

The Response of the European Union to September 11, 2001

The European Reaction Capacity: How much Still National, how much Already Communitarian

Emilia Diana Mohan

Introduction

On September 10, 2001, to humble United States by attacking the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York was considered as *the impossible*. From the next day forward, this act of violence¹ became a symbol of fear, weakness, and vulnerability to a threat infecting and affecting us all. It shattered the illusion of a more cooperative world, that was expected to be born with the end of the Cold War, and granted legitimacy to new attitudes of contempt and loathing towards a different civilization. This new threat², coming from a different cultural dimension, rests more on resentments against the post-modern cosmopolitanism and the relational structures proposed by the Western world, than on high tech weapons or state power. As such, the most horrendously affected by 9.11.2001 was the common normative architecture of the Western culture, and in particular that developed within the Euro-Atlantic community of states³.

The foundation and strength of this special Euro-Atlantic relation consists, mainly, in its intention to create an institutional area capable to usefully explore concrete cooperation and, per se, to smooth the way to peace. Throughout the Cold War, the Euro-Atlantic partnership aimed at confronting the existing challenges of the bi-polar world. In order to successfully face and carry out their obligations, Western states developed a system that locked them in, psychologically and operationally.⁴ The most important feature of this system was the common identification

and, with an equal intensity, of the then existing threat – the Soviet Union and its allies. Designed to enable the participant nations, and their friends, to cooperatively deal with common threats, this community transformed after 9.11 into a victim of a bunch of so called - terrorists. With the holistic feature of the new terrorism, mutual assistance between the allies became the main weapon of the ‘war’, and emphasis on the already solidified Euro-Atlantic relation, a solution in strengthening national and communitarian security. United into a front, their reaction to the attacks of 9.11. appear as the translation into practice of a community of values strongly compatible in their goals and complementary in their methods.

This paper intends to examine the reaction of the European Union, as a supposed coherent body of action, to the events of 9.11. 2001. By this, it intends to challenge the consistency of EU’s foreign policy, as one of the main pillars of the Euro-Atlantic relation; more precisely, it tries to analyze if Europe is capable to articulate a ‘common voice’ within the Euro-Atlantic framework. There are two main possible results: 1. a strongly articulated European voice - if intergovernmental and national EU reactions coincide; 2. a underdeveloped European voice - if intergovernmental and national reactions fluctuate. This second case opens the floor to discussion about the Achilles’ heel of EFP: what makes the EU vulnerable when it comes about accomplishing the official statements initially declared. What determined the collapse of the EU initial stage of reaction, more precisely, the

strongly declared support for a coalition to act in concert with the US. *This is the main problem this analysis intends to address.*

The present paper is structured as follows. The first part will present the way the paper is organized and offers a framework for conceptualizing the relevant theoretical notions that will be used in underlying the central problem depicted by this paper. The

1. Theoretical Background

The Logic of the Argument

Under the intention of reacting terrorism, the responses of the Euro-Atlantic community must be understood as a feedback of a civilization trying to protect its own values. According to this perception, the responses appear as an expression of unity and broad agreement about what constituted 'the threat'. The exercise of this paper is to explain what determined the specific responses of the European member states, considering that the main threat stayed the same. To contribute to the accuracy of the analysis the paper will have the following structure. This part offers a brief presentation of the way the paper is organized and deals with the theoretical background required for the elaboration of the central

Conceptual Setting

Explanatory factors of the post-9.11. European reaction are offered, in part, by the background variables. Even if the official reaction of the European Union was determined by the events of 9.11, the causes undermining the response were prior to the terrorist incident. This is one reason why the background variables are regarded as constructive starting points in analyzing the thorny problems of the European reaction. This section reviews the relevant theoretical notions that will be used in underlying the central problem depicted by this paper. More accurately, it aims to explain the

a. The Euro-Atlantic Relation

There was a broad agreement, that the events of 9.11. had a whiplash effect on the Euro-Atlantic community. The changes brought by the appearance of this new kind of terrorism had an immense impact on the way

second part charts trends and patterns of EU's reaction stages to the events of 9.11, laying emphasis on the national, intergovernmental and individual facets of the response. The last part includes a revealing analysis that tries to explain what determined such reactions and how this contributed to the collapse of the initial European coalition.

argument. The instruments used in the construction of the research question are independent, dependent and intervening variables. The independent variable - *the new terrorism* - influences directly the dependent variable - *the reaction of the EU*, while the intervening/backstage variables shape the way the independent variable affects the dependent one (in our case, the reaction of the EU to the events of 9.11), by offering explanations to the main specific features of the final outcome. Having this said, the hypothesis employed in this paper intends to identify the specificity of the European reaction to 9.11 and to explain the determinant factors of great impact.

EU reactions within the context of various factors, initially regarded as marginal or peripheral, factors that could pose a tremendous impact over the evolution and final reaction the European community of states had. The notions that serve as a good starting point for the present analysis are *the Euro-Atlantic Relation* (as the main framework of the reaction), *the European Foreign Policy* (as the specific European framework of the reaction), *the New Terrorism after 9.11 and Experience with Terrorism within the European Union* (as the main challenge of the reaction).

the states, within this community, reacted and understood to make co-operation operational. Build on one of the strongest community of interests⁵, the Euro-Atlantic relation was expected to be highly coherent to the negative

impulse of 9.11. Euro-Atlantics were expected to pool their minds for the betterment of a consensus-creating co-operation and to appear as a united Western front, strongly determined to oppose 'the enemy'.

Despite being one of the most important strategic relationship existing, the Euro-Atlantic relation is still not as immune to corrosion or inadequate co-operation as it might seem. With the end of the Cold War, threats to national security became diffuse and diverse, highlighting the inability of the Euro-Atlantic community to forge a common vision among its members, about what the best solution for the entire community would be, solutions that should not be driven by parochial national interests. Terrorism at 9.11. contributed to the widening of the already existing transatlantic gap⁶, as well as to the tendency of estrangement between the two parts of the transatlantic relation. Reasons for such an outcome exist on both sides. More and more, the Europeans were concerned with the rising American "hyper-power", their growing tendency towards unilateralism and a disregard for international laws and institutions.⁷ On the other side, the Americans were less and less confident in the

strategic relevance and military power possessed by Europe, within the process of preserving the American way of understanding international security⁸.

Per se, the future of the Euro-Atlantic Relation can be mainly twofold: 1. Transatlantic drift - that is essentially based on the premise that the international order underpinning the Cold War will be eroded over time. Instead of a mature EAR, Europe will try to do its best to reinvent the security concepts and to readapt it to the European necessities. This will determine US to slip into indifference to European security issues and concentrate its energies upon its autonomous rule. The current preoccupations with a shifting attitudes of the US towards the international institutions can be seen as a sign that US is maybe too big for the future positive membership in any international organization. More precisely, the power of US can destabilize any international organization that might contain it. 2. Increased transatlantic participation institutional change might determine a convergence between EU and NATO membership, creating the proper space for a transatlantic defense and security identity⁹.

b. European Foreign Policy

After defining the main framework where the European reaction took place, special attention must be given to the particular context of the European reaction. America being one state, one voice, the Western coalition against terrorism could be weakened by EU's inability to bow to the communitarian interest, as prevalent to self-interested, me-first attitudes. As one of the most significant projects in post-1945 Europe, and as one of the most advanced example of institutional cooperation between countries in the world today¹⁰, EU's foreign reaction was expected to constitute a model of unity and consistency within the more general Euro-Atlantic framework. Constructed to be 'one body of reaction, to have one voice' on the international arena, the EU member states, as initiators of this co-operative organization, are equally responsible for their ability or inability

to task effectively. The very special E.U. institutional architecture and its pro-active character¹¹, reasonably complicates the problem of articulating foreign reactions between the member states. The very special character of foreign policy also complicates sharing external reaction. First, this kind of foreign policy is not among the most democratic forms of strategy and secondly, it touches the very delicate problem of 'the national interest'. Both problems are having different characteristics within the European communitarian environment. In very broad terms¹², EPF is defined as the relation of the EU with the outside world, in an attempt to defend the European interests, and comprises a combination of actions of the EU and of the individual Member states, as long as this combination stays coherent and convergent.¹³

c. *The New Terrorism After 9.11 and European Experience with Terrorism*

Whatever the problems of the EFP or within the EAR were, the events of 9.11 definitely challenged both of them. The essence of this 'provocation' is the new threat, the new terrorism. With the events of 9.11 the classical concept of terrorism, extremely difficult to be conceptualized anyway, became almost unmanageable as a notion and as a reality. In an attempt to define the old concept of terrorism, one can observe that the words most frequently used to describe that type of terrorism were violence, political aim, fear, importance of targets and civilian victims. The new terrorism is dramatically different from the one we use to know – it is global, decentralized, it uses new techniques and has new targets, it is oriented towards mass casualties and destructions, it launches a new kind of terror, based on unpredictability, lack of effective demands and irrational movements, it uses unconventional, biological, chemical and informational weapons. All these characteristics point out that, if the old terrorism was oriented against the institution

of the state and was used for the achievement of certain political objectives, the new terrorism threatens all societal sectors and infrastructures.¹⁴

European countries experienced a relatively high level of national terrorism as compared with the US. This is demonstrated by two facts: the existence of national legislation in six of the European states (see Fig. 2) and the existence of specialized national bodies to react when this kind of situations occur. The functionality of these terrorist-preventive tools is strongly challenged in the post 9.11 framework, more or less because of the 1. Different national past experiences with domestic terrorism and 2. Distinct national institutional structures functioning on different intervention systems. Still, legislation about terrorism exists also at the European level, elaborated by the *Council of Europe*, in the *European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism*¹⁵, or by the *European Union*, in the *Treaty of the European Union*¹⁶.

2. Stages of Reaction

The reaction of the Europeans at the events of the 9.11 must be understood in correlation with the developments of EAR and with the present features of EFP. Most of the analysts, researching this problem, reached the conclusion that 9.11 contributed to the widening of the already 'spacious' transatlantic relation. Not all of them spend enough time in explaining why. The main task of this chapter is to analyze the various stages the post-9.11 EU reaction. There are three main stages, determining three kinds of reactions: 1. A first, inter-governmental stage, regarded as the result of previous consultations between EU's national

representatives. This is the so-called official reaction, occurring within the EU framework. 2. The second, national-based stage consists of national - political and diplomatic - contacts between the European states and the US government. This is the bi-lateral reaction, happening parallel to the EU context. 3. The last phase is taking place at the individual level, and constitutes the reaction of the European public opinion. It should be noticed that the three stages of reaction are not following a strict chronological order; on the contrary, they are intermingled, this making the analysis of the EU's reaction to 9.11 even more interesting.

2.1 *The Intergovernmental Stage*

The official EU reaction had a pre-stage that represents the climax moment of the transatlantic comity. This moment was marked by NATO's (and especially the 11 European states part of NATO) rapid response to offer protection to the US, under Article V. The

reaction in Washington left few room to the Alliance (and as such to its European members) to prove any usefulness. Immediately after the US refusal to wage the war against terrorism within the NATO framework, the intergovernmental stage of

reaction emerges. This European reaction, the alleged official stage, has two phases: 1. a declarative phase and 2. a normative phase.

The declarative phase consists of official statements made by the Europeans, concerning their effective solidarity with the US. Only 36 hours after the attack, formal statements have been made by President Prodi, by the High Representative, the president of the European Parliament. They appeared as a common manifestation of the European willingness and capacity to react together to the threats of terrorism and to support the US: 'continued solidarity with the US, determination in the fight against terrorism and commitment to the security of all citizens in the EU, efforts to tackle root causes of terrorism and contributions to better understanding between civilizations'¹⁷.

In the name of the same solidarity, a range of concrete measures was taken. On the 12th of September the European Commission Civil Protection system was activated to offer assistance to victims in the US. In the same day, a Special Council Meeting is held, with the participation of MS representatives and headed by Solana and Prodi. The Council asked its Justice and Home Affairs and Transport compositions to take all the necessary measures as soon as possible to maintain the highest level of security, particularly in the field of air transport, and any other measure needed to combat terrorism and prevent terrorist attacks. It has also requested the Presidency, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Commission to submit, as soon as possible, a report on concrete measures that may be recommended to speed up the implementation and the strengthening of the operational instruments of both the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs.

The second phase of the intergovernmental stage of reaction consists in the norms that the

European Union officially adopted after 9.11. The most important two documents are those dealing with the elaboration of a common definition to terrorism and with the issues of the European arrest warrant. The new, common definition of terrorism defines as terrorist offences '*the following list of intentional Acts which, given their nature and context, may seriously damage a country or an international organization, as defined as offences under national law, where committed with the aim of:*

(i) *seriously intimidating a population,*

(ii) *unduly compelling a Government or International organization to perform or abstain from performing any act,*

(iii) *seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization*

...murder; bodily injuries; kidnapping; hostage taking; threats; extortion; theft; robbery; fabrication, possession, acquisition, transport or supply of weapons or explosives; unlawful seizure of or damage to state or government facilities, means of public transport, infrastructure facilities, places of public use, and property...

...*transport system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on a continental shelf, a public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss.*'

The European arrest warrant refers to people wanted for any of the 32 above specified crimes - ranging from terrorism to paedophilia - that could be arrested in any of the EU states. It is aimed at replacing extradition with a system of simple surrender on the basis of mutual recognition of 'European' arrest warrant inside the EU.

2.2 The National-Based Stage

The second stage of reaction comprises the various bi-lateral responses of the national states of the European Union. The European bi-lateral responses to U.S. are parallel and contradictory to the intergovernmental EU official policies. The first European visit to Washington after 9.11 was that of the French

President Jacques Chirac, followed by that of the British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who was invited to attend a joint session of the Congress convened to hear President Bush's speech.

During this official meetings, divergent reaction were appearing in France, where the Minister Lionel Jospin issued statements

contrasting with Chirac's unconditional support for the Americans, and also in Britain, where the unconditional support given by the Prime Minister Tony Blair to the U.S. was also criticized and became a subject of internal debate. The Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel was also complaining that Mr Blair's speeches sound "too aggressive" and detached from the European common voice.

The first official visit in the USA, on September 27, of the European Commission's President Romano Prodi and of the Belgian

Prime Minister Guy Verhofstat, was not even mentioned in the Washington press. On a different front, the Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi was making remarks on the "superiority" of the West over Islam simultaneously with the official visit of the EU 'troika' in the Arab region. Germany, in an desperate attempt to save the situation, was calling for European unity and stressing the role of the EU in security cooperation: "European nations must stop their squabbling and petty jealousies and unite to fight against terrorism".

2.3 The Individual Stage

The last stage of the European reaction is that of the European citizens. It is more a counter-reaction to the policies implemented as a response to the events of 9. Most of the reactions were connected with the 'emergency' reactions elaborated by the EU: the European arrest warrant, the common definition of terrorism, the exchange of information on terrorists and protestors, the surveillance of telecommunications, the 47 demands for EU-US cooperation against terrorism.

Public critics considered that the emerging legislation tends to blur the distinction between terrorism and resistance to oppression or political dissent. As such, the new terrorists could also be protestors and refugees, or even

asylum-seekers. The new legislation against terrorism was considered to breed a culture of racism against Muslims and people with Middle Eastern appearance, regarded as enemies of 'our civilization'.

The critics also encompassed the extreme collaboration of the European Union with the US, collaboration that was focusing more on topics like crime and emigration, exchange of telecommunications information, direct exchange of personal data with Europol, the establishment of common border control policies including data on asylum-seekers and a new category of "inadmissible", that should be refused entry by the US and the EU.

3. Explaining the Reactions

This chapter tries to identify the key factors contributing to the collapse of the European coalition, by explaining the stages of the European reaction. As such, it tries to find answers to questions as: A: Why different reactions 1. within the same union, 2. to the same threat and 3. by the same players. and B. How did all this contributed to the breakdown of the initial European coalition. The questions

will be addressed by focusing on the analysis of the three phases of reaction, discussed in the previous chapter, and will be constructed by observing the impact of the backstage variables - the *Euro-Atlantic Relation, the European Foreign Policy, the New Terrorism after 9.11 and Experience with Terrorism within the European Union* - over the European response stages.

3.1 The Pre-phase Factor of the Intergovernmental Phase:

The initial response of the Europeans to support the United States within the NATO framework and the immediate refusal of the Americans to accept this help, explains some hidden sides of the Euro-Atlantic relation: 1. the European wing of the Alliance has limited

appeal for the U.S. because of 2. the diminished efficiency of the Europeans to participate out of area on a large scale. Being obviously excluded by the US, the European were facing a denial of their capacity to contribute as an international player to the

event. On the other side, because they were still keen to play an important role in the international crisis created by 9.11, the only valid solution they had been left with, was to articulate their voices by using the single international institution exclusively European – the European Union. There are three main motivations in this prompt initial reaction of the EU. The first is the above mentioned prestige question of the European states to play an important part in the crisis. The second is connected to the shock created by the events of the 9.11 and especially by the US weakness to prevent the catastrophe. Third, the reaction in the name of the community of shared value. As the closest ally of the United States, the Europeans, even with the risk of attracting potential terrorist attack over their states, had

3.2 The Intergovernmental Factor:

The first phase of the intergovernmental phase must be understood as a feedback to the shock, to a psychological terrifying situation. Even if there were some distinctive diplomatic exchanges between US and the EU, the reaction does not constitute a proof of a special solidarity and does not offer evidence of a unique response in the name of a community of values shared by US and Europe. Most of the other states (with few exceptions), outside the European Union, reacted in the same way and expressed the same kind of solidarity in front of the American tragic experience¹⁸. From this point of view, this part of the European reaction is not making the European coalition stronger or weaker, but just normal when compared with the other states, outside the EU. Europe was reacting as a unique voice, because the entire world was doing the same thing.

An important explanatory factor of this stage of the European reaction is the still intergovernmental¹⁹ oriented decision making process at the level of the European foreign policy. This is directly influenced by the electoral variable; in order to represent their states at the European level, the politicians must be first elected at the national level. Here the situation becomes paradoxical, because on the one side the national politicians have to represent the ‘national interest’ of the people that elected him/her, but on the other side, this

to place themselves under the protective umbrella of the US.

All these factors contributed to the appearance of a strong European coalition, terrified first by their incapability to react and secondly by the incapacity of the Americans not to defend the Europeans, in the case of a future attack in Europe. Later declarations coming from ‘the terrorists’, that Europe is not the main target of their strategies and that their policies are more a reaction to United States interventionist plans, loosened the coalition and determined the European leaders to focus more on the internal potential sources of ‘terrorism’ (like the Turkish community in Germany) and less on the international fight against terrorism, from an articulated European point of view.

interest coincide with the ‘national interest’ of the other EU member states. In the first stage of the reaction to 9.11, the ‘national interest’ coincided with the ‘European interest’. As various factors came into discussion – like the reaction of the public opinion for the unanimous support for the US of the EU - the gap between the national interest and the European interest became a problem, for the national ministers and for the cohesion of the initially declared European coalition.

The second phase of the intergovernmental reaction is more helpful in understanding what determined the collapse of the European coalition. The two normative innovations - the European definition of terrorism and the European arrest warrant – represent the most important evidence of why the European coalition collapsed. The reaction constitutes a proof of how unrepresentative the EFP is at the national level. Created to offer a better protection for the citizen of the Union, the two normative innovations were regarded by the Europeans as contradictory with the liberal democratic system of the Union. Critics voice that democratic culture is not simply about regular elections, but especially about diversity, information, pluralism, multiculturalism, and tolerance of peoples and their ideas. The two above mentioned measures were considered to threaten this democratic culture, first because of the way they were rushed through the EU

(Council and European Parliament) and national scrutiny, and second because of their broad content. The common definition of terrorism was accused of trying to reduce the right of the European citizens to demonstrations, protests and political dissent, in an attempt to transform Europe into a police state.

As far as the European arrest warrant is concerned, the situation was even more complicated, with reactions coming from the national (Berlusconi's initial refusal to accept it), constitutional (Austrian, Portuguese, Danish and Greek constitutions ban transfer of nationalities to any foreign jurisdiction) and Parliamentary (thirty-four Euro MPs from

3.3 The National Factor:

With the modifications accruing in the international systemic structure after the Cold War, the relation between Europe and the United States tended to experience difficulties, especially during crisis situations. The 9.11 events are just another example. The incapacity of the Europeans to articulate a single voice, during a crisis, influenced the Americans in concentrating more on finding national European allies, instead of a single European Union associate. This bi-lateral based EURO-Atlantic relation contributed to the appearance of differentiated reactions within the European Union, when it comes about partnership with USA. Differentiated behavior with the states of a Union makes a possible coalition between the member states of the Union vulnerable to disruption. The impact of EFP in articulating a coherent reaction to the crisis of 9.11, must be understood from the following perspective: EFP is in the process of formation, with the European member states still undecided about the way they should develop it. Disputes exist at the various levels, be it between the bigger states or between the smaller ones.

Frictions about the normative solutions to terrorism were just the beginning of the end for the European coalition. This bi-lateral stage offers more pictures of an still fragmented and national oriented EU, when confronted with an international crisis, as the one created by the events of 9/11. The fact that the first official visits coming from Europe

various political groups signed a procedural protest calling on the European Parliament to deliberate carefully before approving the European Arrest Warrant proposal) levels. The main idea undermining the initial European coalition was the counter-reaction of the European citizens and of the groups representing them, that the foreign policy initiated by the European Union, in tandem with the US strategy against terrorism, is not only unrepresentative, but is also threatening essential civil liberties. On the other hand, officials in states like Spain and the United Kingdom, countries suffering from domestic terrorism, were strongly supporting the implementation of the law.

were those of Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair shows a leading role of the national states in the articulation of the EFP. The problem is not that the role of the states is emphasized in the decision making process when it comes about foreign policy; what could have a destructive impact over the coherence of the European Foreign Policy, is the fact that, within this process, some states are more equal than others - the case of the pre-Ghent meeting. This was another reason why the European coalition felt apart before it could become effective. A special role in the spoiling of the European unity must be given to the nature of the Euro-Atlantic relation. It is clear that there are some more equal partners within this relation too, Great Britain being one of them. The leading role of Great Britain in the war against terrorism also contributed to the appearance of an asymmetrical relation within the European coalition and with the United States.

The asymmetric coalition became even more unbalanced, as national interest in promoting anti-terrorist laws started to differ. Europe's experience with domestic terrorism was more a destructive factor than a coalition-forming one. First, different national leaders were having different interests in promoting a European legislation for terrorism (something that should legitimize their future solution to domestic terrorist challenges). Secondly, depending on the specific national experience with terrorism, the threat stopped being regarded as one. It brought different interpretations from different national

understandings that made the final definition of terrorism extremely broad and comprising. Thirdly, the type of terrorism this definition was addressed to, even if declared to be the new terrorism, was still the traditional kind; the single difference was the fact that the new legislation was harsher than the older, already existing one.

3.4 The Individual Factor

On the other side one has to mention that the new type of terrorism is challenging the nature of foreign policy as such, by moving the center of gravity on the individual as the first and most important victim of the attacks. In a spiral reaction the citizen feel less and less protected by the state or by a union of states and tries to protest against those measures taken at a national or union level that could determine a farther escalation of their insecurity. That is what happened at the European individual level, too. This directly influenced the strength of the European coalition, by making the national leaders to be more focused on the internal problems and secondly, be accused of trying to use the events of 9.11, and the initial accepted reaction of solidarity, as a way to simplify the democratic process, at the national and European level. The initial coalition was based

This immediately provoked reactions from the individuals, reactions that – be it at an official level, through the voice of various NGO's or at the unofficial one, through public demonstrations – undermine the coalition and the power of the European Union to present a strong articulated voice.

on their willingness to support the Americans and to create a protective normative structure to safeguard the European Union from future potential terrorist attacks. As such, the first was supposed to take the form of a strong coalition against terrorism within the Euro-Atlantic Relation while the second intended to create norms that should discourage the phenomenon of terrorism in Europe. The European citizens were criticizing this from two perspectives: the one of the civilian threatened by a unconditional cooperation with the US, that was determining more friction at the individual level – with the declaration of war towards Muslims, than bringing more solutions; and the one, from the point of view of the citizen that sees, in an attempt to fight terrorism, that most of his/her tools of reaction in a democratic manner are affected.

Conclusion

The heartfelt solidarity with the United States demonstrated by the European allies after the terrorist attacks on New York and the Pentagon on September 11 came as a valuable restorative to a faltering transatlantic relationship. Sabotage, surprise or shock, coming from a defuse enemy, are security issues that even the Euro-Atlantic security area is still inexperienced to elucidate effectively. September 11 increasingly underlined that there is a sense that the two sides of the Atlantic are drifting away from the lofty goals they set after World War II and during the Cold War.

United States invincibility was challenged, and Europe's security, as one of its main allies, was deeply touched. Under the spur of crisis, the European Union proved a weak reed. Expectations in Brussels that the European allies would increasingly choose to act through

the European Union rather than NATO, or through bilateral relations with the United States, were swiftly confounded. These diplomatic errands were better and often more swiftly done by nation-states than by the EU, something that proves that Europe is still incapable to articulate a strong European voice. National and communitarian values correspond, but in very few domains; even then they leave a lot of room to interpretations.

September 11 increasingly underlined that there is a sense that the two sides of the Atlantic are drifting away from the lofty goals they set after World War II and during the Cold War. The relationship is not only said to be lacking coherence; it is also said to be losing its necessity, as Americans and Europeans no longer share values or even interests – and, even when they do, lose their commonalities in the increasing capabilities gap that divides them.

The events of 9.11 determined a range of issues surrounding the useful exploration of concrete co-operative means, capable to overcome the new threat of terrorism. This need of cooperation brought together the European states in a coalition strongly supporting the U.S. The terrorist attacks influenced the appearance of a coherent reaction at the level of the European Union but marked also differences, ranging from national to supranational level, reactions that determined the failure of the coalition. The present paper tries to identify the main factors that caused this failure.

The EU visibly did not matter greatly in times of urgent crisis, when the United States turned to its traditional nation-state allies and to NATO, and Europe's nation-states responded in kind. A special EU summit at Ghent, Belgium, attended by all 15 heads of government, was preceded by a private meeting of Blair, Jacques Chirac, and Schröder to discuss military support for the Americans and the strategy of the war.

Most optimists consider that, as in other times of crisis, international and internal, the European Union has accepted the lessons; with the result of taking one more step towards a deeper integration.

NOTES:

¹ On Tuesday 11 September 2001, four US commercial aircraft, on internal flights, were hijacked. Two were flown deliberately into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center, the tallest buildings in New York City and the workplace for some 40,000 civilians. A third aircraft hit the Pentagon in Washington DC, and a fourth crashed in Pennsylvania after passengers attempted to take control from the hijackers. The attacks were later discovered to have been organized by al-Qaida, a terrorist organization based in Afghanistan.

<http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2001/rp01-072.pdf>

² More information will be offered in the section The New Terrorism After 9.11

³ This paper defines the Euro-Atlantic Community of states, the countries full members of NATO and EU, at the moment of the attack.

⁴ www.ciaonet.org/wps/vap04/vap04.

⁵ Promoting peace and stability, democracy and development around the world, Responding to Global Challenges, Contributing to the expansion of world trade and closer economic relations, Building Bridges Across the Atlantic.

⁶ <http://www.google.at/search?q=cache:EsBr5gemUoC:international.tamu.edu/ipo/eucenter/Documents/BOYER%2520PAPER.doc+USEuropean+Union+relations+in+the+Aftermath+of+9-11&hl=de&ie=UTF-8>

⁷ <http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/articles/wpj01-4/Walker.pdf>

⁸ William Wallece, Jan Yielonka, 'Misunderstanding Europe', *Foreign Affaires*, November/December 1998

⁹ www.ciaonet.org/wps/heb03/heb03.pdf

¹⁰ <http://www.bigissueground.com/politics/ash-eufuture.shtml>

¹¹ EU is presently striking for speedier and tighter integration across the board.

¹² It is not the purpose of this paper to analyze the EPF is defined.

¹³ www.ciaonet.org/wps/wao01/-101k.

¹⁴ <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1590/pdf>.

¹⁵ A terrorist act is described as an attack against the life, physical integrity or liberty of internationally protected persons (including diplomatic agents), offences involving kidnapping, taking of a hostage, serious unlawful detention, use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, automatic firearm or letter or parcel bomb.... act of violence, other than one covered by Article 1, against the life, physical integrity or liberty of a person (paragraph 1); and against property if the act created a collective danger for persons (paragraph 2).

¹⁶ "Terrorism is one of the serious forms of crime to be prevented and combated by developing common action in three different ways: closer cooperation between police forces, customs authorities and other competent authorities, including Europol; closer cooperation between judicial and other competent authorities of the Member States; approximation, where necessary, of rules on criminal matters".

¹⁷ 'EU action plan in response to 9.11 2001: one year after' MEMO/02/187, European Commission, External Relations. Brussels, 9th September, 2002.

¹⁸ Putin was the first president to call the White House in an attempt to express his compassion and support for the victims of 9.11.

¹⁹ National ministers agreeing on matters in their responsibility and heads of government deciding the most difficult questions of the EU.