".[14]

Contrary with anti-Lithuanian points of views in many diplomatic actions of Bucharest – most of them given by ignorance or pressures from Warsaw – it can clearly emerged, from the second half of the '20's, a special interest for strategic points of Romanian diplomacy in Eastern Europe, in accordance to obtain and

processing information and connections about and with the Soviets. Until June 1934, Romania had any relations (diplomatic also) with U.S.S.R. and at its Bessarabian borders it preserved a permanent state of war. Riga argued exceptional importance by the fact that two of Romanian Ministers in Latvian capital – Prince Mihail Sturdza (1929-1935) and Grigore Niculescu-Buzeşti (1939-1940) – becames some years after Ministers for Foreign Affairs, in 1940-1941 and respectively in 1944. Romania clearly searched regional allies to complete, together Poland, the *cordon sanitaire* and defends Eastern borders against a Soviet attack: a negative opinion toward Lithuania blocked a benefit bilateral cooperation. Political and military alliance together Poles turned out to be most invincible in comparison with the unknown Lithuanians.

At the end of February and beginning of March 1925, in one of his special mission in Riga, Al. Iacovaky (with residence in Warsaw) connected a lot of confidential meetings with Latvian President Janis Cakste and his Minister for Foreign Affairs, Zigfrids Meierovics. Benevolent attidude was visible: Iacovaky nicknamed Meierovics as "Beneš of the Baltics" and insisted that the two countries must built a strongly "cordon" between Baltic and Black Sea against Soviets. Now, in Riga, Romanian diplomat heard all good news that he wanted to heard. Čakste and Meierovics indicated that Latvia can sustaine Romania in the efforts to repress Soviet propaganda against Romanian administration in Bessarabia[15]. On the same appointment, the two Latvians strengthened Romanian opinion, nominating Lithuania as a "real danger" for the regional *status-quo* and in common interests to keep U.S.S.R. out of European politics.

Coup d'etat of December 1926, led by Antanas Smetona and Augustinas Voldemaras, at a few months after the same challenge in Warsaw, had no good impact at Bucharest. Common opinions here were focused at foreign policy of the two leaders and indicated that it was settled a "Nationalist" dictatorship. Followed his anti- Polish speeches and opinions, Prime Minister Voldemaras catched a image of a "will of war", an "agent of Soviet propaganda", "anti-Versailles", "defender of Red Star", etc. In any milieus, because Voldemaras attitude, nobody tried to be politically correct or to understood the real reasons of December 1926 challenge in

Kaunas. Hating anti Polish Voldemaras, Romanian officials built a deformed view of entire state and regime. For example, in February 1927, General Alexandru Averescu, Prime Minister, read a conclusive **rapport** made from Special Political **Department** of Foreign Affairs Ministry. According to this document, "in Kaunas the dictatorship raised all Lithuanians against it, except the unpoverish rural population, **unanimously** inert in its political and national issues. This no democratic political regime searching, on the will of development, to **strengthen** some fascist organizations such as *Iron Wolf*. Also, we must be sure that now the Lithuanians are better connections with U.S.S:R., especially between Voldemaras and Kremlin".[16]

Augustinas Voldemaras, better like any Lithuanian, became a very known name in stranger political elites of Bucharest. Also, more even Hungarian leaders – Albert Apponyi, Pal Teleki, Miklos Horthy, Istvan Bethlen – (and, remember, Hungary claimed in many times negotiations about territorial clauses of Trianon Peace Treaty!), Prime Minister Voldemaras turned into a expiates off all European revisionist.

Nicolae Iorga[17] is the most important Romanian historian; also, he was a politician, Prime Minister in 1931-1932, President of little National Democratic Party, member in Parliament. His influence, even at the Royal Palace, was vast. On the same, Iorga was representative for Polish lobby and for Romanian-Polish relations historians. In his capacity as a intimate friend of Marshal Pilsudski he was at Warsaw, in 1924, in spite of President Stanisław Wojciechowski's suggestions, just for encouraged the former chief of state retired at Sulejówek.[18] Two years ago after, in his newspaper, *Neamul românesc* ("Romanian People"), same Iorga wrote an incisive article, *Tratatul cu Polonia* ("Treaty with Poland") in which claimed "creation of a entire Romanian-Polish system, in all domains, against Marxist Russia and its friends"[19].

In Spring 1928, after Voldemaras-Pilsudski meeting at League of Nations, in early December, Iorga started a famous and strongly anti Lithuanian press .campaign in his *Neamul românesc*. In one of the articles, *Între Polonia și Lituania* ("Between Poland and Lithuania"), in August 17, 1928, it displayed a really indictment against Voldemaras, portrayed as a "stupid and foolish politician". This idiot – indicated Iorga –

"makes a continuously war of diplomatic *aide-mémoire*-s against the Poles". Voldemaras, who can't predicted anything except "war", "blood" and "revenge", had nothing but a "very little presidential temperament". "New diplomacy of this Voldemaras – drew a conclusion the quoted author – undoubtedly contains brilliant inventions. Excepting juridical formulas as *my land* and *your land* (Iorga had references to Vilnius question) which existed until now in all debates and minds, Lithuania is striving to induce a non existent but proclaimed so-new international law article as is *land reserving for negotiations*".[20]

It is not to be wondered that Voldemaras fall, in September 1929, has been received with a lot of relief: that whoever admitted Lithuania not recognize Versailles treaties system because did not signed now have not the power. Ministers in Warsaw and Riga quickly reported, day after day, about political evolutions in Kaunas without Voldemaras and made suppositions about the future foreign policy. Charismatic Prime Minister Iuliu Maniu can read, into a report from Legation in Warsaw, some hours after the challenge, that "this is the end of obstinate and persevering motion of Lithuania between Berlin and Moscow".[21] "This country – is written after in the report – have now, last but not least, an opportunity to choice, for future, just a normal evolution".[22] New Prime Minister Juozas Tubialis received, from Romanian diplomats in Latvia and Poland, just an non-exist **favorable** perceptions: after anti-Versailles and anti Polish Voldemaras nothing can will be same in the worse sense. Nicolae Lukasiewicz, chargee d'affaires in Poland, after a meeting in Kaunas with Tubialis, informed Prime Minister Maniu, on October 6, 1929, that "Romania can move its Baltic interests from Riga to Kaunas". Tubialis, insisted Lukasiewicz, was a "very upright and well-balanced man, with a high culture and intelligence, a open mind and very friendly with us".[23] Romanian government can input trust in Kaunas but it was necessary – it resumed the new opinions – to convince Warsaw for a new policy in Baltic Republic because the same Tubialis "have not compulsory vigor" for assigned a "correctly political destination"[24] (it means, of course, a Lithuania without its alliance with U.S.S.R.).

Romanian political elites – except Right Orthodox Nationalist "Iron Guard" and the little illegal Communist Party – expressed in all Inter

War a kind of dogma for Versailles peace treaties system, for territorial *status-quo* after 1919-1920 and alliance with France, Poland and Little Entente. Because these, Bucharest fears that Lithuanian starts to broke political and diplomatic isolationism in the '20's together with a help from Berlin and Moscow is almost certain to lift its security. Prime Minister Voldemaras speech, in April 2, 1928, in which it advanced that Poland and Versailles treaties were a menace for his country were taking a hard line against Romanian willingness to engage a negotiation with Kaunas.[25] When, in February 25, 1927 Voldemaras also told about Poland as "a dangerous enemy of Lithuanian independence, greater as the Bolsheviks one"[26], Romanians were most concerned about possible passing to war. Earlier, two years before, Latvian President Janis Čakste condemned Lithuanian foreign policy and encouraged emergent interests of Romania for Baltic region adopted a similar position toward *status-quo*. At that time, in Spring 1925, Čakste increased distrust in Kaunas in expressing his fears just to Al. Iacovaky, Minister in Warsaw and Riga: Lithuania will be an enemy in a possible Red Army's attack on Poland, Romania and Latvia. "A Soviet war for the seizure of Bessarabia – insisted Čakste – will be the end of Latvia".[27]

Another issue of a bilateral disagreement was after a long private trip in Transylvania and on the Black Sea coast of Marshal Pilsudski, in August-October 1928. First *Lietuvos aidas* and after a lot of newspapers from Germany, Austria, Switzerland and Sweden claimed about a military secret alliance between Warsaw and Bucharest against Lithuania and U.S.S.R.[28]

Minister in Berlin, Nicolae Petrescu-Comnen, had violently condemned Baltic insults in a report of March 12, 1929 written to G.G. Mironescu, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Comnen urged an appointment to his Lithuanian omologue: he sustained that *Lietuvos aidas* allegations were nothing but "inventions" and "dirties".[29] Comnen also continued that Kaunas unexpected assertions made a lot of troubles for Romanian diplomacy in Germany as in Austria or Hungary.[30]

Although both nations and states remained deeply coldly, from the end of the '20's, at the same time with above allegations, it can argue efforts to establish a kind of partnership. These were increasing efforts of Prince Mihail Sturdza,

Minister in Riga (with accreditations also in Kaunas and Tallinn) from 1929 until 1935, who has been taken attack. Sturdza argued in his first reports from Riga the necessity for a challenge in relations with Lithuania: it must formed warm ties towards Great Powers dangers. "We have now a very narrow influence and opportunities in Lithuania – wrote Sturdza, in 1931, to his Minister for Foreign Affairs – and we have any chance to be a close partner of this country. Lithuanians – despite Polish allegations – strenghted a fair balance between Germany and U.S.S.R. and Romanians must learn from the Kaunas all skills which serving to a survive inside the chaos after 1918"[31]. The future Minister for Foreign Affairs (in September 1940-January 1941) have tried to put a favorable spin on events, insisting for "intermitente presence of a Romanians in Kaunas" which would be "providential".[32] Just in 1934, together with Estonia, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nicolae Titulescu, agreed the establishment of a Legation in Lithuania.

In all Inter War, any Romanian officials (except some diplomats) never visited Lithuania; on the same, any Lithuanian not come in Romania. Maybe Eduardas Turanskas, Minister in Bucharest, with residence in Prague, was the only. There were not focused any interests in cultural, economic, scientific domains: a sole symbolic Commercial Convention, signed in Berlin, on March 28, 1931, was a ridiculous impact.

There were in Romania any texts, between the two World Wars, about Lithuanian history or civilization, any translation from Lithuanian literature, any scientific debate for knowing Baltic people and country: in Romanian language, just short and very partial articles in some newspapers included knowledges about Kaunas politics, especially and ever bounded of a pro-Polish attitude, in no matter issue. The so-named N. Iorga traveled, in Spring and Summer of 1924, in Poland and its Lithuanian region, exactly at Vilnius: he is a sole Romanian, before 1937-1938, in a such situation. Single in Inter War literature was Iorga's text about Lithuania in a short chapter, "A corner of Lithuania", included in his Polish diary, *Note polone* ("A Polish Memoirs"). In his edited and quoted memoirs, it appear violent refuse to visite Kaunas because of the "political hysteria" in this location, in 1923-1924. Iorga wrote about provisional Baltic capital

as that an "artificial" one, without any "tradition and power", in where lived just "common people quickering to have a fast career and whom Lithuanized common and legendary Polish names and locations because their domestic goals"[33]. Iorga, the most important Romanian historian, abandoned his professional conscience and proved strongly Polish version: naming Lithuanian Inter War capital was nothing but a "center of Germans hatred towards reborn Poland".[34] When he wrote, in the same text, about Vilnius, the historian exulted looking at "the truely location of Polonity and Christianity in all Eastern Europe".[35] As Visiting Professor at Vilnius University, in June 1924, Iorga made two courses: *Idea of Crussade in European South-East* and *Folk Poetry in Romania*. Also, his opinions, in political ones, were printed in many important Polish newspapers, such as *Rzeczpospolita* or *Kurjer Poranny*, without any mentions about neighboring Lithuania. At the end, in July 1924, Tadeusz Glixelli, Rector of Vilnius University, awarded *Doctor Honoris*

Causa to N. Iorga, sole Romanian until now with this distinction in a Lithuanian university.

Just after 1918 – when Romanians and Lithuanians built their own national project – there were any focus to Kaunas inside Bucharest politics. It's talk not only about ignorance and indifference in a premise of the conclusion. Strategic Romanian-Polish partnership, statuated on Defensive Convention of March 3, 1921 was, certainly, one of the most important in projecting Romanian diplomacy on Eastern and Baltic areas. Because a lot of issues in neighboring frontiers, until the end of the '30's governments and politicians from Bucharest and Kaunas never thought some perspectives of bilateral relations and interest. From Romanian side it was certain structural incapacity to exceed, many years after peace treaties of 1919-1920 signatures, a clearly and stabile strategy, except *status-quo* and its security. Diplomats, politicians, cultural and political elites together ceaseless refused to broke barriers between the two countries and nations.

NOTES:

[1] See: Alexandru Averescu, *Notiţe zilnice din război, 1916-1918*, Bucureşti, 1928 and Alexandru Marghiloman, *Note politice*, vol. 3 (1918-1919), Bucureşti, 1995.

[2] About German occupation in Bucharest in 1916-1918 is very informing and suggesting the Sabina Cantacuzino's diary (she is Liberal Prime Minister Ion I.C. Brătianu's sister), *Războiul, 1914-1919*, Bucureşti, 1937.

[3] About 1917-1918 in Bessarabia see diaries and documents from: Petre Cazacu, *Moldova dintre Prut şi Nistru, 1812-1918*, Chişinău, 1992; Ştefan Ciobanu, *Unirea Basarabiei. Studii şi documente cu privire la mişcarea naţională din Basarabia în anii 1917-1918*, Chişinău, 1993; Onisifor Ghibu, *În vâltoarea revoluţiei ruseşti*, Chişinău, 1995; Dimitrie Bogos, *La răspântie. Moldova de la Nistru, 1917-1918*, Chişinău, 1998; I.Levit, *Republica Moldovenească (1917-1918)*, Chişinău, 2002.

[4] See, for a good view: Regina Maria a României (Queen Maria of Romania), *Povestea vieţii mele*, vol. 3, Iaşi, 1991; N. Iorga, *O viaţă de om aşa cum a fost*, Bucureşti, 1985; A.A. Mosolov, *Misiunea mea în România, Curtea Imperială a Rusiei şi Curtea Regală a României în timpul războiului*, Bucureşti, 1997, p. 139-151. Mossolov was Russian Minister in Romania in 1916-1918.

[5] For Moldavian-Lituanian relations see: Constatin Rezachievici, *Ringala - Ana. Un episod dinastic în relaţiile moldo-polone-lituaniene din vremea lui Alexandru cel Bun*, în "Revista de Istorie", 8, 1982, p. 917-923; Constantin Cihodariu, *Alexandru cel Bun*, Iaşi, 1984; Virgil Ciocâltan, *Raporturi moldo-lituaniene, 1420-1429*, in volume "Românii în istoria universală" (ed. Gheorghe Buzatu), Iaşi, 1988, p. 129-143.

[6] See, for Romanian policy: Florin Anghel, *Construirea sistemului "cordon sanitaire". Relaţii româno-polone, 1919-1926*, Cluj-Napoca, 2003. See also Silviu Miloiu, *România şi Ţările Baltice în perioada interbelică*, Târgovişte, 2002.

[7] In Old Romanian language, Pagans/ non Christians were *Lifte*, from *Litva* in Polish.

[8] Florin Anghel, *op. cit.*, passim.

[9] Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe (after A.M.A.E.), fond 71/ 1920-1944 Lithuania, vol. 4, p. 251. About this moment, in Lithuania see Florin Anghel, *Polish Influences in the Baltic Demarches of Romanian Diplomacy, 1920-1930*, in "Lithuanian Historical Studies", 4, 1999, p. 83-94.

[10] A.M.A.E., fond 71/ 1920-1944 Lithuania, vol. 4, p. 253. Report 38111/ July 20, 1924 from I.G. Duca (Bucharest) to Alexandru Florescu (Warsaw).

[11] Ibidem.

[12] Ibidem, p. 254.

[13] Ibidem, p. 255. Raport nr. 3358/ August 3, 1924 from Alexandru Florescu (Warsaw) to I.G. Duca (Bucharest).

[14] A.M.A.E., fond 71/ 1920-1944 Polonia, vol. 49, f. 138. Raport nr. 3412/ August 26, 1925 from Alexandru Iacovaky (Warsaw) to I.G. Duca (Bucharest).

[15] Idem, fond 71/ 1920-1944 Letonia, vol. 8, p. 44-45. Raport nr. 2/ March 2, 1925 from Al. Iacovaky (Riga) to I.G. Duca (Bucharest). Also, for some aspects of Romanian-Latvian relations in the Inter War, see Florin Anghel, *Starp paraleliem spoguliem: Rumanijas un Latvijas attiecibas starpkaru laika*, in "Latvijas arhivi", Riga, 4, 1999, p. 83-94 (with gratitude for Eriks Jekabsons translate and help).

[16] A.M.A.E., fond 71/1920-1944 Lituania, vol. 2, p. 74-75.

[17] Born in 1871 and executed in November 27, 1940 by Extreme Right *Iron Guard* fellows, N.Iorga representing, until now, the idea of *Encyclopedia* in Romanian culture.

[18] N. Iorga, *op. cit.*, p. 456.

[19] Idem, *Tratatul cu Polonia*, în "Neamul românesc", an XXI, nr. 73, 30.03.1926.

[20] N. Iorga, *Între Polonia și Lituania*, în "Neamul românesc", nr 181, 17.08.1928.

[21] A.M.A.E., fond 71/1920-1944 Lituania, vol. 2, p. 97.

[22] Ibidem.

[23] Ibidem, p. 98. Report nr. 6496/ October 6, 1929 from Nicolae Lukasiewicz (Warsaw) to Iuliu Maniu (Bucharest).

[24] Ibidem.

[25] Concerning after Voldemaras intervention were quickly reported also in diplomatic system. A.M.A.E., fond 71/1920-1944 Lituania, vol. 4, p. 103-105. Memorandum of Special Political Department from Foreign Affairs Ministry for Prime Minister Vintilă I.C. Brătianu, June 29, 1928. Quoted speech also at Alfred Erich Senn, *The Great Powers, Lithuania and the Vilna Question*, Leiden, 1966, p. 211.

[26] Speech quoted at E.J. Harrisson, *Lithuania*, 1928, p. 55.

[27] A.M.A.E., fond 71/1920-1944, Letonia, vol. 8, p. 62-63.

[28] Idem, fond 71/1920-1944 Polonia, vol. 53, p.180-183.

[29] Ibidem, p. 176.

[30] Ibidem.

[31] Idem, fond 71/1920-1944 Lituania, vol. 4, p. 262. See also, Mihail Sturdza, *România și sfârșitul Europei. Amintiri din țara pierdută*, Alba Iulia – Paris, 1994, p. 65.

[32] A.M.A.E., fond 71/1920-1944 Lituania, vol. 4, p. 294-295.

[33] N. Iorga, *Un colț din Lituania*, in vol. "Pe drumuri depărtate",edited by Valeriu Rapcanu,I, București, 1987, p. 535-538.

[34] *Ibidem*, p. 556.

[35] *Ibidem*, p. 537.

Institutul pentru studii politice de apărare şi istorie militară, România – UE. Cronologie 1989-2005 (*La Romania – UE, La cronologia 1989-2005*), Editura Militară, Bucuresti, 2006, 630 pg.

Il primo gennaio del 2007 l'Unione Europea ha accolto due nuovi Stati membri e 30 milioni di cittadini. Con l'adesione della Bulgaria e della Romania, si è conclusa la quinta tappa dell'allargamento dell'UE che ha consentito di riunire pacificamente l'Europa dell'est e dell'ovest dopo decenni di divisione.

L'integrazione nella NATO e nell'Unione Europea ha rappresentato due grandi obiettivi, due grandi provocazioni per la politica estera romena, dopo il 1989. Entrambi questi processi si sono finalizzati con tanto successo, il primo nel 2004, e il secondo, come abbiamo detto, il primo gennaio 2007, quindi possiamo dire che l'importanza di questo volume non deve passare inosservato. Questo volume non fa altro che completare la leterattura romena di specialità, non cosi tanto rappresentata nel campo della costruzione e dell'integrazione europea.

Romania ha presentato la richiesta d'ingresso nell'UE nel 1995 ed ha iniziato i negoziati per l'adesione nel 2000. Le trattative si sono concluse con successo nel dicembre del 2004 e il Trattato di adesione è stato firmato nell'aprile del 2005. Nel suo ultimo rapporto sulla Romania, diffuso il 26 settembre 2006, la Commissione ha stabilito che la Romania è sufficientemente pronta per assumersi gli obblighi derivanti dall'ingresso nell'UE. Per affrontare il limitato numero di aree nelle quali saranno necessari ulteriori sforzi, l'Ue ha adottato un pacchetto di misure di salvaguardia. Tali disposizioni, relative all'economia, alla giustizia e agli affari interni, consentiranno di porre rimedio alle difficoltà incontrate in seguito all'adesione.

La complessità del processo d'integrazione nell' Unione Europea è dovuta,da una parte,alla necessità di cambiamento nella società romena e dall'altra parte, L'Unione Europea si trovava, per la prima volta nella sua storia, in una permanente dinamica, le sue estensioni, la profondità del processo dell'integrazione, e l'applicazione delle sue politiche comuni hanno determinato la sua evoluzione in un ritmo affrettato.

Questo volume rappresenta uno strumento di lavoro di grande valore per i ricercatori e per i futuri specialisti del campo, per quanto riguarda un'attenta raccolta d'informazioni, nell'intento di realizzare un'analisi dettagliata della storia d'integrazione della Romania nelle strutture comunitari. Il volume ha presso la forma di una cronologia succinta delle azioni fatte da parte della Romania, puntando su quei elementi che hanno disegnato la politica estera romena verso l'integrazione europea, per il periodo 1989-2005.

Il volume contiene, al suo fine, un'impressionabile materiale bibliografico.I documenti diplomatici presentati in questo volume possono diventare, nello stesso tempo, anche un indispensabile supporto per i corsi ed i seminari universitari di specialità.

È vero che questo volume sorprende soltanto una sezione della storia dell'integrazione europea, cioè il rapporto tra la Romania e le istituzioni comunitari. L'intero campo della costruzione ed dell'integrazione europea è troppo vasto e solo una ricerca settoriale può avere, alla fine, i migliori risultati.

Cosi come gli autori dichiarano, questo volume ha il merito di portare anche un aspetto di novità, cioè ci sono presentati i principali aspetti politici-militari e di sicureza del processo dell'integrazione, dell'armonizzazione della sua politica estera con la Politica Estera e di Sicurezza Comune (PESC)

Dobbiamo riccordare anche il fatto che questo Istituto di ricerca ha realizzato, avendo la stessa metodologia, il volume *La Romania – NATO. La coronologia 1989-2004.*

Finalmente, il volume si sta rivolgendo a tutti coloro che vogliono imparare le nozioni fondamentali del processo dell'integrazione della Romania nell'Europa unita, perchè ognuno possa costruire e sostenere la sua propria concezione sull'Europa allargata.

Mihaela Mustăţea

On the significance of *The Theory of International Politics*, Kenneth N. Waltz – *The Theory of International Politics* (translation, *Teoria politicii internationale*, Polirom, Iaşi, 2006)

The Theory of International Politics by Kenneth N. Waltz is one of the basic books for the IR students and represents a cornerstone for the development of the realist tradition in IR studies in the last three decades. Published in 1979, the book re-launched the realist research, which has been referred to as neo-realism or structural realism. It is also a book that fits its historical and literature context: the decade in which the state's power as well as the military power in the international realm were relatively contested and the concept of interdependence was making much sense of the international politics events.[1] Yet, Waltz generated a parsimonious and persuasive paradigm that contradicts the interdependence and the multidimensional approach and shows what is central in the international politics. Waltz systematizes political realism into a rigorous, deductive systemic theory of international politics that can be characterized by the following features: the **international structure** that has two constant elements and one variable; the two constant characteristics that are **the units** (state-actors) and **the anarchy**; the variable that is **the distribution of power** or the distribution of the capabilities. In the end, the distribution of power defines the main feature of the structure, and the structure influences decisively units/states' behavior. The re-launch of the cold war dynamic in the 1980s through arms race between the super-powers confirmed that the distribution of power between competing units in the international anarchical structure is paramount. However, after three decades of tremendous shifts in the international politics and impressive build-ups of perspectives from new theoretical enterprises in IR studies, one can ask *why this book is still valuable* or *why this book is still helpful for our understanding of the international world?*

I center the answer to these questions on three points: first, Waltz's theory of international politics is not only a paradigm but the centerpiece of a research program that has been developed since then; second, the neo-realist research program sparked from the beginning a vivid polemic that has generated scientific progress; and third, it raises important critical questions regarding the actual dynamics of international politics.

Neo-realism: the research program

The principal merit of the *Theory of International Politics* is the initiation of a new research program in IR study (broadly) and realist tradition (particularly).[2] Waltz's theoretical propositions

[1] The international context in the 1970s has been characterized (among others) by the *détente*, the oil crisis, and the defeat of the United States in the Vietnam War. On *complex inter-dependence* see Keohane, Robert and Joseph Nye (1977, 2001 3rd reprint) *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, New York: Longman.

[2] It is preferable the term realist tradition because the realist thinking in IR studies comprises more than one theory. For details I suggest: Gilpin, Robert (1986) "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism" in Robert Keohane (Ed.)

have been empirical tested and then developed as the basis for new theories.[3] The main cause for this is that the *Theory of International Politics* is mainly a parsimonious endeavor: by combining microeconomic and systemic theories, it limits the abstract construction to a limited number of elements which are considered as the most revealing aspects that define the world politics. Waltz does not deny the existence of other phenomena or processes that impact on world politics, but he selects the most important and relevant factors.[4] The core assumptions of his theory are made of falsifiable propositions, which are rigorously abstracted but sustained only by examples, not by wide empirical testing.[5] *Waltzian* neo-realism began to represent a veritable research program because its assumptions have been empirically tested by other researchers and the results have achieved refined theoretical claims. The examples are very vast, so that I select only one interesting example: the refinement of Waltz's theory of structural balance of power by the theory of balance of threat.[6] One of the propositions that results from the international anarchical structure (or the self-help system) is that units/states tend to balance against each other in order to survive. Waltz's assumption is that states balance against power *per se*, the balance of power being a structural cause of the power distribution. Yet, the theory of the balance of threat -- resulting from empirical testing -- refines this assumption adding that states balance not only against power but also according to the perceived threats.

The paradigm of scientific progress is conceived by the philosopher of science Lakatos.[7] He conceptualizes the research program and the difference between progressive and degenerative research programs. The distinction rests in making the difference between the research program's core propositions and the protective belt propositions. The example of the refinement from the balance of power to the balance of threat shows that the latter does not refute the core propositions of Waltz's systemic paradigm (it is even based on them), but refutes a supplementary paradigm which is identified as being part of the protective belt. The balance of threat theory indicates the progressive potential of *Waltzian* paradigm.

Yet, Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* is not free from critical and intellectual contestation that targets its core proposition and, more specifically, its explanatory and predictability power.

"Neo-realism and its critics"

Neorealism and Its Critics was published in 1986[8] and comprised the current (by that time) academic debate generated by Waltz's new successful research program. Like *The Theory of International Politics*, it has been reprinted several times (the last time in 2004!) and includes four chapters of Waltz's book, articles from top American academic journals and Waltz's answer to its

Neorealism and Its Critics, New York: Columbia University Press; Walt, Stephen (2005) "The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition" in Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner (Eds) *Political science: the state of the discipline*, New York, Washington: Norton, American Political Science Association; and Mearsheimer, John J. (2001) *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company, p.17-23.

[3] On the impact of Waltz's structural realism on different branches of neo-realism (offensive and defensive realism) see Walt (2005), *ibid.* and Mearsheimer (2001), *ibid.*

[4] Waltz, Kenneth (1986) "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: Response to My Critics" in Robert Keohane (Ed.) *Neorealism and Its Critics*, New York: Columbia University Press.

[5] Walt (2005), *idem* p.204

[6] Walt, Stephen (1988), "Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia", *International Organization*, 42 (2): p. 275-316.

[7] Lakatos, Imre (1974), "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes", in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Eds) *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, Cambridge; Cambridge University Press. See also references regarding the research programs in IR studies in Keohane, Robert (1986) "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond," in Robert Keohane (Ed.) *Neorealism and Its Critics*, New York: Columbia University Press.

[8] Robert Keohane (Ed.) (1986) *Neorealism and Its Critics*, New York: Columbia University Press.

critics. *Neorealism and its critics* is far from bringing the fine and inspiring intellectual debate revolving around neo-realism to a conclusion. The sequence of studies, coordinated books and articles consisting of the debate between critics of neo-realism and neo-realist theoreticians continues till nowadays and confirms the real value of developing competing paradigms. It is not the purpose of this review to sum up all the critical perspectives on the neo-realist research program. I would rather point out how the academic debate on neo-realism contributes to scientific enrichment. Two IR research agendas have been conceived and crystallized as competing with neo-realism: neo-liberal institutionalism and social constructivism.[9]

Neo-liberal institutionalist paradigm contradicts primary the structural anarchy outcomes that Waltz conceives. In *Waltzian* terms, the anarchy as a constant feature of the international structure generates competition for security among the state-units (only in a hierarchical structure the units do no compete for security). At their turn neo-liberal researchers contextualize cases in which the security competition is overrun by international institutions that have the ability to assure the member states of absolute gains stemming from institutionalized cooperation.[10] The competition of arguments between the two research programs has been widely known as the *neo-neo debate*.[11] While the arguments on both sides have been clarified, we can identify the opposite points of view, the partial disagreements/agreements and the common elements. The latter tends to bring both programs on a common rationalistic framework of thinking in IR studies, which could lead to complementarity as a *neo-neo synthesis*.[12]

Contrary to neo-liberal institutionalism, which shares common ontological ground with neo-realism, social constructivism is different as a meta-theory. Researchers using the constructivist theoretical framework in IR studies conceive the sources of international phenomena as rooted in inter-subjective and collectively constructed meanings among interacting actors.[13] The application of the constructivist agenda in IR studies is considerable, especially in various empirical studies. Yet, the constructivist theoretical approaches have been stimulated by *Walztian* neo-realism by employing similar systemic or structural abstraction. The title of the famous Wendt's *Social*

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[9] For the parsimony of the article I chose a limited description of these research agendas. For details I make references to the relevant literature.

[10] On neo-liberal institutionalism see: Keohane, Robert and Lisa Martin (1995) "The Promise of Institutional Theory," *International Security*, 20(1): 39-51; Keohane, Robert (1993) "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after the Cold War," in David A. Baldwin (Ed.) *Neorealism and Neoliberalism The Contemporary Debate*, New York: Columbia University Press; and Axelrod, Robert and Robert O. Keohane (1993) "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," in David A. Baldwin (Ed.) *Neorealism and Neoliberalism. The Contemporary Debate*, New York: Columbia University Press. A very interesting critical assessment on neo-liberalism from the neo-realist perspective is Mearsheimer, John J. (1994) "The false promise of international institutions," *International security*, 19(3): 5-45; and (1995) "A Realist Reply", *International Security*, 20(1): "Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin: Realists by Any Other Name..." 85-87.

[11] See also Jervis, Robert (1999) "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate," *International Security*, 24(1): 44-63.

[12] The common rationalistic framework for both neo-realism and neo-liberalism in IR studies is based on the general perspective of international politics in which states are the principal actors operating in an anarchical environment. States are visualized as egoistic actors which behave based on rational calculation and maximizing utility seeking. See Keohane, Robert (1986) "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond," in Robert Keohane (Ed.) *Neorealism and Its Critics*, New York: Columbia University Press. and (1988) "International Institutions: Two Approaches," *International Studies Quarterly*, 32(4): 379-396; Waever, Ole (1996) "The Rise and Fall of the Inter-Paradigm Debate," in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (Eds.) *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pg.166-67; see also Kahler, Miles (1998) "Rationality in International Relations," *International Organization*, 52(4): 919–941.

[13] On constructivism in IR studies see Adler, Emanuel (2003) "Constructivism and International Relations," in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (Eds.) *Handbook of International Relations*, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications; and Hopf, Ted (1998) "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security*, 23(1): 171-200.

Theory of International Politics[14] mirrors an alternative perspective to Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*.

The constructivist alternative to neo-realism is mainly based on the concept of identity, which is socially constructed at the structural level and can generate three different types of patterns: the "competitive system" in which states identify negatively with each other's security (that can be called the "Hobbesian system"); the "individualistic" system in which states are still self-regarding to their security, but the collective gains generated by cooperation are their primary target; and the "cooperative" security system in which each other's security is perceived as the collective responsibility. The implication of the identity element changes entirely the constant element of anarchy conceived by Waltz that triggers permanent security competition among the units. Widening the constructivist perspective at the sub-systemic/regional level, the researchers in the field have contributed with two new important perspectives: the security community and the regional security complex theories.[15]

It should be added that the constructivist perspective on neo-realism challenges and re-conceptualizes security under two inter-related propositions: security is embedded in meanings and discourse; and security could be classified under a sectorial logic: military, political, economic, social and environmental security.[16]

Both constructivism in IR studies and neo-liberalism criticize neo-realism of not being flexible on explaining and predicting shifts in the dynamic of world politics.

Neo-realism at the turning point

While the major shift from the Cold War to the post-Cold War epoch, or in systemic terms from the bipolar to unipolar era, confronted neo-realist research program at the predictive level[17] at the turn of the 21st century, the major challenge emerges at the explanatory level targeting the whole range of features that frame structural realism. The neo-realist agenda is pressed to expand its explanatory panel and includes new perspectives on **units, anarchy** and the **distribution of power**.

One of the two constant elements of the structure is the **units,** which are conceived in *Waltzian* terms as states.[18] However, two significant processes at the turn of the 21st century confront seriously this parsimonious view:

First, the terrorist networks, especially Al Qaeda, are on the high security agenda of the sole superpower of the system, United States of America, and of other great powers. Their military capabilities are engaged in brutal battles on fronts such as in Iraq and Afghanistan. Regional powers are sustained by the United States to attack and suppress Al Qaeda bases through military power projection in neighboring states.[19] Al Qaeda is a transnational actor who breeds not only in

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[14] Wendt, Alexander (1999) *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[15] Adler, Emanuel and Michael Barnet (Eds) (1998) *Security Communities*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; and Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever (2003) *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[16] Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde (1998) *Security A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder, CO: Lynnne Riener.

[17] See examples of prediction failure: Mearsheimer, John J. (1990) "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security*, 15(2): 15-64.and Waltz, Kenneth N. (1993) "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security*, 18(2): 44-80.

[18] Waltz conceives also other type of units than states in an expanded historical perspective, but for the modern times the actual structure is formed by unit-states.

[19] See the example of Ethiopia which sent its army to Somalia.

failed states but also in functional states, as the Madrid and London attacks show. Thus, Al Qaeda and similar terrorist networks that are engaged in major military conflicts with great powers should be included in the explanatory spectrum of the neo-realist research program. Powerful terrorist networks impact dramatically on the international system, are upgraded on the security agenda of the most powerful states in the system, and perform on military fronts.

Second, the European Union (EU) represents a very sophisticated cluster of states with great economic power and security actorness in progress. The EU is not a state and does not seem to develop in this direction. It is not an international organization in its classical/accepted meaning and it is not a military alliance/alignment. Yet, the EU is present in international economy and the slow but evident progress in developing its diplomatic and security capabilities (which add to the existing impressive economic capabilities) point out that a new kind of actor is active in the international landscape. The more relevance will add to its diplomatic and security presence in world politics the more EU will become an anomaly for the neo-realist research program. Neo-realist researchers would lose an important impetus for expanding the neo-realist explanatory power if they wait till EU will be more alike to a state, because this has high chances not to happen.

The EU links this critical assessment to the second constant element that defines the international structure, which is **anarchy**. The empirical data on the member states that form the EU can determine a new research question for an expanded neo-realist agenda: which are the conditions that trigger the exit from security competition, given the constant element of anarchy? This research question would transcend the inflexible proposition that the security competition exit is possible only in a hierarchical system. It would also make an important bridge with the neo-liberal research, which I already mentioned, that has meta-theoretical affinities with neo-realism. The up till now neo-realist analyses on EU are unpersuasive or they lack an in-depth scrutiny.[20]

Finally, the variable of the structure, that is the **capabilities distribution**, poses a special problem regarding the current implication of the unipolar moment. After seventeen years of unipolarity, neo-realist thinkers have failed to predict and to explain the survival of the NATO as a collective defence organization without an existing enemy. Moreover, they have conceptualized poorly the latent trend to balance among units in a unipolar systemic environment. The latter refers to a very promising new paradigm in the neo-realist research program, specifically to the soft balance of power theory.[21] However, the new paradigm proposes an over-stretched empirical base and it seems that almost any diplomatic dispute between the great powers on one hand and the United States on the other hand would imply the soft balance of power behavior. That includes, among other disagreements in the UN Security Council, economic competition and even the formation of the European Union Security and Defence Policy.[22] More refinement, focusing on the rigorous selection of what goes in or out in a soft balancing action, would be needed within the new soft balance paradigm.

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[20] See Art, Robert J. (1996) "Why Western Europe Need the United States and NATO" *Political Science Quarterly* 111(1): 1-39; and Gegou, Catherine (2005) "Causes and Consequences of the EU's Military Intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Realist Explanation," *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 10: 427-433. Art wants to point out that the US forces maintained in Western Europe after the Cold War in order to assure the peace between the Great Powers there. Gegou tries to prove that the European Security and Defence Policy is designed by France as an European alignment against the US supremacy in the world. For the expanded analysis on how the EU is under-theorized in the neo-realist research program see Collard-Wexler, Simon (2006) "Integration Under Anarchy: Neorealism and the European Union" *European Journal of International Relations*, 12(3): 397-432.

[21] Walt, Stephen (2005) "Taming American Power" *Foreign Affairs* 84(5): 105-124.

[22] For the critical assessment of the theory of soft balance I draw on Lieber, Kier A. and Gerard Alexander (2005) "Waiting for Balancing. Why the World Is Not Pushing Back" *International Security* 30(1): 109-139.

Conclusion

The Theory of International Politics by Kenneth N. Waltz is an essential book and stands at the center of research in IR studies. It transcends its literature context from almost three decades ago because it is the cornerstone of the neo-realist research program. It is also valuable for our understanding of international politics because it stimulates critical thought and scientific progress. By understanding structural realism, students of IR studies asses better the alternative research programs that have crystallized by means of academic polemics against neo-realist thinking. *Waltzian* structural realism invites also to make sense of the international world now by including possible refinements that would expand the neo-realist research program.

Diamandi Sava Constantin

Călin Hentea, *Brief Romanian Military History*, The Scarecrow Press, Inc. Lanham, Maryland. Toronto. Plymouth, UK. 2007, 228 pages

I do not think that a perfect and absolute unbiased history is ever possible. Doesn't matter if the author is writing about a topic very close to his place and people or if he is studying the history of foreign nations, he must previously assume a minimum level of subjectivity. We have to pay a tribute to our own perceptions about our past and present lives, our places, our stories, and information. All what we can do is to be as honest as possible. That means that the historian should be permanently aware about the limits of his knowledge, his perceptions, his personal and very human feelings and capabilities, and most of all that means not to lie, not to remove on purpose facts and figures, not to disrupt the reality and the basics of science. For example, if someone would tent to write a history of Balkan countries histories, that person will have to face with quite totally different and sometime opposite national versions for the same historical event.

All the considerations above are designed to frame the most recent book of colonel Călin Hentea, issued by the academic United States publishing house, Scarecrow Press. It is about high courage and responsibility to publish, on your own, abroad, in one of the most competitive editorial market in the world, the military history of your country. Hentea did it proudly and successfully. Just a couple years before, in 2002 he signed the Romanian version of this book on Nemira publishing house, under the title "Armata și luptele românilor", which became, very soon, an editorial bestseller. Only two years after, a full revised and updated edition till the moment of the accession of Romania into NATO in April 2004, was issued. And now, the final edition is available also for the English reader, who benefits of a very clear and detailed dictionary of old Romanian historical terms and a list of military abbreviations and acronyms. Mostly for the English reader and scholar, those two technical sections of the book are very useful, because they are clarifying not only some specific words used in this book and in other articles or papers dealing with the same, not so well known, topic.

Călin Hentea is a very well known journalist and analyst, his work being considered not only by the military public, but also by the civilians, due to his articles and books issued since 2000 about propaganda, media war, psychological and information operations during the modern conflicts. I personally think that colonel Hentea has a special feeling of contemporary history, due to his large personal approach and professional contribution in international military missions as a staff officer in Albania (1997), Kosovo (2003, 2004), Afghanistan (2007), when he put his boots on the ground of various theaters of operations, speaking to the locals, looking at their buildings, monuments and graves, reading their books and newspapers. This very personal understanding of

what is or what was happening around him is one of the landmarks of Hentea's writings. However, **Brief Romanian Military History** is a bright work not because of his special view about the Romanian military history, but because of the book's design.

Hentea's book is an original work based on chronology - written according to the classic rules used by most of historian such as Tucidide, Max Weber or Nicolae Iorga - and the modern perspective generated by cybernetics. Through his ingenious solution, Hentea does not tell, neither comments the fighting past of Romanians, but he simply shows and presents facts and figures. Actually, Călin Hentea makes a choice of those facts and figures from the Romanians history, with the objectivity and apparent lack of personality specific for a documentary. From this perspective it seems that the author is following the French philosopher Paul Veyne's opinion, who said that *"the enrichment of the places repertoire is the only progress possible to be achieved by the historical knowledge; history would never give more lessons learned, but will only increase the number of questions"* (Veyne, *How history could be written*, Meridiane, 1999, pp. 285-286). The author gives to the reader's mind the answer that he can find for any kind of possible questions regarding one or other Romanian fight or commander mentioned in the book. On this regard, one of the first foreign lecturer of this book, Dennis Showalter - past president of the American Society for Military History - who signed the foreword, pointed very sharply: *"These pages present how Romania would like to be seen in military context — and, no less significantly, how it wants to be seen by the West as it moves into the twenty-first century"*. This remark matches very well with my considerations at the beginning of these lines and implicitly underlines one of the charms of this book, which shows in a very natural way the evolution of the Romanian armed forces since the Antiques times till the accession into NATO, its main characters (leaders, commanders, voievodes, princes, heroes), as well as battles and guns. That's why, perhaps, professor Florin Constantiniu said about this book that it could be used as "a little encyclopedia of the Romanian military", because Hentea unite the Ancient history with the contemporary events which pointed the historical evolution of the armed forces on the Romanian lands. A special attention is paid to the international and regional context of each significant national event and also to the Romanians who served in foreign armed forces such as in the Hapsburgs border regiments, Russian imperial cavalry or in the United States forces. This larger approach brings the foreign reader much more close to a better understanding of the respective historical period or character.

I would like to underline about this American edition of this Romanian best seller another important value: as Dennis Showalter also noticed, there are very little edited information for the English-language scholars available on American or Western libraries about the Romanian history, which explains the reason for so many wrong perceptions that we used to complain. Till now we used to be very proud about our history, but very few foreigners know something more consistent about it. I really think that it was and it is our own responsibility and duty as Romanian scholars and historians to publish abroad about the national issues and perspectives and join in this way the world cultural exchange, by honestly promoting the Romanian values. Now, Hentea's book is accomplishing this mission, but his achievement should be permanently followed by the others.

Constantin Hlihor