

Nazi External Propaganda in the United States of America 1933-1939

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Propaganda is, in its essence, a totalitarian instrument. It requires a monolithic, homogenous system to lead a society that is coerced into silence. In co-operation with the strengthening of the totalitarian power, propaganda becomes a political weapon of uttermost importance. But once the supremacy is firmly established, the force of the repressive apparatus is enough to completely suppress all individual liberties and critics of the regime. At this time, state propaganda no longer has in view to persuade the people, but to maintain them in a sort of artificial reality. From this perspective, its external role becomes extremely important. Resorting to ideological struggle, psychological warfare, lies and misinformation, casts confusion on the governments of the democratic states.

The primary target of the totalitarian external propaganda is to promote an attractive image of the states that advance the same ideology outside their borders and a negative image of those that don't. The secondary target is to conceal their true intentions, namely those of world supremacy, by promoting a pacifist and equalitarian morality.

These objectives were also present on the agenda of the national - socialist propaganda department during the twelve years of *N.S.D.A.P* rule. It is still open to debate to what extent these objectives were accomplished. However, besides the effects of the Nazi external propaganda, their endeavour in this respect make up an interesting study.

Modern propaganda is defined as a modern method based upon one or more

scientific disciplines. J. Ellul correctly noted that "the time has passed when propaganda was a matter of individual inspiration, personal subtlety or unsophisticated deceit. At the core of propaganda is now science."¹ In deed, Nazi external propaganda makes up for more than a compelling example of this twentieth century perfected science.

The Nazis left nothing about external propaganda to chance. They developed differentiated action plans suited to their target public. So, obviously, Nazi propaganda aimed at the totalitarian states was based on certain premises, goals, and dedicated symbols, means, as well as propaganda experts who were deployed to match this type of receptors.

Things changed for the Nazi propaganda mechanism when faced with another type of target public, in the democratic states. Analysts differentiate a "diversity of publics", including "weak public vs. tough public" or "subordinate publics".² Public opinion and political factors in the democratic states constituted the "tough public" category, that of a reluctant audience. The persuasion tactics the Nazis had to employ for them were very different from those used internally. A diverse range of arguments had to be employed, but no major drift could be allowed. Hitler could not give up his "fundamental principles": lies, misinformation, etc. The link between internal and external propaganda will therefore be constituted by the second type of public: Germans living outside the borders - the "subordinate public". They were an intermediate category: still in touch with the German way of thinking, but receptive to other means of persuasion due to their specific conditions. Once they were enrolled

in the service of the national – socialism and rendered fanatic, they were an ideal instrument for the external German propaganda. Through them, a gloating image of the Nazi state can be depicted. Using this channel, an open propaganda could be sustained, concealing the secret propaganda. The pacifist, anti-Bolshevik and anti-Semitic Nazi rhetoric they used was an excellent motivation for recruiting new foreign supporters and cover the actual objectives of the Nazi external policy.

All these can be certified by tracking the development of the Nazi propaganda in the United States of America, front-runner in world democracy. This was perhaps the greatest challenge Nazi propagandists had to face: trying to bring about major changes inside the American political class, and – what was actually important for them – inside the American public opinion. This is more difficult as the German internal understanding of public opinion was quite different from reality. Public opinion is not just a sum of individual views, but the product of a debate.³ Nazi messages would thus come under discussion and not be accepted without comments. National-socialists had to take into account that the public is not a homogenous block, as they had shaped it internally.⁴

For these exact reasons, the Nazis took special precautions. One of the fundamental laws of propaganda states that one can not make something out of nothing. It's imperative that you associate the ideas with emotions, another existing idea, build it on an existing foundation.⁵ In the United States of America, this foundation was, in 1933, already far stronger than one would presume. The German community in the USA had become one of the most important as early as the 17th century and with time one of the largest.

The Germans migration to the USA starts in the early 17th century and peaks in the 19th century. Between 1815 and 1914 Europe was swept by the migration fever, starting with Ireland and the Rhine basin.

Three waves of migrants are to be distinguished during this period, as follows: 1830–1860 (peaking between 1847 and 1854), 1860–1890 (Prussian and Saxon Germans) and 1890–1914.

The reasons why Germans migrate to the north-American continent fall in two major categories. Mainly it's about the hostile conditions in Germany – and Europe in general – during this time. Economic hardship, especially in the agriculture, political and religious persecutions, ever growing social gaps generate the wish for a fresh start in a friendlier environment. This complex crisis is felt even in the way of thinking; this long array of changes upsets the values established for centuries. It's also about the ever growing attraction posed by America; information about this area reaches Europeans easier and they think of it as the "promise land".

The moments when more or less numerous German groups migrate to the North-American area are not scarce. These movements were caused by various reasons, repeated throughout the 300 years in question. For instance, as a result of internal persecutions, German Protestants find refuge in the USA starting with the 17th century.⁶ There were also cases of religious leaders, unwanted in Germany, who left for the New World together with their followers.⁷

Napoleonic wars heavily impacted on entire Europe in all fields. The exhaustion caused by 20 years of conflicts made the social and professional reinsertion of the armed forces a difficult one. These people had travelled through many other states, experiencing new realities and living their lives in an ever changing environment. Opposed to that, life in their original areas now seemed narrow and boring, while life across the ocean offered them an interesting adventure. Even more, the peace treaty presented them with a unique opportunity. It stated that for a period of six years, some conditions provided, one could leave without paying the property emigration tax. Many of those living along the Rhine basin

met these conditions and thousands chose to leave for America at this moment. This statement allowed for a process that would normally require a considerable time span to unfold rapidly.⁸ Once settled in the USA they will fit in by fighting in the civil war on one or the other side, just like their ancestors had done in the Independence War.

A further effect of the Napoleonic wars was the near rural collapse they inflicted mainly on the southern German states. Repeating agricultural crisis will add to this in the first half of the 19th century: 1817, 1827–1828, 1837, 1842, 1846–1847, 1848–1849, and 1851–1854. For example, the so-called “great migration” of the Germans in the sixth decade of the 19th century was triggered by the grave situation in the agriculture between 1851 and 1854. Although farmers made up for most of the migration, the ships heading for America also carried other social categories, such as craftsmen and mechanics. They were driven out by hardship of the 1848 revolution that had disturbed internal commerce and reduced exports. People who can’t find liberty to express political opinions in Germany – students establishing secret societies in the early 1830s, studying constitutions and producing radical theories – see the north-American continent as an ideal frame for developing their ideas.

But it’s not just the adversity in their homeland that makes the Germans migrate to America. Wealthy Germans dream of increasing their income and earn millions of dollars.⁹ According to some statistics, there were approximately 6.000.000 Germans in America in 1864.¹⁰

German authorities will treat this migratory trend with a relative indulgence. As a result, in the 17th century, although the emigration was officially subjected to restrictions, Germans were regularly allowed to leave and the restrictions remained virtually decorative. Starting with the 19th century the right to emigrate was already universal. There were even cases when the

authorities financially supported groups of migrants in order for these to reach America.

The German regions most present in the migration are especially those in the south and west: Alsace, Lorena, the Rhine valley, Saxony, Bavaria, the most affected areas by the above mentioned difficulties.

Germans arriving in North-America settle mainly the East coast and the South, rural areas and the borders. Those migrating to the United States were mainly of rural origin. As a result, major German communities inhabit regions like Pennsylvania – a traditional land of the German farmers, Virginia, Carolina, Georgia, New Orleans, Wisconsin, Missouri, Texas, New York, Cincinnati – half the city’s population, Chicago, St. Louis, Milwaukee – approximately a third of the inhabitants, Baltimore, etc.

After arriving, the Germans set up various organizations, in professional, political, religious, cultural and educational fields. For example, Germans living in Virginia come together in the “Richmond Association of the German Social-Democrats”. In Louisville an “Association of the Free Germans” subsided. They are active, they make their opinions known through resolutions, their own newspapers – like *Galveston Zeitung*, the press voice of the Germans in Texas – that they use to inform the German community about the unfolding of events in the country.

The fact that Germans were so well represented in the US will prove to be of great help for the national-socialists after seizing power in 1933. They will take full advantage of this and the Germans in America will shortly become the most efficient instrument for the Nazi propaganda.

Only after comprising all these information about the German ethnics in the United States can we fully understand all aspects of the propaganda strategies that the Nazis employed here.

The German-Americans – as they were called by the Nazi officials – will be fully

engaged in an organized framework, although the best efforts of Germany aimed at camouflaging this. Their main objective was as it follows: all the support had to seem as being from inside the United States, out of the initiative of American citizens (German or not). There was officially no connection between the German authorities and the support they got from various groups in America. The associations active here were presented in a light as good as possible inside the American democratic system. These were nothing but the embodiment of the "heartfelt sympathy" of the Americans for the national-socialist regime and its ideology.

As far as the institutional framework was concerned, the Nazi propaganda apparatus operated in the US through three organizations: "The Steuben Society", "The Friends of the New Germany Association" and later "Kameradschaft".

"The American Steuben Society" was a German-American organization, already founded in 1919, during the Weimar Republic. It was named after the Prussian officer Friedrich Wilhelm August von Steuben, who fought as a general in the American forces during the Independence War.¹¹ The Society will also remain active after Hitler's rise to power in Germany and will become a tool of the Nazi propaganda. It was made up only by American citizens of German origin, who were not members of *N.S.D.A.P.* Since 1934, the man to manage the activity of the organization is Theo. H. Hoffman.

"The Friends of the New Germany Association" (F.N.G.A.) was born early in 1933, right after the *N.S.D.A.P.* groups in the United States dissolved, as a German-American association friendly towards the national-socialist regime in Germany. Many *N.S.D.A.P.* members will join its ranks, and as a result its activities will be disapproved by Hitler, but only officially, as it follows.

These two organizations through which Nazis led a frantic propaganda will fight each other for supremacy during this entire period. On one hand, this aspect is similar

with the state of affairs in the internal Nazi propaganda where often a tensional struggle between propaganda agents would break up. On the other hand, these tensions were inherent as a result of their overlapping: one was supported by the German Foreign Affairs Ministry – The Steuben Society – and the other by *N.S.D.A.P.* – F.N.G.A. The leaders of these organizations will often petition the German authorities, trying to cast a bad light on their opponents. Out of this perspective, "The Steuben Society" will have greater chances of success, due to the fact that the activities of F.N.G.A. were far too aggressive for the democratic north-American state. The Berlin officials were also displeased that the F.N.G.A. was comprised of too many party members that weren't even trying to hide their sympathies as the Nazi propaganda tried to create the image of a natural support, independent from Germany.

A very important decision in this area is reached in October 1933, after E. Bohle, head of the External Organization, meets with two *N.S.D.A.P.* members from the US. They state that they came to Germany for the only purpose of asking the party leadership to halt all *N.S.D.A.P.* activities in the US, as these activities do nothing but seriously endanger all German interests there.¹² The American authorities had just initiated a vast investigation for identifying Nazi propaganda agents operating in north-America. The answer to that was a decree forbidding any activity from party-members in the United States. It established the following:

1. Only citizens of the Reich can achieve party membership.
2. Party members living in the United States are strictly prohibited from getting involved in any party activity. Just like individual members, they are, without exceptions, subjected to the authority of the head of the External Organization.
3. Party member Spanknöbel will be instructed on passing the F.N.G.A. leadership to an American citizen.

4. F.N.G.A. will limit to usual club activities and restrain from any political involvement.¹³

It can be easily seen that Nazis intended to control the outside Germans just as they did with those inside, employing various “methods” for that purpose.

We find out from another document that subsequently to that, in early December, the former leader of F.N.G.A., Spanknöbel, was prosecuted for offending the American state through his actions and that he will be tried in absence after leaving the US territory.¹⁴

In February 1934, only months after this decree, things are still ambiguous. *N.S.D.A.P.* officials insist on revitalizing the party activities in the USA, sparking irritation among the representatives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. On 11th February the German ambassador in the US, Luther, insisted that no change should be made to the decree of October 1933 regarding the F.N.G.A. and warned about plans to reestablish local party groups in the USA.¹⁵

The answer to this telegram arrives on the 16th same month. A report to the German embassy in the USA states that: “The *N.S.D.A.P.* External Organization has ultimately prohibited party members from holding to their F.N.G.A. membership, which is not acknowledged by *N.S.D.A.P.* as one of its legitimate organizations, but as an exclusively American association. A memorandum regarding this matter, issued by Bohle, was sent to every party member in the USA, with the request that a notification about the immediate withdrawal from the F.N.G.A. should immediately be sent to the External Organization of the party.”¹⁶ The memo highlights that there is no local group of the *N.S.D.A.P.* in the US and that party members are strictly forbidden to lead any propaganda among others than citizens of the Reich.

The conflict between the two Nazi propaganda organizations in the USA reaches its climax towards the end of 1934. On 31st October, the head of the “Steuben

Society”, Hoffmann, meets the Führer. After an informative talk, in which Hoffmann brings Hitler up to date about the ideals and goals of his organization, he makes accusations against F.N.G.A. As Hoffmann states, local leaders of the association were mostly young Germans without American citizenship who risked being deported as a result of their political activities. It was also possible that the American government would have to prohibit and break up the F.N.G.A. Such a measure would of course provide enemies of Germany in America with a new object for inciting the public against it. Generally, local leaders of the association are complete strangers to the German-American circles; their origins are unknown, but they are believed to receive instructions from a higher authority in Germany. The activities they involve in, as foreigners, do nothing but harm Germany and bring dissent in the German-American circles. The confusion persists – Hoffmann goes on – after the German consul in the USA accepted the invitation for the F.N.G.A. ceremonies, which proves his moral support for the association.¹⁷

Hitler’s answer goes to show the ambiguous approach of the whole Nazi concept; on one hand he states that in the end, no one can prevent the national-socialist meetings for support outside Germany, but on the other he passed strict instructions that Nazis must restrain from any political activities in their host-countries in any circumstances. At the end of the meeting, the Führer however wonders how much of the information Hoffmann supplied is true and whether or not he is driven by the rivalry between the two organizations. In order to bring light on this matter, an investigation is set up. At the end of it, the state secretary, Bülow, told the state secretary of the Reich’s Chancellery, on 6th November, that it is possible Hoffmann’s remarks about the association are motivated by a certain rivalry between the organizations. But no doubt they are largely justified, as some local groups have caused distress out of too much

enthusiasm.¹⁸ Therefore, the best solution would be to disassociate from all its activities. Bohle added in December that "there is no connection between the party's External Organization and F.N.G.A. As soon as we learned that some party members belong to this organization, we ordered them to leave it, as this was unsuited with the principles of our External Organization. I have to say that the association is the only one that has supported the new Germany actively and without reserves. On the other hand, I also know that the preferred methods of the association have now and then caused distress."¹⁹

The third Nazi propaganda organization aimed at the north-American continent was "Kameradschaft USA". It was founded in 1938, bringing together Germans that had lived in the USA, old members of F.N.G.A. Unlike the other two, this organization operated in Germany.

The reasons why "Kameradschaft" was founded were presented by its leader, Walter Kape, in a memorandum, as it goes:

"When we came into being, in 1938, out of F.N.G.A.'s remains, we did it for three reasons:

1. First of all, we wanted to carry on, here at home, the comradeship that had made us overcome all obstacles and challenges there (in the USA), to help each other and, by sharing the experience we gained fighting in the USA, to add to our strength and courage for our every day work.

2. Second of all, by establishing this association, Kameradschaft, we wanted to render our services to our Fatherland.

3. Third of all, we hoped that this way we would offer our moral support to our brothers still fighting."²⁰

Groups of "Kameradschaft" have been created in Stuttgart, Berlin, Hamburg and Hanover. With the help provided by the German External Institute and the city of Stuttgart, the first national congress of "Kameradschaft USA" could be organized, at the same time with the "American Germandom Fighting!" exhibition.

Inside the organization a special attention will be paid to the propaganda material. Thus, in the spring of 1939, it will be initiated a collection of movies, paintings, photos, notes, pamphlets, newspapers extracts and posters about the national German movement in the USA. "The existing material will be used to gather a complete collection that is later to be included in the German External Institute, just as the Central Archives of the *N.S.D.A.P.* in Munich, as an eternal testimony of our struggle in the USA."²¹

"Kameradschaft" will permanently stay in touch with the US. Of special importance for them were reports regarding the public opinion in America, the same as the feelings of the Germans, whose clubs had by now been closed down, reports of how common Americans see the situation and how the anti-Semitic feelings develop in north-America.

The same document informs about the existence of a new German organization in the US; it's the "National German-American League", which is told to be by far the most active fighting group of the German ethnics in America, always fending off anti-German campaigning. As the Nazi authorities claim, it operates on a fully legal basis and is strictly an American affair where only born or adopted Americans have the right to membership.²²

These were the main organizations in the USA the Nazi employed for their propaganda, in an attempt to gain support, mainly from the American public. But in order to reach their goals, such highly organized structures were not enough. Nazis knew that without an expert analysis of the target-areas and of the public that would be more opened to their message, their undertaking would be destined to fail. Also, since the very beginning, it was necessary a clear view of the best ways their message would use to reach the public. A most interesting German document on this subject is a report of Richard Salet, representative of Ministry of Propaganda at the Washington embassy, to the ministry, in the summer of 1934.²³

Salet makes an analysis of the propaganda activity during the last one and a half year (the report is dated 3rd August) and finds it unsatisfactory. However, he considers that all is not lost, especially in the East and the South, where “the American people (...) still keeps an open mind and now, more than ever, is essential that we find the appropriate means to get closer and inform them.”²⁴ He also believes that “the poison of the hostile propaganda has not yet reached the small towns. Anyway, the population, and especially that outside New York and of the small and average cities have not yet reached the level when they would reject any further information. This presents us with opportunities we should take before it’s too late. The influence of the American press and the overflow of the anti-German literature give people the feeling that we lack courage to react and even that we admit the guilt.”²⁵ The study of these concerns shows that the Nazis paid special attention to the exact areas where large German communities were present: Eastern, Southern and Central American countryside.

As for the propaganda channels, these are also clearly defined: advertising companies, books about the new Germany, political semi-official journals, libraries, and almanacs.

The report states that the two advertising companies employed, Byoir-Dickey-Viereck and Ivy Lee, proved ineffective. “The mysterious influence these companies were supposed to have on the press proved to be nothing more than empty promises. In deed, the latest central articles about these companies only come to prove the opposite. That is why I suggest you put pressure that these contracts be terminated as soon as possible.”²⁶

In addition to the plan of a German foundation from the USA, “The Carl Schurz Memorial Foundation”, for printing a periodical, there were other ideas in the press field. The Macmillan publishing house intended to publish a book called *Germany Speaks*, a project of Herbert S. Houston. All these actions had to be taken quickly, in

order to answer the American propaganda. Salet complains that the “literary markets have been overwhelmed with anti-German garbage. Meanwhile, H. F. Armstrong has published in *Foreign Affairs* his second work on Germany. As a response to that, our side has yet to publish a single book. Scoonmaker, who received a 4.000 RM grant last summer in Germany for writing a book, has not yet sent the manuscript.”²⁷ But the first collection of essays about leading personalities for the book *Germany Speaks* had been rejected by the Macmillan publishing house as unsatisfactory and it is estimated that the next best plan would be to supply a American writer, who has some idea about national-socialism, all the required material and funding for interviews and then he would be left to write the book on his own. Salet even points the right person for the job: F. W. Elven, editor of the German language daily *Cincinnati Freie Press*, and one of the leading German-American politicians. The report assesses that Elven’s personal support for the national-socialists will not only have a considerable effect on German-Americans, but also on the Republican politicians.

Semi-official political publications – modeled after *Foreign Affairs* and *Contemporary Japan* – are considered to be the best way to influence public and private opinion and counterattack “the Jewish journal” *New York Times*, which promotes hostility towards Germany.

Next, the necessity for the establishment of an informative library is underlined. “The population from small and medium sized cities wants positive information about Germany and it would be a mistake for us to miss this opportunity that would later be difficult to get back once we have abandoned this field to the tireless propaganda of our enemies.”²⁸ From the “Kameradschaft USA” memorandum we learn that such a library has been created by the German General Consulate in New York.²⁹

The fusion of all four methods of propaganda preferred by Hitler should have

been issued through an annual publication, an almanac. "An almanac that would combine the advantages of the German publication *Müller-Jabusch*, of the American *World Almanac*, of the British *Whitaker's Almanac*, and of the *Soviet Union Yearbook* would contribute a great deal to the spreading of information. The almanac should be printed in English in New York and London and should contain sufficient information about the German institutions for it to develop into a landmark book, essential for all editorial staff and libraries. As for the design, I specifically recommend the model of the American almanac because it is familiar to Americans and it will considerably contribute to its spread."³⁰

Americans have always responded without delay to all these actions of the Nazis, whether it was by public opinion or official reply. The latter category includes intense debates in the Congress caused by the Nazi activities in the USA.

Congressman Samuel Dickstein (member of the Democrat Party, New York) as the president of the Immigration Committee is to have a relentless activity in the "Special Committee for the Investigation of Nazi and other countries Propaganda Activities in the USA", which Nazis will carefully monitor. In March 1934 results of the up to date investigations. Here is how Luther, the German ambassador to Washington, comments them in a note to the Exterior Ministry:

"The following accusations have been made:

1. The German government wants to solve the Jewish issue in the USA the same way as it did in Germany.
2. In Los Angeles two groups are clashing over almost 100.000 \$ sent for propaganda purposes from Germany.
3. The Silver Shirts are funded by national-socialists agents with German money.
4. Representative Shoemaker claims his son has been beaten in Germany last summer for trying to take pictures of a parade.³¹

5. German ships smuggle weapons. Dickenstein claims he has evidence of that.

6. German ships are planting spies disguised as sailors.

7. German agents have maps of military bases and ammunition dumps in the country.

8. German national-socialists leaders have a secret police force in the US that they use to threat people here with reprisals on their relatives in Germany.

9. Propaganda materials are being smuggled in, and money is sent from Germany to fund this subversive propaganda."³²

During the committee debates the opposition was led by the representatives of those states with a considerable proportion of German ethnics: Texas, Wisconsin, and Nebraska. They emphasized that the project was offending for the Germans and brought forward the achievements of Hitler's regime. Opposition has also emphasized that the Congress has no rights of interfering with the internal affairs of other states. The external propaganda should be controlled by restricting immigration and by the Justice Department.

National-socialists did not remain indifferent to such actions and will take their stand. Not by intensifying propaganda, but by pulling out. The dismissal of the F.N.G.A. was mainly triggered by the fact that the activities of some of its members, like the head of the association, Spanknöbel, drew the attention of the board.

There are also other reactions from the Americans. In 1935, the founding of the world's first opinion poll institute, Gallup, was not independent from the effects of American propaganda, just as the creation, a year later, of the "Institute for the study of propaganda", also a world first.

After all these matters there is still one question to answer: to what degree have the Nazis achieved their goals? To what degree have they stood up to the challenge of adapting a totalitarian mechanism to a democratic system? This is a very difficult estimate.

On one hand, Nazis were permanently faced with a powerful American counter-offensive. This forced the Nazis and Germans in America to back down. They could not afford a vigorous offensive, like they did in Germany or in more auspicious external circumstances. Every step was carefully planned, every propaganda action well calculated.

However, the success of the Nazi propaganda had some echoes in the American society, especially when during the 30's, Nazi demonstrations took place in many American cities. There was also a very popular character of the time, contending for the title of "Hitler of America": the catholic priest Charles E. Coughlin (a former supporter of Roosevelt, he later turned against him). Every Saturday he made on the radio speeches considered to have a Nazi background. He addressed a huge audience, even by today's standards, of 30 million listeners.³³

When planning their propaganda in the USA, the Nazis had to take into account that the public opinion could only be defined in relation to a specific public and certain issues of its interest. This was a whole new reality of that they had created inside the Nazi state. Out of this perspective it was possible to make assertions about the state of the public opinion, about what causes this state to shift, about predictable changes that may occur.³⁴ All these factors were out of Nazi control in America, so their task was an extremely difficult one. In spite of this, they stopped at nothing. The propaganda structures were equally well set up with their advantages and disadvantages. The people that worked in America were carefully selected, well trained for their mission and, most of all, monitored. In this field, one of the aims of the Nazi Germany was to induce a docile behaviour on all Germans, inside or outside the boundaries. By employing various persuasion tactics, they achieved this aim.

Note :

¹ J. Ellul, *Propaganda*, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, p. 4.

² C. Beciu, *Politica discursivă. Practici politice într-o campanie electorală*, Polirom, Iași, 2000, p. 22.

³ E. Bogardus, *The Making of Public Opinion*, Berkley Books, New York, 1999, p. 5.

⁴ J. Stoetzel, *Teoria opiniilor*, Polirom, Iași, 2000, p. 249.

⁵ J. Ellul, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

⁶ In the 17th century Germany, protestant areas have been devastated by the armies of Ludovic XIV. Many of the refugees migrated to England, protector of the protestants at the time. Although Queen Anne made them a warm welcome, their stay in London proved to be quite a problem for the local authorities. This happened just when the governor of New York complained about the lack of workforce in the area. In America, the Germans didn't get in the way of anybody. This is why in 1708–1709 English ships were transporting several thousands Palatins to New York. For more details on this issue, consult Marcus Lee Hansen, *The Atlantic migration. 1607–1860. A History of the continuing settlement of the United States*, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, Evanston and London, 1961, p. 46–47.

⁷ For instance, this was the case of Martin Stephan, member and main financial supporter of a cult that claimed to bring new elements in theology and religious rites. He will upset laic and religious authorities and he will ask to leave for America; his request gets approved and he will embark on November 19th for New Orleans.

⁸ Marcus Lee Hansen, *The Atlantic migration. 1607–1860. A History of the continuing settlement of the United States*, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, Evanston and London, 1961, p. 81.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 287.

¹⁰ Edith Abbot, *Historical aspects of the immigration problem. Selected documents*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois, 1926, p. 517.

¹¹ Those interested in the evolution of his military career in the USA should consult Franz Fabian, *Die Schlacht von Monmouth. Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben in Amerika*, Deutscher Militärvertrag, Berlin, 1961.

¹² *Documents on German Foreign Policy. 1918–1945, Series C (1933–1937), The Third Reich: First Phase*, vol. II, October 14, 1933 – June 13, 1934, (de acum citat ca G.D., C), London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1951, No. 5, p. 5–8.

¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 6.

- ¹⁴ *Ibidem*, No. 139, p. 252–255.
- ¹⁵ *Idem*, vol. III, June 14, 1934 – March 31, 1935, No. 248, p. 467.
- ¹⁶ *Ibidem*, No. 259, p. 492.
- ¹⁷ *Ibidem*, No. 570, p. 1115–1116.
- ¹⁸ *Ibidem*, No. 571, p. 1117.
- ¹⁹ *Ibidem*, No. 572, p. 1117–1120.
- ²⁰ „Mitteilungsblatt der Kameradschaft USA” în *National Socialism. Basic Principles, Their Application by the Nazi Party's Foreign Organisation, and the Use of Germans Abroad for Nazi Aims* (from now on referred as *National Socialism...*), Prepared in the Special Unit of the Division of European Affairs by Raymond E. Murphy, Francis B. Stevens, Howard Trivers, Joseph M. Roland, United States, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1943, p. 275–284.
- ²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 278.
- ²² *Ibidem*, p. 283.
- ²³ *G. D.*, C III, No. 569, p. 1111–1115.
- ²⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 1111.
- ²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 1112.
- ²⁶ The Ministry of Propaganda informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a telegram dated October 1st 1934, that the three months notice regarding the contract between Byvoir and Dickey and the German Bureau for Tourism in New York had been forwarded that day.
- ²⁷ *G.D.*, C III, No. 569, p. 1114.
- ²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 1115.
- ²⁹ „Mitteilungsblatt der Kameradschaft USA” în *National Socialism...*, p. 284.
- ³⁰ *G.D.*, C III, No. 569, p. 1115.
- ³¹ Francis Henry Shoemaker, reprezentant al muncitorilor și fermierilor din Minnesota.
- ³² *G.D.*, C II, No. 347, p. 653–655.
- ³³ Werner J. Severin, James W. Tankard, *Communication Theories: Origins, Methods and Uses in the Mass Media*, Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 92.
- ³⁴ Harwood L. Childs, *An Introduction to Public Opinion*, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 42.

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