The Perception of the Other and the Reabilitation of the Trust in the Balkans

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The Balkans[1] continues to be a turbulent world. The conflict and wars that shook the Balkans in the last years with hardly any interruption were always allied with terrible atrocities. The hatred that spread among the Balkan people, the political, ethnic and religious intolerance combined with wild wickedness became a "coat of arms" for many countries of the South-East Europe.

International community, concerned by the Balkans' evolutions interfered in order to bring the peace, security and stability in the area. Political, economical and military solutions solved only a part of the serious problems of the area[2]. The failure of the West to democratize The Balkans and the obvious conflict mismanagement in the region call for an explanation which we can find in the psychological and geopolitical analysis. So, the determination at the essence level of the historical roots and the understanding of "human earthquake" of human perception changes at the ethnical and religious community level from this turbulent region of Europe. It represents the main target of our research. For these reasons, we will draw a methodological hypothesis which will analyze the role of "the other perception" in the rehabilitation of trust post-conflict between different ethnical and religious groups in region, and in the end we will make some possible suggestions regarding the way of the action.

1. *The Weak Historical Balance, Perceptions and Stereotypes in the Balkans*

In an age in which mass media is dominant, it is difficult to conceive that any elements which generate crises and conflicts can not be known in time. But we believe that Walter S. Jones was right when he said that "Facts do not speak for themselves, but are given meaning by each interpreter from his own... point of view. The conclusion that follows from facts depends on the interpretation that is given to the facts"[3]. Therefore we think that an assumption borrowed from the general theory of systems and combined with the other perception theory can offer another understanding perspective not only to what is happening today in the ex-Yugoslavian area but why it is happening.

Overall, through arguments that came from the general theory of systems and from the organization management, they accept the idea that systems, organizations aim to balance to an optimal state of function[4]. When the turbulences in the global environment determine changes and reorganization in the international relations' structure, the systems tend to lose the balance in the process of redefine themselves.

In those situations, the strategy is essential to be used in gaining a new balance. The Balkans was seen as a different entity in the history of Europe from the spiritual-cultural point of view and also from the political point of view, although the differences seemed to be the rule in this mosaic of people and national minorities. The balance from Balkans was weak all the time because of the action of some aggregation/des-aggregation forces

which acted from interior and also from the exterior. Aggregation-as a process of balance-can be obtained in different ways. In the history of some regions can exist "forced aggregations" through which mechanical, unnatural balances are made. This state exists as long as the external factor has the capacity to maintain/to impose the aggregation force. In this way we can explain the partial balance in the Balkans, in the Ottoman, and then Habsburg Empire period[5] and recently the "Yugoslavian factor". Of course, there are wanted "natural aggregation" in which the economical-political systems obtain long time balance, but unfortunately it didn't happened in the Balkans. According to W. Hagen "Balkan ethnic strains are neither as ancient as time nor as recent as the rise to power of Slobodan Milosevic: rather, they are about as old as the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and rise of nationalism"[6]. As the Ottoman Empire began to break down in the 18th century, the ideology of European nationalism penetrated the Balkans in support of the Balkan Christians' claim to liberation from increasingly oppressive Turkish rule. Eager for territorial gains or Balkan Christian clients, some European Great Powers, notably Russia, became patrons of this process. Thus the foundations of independent national states were laid in Serbia in 1815, in Greece in 1830, in Bulgaria in 1878, and Albania in 1913. In each case, the liberated states territory contained various minorities besides the new ruling nationality. The new states were all also fragments of the ideal territorial nations in the minds of the new nationalists elites. These ideal nations-Greater Serbia, Greater Albania, Greater Greece- were surrounded by other regions populated by still more national minorities and they could belong to one or more neighboring states. In other words, the Balkan states were all born in nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as irredentist nations. The territorial problem of the Balkan states and of the minorities "left outside the borders" was those that generated hate, crises and conflicts. When the South/East European map was modified, the ethnical borders were never overlap to the political borders. Slowly, the

nation did not concord to the national state in the Balkans. A nation, according to Jenny Engstrom, "can be defined as a named human population sharing a historical territory, common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members"[7].

National identity is shaped by perception of Self and the Other. In the historical evolution chance built their self image. The image of a nation is a precious good for a community. Perceptions, in turn, are crucial for the influence of the information based on which people make beliefs and create "trusts". They influence "both the way in which things are seen as well as the facts, and what significance these «facts» carry...and perceptions according to where the observer is located in relation to the thing viewed"[8]. From this point of view, it is extremely important the way in which people perceive their own historical evolution but also, in which way the evolution of the other is reflected.

In the last decades, in the explaining of the social field the theories of the Palo Alto School were frequently used, regarding the optimal aggregation force of the social communication. Also the social representation of the French School was used. We live as individuals in a social representations universe. These are making an "evaluation device, a reality lecture pattern, a placement in a world of values and an own interpretation gave to this world"[9]. Serge Moscovici says that the social representations "make the world to be what we believe that is or that it should be"[10]. So these are also the ways to think practical, oriented to communication and the possession of social, both physique and ideal. Social representations are made inside of a process of elaborating a perception but also a mental perception of reality in which the social objects (persons, context, facts, situations) are transforming themselves in symbolic categories (values, believes, mentalities, psycho fixations, ideologies) with which we operate to understand the world in which we live/move[11].

S. Moscovici says that the social representations contribute to the forming process of behavior and the orientation of social communication. It is very important to

understand the mechanisms through which it is elaborated and, especially, through which these representations are modified, in order to come close to the knowing of the causes which generate the conflict behavior between ethnic or other nature' people/groups. Referring to these, as Moscovici believes that perceptions can contribute to the understanding of social groups' behavior, especially in the crises and revolt times, when "the images" suffers a change. People are more open to talk, the images are more alive, the collective memory is evoked and the behavior becomes more spontaneous. The individuals are motivated by their will to understand a growing unfamiliar and troubled world[12]. This understanding of a changing world is influenced by an already made "lecture pattern". Since the beginning of the 20th century, Walter Lippman wrote that "man... is learning to see with his mind vast proportion of the world that he could never seen, touch, smell, hear or remember. Gradually he makes for himself a trustworthy picture inside his head of the world beyond his reach"[13]. In other words, from the wealth of the events and information available, we select those that confirm an already existing image (selective perception). Furthermore, information that is not interesting can be ignored. So, we think that Jean-Claude Abric was right when he said that from these points of view we can not operate with objective political, social, cultural reality but with any reality it represented (meaning get hold by individual or group) rebuilt in system cognitive, or integrated in his system of values depending on his history and the general social and ideological context[14]. It is obvious that the perceptions of the Albanians in Kosovo were never similar to those of the Serbs in Mitrovita regarding the last events in Kosovo. The Albanians and the Serbs may have lived side by side for centuries in Kosovo, but the Albanians are regarded as squatters. The Serbs consider that the Albanians are backward, alien and that there are too many of them and that they are in the wrong place. Kosovo is perceived by Serbs as "holy place" for their history. For the most Albanians from Kosovo, perceptions on Kosovo are wrong.

From this perspective we have a possible explanation for the behavior and the attitude of some people/groups that took part in the last years' events in the former Yugoslavian area which otherwise look incomprehensible. Eloise de Leon presented at W. Wilson Center, on March 2000, a relevant happening, lived by an Albanian actor: "we were in Macedonia at a festival of Art Schools and it was Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Serbia, Croatia and some other schools of ex-Yugoslavia. Well, I saw a girl and I liked her very much but I never talked with her, maybe because I was Albanian and she was Serbian. We hadn't made any sign to each other. I never made any sign to her. The situation was, indeed, horrible. I couldn't talk to that girl just because of my being an Albanian and her being a Serb"[15].

So strong were the prejudices and the outlooks connected to the other image, of the Serbian in this case, that the Albanian couldn't act in a natural and logical way in a situation as normal as it can be. This situation brings in discussion questions that we all have asked ourselves at least once. Were the Serbs as wild as we thought them to be? Did the Romanians always try to lie on the Others? Were Bulgarians really always hating the Greeks, disliked the Turks, and were fond of the Serbs and mocking the Romanians? Did the Greeks abhor the Turks, demonstrate superiority over the Bulgarians, made compromises with the Serbs and neglect the Albanians? Were all Albanians all the time fighting with the Serbs and admiring the Turks? For sure this perception of the "other" doesn't characterize an ethnic/minority as a whole but then why is it accepted? When an opinion test indicates that 91% from the Albanian population in Macedonia have dislikes of the Jewish people or that 73% from the Albanians from Albania have dislikes over the gipsy people[16], things don't look so simple and they become more and more complicated in crises situations.

A plausible explanation we find in W. Lippman who shows that "the immense majority of people don't judge the things (the persons) after facts but after their representation made by images from anticipated schemes[17]. These images formerly formatted mix up with

stereotypes, which are defined in many ways. Lippman defines them like the image of our case"[18]. In fact the stereotypes are a sign whose primary function is to establish borders between others. By using them it is possible to translate the name of the other into a metaphor convenient for placements on the mental maps, forming thus specific zones, which will be subject of further elaboration. So, the stereotypes are constituted in a very important mechanism, which maintains the prejudices and from here comes the resistance in time at the changing etiquette given by the prejudices, a fact that affects in a visible way the groups' relations.

The Balkans is maybe the most productive area of the continent in the stereotypes matter. Maria Todorova traces the genealogy of Balkanism through the travel writings of western authors to explore how the term Balkan has been negatively constructed over the past three centuries[19]. In XIX century when the journey descriptions from the Balkans countries have grown, the region was presented like an area in which there was a primitive, noisy and aggressive trade but full of color and diverse, which was opposed, without any doubt, to the rigorous and the standardized West[20]. We observe that after a century the western images of the Balkans haven't changed very much. The British journalist Michael Nicholson wrote: "The ferocity of the Balkan people has at times been so primitive that anthropologists have compared them to the Amazon's Ignamano, one of the world's most savage and primitive tribes" [21]. Robert O. Kaplan, referring to Balkan people, shows that they are deeply immersed in their bloody history. "This was a time-capsule world; a sort of a stage upon which people raged, spilled blood, experienced visions and ecstasies. Yet their expressions remained fixed and distant, like dusty statuary"[22]. We notice that nowadays the Balkanization signifies the same disintegration of viable nation-state and reversion to the tribal, the backwards, the primitive, the barbarian[23].

On the other hand, the Balkan people have their own stereotypes. The Croats, for example, use many of these same Balkan stereotypes to different rate and to distance themselves from their Yugoslav brethren. They characterize themselves as more progressive, prosperous, hard-working, tolerant democratic or, in a word, European, in contrast to their primitive, lazy, intolerant, Balkan neighbors. Michael Ignatieff related about a conversation with a Serb soldier which had taken place in Eastern Croatia in a village called Mirkovic. Ignatieff asked him what made him believe he was different from a Croat. The soldier listed many irreconcilable differences between the Serbs and the Croats and accused the foreigners of not understanding them and that is why they considered the Serbs and the Croats to be alike, when they were so different[24].

The stereotypes and the enemy image are formed in response to basic human psychological need for reality. Janet Gross Stein wrote that "Membership in a group leads to systematic comparison, differentiation and derogation of other groups"[25]. When the identities are compatible, the conflict is minimized. If the identities are incompatible the conflict is possible. A violent conflict becomes more likely when one identity is based on the refusal to recognize another identity, when recognizing the other's identity is felt to undetermine one's own identity. Albanians and the Serbs from Kosovo are often considered as mutually exclusive in this way. Common cognitive bases and stereotypes tend to intensify enemy images. Egocentric bias leads people to overestimate the degree to which others' actors are directed at them. Hence they may perceive themselves to be a target of Other's actions even when the other is not actually directing action toward them. People also tend attribute Other's actions to their character, rather than their situation. Hence, they tend to see Other as bad, rather than as constrained by difficult circumstances. A lot of facts, which happened in the last years in the former Yugoslavia show that this assumption is correct.

2. Changing the Image of Other Lethal Stereotypes and Rebuilding the Trust

Many authors believe that enemy's images and lethal stereotypes tend to be self-fulfilling and self-reinforcing[26]. People tend to be more aggressively based on their enemy image or stereotype. This aggressive behavior is likely to provoke a hostile response, which is then simply taken as confirmation of the initial stereotype. Enemy images and stereotypes tend to occupy a central position in groups' belief systems. Groups are highly resistant to changing their central beliefs; changes tend to begin with more marginal beliefs. Finally, people tend to seek out information which confirms existing stereotypes and discount information which would challenge their stereotypes. They also tend to interpret information about the Other negatively, in ways which support their existing stereotypes. The Albanians from Kosovo are seen like backwards, aliens and that they are in the wrong place, so it isn't extraordinary that their mass expulsion from their native places was seen like a normal thing.

Despite these difficulties we think that it is possible to change enemy images. Stereotypes may change when their bonders are presented with a large amount of disconfirming information in a relatively short period. Stereotypes also change gradually over time. As discrepant information arises, people write "exceptions" into the stereotype. This thing could happen if we change in an essential way the messages, we replace the symbols or other "hard" elements from the identity matrix of each group. For this they must action on those factors that lead to the appearance and preservation of the stereotypes that concern the other.

One of the most important factors that helps to form the identity matrix of the group and so its own image of the other is the educational one. In the form without any institutions/the family and the social environment closed to the child/the future grownup and also in that form with institutions- the school in its integrity but also in other institution of preparation- upbringing that offers the person a first lecture of reality. The process starts with one's experience in early life, in school, with children's books, fairytales and other leisure literature, the theatre and so on.

It is very hard to change the elements that hold on to tradition and historical peculiarity in the matter of upbringing in family. Many folk songs, fairytales and stories that are the educational background of the child in the Balkans family contents direct/indirect references – with negative connotations addressed to the "Turk", the "Greek", the "Albanian", the "Serb". We believe that only the collective lost of memory can action on the future generations. The correction of the image of the other person/the neighbor and the elimination of the stereotypes in school is possible and necessary. It is possible on one condition: the political factor must not handle the mass, for its maintenance at power, through cultivation of the stereotypes and of the image of the other person like an enemy of the community.

In October 1998, the proceeding of the International Conference on "The image of the Other/The neighbor in the School Textbooks of the Balkan Countries" concluded that there is a need for substantial intervention in the school textbooks of the Balkan countries in order to eliminate the national prejudice and thus encourage the peaceful co-existence of the various peoples[27]. There are consistent national stereotype all over the Balkans, which share certain constants and essentially all that has been changed is the name of the Other to which they applied. In most cases, each nation-state presents its own members as a «chosen people», heroes or victims in relation to the Other[28].

We thing that a change in the image of the other is possible by revising the content of the schoolbooks, especially the history and literature ones. At the same time we must take into consideration also the socio/humanist disciplines' area from universities (the culture sociology, the ethnology, anthropology, and so on). It could be very profitable for the young people from the Balkan countries to find in schoolbooks more information about the history and common values of this area. We are certain that when a Romanian student will know more

about the work of the Serb author Ivo Andric or about the work of the Albanian author Ismail Kadare and also about the cultural and historical traditions of the Balkan people, he, the Romanian student will be more sensitive at the commune values of the area, he will cooperate more and he will withdraw the stereotypes and the negative images about the Other.

In the experience area of symbolical reconstruction of the Balkans there are some succefull experiences. For example, we could think more about the way in which Goran Bregovic succeded to gather in an artistical group, members and folk musical themes from all over the Balkans. He shows, in this way, that the people from the Balkans have the same values which have an international impact, values that play the role of a bridge in the Balkans area and thus, in the relation of the Balkans with the whole world.

Another important fact in eliminating the stereotypes and changing the image of the other person is mass-media. Michael Kunczik wrote that "radio and TV transmissions of international programs, newspapers and magazines, cultural exchanges programs sports and so on, are probably the strongest images shapers[29]. The journalist does not deal with reality, but with media reality constructed by him. The reality shown by the mass-media is not factual reality and very often does not correspond to «what really happened». Mass-media construct a separate reality. The criteria used to construct this reality are the so called «news values»[30], but the recipient, who has no primary access to most things reported on this constructed world becomes «factual reality». Most recipients/readers consider news as authentic testimony of «actual happening»."

The conflicts from the former Yugoslavia, especially the ones from Bosnia and Kosovo, have revealed that in crises situations mass-media isn't anymore neutral in the matter of the information about the belligerent. This thing was recognized by Jamie Shea, public relations officer at NATO, during the "Alliance Force" operation in 1999: for the leaders, winning a press campaign is as important as winning a military campaign- the two of them are inseparable and you can't win

one without the other[31]. For winning the press campaign the journalists give a very important place to stereotypes and the image of the enemy, when everything is about what lies on the other side of the barricade. General Wesley K. Clark talking about the "imagologycal ammunition" used by the Serbian media controlled by Slobodan Milosevici noted: "High Representative Westendoerp repeatedly complained about the Serb media, which had been especially acid recently using images comparing NATO troops to the Nazi and other incendiary efforts directed at undercutting implementation of the Dayton Agreement and inciting violence against our troops"[32].

A sociological research about the impact of imagologycal ammunition used in the areas of conflict in former Yugoslavia, about keeping the stereotypes and the negative image of the other is necessary. The same mass-media must address to the same information consumer and, after ending the hostilities, where is its credibility? Where can be its place in the post conflict rehabilitation of the trust between communities which at a moment had been at war? Davis Amis, referring to this aspect showed that "From the start foreign reporters were better treated in Zagreb and Ljubljana whose secessionist leaders understood the prime importance of media image in gaining international support than Belgrad"[33]. Implicit, he says, there was a partnership in reflecting the reality in Balkans but it wasn't a unilateral one. Kunezic's researches show that "In Kosovo when negative information is offered both supporters and opponents of certain position behave almost the same. They lead it. In other words the protective shield of selective perception works against information that might result in a positive change of opinion but not against information that might produce a negative change of opinion"[34]. We think that such a tendency is still dominant in all countries of Former Yugoslavia. In most cases nationalist propaganda dominates the competition between journalistic ethics and national interest[35]. Producing and reproducing prejudices, stereotypes and myths is the rule of the game. Journalists should not be looked at

independently, but as a part of the relations and dependencies in which they are involved in a particular society. From that point of view just like any other citizen "they can have the same stereotype and enemy image". We think that it is necessary to unfold some actions and activities in front of the journalists in order to change their mentalities and stereotypes bounded to patriotism and nationalism. There are some journalists in the Balkans who manage to step outside the national hysteria and fight persistently in defense of alternative journalism which respects diversity under-stands communication between various communities engaged in an antinationalist dialogue and promotes tolerance of "Otherness". The nucleus which exists in every country that has appeared after the tearing apart of the former Yugoslavian state can be used for developing a new type of reporter, a reporter that first is a concerned citizen. This new type of a reporter must know to choose what kind of society he wants to live in, and he should decide how he is going to enjoy the right and duties he has. Let us emphasize again one important point of view which is very often not recognized but is vital for the peace within a nation or a province/region, namely an ethically responsible journalism. The journalists must know what are the consequences of their actions.

This truth is valid for Public Relations (PR) too. Michel Kunczik believes that PR aims to correcting the "false" image previously created by the mass-media. Unfortunately, in the Balkans, there were some cases in which PR "tried to create a positive image that, in most cases, didn't reflect the reality including lying and disinformation"[36]. The representative of American PR science Scott M. Cutlip, in 1994 in his book "The Unseen power: Public Relations A History" pointed out that in 1993, "tiny Kosovo threatened by Serbian aggression after Yugoslavia's break up had asked the American PR firm RUDER-FINN to wage an intense public relations campaign in the US" to build up an enemy image of Serbia[37]. James Harff, the president of Ruder Finn's global network explained: The people from Kosovo knew their rights. We helped them to formulate the message in a way that Americans could understand[38].

Calin Hentea affirms that in practice, in limit situations, the officials found at power don't waver to use the dates and the facts from the field just in a favorable way of their interests even if for this they must omit important parts of the reality[39]. But this practice has consequences after the end of conflicts/wars, because it perpetuates and stresses the prejudices, stereotypes which cannot be erased from the mind of the image consumer. This fact was observed for a very long time. At the beginning of the Second World War, Ilya Etirenburg, the well-known Russian writer and journalist, noted in his memoires "the hate I conquered very hard"[40]. In this context Etirenburg noticed the importance of giving to the warrior a reason to hate. It is known that decades after the conflagration ended the image of the other like an enemy blurs and disappears. But for this there are necessary, usually, two generations which should live a history kept away from acute, special and violent conflicts. We can't ignore the fact that during the Cold War, in spite of the ideological antagonisms which seemed unstoppable, the image of the other, of the enemy faded away. It was a time for economic, social, and cultural cooperation, and, step by step, day after day "the Other" became less an enemy, and more a partner. Taking in consideration the facts presented here, some essential questions can be raised. We can ask ourselves if, during a conflict, the comparison of the enemy with a demon is inevitable. Also, we can ask ourselves till where the mass-media and the PR structures can engage to promote the message about the image "demon=enemy". Probably the nature of the conflicts and the engagement in conflicts of the vectors of public communication they should be thought over. What has happened in Kosovo and what is happening in Irak made us think that such questins must be answered.

NOTES:

[1] Recently, more specialists do not agree the overall of the Balkan term, in order to mark the crisis and conflicts in these part of Europe. The Balkans is a geopolitical metaphor. (Ljubica Jehisic, *Farewell to the Balkans: the Slovenian Media's coverage of the war in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (March-June 1999)* in: *International Security, mass-media and public opinion*, Marjan Malesic, (ed.), Ljubliana, 2000, p. 88)

[2] See also, *Building Stability in weak states: The Western Balkans. Vienna, April 2002; From Peace Making to Self Sustaining Peace-International Presence in South-East Europe at a cross boards? Vienna 2004; Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience*, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1998, etc.

[3] Apud, *Robert English and Jonathan J.Halpercin, The other side. How Soviets and Americans perceive each other, A Publication of the Committee for National Security, Transation Banks:* New Burnwick (USA) and Oxford (UK), 1991, p. 14

[4] Martin Griffiths, *Fifty key thinkers in international relations*, Romanian edition, Bucharest, 2003, p. 317-318.

[5] William W. Hagen, *The Balkan's lethal nationalism*, in http://www.cla.wayne.edu/polisci/kdk/easteurope/sources/Balkans.htm.

[6] *Ibidem*

[7] Jenny Engstrom, *The Power of Perception: The Impact of the Macedonian, Question on Inter-ethnic Relations in the Republic of Macedonia*, in *The Global Review of Ethno-politics*, vol. 1, no. 3, March 2002, p. 3-17

[8] Barry Buzan, *People, states and fear*, ed. Romanian, Bucharest, 2000

[9] Adrian Neculau (coord.) *The psychology of the social field. The social representation*, second edition, Polirom, Iaşi, 1997, p. 9

[10] Serge Moscovici, *Social psychology or the God - making machine*, ed. Romanian, Polirom, Iasi, 1997, p. 41

[11] Adrian Neculau, p. 8

[12] Serge Moscovici, p. 61

[13] Walter Lippman, *Public Opinion*, New York: Harcourt Brau, p. 181

[14] Jean-Claude Abric, *Social representations: theoretical aspects*, in Adrian Neculau, p. 108

[15] http://www.suc.org/projects/kosovo/heritage-destruction Kosovo

[16] Panayote Elias Dimitras, *Southern discomfort; Majorities despise minorities, and the hatred is often mutual*, in *War Report*, January/February 1997

[17] W. Lippman, *op. cit.*, p.179

[18] *Ibidem*, p. 180

[19] Maria Todorova, *Imagining Balkans*. London, Oxford, University Press, 1977, p. 453

[20] Antoaneta Olteanu, *Homo balcanicus. Trăsături ale mentalităţii balcanice*, Paideia, 2004, p. 18

[21] http:// www.eurozine.com/article/2003-05-08/goldsworthy

[22] Robert O. Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts. A journey throught History*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1993, pp. XX.

[23] Maria Todorova, *op. cit.*, p. 454

[24] Michael Ignatieff, *The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Concience*, New York, Henry Holt and Compagny, 1998, p. 36

[25] Janet Gross Stein, *Image, Identity and Conflict Resolution*, in *Managing Global Chaos*, eds. Chester Crockers, Fen Hampson and Pamela Hall, Washington, DC: United States Insitutes of Peace Press, 1996, p. 94

[26] http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/example/stu 5095.htm.

[27] Fotini, Toloudi, *The Image of the Other/the Neighbour in the School Textbooks of the Balkan Countries* in *Macedonian Heritage-An on-line review of Macedonian Affairs, History and Culture*, http://A/Macedonian%20Heritage%20%20The%20 Image%2020 of%20the%20Other...

[28] *Ibidem*

[29] Michel Kunczic, *Image of Nations and Transnational Public Relations of Governments with special reference to the Kosovo*, in http://www. operation Kosovo.kentlaw.edu/symposion/Kunczic/Image/ro of 20%Nations...

[30] *Ibidem*

[31] Catalin Hentea, *Propaganda fara frontiere*, Nemira, Bucuresti, 2002, p.27

[32] General Wesley K. Clark, U.S. Army (Retired), *Waging Modern War. Bosnia. Kosovo and Future of Combat*, Public Affairs, New York, 2001, p. 99

[33] Davis Amis, *The Balkans War and Net.*

[34] Michel Kunczic, *op. cit.*, in loc. cit.

[35] Nafsika Papanikolatos, Panayote Dimitras *(Non-) Reporting Diversity and its (Non-) Contribution to the Prevention and Resolution Conflict* in http://archiv. medienhlife.ch/Reports/non-reporting.htm

[36] Micel Kunczik, *op. cit.*, in loc. cit.

[37] Hillsdalle, New York: Laurence Erlbaum Associate, 1994, p. 771

[38] *Ibidem*

[39] Calin Hentea, p. 29

[40] Ilya Etirenburg, *Oameni, ani, viata*, Ed. Univers, 1970, p. 89