

THE ACTORS WITHIN THE POWER EQUATION OF THE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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If in the internal political field and in the case of classic actors – the states – there are institutions that coordinate and order the entire action, these institutions don't exist within the system of international relations and when they exist, they don't usually have the capacity of enforcing their own will. For this reason, some analysts consider that the ensemble of international relations could be defined as “anarchical”¹. This opinion could be right if they referred to the fact that some institutions with universal vocation, constituted for creating and keeping the security within international relations didn't have the possibility of enforcing their will – the case of Nations Society² or, when they had such possibility, the use of force for imposing their will was strictly limited, as the case of ONU in the postwar period and after the Cold War³.

It is remarkable how the fact that the institutions and the organizations, which in one way or the other are involved in the management of international relations, refer more to the classic actors, namely the states, and less to the other actors – the trans or multinational organizations, namely the non-statal powers which usually develop independently of the states and the inter-state relations⁴.

Systemically, the international life, formed by traditional actors, owners of sovereignty – the states – which somehow submit to the rules of public international law and to the decisions taken by the institutions with universal vocation and by non-statal powers, which sometimes transcend the rules and the standards of

international life, can be assessed within a dynamic balance. From this point of view, Samuel Huntington was right when he said that “The world can be chaotic, but the order doesn't miss totally”⁵.

In this context, the actors are in a permanent competition / fight, using all their means, including violence / over for enforcing their will within the system of international relations. An actor's ability of becoming or not established in the system depends on its power potential, on its place and role within the equation. It is on useful vector for the prediction of the actors behaviour within the international field because their grouping will be done in such way to avoid the power preponderance of one / some of them⁶.

The place and the role of an actor in the power equation result from its power potential. Defining and identifying the source, quantifying and perceiving the power are very important for unravelling the potential of an actor. Alvin Toffler believed that, no matter “how many bumpings, saw acts and hardware the actors do”, the power balance “will depend less on their words than on the quantity and quality of the power that each of them brings, to the negotiations”.

The notion of power has a great semantic richness and is used for a very broad area of the social, economic and military reality. Alvin Toffler considers that “the power involves the employment of violence, of wealth and of knowledge (in the largest meaning) for making people act in a given manner. Robert A Dahl thinks that the power is “the ability of determine

people to do what they wouldn't do otherwise" ⁷. We can notice that the two definitions have a common element: the imposing of force by an actor over other /others. But this thing can be realized only if that actor has the capacity of enforcing himself, in other words, if it has a potential.

Traditionally, the power potential was assessed as the sum of human and economical resources, the territorial area, the capacity and the quality of military forces. From antiquity till the beginning of industrial revolution, within the policy of the first tofflerian tendency, the power potential was given by the capacity and the quality of the population of a state. This aspect ruled and was taken into account where the issue of the confrontations between actors was assessed. The beginning of the XIXth century of the policy of the second tendency, transformed the industry and the modern means into predominant elements in projecting judging the power potential for an actor. The uneven rhythm of development and applying of the achievements of industrial revolution in arms production was disturbed the balances and the power hierarchies. The focus of the world power system has begun to move from the states with a huge demographical potential – qarist Russia and Otoman Empire for example – to Europe under the way of industrialization a situation which has dominated the actors of the first tendency⁸.

Within the policy of the third tendency, the actors include understands the importance of quality the power potential, an element given by knowledge, economical, growing, political stability and will / national cohesion, this actors was an important strategical advantage in the power equation. Nowadays, the best quality power comes from the applying of knowledge. The advantage is that in a confrontation the will is not imposed in a traditional way, namely by force. The opinion of Alvin Toffler is that the knowledge can be used "to punish, to reward, to convince and even to transform. It can transform the enemy in an ally"⁹. This problem was spotlighted during the Gulf war, by one of the military analysts of C.N.N. who said that the military planners have to look over the use of bomb's and rockets in order to accurately attack

the targets. The technology will permit very soon the distroyning of the key-elements of a military objective without killing the soldiers or distroying completely the target"¹⁰.

The knowledge made up the information as a very important element for the power potential of an actor. The american military analyst Larry Staquist considers that the power potential must be redefined because untill now it was limitedly conceived, with a specific reference on "arms application systems and certain spatial systems"¹¹. Concerning the measuring of the power potential of an actor, technology, educational system and economical growth are more important than people and the size of its geographical surface. The machineries numerically controlled can be found in a lot of countries of the Third World. A pharmaceutical factory necessary for them has the inherent faculty for marking biological meapons. The numerical, controll installations which manufacture vehicles of a high quality in the Third World can also make rockets of high quality"¹². From this point of view, the authors consider that the leaking of some electronical information over the borders can cause security problems, not less serious than troupe movement¹³.

The actual lock of poise concerning the global communication and information causes spectacular mutations within the power equation. The actor who dominates informational flows can enforce its values, its aspirations and its proper view on the world can produce serious problems for other / others who, concerning the classic power potential is / are his enemy's equal. An exact information is so important as the precise weapon and the new mass media will make it possible in an unprecedented degree¹⁴.

Within the Cold War, decision was given by a gun loaded with images / information. If Nicolae Ceaușescu had understood the revolution impact over mass media and if he had studied the role of mass media in the overthrowing of Ferdinand Marcos in Filipinas, maybe a "Velvet revolution" would have taken place in Romania, as in most of the former comunist countries.

In the battle for "informational space" – in the so called "imagological" war, the victory does no more mean the physically eliminating or subduing the enemy and occupying his

sovereignty space, but occupying his mind through those representations and persuasion which turn the enemy into an ally.

An actor must own the most performant technology in order to accurately use the information weapon. The economical power, a fundamental indicator of the power potential of actors in the future is more assessed only through tangible resources, but especially through the intangible performance resources. The quantity, as in other fields doesn't mean power. Many states own huge economical primary resources, but they are not in the same time the great economical powers of the world. This thing is also valid for the economical resources of the power potential of a state.

The competition for the control of the untangible resources within the power potential tends to remove the one for arms and military technology its the military threatenings will dinamish their force, the competition / conflicts for economical resources will intensify. Edward N. Luttwak thinks that the fear of a nuclear war, with incalculable consequences for humanity will determine a change of place from military means to those economical in order to solve the conflicts between states. "Economical" weapons have functional for both Gulf conflict and the Yugoslavian one¹⁵. An idea appears frequently: the military means are substituted by trade means; – available funds instead of fire power, civil innovation instead of technical – military development and the penetration of markets instead of military bases and garrisons¹⁶.

If a country obtains a faster rhythm for its economical growth, this thing will be reflected in both its power potential and its position within world hierarchy¹⁷. Besides the quantity indicators, for the assessment of the economical power of a state, the productivity dynamics and the added value for the manufactured products are very important for the perception of economical evolutions.

Nowadays, the military dimension of power potential is still considered the one which gives the place and the play of an actor within the power equation in the system of international relations at a certain moment. As nobody would ever eliminate totally the importance of the raw

material or of the raw work in the production process, it is unreasonable to ignore the material elements of the distroying capacity or the human element within the military potential. Alvin Toffler considers a fantasy the idea that the Gulf war was a high – tech war, where the human element was eliminated from the fight¹⁸. The superior officers Rosanne Boiley and Thomas Kearn, participants in the Gulf conflict said: the crucial factor which drives to success in the technology exploitation continuous to be the human element, typically illustrated by the performance of the "Desert Thunder" of the fighter pilots who used the air-air rocket Aim-7. It was a progress five times Sigger than the performance from Vietnam, a direct result of a much better drill¹⁹. The intelligent weapons require intelligent soldiers, well trained so that they would be able to use an ultrasofisticated technology.

The quality, not quantity, is the essential element for evolution of human dimensions within the military factor. Nowadays, a fight aircraft is like a super computer with wings. Its efficiency depends almost totally on the knowledge about aircraft technology and ornament and also on the pilot's intelligence. The same thing, but on smaller dimensions happens with fighter from other branches. The Gulf War demonstrated this thing. The wellknown french military analyst and theorist Pierre Gallois said that United States sent 500000 soldiers in the Gulf, keeping between 200000 and 300000 soldiers in the rearguard, for logistic purposes. But the reality is that the war was won by only 2000 soldiers²⁰. On the other side, Saddam Hussein put up an army of over a million soldiers, with a war experience of almost 10 years, but of inferior quality as to the drill and the general level of training. Over 98% from the american volunteer's from Gulf were high school graduates and many of them had degrees²¹.

That's why nowadays, the use of a quality indicator is more important than the quantity one for the dimension of human factor within the power potential. The number of people in a state is not so important for the strength of its future army. A simple comparison between the demographical maps and the maps that show the

level of urbanism and of people education spotlights an well known thing: the best armies don't belong to the states with the biggest population densities.

For the dimensions of the power potential of a state, the discussions about the place and the role of nuclear arms from the period after the Cold War, are very interesting. The american analysts Janet and Chris Morris, experts in strategy consider that the place of classic military arsenal could be taken by a system of new technologies which can be used in order to defeat the enemy with minimal bloodshed. These can anticipate, detect, avert or block the use of lethal means, taking the loss of human lifes to minimum²². The list of these technologies would include infrasound generators set for the people's control, substances for crumbing the metals or for topping the shifting of fight vehicles by altering of chemical structures of their fuel, etc.

Morris ideas, even if they are sometimes disputed²³, can be found in some american official documents about military strategies²⁴, and it a global level, we could say that these ideas were verified in the final port of the Cold War, within the confrontation. Setween the two superpowers: USA and U.S.S.R. the former U.S.S.R. vanished from the power equation and then it vanished as a state from the system of international relations, obviously because of the regime crise, but the impact of S.D.I., programme (Strategical Defense Initiative) on U.S.S.R. can not be ignored. This put a question mark over efficacy of russian long ray action rockets. If S.D.I. could block effectively the soviet rockets before they stroke USA territory then they would become useless and Moscow would be attacked without the offender having fear of reprisals. The economical decline of the former U.S.S.R. made impossible a soviet answer to S.D.I. programme. Moscow concluded that it can not defend its empire without unacceptable costs so it withdrew from the lost satellite countries. USSR lost the Cold War without using its huge nuclear arsenal for its rescue.

On the other hand, there are specialists and analysts who consider than the nuclear arms will continue to have a special role within the power potential of a state after the end of the Cold

War²⁵. Sir Michael Quinlan said about this aspect: "The lock of war between the advanced states was the key of success. We must perpetuate this situation. The weapons are the way – the aim is to prevent a war. It's better a world with nuclear weapons but without a major war, than a major war, but without nuclear weapons²⁶. The some opinion is sustained by some specialists and analysts from France, who "oppose vehemently to the reducing of the role of nuclear weapons for the disheartening of any agression"²⁷.

The national security strategy of USA, stipulates that also in the future "the strategical nuclear weapons will remain the keystone of the disheartening strategy of USA²⁸. It is wellknown the fact that U.S. and also Russian Federation keep in a permanent fight status a big part of their nuclear arsenal²⁹. In the same time, these status will continue to act against the nuclear weapons proliferation: through political, economical pressure combined, at case, with some concessions: a control over the nuclear technology sales to the countries that would persevere in the line of nuclear weapons introduction.

But in the world there are countries engaged in the programmes of nuclear arming, as India, Egypt, Brazil, Argentina, Indonezia, Pakistan. From this point of view, the nuclear proliferation will be only deloyed, not stopped. There is also the opinion of some specialists who thinks that the american and russian cuts in their nuclear supplies are not considerable because through those pacts the americans and the russians take out from their equipment the old-fashioned nuclear arms and keep the ultramodern, mobile and high precion arms"³⁰. So we are present at an ample process of distroying rockets and other vectors capable of nuclear weapons transportation to the target, but not at the reduction of the nuclear arsenal.

Political and military analysts allege that the nuclear arsenal must be taken into account within the power potential of a state. Even if the world didn't have an experience of a nuclear war – Japon was a tragic experiment – the use of nuclear weapons dominates the strategical thinking of the main actors of international relations after the Cold War. The states – owners

of nuclear weapons – have concrete plans of using them and within the military strategical they play scenarios with the calculation of the consequences of using the nuclear arms for passing over the different levels of the conflict.

For a long time the historians³¹ then the political analysts and the geopoliticians have been interested in unravelling the mechanisms that drive to the climbing or to the decline of an actor within the top of the power equation. Paul Kennedy considers that the climbing of some states among the great power is encouraged by the establishing of a long term report of balance between their economical potential and their military power. The breaking of this balance and the appearance of a delay between the economical potential and the military costs from unrealistic strategical objectives drives to the decline and to the collapse from the power equation top³². The opinion of the american analyst is valid for the correlation between the economy and the army of the second tendency, but not for these of the XXI century. There are cases when the military power and the economical one don't diminish simultaneously. An illustrating example is the Russian Federation during the transition period. There are also some cases when the economical development of military potential, if we take into account the development of Germany and Japan after the second world war.

The analyst George Modelski considers that climbing / decline of the powers within the system of international relations is given / confirmed in the major conflicts the actors are involved in. Studying the major conflicts from the contemporary and modern times, G. Modelski has identified a series of hegemonical cycles associated with long economical cycles associated with *“long economical cycles in which the process growth and the lack of resources determine power loss, the concentration of power take place when the prices are low and the resources are abundant”*³³.

The historian and military analyst Mihail E. Ionescu considers that, in fact, a uni-directional hierarchy cannot be established the power equation because of the structural interdependence from the system of international relations.

The hierarchies within the military or economical level or within the inferior level of transnational interdependences “are not the same. The order of the world is not given by the traditional power balance”³⁴. The conflicts in which the two superpowers USA and USSR – were involved during the Cold War – confirm the opinion of romanian analyst. Sometimes, the ones who appear weak win or the ones who appear unorganized outrun the ones more settled, as in the war from Algeria, Vietnam or Afghanistan.

The geopolitical analysis must take into account not only the potential elements, but also the relations between actors, when it makes assessments of the power potential and when, according, to these assessments it establishes the hierarchies of the actors in a certain space or at a global level. In the opinion of James Rosenau, the political relations are more than the foundations of the actors power³⁵. The place occupied by an actor within the power hierarchy at a certain moment or, as we will see, the perception about his position determines the actor to act / to react in order to impose / affirm his interest in a given geographical area.

The actors' behaviour within the system of contemporary international relations is very diverse and complex concerning their orientation, attitude and the intensity of their implication in international problems solving can vary from maximum to minimum or to a total unimplication. For everybody, the crisis of 1991 in the Persian Gulf, was a major problem, but the actors implication in its solving was different. USA and its allies acted directly in order to determine Irak to withdraw from Kuwait, while China, for example, even if it is a member of the security Council of ONU, confined itself only to a diplomatical way. Monaco and Liechtenstein didn't involve at all in this crisis. Why?

A possible answer for such a question is given by Henry Kissinger, the remarkable diplomat and political analyst, who affirms in his memoirs that what makes a state move is, among others its concern in salvaging national interest³⁶. The conclusion of the american analyst is confirmed by historical analysis, especially for the periods when the main actor of the international life was the state.

Nowaday's not only the number, but also the actors importance in the international life modifial radically. More and more, the non-statal actors, appear in the foreground of the events. After some statistics, in 1995, from 100 economic actors only 55 were states, the others being transnational companies³⁷. But a big part of the activity of these economical-financial giants is not under the settlements valid for the traditional actors-states, so their interest can become, in some cases, incompatible with the national interest of the classic actor. This thing is reflected by some syntagmes that appear mar that of "national interest" such "specific interest", "economical interest", "political interest", "ideological interest", etc.

Some analysts consider the notion of "national interest" as an instrument for the analysis of the contemporary geopolitical phenomenon³⁸. We don't have the same opinion with the ones who deny this thing on the reason that there is not on exact definition of this notion³⁹, but only a notion is enough, taking into account the big number of the actors in the international life.

National interest is a specific feature of the interest as to the life and the activity of a colectivity clotted in a form of political organization, which is the national state.

The interest was completely analysed and studied in psychology, sociology⁴⁰ from which it was taken by the political analysts without on ample debate on the semnifications and meanings that it gets in the analysis of the contemporary political phenomenon. The notion of interest has a lot of meanings and it is used in various disciplines that deal with the analysis of the international political relations. The necessity of defining the notion of "interest", of establishing the causes and the considerations that generate – its sources – and also the elements that determine its intensity and its temporal stability becomes preemprory nowadays.

In psychology, the interest is considered an active and lasting orientation, as a favorable attitude and a personal, predilection to certain things, phenomena or branches of activity⁴¹. Serghei L. Rubinstein defined the interest as a

manifestation for fixing a need⁴². From this we can see the classification of the interests, depending on the fields of activities that the individual it involved on: the interest in knowing, in sports, economical, scientific, political activities a s.o...⁴³

From the sociological perspective, the notion of interest has other valences. The interest is not reduced to the subjective preference of the individual, but it is rather a subjective modality of establishing an objective relation between the situation and the real needs of the human / colectivity and the determinations of the action and its results. The interest is essentially connected with the individual / collective pursuing of an advantage, regarding a certain action and its result.

In this meaning, the interest always has a concrete and determinative character, meaning that at refers to a certain action, to a certain result or to one of its aspects, to the value anal the aim of the action regarding the social agent which can be an individual or a group. The interest necessarilly requires the wording of the individuals / group's aims determined by the needs and the reasons that are essential for that group at a certain moment.

Hans I. Morgenthau gives the exemple of France and England from 1939, when USSR attacked Finland. Moscow infringed the Nations League Pact, so France and England had to react in order to restore the situation. But they didn't act and they didn't do it either when USSR attacked Poland because their reaction would have affected their interests for a long time⁴⁴.

In the analysis of the international relations, the notion of interest refers only to the human groups organized in political, economical, social-cultural, religions options of a group or community which becomes an actor of the international life⁴⁵. Depending on the nature of the pursued aims, of the undertaken actions and also of the promoted, the interest can be manifested in the economical, political or spiritual field, or even in the military field.

On the individual level, the interest, is generated by the existence of the fundamental human needs, from those organical (hunger, air, thirst, reproduction) and of security up to those

aesthetical and cognitive⁴⁶. The sources of interests and their way of appearance are more complex as the community or the group which constitutes as an entity of the system of international relations is never the sum of the individuals that compose it. On this level, the interest can appear from the functional requirement of that entity /actor which is acting in a geopolitical field at a certain moment⁴⁷.

The functional requirement appears as a need and it is conched as an aim as a pursued objective. From this perspective, the classic actors of the international relations – the states – act in order to get their security objectives of keeping peace, of economical and cultural cooperation, a s.o. The objectives are established depending on the evolution of the power relations between actors, on the alliances that the actors can realise and also on the existence / non-existence of a security credible structure.

From the perspective of political realism, Hans I. Morgenthau defines the interest as power because it is in relation with “the substance of politics and it is not affected by the spacial or temporal circumstances”⁴⁸.

In geopolitics, an interest can be considered as such only if the actor, as an element of the system of international relations has the capacity to obtain its materializing. If this thing is not possible, we don't talk about interests, but only about aspiration that can be proclaimed and claimed⁴⁹.

In the opinion of the american analyst Hans I. Morgenthau, if all the states are considered as “political entities that pursue their own interests defined as power, we will be able to make justice for everybody in a double meaning: we will be able to judge fridge other nations as we judge our own nation and in this way we will be able to draw up strategies that respect the interest of other nations protecting and promoting our own interest”⁵⁰. Appealing to historical analysis, Morgenthau ascertains that these ideas were noticed in action from antiquity until nowadays. For example, Tucidide said that the identity of interest is the safest connection between states and individuals. The idea was revived in the XIX century by Lord Salisbury, who noticed that the “only lasting connection between nations is the lock of opposite interests”⁵¹.

In the opinion of James Rosenau, the interest has a double quality. It is an instrument of analysis for the researcher and for the analyst of the contemporary international political phenomenon, but it is also on instrument of action for the actors. “As an analytic instrument. James Rosenau specifies – it is used for describing, for explaining or for assessing the source of external politics of a nation or its adequate character. As the instrument of the political action it serves as a modality of proposing, justifying or sentencing policies”⁵².

In the geopolitical field, the interest can be seen from a threefold perspective. Within the geopolitical phenomenon, *the interest* is the one to determine and direct an actor in order to act in a certain space. In the geopolitical theory and analysis, *the interest* becomes an instrument for identifying and measuring aproximately extent the implication of an actor in solving a problem which can appear in a world region. In propaganda geopolitical cartography, *the interest* can become an instrument of the manipulation of international or internal public opinion. In a world more and more dominated by mass-media, the “guns” waded with information and image can easily convince the public opinion about the “righteousness” of the undertaken actions, but not necessary about the truth or the aims that determined that action.

The criteria of classification and evaluation of the interests that the actors promote in the system of international relations are many and very diverse. This thing drives to very large and sometimes opposite definitions. In the geopolitical theory, the analysis and the assessments would be unrealistic and without objectivity if from the perspective of political action, some analysts had a certain degree of ambiguity in defining and classifying the interests within the contemporary geopolitical phenomenon because it is very difficult to obtain an agreement with a partner, if one of the personal interests was defined so preciously than it would become inflexible⁵² and therefore unnegociable.

From the geopolitical perspective at least two elements, are relevant for specifying the interests, nature and dimensions: the actors

nature and the geopolitical value of the disputed space. From the actors point of view, the interests can be classified by the pursued aims in the system of international relations and they can be national, economical, political, territorial, ideological, strategical. Second, the actors interests are different as to the priorities established in a certain moment and in this case, they, can be classified as essential or secondary. Concerning the objectives intensity and stability in their action within geopolitical field, the interest are defined as steady, variable, general or specific⁵³. Not least, the actors interest can be identified concerning the actors' position in the system of international relations. The interest's can be common if the aims and the adjectives pursued by two or more actors in a space are common, complementary, if the strategical objectives are not antagonical and one of the actors can give up a specific interest which runs counter to other from the some category and conflictual when the strategical objectives pursued by an actor in a space are irreconcilable concerning the objectives of another actor.

The time factor is important for the identifying of the actors' interests. For a short time, the interests of two or more actors can be the same, but they can be divergent or even irreconcilable for a long time. During the second world war, England, USA and USSR had a common interest a short time: eliminating Germany from the power equation on the european continent. After obtaining the pursued objectives in the war the partners of United Nations Coalition situated themselves on irreconcilable positions because the strategical objectives for a long term of USSR and of the Greate Occidental Democracies were totally opposite this thing generated a whole new aspect within the confrontations between actors, known in the contemporary geopolitical phenomenon under the name of *Cold War*.

In their action in the geopolitical field, the actors can also promote indirect interests on a short term, namely instruments or reasons for the promoting of completely different interests but not so obvious. The romanian government's declaration of february 1998, about its participation with all its means, including the

military to operation "Desert Thunder" was justified by the necessity of White House's sensitizing about the requirement of Romania concerning its joining to NATO, but also of refreshing the external image of the country and its international credibility.

The intrinsic geopolitical value gotten or attributed to a geographical space has on important role for the actors orientation, hierarchy and intensity in their disputing of interests in that space, in a certain moment. We take into account only the geopolitical space – that territorial from where the natural conditions make possible the life and the human activity⁵⁴, but not the space in generally. The geopolitical value of the space is given by its valences, namely by its economical, human and natural potential.

The actors of the contemporary geopolitical phenomenon are attracted in a different way in one or the other world region depending on their interests priority. Ion Conea noticed fiveteen 50 ago, that the world's political map had points and regions of a maximum or a minimum political interest". He defined the first as "region of on intense political life" and the latter as those zones "were the political rhythm of the Globe is more quiet"⁵⁵. The famous romanian analyst and theorist identified some interests and disputes' region of friction or of convergence for the forth decade of the XXth century: Mediteranean sea Red Sea and Pacific Ocean"⁵⁶.

Nowadays such friction or convergence maps are kept all arround the big areas of energetical resources and strategical points⁵⁷. The serious crisis form Gulf and the dispute for the control of the routes from the Caspic Sea zone are only two of the many areas of maximum interest for the actors of the century and milenium end.

The conflict or the convergence of the interest in a resourcefull space of the actors don't depend only on needs, from the security ones to the specitual ones. So in Geopolitics, the geographical space must be seen on different ways, from many analysis eagles, depending on the main cathegories of interests. In this way, the actors affirm their sovereignty or establish their control in a POLITICAL SPACE, are in

competition in an ECONOMICAL SPACE put their stamps in a SPECIAL SPACE. Finally, when the of compromise is outrun and the interests become irreconcilable, the actors resort to war in a GEOSTRATEGICAL SPACE.

The understanding of the role played by such territories or territorial elements for the actors of the contemporary geopolitical field gives the analyst the possibility of a correct

evaluation of the military and political crisis and of offering viable selections for, their administration. In Geopolitics, the space, is by definition one the actors competition, but this thing doesn't require automatically aggressive or conflict behavior. The resorting to force, in its military form is repudiated more and more often and considered as a final argument for the interests' settlement in a space or the other.

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 - 4 Sergiu Tămaș, *Geopolitica*, București, 1995, p. 251.
 - 5 Apud, Pascal Bruckner, *Samuel Huntington ou le retour de la fatalité en histoire*, in „Eaprit”, 1997, p. 56.
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 - 7 Alvin Toffler, p. 24.
 - 8 *Ibidem*, p. 22.
 - 9 *Ibidem*, p. 24.
 - 10 *Ibidem*, pp. 155-156.
 - 11 *Ibidem*, pp. 235-236.
 - 12 *Ibidem*, p. 236.
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 - 14 Sergiu Tămaș, pp. 220-221.
 - 15 Alvin Toffler, p. 203.
 - 16 Constantin Hlihar, *Europa în căutarea unei noi arhitecturi de securitate*, în „Observatorul Militar”, nr. 49, dec. 1997, p. 12.
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 - 19 Alvin și Heide Toffler, *Război și Anti-Război. Supraviețuirea în zorii secolului XX*, București, 1995, p. 94.
 - 20 *Ibidem*, p. 95.
 - 21 *Ibidem*, p. 94.
 - 22 *Ibidem*, p. 154.
 - 23 *Ibidem*, p. 162.
 - 24 See, *Joint Vision 2010. America's Military: Preparing for Tomorrow*. p. 7; 11-15; *National Military Strategy of the USA*, 1997, pp. 18-21.
 - 25 Florian Gârț, *NATO: Globalizare sau dispariție? De la Războiul Rece la Pacea Pierdută*, București, 1995, pp. 58-59.
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 - 27 „Joint Force Quarterly”, Spring 1997, p. 84.
 - 28 *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 1997, p. 25.
 - 29 Florian Gârț, pp. 64-65.
 - 30 *Ibidem*, p. 67.
 - 31 Constantin Hlihar, *Istorie și geopolitică în Europa secolului XX*, București, 1999, p. 139.
 - 32 *Ibidem*, p. 140.
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