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## European Union: Western Empire or Russian Periphery?

Mădălina Virginia ANTONESCU

**Abstract:** This article is proposing to explore briefly the dichotomist, even paradoxical condition of EU, an original entity which can be regarded at the same time, as a postmodern form of empire, with two strategic directions of expansion (towards Balkans and towards Central Asia as classical heartland, strategically important for EU due to the energetic center of states once forming the USSR area of control) and also, as a periphery of Russia. This certainly is a very odd condition for EU, as political center of power but having several key-vulnerabilities (energetic dependency on Russia and Central Asia states as area traditionally placed under the Russian influence; lack of European army; immaturity of CFSP pillar; lack of a genuine and centralized CSDP dimension - here, the intergovernmental nature of these pillars, under Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice treaties and also, under the Lisbon reform treaty can be considered as a risk factor of fragmentation and blockage for the construction of a strong European military and security pillar-). From this perspective (hard-power), EU can be seen as a double periphery: as periphery of Russia (through energetic weapon; incapacity for EU to gain access to Central Asia and to built here a sphere of influence) and also, as a periphery of US (lack of a military personal army and of a strong CFSP pillar). EU is a vulnerable part of the Transatlantic Empire (seen as a twofold imperial structure, in our opinion, covering US and EU) in comparison with Russia, as a federal state, strongly anchored in its traditional military dimension (Russia, as a hard-type of imperial structure, rather than being a postmodern one). We use the geopolitical term "empire" and all other key-terms in this article, not in a subjective, emotional meaning but as a scientific category of analyze, that must be explored and treated in an objective way by present schools of geopolitical thought.

**Key-words:** Russia, European Union, Transatlantic Empire, expansion, empire, Heartland theory, pivotal state, periphery, Rimland

The period between the end of the XX<sup>th</sup> century and the beginning of XXI<sup>st</sup> century is characterized (concerning the political evolutions of the European continent) by the tendency of some Western European states to form a kind of *interstate* community called "European Union". This original and complex political entity has progressively formed what we prefer to call a "hybrid empire<sup>1</sup>". EU has started a process of expansion towards the European continent (claiming ambitious imperial objectives such as the *political reunification of a continent* divided by a continuous war history). This was a process initiated from the EU pre-imperial stage (regarding the *three European Communities*, as regional organizations with economic specialized profile<sup>2</sup>). The *first wave*

*of expansion*<sup>3</sup> started in 1973, when Great Britain was been received as full EC member state.

At present EU has become a kind of regional power, neighbor of another great power (Russia), even if we cannot speak about a continuous common "border" (for areas as Belarus, Rep. of Moldova and Ukraine, that are not EU member states).

At this point, one can agree that, in comparison with Russia (holding, as a federal state, both the quality of being a *sovereign state*, as well as the *juridical personality and the territorial conception on a "westphalian state"*<sup>4</sup> endowed with political and juridical borders), EU is not a "westphalian state", neither a federation, nor a confederation of states<sup>5</sup>.

At this moment (before the ratification by all EU member states of the Lisbon reform treaty signed at 18 October 2007) EU is not endowed with juridical personality<sup>6</sup>. Therefore, EU remains only a political entity; as result, EU is not a sovereign entity, and it is seen by a part of the doctrine as not holding the three constitutive elements of a state (territory, population, sovereignty or the competence to establish its personal competences, in order to exert the *exclusive* jurisdiction within its territorial borders). As a result, EU is not owning a "personal territory" like its member states<sup>7</sup>, and it has no personal borders (replacing the political borders of its member states). This "invisible empire" is, despite all these facts, expanding and maturing under our eyes. The legal international principles incident to the *interstate* relations are not presumed to be applied to an entity that is not a state, and that has no legal personality (*EU, condemned to remain into a "clandestine imperial condition"?*). As a paradox, EU can be seen as a political supranational entity, emanating supranational laws and a distinct legal order, both in comparison with international law and the national legal orders of its member states.

This empire is emanating a *legal order* (through its first, *communitarian pillar*) despite the fact that it has no legal existence from the point of view of international law and also, from the perspective of EU member states national law (it is not a *juridical* person, nor a *subject of international law*).

In this article, we'll try to analyze the EU imperial expansion from *the perspective of the Heartland theory*<sup>8</sup>, considered, as a theory adapted to the *present* international design of today's political world map. *Can EU be an empire interested in identifying what it is called "Heartland", in controlling this land and in preventing that other great powers exert their domination over it?*

The *entire article* is trying to explore this ~~interesting~~ perspective, being based on *this continuous oscillation between the EU imperial vocation as a Western center of power, and its possible fall into an inferior condition, that of becoming progressively the*

*periphery*<sup>9</sup>" of another empire or imperial state (the EU *dichotomist* condition).

The collapse of Soviet Empire, in 1991, followed by a political gap, determined the apparition, belonging to new geopolitical tendencies in the ex-Soviet space, tendencies represented by various theories of Alexander Dugin, Dmitri Trenin, Ghenadi Ziuganov, Vladimir Kolosov, Nikolai Mironenko, Nikolai Nartov<sup>10</sup>.

At present, one can assert that Russia stays at a crossroad of temptations: either to assume a new imperial role, trying to recreate its lost "Eurasian empire" (due to its *pivotal imperial role*, to its historical role of representing the main force of a multi-national superstructure covering the majority of *Eurasian continent*), or to choose adopting the democratic Western model and becoming a part of the European political project, by assuming and developing only its *European* identity. A third scenario in Russia's political evolution is based on the opposite tendency, which means for this great power to assume exclusively an *Asian* identity<sup>11</sup>, to turn its back to all European collective (imperial or not) political project and instead being interested in the development of permanent, institutionalized relations with Asian countries (especially with Central Asia energetically rich belt of countries).

The *original* structure of *EU as post-modern empire* can determinate also an *original and complex political relation* between EU and Russia. In this article, we are going to *regroup* the basic arguments supporting the ideas that *EU, as a Western European empire* is interested in creating a *simple* type of cooperation with Russia (an *under-developed, symbolic* relation, which will not be able to represent the future base of negotiations between both parties regarding the New Framework Agreement of Cooperation). EU, in this scenario, will not be interested in negotiating with Russia a basic legal framework for cooperation as a suitable base for an *enforced* partnership with Russia (meaning that Russia becomes a part of the general European integration process, as involving *equal* contribution of both parts to

the creation of a *single zone of stability covering the entire Old Continent*). In this hypothesis, the objective of this potential "*unique area of stability*" (seen as a political concept, revealing an open will for an *intergovernmental* cooperation between EU's member states and Russia on political field, progressively completed by an *intergovernmental* cooperation on *administrative, judicial and policy fields*, as a complete reproduction of the "freedom, security and justice area" introduced as the EU specific objective by the Amsterdam treaty) will not be conceived as an unilateral EU project. This "*single zone of stability*" covering Europe can be a *bilateral* project, expression of the *political agreement* between EU and Russia. This agreement would be a concrete contribution of Russia to the

*historical reconciliation* between the European East and the West, a political *reunification* of the continent, the genuine end of disputes and great walls dividing Europe. After the *German reunification* and its evolution as an EC founder-member state, the second great step to unify the continent will be, in our opinion, Russia's admittance into the great European family, the recognition of its specific contribution to the European identity and the action to avoid any new segregation of Europeans into "integrated zones" and "outsiders".

The *second scenario* of this article is focused on finding those arguments necessary to claim that at present, there are some clues indicating the EU's odd situation: to be nothing else than a "*Russian periphery*", at least from some specific reasons.

## 1. EU as Western empire and its political relations with Russia

Within this section we must begin our analysis from the perspective of the "Heartland" theory, where "*the continental core*", according to Mac Kinder's reviewed theory *Mac Kinder, is Central Asia*<sup>12</sup> (as a zone *different from the Eastern Europe, which is the "pivotal zone"*<sup>13</sup>). According to this scenario, *in order to be a genuine empire*, as a great (collective) power, and as a distinct centre of power, EU must elaborate a specific *strategy* and must take appropriate, concrete measures and common policies (within CFSP pillar, but also, by developing and adapting its existent European vicinity policy) focused on gaining access to the Heartland (Central Asia).

As the European part of the Transatlantic Empire<sup>14</sup>, EU is rather interested to adopt a kind of *formal, symbolic framework-relation* with what it is considered to be a real challenger for the political control of the Old Continent, as an alternative center of power (Russia). In this hypothesis, EU is tempted to conclude a kind of political agreement of cooperation with Russia designed to treat Russia as a special partner of political dialogue, *but not as a state with "European vocation"*.

For EU, Russia seems *to be rather an imperial state*, trying to regain control over its lost sphere of Soviet influence. EU is not treating Russia as a state that in the future will become an EU member. EU has not expressed the intention to open the door of political and economical *integration* to Russia, neither to allow full participation of Russia, as a future EU member state, into a fundamentally modified (if the treaty of Lisbon will come in force) but still European empire. Without expressing its will to candidate for EU membership, Russia seems to be condemned to devote all its efforts to the re-construction of its old imperial project, as an *individual empire* (having *one state core*), precisely because there is no place for it into the EU imperial *collective* project. Thus pursuing two distinct strategies of territorial expansion in Europe and towards Central Asia the two empires will gradually conceive two *different imperial projects* designated to take control over the same *Heartland* (Central Asia) and to prevent that the other empire gains access and implements its policies in this key-area.

Despite its "soft" nature (expansion through negotiations, political dialogue, through export of democracy, through market economy and rule of law; implementation of imperial legislation into the Eastern periphery, due to the supranational nature of European law) EU, as Western empire is still an imperial entity in full process of territorial expansion. The directions of EU expansion are mainly two: *integration of Central and Eastern Europe* (as key-region for EU, necessary for the EU access to Heartland) and *expansion towards East*, through other types of agreements (cooperation, partnership), as direction preparing *the second step* (full acquisition of the "candidate state" political statute, for states like Ukraine, Rep. of Moldova, Georgia, Armenia). Placed in the middle of the EU expansion towards Central Asia, Turkey remains partially an European-anchored state, participating to the *EU imperial collective* project either being integrated into EU as full-fledged member, or remaining a "special EU state" (not a "candidate" but a "partner" of EU): in both cases Turkey will represent the *EU interface* towards Heartland.

In order to be an empire dominating the World-Island, according to the Mac Kinder theory<sup>15</sup>, EU would take control *over its core*, a geographical zone starting from Central European plane to Western Siberia and dissipating its edges to the Mediterranean zone, to Middle East, and also, to Indian and Chinese areas<sup>16</sup>. At present EU represents a Western empire (dominated, from a certain perspective, by a *German-French political "engine"*, in fact, by an original alliance between a continental European power and an oceanic European power) where Germany (as a state of the EU core) has gained, according to the Mac Kinder classical theory, the access and the control over the Central European zone (that is the pivotal zone of the World Island). This geopolitical reality (Central and Eastern European countries are now EU member states, being integrated into the EU empire) symbolizes the territorial advance of EU into the former periphery of the Soviet empire and also, a *clear direction of the*

*Western imperial project expansion towards Heartland*. At this point, one can think about this direction of EU expansion as a part of a greater imperial strategy of "*new containment of Russia*" through the construction, the consolidation and the territorial enlargement of a Western European empire like EU, designed for an ambitious mission (to get control over the Heartland, that is to reduce Russia's access to *Central Asia* and to encourage *the European vocation of these countries* in terms of political democratic values and market economy, as well as by concluding with them several economic specialized agreements with a clear dimension devoted to the implementation of political dialogue framework).

According to the Rimland theory of Spkyman<sup>17</sup>, one can see EU as a Western part of a Transatlantic Empire dominated by an oceanic power (US), trying to get control over the Rimland, in order to control the Eurasian continent. As a component of the Rimland, *EU is a part of an oceanic-dominated empire*, needing to have access to the wealth of the World-Island (Central Asia), a strategy including, if it is necessary, a containment of Russia<sup>18</sup> (as continental power, naturally advantaged by its geopolitical location near the Heartland). In this hypothesis, EU remains *an imperial extension of US*, through which the *leading power* of the Western Transatlantic Empire is ensuring its territorial penetration directly to Central Asian states of the energetically and geopolitical Heartland.

*EU is an empire* designed to accomplish an ambitious task: to put an end to the infra-European "conflicts", to unify politically the Old Continent, to embody an idea of "democratic, market economy, rule of law concept about Europe". But we cannot neglect the EU's initially proto-imperial Western core (even from the beginning, in the stage of the three European Communities creation, this empire *was a Western project*, and also, in the bipolar, antagonist context of the Cold War period, it was designed as a *counter-balance system of Western organizations against USSR system*). After the end of the Cold War, with the collapse of the Soviet Empire (1991) and after the EU was politically and officially

proclaimed (through the Maastricht treaty/1993), EU became a Western empire *continuing its basic strategy to represent a counter-balance to Russia influence over its lost European empire* (a kind of "balance of power" theory, over the Old Continent, at the beginning of the XXI<sup>st</sup> century).

EU, as an imperial project, had also other geopolitical great reasons to be created: first, to integrate Germany, as great continental power, within a Western collective project initiated by Europeans under US's political strategy to re-build a political form of unity, a system of re-conciliation between Europeans through economic integration. From this perspective, EU can be seen as a political form of preventing an *individual* and inevitable German expansion towards Eastern Europe (at present, one can see a *collective*, European expansion towards East, towards the Heartland). Secondary, EU was created in order to prevent the creation of an alliance (as a strategic bilateralism affecting European integration and US strategy to gain control, through the EU project, over the Heartland) between two continental powers (Germany and Russia). Thus, from the Mac Kinder perspective, EU must define immediately a common energetically strategy, as a basic

instrument to prevent the enforcement of a bilateral framework of cooperation between these two continental powers on the key sector for the stability of whole EU project (energy), a real alliance that would fundamentally affect the energetic interests of other great powers like EU in general, or in particular, of states as France or Great Britain.

EU empire can also be seen, from the geopolitical perspective, as a *Western imperial "wall" against Russia's traditional expansion towards Eastern and Central Europe*. Within a much larger geopolitical framework, EU constitutes an empire pursuing not so much a strategy of containing Russia, than a strategy to penetrate a territory of a Heartland naturally placed under the Russian control. At present, Russia is still controlling this territory, due to the energetic alliances concluded with Central Asian states. From this different perspective, EU empire is designed to exert pressures over the "Russian imperial wall" that blocks EU accession to Heartland. Therefore at the beginning of the XXI<sup>st</sup> century we assist at an *imperial clash* between two opposite tendencies, of EU and of Russian empire, that will certainly re-shape the future political profile of the whole Europe and also, of the Eurasian continent.

## 2. EU as "Russian periphery" and the political consequences of this hypothesis for the EU evolution

In our opinion, it seems to be an interesting scenario, if not a paradox (if we are admitting that EU, from another perspective, still remains an *empire*), specific to the original nature of EU and to its odd relation with Russia, as another imperial power acting on the Old Continent, at the beginning of the XXI<sup>st</sup> century.

We can consider EU as the "soft" part (a sophisticated, but vulnerable, non-militarized entity) of a *double-cored* Transatlantic Empire (US being, in this hypothesis, the genuine, the hard core of the whole Western imperial structure) - and for these reasons (the absence of a "hard", militarized nature for EU), the European Union should be considered as the

*vulnerable part of the Western empire*. In fact, EU should be considered as a "middle-zone", shared between an "official protector" (US, through the NATO military arm) and a "challenger": Russia, as a potentially imperial state, assuming in this scenario, *by force* or by using *soft* modalities, an *European imperial vocation*, that is to claim the equal *protectorate over EU* (a bilateral condominium over Europe, between two real, "hard-type" empires).

In this scenario, EU would become a "common periphery", the "middle zone" shared between states like US and Russia, interested in regaining its lost Soviet spaces of influence. Only if Russia would not be content with a role of US "imperial partner" in



exercising a tacit condominium over an integrated, prosperous and developed new type of *periphery* as EU, only if Russia would choose *not to share, but to gain* (through imperial policies of expansion and domination) the *exclusive control over the whole EU* (by managing, for example, in its favor, the Balkan affairs, by succeeding in controlling the conflicts of this region, while preventing any EU capacity to affirm as a great (collective) power into the Balkans), then we could say that EU is becoming *gradually*, a "Russian periphery".

The *lack of credibility* on managing different regional and international affairs (due to the difficulty to harmonize different voices of EU member states in CFSP area); the *lack of prestige* (as incapacity to manage regional conflicts at the borders of EU - like Kosovo - or to impose an European solution on "frozen conflicts" placed on ex-Soviet space, where EU is not perceived as a genuine important political actor, capable to project power *at distance*, towards key-areas as Central Asia, Iran) are sufficient motives to *argue the gradual degradation of the EU from an expansionist empire to an original, paradoxical statute of "periphery"*. In favor of this odd political statute are pledging some elements (that can be complemented by other tendencies, if this scenario becomes reality one day):

- the EU "*soft*" political nature, together with its common policies and specific *objectives*, that are all contributing to the development of an *original* entity, opposed to the *military* type of empire: EU as a *consensual* entity.
- the lack of an autonomous, distinct, powerful European military dimension, necessary to give credibility (in "hard power" terms) to EU on regional and international stage. EU has not, at present, a European army or navy, as has Russia, in its quality of imperial state.
- the difficulty for the EU to become a powerful political actor (insufficient development of the CFSP pillar) and to clearly affirm an unitary voice in the international and regional key-issues.

CFSP is still remaining an intergovernmental type of cooperation, giving the preeminent decisional role to the EU member states and not to EU institutions (European Commission, for example). Its *collective* way to manage CFSP affairs together with the *unanimity* rule in this pillar are representing two elements creating, in our opinion, a lack of prestige and also, difficulties for EU in gaining credibility. This sensible and major political EU pillar is rather affected by the *fragmentation logic* than having a chance to become progressively an integrated, communitarian pillar. With many distinct and even divergent interests EU risks to be reduced, from an unitary, imperial political *actor*, to an *object* for non-EU powers policies, an object suitable for becoming a part of a much larger vision, implemented in Europe by the genuine political centers of power (Russia, China, US). As supranational power (but in other fields than CFSP), *EU is affected by its inner intergovernmentalism and lack of imperial counter-strategies* to avoid the gradual EU transformation *from an empire (or center of power) into a periphery subordinated to another empire* (military, to US; energetically, to Russia). EU also lacks strategies focused on the management of its own peripheries (Balkans; Central Asia; Black Sea; Mediterranean area).

- the *collective* mechanisms of political decisions and the complex decisional procedures (within EU institutions such as the European Commission, the European Council, the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers), together with powerful *national identities* of its member states, are aspects making difficult for the EU to behave and to consolidate as an *unitary* entity, in comparison with Russia, as a *federal state*. Russia has well-developed capacities to project power at distance, to manage "frozen conflicts" in order to control EU actions and to avoid concrete EU counter-strategies destined to resolve these conflicts. Russia has a well-defined (from the constitutional law

perspective) political and juridical *nature* (as federation), that is an advantage, in comparison with EU (EU is not a state, neither a federation, nor an international organization, but a hybrid entity'; in consequence, EU is not a subject of international law, it hasn't legal personality, and this gap can be interpreted, together with other elements, as a factor creating the premise for an *imperial regression* (degradation of EU from the status of a post-modern empire to a non-conventional kind of periphery). EU's peripheral status can also be caused by the constant political will of *Russia to take control over its lost territory*: the ex-Soviet space, including EU member states as Central and Eastern European states and the Balkans<sup>19</sup>, where Russia is directly interested in *dividing the zone*, regarding the newly-found European (EU) identity of Western Balkans (object of the future EU eave of territorial expansion) and in preventing an unification of the Balkans within EU framework (that will create a close door for one of the traditional directions of Russian expansion). As for the Central Asia zone (one of the core-area of its lost imperial territory), Russia has another direct imperial interest (preventing the EU expansion towards the energetic Heartland). If EU will not succeed in breaking the "Russian wall" and in expanding toward this strategic zone (by elaborating a specific strategy for Central Asia, based on *enforced partnership with these countries*, on the *creation of "common energy spaces"*, of *"democratic spaces"* (political dimension) or *"commercial common space"*; by elaborating an *European policy of Caspian friends*", complementary with another specific strategies, as a *simplified, specialized, Euro-Casp*, or a "strategy of Black Sea and Mediterranean friends"), if EU will not be capable to bring Western Balkan into its structures, by enforcing their Western democratic model identity, then EU will lose not only *prestige* (that is a *vital* element for any empire, when it is

evaluated by another empire) but it will lose *two strategic directions of imperial projection of power* (Balkans; Central Asia). These failures will contribute to the general EU regression from a Western empire to an entity incapable to oppose concrete strategies against Russian expansion towards these two key-areas.

- Russia has already a *specific, alternative project for a future Europe* that is not fitting with the imperial project on Europe proposed and already implemented by the EU. Any major failure of the EU collective, Western-democratic project of the future political configuration of the Old Continent will provoke lack of EU imperial prestige and will constitute an important break into the EU imperial profile, provoking the failure of the whole European construction and also, the opportunity for Russia to impose its own imperial, different model (from the "collective project" of an unified Europe, to the "individual imperial project", *single-centered empire*). *The Russian imperial project on Europe seems rather to embrace a traditional, "hard" kind of empire and expansion*<sup>20</sup>, that might not be conditioned by the *free consent* of its components (as at the creation of EU): thus, from a democratic imperial project (EU), Europe might be caught into an *authoritarian*, old-type empire with a *single center of power* (Russia) – this is the radical scenario –, or it might be included into a Russian-style *democratic* empire (that is the moderate scenario), where EU will be simultaneously submitted to the Russian influence and where it will *participate* formally into a symbolic cooperation, at the governance of the new European empire (dominated by Russia, through "hard" or "soft" means). Even if the "hard hypothesis" (the control *manu militari* over EU, as the historical, old type of empires have realized in order to dominate their peripheries) cannot be totally removed in the XXI<sup>st</sup> century, *Russia can gain its European periphery* (not only the Central, Eastern states, the

- Balkans, but the *whole EU*, as such) by using soft (non-military) tools, like EU energy dependence, for example. At present Russia is behaving as an *undecided empire* (or to impose its imperial project by using “hard” modalities, either to influence the EU member states policies through the “energetic weapon” or through other type of political pressures). In this context, we should ask ourselves: does Russia want to be a “hard” empire or does it want to become a “soft” kind of empire<sup>21</sup>; does it *contest or provoke* the EU hegemony over the Old Continent (as part of the Western empire) or is it rather interested in cooperating with EU, in participating to the EU imperial project by accepting the strategies of partnership and the creation of “Four common spaces”/ 2003, by accepting to be treated as an equal diplomatic partner of the Transatlantic Empire, when managing regional or international key-issues (Iran, Kosovo, Iraq)? It seems to be a major *dilemma* for the future evolution of the Russian policy regarding EU. For EU, both scenarios seem to be negative (provoking its regression to the statute of “periphery”), since as a “hard empire”, Russia is a high-militarized regional power, while EU as such is not projected to act as a traditional, military empire (due to its historical dependence on the NATO will to defend the Europeans).
- inexistence of a coherent EU strategy for the Middle East (the second “energetic Heartland”) and the lack of an European strategy for Central Asia (the continental core of the world). If EU is not able to manage the Middle East conflicts and to gain its credibility as a peace negotiator, if it is not able to penetrate into the strategic area of Caucasus, nor to influence in its favor the Iranian dossier, then EU will not be in a favorable position to control the “Continental Core” of the world, despite the fact that it has already integrated the Eastern and Central Europe (the “pivotal zone”) into its structures. In other words it is of no use that EU has integrated Eastern Europe, a periphery which is not capable (in realistic terms) to contribute to the “Europe-puissance” project (meaning the regional and international political affirmation of EU as a political center of power), if EU doesn’t gain *access* to Central Asia.
  - EU can become the periphery of Russia, beside other elements favoring this situation, if Russia will produce some coherent counter-strategies, designed to *limit* the EU expansion to *the Old Continent* and *outside its borders* (towards non-EU Mediterranean countries, Central Asia, Middle East). Russia would need, in this context, to counter-balance any European strategy (for Balkans; Turkey; Euro-Med; the vicinity policy) or to prevent the creation of a strategically coherent EU approach (regarding Middle East, Central Asia), in order to avoid the *general* EU expansion towards the “Continental Core” (Central Asia). At present, there are some elements showing the *clash* between two imperial tendencies (the EU tendency to export its democratic model and to expand - even to integrate into its structures, states of the former ex-Soviet Space; the opposite, the Russian tendency to block the EU territorial penetration into the ex-Soviet Space, precisely into the Central Asia).
  - if EU is not an empire able to dominate *the Continental Core*” (the area from laying from Germany to Central Siberia), than, through the “energetic power” (a form of compulsive “soft power”, distinct of “consensual soft power” used by EU), Russia will insure its control (through the creation of an *informal empire*) over this zone, due to a constant policy of exploiting the EU main vulnerability (*energy field* and the absence of an European policy in this field having as an objective the reduction of EU dependency on Russia energy). Thus, Russia will be the one who will have many chances to be the state dominating the Eurasian continent (from Germany to Central Siberia), and not the

EU that will simply become a part of the Russian "informal energetic empire".

- the peripheral status of the EU can be caused and even due to the EU multi-level system of governance, where *regions* are considered *new political actors* and where the nation-states are not anymore "entirely westphalian". If Russia is decided to transform EU into a periphery, it would be tempted, as some specific moment, to encourage, to press or to admit the "*Europe of regions*" *political model*, through a policy favorable to regional and infra-regional identities. This would be, in essence, a traditional imperial policy (*divide et impera*), destined to create a scission of the EU into many regions with different (if not opposite) identities, with two direct effects: weakness of sovereign nation-states, EU members; weakness of EU as an *unitary* political actor and as a *collective* empire. A "Europe of regions" will be inevitably a zone of tensions and secessionist entities, hardly to control and hardly to unite (by encouraging the "diversity" within EU and by pushing regional identities into EU to define each of them in *opposite* terms, Russia will transform the whole sophisticated, post-modern, multi-level EU system into a failed entity).
- the *original* EU nature (especially its dimension of integration, where member states *have freely ceded some sovereign attributes* in the favor of the EU) can be interpreted, in this perspective, as an element initiating in reality, the EU "imperial regression", its transformation into a periphery. Russia is not a political organization of integration; it is a federal state that has not ceded any sovereign powers to supranational distinct institutions, like EU member states (for example, Germany, as federal state, once integrated in EU structures, has ceded some sovereign attributes in favor of the EU institutions).

In the hypothesis that the EU is not succeeding in gaining access to Central Asia, neither in integrating the Western Balkans

(after creating an independent Kosovo state endowed with an "automatic" or compulsory "European vocation" to become EU member state), EU will risk to become a periphery for Russia. Russia will remain an imperial well-defined state, while EU member states will find that *their sacrifices to cede sovereign attributes to EU institutions* were in vain, if EU doesn't prove its capacity to dominate the "Continental Core" and to apply within the Balkans its prosperous and democratic formula of imperial peace. Once again, the westphalian state will be triumphant in relation with destroyed empires as in the EU case, due to their original, post-state, complex nature.

- Russia doesn't want to integrate itself into EU; until now it declined a "European identity" as "vocation to become EU member", rather preferring to define itself as an *alternative model to the EU project* of political reunification of the continent. Russia, by choosing to stay out of the "European integrated or candidate great family", reflects an attitude of being a *distinct political center of power, a counter-balance element to the EU collective empire*. This attitude is *apparently placing Russia in a formal position of "EU periphery"*, as an outsider, but, in reality, it is expressing Russia's imperial capacity *to resist to the expansion of another* (potentially rival) *empire* (regarding the gain of control over zones of interests for *both* Russia and the EU). It also reflects its capacity to *counter-balance, to limit* EU expansion over the *whole* Europe (by preventing EU to be identified with "Europe", territorially speaking) and it reflects its capacity to form another alternative European model, and to pursue its own lines of expansion towards the some zones of interest as EU. This is an important element (the non-incorporation of Russia by the EU) signaling Russia as an *autonomous European* power, that, in combination with another elements, creates the premise for an *imperial, non-EU integrated Russia to become an empire not only capable to stop EU extension into ex-Soviet space, but also, capable to create mechanisms and strategies destined to transform the EU in its own periphery*

(energetically and politically as well, as direct consequence of this fact).

- the *new* sphere of influence that Russia has created *within EU* is the *Western*, economical prosperous, industrialized, democratic *part of EU* (a paradoxical situation, in *political* terms, due to the strong energetic dependency of Western states on Russian natural gas and oil). Regarding *the new EU member states* (from Central and Eastern Europe, as components of the ex-Soviet sphere of influence), Russia is trying to adopt a strategy of *maintaining* them into a situation of energetic dependency, *preventing* them from searching alternative sources of supplies in order to emancipate from its energetically trust sheep. In this way, on energetic field Russia will gain the direct control over EU, by *"colonizing" its political core exactly* (the EU founder, *Western* core of the Union), with the major consequence, of also gaining the *political control over EU as such*, and influencing in its favor all the political EU evolution, policies and strategies, and as well, influencing the attitude of EU member states in key-problems like the elaboration of an European energy policy reflecting the EU wish for energetic independence). Thus, only through a radical, desperate action, EU could emancipate from Russian energetic control and could gain access towards Central Asia, as "energetic Heartland" (only if *all EU member states* would understand this major political stake and would accept to harmonize their energetic policies, by giving enforced powers in this sector to the EU institutions, in order to elaborate an European energy policy).

- EU can be seen as periphery of Russia, if we are taking into account a current imperial strategy of Russia, *to create a non-European center of power, alternative to Western centers (US, EU)*; in this hypothesis, Russia would be interested in *forming and in maintaining an imperial collective structure of non-Western powers either within or inside the EU*, in order to *counterbalance the Western empire with double core*. Russia would be interested, in this hypothesis, to give an impulse towards the consolidation of the multipolar world framework, to refrain EU in gaining access to

the "Heartland" (Central Asia). A newly-formed structure illustrating this tendency is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization/2001, whose core-state and founder-state is Russia. Regarding this situation (SCO, as a political *collective* imperial structure dominating the "Continental Core", Central Asia), EU is condemned to re-define itself as an "inevitable periphery" of a Eurasian, continental center of non-Western powers. EU has, in this hypothesis, not gained access to Central Asia (controlled by a Sino-Russian alliance within SCO) and it was not capable to exert any kind of influence over the SCO members in order to penetrate towards Central Asia as "Heartland". *This strategic zone* (the "Continental Core of the World", that is Central Asia) *is protected by Russia through a "belt of empires or imperial states" as Russia, China, Iran* (all defined as non-Western powers), in order to block the access of the Transatlantic Empire (EU; US) towards energetically rich countries "captured" by SCO.

- *EU, as Russian periphery, is also the object of a kind of "Russian containment"* (due to the fact that Russia is tempting to create around EU a "wall" of "energetically have-nots" and simultaneously, *to prevent EU access to the Russian "strategic periphery" is formed by Central Asian states*, as parts of former Soviet empire (historically connected to Russia, as imperial core).

- EU is a Russian periphery equally when we are referring to the Spykman's geopolitical concepts (Rimland, Heartland); according to Spykman, in order to control the Heartland one must firstly be capable to control the "Rimland" (a concept gathering a range of political actors and regions like EU, Turkey, Middle East, Arabian Peninsula, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, China, Mongolia, Korean Popular Republic, Japan). In this vision *EU is a part of the Rimland* (in its quality as being the US instrument of projecting power, having as function the accession of the Transatlantic Empire to the control of Heartland). *EU is a geopolitical periphery in relation with the Heartland (Central Asia) and therefore EU needs to be controlled by a power (US or Russia)*

*intending to control the Heartland.* If Russia is becoming to convert EU in its periphery, than will be created for the US to penetrate into the Heartland. And this scenario is not only theoretical, due to the global struggle for energy and to the energetic EU dependency that might consolidate EU geopolitical status as the periphery of a Russian – controlled Heartland. US cannot, at present, exert control over the whole Rimland (it has no coherent and connected strategies with countries and regions of Rimland, designed in order to control the Heartland, neither has EU: for example, EU has no specific *strategies* devoted to Central Asia, to Iran, China, Arabian Peninsula, Mediterranean Sea).

- according to Mac Kinder's theory about "Heartland" (as Central Asia), Russia is a power geopolitically placed in a favorable position to control this Heartland, while EU would remains in a fatal *peripheral* position.

- there is a tendency (through a specific Russian policy) to create *bilateral agreements* on energy between Russia and EU member states, a practice that would produce several major effects: it would hinder the elaboration

of a common approach of EU member states on energy matters and an European energetic strategy; it would increase the EU dependency on Russian energy, a fact risking to produce collapse into the EU political governance on medium and on a long term; it would promote the "*continental alliance*" on energy issue, between Germany and Russia, so far prevented through the creation of the EU (another "break" into the EU wall). Germany will be no longer interested in maintaining an inefficient, complex structure as the EU (in energy terms, and reflected on the *political governance* field) and it will rather be tempted to enforce bilateral cooperation with Russia, instead of pursuing a European (non-energetic) integration. This possible new orientation of an EU core-state like Germany would create a *major unbalance between the core-powers within EU*, and it would even provoke a *domino effect*, by encouraging other EU member states to establish and to enforce bilateral separate economic relations with Russia on energy matters, thus neglecting the common European approach – a moment of true collapse into the EU evolution?).

## Conclusions

It is difficult to apply into the EU case a rigorous and clear political definition, even from the imperial perspective, because of the originality and the complexity of its nature, of its methods of enlargement, of its objectives or decisional proceedings. EU is an original, post-modern political system and it represents a *great scission* in the imperial history, by indicating a complete separation from the old type of empires, formed, maintained, extended and then destroyed through military means.

At the beginning of the XXI<sup>st</sup> century EU is placed at the crossroad between two geopolitical tendencies in its evolutions: the evolution *as a collective empire*, exporting democracy and being projected in order to avoid an alliance between Germany and Russia (two continental powers), equally acting for the purpose to penetrate (through a policy of integrating Eastern and Central

Europe) into the Heartland (Central Asia) and also, being designed in order to prevent the opposite tendency of Russia to keep under its control this key-zone (the defeat of the Cerberus). Meanwhile the EU can be seen as a strange type of *periphery*, controlled by its rival empire (Russia) for reasons exposed in this article, mainly because it lacks an European energetic strategy (while Russia is exerting its *energetic* power, as capacity to project an *imperial* type of *compulsory* soft power over the EU member states). Secondary, EU is a *peripheral location*, according to Mac Kinder's geopolitical theory, in comparison with Russia, naturally placed in the near vicinity of the Heartland (Central Asia).

Paradoxically, *EU as Russian periphery* (geographically speaking) needs to surpass this disadvantageous location, *by assuming an*

*imperial mission*: to force its territorial expansion towards the Heartland. This seems to represent an essential part of the EU reason of being: no longer to insure a political unity for Europeans (that is a mission almost fulfilled) but to assume a new key-mission (getting access to the "energetic Heartland", because of the vital dependence of Europeans on the Heartland sources of energy). It is precisely this "soft dependency" that transforms EU into a Russian periphery and simultaneously, that is pushing EU to create an imperial expansion

towards the Heartland, in order to compete with a "genuine empire" like Russia.

EU is forced to re-construct itself as an empire, in order to get access to the means necessary to control the Heartland (Central Asia). From this point of view EU seems at present, from the energetic and geopolitical perspectives, to represent rather an "emancipated periphery", a desperate Western European will to surpass its geopolitical fatalism and to enter into a genuine *imperial stage*.

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#### NOTES:

<sup>1</sup> Mădălina Virginia Antonescu, *European Union, ancient and medieval empires. Comparative study*, Ed. Lumen, Iași, 2008, pg. 85- 95.

<sup>2</sup> European Community of Charcoal and Steel, created in 18 April 1951, whose treaty entered into force on 10<sup>th</sup> august 1952, for a period of 50 years - the treaty expired in 2002-; European Community of Atomic Energy and European Economic Community (their treaties were signed on 25<sup>th</sup> march 1957 and entered into force on 1<sup>st</sup> January 1958).

<sup>3</sup> In the communitarian jargon it is used the technical term of "enlargement" destined to show, in our opinion, the specific and unique nature of the European Union, in comparison with any other form of political organization (confederation, federation, international organization, state). Also, the EU is not a political structure stretching its territory through violence and use of imperial military force (as the martial, classical types of empires known by history). **EU is rather a legal, diplomatic and postmodern type of empire**, which is not recruiting the peripheries *manu militari*: on the contrary, EU, as a postmodern empire, is attracting the peripheries (*lato sensu*) by stimulating them to wish the integration into a prosperous, democratic structure. EU

is accepting under certain conditions, the eventual adhesion of South Eastern states, as the European Council of Copenhagen/ 1993 decided. These political criteria haven't represented conditions of adhesion for the previous groups of states that presented their demand to adhere to EU. See Helen Wallace, William Wallace- "Political process in European Union", trad. Genoveva Bolea, Ed. Arc, 2004, pg. 451.

<sup>4</sup> The "westphalian state" is defined as the institution claiming to have the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within certain territory. See Sergiu Tamaş, *Political dictionary. Democratic institutions and civic culture*, Ed. Academiei Române, Bucureşti, 1993, pg. 262.

<sup>5</sup> EU is rather a complex political structure that has been described by scholars as a multi-layered system of governance, as a network or as an original form of political governance, impossible to be inscribed in present patterns of political organization (EU defined as non-identified political object). EU was considered a **collective political system** and not an intergovernmental regime, surpassing the classical academic dichotomy supranational- intergovernmental; **a quasi-state system, a flexible and dynamic entity**. The elaboration of the EU policies can be described, by a part of doctrine, as a post- sovereignty one. See Helen Wallace, William Wallace- *op. cit.*, pp. 540- 543.

<sup>6</sup> At present EU is passing through a kind of political crisis, as effect of the negative result at the Irish referendum in 2008. So, EU is still based on the present set of treaties (Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice, Treaty of European Community and Treaty on European Community of Atomic Energy). According to these treaties EU, has not juridical personality (by interpreting the silence of the treaties on this topic). Only the Lisbon treaty is expressly giving to EU the juridical personality. Through the Lisbon treaty, EU is also declared the successor entity to EC (practically, the communitarian pillar is disappearing). In the Lisbon treaty vision, the European Community of Atomic Energy is not dissolved.

<sup>7</sup> Philippe Manin, *Droit constitutionnel de l'Union Européenne*, Paris, Pédone, 2004, pp. 66- 69; 92.

<sup>8</sup> The theory of the "continental heart" is illustrating the global relation between terrestrial and maritime powers. It was formulated for the first time by Halford Mac Kinder in 1904 and then developed in its work "Democratic ideals and Reality"/1919, where the "pivotal zone" became the "continental heart"; the theory was for the third time modified in 1943. See Graham Evans, Jeffrey Newnham, *Dictionary of international relations*, Ed. Universal Dalsi, 2001, trad. by Anca Irina Ionescu, pp. 229- 230.

<sup>9</sup> The „periphery" is a term used in relation with imperialism (the last one defining the hegemonic relation between a state and another state or group of states subordinated to its control). Imperial policy means in this case a deliberate projection of power outside its initial area of jurisdiction, having as purpose to create a coherent administrative and political unity placed under the hegemonic control. See Graham Evans, Jeffrey Newnham- *op. cit.*, pg. 254. Classical empires covered various societies from a geographically limited space that have been ruled but not governed by emperors. There weren't administrative means as the institutions, organizations, information, the administrative staff, necessary for ancient emperors had no in order to govern these peripheries. It was rather a political control over a social and geographical space, obtained and maintained by military force. See classical empires and their behavior in relations with controlled spaces in David Held, Anthony Mc Grew, David Goldblatt, Jonathan Perraton, *Global transformations*, POLIROM, 2004, trad. „By Ramona-Elena Lupascu, Adriana Straub, Mihaela Bordea, Alina- Maria Turcu, pg. 58.

<sup>10</sup> See Vladimir Alexe, *Post-Soviet Russian Geopolitics*, [www.conflict.md/comentarii.php?ID=2063](http://www.conflict.md/comentarii.php?ID=2063)

<sup>11</sup> In its basic geopolitical work, „The Essential of Geopolitics", 2000, Alexander Dugin considers, for example, that the future geopolitical world will be marked by a global bipolarity between continental states and maritime states, between Eurasiatic states and Atlantic states. Dugin is seeing Russia as a kind of empire dominating the European empire organized around Germany and Mitteleuropa and also, dominating the Central Asian empire.

<sup>12</sup> See Paul Claval, *Geopolitics and geo-strategy. Political thought, space and territory in XX<sup>th</sup> century*, Ed. Corint, trad. Elisabeta Maria Popescu, Bucureşti, 2001, pg. 48.

<sup>13</sup> As a geopolitical term, usually depicting peripheral states whose destiny can influence the regional or international stability. During the XIX<sup>th</sup> century Turkey was the central point of imperial rivalry between Russia and Great Britain for gaining such spheres of influences of area as Eastern Mediterranean Sea. The identification criteria of the pivotal states are various, depending on the distinct interests of the great powers elaborating the lists with these kind of states, according to their own strategic interests. See Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *op. cit.*, pg. 446.

<sup>14</sup> By this geopolitical term we are referring to a twofold empire, composed by USA and EU.

<sup>15</sup> Marie-Claude Smouts, Dario Battistella, Pascal Vennesson, *Dictionnaire des relations internationales. Approches, concepts, doctrines*, Dalloz, 2006, pp. 248-249. Paul Claval, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-47. The World-Island is the Old Continent (Europe- Asia- Africa) and the Heartland is the central point of the World- Island. According to another interpretation of this theory, the Heartland can be the industrial and commercial area essential at one moment in time for the great powers, interests (today this area can be the Persian Gulf or the emergent



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economies from South-Eastern Asia). See Andrei Miroiu, Radu- Sebastian Ungureanu, *Handbook of international relations*, POLIROM; 2006, pg. 75.

<sup>16</sup> Marie -Claude Smouts, Dario Battistella, Pascal Vennesson, *op. cit.*, pg. 248.

<sup>17</sup> John Spykman believes in the importance of maritime powers, focusing also on the role of World-Island edges, called by himself the "Rimland". The powers succeeding in controlling the Rimland, either continental or maritime powers, are finding themselves into an advantageous position on the international stage. US must avoid a monolithic and hegemonic World-Island, and take advantage on the Rimland heterogeneity. See Paul Claval, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-53.

<sup>18</sup> The containment strategy was used in the Cold War period against Soviet Union. It means putting around USSR a belt of US allies in order to insure the US security. NATO is a genuine expression of Atlantism, a clear illustration of Mac Kinder theory on maritime powers solidarity. See Paul Claval, *op. cit.*, pp. 126-128.

<sup>19</sup> See Saul Bernard Cohen, *Geopolitics of World System*", Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Oxford, UK, 2003, pp. 211-233.

<sup>20</sup> According to one opinion, Russia has in general a preference for embracing the hard-type of empire (as essentially a military empire)- see Serghei Witte, *Vospominniya, Skif-Alex*, Tallin-Moscow, 1994, vol. 2, pg. 476, quoted by Dmitri Trenin- „The end of Eurasia”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC and Moscow, 2002, pp. 46, 74.

<sup>21</sup> According to Dmitri Trenin, much depends on how we can define the term „empire”. This author disputably considers that Russia is within its present borders, an empire, including not only the North Caucasus but also Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and in a broader sense, Siberia and the Far East. See Dmitri Trenin, *op. cit.*, pg. 24.

## **Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Romania's relations with China. Archives and witnesses**

*Lavinia BETEA, Paul WINGROWE*

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**I**t is a fact that the historians beyond the communist perimeter wrote the best and the most profound analyses of the previous century, regarding the events and the phenomena of the communist world. Until the fall of the communist regimes, the people who lived under them were allowed neither to inform themselves nor to express their feelings about the realities of this excessively idealized society. Yet almost a decade and a half on from the 'annus mirabilis' of 1989, we think we are entitled to say that even the classic writings and analyses of the communist system and of communist history, written before the collapse of the system, will have to be seriously reconsidered, if not completely modified.

Allowing access to the archives, to the documents created by the centres of power and special services of the communist system, is probably the most spectacular event that has ever happened for those who are researching communist history of the last century. What were once considered to be decent historical or political analyses, now have their weaknesses revealed as they are confronted by information that comes from archival research on the main institutions of power, or from other areas that were generally not open to direct investigation.

Writing on the basis of very limited documentary sources, generally official published documents, historians of communism proved to be adept of logical analysis and created explanatory models using a wide variety of sources. But too often the scenarios and theories so produced did not correspond to the facts, and the motives of communist

leaders were often distorted, simply reflecting the thinking of the author. So now, faced with an avalanche of archival documents and statements from 'privileged witnesses' to the history of communism, historians from the free world turn out to be just as naive as those in the former communist countries.

Stalin's death (1953) was a shock to all the power centres of the communist world. There was no plan for the time when the leader in Kremlin would simply stop existing, his death revealing, as Furet put it, 'the paradox of a system, where everything depends in such a manner on one single person, ... [and]... when this person disappears, the system loses something essential'.<sup>1</sup> The absence of a succession procedure for the leadership was one of the characteristics of the regime. One of the Romanian members of the guard at Stalin's catafalque remembered a 'chaotic feeling' – because you didn't know what was coming next – a feeling that was common for all the participants at the burial ceremony.<sup>2</sup>

Without access to the contents of stenograms the deliberations of the key groups in the communist countries, it is hard to imagine the power relations and the difficulties they had in coping with the situation at that time, keeping a sense of normality and maintaining some sort of group stability, in the absence of that once dominant influence in the Kremlin.

Taking Stalin's death as the event which separates the history of the communist regimes into two parts, we will make some comments on the bitter dispute between Moscow and Beijing, and the way it was used for the

benefit of the communist nucleus in Bucharest, relying for our analysis both on archival

documents and the testimonies of direct participants.

### **Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej – 'practical revolutionist'**

The personality and life of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej (1901-1965) remain of perennial interest to historians. Noted for his 'agile diplomacy', his 'cruelty', even his or 'deceptiveness', he was to become a very experienced player in the game of power. The discussion which follows, showing how he used the conflict between the Soviets and the Chinese to establish the independence of his party and country from the USSR in 1964, illustrates these qualities.

Often just mentioned as one of the leaders of the former Soviet Union's satellite states, Gh. Dej's political biography has distinct particularities. First of all, he was the only leader of a European country under Soviet influence who did not spend his early years, and did not receive his communist training in the U.S.S.R. Born in Moldova, into a poor family with a large number of children, Gh. Gheorghiu (once in power, he added 'Dej' to his name, a reminder of his outlaw years) was one of the few workers of interwar Romania who joined the communist party. At that time Romania didn't have many workers and its communist party did not have more than 1000 members, at the end of the second world war being the smallest in Europe. He was arrested in 1933 as the leader of trade union strikes in the transportation sector, and then sentenced to twelve years of hard labour. In prison, alongside Jewish communist intellectuals, he acquired an impressive amount of cultural and ideological knowledge. He escaped from prison just a few days before Romania ceased the war against the Soviet Union.

Once the Soviets occupied the country, this former worker who had spent eleven years behind bars was to become, in the years between 1944 and 1947, head of the Department of Communication and Public Affairs, President of the National Economy Board, and finally Minister of Industry and Commerce. Between 1948-1952 he was First Vice-President of the Council of Ministers,

and in 1952-1955 he took the position of Prime Minister. From 1961 until his death he was President of the State Council. Simultaneously, from October 1945 until his last days, he was the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party.

We could ask 'what was it that determined Stalin to assign this former union leader to be the leader of the communists in Romania in 1945, instead of those well trained activists sent to Romania?' Perhaps the experience of being a 'practical revolutionist that Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej had, influenced Stalin, who had a similar background. Stalin once declared that as soon as the revolution is consolidated, the theoreticians leave the scene and are replaced by new leaders who combine pragmatism and the revolutionary spirit. It is only those who combine theory with a practical experience that prove to have the necessary leadership qualities.<sup>3</sup>

After 1956, with Khrushchev's domestic and international strategy for maintaining the stability of the system, Dej's native leadership capacity was highly valued. His strategies for power and influence gained coherence after 1961, with various stages and goals well laid out by their initiator. His more experienced collaborators would be handled in cold blood and with skill by this true master of politics who consolidated his power, before his death, by establishing a vast network of diplomatic, economic and cultural relations with the capitalist countries, and also by playing the game of balancing between the two great poles of the communist world, Moscow and Beijing.

The portraits of the two leaders of these poles, who would eventually find themselves locked in conflict, Mao and Khrushchev, are very interesting as regards the psychological aspect of power. This is how the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Corneliu Manescu, who knew them both personally, describes them:

'Problems started appearing after Stalin's death. They manifested themselves as problems in the ideological realm. The wider background might have been the differences between Mao and Khrushchev, namely personality differences. After the Second World War, Stalin looked victorious and also had legitimacy because of his participation in the organization of the Bolshevik revolution. Mao had similar qualifications - he was the founder of the Communist Chinese Party, organized 'The Long March', and also looked like a victorious leader in 1949. Stalin and Mao were relatively equal - but the fact that the Soviet Union was the first country where socialism was built, and Moscow was the capital of the strongest communist state, placed Stalin on a higher level. Khrushchev's ascension to power meant that there was a big change in what concerns who the CPSU was able to deal with ideological confrontations. Compared to Mao, Khrushchev was simply a party activist who had nothing to 'brag' about. His desire to have ascendancy over Mao seemed ridiculous.<sup>4</sup>

### **Moscow's man of hopes**

It is important to understand that during the time following Stalin's death and, more importantly, during the period following the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU (1956), the leaders in Bucharest acted as valuable allies of Khrushchev. A particularly strong proof is their involvement in the suppression of the Hungarian 'counter-revolution' of 1956. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania in 1958 might be considered the reward for this loyalty.

Preoccupied, during this time, with consolidating his power in the political circles and, domestically, with solving the economic problems of the country, Gheorghiu-Dej didn't seem to challenge either communist theory or the Kremlin line of policy.

But taking all this into consideration, the changes that he made in respect of diplomats and senior officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - with intellectuals being preferred for the key posts, even if they had an 'unhealthy social background's - suggest more plans than he had actually declared.

Particularly relevant on the nature of relations between Moscow and Bucharest are the encoded telegrams exchanged by officials in the Romanian embassy in Beijing and their superiors in Bucharest. On the 25th of May 1959 the recently appointed Romania's ambassador in China, Barbu Zaharescu (an intellectual from the inter-war period) reported to his minister Avram Bunaciu about the visit he had to meet with his Soviet counterpart, Pavel Yudin. Characterised as a protocol meeting, this took place in the private home of

the Soviet ambassador and was described as 'extremely cordial'. Yudin even offered not only his personal help, but also the facilities available in the Soviet embassy - for example, access to the Chinese press bulletin, and direct access to counsellors and specialists working in the embassy.

The conversation was over an hour long with - as we have noted - a very cordial tone, proving that the relationship was being established on a pattern that we can identify as it relates to the territories of 'occupied countries', with the Soviet specialists being the ones to set the rules by their suggestions and advice. The conversation, in fact, is a presentation by the Soviet ambassador regarding the way that Chinese realities should be interpreted. Its main theme was the 'people's commune'. Oddly, the Soviet ambassador was not too critical of the communes. He even characterized them as a 'necessity'. The former agricultural cooperatives were too small even though they had a large number of families. The people's communes, stretching over thousands of acres, permitted the practice of a socialist agriculture. Being specifically developed within the people's commune, industry gains a local character. There were - as Yudin put it - some 'exaggerations': giving up the principle of distribution according to work, and thus establishing a primitive form of egalitarian communism, the people ate 'according to their needs', and the administration of the commune merged with the state forms of leadership.

The Romanian ambassador gave an account of his meeting with Peng Dehuai, the Chinese Minister of Defence. He was astonished by some of the facts of Chinese military life (the officers being forced to live just like soldiers, and the soldiers being entitled to criticise their superiors). Yudin attributed this to the Chinese experience of partisan warfare. But they did not have experience of the 'real war'. The Soviets will help them, offering the most modern equipment to the Chinese army: fighter jets, ballistic missiles etc. and even helping them to produce this kind of equipment themselves. The Chinese army also lacks in training military leaders, and they will need help

because among them there still were generals in charge of aviation or tank divisions that did not know how to fly, or how to drive a tank.

It is important to note how Yudin's appreciation of the Chinese influenced the Romanian communist leaders – for Yudin the Chinese were very well regarded, and he had a great respect for their political attitude (he couldn't say the same about the Poles or the Czechs).<sup>6</sup>

All the actions and discussions that the Romanian diplomatic bloc would undertake in Beijing in the period 1957-61, would show the same spirit of 'consulting the Soviet comrades'.

### Backstage of the Bucharest conference (June 1960)

Even the conference of June 1960 would be conducted in this same 'spirit of listening to the Soviet older brother'.

A previous conference held in Moscow in November 1957, with representatives of sixty-eight communist parties from all over the world, and where the two great parties openly differed regarding international relations, found the Romanian communists in some difficulty. The high-level Romanian delegation suffered an accident at the airport in Moscow, where the former Minister of Foreign Affairs (Grigore Preoteasa) lost his life.

Between the 20th and the 25th of June 1960, the Third Congress of the Romanian Workers Party took place in Bucharest, Romania's capital city, (the Communist Party took this name in 1948; Romanian initials: PMR). On the last day of the congress there was a meeting of the leaders of communist and labour parties of all the socialist countries. We know what happened there from a stenogram of the plenary session of the Central Committee of the PMR held a month later, in August 1960. Among the items discussed, there was a report about the Romanian contribution to the conference, and appended to this material there was the speech given by Gheorghiu-Dej. From this, we can see that the meeting had certain similarities with a meeting

of the Cominform held in Bucharest in June 1948, when the very same Dej – acting on Moscow's instructions – criticised Tito's policies. At the August meeting, Dej informed his audience that it had been his intention (or rather, Moscow's) to use the meeting of the Third Congress of the PMR to debate certain 'deviations' of the Chinese Communist Party.

The Chinese had suggested delaying the Bucharest meeting, motivating that it had to be more thoroughly prepared. On their way to Bucharest the Chinese delegation spent eight hours discussing matters in Moscow, but did not shift from their stated positions.

Dej's August speech shows us that the meeting that took place on the 24th of June, had two stages with different participants.<sup>7</sup> First, there were the representatives of the communist parties of socialist countries, and then everybody else. Dej points out the 'combative spirit' of those discussions, as well as the fact that there was a certain unity - with the exception of Chinese. They would not sign the agreed document, claiming that they didn't have a mandate.<sup>8</sup> Their final statement was that even though they didn't approve the document, for the sake of unity they would reluctantly sign it. All the other parties criticised their 'false position', and declared solidarity with the Moscow declaration and the

Peace Manifesto, whose importance was underlined by Dej. Only the Albanians gave their support to the Chinese.

Towards the end of his speech, Dej recalled that the Soviet delegation had drawn up a letter that was vouchsafed to the various parties, containing a 'profound' and 'convincing' analysis, but one to which the Chinese reacted violently.<sup>9</sup>

On the 26th of June, at the end of the meeting in Bucharest, the Chinese also distributed a written declaration to all the delegations.

In these events, we can see preparations for the declaration that would seek to renew the unity of the communist movement, to be held later in the same year, in Moscow. The way that things were set up indicates a desire to surprise the Chinese and force them into some sort of alignment within a united front.

Those are the essential backstage events of the Bucharest conference. Unlike Tito, who did not send any representatives in 1948, the Chinese did participate, albeit without sending their most important leaders.

Dej's speech (with advice from the Soviets, but possibly also on his own initiative) is regarded as a preliminary to the discussions about to take place. Dej makes the point that the exchanges of opinion they were called to undertake, are in fact a debate on the struggle for peace. He supported the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence, and criticised the Chinese position regarding war, and also their unacceptable behaviour, while in Bucharest, in distributing the pamphlet 'Long Live Leninism' without asking for Romanian permission.<sup>10</sup>

These differences led to fragmentation in the communist bloc, in spite of the desire of so many to maintain a united front. A month after the event, Dej addressed his views in a letter to the Chinese, in answer to their letter distributed on 26th of June in Bucharest. Again, his position was very much for the

Soviets and against the Chinese. He said that he deeply regretted the devastating ideology of the Chinese, who were declaring that war was the only path which led to the victory of socialism. Their thesis was profoundly 'unjust and inhuman'.<sup>11</sup> In the course of the debate amongst members of the Romanian Politburo whilst drafting Dej's letter, they took up Mao's question: 'so what if 300 million people die, if we can have the whole world living in communism?'<sup>12</sup>

The Chinese were also criticised in this letter for the contradictions in their position. In Moscow, in 1957, when Khrushchev declared his party an equal member of the communist and socialist family, Mao stated that the international communist movement needed to have a head, and that its head could be no other than the Soviet communist party.<sup>13</sup>

Discussing the contents of the letter with other leaders, Dej remarked that it was a closed letter, in which they could not say everything, but they would say more 'when we see them in Moscow'.<sup>14</sup>

During the meeting of the Political Bureau held in October 1960, when discussions took place regarding the activity of the Romanian delegation that was to attend the Moscow meeting in December, the Romanians continued to play the role of supporters of the Soviets.

At the Moscow meeting almost 180-200 people participated, representing twenty-six parties. The Chinese delegation was led by Peng Zhen and the session was chaired – at the prompting of the Romanians – by Suslov. The positions were clearer this time. The criticisms put forward were that in Bucharest the Chinese felt that 'the debate was unjust', and that 'they were confronted by a *fait accompli*', and they were supported in this criticism by the Albanians.

But, as the ex-Cominternist, Petre Borila – a member of the Romanian delegation – put it, there were new matters to be considered in December, here in Moscow:

'The new thing is that the project document will analyse the new stage of the general crisis of capitalism, not in times of war, but in times of peace. You can see that world war can be avoided, and also local aggressive wars can be avoided. There are more and more possibilities to maintain peace and to convert countries from capitalism to socialism without using guns.

Another question is the problem of the national democratic states. These are states, who have achieved their independence, but they are not socialist, and proletarian rule has not been established.

A further question in this document is the unity among socialist countries, those who excluded themselves from this unity ending up like the Yugoslavs. And, finally, there are no fractions or groups admitted in relations within socialist countries and the international labour movement.<sup>15</sup>

These positions were ignored by the Chinese and the Albanian representatives, supported by the Indonesians and the Japanese and, less so, by the Koreans and the Australians.<sup>16</sup>

On the 5th of December 1960 a meeting of the Romanian Politburo in Bucharest heard details of how the debates in Moscow, on the occasion of the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, took place. The report, presented by Khrushchev, was not accepted by the Chinese, Albanian, Indonesian, Korean or Japanese delegations.<sup>17</sup>

It took about four hours to the Chinese to make their presentation. At one point, the Soviets sent a letter to the Chinese, which provoked their disapproval.<sup>18</sup> They criticized its contents and the fact that there were efforts to separate Mao from the Central Committee of the Chinese communist party. They also condemned the meeting in Bucharest, saying that it had a bad impact on the communist movement, repeatedly charging that there had

been a 'surprise attack.' They also complained about the letter sent to them by the Central Committee of the PMR, on the 1st of Aug. 1960.<sup>19</sup>

Later in Dej's speech there were no statements against the Chinese position, but there were attacks against the Albanian leader Enver Hoxha. As a consequence, the Albanians left the room. There was a second speech from the Chinese, and a spontaneous reaction followed.

In editing the document, the Chinese were against using the word 'fractions', and the Romanians came up with a compromise formula, omitting the incriminating term.<sup>20</sup>

So this is how the communist world movement divided. As for Romania, no other European satellite of USSR proved a better supporter of the Soviets. What would change Romania's position so dramatically in the future?

### Strategies to consolidate power and influence

It seems that initially Dej's first concern was to consolidate his own power, a fact confirmed even by those close to him. In time, he would get rid of the ex-cominternists that came from Moscow after the Second World War, and of the Romanian 'ex-illegalists' that were giving signs of independence in reaction to the 'democratic centralism' of his rule.

March 21st, 1961 can be considered as the day on which the Romanian leader confirmed his ascendancy in Romania. On that day, in the 'the Grand Presidium of the National Assembly' – the institution that symbolised the state power – the new State Council was created, whose leader would be Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, who from that time until his death in March 19th 1965, combined the two

supreme powers: that of party and state. On the same day, Ion Gheorghe Maurer became the prime minister of Romania. The new government, like the Political Bureau, was composed of people loyal to their leader.

The prime minister's personality is interesting. Maurer (1901-2001) was born into a family of teachers – his father was a German, his mother a French. Maurer himself was one of a group of left-leaning lawyers, who served in the trials of communists in the inter-war period. Being close to Dej, by virtue of the fact that he was the link man in organizing the escape of the future leader from prison in 1944, Maurer was, at the same time, one of the men watched by the organizers of the post-war Stalinist trials.

Other 'pieces' in the future politics of Bucharest were Alexandru Barladeanu (1911-1997), an economist, again from inter-war period, but a Soviet citizen during 1940-1946, who would represent Romania in Comecon (the Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation). The Foreign Affairs Minister, Corneliu Manescu (1916-2000), is another intellectual who made a special impression as a diplomat, being elected in 1967 as the president of the Twenty-second session of the United Nations.

After promoting this loyal team, Dej distanced himself from the Stalinist past, through a strategy of manipulation. In the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the PMR, held at the end of November 1961, certain episodes in the history of the party were raised by the leader. All the abuses committed in the Stalinist period, including the personality cult, were blamed on the 'Cominternist' fractions in the leading unit of the communist party, fractions that disappeared in 1952.

Khrushchev and Mao had the same concerns as Dej, not only to extend their influence in and relationships with the outside world, but at the same time to feed their people. But Dej was looking for new resources by developing relations with the more advanced countries. His pragmatism led him not to wish to rely on importing products, but on extending the capacity of industrial production in Romania.

Dej did not aspire to 'socialist competition' with US or England, as Khrushchev and Mao did. More than that, in statements outside the propagandistic, he evidenced a fair understanding of the economic situation in Romania.

'We are on the verge of advancing from the stage of crafts' – that's how he characterised, in 1960, Romanian industry – and 'the path to follow is to buy machines from those countries which have modern equipment.'<sup>21</sup>

As his own representatives he would send educated men, former fighters in Spain, with powerful links to the leading figures of several communist parties in Europe. In 1962 and 1963 embassies were opened in Conakry, Havana, Damascus, Accra and Rabat. Diplomatic representations in Morocco, Algeria and Laos were elevated to the ambassadorial level and diplomatic representations were established in Finland, Austria, Great Britain, France, Belgium and Iceland. He put the basis of a trade centre in the Federal Republic of Germany and U Thant, the UN Secretary-General, visited the country in 1963. In 1962, a delegation led by Dej and Maurer, visited Indonesia, India and Burma.

In Romania itself the power station 'Electroputere Craiova' was built, and another power plant, 'Portile de fier', was constructed in cooperation with Yugoslavia.

### **Under the Chinese umbrella, far from Comecon constraints**

When would the appearance of unity with the USSR finally crumble? On the 6th and 7th of June 1962, at a meeting of party representatives from Comecon member countries, during which there was adopted a statement of the fundamental principles of international division of labour, the Romanians stated their point of view regarding their independence. Shortly after that (18-25 of June) Khrushchev visited Romania, where he publicly criticized the policies of the Romanian leadership.

Dej believed that reactivating Comecon was Khrushchev's last try to subordinate, on

the economic level, all the communist countries. He was committed to impose on every country a degree of economic specialisation. Romania and Bulgaria would specialise in agriculture. The Soviet proposals were intended to advantage the countries involved.

'According to this division of labour, we were supposed to take care of growing corn and the Germans would raise their pigs with our corn. This is not a joke; it was actually a proposal from the German Democratic Republic' – remembers the former chief of the Romanian delegation, Barladeanu.<sup>22</sup> Faced



with this problem, Dej resorted to a strategy which made use of methods from his revolutionary days. According to Barladeanu, in celebrating May Day 1962, he invited his close friends to a boat trip on the Danube. That is where he elaborated his future strategy to resist Comecon, laying the foundations for the document that would be known as the 'declaration of independence', published in April 1964.<sup>23</sup> Resisting Comecon and moving closer to states in Western Europe and to America would be a broad strategy further sustained by making use of the 'Chinese umbrella'.

One event involving Khrushchev and Dej had a particular impact on their relationship. Coming back from a trip to Asia in October 1962, on a Soviet plane, the pilot informed Dej that they had not received permission to enter Chinese airspace. Being over China at the time, Dej said that the plane should go back to Delhi. Meanwhile, the pilot informed them that the Tashkent airbase had reconsidered their decision, and they continued their flight over China. Landing in Tashkent, they found out that the flight had continued on orders direct from the Kremlin, without any kind of permission from the Chinese.

Arriving in Moscow, Dej found Khrushchev in the middle of the Cuban missile crisis – an event that contravened principles of peaceful-coexistence that he announced. Dej interpreted Khrushchev's order to continue the flight as a criminal order, saying to Khrushchev that he needed his dead body to show the world how criminal the Chinese leaders are.<sup>24</sup>

How exactly a relationship with the Chinese leaders was established, and what precisely was the relationship between Mao and Dej, are questions which are very difficult to answer.

The first visit of a Romanian delegation to China was led by Prime Minister Maurer, and took place between March 2nd and 10th 1964. Maurer was sent to China with the task of mediating the Sino-Soviet conflict.<sup>25</sup> According to Manescu (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Dej was searching for a degree of support from the Chinese. Previously Dej had called Manescu to a meeting. Just like Stalin, most of his

difficult conversations took place in secret, with no written record being made. Usually, for these difficult missions only very loyal friends were sent to test the water. That instance where the mission was a failure was classified as personal initiatives that took place without Dej's consent. That's what happened with Manescu when he talked to the Chinese ambassador in Bucharest about Romania's position in Comecon. Manescu was supposed to communicate Romania's way of seeing relations with communist countries, and indicate that they wanted normal relations with China. Those were the instructions he got from Dej. If the meeting was successful, everybody would be satisfied, if not, Manescu was to be responsible.<sup>26</sup>

Manescu was supposed to go and convince the Chinese that things had changed in Romania. After the Second World War, Romanians had to side with the Soviets and appear very unfriendly to the Chinese. That made things very difficult, and Romanian declarations could have appeared false if they would not have had their own trouble with the Soviets, regarding the international division of labour, and being forced to work in agriculture according to the 'Valev plan'. The result of this meeting was an invitation for Maurer to visit China.<sup>27</sup>

But Maurer didn't go to China to mediate the conflict between the Soviets and the Chinese, he went there to make China understand the Romanian policy of breaking free of Soviet domination, and to win China's support. He had ten days of discussions with Zhou Enlai, the Prime Minister, where he explained Romanian policy towards the USSR, making clear the fact that they needed China's help to break free of Soviet domination.<sup>28</sup> As a consequence, on April 15th, 1964, the Romanian leadership promulgated the declaration regarding the PMR's position in the international communist movement. The declaration would underline the independence and equality of communist parties, and the sovereignty of socialist countries, marking officially the 'escape' of Romanian leaders from Moscow's domination.

Maurer undertook a second visit to China in the autumn of 1964, when the meeting extended to persons like Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping.

From documents held in the archives we can understand the complicated strategy that Dej was using in respect of the representatives of the two superpowers. So, on this visit, much alike on the previous one, the Romanian plane would stop in Moscow on its way to China. Because Khrushchev was on vacation, Maurer went straight to him.<sup>29</sup> This is how the meeting held on the 27th of Sept. took place: it was a very long lunch, between three in the afternoon and eight in the evening. Maurer had Emil Bodnaras and Paul Niculescu Mizil with him. The Soviets were represented by Khrushchev and Kosygin. At first Khrushchev spoke about production in agriculture for that autumn, and Maurer about the power plant, 'Portile de Fier'. Next came the interesting part – the Chinese position in certain international matters. Khrushchev discussed the problem of territorial disputes with China. Maurer continued, talking about the meeting he had with France's president at the beginning of August, where he debated the problem of peaceful coexistence. Khrushchev criticised the propaganda campaign that was accusing the Soviets of supporting the FRG against the GDR. The Romanians repeatedly asked for an end to the public polemics between the two big parties. Khrushchev brought the meeting to an end, saying that a new meeting was necessary in order to clarify the matters in discussion, starting with 1960.<sup>30</sup>

The stenograms of the visit to China show that the issues debated with Khrushchev had already been related to Mao by members of the Romanian delegation.

The meeting with the Chinese on the 8th of October lasted almost two hours, and they cleared up many outstanding problems.<sup>31</sup> They discussed the matters they had debated with Khrushchev. Maurer and Bodnaras presented

Khrushchev's opinions as they were recorded during their meeting in Moscow. From this point of view we might say that Romanians had a mediating role. Mao's opinion of Khrushchev's politics was that there were only two big countries that mattered – the United States and the Soviet Union. The leaders of the Soviet Union wanted to control the socialist countries. And they wanted to control Iran, Indonesia, and countries in Africa, like Algeria. But in the end they would not be able to control anybody. Khrushchev would pose as the father to his sons, but when the sons grow up, they won't want to listen to their father anymore. Even more, when it comes to countries and parties that don't want to be controlled.<sup>32</sup> Maurer, Mao and other leaders responded one by one to the questions put by Khrushchev. As for the planned Moscow meeting of the representatives of the communist and labour parties, (it was planned for Dec. 15th of the same year), neither the Romanians nor the Chinese intended participating.

Not very well known to the Romanians was China's position regarding Comecon. Mao approved of Romania's position which declared itself 'against any kind of state formations that would allow control over the economy of the Comecon participating countries'. 'We don't need Comecon' – was Mao's opinion, – 'we need bilateral and multilateral discussions, and on this ground we can collaborate.' Mao wanted to 'open fire' over Comecon, soon, in a new letter. He also discussed the possibility of changing Comecon's statutes, and making it larger through the participation of communist countries from Asia, including China. The Romanian delegation was surprised by this – they didn't know that China wanted to participate, actually they had been told the contrary. The conversation ended with Mao's promise:

'In six months, or one year or more, we will start an offensive and we will vote for forming an economic assistance committee between the thirteen socialist countries, founded on a basis of equality. I think you will not be against it'.

The Romanians and the Chinese promised each other help 'down this road, and on this

position, no matter how hard it will be', as Bodnaras recounts it.<sup>33</sup>

From these conversations we can get this opinion on Khrushchev made by Mao. 'If we are determined, and if we firmly resist him, he becomes an animal with a weak body.' Mao had underlined what he saw as the lack of character of the Soviet leader, proven by the fact that he doesn't live up to his word.<sup>34</sup>

Mao offered a further, premonitory, judgment on the Soviet leader – that he is not

doing too well, and that he might 'hang himself'. Indeed, Khrushchev was shortly to be removed from the leading positions of the Soviet state and party. A few months later, in March 1965, Gheorghiu Dej also died, from cancer diagnosed less than two months before his death.

### A Budapest Epilogue

I have long championed the 'recycling' of communist history with the help of archive documents, because they can tear down so many of the logical constructions and theories which have become 'petrified' in the conventional history and in public consciousness.

We end this summary tour of the problems between the Russian and the Chinese people,

as seen and recorded in Bucharest, with this story regarding the bloody course of the events in Hungary, in 1956. Among the examples that were to justify Mao's dismissal of Khrushchev's 'animal weak body', Mao recounted in October 1964, for the benefit of the Romanian delegation:

'When Imre Nagy's counter-revolution took place, Khrushchev didn't have things clear. The whole Political Bureau of the CPSU considered that Soviet troops should be withdrawn from Hungary. This was not our view, not the view of comrades Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping (who were present as Mao told this story) who were in Moscow to express China's position. Our view was that we should hold to our position and not give in to rebellion. The Soviets considered that the Soviet troops should be withdrawn from Hungary. In this situation, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping said that because they didn't have any more work to do they could leave the next day. The following day, all the members of the Political Bureau of the CPSU came to the airport and said that in fact they would not withdraw the troops from Hungary, but would send more. All this happened during a period of two days. On the first day they thought one thing, and on the second day, another thing.'<sup>35</sup>

### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> F. Furet, *Trecutul unei iluzii, Eseu despre ideea comunistă în secolul XX (1995)*, București, Humanitas, 1996, p. 503.

<sup>2</sup> L. Betea, "Alexandru Bărlădeanu despre Dej, Ceaușescu și Iliescu", *Evenimentul Românesc*, București, 1997, p. 125.

<sup>3</sup> Apud R. Pipes, *Scurtă istorie a revoluției ruse (1995)*. Humanitas, București, 1998, p. 126.

<sup>4</sup> *Convorbiri neterminate. Corneliu Mănescu în dialog cu Lavinia Betea*, Polirom, Iași, 2001, p. 70.

<sup>5</sup> P. Sfetcu, *13 ani în anticamera lui Dej*, prefata, note și selecția textului L. Betea, Editura Fundației Culturale Române, București, 2000, pp. 205-208.

<sup>6</sup> Arhivele MAE, Direcția VI, vol.220/1959, fond China 8, f.25-27.

<sup>7</sup> ANIC, fond CC al PCR/ Cancelaria, dosar 36/1960, f.33.

<sup>8</sup> *Idem*, f.34.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibidem*, f.35.

<sup>10</sup> ANIC, fond CC al PCR/ Cancelaria, dosar 36 1960, f. 59-61.

<sup>11</sup> ANIC, fond CC al PCR/ Cancelaria, dosar 36-1960, f.65-66.

<sup>12</sup> ANIC, fond CC al PCR/ Cancelaria, dosar 36 1960, f.38.

- <sup>13</sup> ANIC, fond CC al PCR/ Cancelaria, dosar 36/1960, f. 63.
- <sup>14</sup> Darea de seamă, cit. f.38.
- <sup>15</sup> ANIC, fond Cancelaria CC al PMR, dosar 43/1960, f. 7.
- <sup>16</sup> *Idem*, f. 12.
- <sup>17</sup> ANIC, fond CC al PCR/ Cancelaria, dosar 47/1960, vol. I, f. 12.
- <sup>18</sup> Indeed, the fact is confirmed in the memoires written by Mao's doctor, who was present when Hrushtchev met Mao, in 1958. See Dr. Li Zhui, *Viața particulară a președintelui Mao* (1994), vol. I. Elit, București, 1995, p. 322.
- <sup>19</sup> ANIC, fond CC al PCR/ Cancelaria, dosar 47/1960, vol. I, f. 16.
- <sup>20</sup> *Idem*, f. 21-32.
- <sup>21</sup> ANIC, fond CC al PCR/ Cancelaria, dosar 17/1960, f. 2-5.
- <sup>22</sup> L. Betea, *op. cit.*, p. 149.
- <sup>23</sup> *Idem*, p. 147-148.
- <sup>24</sup> P. Sfetcu, *op.cit.* pp. 303-304.
- <sup>25</sup> C. Păiușan, N.D Ion, M. Retegan, *Regimul comunist din România, o cronologie politică (1945-1989)*, Tritonic, București, 2002, p. 120.
- <sup>26</sup> *Convorbiri neaterminate. Corneliu Mănescu în dialog cu Lavinia Betea*, Polirom, Iași, 2001, p. 82.
- <sup>27</sup> *Idem*, pp.85-86.
- <sup>28</sup> L. Betea, *Maurer și lumea de ieri, mărturii despre stalinizarea României*, ed. II, Dacia, Cluj-Napoca, 2001, p. 176.
- <sup>29</sup> *Idem*, p. 177.
- <sup>30</sup> ANIC, fond CC al PCR/ Cancelaria, dosar 55/1964, vol. II, f.1-5.
- <sup>31</sup> ANIC, fond CC al PCR/ Cancelaria, dosar 55/1964, vol. II, f. 140.
- <sup>32</sup> *Idem*, f. 143.
- <sup>33</sup> *Ibidem*, f.156.
- <sup>34</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 148.
- <sup>35</sup> *Ibidem*, f. 150.

## Anexa

## Mao's reforms in Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej's eyes

Fragments from Darea de seama asupra activitatii delegatiei CC al PMR la Consfatuirea partidelor comuniste si muncitoresti din tarile socialiste, June, 1960 la Bucuresti, presented by Gh. Gheorghiu Dej at the plenary session of the Central Committee of the PMR, August 1st 1960.

'Know that at the Congress approximately 50 communist parties participated, and their participation saluted our congress. This is a great honour for our party. I think that the Second Congress had a very low number of representatives, and it is a very important fact that this Third Congress had high ranking participants from all the socialist countries, notably and prominently the Soviets, and many other parties from the socialist countries.

On this occasion when representatives from socialist and non-socialist countries met together there was supposed to be a meeting between these representatives, to examine the international situation and the things that we accomplished at the meeting in Moscow in 1957. We expected some exchange of opinions between delegations, and a public declaration that would be our guide, in our struggle for peace and socialism.

Such a meeting was necessary because of the things that had been going on in China for several years, economically, socially, culturally, as well as politically. Those things started to have considerable significance and they attracted the attention of leaders in the socialist countries, and of course, leaders of communist parties in the capitalist countries.

In China there was circulating a number of new theses, with a particularly Chinese character, which we didn't understand, and which we tried to figure out. I mean by this the slogans: 'let a hundred flowers bloom. a hundred schools of thought contend'. Which flowers should bloom? What schools should contend? Of course, as a Chinese figure of speech, only the prettiest should bloom, and only those schools should contend that share our concept of life.

This issue produced much controversy among the Chinese people, there were theories influenced by these slogans, coming from Mao and other leaders of the party. In China's situation, this was possible, because the war destroyed the upper class, and in an independent China it was possible for different parties and political groups to co-exist.

They had as a goal the transforming the rich into working people. We were surprised by their way of seeing this problem: after much debate this thesis of all the flowers blooming and all the schools contending, certain manifestations started to take place. Certain characteristics of those social categories helped them gain courage, and promote their own theses about life, contrary to Marxism-Leninism. They were arrested, condemned and even shot. When the representatives of those currents started to demonstrate, they started explaining that they did this to make the enemy show his face, and battle with him, for the enemy was hiding among a mass of people. In the ideological struggle, their maneuver succeeded in removing the heads of a certain number of representatives, this being nothing more than a crazy act, an adventure beyond belief.

They went very far in spreading the theory of strikes, and they had so many contradictions that they concluded that, in certain situations, the workers need to go on strike and admitted that they can go on strike, and they should do so. It was something very damaging especially because it was shortly after the events in Hungary and Poland. In the economic construction they started organizing the people's communes, from the bottom up in the cities. This is primitive communism with a certain military colour.

Among their leaders, there were a few workers, people from the countryside and some intellectuals with their characteristic mentality. This is where the conclusion comes, that people from the countryside had a higher degree of consciousness than the working class.

In the communes they completely destroyed the family life, fitting everybody in a schedule, when to wake up, when to go to work, when to go to bed...

Then they adopted the development by 'leaps', not on a basis of even development...

As far as the Chinese communist party is concerned, it is very influential, it is bound to the masses, but we don't know for how long. We hope that life will teach them to modify an entire set of things. They criticized the principle of material incentives, but we know that without it there is no progress, and you can not level living standards the way they tried to do. You have a blue suit for one year, along with your cup of rice, but they don't ask if you can produce more. Abandoning material incentives leads to economic catastrophe.

In industry, they came up with slogans like 'Walking on Two Legs' and when they failed, they said again, 'Going Further on One Foot' and 'More Metal to Heavy Industry'. They came up with a theory that it is not good to

have big specialized factories, and that we could organize the production of iron and steel to compete with England, closing the gap with determination. They established smelting furnaces in Universities and public buildings, and maybe even Mao has some in his house. Everybody was forced to look for iron, and they went for it.

Further, they made the political leaders do manual labour and thus created a strong link between practice and theory. In Albania, the President drives a tractor but, compared to the others, what is his efficiency? You would always have to criticize him for his limited effectiveness, because neither his age nor his time would allow him to do better, simply because he is the President. The Chinese invited to their embassy a number of people working in cultural fields, and, over a cup of tea, they showed a documentary with Mao carrying water in front of the Chinese people, who were laughing heartily, encouraging him.'

## Les événements de Roumanie reflétés dans les documents diplomatiques français (1944 – 1947)

Camelia BRÂNCOVEANU

Après la crise ressentie par les relations franco-roumaines pendant l'été de 1940, illustrée par la tentative franco-britannique de bloquer le transport sur le Danube<sup>1</sup>, les relations entre les deux pays se sont améliorées. Le nouveau régime instauré en Roumanie en septembre 1940 était aussi préoccupé que celui du maréchal Pétain d'une réforme interne profonde et de la nécessité d'adaptation au nouvel ordre européen imposé par l'Allemagne nazie. Pour une certaine période de temps, le rôle principal de la mission diplomatique roumaine de Vichy et de celle française de Bucarest sera d'observer et d'informer sur la politique de collaboration avec le troisième Reich, que les deux états devaient mener. Plus tard, les rapports franco-roumains seront construits sur des fondements nouveaux, entre le régime de Pétain et celui d'Antonescu s'étant établie une coopération dictée par le développement de la deuxième guerre mondiale, surtout après 1942, quand Berlin s'est adjugé le contrôle sur le territoire métropolitain français tout entier.

L'amitié franco-roumaine, ayant des racines profondes, a pourtant résisté pendant toute cette période mouvementée que les deux peuples ont traversé. Selon un article du quotidien « La Dépêche Dauphinoise », elle était l'expression naturelle, raisonnable, spontanée d'un sentiment permanent mais qui, pour le moment, devait être réservé, à cause des circonstances. Malgré les événements, il était pourtant sûr que cette amitié resterait forte et ardente comme toujours. Le savant roumain Horia Hulubei a porté témoignage en faveur de cette conclusion quand, pendant

l'été de 1942 il a visité quelques universités françaises. L'atmosphère qu'il y a trouvé, la similitude de sentiments nourris par les Français et les Roumains, l'accueil qu'on lui a fait l'ont profondément impressionné. Dans une discussion avec Grigore Gafencu à Genève, Horia Hulubei montre que l'accueil organisé par les collaborationnistes officiels a été « froid et inanimé jusqu'au moment où les universités françaises, les professeurs et les étudiants se sont aperçus à qui ils avaient affaire. Puis les sentiments ont fusionné dans les plus émouvantes manifestations de sympathie et de croyance commune au renouvellement de France et à la reconstruction de Roumanie ».

« Je sais que vous souffrez, mais il faut savoir que nous souffrons cruellement aussi !, ont été les paroles avec lesquelles Hulubei a ouvert partout les portes de la France « inoccupée ». Le messenger officiel de la Roumanie guerrière, alliée avec l'Allemagne, messenger dont les officiels français se sont méfiés au début, et c'était absolument normal – remarquait Grigore Gafencu – a réussi de cette manière à enlever le mensonge qui pesait sur l'attitude et la propagande officielle en France, de même qu'en Roumanie : les coeurs se sont rapprochés quand ils ont senti qu'ils éprouvaient la même douleur, ils battent à l'unisson et attendent le même salut.

C'est le motif pour lequel Hulubei est rentré de son voyage en France avec d'autres impressions qui diffèrent des opinions des voyageurs officiels [...] Hulubei a amené une note d'optimisme et d'animation. Les jeunes français qu'il a connus à Lyon et à Montpellier

sont prêts moralement, décidés à tenir tête à la propagande et à la pression étrangère : ils croient et ils attendent l'heure de la libération. « Je rentre plein d'espoir et de vivacité – reproduisait Grigore Gafencu les mots de Hulubei. Je sais maintenant qu'un monde tout entier sent comme nous. Une exaltation si vivante et si déchaînée vaincra tous les chagrins de nos jours. »<sup>2</sup>

Dans ces années-là, la presse française soulignait elle aussi avec satisfaction, l'admiration que les jeunes roumains éprouvaient pour la culture française (les articles parus dans « La terre roumaine »), ce qui aurait dû servir d'exemple pour les Français qui doutaient de l'avenir de leur pays. Une série d'actions de succès, au caractère culturel, ont été organisées aussi par La Légation de Roumanie à Vichy. Un exemple concluant est la manifestation organisée à Paris, avec le soutien des jeunes roumains qui étudiaient en France, au Sanatorium des étudiants de Saint-Hilaire.<sup>3</sup> À cette occasion on a publié des articles élogieux sur la Roumanie dans « Action Française » et « Petit Niçois », où on soulignait que « le beau geste » des Roumains envers la France et les enfants français devrait faire tous les Français comprendre qu'ils avaient le devoir de poursuivre leur grande mission civilisatrice dans l'Europe de demain.

En même temps, à l'occasion de la célébration de certains moments importants de notre histoire, par exemple le 85<sup>e</sup> anniversaire de l'Union de la Valachie avec la Moldavie<sup>4</sup> ou la Fête du 10 mai<sup>5</sup>, en France se sont déroulées plusieurs manifestations dédiées à notre pays, des articles ont été publiés dans la presse française ou des émissions spéciales à « Radio Paris ».

Dans la première moitié de 1944 la présence de l'élément roumain dans la presse et la vie culturelle française connaît un évident pas en avant. Ainsi la revue illustrée hebdomadaire « Franc-Jeu » publiait au cours du mois de mai 1944, avec le soutien de G. Vorvoreanu, correspondant de presse auprès de la Légation de Roumanie en France, un matériel documentaire sur la vie et l'organisation de la jeunesse de Roumanie

(activité extrascolaire, travail des jeunes roumains, service prémilitaire), accompagné d'un riche matériel photographique.<sup>6</sup> Pareillement, dans les cercles littéraires français un grand succès a été réputé par les traductions de certains poèmes de Tudor Arghezi, parus dans la revue française « Cahiers du Sud », à côté d'une série de poèmes de L. Blaga.<sup>7</sup> La Roumanie musicale est présente elle aussi pendant cette période à Paris où plusieurs concerts sont organisés, tel le concert dirigé par le grand maître chef d'orchestre Ionel Perlea dans la salle du Théâtre « Champs-Élysées », dans la présence d'une audience assez nombreuse et des représentants de la Légation de Roumanie en France. Le programme du concert a été diffusé aussi par « Radio-Paris », sa présentation étant faite par le critique musical français Serge Moreux, du journal « Le Gerbe », connu sous le pseudonyme Germain Souleine.<sup>8</sup>

Une présence culturelle roumaine remarquable a eu lieu également dans le cadre de l'Institut de Langues Orientales, où les étudiants français, en n'importe quelle année d'étude, se sont inscrits aux cours de roumain. Comme point de départ pour les conversations on utilisait les sujets d'histoire, de géographie et de littérature roumaine. Les lectures sont choisies des pages de poètes tels : Goga, Cosbuc etc. Les étudiants, à part le perfectionnement des connaissances de langues, étaient obligés de se documenter personnellement sur certains problèmes roumains.<sup>9</sup>

En avril 1944, quand les troupes soviétiques sont arrivées aux frontières de la Roumanie, la presse française s'est occupé intensément de notre pays, en exposant les raisons et le but de notre guerre, signalant les succès de l'aviation roumaine, publiant différentes nouvelles sur notre pays et ses relations avec la France.<sup>10</sup>

Une page importante dans l'histoire des relations franco-roumaines de cette période est représentée par l'appui que les patriotes roumains du « Front National Roumain de France » (F.N.R.)<sup>11</sup> ont accordé à la Résistance Française. Le F.N.R. c'était un mouvement démocratique, créé à l'automne de 1944,



conduit par Traian Vuia, qui a été inclus dans la Résistance française pendant la guerre. Jusqu'au mois de septembre 1944, 60 membres du Front National Roumain sont morts sur le champ de bataille et plus de 5000 Roumains de France ont été déportés en Allemagne. Après la libération, beaucoup de Roumains se sont enrôlés dans la nouvelle armée française, tout comme en 1914 et 1939, pour continuer la lutte contre l'ennemi nazi. D'ailleurs, il faut mentionner que depuis l'invasion de la France, une série de jeunes médecins de l'Association des médecins roumains, qui se spécialisaient en France, ont été entraînés, par leurs collègues français, pour assurer l'assistance médicale aux militaires français et à la population civile dans le cadre des Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur. Ils ont de même décidé de continuer la lutte aux côtés des grands Alliés de la France et aux côtés de l'armée roumaine contre le troisième Reich.

Le Front National Roumain a informé le Gouvernement roumain sur le fait que le 22 août 1944, en pleine Insurrection Nationale à Paris, les « militia » patriotiques roumaines ont autorisé les Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur à occuper le Consulat Roumain de Paris, pour mieux protéger les biens du peuple roumain contre les troupes allemandes et les partisans d'Antonescu en France. Après la libération de Paris, en accord avec le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de la République Française, on a fermé les bâtiments de la Légation et du Consulat roumain en France, et ils seront restitués dès que le Gouvernement roumain aura désigné un représentant en France. Après la complète délivrance de la France, le Front national Roumain a milité pour la protection des droits des immigrants roumains dans la France libérée.<sup>12</sup>

À l'initiative de F.N.R., la veille de l'insurrection de Paris on a formé l'Association des Femmes Roumaines de France, qui rassemblait les Roumaines qui étaient actives dans diverses formations de la Résistance, de même que dans l'Union des Femmes Françaises. L'Association des Femmes Roumaines a organisé de nombreuses actions ayant pour but le renforcement de la solidarité franco-roumaine. En organisant des

veillées, des réunions littéraires, des conférences, des expositions, des manifestations culturelles, les femmes roumaines cherchaient à attirer un public français si nombreux que possible pour soutenir la cause de Roumanie.

Tandis qu'en France il y avait les luttes pour la délivrance de Paris, en Roumanie se déroulaient des événements ayant une signification pareille. Le coup d'état de Roumanie du 23 août 1944, en corrélation avec les événements de France, a ouvert le chemin de l'épanouissement des relations franco-roumaines sur des nouveaux horizons. Sur le plan politique et diplomatique, le 30 août 1944, dans une déclaration faite par le gouvernement roumain on montre que, étant donné que le gouvernement de Vichy « a cessé d'exister, [...] la question de reconnaître ce gouvernement est inutile ». Une telle déclaration signifiait, implicitement, la reconnaissance du gouvernement français conduit par Charles de Gaulle. D'ailleurs, le 5 septembre 1944, le gouvernement roumain a chargé le représentant de la Roumanie en Turquie, le ministre Alexandru Cretzianu, de contacter le représentant du gouvernement provisoire français à Ankara et de lui communiquer la déclaration du gouvernement roumain du 30 août 1944, ainsi que sa volonté d'entretenir « avec le gouvernement français les relations les plus cordiales, dans l'esprit de la vieille et immuable amitié qui lie les deux pays ».<sup>13</sup>

En raison de la situation internationale, c'est à peine le 1 mars 1945 que le gouvernement roumain et le gouvernement français nouent des relations au niveau de représentations politiques, transformées le 13 avril 1946 en légations<sup>14</sup>, suite aux lettres d'accréditation déposées par Simion Stoilov, agissant en qualité d'envoyé extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire de Roumanie à Paris.

Les nouvelles sur les événements du 23 août 1944 de Roumanie se sont répandues avec rapidité et sur les voies les plus diverses dans le monde entier. La journée de 23 août 1944 n'était pas encore terminée et les événements de Bucarest ont été enregistrés et commentés à l'étranger. Dans les jours à suivre les postes de radio et les grands quotidiens ont accordé une grande attention

aux événements de Roumanie et y ont consacré de nombreux commentaires en diffusant des informations provenant de sources officielles roumaines et des propres sources. Des colonnes entières de matériels sur les événements passés en Roumanie ont paru dans les journaux français « Le Populaire », « Front National », « L'Humanité », « France Libre », « L'Aube » etc. Les commentaires soulignaient le fait que, malgré qu'elle fût sensationnelle, la nouvelle n'était pas du tout surprenante, parce qu'il y avaient des mois entiers qu'on attendait que la Roumanie capitulât. La presse française a apprécié l'acte du 23 août 1944 de Roumanie comme un événement de grande importance, qui a donné un des plus sensibles coups au troisième Reich. Les commentaires parus soulignaient les conséquences du passage de la Roumanie aux côtés des Alliés du point de vue militaire, mais aussi politique et économique. Ils anticipaient également que l'effort militaire et économique de Roumanie dans la guerre menée avec les Alliés l'autorisaient à envisager avec espoir la future Conférence de paix, où notre pays espérait obtenir des conditions qui répondent à son effort, déjà reconnu au niveau mondial.

Pareillement, dans beaucoup d'articles on soulignait le fait que malgré les difficultés des années de guerre, l'amitié franco-roumaine a réussi à surmonter beaucoup d'obstacles, en démontrant ainsi sa durabilité. Une preuve dans ce sens c'est la réunion pour la constitution de l'Association « France-Roumanie » de mars 1945.<sup>15</sup> La séance a été ouverte par le professeur Aurel Pampu, saluant les personnalités présentes. Dans son allocution il a fait une présentation de la traditionnelle amitié franco-roumaine. Parallèlement, il a parlé de l'influence très forte que la France exerçait sur la Roumanie en plusieurs domaines : politique, littéraire, arts, science etc.

En même temps, entre 8-9 mai 1945 à Paris a eu lieu un Congrès des Roumains démocrates réfugiés en Occident.

Le centre du mouvement de résistance roumaine anticommuniste de Paris, dénommé « Le Comité Démocratique pour l'Indépendance

Roumaine » s'est attribué la responsabilité de l'entier mouvement de l'étranger. Nous rappelons quelques objectifs poursuivis par le mouvement de résistance roumaine : critique à l'adresse du gouvernement roumain instauré le 6 mars 1945 ; critique de la politique soviétique à l'égard de la Roumanie ; défense de l'intégrité territoriale du pays et annulation des rapports territoriaux de l'été 1940 par des articles publiés dans les journaux roumains d'Occident (« La Roumanie Libre », la revue du « Front National Roumain de France », « La Roumanie Indépendante », le journal du groupe de résistance de Bruxelles), mais aussi dans la presse occidentale (« Journal de Genève » etc.), mémoires adressés aux gouvernements etc.<sup>16</sup>

Les représentants de l'exil démocratique roumain joueront un rôle important dans la défense des intérêts roumains pendant la Conférence de paix<sup>17</sup>. Ainsi, en octobre 1946, Grigore Gafencu a présenté aux participants à la Conférence de Paix, au nom de la démocratie roumaine, un mémoire qui comprenait des observations sur le projet de Traité avec la Roumanie. Nous n'analysons pas dans ce travail l'attitude de la délégation française à l'égard des problèmes roumains dans le cadre de la Conférence de Paix de Paris de 1946. D'ailleurs, la capacité de la délégation française d'influencer les grandes décisions de la Conférence a été réduite. En général, la France a soutenu les demandes de la Roumanie concernant l'annulation du diktat de Vienne ou accorder le statut de co-belligérance. Il existe dans l'historiographie roumaine d'excellentes monographies sur la conférence de paix de 1946, grâce à Ion Enescu, Gheorghe Tutui, Stefan Lache, Valeriu Dobrinescu et autre.

En octobre 1945 toute la presse roumaine a accordé une grande attention aux résultats électoraux de France, qu'elle considérait à l'unisson comme une victoire des principes de liberté et de démocratie. L'intérêt manifesté par l'opinion publique de Roumanie et par le gouvernement roumain est d'autant plus grand vu qu'il y en avait beaucoup qui estimaient que la solution trouvée avait eu des conséquences profondes dans la politique

internationale. Généralement, il y a eu trois sujets débattus par la presse roumaine suite aux résultats des élections françaises :

- En premier lieu il s'agit du succès personnel remporté par Le Général de Gaulle. L'élection du Général de Gaulle en tant que chef du gouvernement français a été reçue avec satisfaction par la plupart des Roumains.
- Les journaux de Bucarest ont publié à la une et sous de gros titres le succès obtenu par les partis de gauche. Le succès remporté par les partis de gauche et surtout par le Parti Communiste a été apprécié notamment dans les journaux « Scanteia » (« L'Étincelle ») et « Romania Libera » (La Roumanie Libre) ;
- L'échec du Parti radical socialiste, que la presse de gauche de Roumanie comparait avec les partis national paysan et national libéral de Roumanie, en les qualifiant ironiquement « des partis historiques français ». <sup>18</sup>

La mission de De Gaulle de former un nouveau gouvernement, écrivait à ce temps-là « Universul » (« L'Univers ») est une nouvelle preuve de patriotisme du peuple français, qui dans des moments difficiles de son histoire fait la preuve de sa solidarité.

Les journaux de Roumanie ont été unanimes à déclarer que de Gaulle incarnait l'esprit de la résistance et de la liberté du peuple français, qu'il était le seul capable à accomplir l'union des Français.

Lorsque la crise gouvernementale a explosé, la presse roumaine n'a pas caché sa surprise et son inquiétude. Sous une forme différente et avec des nuances imposées par la couleur politique, les journaux ont exprimé unanimement l'espoir de voir une solution au conflit entre de Gaulle et L'Assemblée Constituante le plus vite possible. Certes, la presse de gauche avait une position favorable au P.C.F. Ainsi « Romania Libera » (« La Roumanie Libre ») écrivait : « Le Parti Communiste Français considère qu'en France il n'existe pas même une politique externe qui soit conforme à ses intérêts. Le peuple français refuse que le retour à la politique de l'équilibre transforme la France dans le champ de bataille

de l'Europe. Il ne veut pas repartir le monde en deux groupes hostiles qui luttent sur notre territoire ... » <sup>19</sup>

Sous de gros titres, à la une, la presse roumaine annonçait le dénouement de la crise gouvernementale française et la création du nouveau cabinet.

L'intérêt de la France pour la Roumanie, pour les évolutions politiques de notre pays dans ces premières années de l'après-guerre est illustré par l'attention que la délégation de France à Bucarest a porté au déroulement des élections de novembre 1946, à l'égard desquelles elle a rédigé beaucoup de rapports adressés au Ministère français des Affaires Étrangères.

Les documents diplomatiques français n'apportent pas d'informations spectaculaires, ils ne contiennent pas de données sur les résultats réels du scrutin ni même des considérations concernant la position de la France face à cet événement. De toute façon, la France a joué un rôle mineur dans la reconstruction de la Roumanie après la guerre. Mais ce sont les observations sur la position prise par les principaux acteurs du drame joué dans l'automne de 1946, sur la position prise par l'Union Soviétique et l'attitude des pouvoirs anglo-saxonnés qui sont assez importantes. Les évaluations des diplomates français sur le procès politique qui s'y est déroulé sont extrêmement intéressantes aussi.

Depuis l'été 1946 une série de documents diplomatiques français traitent de la nouvelle législation électorale conçue par le gouvernement Petru Groza, qui désavantageait les forces politiques d'opposition. Le 10 juillet 1946 Jean Paul Boncour, <sup>20</sup> le représentant politique de France à Bucarest, relatait la discussion avec Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu, le ministre de la Justice : « Avec une sincérité qui ne m'a pas étonné – relatait le diplomate français – le ministre de la justice m'a déclaré formellement que les prochaines élections de Roumanie ne seraient pas libres ; il m'a rappelé qu'il n'y avait jamais eu d'élections libres en Roumanie ; par conséquent, m'a-t-il dit en essence, le Parti Libéral, qui n'a jamais représenté qu'une minorité dans le pays, a pratiquement gouverné la Roumanie de

l'entre-deux-guerres, La Couronne lui offrant périodiquement la possibilité d'organiser des élections ; aussi n'y aurait-il pas de grande différence pour nous, parce que nous jouissons de la confiance de Moscou et nous sommes les seuls à en venir d'une manière satisfaisante pour le pays aux besoins de la nouvelle politique envers l'Union Soviétique - U.R.S.S. M. Patrascanu a ajouté que dans sa vision, la mise en application de sa législation électorale devrait laisser un nombre suffisant de places aux partis politiques, pour qu'ils puissent jouer au Parlement le rôle d'opposition de sa Majesté. Le Ministre de la Justice, d'ailleurs, ne m'a pas caché que dans cette question il n'était pas du tout d'accord avec ses confrères politiques qui préféreraient éliminer toute sorte d'opposition organisée ; je doute que les éléments du F.D.N., qui contrôlent à peu près partout les opérations électorales, s'inspirent du libéralisme politique de Patrascanu ; mais il faut prendre en compte l'hostilité de plus en plus vigoureuse de l'électorat et surtout des masses de paysans, contre la formation politique qui détenait le pouvoir. À cet égard, M. et Mme Patrascanu m'ont donné des exemples nouveaux et typiques sur le manque de confiance insurmontable que le Parti Communiste subit à la campagne ; les équipes motorisées de propagande envoyées dans les villages, sous prétexte de réparer le matériel agricole, sont bien accueillies tant qu'ils s'occupent de ces réparations, puis ils sont rapidement battus à bras raccourcis, pour les convaincre, disent les paysans, que les gens ne veulent pas de kolkhozes en Roumanie ; les crèches créées récemment par l'Association des femmes antifascistes, pour s'occuper des enfants tandis que les mères moissonnent les champs, restent inoccupées parce qu'aucune famille n'agrée pas à remettre sa progéniture aux soins des communistes, qui sont suspectés de vouloir les déporter en U.R.S.S. »<sup>21</sup>

Jean Paul-Boncour manifeste une certaine hostilité envers les leaders des partis démocratiques, ils considèrent que ceux-ci ne se sont pas adaptés aux nouvelles circonstances politiques et qu'ils sont les porteurs de tares politiques roumaines de la période d'avant la seconde guerre mondiale. Il

est possible que le diplomate français ait les mêmes sentiments qu'il éprouvait pour les partis et les leaders politiques qui avaient conduit la France au désastre de 1940, tant bien qu'on observe une hostilité à l'adresse des pouvoirs anglo-saxons, qui ne traitaient pas toujours le pays à l'amiable. Avec ces préjugés et avec certaines sympathies pour la gauche démocratique, le diplomate français décrit les réactions des partis démocratiques et leurs relations avec la monarchie, la position du souverain et des pouvoirs anglo-saxons.

Les deux partis démocratiques, Le Parti National Paysan et Le Parti National Libéral, faute de pouvoir influencer les débats sur la législation électorale, ont retiré leurs représentants le 12 juillet 1946, essayant d'attirer également le roi dans une attitude d'obstruction et lui avaient proposé de trouver refuge à Sinaia et de laisser à la charge du gouvernement Groza l'organisation des élections sur des fondements illégaux. Le roi pourtant a rejeté les démarches des leaders paysans et libéraux, attitude que le diplomate français essayait d'expliquer de la façon suivante : « Suite à l'expérience pénible et décourageante qu'elle a vécue pendant une telle crise de derniers quatre mois de 1945, la Cour, indignée par l'attitude des deux leaders anciens de l'opposition, a préféré s'entendre avec le gouvernement et le Roi a cédé pratiquement sur tous les plans (...) ». <sup>22</sup> Jean Paul-Boncour justifiait l'attitude du roi par le fait que « Les Américains critiquent l'attitude adoptée dans de telles circonstances par le président Maniu, récemment réélu triomphalement à la tête du Parti National Paysan ». Le principal problème pour le roi – montrait le diplomate français – semblait être la sauvegarde de l'institution monarchique. Il avait des informations selon lesquelles lors de leur introduction à l'audience au roi, Petru Groza, Gheorghe Tatarescu et Lucretiu Patrascanu ont été d'accord que les modifications constitutionnelles (la possible proclamation de la République) soient confiées à une assemblée législative, spécialement élue à cet effet. En recevant ces garanties à court terme, le souverain signe le décret de la loi électorale le 13 juillet 1946, bien qu'il s'en

rende compte que la nouvelle loi électorale ouvre la porte aux fraudes électorales du gouvernement Groza, qui avait la possibilité d'élire lui seul le parlement qu'il désirait. Avec objectivité, Paul Boncour note : « La Roumanie sort difficilement de la grave crise gouvernementale provoquée par la législation électorale, qui aurait pu dégénérer dans une crise constitutionnelle si le roi Michel n'avait pas refusé de s'engager sur les voies que Messieurs Maniu et Bratianu se hâtaient de prendre et de s'y aventurer de nouveau ». <sup>23</sup>

Les réactions des pouvoirs anglo-saxons à l'égard des élections générales de Roumanie sont attentivement enregistrées par le diplomate français, convaincu qu'elles représentaient la seule possibilité d'intervenir dans le blocage du procès de bolchevisation du pays. Paul Boncour a l'occasion d'apprendre des informations fournies par le représentant américain Burton Berry sur les résultats préconisés du scrutin. Berry, qui détenait des données des milieux gouvernementaux, communiquait à son collègue français, que les leaders du F.N.D. savaient que, dans les conditions d'élections libres, ils auraient obtenu seulement 10%, mais par manipulation des résultats ils ont l'intention de s'adjuger 90% de mandats, ci-inclus les mandats qui reviendraient à la dissidence libérale conduite par Tatarescu. <sup>24</sup>

Le représentant de la Grande-Bretagne à Bucarest était convaincu que le gouvernement roumain contrôlé par les communistes exercerait des pressions sur l'électorat pour s'assurer une majorité confortable, mais en dépit de ces abus, La Grande Bretagne n'était pas disposée à rompre les relations diplomatiques avec la Roumanie : « Seule une initiative américaine pourrait changer cette attitude... Foreign Office estime que la politique de refus ou de retrait de la reconnaissance a fait long feu et généralement elle n'a réussi qu'à priver les pouvoirs anglo-saxons des moyens d'action qui, sans être très efficaces, n'auraient pas été moins utiles. » - concluait Jean Paul-Boncour. <sup>25</sup>

La préoccupation pour le problème des élections générales apparaît de nouveau dans les télégrammes de la Légation de France à

Bucarest, à l'automne 1946. Paul Boncour retient des opinions différentes des leaders politiques à l'approche de la consultation électorale. Au début du mois d'octobre, il a l'occasion de discuter avec Tatarescu, à un moment où circulaient des informations selon lesquelles les élections seraient ajournées, à cause du fait que la fraude électorale qui se profilait aurait influencé négativement les négociations de paix de Paris. Le représentant diplomatique de la France montre que Tatarescu ne croit pas à cette possibilité et il précise qu'il a convaincu le Secrétaire d'État Byrnes qu'en Roumanie on ne pouvait pas organiser des élections comme à Missouri. Tatarescu révélait ensuite à Paul Boncour qu'il avait assuré le Ministre britannique des Affaires Étrangères Bevin que le gouvernement dont il faisait partie n'était pas communiste, parce que lui-même, qui avait jeté des communistes en prison, « il ne reniait rien de ses convictions passées et qu'il était déterminé à bloquer toutes les voies de bolchevisation du royaume ». <sup>26</sup>

La nouvelle entrevue du diplomate français avec Patrascanu où celui-ci informait Paris dans un long télégramme du 15 octobre 1946 est très intéressante : « Il semble que M. Patrascanu, revenu de Paris – rapportait Jean Paul-Boncour – n'a plus la même attitude conciliante qu'il avait l'été dernier ; même dans la mesure où il affirmait devant toute personne qui voulait l'écouter, qu'il entendait laisser à l'opposition une représentation adéquate dans la future assemblée ; il me semble que dans notre capitale il a reçu un traitement approprié et suffisamment efficace pour guérir de son inclination non-totalitaire à l'égard du parlementarisme. Après s'être réservé toutes les faveurs des MM. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej et Maurer, les délégués soviétiques, paraît-il, ont grondé M. Patrascanu quand il est resté seul, pour une période, à la tête de la délégation. On peut déceler trois éléments essentiels dans l'argumentation qu'ils ont soutenu devant le Ministre Roumain de la Justice.

1. La faiblesse de la résistance de Washington envers la politique de Moscou et surtout l'incapacité de M. Byrnes et de ses

collègues de comprendre quelque chose des problèmes de l'Europe Centrale, de Sud et Orientale. Le désintérêt des affaires européennes représente aux yeux des Russes un facteur inéluctable de la politique mondiale des États-Unis ; leur objectif n'était que de retirer, le plus tôt possible, le maximum des troupes américaines de notre continent; quelque éloquentes qu'elles soient de la part de la direction de Washington, toutes les affirmations contraires et catégoriques ne sont que des ballons d'oxygène donnés à une clientèle politique pour le peu de temps dont on a besoin.

2. La soviétisation de l'Europe est en train de se produire non seulement dans les régions occupées de l'Allemagne et d'Autriche, mais aussi en Italie, parce qu'à Trieste les communistes italiens comportent une attitude favorable envers les réclamations des Yougoslaves. En Balkans on dédie à l'union bulgare - yougoslave le jour dans lequel on pourra l'accomplir. Il reste qu'on supprime une petite île bulgare qui embarrasse...

3. Le Rideau de Fer ne va pas s'ouvrir que pour la France, mais du côté intellectuel... Après tout, Monsieur Pătrășcanu, qui en paraît tout à fait convaincu, conclut qu'en Europe la suprématie va appartenir en permanence à Russie, situation dans laquelle, dit-il, on doit à tout prix s'adapter. C'est ainsi qu'il justifie l'alignement au point de vue des extrémistes de son parti<sup>27</sup>.

Quelques jours avant les élections (le 16 octobre 1946 le gouvernement les avait établies pour le 19 novembre 1946) Paul-Boncour transmet de nouvelles informations qui étaient en contradiction avec les dispositions que Patrascanu aurait reçu des Soviétiques à Paris. Ana Pauker, qui venait de rentrer de Moscou - montrait-il - elle y aurait reçu des renseignements pour procéder avec modération à la manipulation des opérations électorales. De plus, il y avait des informations selon lesquelles l'un des vice-présidents de P.N.P., Mihai Popovici, aurait négocié en secret avec P.C.R. „Les négociations - continua Jean-Paul Boncour - n'ont eu aucun résultat et je suis tenté à croire que, par suite de ce fait, les communistes ont procédé avec

Mihai Popovici de la même sorte qu'ils ont agi avec Dr. Lupu en janvier, l'année passée; autrement dit, Moscou tente à exploiter l'ambition et la crédulité des politiciens roumains pour diviser de plus les partis qui se trouvent en opposition. Le leader du Parti Paysan a dit au Monsieur Auboyneau qu'il ne défend pas extrêmement le principe monarchique, qui est contraire à la doctrine du Parti Paysan et qui a une inspiration républicaine<sup>28</sup>.

Mihail Ralea manifestait lui aussi des dispositions conciliantes envers les élections et l'avenir de l'opposition ; il partait pour Washington à titre de ministre de la Roumanie. Ralea aurait averti le gouvernement de Groza sur l'effet désastreux qui aurait pu se produire en États-Unis dans le cas du triomphe écrasant de la coalition dirigée par les communistes. De plus, „il a ajouté que l'ambassadeur d'U.R.S.S., auquel il a présenté son point de vue, l'a rassuré que Moscou a donné son accord en ce qui concerne ce sujet”. Ralea partait au poste ayant la certitude que le gouvernement va manoeuvrer les résultats pour qu'ils soient plus équilibrés et de la sorte qu'il donne une riposte à la campagne internationale de presse qui accusait les conditions de terreur dans lesquelles la consultation électorale se déroulait.<sup>29</sup>

Les résultats électoraux<sup>30</sup> publiés contredisaient évidemment les options politiques du pays et l'opposition espérait qu'ils seraient invalidés par l'action du roi et des pouvoirs occidentaux, qui auraient du faire des pressions dans le but de répéter les élections.

Le 26 novembre 1946 Iuliu Maniu a adressé un mémoire au roi Michel, qui, en dernière analyse, lui suggérait de ne pas participer à l'inauguration du nouveau Parlement, résultat des élections locales, événement prévu pour le 1<sup>er</sup> décembre. Mais le souverain - remarquait le diplomate français - n'était pas prêt à agir en fonction des démarches de l'opposition, mais en tenant compte des réactions des pouvoirs anglo-saxons et notamment du gouvernement américain. Même si le ministre britannique à Bucarest avait déposé une note de protestation au Ministère des Affaires Étrangères

concernant la fraude des élections, Dean Acheson „a répondu formellement qu'on ne pose pas le problème de la reconnaissance ou de la non reconnaissance du gouvernement roumain et que la réception de la nouvelle, mardi nuit, c'était pour l'entourage du roi Michel un véritable soulagement”.<sup>31</sup>

Les communications de Paul Boncour laissent entendre que le roi et ses conseillers voulaient éviter une nouvelle confrontation avec la coalition dirigée par les communistes, d'autant plus que ceux-ci avaient accepté de ménager temporairement le souverain. La position incommode du roi est surprise le 3 décembre (après que le roi ait lu son message à l'inauguration des travaux du nouveau Parlement) par le diplomate français : „ On me confirme que, en prévoyant une démarche américaine, le Roi Michel a attendu mardi, la nuit de 30 novembre vers le 1er décembre, tard dans la nuit, avant de signer le message qu'il devait lire le lendemain dans la Chambre et il est curieux qu' à la Cour on pose encore la question si, par hasard, une protestation contre les résultats officiels du scrutin du 19 novembre n'arrive de Washington. Il existe la peur envers un tel communiqué, dont les termes paraîtraient maintenant comme un blâme des États-Unis, adressé au souverain et comme un encouragement de la nouvelle attitude du Parti Paysan, attitude désagréable pour la Couronne”.<sup>32</sup>

Des leaders du Parti Paysan – informait Jean-Paul Boncour – considéraient que l'entourage du roi Michel était responsable pour le fait que le souverain avait participé à l'inauguration du Parlement. Cependant, la réaction du roi semblait tenir compte même des déclarations confidentielles des leaders de l'opposition. Ainsi, pendant une audience accordée par le roi au président P.N.P., immédiatement après les élections, Maniu aurait reconnu que, pour son parti, il était impossible de prendre le pouvoir et il aurait été d'accord que le gouvernement de Groza continue à conduire le pays. Le roi avouait à Paul-Boncour que l'erreur de l'opposition a été sa croyance que le souverain pouvait se désolidariser en public de son gouvernement dans toute la période durant les circonstances

actuelles. Une année plus tard, le gouvernement de Groza n'hésitera pas à se désolidariser du roi Michel.<sup>33</sup>

Le manque de réaction des États-Unis envers la farce électorale du 19 novembre convenait, vu les circonstances, au roi et au régime, qui se voyait confirmé indirectement. En échange, les diplomates américains de Bucarest – rapportait Jean-Paul Boncour – „ sont dégoûtés que Washington n'ait pas réagi plus violemment envers les procédés électoraux du gouvernement de Groza et observent en quelle mesure leur pays a perdu son prestige, ne prenant aucune mesure sérieuse, malgré les avertissements diplomatiques répétés envoyés de Bucarest avant les élections.”<sup>34</sup> Le diplomate américain Burton Berry ne cachait pas à son collègue français la fatigue causée par la mission ingrate qu'il avait à accomplir à Bucarest et il l'annonçait qu'à ses insistances il serait bientôt remplacé par Rudolf Schoenfeld.

Malgré les évidences, Paul-Boncour cherche à découvrir des aspects positifs dans un processus politique qui ne laissait lieu qu'aux plus sombres prévisions. Le diplomate français enregistrerait quelques opinions, y compris de la part des adversaires de la coalition contrôlée par P.C.R., qui considéraient que le régime actuel était le seul qui ait pu gérer d'une manière satisfaisante les relations avec U.R.S.S. En revanche, le diplomate français, persiste dans la présentation péjorative de l'opposition et en premier lieu de P.N.P. : „Malheureusement, à ce moment, parmi les personnes de bon sens ... le président Maniu et quelques autres leaders âgés du Parti Paysan ne sont pas présents; leur exaltation n'a fait qu'accroître au fur et à mesure qu'ils apprenaient les résultats réels des élections”. Certainement, Paul-Boncour ne considérait pas que les résultats officiels étaient réels, mais ce qui l'inquiétait c'était que „le président Maniu est allé même jusqu'à évoquer la perspective d'une guerre civile dans le cas où les pouvoirs allaient tolérer la situation issue par la suite des opérations électorales du gouvernement de Groza”.<sup>35</sup>

La fin de ce drame, dans laquelle la majorité des personnages interprétaient des

rôles qui n'avaient rien d'honorable, pourrait être l'échange de messages à l'occasion du Nouvel An entre Iuliu Maniu et Paul-Boncour. Le diplomate français répond au message adressé par Maniu d'une manière cynique, qui ne faisait qu'attester l'abandon et l'isolement dans lequel se trouvait le leader du Parti Paysan, désavoué par ses contemporains qui étaient incapables d'entendre la fermeté de ses convictions et son intransigeance, même par ceux qui provenaient de démocraties traditionnelles : « J'ai l'honneur de confirmer la réception et de vous remercier de tout mon cœur pour le message télégraphique de Nouvel An. Des vœux si impressionnants que

l'opinion de France, malgré les préoccupations si graves que votre pays ait dans ces moments, elle vous retourne les mêmes vœux affectueux. Surtout la France, alliée à l'U.R.S.S. et liée depuis toujours avec la Roumanie d'une amitié si profonde comme la fraternité, elle désire ardemment que dans un futur plus proche, les troubles politiques, pour lesquels on est heureux de n'en avoir pas été responsables, soient suivis par l'apaisement des esprits. On désire que la Roumanie puisse retrouver tout de suite la prospérité dans une atmosphère dominée par le calme et dans le jeu libre des institutions démocratiques.<sup>36</sup>

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Consultez, pour les détails, Philippe Marguerat, *Le troisième Reich et le pétrole roumain. 1938-1940*, Sitjoff-  
Leiden, Genève, 1977, p.197.

<sup>2</sup> Les Archives Nationales Roumaines (A.N.R.), le fond de Grigore Gafencu, vol.292, Note du 11 juillet 1942.

<sup>3</sup> „La Dépêche Dauphinoise”, N° 80, le 1<sup>er</sup> octobre 1943.

<sup>4</sup> Par le soin de la Légation de Roumanie, le 14 janvier 1944 a eu lieu à Vichy, en présence de l'épouse du Maréchal Pétain et des membres du gouvernement, du corps diplomatique et de grands dignitaires et représentants de la société française, un spectacle qui a groupé trois films roumains : „Images de Roumanie”, „Le Pays de Moji” (Roumains de la région des Monts de l'ouest) et „ Les Monastères de Bucovine”. Cependant, le poste de radio français a eu le soir de 24 janvier 1944 une émission dédiée à l'Union des Principautés. Le maître de conférence a fait l'historique de l'événement célébré en soulignant que le germe unificateur est apparu premièrement en Transylvanie, mettant en évidence le rôle joué par la France et par Napoléon III dans la réalisation de l'Union de 1859. Il a suivi un programme musical, qui a compris „Le Poème Roumain”, par George Enescu et de différentes mélodies traditionnelles.

Il est apparu, sous la signature de Pierre Vitoux en „Le Petit Parisien” du 24 janvier 1944, un article dans lequel on montrait que l'anniversaire de l'Union des Principautés offre aux Français l'occasion de retourner le regard sur la nation roumaine, très courageuse, qui lutte depuis trois années à l'Est contre le bolchevisme. La France – montrait Vitoux – a entretenu les plus étroites relations avec la Roumanie. Les Roumains ont eu l'ambition de faire de Bucarest un petit Paris. Entre les deux pays l'échange de différents domaines est constant. Le Bucarest a le regard tourné vers l'Occident, tous les cercles roumains sentent et pensent en ce moment dans le sens européen. Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris, Fonds Archives Diplomatiques, 18<sup>e</sup> volume, 1942-1945, f. 710.

<sup>5</sup> Une bonne partie de grands quotidiens français ont publié des notes sur la signification du jour de 10 Mai, en soulignant l'importance que ce jour recevait dans les situations difficiles que la nation roumaine traversait, mettant en évidence les vertus et les droits du notre peuple, en rappelant encore une fois l'intérêt et l'affection que la France montre à la Roumanie, mais aussi la situation difficile dans laquelle se trouve le pays comme suite de l'avancement soviétique. „L'Oeuvre”, N° 90, 10 Mai 1944; „Paris-Soir”, N° 12, 11 Mai 1944; „Nouveaux Temps”, N° 20, 12 Mai 1944; Le Petit Journal”, N° 12, 11 Mai 1944; „Aujourd'hui”, N° 47, 11 Mai 1944.

<sup>6</sup> Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris, Directions des Affaires Étrangères, Fond: Europe (1940-1950), France, 19-e volume, Dossier 244, 25 Avril 1944, f. 110; Revue „Franc-Jeu”, N° 15, Mai 1944.

<sup>7</sup> Revue „Carriers du Sud”, N° 14, 26 Avril 1944.

<sup>8</sup> „Le Gerbe”, N° 86 du 23 Février 1944. On rappelle du programme du concert: „Rhapsodie Roumaine” par G. Enescu, „Variations” par I. Perlea, „Le Boléro” de Maurice Ravel, etc.

<sup>9</sup> Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris, Directions des Affaires Étrangères, Fond: Europe (1940-1950), France, 19-e volume, Dossier 544, 4 Mars 1944, f. 130.



<sup>10</sup> Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris, Directions des Affaires Étrangères, Fond: Europe (1940-1950), Roumanie, 11-e volume, Dossier 1033, f. 111-130; "Petit Journal", N° 1, 25 Février 1944; "Le Mémorial", N° 10, 6 Avril 1944; "Lyon Soir", N° 41, 12 Avril 1944; "Le Petit Marseillais", N° 32, 14 Avril 1944; "Le Journal de débats", N° 56, 14 Avril 1944; "L'Oeuvre", N° 85, 6 Avril 1944; "L'Effort", N° 12, 1 Avril 1944; "La Croix", N° 74, 12 Avril 1944; "Le Moniteur", N° 60, 14 Avril 1944; "Lyon Républicain", N° 25, 13 Avril 1944; "Le Petit Journal", N° 10, 13 Avril 1944; "Le Petit Méridional", N° 36, 14 Avril 1944; "Le Petit Gironde", N° 43, 15 Avril 1944; "L'Avenir", N° 28, 5 Avril 1944; "L'Action Française", N° 40, 18 Avril 1944; "Le Petit Dauphinois", N° 13, 6 Avril 1944; "La Dépêche de Toulouse", N° 44, 7 Avril 1944; "Marseille Matin", N° 15, 8 Avril 1944; "Courrier du Centre", N° 23, 7 Avril 1944; "Le Petit Provençal", N° 12, 18 Avril 1944; "Petit Nicois", N° 28, 20 Avril 1944.

<sup>11</sup> Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris, Directions des Affaires Étrangères, Fond: Europe 1940-1950, Roumanie, 13-e volume, Dossier 954, f. 85-150.

<sup>12</sup> Revue "La Roumanie Libre", N° 9, Septembre 1944, p. 2.

<sup>13</sup> Ion Calafeteanu (coordonnateur), *L'Histoire de la politique externe roumaine*, Maison d'édition: Enciclopedica, Bucaresti, 2003, p. 340-341.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 348.

<sup>15</sup> A.N.R., Le Ministère de la Propagande Nationale, Informations, vol. III, Dossier 955, le 10 Mars 1945, sans page.

<sup>16</sup> Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris, Directions des Affaires Étrangères, Fond: Europe 1940-1950, France, 19-e volume, Dossier 1010, Mars 1945, f. 91-98.

<sup>17</sup> Revue "La Roumanie Libre", N° 10, Octobre 1946.

<sup>18</sup> Revue "La Roumanie Libre", N° 11, Novembre 1945.

<sup>19</sup> Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris, Directions des Affaires Étrangères, Fond: Europe 1940-1950, Roumanie, 13-e volume, Dossier 983, f. 70-82.

<sup>20</sup> Après la libération de la France il est nommé représentant politique de la République Française en Roumanie, le 3 Mars 1945. Le 22 Mars 1945 Alexandru Bianu, chargé d'affaires du gouvernement roumain en France, signalait le fait que Paul-Boncour était parti vers la Roumanie. Dans sa qualité de représentant politique il y restera jusqu'à la fin de l'année 1947.

<sup>21</sup> Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Série Z, Europe, 1944-1949, Roumanie 10 — Télégramme Paul-Boncour vers le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Bucarest, 10 Juillet 1946.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibidem*, - Télégramme Paul-Boncour, Bucarest, 15 Juillet 1946.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibidem*, - Télégramme Paul-Boncour, Bucarest, 18 Juillet 1946.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibidem*, - Télégramme Paul-Boncour, Bucarest, 16 Juillet 1946.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibidem*, 7 Août 1946.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibidem*, - Télégramme Paul-Boncour, Bucarest, 4 Octobre 1946.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibidem*, - Télégramme Paul-Boncour, Bucarest, 15 Octobre 1946.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibidem*, - Télégramme Paul-Boncour, Bucarest, 8 Novembre 1946.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibidem*, 19 Novembre 1946.

<sup>30</sup> Paul-Boncour savait le 19 novembre 1946 quels seront les résultats officiels, certainement falsifiés : „Il est possible que dans les milieux sociaux-démocrates on ait laissé échapper des informations concernant le pourcentage de votes attribués dès aujourd'hui aux différents partis: 38% aux communistes, 18-20% aux sociaux-démocrates appartenant au Front Unique des Ouvriers, 12-14% à d'autres partis du bloc gouvernemental. 30% environ seraient réservés à l'opposition." Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Série Z, Europe, 1944-1949, Roumanie 11, Télégramme Paul-Boncour, Bucarest, 19 Novembre 1946.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibidem*, Télégramme Paul-Boncour, Bucarest, 16 Novembre 1946. Un télégramme de l'ambassadeur français à Washington du 16 Novembre 1946 préfigurait déjà l'attitude que le gouvernement américain va adopter: „Le Département d'État estime comme satisfaisantes les élections qui confèrent au Parti Libéral et celui des Paysans une position comparable à celle détenue par l'opposition en Bulgarie. Le chef de la Division de l'Europe des Balkans souligne que, contrairement aux bruits que la presse a fait circuler, le Département d'État ne pense pas à la possibilité de cesser sa mission en Roumanie". Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Série Z, Europe, 1944-1949, Roumanie 10 - Télégramme Washington, 16 Novembre 1946.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibidem*, Roumanie 11, Télégramme Paul-Boncour, Bucarest, 3 Décembre 1946.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibidem*, Télégramme Paul-Boncour, Bucarest, 13 Janvier 1947.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibidem*, Télégramme Paul-Boncour, Bucarest, 3 Décembre 1946

<sup>35</sup> *Ibidem*, Télégramme Paul-Boncour, Bucarest, 11 Décembre 1946.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibidem*, Télégramme de Jean Paul-Boncour adressé à Iuliu Maniu, Bucarest, 2 Janvier 1947.

## Rethinking Balance: from Power to Threat

Sava DIAMANDI

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Twenty years passed since the theory of balance of power has been revised and refined by a new paradigm. Much thinking about the international system has been centered on the idea that states oppose any other state that accumulates enough power to be a potential hegemony. That is the central idea of the balance of power theory. Whereas this paradigm revolves around the power buildup that triggers the process of systemic balance, a “new” paradigm, called balance of threat, puts at forefront the assumption that states balance as a reaction against threat and not against power *per se*. The main factor that generates the process of balance, through internal buildup of military power or/and alliances formation, is the threat posed by states. Power accumulation is downgraded from a central feature to one of the variables on which threat is based, alongside with aggressive intentions and geographical proximity.<sup>1</sup>

The balance of threat theory made a major development of one of the realist school's tenets. It proved that the traditional thinking of how the international system functions can be refined. It also illustrated that foremost scholars of the realist tradition of international relations theory, e.g., Hans Morgenthau or Kenneth Waltz, made inconsistent assumptions about the impact of security competition among states. This theory made a splendid case of how scientific programs advance based on dynamic scientific research.<sup>2</sup> In this specific case – the traditional balance of power theory replaced by the modern balance of threat theory – it confirmed that neo-realism is a scientific program that can produce new valuable thinking on processes that decode international politics.

However, after its momentum and after twenty years since its outset, the balance of threat theory has not been substantially developed, nor in its theoretical depth neither in its empirical substance. It has been consumed mainly by its core prediction, i.e., a politico-military alliance of states will dissolve as the natural result of the threat disappearance. Whereas the threat that has triggered the external balance process of alliance formation fades away, the expected consequence is that the alliance breaks away too. The recent historical record shows crystal clear that this prediction was fallacious. The post – Cold War epoch makes the case of an alliance – the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – which survives the fading of the threat that initially brought it alive. Instead of further revision of the balance of threat paradigm, the author, Steven Walt, preferred to redesign it with a new name: *the balance of soft power*. Less substantial and with a questionable historical record, in comparison with the former balance of threat paradigm, the theory of soft power struggles to explain how processes of balance still persist, in disguised and altered forms, within a unipolar dominated international system.<sup>3</sup>

This article sustains that the theory of balance of threat can be further improved both in its theoretical and empirical dimensions. Getting off some of the core assumptions of the neo-realist theory on which balance of threat is based is an option, since these assumptions could have been the breaks to deepen investigations on sources of threat balancing processes. Analyzing threat perception formation is better placed in a constructivist framework of thinking, which

centers on the interplay between ideas, collective shared beliefs and identities in order to explain world politics. The findings of other research agendas that are based on the constructivist framework, such as *securitization theory* or *regional security complex*, can be inserted in an expanded and refined theory of balance of threat.

Regarding the empirical research, this study proposes more clarity on choosing the level of analysis (systemic, sub-systemic and unit) and the chronological frame. The selection of a time frame would be very valuable for historical tracking of change in the area of shared strategic beliefs that shape international politics.

I start this article by looking to the roots of balance of threat theory, namely the realist tradition and its traditional balance of power tenet. The second section investigates how the balance of threat theory is set up and it reveals its weaknesses. The third section shows how the balance of threat applies to the current unipolar context of international politics. And the fourth part explores the main features of an extended theory of balance of threat.

The conclusions focus on the relevance of an expanded historical record in which threat balance can be further tested. The conclusions include preliminary findings on the interchange between the study of international history and the theory of international relations.

## I. Balance of power and the realist tradition of thinking in international relations theory

The concept of balance of power has a multitude of meanings. At the middle of the last century, Ernst Haas found 8 meanings and definitions of the balance of power concept. It is certain that this line of research comes to an entangled result.<sup>4</sup> It is an unsound track of research since it gets merely to the conclusion that we might not find what really means the balance of power. The central issue is not to attempt finding one general and collectively accepted definition but to see how this concept is embedded in scientific research programs. Although various forms of thinking about the balance of power have been recorded in the history of mankind – the Greek historian of the fifth century BC, Thucydides or the Indian philosopher of the third century BC, Kautilya – a generous body of thinking about this concept is recorded only in the European world, beginning with the Epoch of the Illuminist philosophy. The concept is found in both, philosophy research and documents of statecraft including international treaties, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.<sup>5</sup> Yet, the balance of power has been articulated in a theoretical construction just since the set up of the realist theories of international relations.

In order to grasp the connection between realism and balance of power theory I draw on

the difference between *grand theories* and *middle range theories* of international relations.<sup>6</sup> While the grand theories focus on the general picture and try to answer the question on how the international world functions, the middle range theories explore specific and limited problems regarding the international politics.

Different tenets of the realist school of international relation theory – classical, neo-realist, offensive, defensive, or neo-classical – are research programs that explain the nature of international politics. These theories are identified as grand theories of international relations. As the differences between these research programs are beyond the objectives set by this paper, I confine to a general picture that defines the realist tradition in international relation theories.<sup>7</sup> Realism explains the world politics as an enduring struggle for power between sovereign states that operate in an anarchical environment.

On the other hand, the balance of power theory is, undoubtedly, a middle range theory that focuses on how states oppose each other. It describes the results of power distribution in the international system. The research question of the balance of power theory is how the international system escapes from being

dominated by a single state or how the condition of world hegemony or universal empire is avoided.

It is important to notice that the balance of power as a middle range theory rests on the realist core assumptions about international politics. Realism has been promoted as a school of thought in the theory of international relations, which resulted from a great debate between scholars. The concept of balance of power stood at the very center of this debate. After the end of the First World War, liberalism – as a normative paradigm of thinking in international relations – proposed a new era of statecraft based on the international law of peace, promotion of free market, the prohibition of war as an instrument of international relations, and the guaranty of peace based on a collective security framework. Liberalism completely refuted the balance of power described as an institution of international politics which was blamed to stimulate the resort to war among states.

Many scholars who put the basis of the realist tradition have argued that liberalism is a mere utopia as the international world can not escape the brutal security competition between states. Not any form of international institutions or instruments of collective security can achieve an international system free of war. Power politics are a given. Some forms of international stability can be achieved through the prudent management of power relations based on the principle of balance of power.

There are a number of core assumptions on which realist theories draw on. First, realism puts the emphasis on the anarchical structure of international world, meaning that there is no central authority that can regulate the relations between states. The condition of anarchy defines the international system as a self-help system within which states have to look for their security relying on their own capabilities. The prospects of war are a constant element of international politics. Second, states are locked in a *security dilemma* as they have to permanently evaluate their capabilities in relation with the other states in the system.<sup>8</sup> There is an inexorable sense of insecurity

between states as they are pushed to expand their military power in order to be sure that they will not be overtaken by other players in the system. Third, the competition for security among states is the regular feature and it can be surmounted only when the system becomes hierarchal in the form of hegemony, universal empire or world government. And fourth, the most important players in the international system are states viewed as rational units that operate under the logic of national interest, survival, and power maximizing.

Balance of power is a central result of the realist's core assumptions.<sup>9</sup> States, as rational actors constrained by the conditions of the security dilemma will oppose against another state that accumulates enough power to become hegemony. The perspective of system hegemony or world domination by a single center generates the risk for all the other players in the system to lose autonomy of action and sovereignty.

The relative power distribution in the system represents the central frame of analysis. Whereas a state actor or an alignment of states begins to translate aggregate power into military capabilities to an increased level, the other state actors in the system perceive this situation as an *imbalance of power* in the system. Their reaction is twofold: on one hand they increase domestic power buildup efforts (the process of *internal balancing*), on the other hand they form military alliances (the process of *external balancing*). The balance of power that is formed can be tested in a military conflict. Whoever would win the war, the process of shaping the system of balance of power is re-created since all the state actors will continue to be cautious on the distribution of power within the system and will permanently watch out against any attempt of hegemony. The post-war process of balancing can result in the situation in which alliances are formed between former enemies.

There is a certain belief of the realist prominent scholars regarding a pattern of balancing behavior of states that is generated by the general conditions of anarchy in international politics. This tendency is found in both classical and modern (neo-realist)

forms of realism: Morgenthau, one of the leading theoreticians of classical realism, sustains that the international balance of power is a general principle that can be found in any society formed by autonomous units and the balance of power with its adjacent policies are inevitable; Waltz, the initiator of neo-realism, states that "balance of power politics prevail wherever two, and only two requirements are met: that the order is anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to survive" and "states, if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side, for it is the stronger side that threatens them".<sup>10</sup>

The way scholars of *realpolitik* read the international history, as the empirical basis of their theories, outlines the recurrent formation of balance of power. It generally starts with Europe in the seventeenth century when the supranational power of the Pope was replaced by modern sovereign states. Beginning with the Westphalia Peace in 1648, the international treaties between states invoked the balance of power as desirable in order to prevent the dangerous boost of power of any nation. Successive attempts of winning hegemony in Europe, by Louis XIV of France, Napoleon, Wilhelmine or Nazi Germany have been watered down by balancing coalitions. Nineteenth century is par excellence the epoch of balance of power statecraft. First, England confirmed its successful performance as European *balancer*, forging alliances with other continental powers in order to obstruct

any attempt of hegemony on the European continent. And secondly, the Concert of Europe formed after the Napoleonic Wars was meant as an association of great powers that recognized the principle of balance of power as the prerequisite of stability and status quo maintenance.<sup>11</sup>

The theory of balance of power is not free of controversies within the realist tradition of international relation theories. In the realist form of the hegemonic stability theory, the balancer usually overlaps with the hegemon actor, which uses balancing strategies in order to assure the stability of the system. That is also an approach that transcends the limited historical record of the *Westphalian* world of European modern states, expanding the research to the evolution of successive empires in world history.<sup>12</sup>

But the major source of the re-interpretation of balance of power theory rests on middle range theories that test the general propositions advanced by grand theories. The central research questions posed by middle range theories are: whether the balance of power really represents a recurrent result of the anarchical international system; why would states prefer the balancing behavior over other alternatives such as bandwagoning or buck-passing? Or what does the empirical record tell us about the real motives on which balancing strategies are based on?

## **II. Replacing power with threat. The genesis of the new theory of balance**

Steven Walt, a neo-realist scholar of international relations, starts its research questions on balance of power theory with general remarks on international history.<sup>13</sup> Reflecting on the Two World Wars and the period shortly after the Second World War, he comes to the conclusion that the general assumption on balance behavior triggered by power accumulation does not fit the historical record.

The major findings are that Germany bid for hegemony was overcome by more powerful coalitions. In the World War I the alliance formed against Germany, namely by Great Britain, France, Russia, joined later by the United States, was far superior than the combined power of Germany and its allies, namely Austrian-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. A similar situation was in the Second World War, where the coalition against Nazi Germany attracted more states, although

Germany was the weaker side in terms of aggregate power. And the third example is the short period after the Second World War that was marked by the preponderance of the United States power (including the monopoly over nuclear capabilities). Yet, a large number of states preferred to form an alliance with the United States and not to balance against its power, as the theory of balance of power would predict.

It should be mentioned here that Walt's findings on the Two World Wars are not convincing. For the First World War the situation can be interpreted as following: Germany, although slightly inferior in terms of demography, economic power, and number of military units had more advantages in terms of army mobilization and performance. In other words, Germany had a big advantage of translating aggregate power into offensive capabilities. Till United States joined the Entente and made clear the outcome of the war, German army knocked down Russia and fought the war in Western Europe on the French territory. In this case, German army performance can be considered a capability in itself and should be counted.

For the case of the Second World War, Walt confuses the way the anti-Nazi alliance has been enlarged. It was not that a number of states rushed in to save Europe from Nazi domination, but rather that Hitler's decisions to declare war on Soviet Russia, and then on the United States overstretched significantly the anti-Nazi alliance.

Yet, the third instance that refers to the period short after the Second War shows very clear that the balance of power theory is inconsistent with the historical record. Roughly all the European Western powers, alongside with Greece and Turkey preferred to adhere to defensive pacts with the United States, in order to deter a potential attack of the Soviet Union. The balance of power theory would predict in this case that most of the other great powers in the international system would swiftly initiate balancing processes directed against the potential hegemon. However, a number of states felt more threatened by Soviet Russia, instead of the

United States. This result generates the general hypothesis on which balance of threat theory is based: that states balance against threat and not power *per se*. Internal or external balancing processes are the result of an external threat posed by other states. Power distribution within the international system does not tell us which states will align against others.

Threat formation relies on a number of combined variables: *aggregate power*, *geographical proximity*, *offensive capabilities*, and *perception of aggressive intentions*.

The *aggregate power* means the states' total resources, including industrial and military capability, population and technological dynamism. The states will have more tendencies to balance against a threatening state, the greater the aggregate power this has. A strong indicator regarding the existence of *offensive capabilities* is when a state possesses the capabilities with which it can threaten the territorial integrity of another state at an acceptable cost. States with powerful offensive capabilities are more likely to provoke other states to balance. States that are in close *proximity* pose a greater threat than those that are far. And decoding *intentions* of a state as aggressive will make others to balance. Both internal and external processes of balance come to an end when the external threat disappears.

The case of NATO formation against the Soviet Union after the Second World War fits rightly the balance of threat's scenario. USSR had an impressive *aggregate power* that has been translated into impressive *offensive capabilities* with which it has wiped out the powerful German Wehrmacht. As the Red Army tanks rolled deep into Europe, the USSR began to be in the *near vicinity* of Western European states. The *aggressive intentions* of the USSR have been decoded as it began to aggressively impose puppet regimes in Eastern and Central Europe, while the final settlement regarding Germany was postponed *sine die* by the soviets. The Western countries signed a collective defense treaty in 1948 and one year later they joined a defense treaty with the United States.<sup>14</sup>

It is not that Walt's empirical record is focused on grand historical events such as the World Wars or the beginning of the Cold War. These are general hypothesis based on which the author starts a detailed analysis of alliances formation cases. The external balancing process is the central aspect of the research. Walt chooses, for testing the balance of threat's hypotheses, to focus on cases of alliances formation in two regions during the Cold War times: Middle East (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iraq, and the two superpowers: the United States and USSR) and South-Western Asia (Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, India, China, and the two superpowers: the United States and USSR).

There are two general propositions that Walt tries to prove. One is that states prefer to form military alliances or alignments in order to balance and not to bandwagon. The other is that states form alliances or alignments in order to balance against the most threatening and not the most powerful state.

### **The limited historical record**

Beyond its merits, it is striking that the empirical record of the balance of threat theory remains so narrow. For instance, a very challenging case study would be represented by the European states' competition for security during the time before the World War II. This case does not fit either the balance of threat or the bandwagoning expectations.

While Germany became a major threat for the other European powers, the balancing process did not seem to work. France and Great Britain did balance very late, after a lot of appeasement and Soviet Russia preferred to cut a deal with Germany and adopted a favorable non-belligerent position at the beginning of the conflict. The Soviet action would not be bandwagoning as it was not weaker than Germany.

Bandwagon refers to the situation in which weak states choose to align with the dominant power in order to appease it or to share the profit of a victory. The alternative of bandwagon is considered in these case studies, because Walt observes that American foreign policy decision makers, during the Reagan administration, believe that other states would prefer to accommodate with the USSR threat rather than balance against it. He proves, based on the above mentioned empirical record, that, actually, when states are faced with an external menace posed by a third state, they will rather prefer to form alliances against it than to align with it.

The new theory of balance represents a major new finding on the processes that explain the results of security competition among states. It replaces power, framed in terms of military capabilities, with threat perceptions. Not the distribution of capabilities in the system, but the distribution of threats is the main determinant of balance.

The whole case seems to be defined by a buck-passing scenario in which states avoid to be part of balancing coalitions preferring the other third states to take on the burden balancing. Buck-passing remains unconsidered although it explains a very important piece of international history, which represents the prologue of the Second World War.<sup>15</sup>

The balance of threat theory simply requires more empirical record for testing. Otherwise it explains only the balancing behavior of states in two sub-systems within the historical framework of the Cold War. In this context, the propositions put forward by this theory can hardly count for general propositions that explain the behavior of states and are valid across time and space.

### **The anomaly**

Findings on balance of power inconsistencies represent the onset of the theory of balance of threats. Even the balance of threats needs

further reformulation since it does not fit recent evidence. In the case of threat decline, the theory would predict a proportional decline

of balancing processes as well, be it domestic or external. As the danger posed by a state disappears, the result is that also the alliance build to counter the threat would fade away.

The idea of ending the balancing process in the conditions of threat disappearance is challenged by the case of NATO. As a military coalition of states, NATO was designed to counter the Soviet threat. After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of Soviet Union, it would have been expected, based on the theory of balance of threat that NATO would become obsolete and the alliance would come to a natural end. However, the outcome has been converse: the more Russia was loosing power in the 1990s, the more the Eastern European states have been more willing to join NATO. Instead of disappearing, NATO enlarged. Although less threatened, the Eastern European countries have been eager to join the alliance. Balance of threats theory is inconsistent with both NATO persistence and the enlargement of the alliance with Eastern European states.

### III. Balancing processes in the era of unipolarity

Most of the theories of the realist tradition do not decode comfortably the context set by the current unipolar structure of world politics which unfolded after the Cold War. These theories and the auxiliary forms of balance paradigms have explained to a large extent the results of multipolarity or bipolarity. However, these abstract constructs seem to be unfitted and not designed for making sense of an international self-help system that is dominated by a single power.<sup>18</sup>

Balance of power theory would expect that most of great powers in the system form balancing coalitions against the domination of a single power. The advocates of systemic balance of power theory indicate that although a balancing coalition has not yet emerged, this process can be more durable than expected.<sup>19</sup> There would be a number of signs that signal the slow coming into sight of a future trend of balance formation. The rise of China, the resurgent Russia, or even the development of the European Union Security and Defense

For the second edition of the book *The Origins of Alliances*, in 1990, Stephen Walt indicates in the *Preface* that "[...] the optimistic rhetoric about maintaining the "Atlantic Community" should be viewed with some skepticism [...] Although NATO's elaborate institutional structure will slow the pace of devolution, only a resurgence of the soviet threat is likely to preserve NATO in anything like its present form."<sup>16</sup>

It is true that NATO configuration has been altered in the last two decades as it added a new strategic concept, new state members and even it has performed out-of-area military missions. Yet, the core *rationale* of a collective defensive pact remains intact. The fact that there is no entire harmony at the decision level among its members does not change too much the bigger picture, as it did not change the bigger picture of other uneasy but still successful alliances in international history.<sup>17</sup>

Policy are indicators of a future international structure defined by multipolarity. Yet, this expectation is purely a gamble since the prolongation of unipolarity would keep the theory in the background, just waiting for the balance to come. The more unipolarity persists, the more the theory of balance of power falls slowly into disuse.

On the side of balance of threat theory, the absence of balancing at systemic level in the framework of unipolarity is explainable. The absence of threat intentions posed by the single superpower of the system, namely the US, makes that no balancing coalition will form. Yet, the author's theory struggles to unmask persistent tendencies of balancing at systemic level that can be activated at any time if the US does not restrain its unilateral power projection in third countries. These balancing tendencies are materialized in a *soft power* form. They show the other great powers discomfort *vis-à-vis* the US unilateral military actions and are confirmed in various forms



short of military components. The balance of soft power finds out that balancing processes are persistent and they can be activated in military known forms when the level of threat posed by the single superpower of the system would transcend certain limits.

It should be mentioned that the balance of soft power rests on a very unsteady empirical record. What would go in and what would go out from a list of states' balance of soft power behavior?<sup>20</sup> The theory is quite unclear on this issue. The theory represents also an effort of criticizing the neo-conservative tenet of foreign policy embraced by the Bush administration in the context of the US intervention in Iraq.

Another fallback of the balance of threat theory and of the new form of balance of soft

power theory is that they try hard to validate the realist tradition core assumptions regarding the recurrent security competition among states as the sufficient result of the anarchical international structure. From this point of view, Walt comes too easily to the conclusion that European powers, e.g., France or Germany, would slide into a security competition with the US. The current developments show that the transatlantic relations stay on firm grounds. The path from amity to enmity is visualized by Walt as too easy and straightforward. It is almost as if lord Palmerston's views on alliances from XIXth century England would be still very lively and applicable in the current context of the US – Europe relations.<sup>21</sup>

#### IV. An extended theory of balance of threat

The general conclusion is that, with the exception of NATO anomaly, the balance of threat theory's validity persists as long as the levels of analysis are correctly distinguished and visualized. During the Cold War times, the clear cut between systemic and sub-systemic levels was blurred by the insertion of rivalry between the two superpower – the US and Soviet Union – within merely all sub-systemic structures. Only after the demise of bipolarity, the regional structures and their specific security relations become conspicuous. The interplay between geographic proximity and perception of threat makes balance of threat theory relevant for making sense of the security relations among regional actors.<sup>22</sup>

The employment of balance of threat theory for sub-systemic analyses overlaps with the findings of a more sophisticated paradigm called the *regional security complex*. The latter paradigm focuses on processes of securitization and de-securitization within clusters of states. The regional security complex is defined by the intensity of these processes which are so intertwined that the states' security concerns cannot be considered or resolved apart from one another.<sup>23</sup>

It is noticeable that the regional security complex introduces also the notion of

de-securitization, meaning that threat intentions within a cluster of states decline to such a degree that states cede to be locked into a security competition. The relations would be in this case replaced by patterns of amity in forms of a high degree of cooperation or at the maximum of a security community.<sup>24</sup>

The element of de-securitization complements the balance of threat theory, being a sort of a missing link. It is a very important addition since the balance of threat theory is rather quiet on the forms in which balancing processes fade away and on the possible scenarios following from it.

But how do the processes of securitization and de-securitization really take form? This is also another issue on which balance of threat theory does not say much, because of two causes. First is that the theory in its present form takes for granted only two possible scenarios: alliances or opposition between states. And the second is that it would sacrifice the required parsimony of paradigms and the reluctance of neo-realist systemic research that does not leave too much space of an interconnection between unit level (the foreign policy) and systemic level processes (the distribution of power among units).<sup>25</sup>

The clear cut between foreign policy and systemic approaches is exaggerated. Moreover, it does not make sense of states' variations in decoding threats. The current balance of threat theory does not consider the analysis of threat perceptions' fluctuation at unit level. If domestic analyses of the way in which security concerns form are introduced into theory, then the theory would become more clarifying, e.g., the way Iran changed its security concerns after the coming to power of the Ayatollah regime in 1979.

Including variables that refer to processes of securitization would also reveal how states that form a military alliance will prefer the continuation of this arrangement. For instance, the analysis of the development of NATO member states' security concerns shows two general trends. One is that they prefer keeping the collective defense arrangement for a future possible resurgence of military threats coming from a third state. The second is that their main concerns focus on security risks that result from failed states, international networks of terrorism, or the spread of weapons of mass destruction.<sup>26</sup>

In order to disentangle all the elements that can complicate the disclosure of domestic processes of threat formation, the insertion here refers to the findings of the *securitization theory*. The main idea promoted by this paradigm is that norms formation and adoption is based on discourse analysis.<sup>27</sup> The discourse analysis in political science is the method of understanding how political issues come into sight as an intersubjective process. The discursive approach is employed to see how national security or international organizations security agenda is set up. According to the securitization theory, the security policy is not objective, but intersubjective.<sup>28</sup> An issue becomes a matter of security as a result of a speech act. What is relevant is not the existence of an external threat but more of how that threat is designated by the securitizing actor as a security issue, an issue that is more important than others and should take absolute priority.

The general flaw found at the theory of threat is the absence of an in-depth focus on threat formation. This general issue comes relevant as the theory of balance of threat can not explain how NATO persists in the context of the external threat disappearance.

Both the regional security complex and the securitization theories' findings are complementary to the balance of threat theory. Based on the new assumptions of the securitization, it becomes explainable how states can change their perception on the external threat and how the exit from a balance scenario can be.

While the variables of *geographic proximity*, *aggregate power* and *offensive capabilities* remain valid, the perception of aggressive intentions should be enlarged with the *securitization/de-securitization* variables. The materialization of balancing processes, in terms of domestic military enhancement and initiation of alliances, depends on the success of a domestic *securitization* speech. The way out from a balance of threat situation results from a successful domestic *de-securitization* speech.

The exit from a balance of threat is conceived in various scenarios, ranging from recreating another competition for security, in which states will form new balances of threat, to the circumstances in which the relations are constructed in terms of co-operation, and to the situation in which the states will form a pluralistic security community.

The balance of threat exit in the form of a successful de-securitization discourse does not imply the automatically dissolution of security commitments between states, as new forms of security concerns can be inserted on a common security agenda.

It is worth mentioning here that an expanded theory of balance of threat would become, to certain degree, contradictory with its realist tradition umbrella. Integrating the variable of de-securitization and its possible results - especially the co-operation or security community relations - contradicts the central assumption of realism on anarchy, which generates a self-help system and an inexorable security competition among states. A general

defection of the realist research programs is the inflexibility on explaining the change in international politics. The central cause of this flaw, which has influenced also the balance of threat theory, is the predetermined systemic processes that are expected to be generated by the anarchical structure of international politics.<sup>29</sup>

The securitization and the regional security complex theories have been both influenced by the conventional constructivist approach in international relations theory. Constructivism is defined as "the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world"<sup>30</sup>. Constructivism is a framework of thinking about the nature of social life that can be used in empirical research on international relations issues. It puts emphases on the shared intersubjective beliefs and the role of identities that shape the social structure of international politics. The context visualized through the lenses of conventional constructivism is not predetermined but constituted jointly by agents and structures.

The balance of threat theory can be framed in a constructivist approach that offers more

flexibility on revealing the changing patterns of security relations between states in the international system. It would transcend some of the rigid realist expectations on balancing recurrence in the anarchical international system and on interpreting the threat formation solely through the lenses of sovereignty/territorial defense.

As the expanded theory of balance of threat can have a closer look on threat formation, various data can show that the threat formation roots are not limited at defending national territory or sovereignty. The securitization process can imply, beyond the elements of political and military security, the recourse to issues of identity and economy in the forms of concerns lifted up to existential/security concerns.<sup>31</sup>

A sectorial approach on threat formation that includes military, political, social and economic elements does not hamper the military components on which balance of threat is based. At this point, a differentiation should be made between process and result. The employment of military instruments by states, through military power enhancement and defensive pacts initiation with other states that have similar security concerns, remains the result of the balancing process.

### **Conclusions: the history and theory of balance of threat**

This article is a broad critique of Stephen Walt's balance of threat theory. A general finding is that beyond its merits as a better theory on balance, this paradigm has encountered important challenges. The view of this article is that the balance of threat theory represents a major contribution to creating better instruments of analysis that make sense of the international politics. However, the theory needs some refinement that includes more in-depth evaluation of the threat formation variable. It also needs more empirical record in order to reveal systemic and various sub-systemic trends.

In the beginning, this article makes an introduction into the traditional balance of power theory and its realist tradition

theoretical framework in order to reveal the relevance of the re-formulation done by the theory of balance of threat. The main flaw of the theory is this: the "big" expectation of NATO's dissolution as a natural consequence of external threat's disappearance has not been met. Instead of fading away as we would expect based on the balance of threat theory, NATO enlarged. The alliance has become even stronger as the current return of France into the integrated military command, ending a fourth decade rift, shows.

The answer to this inconsistency is that the balance of threat theory can be further revised. Adding the securitization and de-securitization elements that stand at the core of threat formation would make more sense of states'

security options in various regional/sub-systemic frameworks.

Another major finding of this article is that balance of threat theory can be improved outside its realist tradition aegis. A more flexible theoretical framework, such as the moderate constructivism, can offer more space for the interpretation of threat formation at unit or systemic level. The change of states' security preferences and the outcome of exiting the balance of threat relations on the lines amity relations can be captured by the balance of threat paradigm only with better equipped instruments of analysis. Discourse security analysis is one of these instruments.

The second major weakness found at the balance of threat theory is represented by its narrow empirical basis. A general explanation of this gap is to a certain degree stemming from the realist paradigms' tendencies characterized by *presentism*.<sup>32</sup> Although realist research programs as grand theories of international relations studies develop general proposition on international politics that transcend time and space, their empirical ground is contained into the *European Westphalian order*. Even within this time frame, the historical record barely refers to other epochs than the XIXth and XXth century.

Walt's balance of threat theory is obviously marked by *presentism*. The first studies starts with evolutions on statements of the Reagan administration foreign policy decision-makers.<sup>33</sup> The second, more recent study on *balance of soft power* debates the performance of the Bush administration foreign policy and the impact of the US intervention in Iraq.<sup>34</sup> A history of the balance of threat is thus missing, living a question mark over whether the balance of threat is a recurrent feature of the international system or not.

Choosing an empirical record that would count for the history of balance of threat is a complex enterprise. Scaling a historical frame is, in particular, the most intricate issue. One option is to visualize **balancing processes** on the broad scale of the **historical international systems that have been recorded by historians**. Comparative analysis would be then the most

challenging quest. As a general result of comparison between different international systems in a study addressed by 9 scholars, the outcome is that balance is not recurrent and not the most prominent feature of the described systems. In most of the cases balancing fails and rising to hegemony represents the recurrent aspect. For accounting the decline of the hegemonic power, again, the balancing processes do not stand as prominent variables.<sup>35</sup>

The second option is to choose a narrower historical frame, which would be characterized by turning points or environment shifting in order to count for regular or varied security preferences of the actors within an international system. I find in particular that the period between World War II and the recent times at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century offers important features that would make it for a good case of empirical research.

First, the selected historical frame reveals important turning points that would possibly generate shifts in collective beliefs, which shape strategic preferences of states. A general hypothesis is that the balance of threat might have been the general norm of the international system in the first three centuries of the *European Westphalian* world. Yet, the finalization of a long epoch of European great powers, locked in the security environment of multipolarity, marks the beginning of parallel security speeches, which generate collective beliefs at more than one sub-system. The threat formation process at systemic level, during the Cold War, can include the variable of identity, in forms of political ideological confrontation. The research question is what are the processes of securitization telling us about the grounds on which threat formation is based?

Second, for the shifts produced after the collapse of the Cold War order, the empirical research looks at whether the balance of threat becomes challenged by other strategic preferences or whether a systemic strategic preference for balance of threat is just complementary with other preferences that can be counted at systemic level.

Third, the selected time frame has a special importance for the actual international system. After the World War II, the international system gets completely integrated, on a world scale. It transcends the outlook of a European dominated world to the point of multiple states that share the same system. As the system is rooted in the model of the European sovereign states, the line of research looks to whether the regional settings recreate the model of balancing behavior. The emulation of balance processes is an interesting line of empirical research in the context in which the region from where the system originates, namely Western Europe, makes the case of an exit from the balancing logic towards the emergence of a pluralistic security community.<sup>36</sup> Another research question related to regional contexts focuses on revealing variations of threat formation processes, added to the traditional military or political ones. The distribution of identities among regional actors is considered, as it covers many forms, e.g., national, religion or ideology.

And fourth, the proposed research area departs from the current literature on balance theories. The reference time frame for the theory of balance of power is 19<sup>th</sup> and the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. For the balance of threat, the empirical data are rather modest, as it has been already pointed out. Contextualizing a long perspective of an international structure of world politics is feasible as the middle range theories should not necessarily be bound to generate general propositions that are valid in any time or space. It should not be expected that the theory of balance of threat produces propositions that are equally valid for Ancient Greek World and 20<sup>th</sup> century Europe. Threat perception and its

securitization processes differ from a historical context to another depending on the strategic culture that the historical actors produce in their specific historical milieu.

Regarding the international history, this article proposes a new approach of empirical investigation. International history can surpass the view of being solely the study of diplomatic and military events. Describing and analyzing collective mentalities and their impact on economic and social structures within a long historical perspective have been considered by the modern historiography under the aegis of the so called French *Annales* School.<sup>37</sup> Yet, this historiography trend has a major gap in terms of international relations history, as the prominent preoccupation has been the economic and social history.<sup>38</sup>

A synthesis of the international history research and of the theory of international relations has much more to contribute for the advancement of knowledge within the study of international politics than two separated and delineated approaches. Analyzing discourses of security in systemic and sub-systemic environments and their impact represents the central link for both the history and the theory of international politics. The essential conditions for forging such a study is that, on one hand, the selected theory of international relations must be a middle range paradigm centered on a problem-solving frame; and on the other hand, the historical examination that does not focus on the succession and construction of specific events, but on describing certain features of a selected long term-based structure. These views on empirical research and paradigm employment are proposed for a comprehensive study on the history and theory of balance of threat.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Balance of threat theory is based on two studies by the same author: Walt, Stephen (1987) *The Origins of Alliances*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, London and (1988) "Testing Theories of Alliance Formation. The Case of Southwest Asia" *International Organization*, vol. 4(2): 275-316.

<sup>2</sup> On progressive/degenerative research programs see Lakatos, Imre (1974), "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes", in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (eds) *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. See also references regarding the research programs in IR

studies in Keohane, Robert (1986) "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond," in Robert Keohane (ed.) *Neorealism and Its Critics*, New York: Columbia University Press.

<sup>3</sup> Walt, Stephen (2005) "Taming American Power" *Foreign Affairs* 84(5): 105-124 and (2002) "Keeping the World 'Off Balance': Self Restraint and US Foreign Policy" in John G. Ikenberry (ed.) *America Unrivaled. The Future of Balance of Power*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. On balance of soft power see also Paul, T.V. (2005) "Soft Balancing in the Age of US Primacy" *International Security*, 30(1): 46-71. For the critical assessment of the theory of soft balance see Lieber, Kier A. and Gerard Alexander (2005) "Waiting for Balancing. Why the World Is Not Pushing Back" *International Security* 30(1): 125-138.

<sup>4</sup> Haas, Ernst (1953) "The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda," *World Politics* vol. 5 (4): 370-98.

<sup>5</sup> A history of balance of power is developed by Kissinger, Henry (2002) *Diplomația*, București: BicAll, pp. 58-88; see also Sheehan, Michael (1996) *The Balance of Power. History and Theory*, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 24-52 and pp. 97-144. See also the definition of balance of power in Findling, John (1980) *Dictionary of American Diplomatic History*, Westport: Greenwood Press, p. 33.

<sup>6</sup> Gilpin, R, *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981, pp. 3-4. Gilpin develops on the initial idea of K.J. Holsti (1971) "Retreat from Utopia: International Relations Theory, 1945-70", *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, vol. 4: 165-77.

<sup>7</sup> I employ the term *realism* and *realpolitik* meaning the realist tradition of IR theory. On realism in IR theory, the literature is immense. I refer here at two studies on this topic: Walt, Stephen (2005) "The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition" in Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner (eds) *Political science: the state of the discipline*, New York, Washington: Norton, American Political Science Association; and Mearsheimer, John J. (2001) *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company, pp. 17-23.

<sup>8</sup> On the security dilemma see Hertz, John (1950) "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, vol. 2: 157-180.

<sup>9</sup> On the theory of balance of power see Walt, (1987) (1988) *op. cit.* Sheehan, *op. cit.*, Kissinger, *op. cit.* Gulick, Edward V. (1955) *Europe's classical Balance of Power*, New York: Norton, Kaplan, Morton A. (1957) *System and Processes in International Politics*, New York: Wiley; Morgenthau, Hans J. (2007) *Politica între națiuni*, București: Polirom, pp. 203-243. Waltz, Kenneth (2006) *Teoria politicii internaționale*, București: Polirom, pp. 147-81. Paul, T.V., J. J. Wirtz și M. Fortmann (eds.) (2004), *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century*, Stanford CA: Stanford University Press; Nye, Jr. J.S. (1997) *Understanding International Conflict*, New York: Longman, pp. 12-68; Kegley, C.W. and E.R. Wittkopf (2004) *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*, Belmont CA: Thomson Wadsworth, pp. 531-64.

<sup>10</sup> Morgenthau, *op. cit.*, p.203; Waltz, *op. cit.*, 177.

<sup>11</sup> Kissinger, *op. cit.*, 48-87; Findling, *op. cit.*

<sup>12</sup> Ikenberry, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-16; the leading theoretician on neo-realism hegemonic stability is Gilpin, *op. cit.*

<sup>13</sup> Walt (1987) (1988), *op. cit.*

<sup>14</sup> I simplified much the road of alliances formation at the beginning of the Cold War. For the extensive and detailed history on the Cold War see Gaddis, John (1997) *We Know Now. Rethinking Cold War History*, Oxford: Clarendon Press. See also Baylis, John (1984) "Britain, the Brussels Pact and the Continental Commitment" *International Affairs*, 60(4).

<sup>15</sup> On balance vs. buck-passing in power politics see Mearsheimer, *op. cit.*, 267-333.

<sup>16</sup> *op. cit.* p. VII

<sup>17</sup> For example, the Entente during the World War I, the Anti-Nazi alliance and even NATO during the Cold War have all encountered misunderstandings between their member states. Yet all these alliances have been successful, completing their objectives. Here should be made a clear cut between loose and dysfunctional alliances on one hand and current diplomatic frictions that have no relevant impact.

<sup>18</sup> With the exception of the realist strand of hegemonic stability, the absence of balancing against the US predominance after the Cold War generates a lot of question marks in realist approaches. About the debate regarding the balance of power in the post-Cold War times see Ikenberry, *op. cit.* and Paul, *op. cit.*

<sup>19</sup> Waltz, Kenneth (1993) "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security*, vol. 18 (2): 44-88.

<sup>20</sup> Lieber, *op. cit.* pp. 125-138

<sup>21</sup> Palmerston was PM of Great Britain during the Victorian epoch. He famously stated that "England has no permanent friends; she has only permanent interests."

<sup>22</sup> The post-Cold War times show that balancing behavior is recurrent in various sub-systems such as Middle East, South Asia, and South-Eastern Asia. Yet other sub-systems such as North America or the European Union do not encounter any balancing behavior.

- <sup>23</sup> Buzan, Barry and Ole Waever (2003) *Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 44.
- <sup>24</sup> Alexander Wendt points out three possible security systems: the "competitive system" in which states identify negatively with each other's security (that can be called the "Hobbesian system"); the "individualistic" system in which states are still self-regarding to their security but the collective gains generated by cooperation are their primary target; and the "cooperative" security system in which each other's security is perceived as the collective responsibility. See Wendt, Alexander (1992) "Anarchy is what states Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization*, 46(2): 391-425. Security community is a region in which war and security rivalry has become very unlikely or even unthinkable. The term has been coined by Karl Deutsch in 1950s, but it has been adapted by constructivist scholars in the 1990s: see Adler, Emanuel and Michael Barnett (eds) (1998) *Security Communities*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- <sup>25</sup> Waltz, Kenneth (1986) "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: Response to My Critics" in Robert Keohane (ed.) *Neorealism and Its Critics*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- <sup>26</sup> Regarding the new security concerns of the NATO member states see the two strategic concepts that have been agreed on after the Cold War: *The Alliance's Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Rome, 8 November 1991*, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b911108a.htm>. and *The Alliance's Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999*, available HTTP: <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>. On the changing patterns of threat formation in Europe from the classical defense to the multi-sectorial threats see also The EU Security Strategy (2003) *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, available HTTP: <http://www.consilium.eu.int>.
- <sup>27</sup> Waever, Ole (2005) "Discursive Approaches," in Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez (eds) *European Integration Theory*, Oxford: Oxford University Press and (2005) "European Integration and Security: Analysing French and German Discourses on State, Nation, and Europe," in David Howarth and Jacob Torfing (eds) *Discourse Theory in European Politics*, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
- <sup>28</sup> Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde (1998) *Security. A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- <sup>29</sup> Buzan, Barry and Richard Little (2000) *International Systems in World History. Remaking the Study of International Relations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 18-22.
- <sup>30</sup> Adler, Emanuel (1997) "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics," *International Journal of International Relations*, 3(3): 319-363. On constructivism in IR theory see also Hopf, Ted (1998) "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security*, 23(1): 171-200.
- <sup>31</sup> The idea that security can be defined on distinct sectors has been promoted by Buzan in (1991) "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century," *International Affairs*, 67(3): 431-451 and developed in further studies. Walt disagrees with the extension of the security concept beyond its military dimension; see Walt, Stephen (1991) "The renaissance of Security Studies" *International Studies Quarterly*, 35: 211-239.
- <sup>32</sup> Buzan and Little, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-22.
- <sup>33</sup> Walt (1987), *op. cit.*
- <sup>34</sup> Walt (2005), *op. cit.*
- <sup>35</sup> Wohlforth, William C., Richard Little, Stuard J. Kaufman, David Kang, Charles A Jones, Victoria Tin-Bor Hui, Arthur Eckstein, Daniel Deudney and William L. Brenner "Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History" *European Journal of International Relations*, 13 (2): 155-185.
- <sup>36</sup> This process has been masked by the Cold War's context in which the majority of the European Community member states were also NATO members. Yet, the consolidation of the European Union after the Cold War shows that the process of integration and security community building among European states has been contiguous with the security competition between Western World and Soviet Empire.
- <sup>37</sup> Burke, Peter (1990) *The French Historical Revolution: the Annales School 1929-89*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- <sup>38</sup> States, power and important events have been underconsidered by the historians of the *Annales School* as the preferred area of the traditional event-based history.

## Les agents diplomatiques français et la question de Trieste et de la Vénétie Julienne (1945-1947)

Florin FUGARU

### A. Questions internationales

Entre 1945 et 1948 Trieste fut un des enjeux de la guerre froide. La revendication de Tito sur la ville fut virulente et obsédante. Pour les Occidentaux, Trieste à la Yougoslavie, c'était "les soviétiques dans les mers chaudes". Il faut noter que Trieste avait en 1945 une majorité italienne et une forte minorité slovène. Trieste c'était à l'époque le débouché maritime de tout l'Europe Centrale, mais aussi un centre culturel slovène important.

En 1945, Tito a revendiqué tout le Karst, y compris Trieste et Gorizia. Le plateau est de population entièrement slovène, mais les bords de l'Adriatique et d'Isonzo et surtout les villes Trieste et Gorizia sont à majorité italienne.

Au début de 1945 les soviétiques paraissent appuyer Tito dans ses projets relativement à Trieste et à Vénétie Julienne.

Ainsi, par un télégramme du 10 mars 1945<sup>1</sup>, on apprend que le Gouvernement Soviétique aurait promis d'appuyer le projet du Maréchal Tito de faire de la Vénétie Julienne une république autonome avec Trieste pour capitale qui s'intégrerait dans la république Fédérale Yougoslave.

Par une dépêche en date du 18 avril 1945<sup>2</sup> signée René Massigli, l'Ambassadeur de France à Londres souligne qu'il était à prévoir que Tito au lendemain de la signature de l'accord russo-yougoslave et à un moment où il se sent solidement appuyé par les forces armées soviétiques, maîtresses de Vienne, se livrerait à quelque manifestation et se ferait publiquement le porte-parole d'une politique d'expansion depuis longtemps connue.

Massigli note que d'une façon générale on paraît considérer à Londres que le règlement de la question de Trieste et de son attribution définitive ne présente pas un caractère d'urgence.

On montre que du point de vue militaire, pour les armées d'occupation britanniques et américaines en Autriche, la libre disposition du port de Trieste sera indispensable, mais du point de vue ethnique, on paraît admettre à Londres que Fiume devrait être attribué à la Yougoslavie. Les revendications yougoslaves en ce qui concerne l'hinterland d'Istrie et de la région de Trieste sont également jugées raisonnables par M. Massigli; mais on note que Pola et Trieste sont, dans une large mesure, des créations de la Double Monarchie ou l'élément slovène n'y représente qu'une faible minorité.

Massigli considère que le problème politique de Trieste dépasse singulièrement le cadre d'une étude ethnographique : "Il s'agit presque de concilier l'inconciliable, de tenir compte d'une part des besoins militaires des puissances occidentales, et de l'autre, de ménager à la fois les intérêts de nos alliés yougoslaves".<sup>3</sup>

Mais, par un télégramme du 16 mai 1945<sup>4</sup>, Massigli souligne qu'en réalité l'affaire de Trieste et l'affaire de Klagenfurt constituent deux aspects du même problème : il s'agit de savoir qui aura le contrôle, non seulement du port de l'Adriatique qui alimente l'Europe Centrale, mais encore la ligne de chemin de fer qui lie Trieste au système ferroviaire danubien. Massigli note que "le Maréchal Tito,



spontanément ou non, s'efforce de pousser ses avantages dans deux directions".<sup>5</sup>

Par une autre dépêche datée le 17 mai 1945<sup>6</sup>, René Massigli, Ambassadeur de France à Londres, montre que le Gouvernement britannique regarde la question polonaise, la question hongroise, la question autrichienne et la question de Trieste comme parties d'un seul et même problème, celui de l'expansion russe en Europe : "Il s'agit de savoir, dit Massigli, où cette expansion s'arrêtera". On note que la politique russe serait soumise à l'influence des maréchaux et des généraux de l'armée rouge qui dans l'élan et la fierté de la victoire, veulent aller plus loin et considèrent qu'ils leur appartiennent de faire la loi dans les pays d'Europe : "Le Maréchal Staline serait personnellement disposé à plus de modération mais ayant à compter avec la position extrêmement forte des chefs militaires, se trouverait dans une situation très embarrassante."<sup>7</sup>

Les agents diplomatiques français en Yougoslavie se sont prononcés en 1945 sur la question de la frontière italo-yougoslave. Ils ont pris une attitude ferme en se prononçant distinctement pour la souveraineté italienne sur Trieste quand à la question istrienne, ils ont soutenu la cession de cette région à la Yougoslavie.

Par une note de 15 septembre 1945<sup>8</sup>, concernant le règlement de la frontière italo-yougoslave, la position française est que l'établissement d'une nouvelle frontière entre l'Italie et la Yougoslavie ne concerne pas seulement les intérêts limités de deux Etats limitrophes, mais pose aussi de nombreux problèmes européens qui mettent en cause de graves questions internationales d'ordre aussi bien politique qu'économique. En ce qui concerne le problème du littoral slovène, le point de vue français est de maintenir la souveraineté italienne sur Trieste, mais on note que cette souveraineté ne serait guère qu'une fiction aventureuse et précaire si elle ne pouvait pratiquement se manifester par un courant continu de vie assurée par une communication en terre ferme entre la masse italienne et Trieste :

"Notre politique implique donc que l'Italie conserve une ligne côtière allant de la Baie de

**Muggia au Sud de Trieste, jusqu'à l'embouchure du Judrio.** ancienne frontière austro-italienne de 1914. L'Italie peut conserver ainsi **Monfalcone** (...) en revanche les îlots urbains italiens à partir de Capo d'Istrie seraient abandonnés à la Yougoslavie"<sup>9</sup>, soutient la position diplomatique française.

En ce qui concerne la question istrienne, on remarque que cette question ne semble pas actuellement se poser en faveur de l'Italie dont la langue et les traditions ne persistent plus que dans les villes plus ou moins déchues mentionnées plus haut à propos du littoral.

Le journal français "Le Croix" du 6 mai 1946<sup>10</sup>, note que les experts des quatre puissances n'avaient pu se mettre d'accord en 1945 sur un tracé de la frontière dans la Vénétie Julienne. Chacun d'eux avait sa "ligne" qui figure dans le rapport que les quatre ministres examinent.

La "ligne soviétique" laisse à la Yougoslavie toute la Vénétie Julienne, Trieste, le col de Tarvis, et une partie du Trioul.

La "ligne française" donne à l'Italie Tarvis, la ville de Gorizia, la ville et le port de Trieste et une minime partie de l'Istrie.

La "ligne britannique" place sous la souveraineté de Rome, Gorizia, Trieste, environ un tiers de l'Istrie et Pola.

La "ligne américaine", enfin, est semblable à la britannique, mais laisse à l'Italie environ la moitié de l'Istrie, dont la vallée de l'Arsa.

On note que la ligne américaine est la plus défavorable aux demandes de Belgrade, la ligne française s'efforce d'arriver à un compromis acceptable par les deux parties.

Il faut y ajouter l'attitude de la revue française "L'Esprit" à l'égard de l'affaire de Trieste et de la Vénétie Julienne. "L'Esprit" publie en juin 1945<sup>11</sup> un article sur l'affaire de Trieste signé M. Bertrand d'Astorg. M. Bertrand d'Astorg considère "qu'il faut reconnaître qu'il y a quelque injustice et quelque hypocrisie dans la querelle qu'on cherche à la Yougoslavie de Tito à propos de l'occupation de la Vénétie Julienne et Trieste."<sup>12</sup> Il remarque qu'il faut tenir compte de la peur de voir les Russes à Trieste.

"Disons-le crûment : s'il ne s'agissait pas de la « petite nation » yougoslave, premièrement et si, deuxièmement, on ne voulait pas voir derrière cette nation l'ombre de la puissance soviétique, la Yougoslavie a-t-elle droit aux territoires qu'elle occupe ? Si ces territoires sont peuplés d'une majorité de slovènes et de croates qui ne se veulent pas italiens et se veulent yougoslaves, la réponse doit être aussi affirmative que quand on demande : la France a-t-elle droit à l'Alsace ? et moins équivoque quand on demande : la Roumanie a-t-elle droit à la Transylvanie ?"<sup>13</sup>

M. Bertrand d'Astorg note qu'en Istrie, comme dans la Vénétie Julienne, la justice, si elle accepte ce principe, est pour la cause de la Yougoslavie, dont les troupes, quand elles descendent la vallée de l'Isonzo, ou progressent sur le plateau du Karst, sont accueillies par une population qui parle comme elles, sent comme elles, et veut ce qu'elles veulent.

Même fondée sur les statistiques italiennes, la carte ethnographique de l'Istrie et de la Vénétie Julienne est assez claire : sur tout l'Istrie Centrale et Orientale, sur tout le Karst, le long du val de l'Isonzo (la Sotcha slovène) une masse slave compacte ; des taches de population italienne, ou plutôt italianisée, dans les villes du littoral istrien occidental (Pola en particulière) ; un gros îlot italien dans Trieste, entièrement cerné par le bloc slovène.

"On dira que cette carte est tirée d'un atlas linguistique. Mais, si l'idiome n'est pas, en Alsace, par exemple, un argument concluant, dans toute cette région il l'est. Qui ne parle pas italien, ne se sent pas italien. Qui parle slovène, se sent yougoslave"<sup>14</sup>, note M. Bertrand d'Astorg.

En ce qui concerne la Trieste, M. Bertrand d'Astorg souligne que la majorité des triestins sont italiens. Le port de Trieste n'est un grand port que s'il dessert tout l'Europe Centrale. Il remarque qu'il doit être le port non seulement de la Yougoslavie, mais de l'Autriche, de l'Hongrie, de la Tchécoslovaquie. Il peut concurrencer Hambourg. On note que Trieste n'est pas un port italien : sa position excentrique le proclame assez. Trieste pourra reprendre la place qu'il avait à l'époque de

l'empire austro-hongrois à condition qu'il soit la tête de voies ferrées améliorées, d'autostrades prolongées vers le Nord-Est et l'Est.

Au fond, note M. Bertrand d'Astorg, le cas de Trieste illustre l'état de l'Europe Centrale à récréer : ni l'économique, ni le militaire, ni le politique, ne peuvent, à eux seuls, donner des tracés équitables des frontières.

Par une note datée le 4 juin 1946<sup>15</sup>, on souligne que Trieste est le seul point de l'Europe Centrale qui touche à la mer. Il n'existe pas en Europe d'équivalent à une situation aussi exceptionnelle et cette situation commande la destinée de ce port. On affirme qu'ici une seule porte existe et tout y converge, l'Europe septentrionale et occidentale, découpée par les mers est abondamment desservie par quantités de ports. On montre que les pays situés à l'Est comme à l'Ouest de Trieste lui sont économiquement étrangers ; pour le rôle indiqué ci-dessus Venise suffit à l'Italie et à la Yougoslavie un élément essentiel fait pour longtemps encore défaut : l'existence d'une grande industrie moderne. Trieste n'est ni de l'Est, ni de l'Ouest, elle est axée Nord-Sud.

"Si l'on passe à l'argument de l'utilité économique, il apparaît d'une claire évidence que Trieste n'est plus nécessaire à la Yougoslavie qu'il n'était à l'Italie."<sup>16</sup>

On remarque que vu l'état actuel et pour longtemps prévisible de son économie, la Yougoslavie dispose déjà d'un nombre de ports largement suffisant à ses besoins réels : Susak, Split, Dubrownik, Cotor et peut-être Fiume.

"Aujourd'hui la Yougoslavie revendique une ville qui lui étant économiquement non moins inutile n'est même pas yougoslave"<sup>17</sup>. La note souligne qu'abandonner Trieste à un seul détenteur serait octroyer à celui-ci la latitude de transformer ce centre commercial dans un puissant levier au service de sa propre politique.

L'opinion diplomatique française concernant Trieste et son territoire est de lui rendre le statut britannique de république autonome protégée. On souligne que cette protection devrait leur être assurée par une puissance assez désintéressée pour être impartiale,

matériellement et moralement forte. On montre que seule l'Organisation des Nations Unies devrait réunir ces conditions. Un directoire de l'ONU siègerait en permanence et aurait intégré dans la Constitution de la République dont il constituerait le sénat régulateur : cet organe aurait droit de veto contre toute mesure administrative ou législative qu'il estimerait contraire à l'intérêt général. On souligne que la République Autonome serait un État fédéral. Trieste serait le siège du Conseil Fédéral et du Conseil Supérieur de l'ONU. Mais chacune des capitales provinciales (Gorizia, Trieste, Pola) aurait ses propres organes de gouvernement local, assistés d'une délégation du Conseil de l'ONU. On estime que l'État fédéral triestin puisse avoir admis à protéger ses intérêts commerciaux à l'étranger par des consulats : "Au surplus, si cette modalité n'était pas retenue, ne pourrait-on admettre que le passeport de citoyen de Trieste fût valable et pût être visé dans les consulats de toutes les nations relevant de l'ONU : commodité considérable pour les grands voyageurs que sont les triestins et privilège unique qui en ferait des citoyens de l'univers".<sup>18</sup>

En ce qui concerne les avantages de la solution française on identifie :

- A. – à l'intérieur de l'État autonome :
1. les deux groupes de population en présence, italien et slave, se trouveraient juxtaposés en proportion sensiblement équivalente ;
  2. l'État autonome contrôlerait lui-même deux des principaux cols, Tarvin et Picdicolle, qu'empruntent deux de trois lignes de communication qui la relie à l'Europe Centrale, condition de son indépendance ;
  3. l'État autonome aurait la possession de Tolméno, point stratégique important pour sa sécurité ;
  4. Trieste reviendrait ainsi à sa destinée historique et naturelle d'emporium libre, sous la protection d'une puissance qui serait maintenant l'ONU. On remarque que les triestins seront libérés de toute crainte de "balkanisation".

B. – au regard des deux compétiteurs :

1. La Yougoslavie gagnerait l'importante ville de Fiume ;
2. Aucune parcelle de population yougoslave ne se trouverait plus sous la domination italienne ; en revanche la Yougoslavie acquerrait une population très notable de nouveaux éléments italiens ;
3. La Yougoslavie gagnerait (argument psychologique) de voir Trieste sinon englobée dans ses propres frontières, du moins arraché à l'Italie.

En ce qui concerne l'Italie, elle se voit débarrassée de la totalité de ses minorités slaves.

C. – au regard des quatre grandes puissances :

1. l'intérêt général se trouverait sauvegardé ;
2. une vaste région européenne retrouverait à Trieste son port franc ;
3. une barrière territoriale que le pavillon de l'ONU couvrirait serait interposée entre la violente animosité réciproque de l'Italie et la Yougoslavie.

Au début de 1946 Staline a fait discrètement savoir à Tito qu'il n'avait pas les moyens de faire une nouvelle guerre pour Trieste. Ainsi, Staline accepte en juin 1946 le plan français de la création d'un territoire libre de Trieste et du tracé français pour la frontière italo-yougoslave. "Le territoire libre de Trieste" fut partagé en deux zones : le nord de ce territoire, ou zone A, avec la ville même de Trieste, était occupé par les Anglo-Américains, et le sud, ou zone B, avec le petit port de Koper (Capo d'Istria) par les yougoslaves.

L'Ambassadeur de France à Belgrade, M. Jean Payart, remarque par un télégramme daté le 16 juin 1946<sup>19</sup>, que le Kremlin a vivement encouragé Tito à demeurer ferme sur ses positions dans une question qui sous son double aspect continental et maritime est au moins d'intérêt panslave donc russe que d'intérêt spécifiquement yougoslave.

En ce qui concerne l'acception par Molotov du plan français de la création d'un territoire libre de Trieste et du tracé français pour la frontière italo-yougoslave, Jean Payart considère que la décision de Paris a provoqué chez quelques membres du parti communiste

yougoslave "sans doute insuffisamment initiés" une certaine déception à l'égard de Moscou. "Tous les efforts des chefs du Parti, note M. Payart, tendent actuellement à mettre hors de la cause l'URSS, qui doit envers et contre tout demeurer la seule alliée fidèle et à concentrer les rancœurs sur les trois puissances occidentales, en particulière sur l'Angleterre et les Etats-Unis"<sup>20</sup>, montre l'Ambassadeur de France à Belgrade.

D'après une note rédigé par M. Nac le 20 juin 1945<sup>21</sup> on saisie que le Gouvernement soviétique était d'accord dès 1945 que le problème de Trieste devrait être résolu à la Conférence de paix.

Pour le "Témoignage Chrétien" le problème de Trieste et de la Vénétie Julienne, qui est "la principale pierre d'achoppement de la paix", semble être devenue en juin 1946, un véritable casse-tête chinois.<sup>22</sup>

Par son article du 28 juin 1946 on montre qu'ici comme ailleurs, les rivalités stratégiques et diplomatiques des Anglo-Saxons et des Russes ont contribué à embrouiller une question qui l'était déjà suffisamment par elle-même.

Le journal français remarque qu'en Vénétie Julienne une bonne moitié de la population peut se réclamer de la nationalité italienne et l'autre, déjà divisée quant aux caractéristiques raciales entre slovènes et croates, comprend également un remarquable pourcentage d'hybrides. Ceux-ci sont beaucoup plus de culture italienne que slave, car parlant couramment le dialecte vénitien, ils ne comprennent pas la langue littéraire slovène et croate.

On note que beaucoup de personnes d'origine slave parlent indifféremment les deux langues, et seuls l'occasion et l'intérêt du moment leur font se réclamer de telle nationalité plutôt que de telle autre.

Le journal français "La Croix" publie en 3 juillet 1946<sup>23</sup> un article sur l'internationalisation de Trieste et sur le fait que le délégué soviétique a accepté le compromis français sur la frontière italo-yougoslave : "Une fois de plus, on a frisé la catastrophe. lundi, au Palais du Luxembourg (...). Finalement, le délégué soviétique se rallia à la proposition française,

renonçant donc à Gorizia et au col de Tarvis pour les yougoslaves."<sup>24</sup>

M.G. Heuman, Consul de France à Ljubljana, présente par une dépêche datée le 8 juillet 1946<sup>25</sup> l'attitude slovène devant l'accord des quatre : "Dans le public, soigneusement entretenu jusqu'à la dernière minute dans la croyance que l'URSS soutiendrait jusqu'au bout les revendications yougoslaves d'annexion pure et simple de Trieste et de la ligne dite ethnique pour la frontière, l'effet de surprise produit par la volte-face de Moscou a été total"<sup>26</sup>.

On remarque que dans les milieux hostiles au régime, on se félicite de l'échec d'une politique étrangère exclusivement orientée sur la Russie.

Concernant la position de l'opinion qui reste fidèle au régime, on remarque qu'elle recherche à la défection de l'Allié russe des justifications échafaudées sur le thème de recul tactique, destiné à obtenir l'évacuation de Trieste par les anglo-américains.

Par une dépêche du 25 octobre 1946<sup>27</sup>, William de Peyster, Vice - Consul Percepteur pour Trieste, en parlant de la situation politique en Vénétie Julienne, note qu'au cours de la période s'étendant de la fin du mois d'août 1946 à la mi-octobre 1946, l'évolution politique en Vénétie Julienne est caractérisée par la lutte spectaculaire entre le mouvement slavo - communiste et le rassemblement des forces italiennes d'une part, et d'autre part par l'affermissement réel du Front Indépendantiste qui a su s'allier la masse des réfugiés slovènes catholiques anti-communistes et qui semble disposer d'un ensemble assez appréciable de capitaux.

Il est à noter en premier lieu que sous des titres divers, le front communiste présente une très grande unité : le Parti Communiste Julien, L'Union Antifasciste italo-slovène et les Sindacati Uniti reçoivent des consignes de l'extérieur qui sont parfois parallèles, mais parfois aussi complémentaires, chacun devant se spécialiser dans une campagne politique, économique ou sociale d'apparence à première vue contradictoire, mais qui se lie à l'ensemble d'un plan parfaitement ordonné.

On souligne que les armes dont les partisans de Tito disposent en zone d'occupation britannique sont puissantes et nombreuses. Ils sont bien pourvus d'argent ; il y a seize mois les occupants yougoslaves de Trieste ont emporté avec eux les fonds de la Banque d'Italie ; la vente de matières premières de la zone B, où la ligne italienne a été remplacée par une ligne d'occupation yougoslave, la vente des produits agricoles et de la pêche, un important marché noir dont la forme la plus visible est le trafic du tabac à Trieste, sont une excellente source d'approvisionnement en lires.

La situation en Vénétie Julienne est présente par une autre dépêche de M. William de Peyster le 4 novembre 1946.<sup>28</sup> La dépêche fait connaître la situation des écoles slovènes en Vénétie Julienne.

On note que les difficultés rencontrées en 1945 pour l'organisation des écoles en zone d'occupation anglo-américaine avaient retenu l'attention du Gouvernement militaire allié.

On montre qu'un double problème se posait : celui des livres de classe d'un part (les anciens livres de textes fascistes étaient inutilisables et les manuels slovènes importés plus ou moins clandestinement de Yougoslavie n'offraient pas la qualité d'impartialité désirée), le problème des maîtres d'autre part (on avait éliminé l'ancien personnel italien trop marqué, mais les maîtres nouvellement recrutés se sont souvent montrés insuffisants tant en quantité qu'au point de vue de leur formation). On note qu'il y eut donc pareillement une épuration du personnel enseignant et la formation de nouveaux professeurs munis de nouveaux livres sous l'égide de la section d'éducation du Gouvernement Militaire.

Cette politique de neutralisation souleva de vives critiques tant du côté italien que du côté slave et l'on prétendit que cet enseignement apolitique enlevait aux enfants tout sentiment national. C'est à la rentrée scolaire, au début d'octobre 1946, que l'Union Anti-Fasciste italo-slovène (L'U.A.I.S.) a commencé une campagne extrêmement violente contre la politique pratiquée par les anglo-américains. L'U.A.I.S. refusait en effet

que l'on envoie des enfants slovènes dans des écoles dirigées par des maîtres formés par les cours de vacances et qu'elle accusait d'être des réfugiées istriens ayant fui leur pays pour éviter la juste répression des tribunaux populaires yougoslaves.

On note que les mères de famille slovènes se sont réunies dans les divers villages de la région de Trieste pour jurer solennellement devant les portraits de Staline et de Tito qu'elles ne confieraient pas leurs enfants à des traîtres à la solde des puissances impérialistes.

Le Capitaine Simioni, chef de la Section d'éducation du Gouvernement Militaire Allié, sembla au début quelque peu pris au dépourvu devant l'attitude résolue des paysans et promit aux villageois de reconsidérer leurs demandes et d'étudier la possibilité de rétablir les instituteurs choisis par le peuple à condition qu'à côté des portraits symboliques de Staline et Tito, on mette aux murs ceux de Truman et Churchill. Pour donner plus de force à ses arguments, la population slovène de Santa Croce, Vescova, Opicina, Divek, Doberdo, Monrupino, Trbca, Catinava, Stuvan, Duttogliano, Duino, Prosecco, et des villages du Collio, chassa des écoles les maîtres désignés par le Gouvernement Militaire. En même temps, une vive campagne de presse était lancée contre les livres publiés par le Gouvernement Militaire.

Le Capitaine Simioni qui avait semblé faiblir au cours des premiers jours, reprit rapidement la situation en main : dès 20 octobre 1946 les instituteurs officiels couvraient leur classe sous la protection de la Police Civile Julienne. Les paysans, forts de leur première victoire, tentèrent de réagir en n'envoyant pas leurs enfants à l'école ; mais le Gouvernement Militaire déjà cédait et commençait à dire que le différend soulevé provenait de conceptions différentes en matière d'éducation et que le Gouvernement Militaire Allié, n'étant qu'un Gouvernement provisoire, il devait se limiter à administrer les écoles slovènes pour ne pas "désappointer" des gens qui avaient toujours considéré les Alliés comme des frères d'armes. On note que le ton avait complètement changé et l'on admettait même que tout incident eut pu être

évitée dès le début par des négociations, car le désaccord ne portait que sur la forme et non le fond. On manifestait une grande satisfaction que les anglo-américains aient admis la présence, à côté de celui des autres chefs alliés, du portrait de Tito.

Par un rapport du Lieutenant - Colonel Chezelles, Attaché Militaire et de l'Air près de l'Ambassade de France en Yougoslavie, en 7 octobre 1947<sup>29</sup> on note une tentative de coup de force yougoslave à Trieste dans la nuit du 15 au 16 septembre 1947, au lendemain de l'établissement du "Territoire Libre" par le Traité de paix de Paris.

On note que les triestines, qui depuis un an fondaient de gros espoirs sur la constitution du "Territoire Libre", ont découvert la précarité de leur situation et l'instabilité de leur sort. M.

Chezelles montre que la position excentrique de Trieste n'a jamais beaucoup intéressé Rome.

Sur le "Territoire Libre" de Trieste, M. Chezelles remarque qu'il est trop petit, c'est-à-dire manque d'hinterland pour pouvoir se suffire à lui-même du point de vue économique. Il est en grande partie tributaire des pays voisins.

M. Chezelles considère en 1947 que l'avenir économique du "Territoire Libre" paraît bien noir.

Il faut noter qu'en 1954 la Yougoslavie s'étant rapprochée des occidentaux après sa rupture avec l'URSS, le territoire fut partagé : la zone A devient italienne et la zone B yougoslave, rattachée à la république de Slovénie.

## B. Question de Trieste et de la Vénétie Julienne. Pétitions pour Quai d'Orsay

Les archives du Quai d'Orsay comprennent au sujet de la Vénétie Julienne quelques dossiers qui renferment un bon nombre des pétitions rédigées par de nombreuses personnalités politiques ou culturelles qui défendent soit le point de vue yougoslave, soit celui italien sur la question de la Vénétie Julienne. On peut présenter quelques opinions relatives à cette question en s'efforçant de garder l'impartialité historique.

En constatant du fait qu'en France les journaux "d'avant-garde" ont fait campagne contre l'impérialisme italien, au sujet de Trieste, M. Caron note par une pétition adressée à M. Jean Freville, de la Chambre des Députés, les suivantes<sup>30</sup> :

"Je croyais qu'impérialisme était synonyme d'expansionnisme, aussi, en lisant chaque jour que les italiens sont des impérialistes, du fait qu'il désirent que Trieste italien reste à l'Italie, je ne puis pas faire à moins de penser, non sans un sourire de triste ironie, à l'Algérie, au Maroc, à la Tunisie, et à toutes les autres colonies qui font la puissance et la richesse de quelques nations seulement, alors que d'autres, plus faibles, renfermées dans leurs frontières, luttent depuis toujours pour leur propre

existence. L'Italie actuelle impérialiste ? Et pourquoi ? Expliquez- nous, chers camarades, sans parti pris, avec le même calme de lucidité d'esprit et de bon sens dont le chef du parti C.F. a toujours fait preuve et su traiter maintes questions d'ordre intérieur et international, expliquez-nous donc pourquoi ? Expliquez aux familles des 790.000 morts italiens, tombés en holocauste pour Trieste, pourquoi ils ont donné leur vie pour rien ? (...) Certes, nous comprenons votre sympathie pour Tito, que nous partageons d'ailleurs, qui a su par son élan patriotique et son courage réaliser son unité et délivrer son pays. Mais attention ! En Italie aussi des forces nouvelles sont surgies, sympathique à la France, à son bien être, à son bonheur (...) Croyez-vous que le peuple français pourrait vivre sans ses colonies et son empire ?"<sup>31</sup>, note M. Caron dans sa pétition du 13 avril 1946.

Par une dépêche du 20 mai 1946<sup>32</sup>, l'évêque de Trieste et Capodistria considère que la ligne française pour la division de la Vénétie Julienne a été tracée par quelqu'un qui ne connaissait même pas superficiellement cette région, la ligne française étant pour lui injuste et déraisonnable.

"Que disiez-vous si la Russie voulait la Bretagne ?", se demande-t-il. Il souligne que la ligne française laisse Parenzo, Orsera, Povigno, Pola, des villes parfaitement italiennes, à la Yougoslavie.

"Je vous prie, M. le Ministre, de ne pas lier le nom très noble de la France à une si énorme injustice. (...) Mais il y a un autre motif beaucoup plus grave qui me fait parler : tandis que beaucoup ne connaissent le régime de Tito que par quelque hâtive et superficielle lecture de journaux, moi je le connais parce que je l'ai sous les yeux. Plus de la moitié de mon diocèse se trouvent dans la zone B, c'est-à-dire sous Tito. Et il est à remarquer que le régime de la zone B n'est pas encore le système établi en Yougoslavie. En Yougoslavie, la persécution religieuse est satanique. (...) Je vous prie, M. le Ministre, de ne pas contribuer au martyre d'une pauvre population. La ligne française est inadmissible et personne ne l'acceptera. Elle pourra être imposée comme on impose la mort, parce que ce sera la mort de très nobles villes sacrifiées à l'impérialisme communiste"<sup>33</sup>, considère l'évêque de Trieste.

Dans un appel des habitants de Lussimo du 1<sup>er</sup> mars 1946<sup>34</sup>, on note que le drapeau yougoslave ne flotte qu'aux fenêtres des maisons réquisitionnées par les "occupants". "Ces derniers, qui vivaient jadis dans les bois, au contact de la civilisation, ont senti le besoin de réquisitionner les plus belles maisons pour leur innombrables comités."<sup>35</sup>

Les habitants de Lussimo notent qu'au cours de six mois d'occupation ont été forcés de débaptiser ses barques de leurs noms italiens pour les appeler avec des noms croates.

Par une dépêche du 28 juin 1946<sup>36</sup>, le Président de l'Union Nationale des Étudiants de France prie le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de France, M. Georges Bidault de bien vouloir organiser une réunion d'information au sujet des questions de Trieste et de la Vénétie Julienne, sous l'égide de l'Union Nationale des Étudiants de France:

"Nous avons décidé d'organiser cette manifestation en formulant les réserves suivantes : 1. en vue de donner à l'exposé un caractère absolument objectif, nous avons demandé que cela soit fait par un représentant

des pays qui ne se trouvent pas engagés dans la solution de la question de Trieste ; 2. Quoique cette réunion ait été proposée par nos amis yougoslaves, j'ai tenu à ce que des représentants italiens puissent également exposer la thèse de leur pays."<sup>37</sup>

Par une pétition datée le 30 juillet 1946<sup>38</sup> établie par la Comité de l'Union Démocratique des Originaires de la Marche Julienne et Trieste, adressée à Monsieur le chef de la Délégation de la France, les émigrés yougoslaves de cette région vivant en France, Belgique et Hollande demandent de vouloir bien soutenir les revendications yougoslaves : "Pour la population yougoslave, c'est-à-dire pour la majorité de la population de la Marche Julienne, l'occupation italienne de cette région représentait la plus cruelle des oppressions nationales."<sup>39</sup> On montre que l'interdiction de l'usage de la langue maternelle même dans la vie privée, l'obligation forcée de modifier les noms de famille, n'étaient que quelques exemples d'une politique d'italianisation déjà inaugurée par les régimes préfascistes.

Par une lettre du 10 juin 1946<sup>40</sup>, le Secrétaire du Parti Communiste Français de S<sup>te</sup> Marie Aux Chênes demande au Ministre de l'Affaire Étrangère d'user de sa haute autorité pour qu'une proposition à la satisfaction des intérêts nationaux de la Yougoslavie soit acceptée.

Par une dépêche du 21 juin 1946<sup>41</sup>, M. Albert Bayet, professeur à la Sorbonne et M. Aubel, professeur à la Faculté des Sciences montent au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Georges Bidault, que le rattachement de Trieste à la Yougoslavie est justifié par le fait que Trieste est une partie du territoire national yougoslave. En séparant Trieste de Yougoslavie, on la prive de son hinterland naturel et on prive la Yougoslavie de son seul port important sur l'Adriatique.

"Ce n'est pas la première fois que la question de Trieste se pose devant la France. Une fois déjà au cours de son histoire, la France a résolu cette question lorsque Napoléon a rattaché Trieste à l'Illyrie, exclusivement composée des régions yougoslaves. Aujourd'hui, aux raisons de justice, de démocratie, et de conséquence

historique viennent s'ajouter pour obliger la France à travailler au rattachement de Trieste à la Yougoslavie, les raisons d'ordre sentimental, de son amitié traditionnelle pour les peuples de Yougoslavie, ses alliés fidèles et dévoués de deux pénibles guerres."<sup>42</sup>

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Dejean, télégramme n° 619. le 10 mars 1945; Z. Europe. 1944 – 1960. Yougoslavie, dossier 43, MAE Quai d'Orsay.

<sup>2</sup> René Massigli, par une dépêche sur *La question de Trieste*, adressée à Jules Jeanneney, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères par Intérim, le 18 avril 1945; Z. Europe. 1944 – 1960. Yougoslavie, dossier 43, MAE Quai d'Orsay.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>4</sup> René Massigli, télégramme à l'arrivé, n° 2639/2642, le 16 mai 1945; Z. Europe. 1944 – 1960. Yougoslavie, dossier 43, MAE Quai d'Orsay.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>6</sup> René Massigli, l'Ambassadeur de France à Londres, par une dépêche intitulée *Politique Russe en Europe*, adressée à M. Georges Bidault, le 17 mai 1945; Z. Europe. 1944 – 1960. Yougoslavie, dossier 43, MAE Quai d'Orsay.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>8</sup> *Le règlement des frontières italo – yougoslaves, Positions françaises*, le 15 septembre 1945; Z. Europe. 1944 – 1960. Yougoslavie, dossier 43, MAE Quai d'Orsay.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>10</sup> "Les quatre arbitrent le différend italo – yougoslave sur la Vénétie et Trieste", en *La Croix*, lundi, le 6 mai 1946.

<sup>11</sup> M. Bertrand d'Astorg, *L'Affaire de Trieste*, en *L'Esprit*, 13<sup>ème</sup> année, n° 7, 1<sup>er</sup> juin 1945.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>15</sup> Note sur la question du Trieste, le 4 juin 1946; Z. Europe. 1944 – 1960. Yougoslavie, dossier 45, MAE Quai d'Orsay.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>19</sup> Jean Payart, télégramme n° 629 634, le 16 juin 1946; Z. Europe. 1944–1960. Yougoslavie, dossier 46, MAE Quai d'Orsay.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>21</sup> M. Nac, note rédigée le 20 juin 1945; Z. Europe. 1944 – 1960. Yougoslavie, dossier 46, MAE Quai d'Orsay.

<sup>22</sup> "Un foyer d'incendie Trieste", en *le Témoignage Chrétien*, le 28 juin 1946.

<sup>23</sup> "Les quatre décident de l'internationalisation de Trieste. Le compromis français sur la frontière italo-yougoslave est accepté", en *La Croix*, le 3 juillet 1946.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>25</sup> M.G. Heuman, Consul de France à Ljubljana, par une dépêche intitulée "Attitude slovène devant l'accord des quatre", adressée à M. Georges Bidault, le 8 juillet 1946; Z. Europe. 1944 – 1960. Yougoslavie, dossier 46, MAE Quai d'Orsay.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>27</sup> William de Poysson, Vice - Consul Percepteur pour Trieste, par une dépêche intitulée "Evolution de la situation politique en Vénétie Julienne entre 25 août 1946 – 18 octobre 1946", adressée à M. Georges Bidault, le 25 octobre 1946; Z. Europe. 1944 – 1949. Yougoslavie, Italie – Yougoslavie. Question de Trieste (1.09.1946 – 14.11.1946), dossier 48, MAE Quai d'Orsay.

<sup>28</sup> *Idem*, par une dépêche sur "Les communistes et les écoles slovènes en Vénétie Julienne", adressée à M. Georges Bidault, le 4 novembre 1946; Z. Europe. 1944 – 1949. Yougoslavie, Italie – Yougoslavie. Question de Trieste (1.09.1946 – 14.11.1946), dossier 48, MAE Quai d'Orsay.

<sup>29</sup> Le Lieutenant Colonel Chetelles, l'Attaché Militaire et de l'Air près de l'Ambassade de France en Yougoslavie, Rapport établi sur la situation à Trieste au lendemain de l'établissement du "Territoire Libre"; Belgrade, le 7 octobre 1946; Dossier 10 T/482 (1947 - 1963), Archives de l'Armée de Terre, Vincennes.

<sup>30</sup> Caron, Perron, adressée à M. Jean Freville, Chambre des Députés, Paris, le 13 avril 1946; Z. Europe. 1944 – 1949. Yougoslavie, Question de Trieste, Pétitions, dossier 69, MAE Quai d'Orsay.



<sup>31</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>32</sup> Antonio Santin, l'évêque de Trieste et Capodistria, par une dépêche du 20 mai 1946 ; Z. Europe. 1944 – 1949. Yougoslavie, Question de Trieste. Pétitions, dossier 69, MAE Quai d'Orsay.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>34</sup> Appel des habitants de Lussimo en date du 1<sup>er</sup> mars 1946 ; Z. Europe. 1944 – 1949. Yougoslavie, Question de Trieste. Pétitions, dossier 69, MAE Quai d'Orsay.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>36</sup> Le Président de l'Union Nationale des Etudiants de France, par une dépêche adressée à M. Georges Bidault, le 28 juin 1946 ; Z. Europe. 1944 – 1949. Yougoslavie, Question de Trieste. Pétitions, dossier 69, MAE Quai d'Orsay.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>38</sup> La Comité de l'Union Démocratique des Originaires de la Marche Julienne et Trieste, Pétition adressée à M. le Chef de la Délégation de la France à la Conférence de la Paix, le 30 juillet 1946 ; Z. Europe. 1944 – 1949. Yougoslavie, Question de Trieste. Pétitions, dossier 69, MAE Quai d'Orsay.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>40</sup> Le Secrétaire du Parti Communiste Français de S<sup>te</sup> Marie Aux Chênes, Pétition du 10 juin 1946 ; Z. Europe. 1944 – 1949. Yougoslavie, Question de Trieste. Pétitions en faveur de la Yougoslavie, dossier 70, MAE Quai d'Orsay.

<sup>41</sup> M. Albert Bayet, professeur à la Sorbonne et M. Aubel, professeur à la Faculté des Sciences, par une dépêche adressée à M. Georges Bidault, le 21 juin 1946 ; Z. Europe. 1944 – 1949. Yougoslavie, Question de Trieste. Pétitions en faveur de la Yougoslavie, dossier 70, MAE Quai d'Orsay.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibidem.*

# **The European Union of 25-27. The Enlargement Towards Central and Eastern Europe. The Romanian Case**

*Adrian IVAN*

**T**he enlargement represents the second major dimension of the European construction. It is part of the European

integration and of Europe's federal unity plan devised by the founding fathers.

## **Theoretical considerations**

In the specialized literature the enlargement is defined as "an organization as a process of gradual and formal horizontal institutionalization of organizational rules and norms" (Schimmelfenning, Sedelmeier 2005: 5).

Institutionalization means a process through which the actions and the interactions of certain social actors become normative models.

In other words, the enlargement is the process through which the political, economic and normative system of an international organization, for example the European Union, was and is horizontally extended to other member states. The difference between horizontal and vertical in this process is comparable to "widening" and "deepening", these concepts being used in the European integration process.

This is a step by step process because it is based on several stages, which begin for the countries in Central and Eastern Europe with the accession demands, the negotiation process established by the Copenhagen criteria (1993) and continue after the accession when the new members put into practice their commitments and the Union's policies.

This process is based on the Rome Treaty (A. 23<sup>rd</sup>), which states that any European

country can apply in order to become a member of the European Communities. The Treaty was reinforced by the Maastricht Treaty (1992), without clearly defining the term "European".

The failure of Marocco to become a member of the European Economic Community showed that to be "European" means at least to be geographically in the North of the Mediterranean Sea (Coffey 2003: 5-7).

A better definition of the "European" term was given by the European Commission at the Lisbon European Council (1992), when the geographical, cultural and historic aspects of the term were underlined (Vesa, Ivan 2001: 16).

The historical-cultural dimension of the integration process was a constant aspect of the enlargement, especially as it corresponded to the diversity and pluralism that characterized and characterizes Europe. One of the European Union's founding father said "We have to foster Europe not only for the free nations, but also for the ones in the East who need our assistance and moral support" (Dumont 1997: 81).

The enlargement process was based on various reasons coming from the European Union and the candidate countries (Wallace 2005: 292-294).

The integration vectors were economic and political for the first wave of enlargement (Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark) or political (security) for the last one (Central and Eastern Europe).

The success or the failure of the Union's enlargement can be measured according to its costs and benefices. If the Union succeeded to integrate new members, thus reducing *the marginal cost in favor of certain net benefices (common norms and rules, a bigger market, competitiveness, a greater negotiation capacity in international relations)* the enlargement was a success. We will find out the answer in the following years, after the transitions periods offered to the new members.

We think that the European Union is the present answer the founding countries of the European Communities and those who acceded after their creation gave to the European unity plan, presented by Robert Schuman on Mai 9, 1950.

The European Union tends to become a more important global actor, who can and has to offer to its members the framework for a modern economic development, an integrated market based on economic and monetary union, but also security.

The Union had to respond to the division consequences of the Cold War, the transition in the former communist countries through a gradual, coherent policy, determined by economic relations (market relations), political and security ones (the management of the European crises) in which the enlargement was an important element, underlined by Jacques Delors, Romano Prodi, Gunther Verheugen etc.

The enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe will confront the Union with numerous nationalisms and transition problems, but will also bring numerous competitive and dynamic economies, a large number of consumers and qualified workers, which might represent the comparative advantage of the United Europe with respect to its global competitors (Kok 2005).

The accession reasons for one state or another were determined by economic, political, security interests etc. For some states

like Great Britain, Ireland or Denmark, which represented the first enlargement wave (1973), it was not about coming back to Europe or reuniting with the European family because they've never left the Liberal Europe.

As Desmond Dinan showed, for Great Britain, the economic reason was the most important (Dinan 2004: 7). The best example in this respect was the moment when Great Britain, realizing the damages caused by the restrictions its products had on the European economic market, did not hesitate to abandon the European Free Trade Association, an organization it had created in 1959.

Moreover, the British guessed the global potential of the European Community, especially in the commercial area.

On the contrary, the Irish saw the integration as a possibility to affirm their European identity as a way of keeping their national identity and a way of fighting against the English hegemony. As the author says, acceding to the EEC Ireland did not become more European, but less British (Dinan 2004: 8).

As for the next group of countries that acceded to the Community – Greece (1981), Portugal and Spain (1985), the accession motives were rather political, taking into consideration the authoritarian regimes from which they liberated themselves at the end of the '70s. Their accession was a guarantee for the consolidation of democratic regimes, but also a support for economic development and modernization.

The next group, was made up of Austria, Sweden and Finland, integrated in 1995. All the three countries corresponded to the "European" definition of the integration criteria, having sound economies and consolidated democratic regimes. However, their *neutrality*, so important during the Cold War, risked now to jeopardize their international position. They needed to immediately join a security community, without underestimating the role the Internal Market had in their external options.

At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century the enlargement was part of European geopolitics, different from the one of the '90s. The variables that influenced the change were

determined either by the "Kosovo crisis" and the "Austrian crisis", or by the reversal of the federalist movement at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, as well as by a profound crisis of the nation-state.

If until the Kosovo crisis (1999) the discontent of France and of other member states towards the United States was still timid, after this crisis we witness a stronger criticism towards the American foreign policy, distinguishing a group of states that were interested in developing a military component of the European Union (the creation of an integrated army). The number of those who sustained the affirmation of the European Union not only as a provider of economic stability and modernization, but also as a security provider increased in after 2000.

The enlargement trend announced by the Helsinki European Council (December 1999) was surely influenced also by the effects of the economic globalization – mass migration, conquest of markets, the dynamic commerce with Central and Eastern Europe, which was in a transition period, and the positive political and economic reforms in this region.

The Nice institutional reform (2000) will include in the European institutions' structure 12 of the 13 candidate countries. Moreover, the European Convention will have representatives from Central and Eastern Europe.

In 2004 the European Union enlarged with ten new members, the biggest and maybe the

most challenging enlargement in the history of the European construction.

All in all, the enlargement had *general motives* like the issues related to economic independence and global policies and geopolitical interests (the German case in Central Europe, security interests or the European Union's interest to have states with democratic political regimes and market economy in order to reduce the risks that other interethnic conflicts, like the one in former Yugoslavia, might outburst).

On the other hand, the process had *specific motives*, different from one country to another, which might vary from socio-economic problems to security issues and identity preservation.

The enlargement process was not a linear one. It was based on the European Union's conditions expressed in the Copenhagen criteria:

1. *politic criterion: rule of law, stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, human rights and respect for and protections of minorities;*
2. *functional market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; the adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union;*
3. *implementation of the community acquis (European Council, Presidency Conclusions paragraph 7 A (iii), Copenhagen European Council, 21-22 June 1993).*

## **The enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe. Reasons and conditions**

The ~~integration reasons~~ for the countries in Central and Eastern Europe were more complex, concerning security, economic, political and socio-cultural issues. There is no other ideological ~~alternative or systemic~~ paradigm for Central and Eastern Europe than the one related to the "return to Europe", presented in the studies on the European Union's enlargement (Hughes, Sasse, Gordon 2004: 1-2).

The ~~accession of the countries~~ in Central and Eastern Europe was characterized by

certain conditions imposed by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, which determined certain analysts to be more critic regarding the Union's policies towards the median area and equality principle in the accession negotiations.

However, as Paul Magnette said:

*"The enlargement of the European Union with ten new states is the event of the decade. The accomplishment of the Big Europe from the Baltic to the Mediterranean Sea and soon from the Atlantic to the Black Sea represents*

*an essential stage in the history of this region*" (Magnette 2004: 6-7).

The enlargement issue represented an important subject for the international relations' theoreticians, especially for those interested in the European integration issue. The writings on this matter were oriented on three dimensions concerning the EU's enlargement policies: the policies of the candidate countries, the policies of the member states as regards the enlargement, the policies of the EU and the enlargement's impact (Shimmelfenning, Sedelmeier 2005: 6-7).

In this respect, the analysis concentrated on the decision making process, the formal acts or the horizontal institutions. In the enlargement analysis we can identify two theoretical currents: rationalism and institutional constructivism.

The rationalist explanations are based on two steps: 1. explanation of the preferences of the candidate countries and of the member states; 2. explanation of organizational collective enlargement decisions at the macro-and policy levels (Shimmelfenning, Sedelmeier 2005: 11).

The institutional-rationalists describe a world where the actors are preoccupied by the maximization of their economic and security preferences. In the event of an interest conflict, the actors turn to negotiations, which have the aim of finding equilibrium between costs and benefits. From this point of view the enlargement is a test to show the power distribution among the members of the EU, but it also shows, according to the game theory, the organization's capacity to maximize its economic, political and security benefits and in the same time to reduce the economic, budgetary and institutional costs of the enlargement (Moravcsik 1993, 1998).

As for the E members, they also try to maximize their share of the collective benefits and to reduce their contribution to the enlargement's costs.

Sonia Piedrafita and Jose I. Torreblanca consider that there are three logics of the EU's enlargement policy: *efficiency logic, identity logic and argumentation logic* (Sonia Piedrafita and Jose I. Torreblanca 2005: 32-25).

The efficiency logic is based on the rational choosing theory. Based on agreements,

the EU's member states define their preference *a priori* taking into consideration their particular interests and in accordance with the main technical medium, expressed in a common procedure. The power relationships established among the actors are based on coercion, compensation and conviction. The limit of the power relations takes into consideration the particular interests of the actors and their negotiation capacity. In this case, the political institutions are the consequence of the political actions, of agreements practical plans and of the collective actions' resolution of dilemmas. This type of logic considers that the governments of the EU's member states are the most important actors within the European Union, which, on the basis of their interests and expectancies of their political actions, define their preferences before the final phase of the common decision making process, acting for the maximization of their benefits.

The "*argumentation*" logic (Habermas) is based on the *communicative action theory*, on the "*power of language*" and on the discourse effects. Thus we talk about a collective communication process, opposed to negotiation, which seeks consensus in the logic of discourse actions and collective norms- finding the "*better argument*" starting from the discourse and norms logic. The actors are considered to be rational not only when they act in accordance with their interests, but also when they obey the norms and principles accepted by all the others and when they can explain and justify their actions. Thus, legitimacy is determined more by *argumentation* than by *identity* and *efficiency*.

The "*identity*" logic belongs to the institutional constructivism, starting from the premise that norms and principles influence the negotiations between the member states and the candidate countries, as well as between them and the Union's institutions. According to this theory the actors' rationality is rather contextual than instrumental, coming from the *community identity* to which the actors belong.

On the other hand, a very important role in the EU's enlargement was played by the

democratic values and the cultural context. The decision making process take into consideration the creation of a *common identity*, based on the promotion of common objectives and visions of the member and candidate countries. Thus, the collective decision is rather the subject of *identity* than of efficiency. It seeks to develop and protect "*the sense of weness*" and to establish the solidarity limits.

The sociological current, **the institutional constructivism**, also known as the sociological institutionalism, deals with the *systemic* analysis of the organizational level of the enlargement (the actors, the relationships among them, the principles that determine the actors, actions, the norms, the common values). Moreover, the constructivism relies on the ideative and cultural factors of the enlargement, like "*community*" or "*cultural matrix*" of the candidate countries, concepts like "socialization" and "Europenization" (European identity). It is also interested in the degree of the actors' participation (from within of from outside the organization) in the *collective identity* or *fundamental beliefs* definition process (Shimmelfenning, Sedelmeier 2005: 14).

If we compare the enlargements of the European Communities and of the European Union we can notice that for the EFTA countries the proper theory was that of the rational institutionalism- Great Britain, Denmark, Ireland, Austria, Sweden and Finland wanted to maximize their economic and security benefits through the organization- while for the Central and Eastern countries we can notice a constructivist logic- these states wanted to get out of the "*Eastern identity*" and to "return to Europe". For these states the democratic norms and the values of the European Union were more important than the logic of the maximization of economic and security benefits.

We cannot neglect the preferences of the Union and of the member states if we take into consideration some variables like the geographical proximity of Central and Eastern Europe (economic and geopolitical interdependencies) and the socio-economic structure (market access competition, investments and budgetary collections).

The dissolution of the communist regimes from Central and Eastern Europe was soon accompanied by major political and economic changes of the states in the region, which were confronted with the transition from a centralized economy to a market economy (Ghilhauis 1993: 137-150; Pop 2000; Kornai 2000; Tismaneanu 2001). The only hope of these states was the integration in the Euro-Atlantic (NATO) and European structures (the European Communities – the European Union). Consequently, these countries showed, ever since the beginning of the '90s, an increased interest in joining the European Communities. The institutions of the 12 did not formally make commitments to these states, but they showed their will to support their efforts towards a democratic regime and a market economy.

Thus, the European Communities proposed to the countries from Central and Eastern Europe several association agreements, known as "European agreements" (Ramses '96: 273-283; Lesquene 1994: 111-136). The first such agreements were signed in 1991 with Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland. They were followed in 1993 by the association agreements between the European Communities and Romania and in 1994 by the one with Bulgaria. The last agreements were concluded with the Baltic states. Based on the general principles of market economy, political pluralism and human rights, "the European agreements" replaced the intermediary agreements from 1988-1989, aiming at creating a free-exchange area between the EEC and the countries from Central and Eastern Europe.

The agreements were very profitable for these countries as the EEC eliminated quantitative restrictions and customs fees to some products and provided constant support for the implementation of the community *acquis* in this region. The agreements enjoyed great support in these states although they were not immediately followed by concrete promises of accession.

In Romania, the lack of professionalism inherited from the totalitary regime, the dissolution of the alliances which Romania

was part of, such as CAER and the Warsaw Treaty (1991), had an impact upon Romania's foreign policy.

Shortly after the revolution of December 1989 Romania's image credit was seriously damaged facing a potential threat of isolation in terms of foreign affairs.

Like its neighbours from the Central Europe (The Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, Hungary and Poland), Romania stated out its firm desire to 'return to Europe', to intergrate in NATO and the European Union.

Nevertheless, this approach was more likely a formal one as the Romanian state was far from the 1993 Copenhagen criteria (rule of law, human rights and ethnic minorities protection, functional market economy able to cope with the competition from the Single European Market and the adoption of the community acquis).

In order to respond to these exigencies, Romania had to implement rapidly a radical reform of its economic system which required with priority the privatisation of state owned companies.

The Declaration of January 7, 1990 highlighted Romania's desire to set off a collaboration with the EEC. The first results of this new orientation emerged in October 1990 when Romania signed the *Trade and cooperation agreement with the EEC*, which became operative in 1991 (Gog 2001: 203). Although this was supposed to be a 10-year agreement, Romania signed it for a five-year term. It applied to all the products originating from the Community except for coal, steel, and agricultural products.

In the second stage Romania signed a *Treaty of EU Association* (1 February 1993) which was part of the European agreements (see the European association treaty between Romania and the EU posted on the Internet site of the Foreign Affairs Ministry).

This treaty set out an important juridical framework for surpassing the gap between Romania and the civilisation space embodied by the European organisation. The EEC committed to support Romania on its way to a new political and economic system which

would respect the rule of law and human rights, including minority rights, practice a multiple party system based on free democratic elections and build up a market economy.

The association agreement also created an institutional framework aimed at developing closer relations between Romania and the EU: the Association Council (political-national level) and the Association Parliamentary Committee (a Commission for Romania's European integration was created) and the Association Committee. The latter is composed of high officials of the Romania government and the European Council and Committee and assists the Association Council.

The new framework between Romania and the EU allowed a structured dialogue between the two parts at all levels, improved access of the Romanian products on the community market, participation of the Romanian state at all the development projects of trans-European infrastructure networks – transport, communication, energy, participation in community programs (research, industrial cooperation, energy, environment protection, transborder cooperation, support in the formation and training of staff). The essential component of this agreement was the economic one, seriously affected in previous years and even by the delays in the harmonization of the Romanian legislation with the community legislation.

The European Council of Copenhagen (June 1993) pointed out more clearly the exigencies of the European Union towards the candidate countries, the structures and the synthetic guidelines of evaluation at the political, economic and social levels.

A new step ahead was made through the publication of the White Book in 1995 and, particularly, through the 2000 Agenda, acknowledged in 1997.

The abovementioned documents were preceded by the *Pre-accession strategy* adopted by the European Council from Essen (December 1994), aimed at preparing the economy of the candidate countries for the rules of the EU internal market. This strategy made the distinction between the alignment to

the internal market and the EU accession. The EU accession involved throughout acceptance of the community *acquis*.

Romania's answer to the abovementioned documents was the working out of a 'Declaration' (Snagov Declaration from 21 June 1995 signed by most of the Romanian political forces) which supported the '*National strategy for Romania's pre-accession to the EU*' (From Essen to Cannes 1995: 145-227).

The flaws of the document consist in the lack of understanding of the European integration phenomenon by overlooking the economic and social costs of this action. We find ourselves again in the '*mimesis*' era as the government pleaded for a '*Europe of the countries*' in which the transfer of sovereignty is limited.

In 1995 Romania submitted the application in view of accession. The change of the political regime in 1996 forecast the improvement of Romania's image abroad but this was soon damaged by the lack of coherent policies of Ciorbea government. The application was analysed by the European Commission which worked out and published its '*Opinion*' on 22 June 1997 (Agenda 2000. *Aviz de la Commission sur la demande d'adhésion de la Roumanie à l'Union européenne*, supl. 8/1997, OPOCE, Luxembourg, p. 92).

The Commission analyzed in depth the situation of our country on account of the Copenhagen criteria (1993). They pointed out that the political action was on the right track, still there were gaps to fill in the field of privatization, the enhancement of the juridical regime and the coherence of the economic policies, competition and the adoption of the community *acquis*. The conclusions of the Commission, stated out in its '*Opinion*', was highly detrimental to Romania. According to the Commission, Romania could fulfill the medium term economic obligations.

The Government of Romania answered to this '*Opinion*' in September 1997 by criticizing the Commission's lack of sympathy with the economic and social transformations in Romania. The Bucharest Executive also criticized the EU enlargement strategy which,

allegedly, created two groups of countries treated differently, although the EU had committed to respect the principle of equal treatment of the candidate states. At the same time, they criticized the Commission's proposal that the reform of the European institutions, stated out in the new Amsterdam treaty, cover only 20 states (Herlea 1997: 9-27).

In 1997 Romania replied to the Commission by launching the '*National Program for the Adoption of the Community Acquis*' with support from all political parties. In this document Romania stated out its intentions to create a functional market economy, the strict control of the borders, a stable macroeconomic climate, the consolidation of the legislative framework with regard to property consolidation etc. The modest achievements of the Romanian government in the following period were disappointing to the EU. Consequently, Romania was left out of the group of 'Luxembourg countries' (1997) (Decisions of Luxembourg European Council, 12-13 December 1997: 2).

The Luxembourg European Council (1997) decided to call out the bilateral Intergovernmental Conference in the spring of 1998 in order to start negotiations with Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, The Czech Republic and Slovenia.

Despite the failure in Luxembourg, the '*National Program for the Adoption of the Community Acquis*' allowed further negotiations between the Romanian institutions and the EU. The European institutions committed to support Romania in several fields: the modernization of the infrastructure, environment protection, the development of small and medium enterprises, the reform of the public administration and statistics. Unfortunately, the report presented by the Commission in 1998 highlighted the weak economic performance of the governments acting between 1996-1998.

Romania's historical moment was 10-11 December 1999 in Helsinki, when the European Council decided to organize bilateral intergovernment conferences in February 2000 for setting off negotiations with Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, Bulgaria and Malta (Regular



Report from the Commission on Progress towards Accession by Each of the Candidate Countries, European Commission, IP/99/75: 1).

On this occasion the 13 candidate countries were grouped in a unique framework meant to ensure full equity.

The preparations for the European Council in Helsinki took place in Wien (December 11<sup>th</sup>-12<sup>th</sup> 1998) when the Council requested the Commission to work out a Report on the candidate countries. The Commission chaired by Romano Prodi was more responsive to the problems of the Central and Eastern Europe. The Report concerning Romania stated out the need for Romania to fulfill two criteria: the mobilization of financial resources, the implementation of structural reform of childcare institutions and improvement of the macroeconomic climate. The 1999 Commission Report was earmarked by the Kosovo crisis. The Commission stated out in the forefront the positive political issues in Romania as a consequence of the attitude showed by our country towards the bombing of Yugoslavia. The acceptance of the negotiations with Romania was a step forward on the way to the EU accession.

The negotiations with Romania started on February 16, 2000. On May 26, 2000 the Romanian government closed 5 chapters: small and medium enterprises, science and research, education, training and youth, foreign relations and common foreign and security policy. Position documents were issued for competition, statistics, the law of trading companies, consumer protection, culture and media, telecommunications and information technology, customs union and transport policy. The negotiations with the EU revealed once again that the Romanian institutions lacked knowledge and specialists in different areas of European integration. The insufficient coordination among ministries and the shortcomings of the 1999-2000 government were also unsatisfactory. However, since 2001, negotiations have improved following a clever strategy, which was constantly expressed in the reports of the European institutions. (Pușcaș 2004: 5-11).

The Helsinki decision was a political one, as Romania claimed serious economic, administrative and juridical delays. The situation worsened in 1999-2000. Romania's official position towards the future European architecture to be discussed in Nice (November 2000) was favorable to a 'United Europe of the Nations'. This position was very much close to Great Britain's, a country which showed very little willingness to give up sovereignty in favor of the Union.

The reform of the European institutions drawn up in Nice (2001) included Romania in the future enlarged Europe (Vese, Ivan 2001). Romania became more active in its relation with the European Union, which shared Romania's opinions with regard to the Constitution of the future united Europe (Jinga 2002: 118-134).

Regrettably, the weak economic performances and the lack of a juridical and economic framework meant to comply with the EU's exigencies, have been delaying Romania's term of accession. In early 2002 the removal of the obstacles from the free circulation of the Romanian citizens in the Schengen area was a positive signal that Romania started to make progress, especially in the field of border control and the uniformization of the Romanian legislation with the European legislation in this field. In 2002 the European Commission's Country Report pointed out the economic progress achieved by Romania. However, contrary to Bulgaria, Romania's status was not labeled as functional market economy, which was an important criteria to finalize the negotiations with the EU. The 2003 Report did not bring any change in this respect, using an ambiguous formula which stated that Romania could be considered a functional market economy if they continued the satisfactory progress achieved to date (2003 Regular Report on Romanian's progress towards accession: 121).

Romania continued to fulfill the political criteria, made economic progress, worked out structural reforms, made progress in the adoption of the community acquis, took anti-inflation measures but was still facing the threat of generalized corruption across the

entire society and had little administrative capacity to implement the adopted legislation. At the same time, the Commission criticized the lack of total reform in the field of energy, agriculture, environment protection, mining etc. Nevertheless, the Commission stated out the positive measures taken in the area of inflation and corruption (see Anticorruption National Prosecutor's Office) and ethnic minority protection, especially in respect of the Roma population.

On the whole, the 2003 Report was positive, allowing the continuation of the negotiations with the EU. However, the forecast for 2004 was not very encouraging given the general elections which were expected to slow down the pace of the structural reforms.

It is remarkable, however, that ever since 1995, when Romania submitted the application for accession to the EU and until 2003 the country has made significant progress towards finalizing the negotiations and signing the pre-accession treaty with the EU in 2005.

Nevertheless, important negotiation chapters such as agriculture, competition policies, regional development policies, energy, justice and home affairs, financial and budgetary forecast etc. remained open as they required political will and immediate reforms.

We believe that the accession of the 10 states in May 2004, the greatest enlargement

in the history of the European integration, have hampered Romania's negotiations with the EU. In this respect Romania can build up a new negotiation strategy, mainly because the perspectives of immediate enlargement do not always bring up positive effects. For instance, in the field of agriculture Romania will have to negotiate the statute of over four million individual households for which subsidies will cease starting from 2011-2012. At the same time, we believe that the price of energy will be difficult to liberalize because of the social consequences it draws. Also, there will be delays in public administration, mostly as a result of the fact that the Romanian state lacks sufficient specialists who can implement the community legislation.

Romania managed to finalize the accession negotiations in December 2004, shortly after it received the status of functional market economy. However, 11 conditions were stated out with regard to the reform of the justice, corruption fighting, the reduction of steel production, environment protection etc. The accession treaty was signed in April 2005.

A difficult implementation process of the community acquis will follow and, in our opinion, Romania is not duly prepared. The continuation of the reform in the field of justice and home affairs is, nevertheless, a must.

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## Diplomacy in Action on the Highest Level in Order to Combat the Effects of Global Financial Crisis

Dumitru MAZILU

**Abstract:** *The world financial crisis has serious consequences in all sectors of economy. Many factories have been closed and unemployment has reached the highest level of the last decades. The leaders of the industrialized countries and emergent economies – during important international meetings- have tried to find adequate solutions in order to minimize the effects of the financial crisis. We can say that at national and international levels there have been drawn certain options and we shall refer to them in the present study.*

**Key words:** *financial crisis, emergent economies, fighting financial crisis effects*

**JEL Classification:** *A13*

**Résumé:** *La crise financière mondiale a de sérieuses conséquences dans tous les secteurs de l'économie. Beaucoup d'entreprises ont été fermées et le chômage a atteint le plus haut niveau au cours des dernières décennies<sup>1</sup>. Les dirigeants des pays industrialisés et des économies émergentes - au cours des importants débats internationaux<sup>2</sup> - ont essayé de trouver des solutions appropriées pour limiter les effets de cette crise financière<sup>3</sup>. Nous pouvons affirmer qu'au niveau national et international certaines options ont été présentées<sup>4</sup> et dans cette étude nous allons nous rapporter à ce qui a été dit ci-dessus<sup>5</sup>.*

**Mots clefs:** *crise financière, économies émergentes, le combat des effets de la crise financière*

**Abstract:** *Die internationale Finanzkrise hat schwere Folgen für alle Sektoren der Wirtschaft. Viele Unternehmen wurden geschlossen, die Arbeitslosigkeit hat das höchste Niveau aus den letzten Jahrzehnten erreicht. Die Leaders der industrialisierten Länder und der emergenten Wirtschaften haben im Rahmen wichtiger internationaler Debatten versucht, adäquate Lösungen zur Beschränkung dieser finanziellen Krise zu finden. Man kann sagen, dass auf nationaler und internationaler Ebene einige Wege, auf die wir in der Studie eingehen, konzipiert wurden.*

**Schlüsselwörter:** *Finanzkrise, emergente Wirtschaft, Bekämpfung der Effekte der finanziellen Krise*

The global financial crisis has serious consequences on all sectors of the economy. Many enterprises had to close the door and unemployment gets the highest level in last decades<sup>1</sup>. The leaders of the industrialized countries and emerging economies – during the important international debates<sup>2</sup> – are trying to find out the appropriate solutions to limit the effects of this financial crisis<sup>3</sup>. We can say that at national and international level some options are now on the way<sup>4</sup> and in this study we are referring to them<sup>5</sup>.

As it is known, in the second half of 2007 and the first ten months of 2008, the financial

crisis has been felt more in some countries, especially in the United States; since October 2008 the financial crisis has become global in nature. The efforts to combat the crisis have involved national, European and universal institutions, and an analysis of the role of these institutions is of uttermost necessity.

In November 2008 José Manuel Durão Barroso, President of the European Commission compelled attention that *exceptional times require exceptional measures*, because *the employment and welfare of our citizens are at stake*<sup>6</sup>, and Nicolas Sarkozy, President of France who was also the President of the European Union at that time, stated that we

cannot continue to lead the economy of the 21<sup>st</sup> century with the instruments of the economy of the 20<sup>th</sup>. President Sarkozy emphasised that the EU has an important role to play in the efforts to combat the global financial crisis. *We are confident – he pointed out – that working together we will overcome the current challenges and we will restore the stability and prosperity of our economies*<sup>8</sup>. Outstanding personalities and knowledgeable researchers have carried out analyses relating to the ways and methods to combat the current crisis<sup>9</sup>.

Triggering global financial crisis is the subject of diplomatic negotiations at the regional level but also globally and the most appropriate measures to limit its negative

effects, but – especially – the causes that triggered it are being searched for. It is obvious that the most sustained diplomatic activity to combat the consequences of the global financial crisis is held by the European Union, on the one hand, and some groups of states sharing common interests, but also having the capacity to impose a certain way in the financial relations at national, regional and global, on the other hand. It was found that – of those groups of countries – G20, established in 1999, took the initiative of diplomatic negotiations dedicated to urgent and effective strategies. However, G20 has been preceded by consultations and negotiations at European level.

### **§ 1. Contribution of the French Presidency of the EU – recognized and appreciated**

Given that crisis – manifested in various forms (especially as a mortgage in the United States) over the past year and a half – came out after the Lehman Brothers Bank crash, with *“almost unimaginable consequences”*<sup>10</sup>, the French Presidency European Union took the initiative of negotiating and adopting urgent measures to stop the consequences of the crisis at the European level and worldwide. The personality who has shown “clairvoyance and realism” in these “troubled times” was the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, who was also President of the European Union. His message – not only to the Member States, but also for other States as well, was firm and consistent: “I want that on this matter (the financial crisis – note ns.), we, Europeans, to be entirely united.”<sup>11</sup> Sarkozy said that “this crisis marks the beginning of the <genuine Exist century>”<sup>12</sup>. First, the French Presidency organized consultations with some countries, including Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Spain and with the President of the European Commission José Manuel Durão Barroso, then, on Friday, November 7, 2008, convened the leaders of the 27 member states with a view to set up a *concert program of measures*,

assumed by the European Union, and then promoted worldwide.<sup>13</sup> Among the measures negotiated by the EU French Presidency the most important ones focus on: a. the involvement of national institutions; b. the involvement of European institutions, c. the universal involvement of institutions in combating the effects of global financial crisis. Although the views of European leaders regarding the *means to combat the crisis* were different a consensus on the imperative necessity that these means should be applied both at national and European level and worldwide came into shape.<sup>14</sup> Nicolas Sarkozy negotiated with Angela Merkel, German Chancellor, with Gordon Brown, Prime Minister of Great Britain, and discussed the measures with the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Durão Barroso. The French President considered *“urgent and necessary”* to organize an international summit to discuss *“practical ways”* to combat the global financial crisis. On November 15, 2008 the works of the “Group 20”, were held in Washington, where several immediate measures to limit these effects and to eliminate the causes of the crisis were outlined.

## § 2. G20 - a group composed of industrialized and emerging countries

Established as a “consultative Forum on international financial issues between the largest and most influential economies in the world”, <Group 20> was founded in 1999 and included South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, South Korea, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Britain, Mexico, Russian Federation, United States, Turkey and the European Union – entitled to express its point of view by its President in exercise based on the principle of rotation. “Group 20”

comprises two thirds of the world's population, represents 85%-90% of Global Gross Domestic Product and provides 80 percent of world trade. Before the triggering of the global financial crisis, “Group 20” held a meeting at the level of ministers of finance or heads of the (Governing) central banks. The Summit in Washington on November 15, 2008, was organized for the first time at the level of the heads of the G20 member states. The explanation of the call at this level lies in the exceptional importance of the issues addressed.

## § 3. Solutions Proposed at G20 Summit in Washington

For the preparation of the Summit in Washington on the days of 8-9 of November 2008, in Sao Paulo – Brazil’s “financial capital” – a meeting of the finance ministers and the heads of the G20 central banks was held. They suggested the adoption of measures on the issue of charged fees: to increase the role of national institutions to combat financial crisis; to reform the international financial system, through “*Breton Woods II.*” Major emerging economies, especially Brazil, Russia, India and China, came to the Summit prepared to obtain “*participation*” in international decision-making system “*according to their position in the global economy*”. It is known that – in recent years – China has been involved in African

economies, *developing a new type of cooperation with African countries, based not only on the exploitation of their resources but also <on an effective support for the economic development of these states>*; Brazil has involved more in the economy of Latin American countries and India has expanded its economic relations with the Russian Federation. The European Union has brought to the Summit in Washington “*a strong message of profound reform of the international financial system*” by taking measures to oversee it. Russian Federation has expressed public support for the European Union position on reforming the international financial system – through the statement of her President, Dmitri Medvedev.<sup>15</sup>

## § 4. Confrontation and Cooperation at the Summit in Washington

On November 15, 2008 – in Washington – several points of view were confronted, especially between the European Agenda, supported by Nicolas Sarkozy and the American Agenda, supported by President George W. Bush. If the European Union called for an effective involvement of national institutions. European and universal “in combating and preventing the global financial crisis”, *President Bush stated that “the United States does not want a too severe framing of*

*their financial industry, whose contribution to Gross Domestic Product of U.S. is 10 percent*”<sup>16</sup>. U.S. President refused the idea that the United States would bear the entire responsibility for the international financial crisis, but it was agreed for the G20 leaders “*to lay the ground for reforms to prevent repetition of such crises in future*”.<sup>17</sup> President Bush claimed that “*this crisis is not a failure of the free market economy, and the answer is not to reinvent the system*”<sup>18</sup>. However, the

European Union, the Russian Federation, Brazil and China have decided to "change the architecture of international finance" through "effective measures of regulation and supervision". After a preparatory meeting of the finance ministers and heads of G20 central banks – which took place in Sao Paolo between November 8-9, 2008 – and after high level negotiations in Washington on November 15, 2008, some very important decisions have been adopted:

- a. effective support for the economic through re-launching policies
- b. adoption of international standards to give an appropriate regulation of the financial

system, c. performing a reform of international institutions in order to prevent similar crises in the future. The negotiations during the Summit have highlighted that "negotiations of the details is difficult" and that "they should be continued until the next meeting to be held on 30 April 2009", when they reach 101 days in the U.S. Administration by Barrack Obama. Preoccupation to find appropriate solutions to combat global financial crisis concerns not only national and regional institutions but also the existing universal ones.

### **§ 5. National institutions - an important role in combating the financial crisis**

Beyond the divergent points of view – which did not miss during the G20 Summit in Washington, held on November 15, 2008 – a consensus on the involvement of national, regional and universal institutions in the complex process of combating the effects of world financial crisis came into shape. Consensus on this option was outlined just before the Summit, by the measures adopted by the United States and the positions agreed – through negotiations – by the EU leaders, at the request of the President in exercise of the Union, Nicolas Sarkozy. It is known that – after the first negative vote of the House of Representatives for the "Paulson Plan" to support the banking system by 700 billion U.S. dollars, following the Lehman Brothers crash – following the positive vote of the Senate, the House of Representatives voted in favor, with 263 votes more than needed for the grant amount. After negotiations with Germany, Britain, Italy and Spain, the French Presidency has promoted the involvement of national institutions for "supporting the banking system."<sup>19</sup> The French President has managed to promote the view that "in these troubled times, returning to the State, is a solution, even on a temporary basis."<sup>20</sup> Gordon Brown, Prime Minister of Great Britain, has initiated an action to "support the

banking system", and Angela Merkel – after having expressed some reservations – agreed to accept, eventually, "involvement of national institutions in combating the effects of the crisis." However, after the G20 Summit in Washington, the involvement of national institutions has continued to support the banking system. An example – commented extensively in international banking circles – is the support of the U.S. Government of one of the most important banks: CITI GROUP. Under the circumstances where CITI GROUP actions have declined by 60 percent, in the week of November 17-23, 2008, the government announced that the U.S. would intervene to guarantee bad mortgage loans and certain other assets belonging CITI GROUP, with the amount of 306 billion dollars. The Government of the U.S.A. decided, however, an injection of 20 billion dollars cash from the U.S. Treasury, in addition to the 25 billion dollars, granted in the October "program to save financial system", advanced by Henry Paulson, Secretary of State of the U.S. Government. In exchange for the financial aid – the CITI GROUP has to keep away from a possible bankruptcy – the U.S. Government will receive preference shares for 27 billion dollars.

## § 6. Bankers - forced to restrict spending

Most analysts of the financial system have pointed out that one of the causes of the "current crisis" is the "waste", consisting in bonuses of millions of dollars to bankers. For example, Goldman Sachs, UBS, Lehman Brothers, Barclays and other banks – who are now in difficulty – have given substantial bonuses to their leadership, to those bankers who were considered to be "a business performance management." Robert Diamond – Head of Commercial Division at Barclays – received in 2007 a bonus of 6.5 million pounds sterling in addition to basic annual salary of 250,000 pounds. Substantial bonuses were also received by other members of bank management teams, like managers from Goldman Sachs, UBS, Deutsche Bank etc... This year more and more banks have decided

to give up bonuses and limit the payment of basic salaries of bankers that are still quite substantial. Waste disposal has been requested by Senators of the American to multinational managers who asked for substantial aid from the U.S. legislature. For example, the managers from "General Motors" have asked for a financial support of 60 billion dollars from the U.S. legislatures. After "having shown" that this is an appropriate financial support, a U.S. Senator asked them on what kind of the plane they came to Washington, and when they replied that they came on personal aircraft, the Senator advised them to return home and sell the planes and other liabilities acquired for personal enrichment, thus avoiding the bankruptcy of their company.

## § 7. European institutions - an increasingly important involvement in combating the global financial crisis

Following the negotiations initiated by the French Presidency, the Member States of the Union and also the European Commission have examined the possible and necessary measures to combat the global financial crisis. On November 26, 2008, the European Commission presented a "plan for economic re-launching", comprising of two central elements: a. tax incentives for short-term stimulation of the demand, jobs protection and regaining consumers' confidence that they can afford to purchase the products they need b. the European Commission proposed – in the following period (years 2009-2011) – to put more emphasis on "smart investments" to determine economic growth. The President of the European Commission, José Manuel Durão Barroso, highlighted the need to "adjust the national measures to those adopted at European level". According to the European Commission priority-, at least at this stage – will be given to "punctual short term actions", aimed at, for example, subsidies for the automotive industry. The European Commission shares the opinion of some

American industrialists who argue that one should act with more courage for *relocating the automobile industry to Eastern countries*.<sup>21</sup> The European Commission has proposed, at the same time, that Member States should follow the example of Great Britain on reducing added value tax. European Commission supports the view of Prime Minister Gordon Brown that such a reduction would be likely "to support national economies". It is known that the minimum level of added value tax is 15 percent; however, 25 member states practice a percentage higher than the ceiling of 15 percent. Only 2 Member States: Cyprus and Luxembourg have an added value tax of 15 percent. Gordon Brown has proposed a reduction of added value tax from 17.5 to 15 percent by the end of 2009. The European Commission has proposed also to give a more sustained support to small and medium enterprises, which have proven to be largely exposed to the global financial crisis. It is stressed that the European Investment Bank has engaged a "loan program of 30 billion



*Euro for small and medium enterprises*". The European Commission decided, at the same time, the reallocation of targeted funds – giving priority – to the vulnerable areas in the Union.

Based on analysis, the European Commission found that appropriate measures are necessary to accelerate payments on projects for structural funds.

### § 8. Universal institutions - reforming concerns

The global financial crisis has led to concerns regarding the reform of global financial institutions as well. The Summit in Washington has proposed, among other things, a Breton Woods II, according to which measures are agreed to "*improve the international financial system architecture*". U.S. President, George W. Bush, called for "*modernizing the International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development – World Bank*".<sup>22</sup> Political leaders of several countries consider that the international financial reform should include "*supervisory methods*" where *all the institutions and markets, financial institutions, including offshore and rating agencies, should be attracted*. On reforming the system of universal institutions, the European leaders – led by the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy – have advanced several proposals, including: a. the construction of a system of international finance where the European Union "*has a more important role*", b. adopt a "*program of*

*action to counteract the effects of the financial crisis*", c. ensuring accountability and transparency for all participants in the functioning of the global financial system. More emerging powers, especially Brazil, Russian Federation, China and India insist to take an active part in the decision making of the development and promotion of the world financial system. Meanwhile, several countries in the Islamic world formed the D8 group – Islamic Economic International, insisting that the decisions which it takes should be considered at the level of universal economic mechanisms. Heads of state and government – meeting at the Winter Council in Brussels, December 11-12, 2008 – had to resolve major problems for the economic development of the European Union not only for the new year 2009, which was close, but also for the next 4-5 years at least. Urgent and equally expensive measures had to be agreed to limit the effects of global financial crisis<sup>23</sup>, along with measures to counteract the climate change.<sup>24</sup>

### § 9. Limiting effects of global financial crisis - a priority for the European Union

The leaders of the European Union reached full consensus on the adoption of effective measures to limit the effects of global financial crisis.<sup>25</sup> The European Commission proposals<sup>26</sup> have received support, although both at the ECOFIN<sup>27</sup> meeting and during the debates prior to the European Summit in

Brussels certain reservations have been expressed.<sup>28</sup> Before the Summit in Brussels, France and Britain have called for a "*Plan as committed as possible to combat the global financial crisis*", but Germany has been more cautious, considering that it is the main contributor to the Community budget.<sup>29</sup>

### § 10. 1.5 percent of European gross domestic product - a contribution required to effectively combat the crisis

The European leaders reunited in Brussels, on 11<sup>th</sup>-12<sup>th</sup> of December 2008 discussed the European Commission proposal on "*the*

*economic re-launching plan of 200 billion Euro*"<sup>30</sup>.

Heads of State and Government meeting in Brussels, had to consider ways of promoting the "economic Plan", involving 1.5 percent of European gross domestic product, as they had to overcome Germany's repeated reserves. To prepare the Winter Summit in Brussels, of 11<sup>th</sup> -12<sup>th</sup> of December 2008, Prime Minister Gordon Brown, President Nicolas Sarkozy and President of the European Commission José Manuel Durão Barroso, met on 8 December 2008 in London, in a MINISUMMIT, during which the three pronounced for *effective and coherent action at the Summit of 11<sup>th</sup> -12<sup>th</sup> of December in Brussels*<sup>31</sup>. Even from the first day of the Summit in Brussels,<sup>32</sup> compromising solutions were found, giving expression to European Union leaders' will to address the issue of combating the financial crisis as "a priority of all Member States"<sup>33</sup>. After several meetings – at European<sup>34</sup> and worldwide<sup>35</sup> level – the EU has shown perseverance and determination to promote an agreement on measures to counteract climate change. Legislative package designed to reduce carbon emissions by 20 percent over the next 12 years was voted unanimously by the representatives of the 27 European Union Member States<sup>36</sup>. Stavros Dimas, European Commissioner for Environment, said – after the unanimous vote of the Member States: "If all the other countries follow the example of European Union Member States, then our planet is standing a chance."<sup>37</sup> On April 2,

2009, the leaders of industrialized countries and emerging economies had decided to act together, in order to limit the effects of the global financial crisis<sup>38</sup>. Barak Obama, the president of the United States, has proposed to reinforce the role of the International Monetary Fund to be able to support effectively some countries in difficulty; Nicolas Sarkozy, the president of France, has suggested to find out better solutions in the field of international control on financial system; some leaders of emerging economies have proposed to be approved an important financial amount, in order to help developing countries<sup>39</sup>; all leaders accepted the idea to facilitate the development of international trade<sup>40</sup>, as an important stimulant of the increased productivity in all sectors of the economy all over the World<sup>41</sup>.

We can see at national and international level some important measures taken on combating the effects of global financial crisis. The European Union has proved effective not only by the initiatives taken, but above all by the concrete measures taken to limit the effects of this crisis.

There is a hope that – under the current circumstances – the financial crisis will be limited and even eliminated if all institutions at national<sup>42</sup>, European and international level would act effectively<sup>43</sup>.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Some conclusions on the effects of this global financial crisis have been underlined on April 2009 Summit of G20 in London, Great Britain.

<sup>2</sup> See the European Summit in Brussels, on November 7, 2008; the Summit of G20 in Washington, on November 15, 2008; the Summit of G20 in London, on April 2, 2009.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>4</sup> In particular, after the Summit of G20 in London, on April 2, 2009.

<sup>5</sup> In order to underline the main conclusions of the leaders of the World on combating the effects of this global crisis.

<sup>6</sup> Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, *Statement regarding the measures combating the world financial crisis*, Brussels, November 26, 2008.

<sup>7</sup> Nicolas Sarkozy, *Statement at the Conference on the Closure of the European Union Summit*, Brussels November 7, 2008.

<sup>8</sup> Nicolas Sarkozy has stated that the European Union will cooperate with the other powers to of the world to reach this objective agreed by G8. *I wish that on this subject matter, We the Europeans are entirely unite (Ibidem)*.

<sup>9</sup> Letessier Jean Yves, *L'Europe économique et son avenir*, Ed. Armand Colin, Paris, 2008; Artus Patrick, *La crise financière*, Ed. Descartes, Paris, 2008; Chevalier Jean Marie, *Où va l'économie mondiale?*, Ed. Odile Jacob, Paris, 2002; Jaques Attaly, *300 décisions pour changer la France*, Ed. La documentation française, Paris, 2008; Eric Delbecque, *Quel patriotisme économique?*, Ed. Puf, Paris, 2008; Jean Luc Greau, *La trahison des économistes*, Ed. Gallimard, Paris, 2008.

<sup>10</sup> Henri du Limbert, "Sarkozy's Economic Patriotism", *Le Figaro*, October 24, 2008.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>13</sup> Gaëtan de Capèle, "The Moment of Truth", *Le Figaro*, October 13, 2008.

<sup>14</sup> Gideon Rachman, "Financial Crisis Redefines Political Leaders", *Financial Times* October 14, 2008.

<sup>15</sup> Philip Stephens, *Financial Times*, October 9, 2008.

<sup>16</sup> "Summit on the crisis in Washington", *Adevărul internațional*, November 15, 2008.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibidem*, p.10.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>19</sup> Henry du Limbert, "Sarkozy's Economic Patriotism", *Le Figaro*, October 24, 2008.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>21</sup> Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, *Op. cit., loc. cit.*

<sup>22</sup> George W. Bush, *Statement at the Summit in Washington*, November 15, 2008.

<sup>23</sup> Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, *Op. cit., loc. cit.*

<sup>24</sup> Vaclav Klaus, "Global Heating Has Become an Ideology", *Adevărul internațional*, December 12, 2008.

<sup>25</sup> Jean Claude Trichet, President of the Central European Bank, stated that *The global economy will probably remain weak in 2009 also and equally the demand of the EURO countries* ("Statement made on December 4 2008", in *Business International*, December 5, 2008, p. 47).

<sup>26</sup> Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, *Op. cit., loc. cit.*

<sup>27</sup> Council of the Ministers of Finance of the European Union.

<sup>28</sup> At the Council of the Ministers of Finance of the European Union (ECOFIN Council) meeting that took place in Brussels at the beginning of December 2008, the German minister of finance, Peer Steinbrueck, manifested reservations regarding the proposals in *The Common Document*, which did not specify „ *the concrete effort each country was supposed to make*”.

<sup>29</sup> Peer Steinbrueck stated at the ECOFIN meeting that anything above the 32 billion promised for combating the crisis Germany's effort would be too great.

<sup>30</sup> Re-launching Plan published by the European Commission November 26, 2008 (Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, *Op. cit., loc. cit.*).

<sup>31</sup> Angela Merkel was – as the daily „*Bild*” noticed – the great absentee of the MINISUMMIT in London. However, the German Chancellor has made her position known before the Summit in Brussels on December 11-12, 2008. Her Excellency has stated that she would not agree with an *Economic re-launching plan* that would jeopardize jobs in the energy consuming industries in Germany. *We cannot be indifferent while jobs in chemical, steel manufacturing industries are being created in the world where environmental legislation is less rigorous than here* (Angela Merkel, "Statement made on December 8", 2008, in the *Bild*).

<sup>32</sup> On December, 11, 2008.

<sup>33</sup> Silvio Berlusconi, *Statement made in Brussels on December 11, 2008*.

<sup>34</sup> Stravros Dimas, European Environmental Commissioner stated, at the UN Conference on global heating in Poznan, in Poland, on December, 1, 2008: „*The Financial crisis has highlighted how dangerous is to ignore imminent warnings. We cannot afford to repeat this mistake in the case of climate changes if we want to avoid the serious economic, social, probably even catastrophic consequences they may have in the following decades.*”

<sup>35</sup> *UN Conference on climate changes*, Poznan, December, 1-12, 2008.

<sup>36</sup> At the Summit in Brussels, on December 11-12, 2008.

<sup>37</sup> Stravros Dimas, *Statement at the Summit in Brussels*, on December 12, 2008.

<sup>38</sup> The Summit of G20 in London, on April 2, 2009.

<sup>39</sup> Ban Kee Moon, the Secretary General of the United Nations, has proposed 1000 billion dollars as financial support for developing countries.

<sup>40</sup> It was an agreement to increase financial contributions of the states for the development of international trade.

<sup>41</sup> Some leaders of G20 – and in particular from Brazil and India – have underlined that, this way unemployment would be reduced and the economy would be recovered.

<sup>42</sup> The states, first of all.

<sup>43</sup> See the conclusions of the G20 Summit, in London, on April 2, 2009.

## NATO's New Clothes. A New Strategic Concept

*Teodora Crina POPESCU*

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The decision to issue a new Strategic Concept had been hammered out in the Declaration on Alliance Security issued by the Heads of State and Government at NATO's Summit at Strasbourg/Kehl, in April 2009.

In general, the Strategic Concept served to codify the policy framework of the Alliance's functioning and its periodical reviews provided for the reflection of the incremental changes the Alliance underwent. Since 1991, when the Strategic Concepts have started to be released to the public – thus following the logic of a public diplomacy document but keeping its core strategic dimension – the document sets out NATO's security tasks, acknowledges and possibly foresees the features of the evolving security environment, highlights the Alliance's approach to security and offers guidelines for its future cooperation policy (with partners and organizations) and for the streamline of its military capabilities.

The first Strategic Concept, called "The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area" was agreed in 1949 and since then it had been revised in 1952, 1957, 1968, 1991 and 1999. Every new version was triggered by the intrinsic transformations the international system went through and the fundamental changes in the Alliance's approach to the security environment.

Four out of six Strategic Concepts (1949, 1952, 1957 and 1968) were conceived for the preparation of military defense in given geographical areas and were classified. The other two (1991 and 1999) were post-Cold War documents, forward-thinking and

innovative in their approaches, heralding the transformation of the Alliance.

The first two strategic concepts, D.C. 6/1 of 01.12.1949 and M.C. 3/5 of 03.12.1952 do not differ much in the language used, provide general lines for defense planning and do not clearly identify the potential enemy. In a way they set the stage for the next strategic concepts, which will become more focused and explicit.

The breakthrough came in 1957 with the third strategic concept, M.C. 14/2 of 23.05.1957, where the USSR is for the first time identified as *the enemy* and the *general war* is perceived as the greatest threat to the survival of the NATO nations. The idea of *massive retaliation strategy* becomes an integral part of the Strategic Concept as "utilization of all weapons and forces at NATO's disposal" should be used "since in no case is there a NATO concept of limited war with the Soviets". The Alliance is envisaging not only the use of *first strike* but also is accommodating the idea of "maximum destruction...within the first few days" when using a nuclear arsenal, in order "to gain nuclear superiority".

The fourth strategic concept, M.C. 14/3 of 16.01.1968 brings in new notions and theories. It identifies the Warsaw Pact as the enemy, launches the *concept of forward defense* and *limited war* and highlights that the Alliance's deterrence is based on *flexible response*, consisting of three pillars: direct defense, deliberate escalation and general nuclear response (the ultimate deterrent and military response). It also thoroughly depicts the regional geo-strategic importance of its allies

from the North Sea to Mediterranean and from the Atlantic Ocean to inland Western Europe.

Post-Cold War strategic concepts had several objectives. First, it had to lay down the Alliance's purposes, underlining NATO's radical shift from *competition* to *cooperation* with former rivals. Actually many ex-enemies became in a very short period of time cooperation partners, highlighting how artificial the ideological adherence to the communist military bloc was. For NATO it was less expensive to engage and develop political dialogue and practical cooperation with them than to perpetuate the rift.

Second, it had to gather public support within NATO nations and prepare and endow the Alliance for future engagements. The post-Cold War strategic concepts were less explicit than previous versions, as the security environment was radically changed. There was not anymore a single enemy but a myriad of potential risks. NATO was a defensive political-military organization, with the capabilities to combat only a few of them; therefore it had to take into consideration further adaptations to the fluid security environment. Based on these assumptions the Alliance gained a *raison d'être* despite many voices that heralded the end of it.

The "Alliance's New Strategic Concept" of November 1991 acknowledges the broad definition of security and the shift from "the predominant threat of the past" to risks that "are multi-faced in nature and multi-directional" and are "hard to predict and assess". Furthermore, it admits that the Alliance security "must take account of the global context". The set premises led to the conclusion that "the changed environment offers new opportunities for the Alliance to frame its strategy within a broad approach to security."

As a strategic document it emphasizes four fundamental security tasks: security, consultations, deterrence and defense and preservation of the strategic balance within Europe (referring to the remaining Soviet forces in Europe, in particular in Poland and Germany).

The document includes a reference to the Alliance's new force posture that intends to

shift "where appropriate from the concept of forward defense towards a reduced forward presence" and the modification of the principle of flexible response "to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons". The Allies' forces also transform, replacing their in-place linear defensive posture with rapid reaction elements, main forces and augmentation forces and new concepts fly such as: flexibility, mobility and readiness.

The Alliance's Strategic Concept of April 1999 brings in new realities. The Alliance's fundamental security tasks are revised as the objective of creating a strategic balance in Europe is accomplished.

New ways of enhancing the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area are identified: promotion of partnerships and involvement in crisis management. It signals the Alliance's interest and intent to broaden its area of activity and involvement beyond its traditional territory (NATO countries territory). Past experience, such as the involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo crisis (March 1999) made *NATO become regional* and was indicative for the breaching of the old patterns of international law principles that allowed for military interventions. This approach is practically included in the Strategic Concept: "Regional and, in particular, geo-strategic considerations within the Alliance will have to be taken into account, as instabilities on NATO's periphery could lead to crises or conflicts requiring an Alliance military response, potentially with short warning times."

Great emphasis is put on the operational capabilities needed for the full range of missions (both article 5 and crisis response operations) such as: effective engagement capability, deploy ability, mobility, survivability of forces and infrastructure and sustainability.

Another innovative aspect reflected for the first time in a strategic concept was the clear reference to NATO's intention to *enlarge*, as stated under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty.

Debates and discussions on the necessity and inevitability to have a new strategic concept have been intensively engaged in the past three years. Security, consultations,

deterrence and defense alongside crisis management and partnerships are still relevant touchstones for the Alliance. One may ask which hypotheses could add to the decision to reflect on the shape of a new strategic concept which is expected to be delivered to the next NATO Summit.

The hypotheses that will be presented below are the two sides of the same coin: on one hand there is the nature of the evolving security environment and on the other hand is about the suitable feedback to both the challenges and the opportunities of this system.

First, the strategic environment evolved in the last 10 years becoming increasingly unpredictable; it encompasses new security challenges (such as terrorism, proliferation of WMD, misuse of emerging technologies, growing availability of sophisticated conventional weaponry, disruption of the flow of vital resources, cyber attacks, piracy just to name a few), mainly asymmetric threats that require a tailored response which many times could not solely make use of the traditional military means. Nowadays, the dichotomy between hard and soft security threats is fading out, as in many cases they feed and complement each other. Consequently, NATO should transform its forces and capacities to efficiently deal with them.

Second, NATO also assumed new operational roles (post-conflict stabilization, reconstruction and human welfare) beyond the military aspects involved in crisis response operations. Against this background, NATO's Comprehensive Approach to civil-military operations is a daunting but indispensable task and could become a core element of the next strategic concept. NATO's political goal in an operation cannot be achieved without well coordinated civil-military capabilities. Civilian capabilities which must be integrated with military ones should come from two important sources: NATO allies' national assets and international organizations (be it multinational such as UN, EU, OSCE or nongovernmental such as the Red Cross).

Third, the Alliance started to be involved in numerous operations that exceeded its traditional area of responsibility: Afghanistan

(ISAF, NTM-A), Iraq (NTM-I) and off the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden. These examples where NATO extended steadily its area of operations indicated that the *Alliance became global and an expeditionary projector of stability*. It is the globalizing characteristic that keeps NATO's transformation process advancing. Concurrently, the growth in the complexity of NATO's operational tasks intertwined with the development of partnership relations and brings us to the next argument.

Fourth, the international system is entropic therefore long-term cooperation on specific issues and common, shared interests with like-minded states or organizations are of strategic importance and could bring benefits to all parties involved. Based on this assumption the idea of partnership cooperation crossed the traditional Euro-Atlantic area and involved countries from the Arabic Peninsula (Istanbul 2002-Istanbul Cooperation Initiative) or Far East countries (Riga 2006-partners across the globe such as Australia, South Korea, Japan, New Zealand). It shows that NATO can engage in institutionalized global partnerships which could open on a medium-term the door to global membership.

Fifth, the revised strategic concept should clarify the legal framework for the use of force and NATO's relationship with the UN on this particular aspect, as NATO's air campaign in Kosovo in 1999 was considered from the point of view of the traditional international law as lacking legitimacy.

Sixth, NATO should also seriously contemplate the possibility to deliver preemptive strikes although it is debatable if using preemptive force is consistent with the terms and purposes of the UN Charter. Examples offered by the US in Iraq in 2003, Turkey in northern Iraq at the end of 2007 and Russia in August 2008 in Georgia (although this one is arguable as president Medvedev saw the intervention as "Russia's 9/11") make a point in case, as the fine threshold has been broken by state actors.

Seventh, NATO identifies the disruption of the flow of vital resources as one of the main threats to the Alliance over the next 10 to 15 years (as stated in the Comprehensive

Political Guidance endorsed by NATO Heads of State and Government in 2006). In the same vein, the new Russian Security Strategy warns that the growing struggle for energy resources could bring about military clashes (just to remember December 2008-January 2009 skirmishes between Russia and Ukraine which fortunately didn't escalate beyond the diplomatic rhetoric). In this context, NATO should reorient the strategic focus on its traditional area, especially but not limited on High North which has become a colliding challenging area with Russia.

Eight, the Alliance's Strategic Concept of 1999 was written before the major wave of enlargement of 2004 which includes countries that had acute past resentments vis-à-vis Russia. Moreover, the reemergence of Russia which plays a regional assertive and resurgent role adds to the transformation of its near abroad to an area of "privileged interests" (as the August 2008 crisis in Georgia proved it); it means *realpolitik* is back in business. This could determine NATO to rethink the Alliance's deterrence policy and also to

ponder more pragmatically its relationship with Russia.

Last but not least, it should be noticed that NATO as organization is benefiting from what could be called "structured cooperation" (a pool of nations decide to cooperate to take forward certain strategic programs) among its allies and sometimes even *partners* on areas of strategic importance (for example Strategic Airlift Capability-SAC, Strategic Airlift Interim Solution-SALIS, Sealift Capability Package and Allied Ground Surveillance-AGS). This manner of "structured cooperation" with allies and partners alike (which could be similar to what *niche capabilities* buzz words were in 2002) should be reflected in the future strategic concept.

These structural changes and conceptual developments will most probably be reflected in the next strategic concept when discussing the role and purpose of NATO. It is crucial to find common grounds and do not dilute the substance of this strategic document although the decision at 28 instead of 19 could be more difficult to be achieved than expected.

## Câteva considerații privind geopolitica Orientului Mijlociu

Cristian TUDOR

Indiferent din ce perspectivă ar fi privit, Orientul Mijlociu reprezintă un subiect la modă, care emană un exotism din ce în ce mai periculos și captivant. În zilele noastre, Orientul Mijlociu, prin conflictele sale complexe inter-etnice și inter-confesionale, este un focar de instabilitate. Indiferent de ce tip de Orient Mijlociu vorbim, instabilitatea propagată de această regiune este deja devenită tradițională și continuă să iradieze întregul mapamond.

Orientul Mijlociu rămâne un termen ambiguu. Din punct de vedere geografic reprezintă un subcontinent fără granițe în mod clar delimitate, fiind utilizat ca sinonim pentru Orientul Apropiat, în opoziție cu Orientul Îndepărtat.

Pentru început, am putea percepe Orientul Mijlociu ca fiind o „simplă” regiune. Istoria demonstrează că interesele geostrategice și militare au reprezentat factorul catalizator al denumirilor regiunilor. Cu alte cuvinte, regiunile au fost *botezate* de către inventatorii lor pe baza intereselor acestora și, implicit, a concepțiilor acestor inventatori asupra securității<sup>1</sup>.

Termenul *Orientul Mijlociu* a fost inventat de Alfred Thayer Mahan, ofițer și geostrateg din Forțele Navale ale SUA<sup>2</sup>. Militarul american a folosit termenul pentru prima dată în articolul „Gulful Persic și Relațiile Internaționale”, publicat, în 1902, în revista britanică *The National Review*. Acesta sugera că Marea Britanie ar trebui să-și asume responsabilitatea de a menține securitatea în Golful Persic și zona coastelor acestuia – Orientul Mijlociu – pentru a securiza ruta către India și a supraveghea, în același timp, Rusia<sup>3</sup>.

Termenul *Orientul Mijlociu* a fost consacrat și mai mult grație lui Sir Ignatius Valentine Chirol<sup>4</sup>, jurnalist și diplomat britanic, în carte sa *The Middle Eastern Question*, care încorporează o suită de 19 articole publicate în *The Times* în perioada 1902-1903. În 1903 ghilimelele care până atunci îmbrăcau termenul *Orientul Mijlociu* dispar, iar acesta începe să fie utilizat ca atare. Alți specialiști susțin faptul că termenul ar fi fost vehiculat pentru prima dată în Indiile Britanice, în jurul anilor 1850<sup>5</sup>.

În mod oficial sintagma *Orientul Mijlociu* este folosită pentru prima dată de către Lordul Curzon în Camera Lorzilor, la 22 martie 1911, într-o discuție privind situația din regiunea Golfului Persic, a Turciei și a Asiei<sup>6</sup>.

Observăm că termenul *Orientul Mijlociu* a descris, la momentul respectiv, o zonă de interes a Imperiului Britanic. Atât Mahan cât și Chirol considerau regiunea importantă din punct de vedere strategic, evaluând-o din perspectiva protejării Indiei. Regiunea Orientului Mijlociu începea să prezinte interes pentru Imperiul Britanic, fiindu-i apreciate calitățile de zonă – tampon dintre India și Europa.

Ulterior britanicii vor prelua, după primul Război Mondial, și majoritatea teritoriilor arabe ce aparținuseră otomanilor. Ca dovadă a asimilării și acceptării termenului de *Orientul Mijlociu*, în 1932 *Royal Air Force Middle East Command* din Irak a fost unit cu *Near East Command* din Egipt, Cairo, noul Cartier General fiind denumit *Middle East HQ*<sup>7</sup>.

Destinele popoarelor din Orientul Mijlociu continuă să fie determinate, ca și în ultimele câteva sute de ani, de puteri occidentale, care la rândul lor au viziuni și interese divergente privind zona în sine. Tocmai de aceea Anglia



trebuia să mai țină cont și de interesele celui mai important aliat al său în regiune, Franța. Acesta este și rațiunea încheierii acordului secret Sykes-Picot, semnat chiar când, cu ajutorul colonelului T. E. Lawrence, fusese declanșată revolta arabă împotriva turcilor.

Cererile franceze se refereau nu numai la Marea Sirie (Siria, Liban, Palestina), dar și la Cilicia și la Kurdistanul otoman, care cuprinde regiunea bogată în hidrocarburi Mosul. Miza era, printre altele, reglementarea statutului Palestinei, pe care ambele părți doreau să o aibă sub control. Franța cea *laică* dorea să-și prezeve rolul de protectoare a creștinătății. S-a convenit provizoriu o împărțire între Marea Britanie și o administrare internațională a locurilor sfinte.

Orientalistul francez Francois Massouile afirmă, însă, că pentru Marea Britanie în realitate acel acord era un pas înapoi. De aceea englezii au hotărât să joace cartea sionismului, interesați să obțină sprijinul comunităților evreiești. Crearea unei vetre evreiești în Palestina și conflictele care ar fi erupt ulterior ar fi permis consolidarea prezenței unui arbitraj britanic și, în consecință, securitatea trecerii prin Canalul Suez<sup>8</sup>.

Mai târziu, datorită importanței strategice a petrolului și a celor două conflagrații mondiale termenul a continuat să fie uzitat pe scară largă. Descoperirea unor cantități uriașe de petrol în Peninsula Arabă, precum și ritmul crescut al migrației evreiești în Palestina au făcut ca aceste teritorii să fie incluse în Orientul Mijlociu al lui Mahan<sup>9</sup>.

Nu trebuie omis faptul că inclusiv locuitorii „Orientului Mijlociu” au botezat acea regiune, prin sintagmele *Maghreb – vest* și *Mashreq – est*, care originează dintr-o altă eră geopolitică, respectiv aceea a primului val al

cuceririlor arabe în nordul Africii, din secolul VII și VIII. Cu toate acestea istoria a demonstrat că nu toate societățile sunt capabile să impună propriile percepții asupra geografiei politice și securității.

În perioada celui de-al doilea război mondial la Washington erau utilizate ambele sintagme, *Near East* și *Middle East*. În esență, după a doua conflagrație mondială *zona de interes* la care ne refeream a fost „preluată” de la britanici, împreună cu numele dat acesteia de către SUA<sup>10</sup>. Sesizăm încă o dată modalitatea occidentală de abordare a *Orientului Mijlociu*, dintr-o perspectivă pur realistă. În SUA termenul *Orientul Mijlociu* este uzitat, în mod oficial, pentru prima dată în Doctrina Eisenhower (1957).

Secretarul de stat american John Foster Dulles considera Orientul Mijlociu zona cuprinsă între Libia în vest și Pakistan în est, Siria și Irak în nord, Peninsula Arabă în sud, plus Sudan și Etiopia<sup>11</sup>. În 1958 Departamentul de Stat al SUA oferea clarificări asupra utilizării termenului *Orientul Mijlociu*, arătând că acesta este sinonim cu termenul *Orientul Apropiat* și cuprinde numai Egipt, Siria, Israel, Liban, Iordania, Irak, Arabia Saudită, Kuweit, Bahrain și Qatar<sup>12</sup>.

Washingtonul continuă și în prezent să *extindă* și să promoveze energic atât interesele în regiune, dar și termenul *Orientul Mijlociu*. Singura diferență este că acestui termen i-au fost alăturate conceptele *extins* și *democrație/democratizare*, generând astfel actuala politică a SUA față de zona respectivă, marcată de un realism unic american, după cum afirma Condoleezza Rice<sup>13</sup>, actualul secretar de stat american.

## 1. Orientul Mijlociu: entitate geostrategică

*Orientul Mijlociu* se potrivește cel mai bine punctului de vedere realist privind politica internațională<sup>14</sup>. Interesele politice internaționale ale inventatorilor și utilizatorilor au cauzat nașterea conceptului. Modificările geostrategice care au survenit pe scena internațională au

marcat o profundă evoluție a intereselor celor care dețineau de la bun început „copyright-ul” conceptului de *Orient Mijlociu*. Astfel, la finalul războiului rece apariția unor noi interese geostrategice a cauzat *lărgirea* conceptului inițial, prin adăugarea republicilor

ex-sovietice central-asiatice. Rațiunea *extinderii* Orientului Mijlociu o constituie necesitatea asigurării accesului la resursele energetice din Asia Centrală.

Termenul *Orientul Mijlociu* se bucură de o doză de criticism datorită eurocentrismului care stă la baza nașterii acestuia. Termenul a fost generat de percepția britanică față de punctul cardinal estic. Estul era perceput ca fiind apropiat, îndepărtat sau mijlociu. Acesta reflectă poziția geografică a regiunii având ca punct de referință Marea Britanie, fiind uzitat pentru prima dată în Europa, în ciuda faptului că Mahan era american. Impunerea termenului din exterior, tratată dintr-o perspectivă generică, reflectă o serie de relații de putere pe care le vom sesiza și în cazul evaluării efectelor negative produse de politicile statelor occidentale de a *democratiza* Orientul Mijlociu, sau cel puțin a *promova* democrația în acest areal.

Cu alte cuvinte, înțelegem conceptul de Orient Mijlociu *per se* ca o invenție geostrategică, care derivă dintr-o viziune occidentală asupra securității. Orientalistul francez Francois Massoulie descrie cel mai elocvent realitățile regionale prin afirmația „Orientul Mijlociu din secolul XX este, de fapt, o creație anglo-franceză, străină de dinamicile proprii ale acestei regiuni”<sup>15</sup>.

Orientul Mijlociu este abordat de către *vestici* având ca fundamente următoarele: asigurarea accesului nerestricționat la resursele energetice la prețuri rezonabile, soluționarea diferendului israeliano-palestinian, limitarea apariției vreunei puteri regionale cu aspirații hegemonice, promovarea Islamului moderat și încercarea limitării fundamentalismului islamic, dar și susținerea regimurilor politice *prietene*, dar dictatoriale.

În esență, după cum am mai arătat, situația actuală nu diferă de perioada de început a

secolului XX. Mecanismul este similar: interesele marilor puteri, precum și percepția occidentală a amenințărilor de securitate din acest areal au definit, ca și în timpul lui Mahan, ceea ce înțelegem azi prin termenul *Orientul Mijlociu*. Un exemplu elocvent în acest sens îl oferă cercetătorul turc Pinar Bilgin, care arată că viețile femeilor din Kuweit și Arabia Saudită sunt puse în pericol nu numai de capacitățile militare ale vecinilor săi din Golful Persic, dar și de către caracterul conservator al propriilor lor regimuri care restricționează drepturile femeilor sub acoperământul tradiției religioase.

Această abordare tipologică a Orientului Mijlociu a servit și negativ intereselor statelor care au promovat-o inițial. Conducătorii regionali, a căror percepție a riscurilor de securitate nu era în convergență cu cea a inventatorilor *Orientului Mijlociu*, au început să exploateze în beneficiu intern percepțiile vestice asupra securității regionale. Aplicând ceea ce R.B.J. Walker numea prezentarea *exteriorului* drept pericol pentru a putea menține pace în *interior*, conducătorii regionali exploatau, practic, oportunități de securitate generate de simpla percepție de securitate a celor din *exterior*. Această practică adoptată de o serie de regimuri arabe întărește securitatea statului, privit ca principal instrument de contracarare a amenințărilor *din exterior*, dar diminuează drastic securitatea umană, individuală, creând practic un mecanism periculos de menținere în viață a regimurilor polițienești din această regiune.

În concluzie, *Orientul Mijlociu* de astăzi este beneficiarul unei cantități uriașe de *stabilitate* de sorginte occidentală, injectată preponderent cu mijloace militare, cu obiective variate, printre care promovarea libertății și democrației - elementul central al actualei politici a SUA față de regiune.

## 2. Orientul Mijlociu: o perspectivă arabă

Orientul Mijlociu constituie o regiune de o complexitate incontestabilă, marcată de o volatilitate deja devenită tradițională, care, după cum arăta Walid Al-Moualem<sup>16</sup>, șeful

diplomației siriene, continuă să se confrunte cu provocări multiple.

După cum este firesc, provocările regionale sunt percepute în mod diferit de

fiecare stat din regiune. Acest mecanism a generat fenomenul interdependențelor de securitate, transformând regiunea în ceea ce Berry Buzan numește complex de securitate. Conștientizarea existenței acestui complex de securitate a făcut ca Orientul Mijlociu să fie adesea confundat cu lumea arabă și vice-versa.

Perspectiva arabă a *Orientului Mijlociu* emană din conceptul de securitate națională arabă, care, după cum este firesc, definește o serie de preocupări panarabe<sup>17</sup> de securitate. Percepția securității dintr-o perspectivă naționalistă arabă este de fapt reacția statelor arabe, inițiată la începutul războiului rece, la încercările Washingtonului sau Moscovei de a câștiga sfere de influență în regiune.

În teorie, după cum afirma S. Al-Husaril (1880-1969), unul dintre primii teoreticieni ai panarabismului, naționalismul arab nu se reduce doar la locuitorii Peninsulei arabe, după cum el nu se reduce numai la musulmani. Acesta considera că arabii sunt, de fapt, o singură *umma*, iar actualele diferențe ca și divergențe între statele arabe (politice, economice, legislative, administrative) ar fi toate moșteniri ale epocilor de ocupație<sup>18</sup>. Un sentiment arab apăruse în secolul VII în sânul islamului care reunise într-un proiect comun triburile rătăcite din deșertul peninsulei. Naționalismul arab contemporan, care și-a mai aflat expresia cea mai deplină în scrierile lui Michel Aflaq (1910-1989), întemeietor al partidului *Baath*, este, în realitate, o utopie voluntaristă. Ridicându-se totodată împotriva divizărilor de după război, panarabismul afirma conceptul de națiune arabă într-un moment în care împrejurările făceau ca realizarea lui să fie mai dificilă decât niciodată<sup>19</sup>.

Problematika *Orientului Mijlociu* este tratată în lucrarea de față pornindu-se de la premisa inexistenței unei *lumi arabe* per se. Societatea arabă contemporană, care, cel puțin la nivel conceptual, este percepută drept transnațională, este într-adevăr arabă, dar neomogenă și neunitară, relativ similară celei din secolul VII, cu interese naționale statale. *Lumea arabă* actuală, înțeleasă de unii observatori drept o construcție societală, reflectă, din perspectiva autorului,

incapacitatea popoarelor arabe de desăvârșire a sentimentului național arab (panarabismul). Lumea arabă nu există decât ca eventuală macro-regiune geopolitică generată de interesele regionale ale marilor puteri occidentale.

S-ar putea spune că la eșecul desăvârșirii panarabismului a contribuit și Islamul (perceput de către naționaliștii arabi drept un patrimoniu național, un element esențial al istoriei naționale a arabilor), deoarece a dat naștere dilemei *mai întâi patria sau religia?*

În secolul VII apariția Islamului – religie revelată în limba arabă – a reprezentat în primul rând un factor coagulant al arabilor care existau de dinainte, divizați, în Arabia. Faptul că revelația coranică s-a produs în limba arabă i-a făcut pe arabi să acționeze ca un popor ales și să se simtă responsabili de propagarea mesajului popoarelor non-arabe.

Istoria arabilor este greu de separat de istoria Islamului, începând din secolul al VII-lea, când “un profet arab a proclamat la Mecca o nouă religie, provocând o răsturnare politică și socială ale cărei efecte nu încetează a se face simțite”<sup>20</sup>. Istoria arabilor de dinainte de apariția Islamului este relativ cunoscută, până în secolul al IV-lea. Arabii erau *nomazi* prin excelență, acesta fiind de altfel sensul inițial al cuvântului arab (Nadia Anghelescu: 2002). Constituirea imperiului arabo-islamic, cu granițe din China până în Pirinei, a făcut ca semnificația termenului arab să însemne *vorbitor de limbă arabă* și să fie validă inclusiv în prezent.

Inabilitatea popoarelor arabe de a acționa unitar nu este o noutate, dar nici strict efectul geopoliticii actuale și a promovării intereselor naționale. *Lumea arabă* contemporană se comportă în aceeași termenii în care arabii, aici în sensul lor de nomazi, reacționau la efectele socio-politice ale apariției islamului, greu de gestionat de către niște popoare preponderent analfabete<sup>21</sup>.

Istoria islamului cunoaște cel puțin trei războaie civile, dintre care două chiar în primul secol după moartea profetului Muhammad (632). Conflictul armat intermusulman a fost o constantă în viața comunității, din motive de care nu este

întotdeauna responsabilă religia islamică, ci mai degrabă zona în care aceasta și-a întemeiat statul, care a fost permanent afectat de invazii barbare provenind din Asia<sup>22</sup>. În această privință islamul a fost un veritabil factor civilizator al acestor barbari, fie ei mongoli sau turci, dar un factor care a și plătit prețul acestei interacțiuni cu barbarii, fiind victima convulsiilor sociale, politice și economice provocate de „veneticii stepelor”<sup>23</sup>.

Nivelul de educație a profetului Muhammad continuă să reprezinte un subiect controversat. În Coran, surele 7:157, 158 și 29:47, 48,49, îl descriu pe Muhammad ca fiind *ummi*, ceea ce în araba contemporană literară înseamnă analfabet. O serie de orientaliști<sup>24</sup> consideră că termenul *ummi*, care i se aplică în Coran, nu înseamnă analfabet, ci *om de rând*, necunoscător al legii divine.

În traducerea sa George Grigore folosește termenul neînvățat pentru a interpreta *ummi*. În Coran, sura 96:1-3, îngerul Gabriel, care îi dictează profetului mesajul în întregime, utilizează verbul *qara'*, la imperativ, *iqra'*, după cum urmează: „Citește! În numele domnului tău care a creat. Care l-a creat pe om din sânge încheșat. Citește! Domnul tău este cel mai nobil”. Cheia, se pare, constă în modalitatea de înțelegere a verbului *qara'*, care se interpretează *recitare* sau *predică*, urmând ca mai târziu să fie utilizat sensul de „culegere de revelații sub formă scrisă”<sup>25</sup>. O serie de versiuni ale traducerii Coranului în limba engleză evită să traducă termenul *ummi*.

Fără a intra în detaliile contradicției academice asupra nivelului educației profetului Muhammad, în secolul VII, în perioada apariției Islamului, majoritatea arabilor primei generații de musulmani erau analfabeți. Bernard Lewis subliniază faptul că arabii au putut cuceri țările și imperiile civilizate din jurul deșertului lor, însă ei au trebuit să accepte și să preia organizarea statală a acestora, începând cu modul de impozitare și percepere a impozitelor, mergând până la instituțiile de învățământ. El spune la un moment dat că „dacă Persia a fost islamizată, islamul a fost și el iranizat.”

Cu toate acestea, Islamul fără arabi nu ar fi putut fi ceea ce este azi, precum nici arabii nu

ar fi ceea ce sunt azi fără islam. Această interdependență este esențială pentru deprinderea substratului socio-religios care a marcat istoria poarelor arabe și devenite arabe<sup>26</sup>, după moartea profetului Muhammad, în 632. Dominique Sourdel consideră că fără islam arabii ar fi fost incapabili de altceva în afara unor infiltrații sporadice în teritoriile învecinate; pe de altă parte, fără arabi și fără spiritul lor războinic islamul nu ar fi putut declanșa această vastă mișcare ofensivă, ale cărei consecințe politice aveau să rămână complet imprezvizibile chiar și pentru aceia care o declanșaseră.

Astăzi islamul în cadrul său contextual contemporan poate fi o arie geopolitică, un spațiu istoric, un câmp socio-cultural în care se înscrie *umma* islamică în devenirea ei, o comunitate care reprezintă aproape un sfert din omenire. Referințele care atestă unitatea comunității islamice nu pun în evidență totuși o lume monolitică<sup>27</sup>. Ele nu pot masca asperități de ordin sociologic, clivajele religioase, antagonismele politice ținând de opțiunile ideologice ale fiecărei componente a *umma*.

Dintr-o perspectivă naționalist-arabă *Orientul Mijlociu (Arab)* ar trebui să reprezinte, de fapt, un *sistem regional arab*. Privind *Orientul Mijlociu* prin optica panarabismului putem înțelege mai bine evoluția relațiilor de putere dintre statele arabe, sau, mai bine spus, năzuința acestora către realizarea națiunii arabe. Preocupările de securitate ale acestor state sunt, de multe ori, diametral opuse, dar interdependente în cele mai multe cazuri și, în mod cert, diferă, uneori drastic, față de cele ale celorlalți actori *nearabi*, respectiv Iran, Israel și Turcia. Această viziune intră în coliziune cu percepția occidentală asupra regiunii *Orientului Mijlociu*, care este *inter alia* perceput ca fiind un mozaic etnic. În final, prezintă relevanță sporită inclusiv faptul că la nivelul populațiilor arabe nu s-a putut agreea o definiție comună pentru ceea ce înseamnă *arab* – aspect de multe ori neglijat de către specialiști.

Profesorul egiptean Bahgat Korany consideră că *lumea arabă* nu este doar un conglomerat de state suverane care

interacționează în condițiile impuse de anarhia internațională. Acesta pune accentul pe aspectele non-militare ale securității, respectiv cele societale, subliniind importanța identității și a prosperității. Preocupările de securitate ale diverșilor actori din spațiul arab diferă în mod substanțial, în funcție de nivelul de dezvoltare socio-economic. Nu trebuie omis faptul că securitatea unui stat arab de multe ori se confundă cu securitatea regimului aflat la putere în respectivul stat arab.

LSA promovează securitatea statală, omițând să se refere la securitatea societală în *lumea arabă*. În consecință, este lesne de înțeles că în *lumea arabă*, ca peste tot, securitatea este de mai multe feluri. Sunt agende locale, regionale și internaționale. Sesizăm existența intereselor domestice ale regimurilor și interesele majore ale marilor forțe internaționale. Elementul central care este absent în acest tablou reprezintă dimensiunea socială a securității, securitatea umană, societală. În *lumea arabă* sunt rare momentele în care se poate spune că individul este beneficiarul principal al securității.

Orientul Mijlociu mai este și al musulmanilor. Problema este că în acea regiune musulmanii tind să devină islamiști. Islamistul, în comparație cu musulmanul – care este caracterizat printr-o moderație vizibilă și cuantificabilă – este musulmanul fundamentalist-extremist, care ideologizează și politizează Islamul, interpretându-l arhaic, în funcție de varii interese, precum cel cu caracterul cel mai notoriu, restabilirea califatului islamic, sau desăvârșirea războiului sfânt împotriva SUA și a puterilor occidentale, etc.


Adesea mulți observatori confundă lumea musulmană cu lumea arabă și cu Orientul Mijlociu. Nu este nevoie să mai subliniem faptul că majoritatea musulmanilor de pe glob nu se situează în *lumea arabă*, sau în *Orientul Mijlociu*. Potrivit site-ului deja consacrat și recunoscut în domeniu, [www.adherents.com](http://www.adherents.com), la acest moment la nivel global există 1,5 miliarde de musulmani și 2,1 miliarde de creștini. Este deja elementar faptul că numărul cel mai crescut de musulmani se află în Asia și

nu în Orientul Mijlociu. Numai în Indonezia există peste 200 de milioane de musulmani și în Pakistan și India peste 150 de milioane în fiecare<sup>28</sup>.

Și în cazul Orientului Mijlociu musulman amenințările și percepțiile de securitate diferă. Pentru unii islamiști, spre exemplu, amenințarea supremă de securitate constă în nivelul sporit de *influențe neislamice* care originează din exteriorul acestui areal, cu toate că nu există o definiție unanim acceptată cu privire la ce este și nu este islamic. Unii consideră influența occidentală *neislamică*, pe când alții consideră *neislamic* faptul că Regatul Islamic al Arabiei Saudite a permis trupelor SUA să *calce* pe pământurile sfinte, sau chiar și naționalismul arab<sup>29</sup>.

Orientul Mijlociu nu poate fi analizat exhaustiv, numai prin evaluarea conflictelor care se petrec în această arie geografică și prin evaluarea *real politik*-ului cu care terți actori și-au urmărit machiavelic -și continuă să o facă- interesele în regiune.

Orientul Mijlociu va fi în continuare rezultatul intersecției unor percepții statice, de natură militară, asupra securității regionale, care derivă din concepții de securitate diferite, generate de modurile alternative în care este privită, înțeleasă și dorită lumea. În concluzie, Orientul Mijlociu poate fi privit și înțeles drept o invenție geopolitică, ale cărei jocuri sunt toate cu sumă nulă și unde principiul guvernant este *power politics*. Probabil că lucrurile ar fi stat altfel, dacă în Orientul Mijlociu nu ar fi existat petrol.



NOTE

- <sup>1</sup> Pinar Bilgin. *Whose Middle East? Geopolitical Inventions and Practices of Security*, International Relations, 2004.
- <sup>2</sup> Roger Adelson. *London and the Invention of the Middle East: Money, Power and War, 1902-1922*. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1995.
- <sup>3</sup> Alfred Thayer Mahan. *Persian Gulf and International Relations*, The National Review, September 1902, pag. 27-45.
- <sup>4</sup> Roger Adelson. *London and the Invention of the Middle East: Money, Power and War, 1902-1922*. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1995.
- <sup>5</sup> Peter Beaumont, Gerald H. Blake, J. Malcom Wagstaff, *The Middle East: A Geographical Study*, David Fulton, London, 1988.
- <sup>6</sup> *Ibidem*.
- <sup>7</sup> C. G. Smith. *The emergence of the Middle East*, *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 3, No. 3, July 1968.
- <sup>8</sup> François Massouile. *Conflictetele din Orientul Mijlociu*, Ed. Bic All, București, 2003.
- <sup>9</sup> Pinar Bilgin. *op. cit.*
- <sup>10</sup> Sedat Laciner. *Is there a place called Middle East?*, The Journal of Turkish Weekly, 2 iunie 2006.
- <sup>11</sup> Roderic Davison. *Where is the Middle East*, *Foreign Affairs*, 38, 1960.
- <sup>12</sup> *Near East' is Mideast*, Washington Explains, The New York Times (August 14, 1958).
- <sup>13</sup> Condoleezza Rice. *Foreign Affairs*, July-August 2008.
- <sup>14</sup> Joseph Nye, *Descifrarea conflictelor internaționale*, Ed. Antet, București, 2005.
- <sup>15</sup> François Massouile, *op. cit.*
- <sup>16</sup> În alocuțiunea susținută în calitate de șef al delegației siriene la cea de-a 63 sesiune a Adunării Generale a Națiunilor Unite, New York, 27 septembrie 2008.
- <sup>17</sup> Pinar Bilgin, *op. cit.*
- <sup>18</sup> A. Abdel-Malek, *La pensée politique arabe contemporaine*, Le Seuil, Paris, 1971.
- <sup>19</sup> François Massouile, *op. cit.*
- <sup>20</sup> Dominique Sourdel, *Istoria Arabilor*, Ed. Corint, București, 2002.
- <sup>21</sup> Alfred-Louis de Prémare, *Les Fondations de l'Islam*, Seuil, 2002.
- <sup>22</sup> George Grigore, *Problematicele traducerii Coranului în limba română*, Editura Ararat, București, 1997.
- <sup>23</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Middle East*, Touchstone, New York, 1995.
- <sup>24</sup> Nadia Anghelescu, *Introducere în Islam*, Ed. Enciclopedică, București, 1993.
- <sup>25</sup> *Ibidem*.
- <sup>26</sup> Ne referim aici la mawali, noii convertiți, care au jucat un rol tot mai important între cuceritori și supușii nemusulmani. Dinastia omeyazilor s-a stins tocmai datorită faptului că s-a străduit să conducă umea eterogenă a teritoriilor cucerite cu ajutorul unor conducători, în principal arabi, fără a face apel decât într-o foarte mică măsură la noii convertiți și la băștinașii nemusulmani.
- <sup>27</sup> Ali Mérad, *Islamul Contemporan*, Ed. Corint, București, 2003.
- <sup>28</sup> US Department of State International Freedom Religious Report 2008.
- <sup>29</sup> Pinar Bilgin, *op. cit.*

## BOOK REVIEW

Constantin Bușe, FROM THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. STUDIES, Editura Enciclopedică, București, 2009

*From the History of International Relations. Studies* by Professor Constantin Bușe is a book that covers a series of international history studies. The author focuses on a wide range of case studies, from Latin America during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, to Europe in the interwar time, the nonalignment movement, and to various Romanian bilateral relations with third countries.

The book is first of all a vivid diplomatic history and enjoyable reading. It reveals the actions, views and perceptions of statesmen and diplomats in diverse contexts of international affairs. The historical narration is based on strong evidences from diplomatic archives, economic data, public speeches, biographic or printed media, being a model of scientific rigor writing on international diplomatic and political history.

In the studies regarding Latin America this book illustrates key moments such as the war of independence against Spain, the position of Latin American states towards the two World Wars, and the European crises during the interwar time (*The Independence War of Latin America, the European Powers and the United States, Latin America and the First World War, Several Features of the New World's Stance on the European Crisis, The Pan-American Solidarity during the Second World War. The Latin American Contribution to the United Nations Victory*). An important value of these studies consists in disentangling the interplay between diverging interests of Latin American states on one hand and the other major players involved in the Western Hemisphere, on the other hand, be they the United States or the European Great Powers.

These studies start with the emergence of new sovereign states in Latin America as a result of the war for independence between Latin American insurgents and Spanish forces. The focus lies on how the European Powers and the United States positioned themselves vis-à-vis the two belligerents of the war for independence in Latin America. The relations between the newly emergent states in Central and South America and the other Powers were far from a clear perspective. The United States and Great Britain positions developed from a cold stance towards the insurgents to the official diplomatic recognition in the end of the conflict, while the European powers from the Holy Alliance failed to advance a mediated solution. The study ends by portraying Bolivar's grand plan of a Latin American confederacy thus the emergence of a new geopolitical reality that is a wide range of nation-states in Latin America.

Regarding the First World War the study describes how non-belligerence was expressed by Latin American states. The author reveals the details of a complex context in which 20 Latin American states defined their attitudes towards the two warring parties based on different and quite antagonistic conditions. e.g. the commercial relations, the ethnic composition, military or political cultural tradition, specific relations with third countries, including the position adopted by the United States, and even the propoganda pursued by belligerent European countries within those states.

The other successive studies focus on how the „New World” or the continental America dealt with the second German efforts for world hegemony, which peaked with the outburst of the Second World War. The author points out how the entire New World – that includes, beside the Latin America states, the United States – reacted to the rising of Nazi Germany on the world stage and then how the pan-American solidarity was forged during the war. The historical narration is dense as the author follows in great details the perspective of the American states in relation to all the international crises

provoked by Germany in Europe. It is not randomly that the author chooses to evaluate and illustrate the inter-American diplomatic background since the United States was facing a real challenge in Latin America posed by a genuine German diplomatic offensive there. The study offers here keys to understand the success of the United States' „good neighborhood policy” in Latin America and the road to the Conferences of Buenos Aires (1936) and Lima (1938), which paved the way to a veritable „pan-American solidarity” during the Second World War.

Key – themes of the international history of the period between the two World Wars are covered in this book by two important studies: one on the international context that generated the Locarno Treaty (*From Versailles to Locarno. Between Illusions and Hopes*) and the other on the Lausanne Conference (*The Lausanne Conference. June-July 1932*). The first study describes how the relations between the victorious allies of the First World War developed after the Paris-Versailles Peace Treaties, culminating with the settlement for Western European security at Locarno. This represents a major contribution for understanding the divergent positions promoted, on one hand, by France and on the other hand, by Great Britain and the United States, towards managing the post-war European security. A central issue that is revealed here represents the war „reparation” payments by Germany and how the victorious powers managed this issue.

Following the convoluted history of the „reparation” payments, the second study moves the focus to the context of the collapse of the world economic order in the 1930s. It focuses on the interconnections between the European war debts to the United States and the German war reparation payments. A central moment of these issues was the international economic conference at Lausanne, where the European nations discussed the ways of removing the impediments to the economic recovery represented by debts. The author investigates in details how the conference developed, illustrating and analyzing the speeches made by key political personalities of those time, from Ramsay MacDonald, Giuseppe Motta, Eduard Herriot to Franz von Papen. It is also very interesting the assessment of the Romanian delegation report on the conference annexed at the end of this study.

The book makes a detailed review of the non-alignment movement during the Cold War time till its fading away during the recent history (*The Non-Alignment Movement, Myth or Reality?*). The author concludes that „despite all efforts made, the generous principles permanently proclaimed, and the objectives and ends that wanted to be accomplished, the movement has failed to become *the third way* as Marshal Joseph Broz Tito stated at Bandung in 1955, meaning the departure from the two main Cold War alignments” (p. 492).

Parts of the Romanian international history are covered in this book in several studies. The author focuses on various stances of Romanian bilateral relations with third countries during the nineteenth century, from *The Beginnings of the Romanian-American Relations and Aspects of the Commercial and Economic Relations between Romania and France (1856 – 1866, 1866 – 1867)* to *The Romanian and Serbian Relations. The 1868 Treaty of Alliance*. An important study is dedicated to the Romanian-Latin American states relations with a special attention directed to the role played by the greatest Romanian diplomat, Nicolae Titulescu, to the development of those relations during the interwar period (*The Chronicles of the Romania and Latin America Relations. The Contribution of Nicolae Titulescu*). In the study *The European Idea within the Vision of the Romanian Political and Intellectual Elites (1919 – 1939)*, we can notice how important Romanian scholar and statesmen approached the project of the united Europe. The description of various stances expressed by Dimitrie Gusti, Vespasian Pella, G. G. Mironescu, Ion G. Duca, Constantin Visoianu, Grigore Gafencu or Nicolae Titulescu are embedded in the context of the wide European debate of the epoch on how the European unity can be achieved (the Coudenhove-Kalergi and Aristide Briand projects, and the Tardieu plan).

*From the History of International Relations* is an all-encompassing book that deals with major issues of international history. After covering all these issues the reader can miss here, to a certain degree, a chapter (introduction or concluding remarks) in which Professor Bușe would make general remarks on his studies. All these topics of international history reveal the author in diverse stances of the historian craft: the American Hemisphere scholar, the interwar time scholar, or the Romanian international history scholar. It would have been a thought-provoking approach for the reader and, for certain, a binding element of this book, if the author illustrated his broad perspective of the



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investigated historical periods, pointed out why these themes (epochs, times, geopolitical spaces) inspired him, and showed which are his major historical viewpoints or beliefs. The scholarly community and the students of international history would very much welcome such an approach for the (hopeful) second edition of this book.

*From History of International Relations* represents a broad historical approach not only from the perspective of the multitude international contexts or geopolitical spaces that are investigated – Latin America, the interwar period, aspects of the Romanian international history – but also due to the vast array of case studies – bilateral relations between states, international conference and treaties, ideas and grand projects, or the evolution of states alignments. The book stands for a major contribution to the Romanian and international history literature.

Sava DIAMANDI

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