

NEOREALISM AND SMALL STATE ALLIANCE BEHAVIOR IN WARTIME - THEORETICAL ASSESSMENT

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- ◆ *Balance of Threat*
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- ◆ *Bipolarity in a Multipolar World*
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Kenneth Waltz approaches the problem of alliance formation from the direction of dynamics inherent to change in the structure of the international state system. He argues that states form alliances to counter or *balance* against rising great powers which are deemed threatening to the existing balance of power in the international system by virtue of their increasing capabilities alone¹. In an anarchic world in which the units are undifferentiated in either function or intention, excessive accumulation of capabilities equals threat². As one power gains enough in capabilities it threatens others, thereby provoking alliance-forming reactions. While he does not dwell on why this threat forms - why imbalances of capabilities occur in the first place - his theory is useful as one of defensive response by other states in the system and has been seminal in creating the Neorealist school of international politics³.

According to Waltz, the threat presented by an imbalance of capabilities is to the existing structure of the international system. Referring mainly to great powers, he notes that when faced with the threat of a rising and presumed aggressive state, other states may do one of two things: *balance* or *bandwagon*. In a multipolar world, other great powers may either balance by allying against the stronger side (the state accumulating an excess of capabilities) or „join

the stronger side" and bandwagon⁴. In a bipolar World, one great power is the bandwagon, the other is the balancer, and small states are left with the alternative of balancing or bandwagoning. Waltz does not say much about the relationship of small states to other great powers in a multipolar world, or to other small states in either a bipolar or multipolar world, beyond noting that they face multiple dangers and need to be cautious. His system-level theory considers system-level threats and therefore exigencies connected with lesser unit-level threats and responses (those affecting small states) were not of concern to him⁵.

In a bipolar world, according to Waltz, one of the two great powers will automatically balance against the other. In a multipolar world, other great power will also tend to balance against the stronger state by allying together. Waltz does not rule out the theoretical possibility that at least one of the other great powers in a multipolar world will neither balance nor bandwagon, seeking instead independent ends entirely. But he does not pursue this either⁶. In consequence, Waltz effectively reduces the multipolar world to one of bipolar alliances.

Interestingly, although his theory and the manner in which he applies it presumes the existence of a one balancer (balancing alliance) - one bandwagon (bandwagoning alliance) phenomenon both in bipolar and multipolar worlds, Waltz had warned against precisely this type of error. As he phrased it, the forming of „two rival camps" is „so complicated" and difficult a process it can be done „only under pressure of war" and even the formation of two blocs during World War II „did not make the multipolar system into a bipolar one⁷.

In spite of Waltz' caution on this point, the unintentional sleight of hand performed by insisting on one bandwagon and one balancer creates an artificial bipolarity in Neorealist theory. This artificial bipolarity in turn hinders clear determination of the nature of the threat and of the nature of the response. And this lack of clarity complicates the use of the theory for analysing alliance behaviour. These problems are highlighted when the theorist is careful in asking and answering the following questions:

- What is the threat ?

- What is threatened ?
- Who defines the threat ?
- What are the response choices ?

What is the threat ? In Waltz' theory it is a relatively larger share of capabilities or, more simply, an imbalance of power. *What is threatened ?* The existing structure of the international system; the system *status quo*. *Who defines the threat ?* Herein lies one of the most serious problems in Neorealist analyses of alliance forming behaviour. Logic would dictate that the entity whose alliance forming behaviour is under question also define the threat to which it is responding. On this Waltz is understandably nuclear. After all, the threat is to the system and the system is not a sentient entity. This lack of clarity limits the usefulness of his analysis for predicting alliance behaviour. If the entity defining the threat changes, then it follows that the nature of the threat and the nature of what is threatened may change as well.

The gist of Waltz work indicates that the balancing great power defines the threat, but at times it appears that „the analyst", some presumably objective third party, is defining the threat. Waltz was apparently aware of this problem since he alludes to it when noting that states cannot easily „reconcile two conflicting imperatives - to act for their own sakes, as required by their situation, and to act for the system's stability or survival, as some scholars advise them to do"⁸. Again, however, he does not proceed differently himself. At the very least, third party definition of the threat immediately raises the possibility that the primary threat perceived by the responding power may be misidentified. In terms of a theory of dual response, it encourages the imposition of exactly the sort of artificial bipolarity on multipolar worlds against which Waltz warned. If the entity threatened does not define the threat then the response of that entity - the alliance motivation - is no longer necessarily defined in terms of the threat provoking it. Instead, within this essentially bipolar model, the threat presented to all states other than the great power balancer is inferred on the basis of the response. This approach opens the door to more of less arbitrary assignments of who is balancing and who is bandwagoning.

This error is particularly egregious when evaluating small state alliance forming and intra-alliance behavior. Whereas a great power's attitude toward system change or system maintenance determines whether it is balancing or bandwagoning, attitudes towards local and regional threats and irredenta, which tend to be the most immediate catalysts and principle motivators of small state alliance behavior, are excluded from analysis. The small state is therefore judged as to whether it bandwagoned or balanced - allying with or against the threat - not by its motivations and attitudes and by the choice it consciously made, but rather on the basis of which of the two alliances it has joined⁹. Instead of evaluating alliance forming behavior on the basis of the state's relationship to the threat it perceives, behavior is evaluated purely on the basis of the state's relationship to the two protagonists perceived by „the analyst". In consequence, its alliance motivations are imputed rather than empirically determined. Here, Waltz is not only uninterested in explaining small state alliance forming behavior, as he explicitly admits, he is unable to do so as well.

What are the possible responses to the threat? According to Waltz there are only two: balancing and bandwagoning. In Waltz' world of Manichean response, a state may opt to ally

2. Balance of Threat

Stephen Walt takes Waltz as his point of departure in his explicitly alliance behavior oriented balance threat theory. According to Walt:

<<When confronted by a *significant external threat*, states may either balance or bandwagon. Balancing is defined as allying with other *against the prevailing threat*; bandwagoning refers to alignment *with the source of danger*¹²>>.

Walt does not follow a logical procession through the key questions of what is the threat, what is threatened, who defines the threat, and what are the response choices. Rather, he is more concerned with which of Waltz' responses - balancing or bandwagoning - is prevalent.

Walt presents a refinement of Waltz, identifying intention as a separate and independent attribute and adding it to capabilities. This interplay of intent and capabilities brings the problem of

itself against the threat or in support of it, but it may neither opt out of alliance altogether nor seek any compromise accommodation: both of which are typical small state security strategies. Why do states choose to balance? To preserve the existing system or defend the *status quo*. Why do states choose to bandwagon? Waltz is unclear again although it is understood that the bandwagon itself seeks to change the system *status quo*. Small states, however, may either balance or bandwagon in the face of a threat and the theory cannot predict which course of action a small state will choose or why it will do so¹⁰.

Another point of confusion concerns the aforementioned lack of an explicit definition of alliance and what it entails. Waltz' usage implies that allied states „stand together" against another state or states. But the imprecision of his working definition makes it almost impossible to discern precisely who is doing what to (or with) whom, especially if a state's alliance remains formally undeclared and unmarked by unambiguous action. This failing can be attributed largely to the fact that Waltz' theory is not one of alliances, although the balance-of-power in the international system is inextricably tied to the alliances that are formed therein¹¹.

threat-making and threat perception more into line with what we know of decision making processes and actual state policies¹³. At the same time, this refinement inextricably ties Neorealist structural analysis, which Waltz had taken great pains to keep at the system-level, to a unit level factor: the intention of the state. It deserves emphasis that Waltz had not ignored intention. However, within the confines of his theory, which postulates a Hobbesian world of 'war of everyman against everyman', intention was held to be constant¹⁴.

Walt is explicit in specifying that the state is the entity which is threatened; again, a fundamental change from Waltz. Yet, because of the artificial bipolarity imposed by Waltz' theory, Walt also back and forth between describing threats of the state and threats to the system. This inconsistency is first suggested in

his opening definition where he described balancing „as allying with others against the prevailing threat" but does not specify what is being threatened¹⁵. Walt return to this inconsistency in a later work, where he defines balancing as „alignment *against the threatening power* to deter it from attacking or to defeat it if it does, (while) bandwagoning refers to alignment *with the dominant power*, either to appease it or to profit from its victory"¹⁶. Thus, states balance against threats to themselves but they bandwagon with possibly non-threatening power. The first being a response to a unit-level threat consisting of aggressive intent as well as capability and the second to a system-level threat necessarily consisting of capability alone¹⁷.

Aside from the noxious influence of imposed bipolarity on the theory, this shifting is also partly the result of Walt's attempt to maintain his variant of Neorealist theory at both the level of the system and that of the unit. In attempting to keep his theory at the system level he equates the „relative distribution of threat" across the system to the „relative distribution of capabilities". However, whereas capabilities are largely (although not entirely) material attributes which can be transferred, created, destroyed, captured, or lost; intent is inherently the attribute of the individual unit. Intent is non-transferable and indestructible, although it may be modified. There is no relative distribution of aggressive intention across the system, although a state may face multiple threats. Some state do not express aggressive intent even when they have the capabilities to do so. Likewise, at least some states possessing greater capabilities are non-threatening to some other states which possess less. Unfortunately, such shifting between threat as determined by capabilities alone and threat as determined by both capabilities and intent confuses the identification of the threat and the response.

Walt recognises Walt's error in allowing third party definition of the threat and is explicit about who or what may appropriately define it: the states perceiving the threat. He then persuasively argues why this should be the case and how it should be undertaken, explaining that „independent

evidence of an external threat (for example, increases in military power, bellicose statements or actions, and so on) should be compared with each state's response (that is, did it balance or bandwagon?)¹⁸. Unfortunately, in the presentation of this theory he does not apply his own admonition rigorously, and instead introduces the same sort of shifting criteria for evaluating threat as had Waltz, with the same negative effect on clarity an logic. According to Walt:

<<...alliance choices are based on subjective assessments: *it is the actors' perception of threat that count, not the analysts „objective" evaluation.* And because geographic location and intentions affect the level of threat that a state poses to others, different states will view potential allies and adversaries in different ways, *unless one state is so strong and aggressive that the threat it presents is overwhelmingly clear.* ... Assuming we have accurate independent information on perceptions, we can test whether balancing or bandwagoning was preferred by asking whether policy makers chose to align with or against the states they perceived as the *most powerful or threatening*¹⁹>>.

Walt shifts between the state and „the analyst" as perceivers of the threat when he attributes a *mat threatening* status to the *most powerful* state, regardless of the allying state's perception of how threatening or non-threatening the most powerful state might be²⁰. Moreover, establishing the existence of an *overwhelmingly clear* threat is problematic. Walt seems to be implying that in these cases other threats may be dismissed. But this makes sense only if „the analyst" is defining the threat. One threat may be overwhelmingly clear to a state without diminishing the fact that a more direct and immediate threat also exists. As a result, ambiguity over who defines the threat, the same difficulty appearing in Waltz' theory, is repeated by Walt, although to a lesser degree²¹.

Another set of inconsistencies arise for Walt's theory because he has adopted response categories developed for a system level analysis in which only the great powers are actors, although he

is seeking to explain small state (non-great power) behavior. Thus, in one formulation, states balance against the *most dangerous threat* to themselves by allying with the *second most dangerous threat* to themselves, and they bandwagon by allying with the *most dangerous threat* to themselves²². In another formulation, Walt asserts that there are two motives for bandwagoning. In the first, allying „with *the threatening state or coalition*, the bandwagoner may hope to avoid an attack on himself by diverting it elsewhere“, while in the second, „a state may align with *the dominant side* in war in order to share the spoils of victory“²³. Although Walt uses *the threatening state* and *the dominant side* interchangeably - the state is presumably responding to the same entity with the same intention - it is evident that there is not perceived common cause in the first instance and something much, less than the most dangerous threat to the state that has chosen to bandwagon in the second.

Walt explains that the essence of bandwagoning is „unequal exchange“ and „accommodation to pressure“, and that „most important of all, bandwagoning suggests a willingness to support or tolerate illegitimate actions by the dominant ally“²⁴. At the same time, however, he notes that „strictly speaking“, only voluntary shifting to the side of the most threatening or dominant state „should be viewed as bandwagoning“²⁵. Aside from the internal contradiction, Walt’s „unequal exchange“ simply describes a reality of great power - small state alliances (and their relations in general) independent of whether the state is balancing or bandwagoning.

To take a previous example, in 1938 Czechoslovakia’s French and British great power allies imposed tremendously asymmetrical costs on it by pressuring Prague to cede the Sudetenland to Germany, leading to the dissolution of the state itself. It deserves emphasis that this was something more than mere abandonment. London and Paris explicitly conveyed their intention to actively participate in isolating Czechoslovakia internationally if it did not comply. Clearly, Czechoslovakia, a balancing power with every interest in

preserving the *status quo*, had shown a remarkable „willingness to support or tolerate illegitimate actions by the dominant ally“, and had been subjected to a grossly „unequal exchange“. Elsewhere Walt notes that: „Bandwagoning is risky because it requires trust; one assists a *dominant power* in the hope that it will remain benevolent“²⁶. In other words, bandwagoning is done not with the most dangerous threat, but with an at least temporarily benevolent state.

While this last point makes good sense, allying with a state’s most dangerous threat is not only counter-intuitive, it is nonsense. Whatever this type of joining with the most dangerous threat is called (e.g., capitulation, surrender etc.), the lack of common interest and the failure to voluntarily contribute military forces indicate that it is not alliance in any of its normal usages. Facing this contradiction, Walt moves between describing a threat to the state (as perceived by the state) when balancing, and describing a combination of threats to the state and to the system when bandwagoning (as perceived by „the analyst“). Only in this manner is it possible for small states to bandwagon by allying with their most dangerous threat in order to appease or divert it. As Walt notes, small states also bandwagon for profit, a „share in the spoils“, and thus, evidently *not* with their most dangerous threat.

Tellingly, in his research on the Middle East, Walt finds „very little“ evidence to support the bandwagoning for appeasement assertion²⁷. In his empirical survey of Southwest Asia he does not find a single case of threatened small states bandwagoning with the power which threatens them the most. According to Walt:

<<When faced with a clear external threat, these states almost always sought to counter the threat through some combination of external alignment and internal effort. Furthermore, when the level of threat in increased (that is, during a crisis or war) efforts to balance intensified. This is true even when the leaders in question preferred a policy of neutrality. ...Most important of all, these states have chosen to balance even when allied support

was uncertain. ...By contrast, examples of (appeasement) bandwagoning are almost non-existent. None of the alignments examined here resulted from a decision to bandwagon; at most, they are examples of detente²⁸>>.

One might expect that given his empirical findings he would revise his theory on this score. But he does not - or not essentially. Although it is not documented in any of his case studies, bandwagoning with the threat most feared is maintained in his theory as the primary form of small state bandwagoning. Rather than small states reacting to a threat that they themselves define, as Walt stipulated, he has them reacting also to a system threat as defined by „the analyst“. Thus, his definition of balancing *against the threat* but bandwagoning *with the dominant power*.

Walt's empirical case studies are excellent, which makes his theoretical inconsistencies all the more glaring. Limiting his cases to the post-World War II bipolar world, coupled with the Manichean approach introduced by Waltz for judging reaction to systemic threat (which itself may be the partial result of theory development in a bipolar world), reinforces a tendency to impose threat perception from without in constructing his theory. Once the issue of local threats is raised, as he does in his empirical work, a world of multiple threats to the small state emerges clearly. His work also suggests the seeming paradox that small states engage in non-bandwagoning behavior apparently bandwagoning.

Since Walt's theoretical question is formed in terms of whether balancing or bandwagoning is more predominant, one evident conclusion of his empirical studies, that threat misattribution is a serious problem in the theory, does not emerge. The important discovery, that *status quo*-oriented states often appear to be bandwagoning with *the dominant threat* from a systems perspective when they are actually balancing with *the dominant power* against a local (or perhaps even systemic) threat generated by a third power, leaves no mark

3. Balance of Interest

Waltz and Walt describe a world of defensive response. Once the threat, defined in terms of capabilities alone or capabilities joined

on his theory. This failing is somewhat surprising in that Walt lucidly illustrates the phenomenon in some detail in his examination of Turkish alliance behavior in 1945:

<<Turkey's alliance policy presents an even clearer example of balancing behavior. During World War II, Turkey maintained a neutral position between Nazi Germany and its traditional Russian rival. Turkey swung towards the Allies Germany's defeat approached to ensure Western support against any future threat from the Soviet Union. ...Although this might appear to be an example of bandwagoning, it was in fact an effort to balance against the Soviet Union by obtaining British or American support. As the danger from Germany receded, the traditional threat from Russia dominated Turkish calculations²⁹>>.

Unlike Waltz, Walt is explicit on what constitutes an alliance. However, his definitions of an alliance as „a formal or informal relationship of security cooperation“ which „assumes some level of commitment and an exchange of benefits“ is so broad that it can encompass relationships ranging from sporadic consultations on security issues during crisis, to regular exchanges of military intelligence, to actual military cooperation³⁰. In such a definition, British and French arrangements with Germany at Munich in 1938-1939 could be construed as an alliance.

Walt also uses alliance, implying commitment of military force, interchangeably with alignment, which does not. Aside from understanding a general sense of a joining, the reader cannot discern whether it is truly military alliance, alignment under non-alliance (or neutrality), or capitulation that Walt is describing when he refers to alliance. These are important lapses given that the standard social science definition specifies that the formal promise or actual provision of „military assistance“ in some common interest is the *sine qua non* of alliance³¹.

with aggressive intent, is manifest, then states are faced with the choice of responding by bandwagoning with the threat or balancing against

it. Neither approach focuses on the causes which provoke the initial increase in capabilities and/or aggressive intent. In his *balance of interest* theory, Randall Schweller supplies a necessary corrective to the *status quo* bias that has dominated Neorealist theory, causing it to neglect the purposive creation of threats to the system and to individual states³². Paradoxically, this neglect in Neorealist represents a retrograde development in theory. Classical Realists have for some time established the existence of two categories of states and interests in conflict in the international system: *status quo* states and revisionist states³³.

The reintroduction of intentional revisionism, which has often initiated change in the system, aids in clarifying the options within the alliance universe³⁴. First, great power or *primary balancing* is not the opposite of great power bandwagoning, which itself presupposes the joining of an already existing threat³⁵. Rather, primary balancing is the opposite of *revisionist aggression* or *threat of aggression*. Second, fear of (defense against) the bandwagon is not the primary reason for a small state to bandwagon. As Schweller argues, the primary motivation for bandwagoning is „usually self-extension: to obtain values coveted" or, more simply, „by the opportunity for gain"³⁶. Stressing this „opportunistic aspect of bandwagoning", Schweller notes that:

<<Bandwagoning is commonly done in the expectation of making gains; balancing is done for security and it always entails costs. ...bandwagoners, whether they are partners in crime or simply followers of a fashionable trend, do not attach high costs to their behavior. Instead, they anticipate the advantages of being on the winning side³⁷>>.

The implication, made explicit by Schweller, is that some small states will prefer to balance against threats because they are supporters of the *status quo*, while others will prefer to bandwagon with revisionist aggressors if they harbor revisionist aspirations themselves. He differentiates two sets of states with two different sorts of alliance motivation founded on two different orientations toward the international system *status quo*.

Up to this point, Schweller's contribution provides needed clarification. He introduced the concept of aggressors whose actions are dictated not by defensive response to threat but intention to alter the *status quo*, arguing that this is the chief reason for joining bandwagoning alliances. Here, Schweller reverses Walt, who held that appeasement was the primary reason for bandwagoning by small states followed „sometimes" by a desire to „share in the spoils", i.e., revisionism. By re-introducing revisionist aggression as the opposite of balancing, Schweller leads us back to the insight that revisionism is inherently system-oriented since it challenges the existing distribution of capabilities.

Schweller points out, as have several other alliance theorists, that states may also choose neutrality³⁸. In his theory of offensive and defensive and alliance formation, states may attempt to opt out altogether. Schweller also notes that small states (*weak states* in his terminology) attempt to distance, but he does so within a context that wholly misses the inherent instability of great power - small state relations. Schweller maintains that the small state is distancing from other threatened states, and from the revisionists, but not from actual or potential great power allies³⁹.

At this point however, Schweller begins to repeat errors made by Walt and to introduce new confusion. Since he is interested in both the defensive and offensive nature of alliance behavior he asks not *what is the threat* ? but *what is the interest* ? His responses are basically four, depending on whether a state is oriented toward the system or towards its own self-preservation or aggrandizement. Schweller is not clear on who defines the interest, but it emerges from his discussion of cases that „the analyst" does as much as the individual states. Defense remains the principle reason why a state chooses to balance, but it may be responding either to a perceived threat to itself or a threat to the system.

Although he emphasizes revisionism as the principle for bandwagoning, Schweller does not seriously examine the viability of other

alliance motivations imputed to small states. He thus includes as secondary motivations that of diverting and appeasing threat, the desire to avoid sanction for being on the losing, and the desire to „ally with the stronger side for protection from more pressing dangers⁴⁰. In this motivation, Schweller unintentionally puts his finger on the reason why Neorealism is currently so poor a predictor of small state alliance formation and intra-alliance behavior. If in allying „for protection from more pressing dangers" the small state is considered to be bandwagoning and not balancing, then clearly Neorealism as it is currently structured and applied cannot be employed to predict small state alliance behavior.

In conclusion, Schweller predicts in his model that only „*status quo* powers of the first rank", (great powers), will balance. All small states, whether revisionist or *status quo*-oriented, will bandwagon⁴¹. This is a safe assertion since he has defined as a category of bandwagoning a behavior that is considered balancing for great powers, and arguably the most common reason for small states to seek alliance. What is „is allying for protection from more pressing dangers" if it is not, as Schweller phrased his definition of balancing, „alignment against the threatening power to deter it from attacking?"

Part of Schweller's evidence for his conclusions are derived from what must be considered an extraordinarily idiosyncratic reading of World War II history and this may have had a deleterious effect on his theory. He first defines *weak states* as those possessing „relatively few capabilities" or suffering from „poor state-society relations⁴². He then asserts that among those *weak states* that bandwagoned in the 1930s either to appease Germany or to avoid sanction for being on the losing side were France, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. This is an amazing affirmation. Czechoslovakia was, after Germany, the best armed of the continental powers which spent the most on its defense, had one of the most advanced military industries, and possessed enormous stocks of war matériel⁴³. It also had one of the healthiest

society-state relationships and enjoyed broadbased popular legitimacy. Until it was partitioned by Germany, it was firmly within the *status quo* alliance of France with strong ties to Great Britain and to the Soviet Union.

France we considered one of the five European great powers with Europe's largest army. It was not rent by severe socio-political instability. It was, in fact, the sponsor of the anti-revisionist Eastern Alliance system until that system's final collapse in 1938. Moreover, although it showed little resolve or evidence of balancing behavior in 1938, it did react militarily to German aggression in September 1939. Moreover, it continued to fight until it was defeated, occupied, and partitioned by Germany in May-June 1940.

Yugoslavia was invaded, partitioned and dissolved by Germany on the eve of its alleged alliance in 1941. The political leaders which signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany were immediately deposed by the Yugoslav military, prompting the German (and Hungarian and Bulgarian) invasion. By June 1941, all of these states were considered part of German-occupied Europe, not as German allies, and for good reason. Paradoxically, Schweller criticizes others for confounding *capitulation* with *bandwagaming* but does not proceed differently himself⁴⁴. Succumbing to German military might was not equivalent to allying with it, either in the general sense of uniting for common cause or in the more specific sense of committing military forces or facilities in support of it⁴⁵.

Schweller includes two other states in his examples of bandwagoners of the 1930s. Austria, whose *Anschluss* with Germany is something quite different than alliance by any measure, and Romania, which appears to be his single example of bandwagoning „for protection from more pressing dangers". As argued above, this last category of bandwagoning makes little logical sense unless one imposes a world of bipolar choices on what was, by all accounts, a multipolar situation.

Schweller asserts the „Rumania bandwagoned with the Axis for protection from Russia, Hungary, and Bulgaria, which viewed

Romania's territory as irredenta⁴⁶. Thus, in responding to a perceived threat by seeking to balance against it, Romania ends up bandwagoning. Not because it is really bandwagoning, but because it has chosen to balance with the state which „the analyst " has designated as *the aggressor* in the system.

The problem of misidentifying the alliance motivations of small states is set into sharper relief when we confronting Schweller with Schweller. If we accept that bandwagoning is „commonly done in the expectation of making gains" and „bandwagons, whether they are partners in crime or simply followers of a fashionable trend, do not attach high costs to their behavior". And if we also accept that „balancing is done for security and it always

entails costs". Then how does Romania's alliance „with the Axis for protection from Russia, Hungary, and Bulgaria", concluded only after Germany compelled it to cede one third of its territory to those three states qualify as bandwagoning⁴⁷.

These are not questions of interest to theorists only. They have significant policy implications. Bandwagoning implies aggressive intent and behavior against the balance of power *status quo* as well as against those who support that *status quo*. Misattributing aggressive motivation to what might otherwise be considered a friendly state and natural ally ignores possibilities that might be exploited by *status quo* powers in their favor.

4. Bipolarity in a Multipolar World

The imposition of artificial bipolarity in Neorealist theory is one of its major and most persistent weaknesses. In Waltz' terminology, the *de facto* bipolar confrontation is between *the stronger* and *the weaker sides*. For Walt, it is between *the most dangerous threat* (sometimes *the dominant power*) and *the second most dangerous threat*. Schweller is less clear on this point but it seems that the alternatives are the *status quo-oriented great power* (which he calls the „lion") and the *revisionist great power* (the „wolf").

Implicit in this Manichean world is that only one power can threaten the system (or the state) at a time⁴⁸. This is an illogical presumption. While the preservation of the system *status quo* would necessarily imply common interests for all *status quo* oriented states, the same system may be revised in a multitude of directions. The only necessarily common factor that unites revisionist states at any point in time is the destruction of the existing *status quo*. Returning to the classical Realists, the world is composed of two *types* of states in terms of their orientation to the system *status quo*, not two *camp*s.

How does this imposition of artificial bipolarity affect analysis of small state alliance behavior? Primarily, it increases the probability

that a threat perception and a response behavior will be misattributed since the framework of the theory - „the analyst" - has defined which is the „strongest" or „most dangerous threat" *a priori*. The same problem arises regarding the behavior of other great powers in a multipolar world whose choices, according to the theory, are reduced to allying with one side or the other⁴⁹. Even during the global conflicts of World War I and II, coterminous secondary conflicts abounded, as Waltz acknowledged⁵⁰.

For small states the multipolar world is truly multipolar, with a multiplicity of possible threats. The most dangerous threat which a small state perceives may not be evident to either „the analyst" or to other great powers, who are focused, according to the theory, on the first or second strongest or most dangerous, but not on the third, fourth, or fifth greatest threat. When the possibility of local conflicts, which regularly fall below the radar of great powers and system's theorists, is added into the equation, it emerges that small states may face multiple threats even under conditions of system bipolarity⁵¹. Since third party actors are excluded from the theoretical framework, the motivations of small states which ally with the analyst's „strongest" or „most dangerous" threat are

either simply imputed to be aggressive and opportunistic or the definition of bandwagoning motivations is expanded to include what would

normally be considered classic defensive response balancing behavior if applied to great powers.

5. Methodology and Theory

Rewriting the literature, it emerges that small states are regularly attributed motivations for joining alliances which do not meet even the most basic criteria of „alliance“ (a joining together in some common interest). One suspects that alliance motivation categories hypothesized with little empirical foundation and have proven irrationally resistant to empirical challenge. Walt's hierarchy of small state bandwagoning motivations, for instance, includes first, to avoid attack by the great power it is allying with and to direct that great power's aggressive intent elsewhere, and second, to „share in the spoils“ of the great power's presumed victory, i.e., opportunistic revisionism. Schweller has slightly more extensive hierarchy of alliance motivations: (1) to pursue revisionism, (2), to appease the great power threat by allying with it and to divert the aggressive intent of its great power ally, (3) to avoid sanction for being on the losing side, and (4) to balance against „more pressing dangers“.

An examination of these motivations reveals that Walt and Schweller both include one category, that of allying to avoid attack and/or diverting the aggressive intent of its great power partner elsewhere, which does not constitute an alliance even by its minimal definition. (Nor is it validated in Walt's empirical research). Additionally, Schweller's category of allying to avoid sanction for being on the losing side is not an alliance motive at all. It is instead a motive for leaving one alliance, only possibly for another. Logically, if a state were unallied it could not be on the losing side of a conflict between alliances⁵². On the basis of this exercise, Walt is left with one category of small state motivations for bandwagoning: revisionism, and Schweller with two: revisionism and seeking „protection from more pressing dangers“.

It is worthwhile examining how these motivations track with small state-oriented empirical and non-Neorealist theoretical work on alliances with great powers. Perhaps the most concise security-based explanation of the motivation for such alliances is expressed in

Johan Holst's assertion that small states ally „because they obtain „drawing rights“ on the military capability of great powers⁵³. This explanation encapsulates both the defensive response bias of current Neorealist theory - the quest of a state with limited capabilities for survival as an independent and sovereign entity in the fact of threatening states possessing much greater capabilities - as well as the more aggressive acquisitive tendencies of revisionism emphasized by Schweller⁵⁴. Simply put, the military capabilities of the great power ally are necessary for the small state to pursue its aims, whether defensive or offensive.

It emerges from the empirical evidence, and from a more careful employment of the term „alliance“, that small states ally predominately for the very same reasons that great powers do: aggressive revision and reactive defense. The inability of Neorealism-based analyses of alliance behavior to perceive this is an artifact of the artificial bipolarity imposed by the theory: While the small state's alliance motivation may be the same as that of the great powers, it is evaluated differently and reassessed on the basis of with whom the small state allied.

Thus, Schweller's categories of bandwagoning includes „revision“ - the *raison d'être* of the bandwagon/primary aggressor, as well as „protection“ - the *raison d'être* of the primary balancer. The small state which allies for protection, however, is not bandwagoning even if the theory deems it to be so doing. It is allying with the bandwagon/aggressor identified by the theory/analyst to balance against another more immediate threat which does not fall within the bounds of the theoretical framework or the purview of the analyst. In short, the small state is balancing with the bandwagon, as illustrated in Figure 1. The current structure of the theory does not permit differentiation between the type of *bandwagoning* which implies either premeditated or opportunistic aggressive intent directed against the balance of power *status quo* as well as against those defending it, and the act of joining the *bandwagon* for defense from other aggressors.

6. Incompatible Alliances

Surmounting this obstacle requires the introduction of an awareness in the theory that there may be more than one bandwagon-balance dynamic in operation at any one time. Moreover, multiple bandwagon-balancer dynamics may be operating simultaneously on both the system level and at the local level. The key may lie in recognizing that states, and especially small states, may enter into incompatible alliances with a great power against a third party threat. Once the notion of *incompatibility* is introduced, third party threats reappear and the possibility of conflicting short and long term alliance goals emerges. As a result, the subsequent alliance forming and intra-alliance behavior of small states becomes more intelligible.

There is an opening in present Neorealist alliance theory; particularly in the literature focusing on the Third World, to redress the problem of artificial bipolarity and more readily identify instances of incompatible alliance. Stephen David describes the phenomenon of small states reacting primarily to third party threats in a bipolar world as *omnibalancing*. According to David, this concept „incorporates the need of leaders to appease secondary adversaries⁵⁵. However, these adversaries are secondary only in their power relationship to the two great power poles. In terms of the threat they present to the concerned small state they are primary.




Figure 1. BIPOLARITY AND ALLIANCE CHOICE

As David notes, „Third World leaders will bandwagon to a superpower threatening them in order to balance against the principal threats" which the same superpower is supporting, in the absence of other viable balancing partners⁵⁶. While other authors have also noted that small states key off of local/regional threats in joining alliances,

David is the first to specify that they may then ally with another, less immediate, threat in order to do so⁵⁷. He is also the first to suggest that this less immediate threat may be viewed as the primary aggressor/bandwagon in the system by another great power. This dynamic is described in Figure 2.




Figure 2. Incompatible alliance dynamic

Like David, Walt also describes the dynamic of incompatible alliance formation during the Cold War. Typically, a *status quo* - oriented small state under imminent and dangerous threat from a revisionist state seeks to balance the threat. Because of its location in a region where the influence and/or the interest of the *status quo* great power (the U.S.A.) is low; the *status quo* small state can only turn to a revisionist great power ally (the Soviet Union) to balance this threat. The imminently threatening state and the revisionist great power that might be available for balancing are in a compatible revisionist alliance together. Therefore, the threatened *status quo* state seeks alliance with the less-immediately-threatening revisionist great power to balance against its most immediate threat, even though the great power is allied to that threat. The key variables here are presence and immediacy of threat and the lack of available alliance alternatives.

The notion of *incompatibility* and *compatibility*, while akin to what Barry Buzan has termed „security complexes“, is less ambitious. It excludes consideration of such attributes as culture, tradition etc., which contribute to the nature and extent of relations between states. The notion of compatibility/incompatibility merely refers to whether the small state is in agreement with its great power ally on the need to maintain/restore the *status quo* balance of power or on the need to revise that balance. Once this is ascertained, a number of predictions about subsequent intra-alliance behavior can be made.

The implications of incompatibility for intra-alliance behavior are significant. Since such an alliance is based on circumstances of the moment rather than common orientation to the existing balance of power (i.e., long-term interests) it can be expected to last only so long as the specific circumstance of the threat does⁵⁸. Once that threat has been removed, reduced, or redirected, the great power ally itself becomes a dangerous threat to the small state ally; perhaps the most dangerous. Current political sympathies and long-term interest will motivate the small state to seek to exit the alliance as soon as the immediate cause for the alliance is

resolved or the opportunity arises. While David and Walt explicitly refer to the alliance formation behavior of Third World states in a bipolar world, the dynamic they describe is equally valid for the dilemma of small states under threat in a multipolar world.

The notion of incompatibility as a significant determinant of intra-alliance behavior is generally relegated to a footnote in political science and is practically non-existent in contemporary historiography. Historians who explicitly address motivational factors, tend to do so on a particularistic basis. Their studies generally do not examine how and why classes of states form incompatible alliances but rather how and why a particular state differend with its great power ally⁵⁹. Political scientists, for their part, tend err either by ignoring the issue or by presuming a compatibility between previous political orientation („prior tacit alignment“) and current alliance goals.

Waltz, for instance, avoids the issue entirely. Walt presumes compatibility and prior tacit alignment even while he empirically describes the dynamic of incompatible alliance. Snyder establishes compatibility as the norm when he states that: „Alliances generally strengthen alignments by introducing elements of precision, obligation, and reciprocity⁶⁰60. Schweller is categorical on a necessary correlation between compatibility and alliance, and makes a blanket refutation of Walt's and David's empirical work, asserting that „because members of military alliances always sacrifice some foreign policy autonomy; the most important determinant of alignment decisions is the compatibility of political goals, not imbalances of power or threat⁶¹“.

At most, passing reference is made to the rarity of incompatible alliances due to their problematic nature. For example, Schweller argues that:

<<Alliances are rarely a mix of revisionist and *status quo* states. This is because revisionist states will only join a defensive, *status quo* coalition if their survival absolutely demands it; otherwise they will flock together to overturn the *status quo*... For the same reason that

revisionist states flock together, *status quo* states cannot readily embrace a revisionist state: to do so would be to risk unraveling the *status quo* which they are committed⁶².>>

While it is true enough that “birds of a feather” prefer “to flock together” when circumstances allow; the essential element of incompatible alliance is *force majeure*, a predominant factor in small state alliance behavior.

The inability to differentiate *status quo* small states which balance against threat by entering into incompatible alliance with revisionist great powers, from revisionist small states which bandwagon in compatible alliances with revisionist great powers has several important effects. To begin with, it virtually ensures a consequent inability to comprehend or predict subsequent intra-alliance dynamics. This problem is likely to be exacerbated by the tendency to attribute or impose a compatibility of ends and means on the small state instead of deriving its alliance motivations empirically, leading to further confusion and greater „unpredictability“.

Additionally, evidence which indicates incompatibility will tend to be neglected if not disregarded outright as „anomalous“, further militating against an accurate evaluation. Finally, lack of differentiation and misidentification of alliance motivations will also tend to encourage policy makers to develop misdirected policies toward small states which enter into such alliances. Unless the incentive structure which led the small state to enter the alliance is properly understood, it cannot be altered to obtain desired changes in small state alliance behavior.

The potential impact of compatibility or incompatibility on specific aspects of the alliance such as the nature, duration, expectations within, and structure of the alliance is profound. The fact that compatibility is based on a common orientation to the balance of power - its maintenance/restoration or its revision - implies common long-term goals and common approaches to those goals. This in turn implies multiple contacts and linkages or, at least, the absence of barriers to close links

between a greater number of actors (political, military, economic and cultural elites) on a broader range of issue-areas. Moreover, since it is based on common long-term goals, compatibility implies alignments and alliances of longer-term duration generally preceding the outbreak of war (the *prior tacit alignment* assumed in most alliance theory).

Incompatible alliances, on the other hand, are based on oppositional long-term goals and thus imply more limited areas of agreement and fewer common approaches. It could be expected that contacts and linkages under conditions of incompatible alliance would be maintained between a narrower range of actors and across a more limited number of issue areas. Likewise, such linkages could be expected to be of shorter duration, established at the last moment in the manner of „coalitions“ rather than based on prior alignment or alliance.

The implications of compatibility, and incompatibility for independent action by the small state, particularly action which is manifestly against the interest of the great power ally, is even greater when one considers the inhibiting effect that military alliances generally have on smaller state allies even in peacetime. Genuine military cooperation and integration required for joint operations necessitates at least partial renunciation of state control over the lesser ally's military institution and at least minimal levels of interoperability and compatibility. In an empirical study of the impact of military alliances on participating small state members, Constantine Danopoulos concludes that „alliances limit the foreign and security policy freedom of member-states“⁶³. One reason they do so is because they make the military of the small state „overtly dependent on the alliance, particularly the Leading member, for war-related material, sophisticated training, and support“⁶⁴.

But this is neither the only nor the most important aspect of the leverage conferred to the great power in great power small state military alliances. As Danopoulos further notes:

<<... finally, and perhaps more importantly, sustained alliance participation leads officers to

pursue goals that may be beneficial to alliance interests but not always to the best interests and aspirations of their own nation. The latter, of course, could be due to genuine proalliance attitudes shared by the majority of the military, or the result of the decisive influence of key proalliance groups and/or cliques within the armed forces and the corresponding neutralization and demoralization of officers favoring an independent foreign policy⁶⁵>>.

The empirical evidence indicates that the mere existence of the alliance and its duration are likely to have a vital impact on the independence of the small state within the alliance. More specifically, they will tend to increase the ability of the great power partner to influence the small state ally through the latter's military institution. It stands to reason that compatibility enhances great power influence over the small state ally while incompatibility inhibits it.

Compatibility presupposes the latent and explicit conditions for the creation of a shared *Weltanschauung*. This may lead, *in extremis*, to an explicit effort at institutional synchronization in the political, military, economic, and even cultural domains, thereby reinforcing solidarity and identification with the great power alliance sponsor. In Hungary, for example, during the second half of the thirties, the „immediate and long-range revisionist aspirations" which made Hungary a compatible ally for Germany had the consequence of „synchronizing her internal political institutions and styles ever more closely with those of Nazi Germany⁶⁶.

As Danopoulos points out, the loyalties and interests of the small state's military tend to converge with those of the great power alliance sponsor. A greater readiness on the part of compatible ally elites to renounce individual state preferences for the sake of the „common good" and alliance solidarity can therefore be expected. Likewise, an increased tendency to evince sympathy for the preferences of the great power alliance partner on a much broader range of topics and policies than the purely military can be predicted⁶⁷. A compatible alliance implies conditions that tend to facilitate increasing

convergence of the small state's institutions, styles, attitudes, interests, and loyalties to those of its great power ally.

At the other end of the spectrum, incompatible alliances exist as the result of temporary circumstances. In the case of incompatible *status quo* small states allying with revisionist great powers, the small state is generally driven to the alliance by, and often immediately following, an aggression against it by a third power. Such an alliance does not imply a broader convergence of interest and loyalties, although aspects of convergence may be present once the alliance is formed. Beyond the immediate and limited common interest, incompatible small states could be expected to continue to perceive the desired end result of the alliance very differently from that of their great power partner. Likewise, given oppositional long-term goals, a generally shorter duration of alignment and alliance might be expected, as well as a lesser degree of institutional cooperation. These, in turn, would also tend to diminish the small state's identification with the goals and interests of the great power. Presumably, the development of a strong and solidary coalitional mentality would be inhibited and less loyalty „confusion" or value shifting that would tend to favor alliance interests over those of the state could be expected. In short, incompatible allies are likely to have a more favorable position from which to pursue independent national interests.

Incompatible allies could also be expected to enjoy an advantage concerning the alliance expectations of the great power partner. To the extent that the limited common interest in the alliance is easily perceivable, it is likely that the great power will expect that all goals of the small state do not necessarily coincide with its own. Since the great power is likely to anticipate that differences with its incompatible small state ally will appear in the normal course of events, such differences would possess an inherent legitimacy in the alliance relationship. The great power partner could be expected to tolerate and permit disagreements, even ones over fundamental alliance issues beyond the common

interest which provoked the small state ally to join the alliance in the first place.

On the other hand, a small state ally in compatible alliance could be expected to have common positions on a broader range of issues. This may lead the great power ally to tend to view it as a source of automatic and unquestioning support. It might be anticipated, for instance, that the great power would expect support for its revision of the international system and for any „new order“ that it champions, in all of its respects, from compatible allies. If and when differences appear even on non-fundamental issues, including over the pursuit by the small state of independent national interests, they are likely to provoke more intolerant and harsher reaction from the great power partner. Broad, long-term goal compatibility implies that small state allies will forego their own shorter-term interests in the alliance to further that goal. Generally, broad compatibility implies less great power tolerance for small state partner deviation. When such a difference occurs on a

fundamental issue, like continued military participation in the war, it might be interpreted as betrayal of the alliance itself, provoked even more drastic response from the great power ally.

Much of the following chapter dwells on the domestic political process in the cases under study. This detail is included primarily to highlight the processes by which small states can develop very different orientations to the balance of power. It is also included to differentiate the problems arising in small state-great power alliance stemming from the asymmetrical nature of the relationship from those caused by compatibility/ incompatibility. However, in terms of the theoretical contribution, it is sufficient to know the orientation of the small state to the balance of power, and whether this orientation is compatible with that of the great power ally, in order to predict important aspects of its subsequent intra-alliance behavior.

¹ Kenneth M. Waltz, *The Theory of International Politics*, Reading, M.A., Addison-Wesley, 1979. Waltz acknowledges aggressiveness and intent as a factor provoking the alliance-forming reaction only in passing.

² Waltz is explicit on the functional lack of differentiation and implicit on undifferentiated intention. In his reasoning, if a state possesses the capabilities necessary to change the system, it will seek to do so.

³ Since his theory is about why balances of power occur, he was not especially interested in why imbalances occur in the first place. Alliances that actively seek to change the system *status quo* or balance of power are left out of Waltz' analysis entirely.

⁴ Waltz (1979), p. 126.

⁵ Waltz (1979), p. 72-73.

⁶ In comparing the pre- and post-war II international systems, Waltz noted in passing that: „With many great powers, the concerns of some of them are regional, not global. With only two, their worries about each other cause them to encompass the globe. For all but the United State and the Soviet Union, problems are local or regional“. See Waltz (1979), p. 198.

⁷ Waltz (1979), p. 167. Waltz further notes that „Even under the greatest pressure, the unity of alliances is from complete“ since „even as they adjust to one another“, states in wartime alliance „continue to jockey for advantage and to worry about the constellation of forces that will form once the contest is over“. Ibid.

⁸ Waltz (1979), p. 165.

⁹ Here Waltz is undermining his own admonition that the quality of the historical writing be carefully controlled. See Waltz (1979), p. 43.

¹⁰ Dan Reiter, *Learning, Realism, and Alliance. The Weight of the Shadow of the Past*, in *World Politics*, 1994, Winter, vol. 46. He notes „realism provides the theoretical structure to support predictions opposite one another that, when facing a systemic threat, the affected minor powers could enter into alliances to either balance against or bandwagon with the threat“, p. 502.

¹¹ Hans Morgethau noted that „alliances are a necessary function of the balance-of-power operating in a multiple state system“, in „Alliances in Theory and Practice“, in Arnold Wolfers, ed., *Alliance Policy and the Cold War*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 185.

¹² Stephen M. Walt, *The Origin of Alliances* Ithaca, 1987, p. 17.

¹³ Walt refers to capability, proximity, and intent, although proximity might be subsumed under capability to carry out intent since adequate weapons delivery systems reduce the effect of proximity on the immediacy of the threat.

¹⁴ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Nelle Fuller, editor, in *Encyclopedia Britannica Great Books of the Western World* (1952), p. 85.

¹⁵ Walt (1987), p. 17.

¹⁶ Stephen M. Walt, „Testing theories of alliance formation: the case of Southwest Asia, „*International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Spring 1988), p. 278.

¹⁷ For a similar criticism see Randall Schweller, „Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In, „*International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), p. 82.

¹⁸ Stephen M. Walt, Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia, Vol. 42, No. 2 (1988), Spring, p. 283..

¹⁹ Ibid, pp. 283-284. Emphasis mine

²⁰ Van Staden makes the same point, noting that „the stronger side need be the sources of the danger". Alfred Van Staden, *Small State Strategies in Alliances: The case of the Netherlands*, in „*Cooperation and Conflict*", vol. 30, nr. 1, 1995, p. 45. See also, Walt (1987), pp. 17-21.

²¹ I consider Walt's difficulty the lesser because more rigor in following the guidelines he establishes would redress the problem. Walt, however, largely misses the problem.

²² Randal Schweller, *Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back*, in „*International Security*", vol. 19, nr. 1 (Summer), 1994, p. 80. Schweller notes that: „Without exception, the literature on alliance behavior in international relations theory has accepted Walt's definition of bandwagoning as aligning with the most menacing threat to a state's independence". See, e.g., Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, editors, *Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1991; Eric J. Labs, Robert G. Kaufman and Stephen M. Walt, „Balancing vs. Bandwagoning: A Debate", *Security Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Spring 1992); and Stephen Van Evera, „Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War", *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/1991). Van Evera goes so far as to describe bandwagoning as „giving in to threats" (p. 20).

²³ Stephen M. Walt, „Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power", *International Security*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Spring 1985), pp. 7-8. Somewhat tellingly, Walt then gives several examples of the second type of bandwagoning but none regarding either „avoidance" or „appeasement" motivated bandwagoning.

²⁴ Walt (1985), p. 55.

²⁵ Ibid, p. 75.

²⁶ Walt (1988), p. 279.

²⁷ In his earlier surveys of the Middle East, Walt notes that the tendency was to balance and bandwagoning was relatively rare. But, as he defines bandwagoning in this case as „alignment with the dominant state or coalition", we are still left in the dark as to whether the purported instances of bandwagoning were with the *most dangerous* or not. Walt (1988), p. 277. See also, Walt (1987) and Walt (1985).

²⁸ Walt (1988), p. 283.

²⁹ Walt (1988), pp. 292-293. See also Ferenc Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971, pp. 31-33. Vali also notes that „it was the Soviet threat, more menacing in its modern Stalinist form than the Tsarist pressures experienced in the past, that compelled Ankara to seek close political and military ties with the West". Ibid, p. 35.

³⁰ Walt (1985), p. 1, footnote 1.

³¹ Arnold Wolfers, „Alliances", in David I. Sills, ed., *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, New York, Macmillan, 1968, p. 268. See also, Glenn H. Snyder, „Alliances, balance, and stability", *International Organization*, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Winter 1991), p. 122. Alternately, George Modelski defines „alignment" as „all types of political cooperation", and alliance as „military collaboration" in „The Study of Alliance: A Review", *Journal of Conflict Revolution*, Vol. 7, No. 4 (December 1963), pp. 769-776.

³² Schweller (1994), pp. 85-95.

³³ See, ce.g., Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962; Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1948; Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, New York, Harper and Row, 1946; Frederick L. Schuman, *International Politics: The Destiny of the Western State System*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1948.

³⁴ As Wolfers noted: Because self-extension almost invariably calls for additional power, countries that seek self-extension tend to be the initiators of power competition and the resort to violence. Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics*, Baltimore, p. 96.

³⁵ *Primary balancing* is used here to denote the action of the great power balancing alliance sponsor. Small states joining this alliance engage in *secondary balancing*.

³⁶ Schweller (1994), p. 74-76.

³⁷ Ibid, pp. 106-107.

³⁸ Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliances, Balance and Stability*, *International Organization*, vol. 45, no. 1, Winter, 1991, p. 128; Reiter (1994), p. 503; Schweller (1994). Walt also noted that neutrality was a response taken in his empirical study of Southwest Asia, but did not include it (considering it as bandwagoning) in his theoretical discussion. See Walt (1988), p. 308.

³⁹ Schweller (1994), p. 103. See also, Randall Schweller, „Tripolarity and the Second World War". *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 37, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 84 and 87-92. Here Schweller appears to have missed entirely the perilous world in which small states exist and the dangers presented them by all great powers.

⁴⁰ Schweller (1994), p. 102.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 102. Schweller is evidently defining his „weak states" both from the perspective of power and internal stability as either small states/weak powers or weak/internally vulnerable state structures, or both.

⁴³ Donald Kagan. *On the Origins of war and the Preservation of Peace*, New York, 1995. pp. 408-409. Skoda armaments, machine-guns and munitions were among the most sought after in Europe and the Germans were uncomfortably surprised by the strength and extent of (untried) Czechoslovak fortifications during their occupation.

⁴⁴ Schweller (1994), p. 84. See his remarks regarding Eric Laibs, „Do Weak States Bandwagon" *Security Studier*, Vol. I, No. 3 (Spring 1992), p. 409.

⁴⁵ Schweller may be equating the German-sponsored puppet states of Croatia, Slovakia, and Vichy France with the states of which they originally formed a part, although he is not specific on this point. Wherever the case, Croatia was decidedly not representative of Yugoslavia, nor Slovakia of Czechoslovakia, nor Vichy France of the French Fourth Republic.

⁴⁶ Schweller (1994), p. 102. His article actually states "... which viewed Russia's territory as irredenta" but this is obviously a typographical error as the reference to Romanian Besarabia - annexed by Russia; Transylvania - annexed by Hungary; and southern Dobrudja - annexed by Bulgaria is clear.

⁴⁷ Schweller (1994), pp. 106-107 and 102.

⁴⁸ Waltz, Walt, Snyder, and others recognized the possibility of local and regional threats but then set them aside and continued on with a model of artificial bipolarity.

⁴⁹ As Stanley Hoffman has noted, „it is a mistake to treat issues in which third parties are controled as if these countries were pawns in a global balancing game, instead of dealing with the issues' intrinsic merits and the nations' interests". Stanley Hoffman, *Primary or World Order*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1978, p. 175, footnote 5.

⁵⁰ See, Waltz (1979), p. 167;

⁵¹ See, e.g., Waltz (1979), p. 198; Walt (1988), p. 311; Snyder (1990), p. 108 and Snyder (1991), p. 131; Reiter (1994), p. 504.

⁵² While one might argue that such a state might have a great deal to lose in any case if it were not on the winning side, the essentially asymmetrik aspects of great power-small state relations means that all small states have a great deal to lose in war no matter whether or with whom they are allied. There is no logical reason why an unallied state should lose more than a state allied with the winner at the end of a war. The experiences of Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, and Turkey are illustrative in this regard.

⁵³ Johan Holsti, „Liliputs and Gulliver Small States in a Great-Power Alliance", in G. Flynn, editor, *NATO Northern Allies. The National Security Policies of Belgium, Denmark, the Netherland and Norway*, London, Croom Helm, 1985, p. 259. Secondary reasons for such alliances include other sorts of power amplification such as enhanced international status and political about at well as access to military and economic assistance. See, e.g., Van Staden (1995), pp. 31-51, and A. Schou and A. O. Brundtland, editors, *Small States in International Relations*, Stockholm, Almqvist and Wilsell, 1971.

⁵⁴ Robert Rothstein's work represents a very good example of the former school. See, Robert Rothstein, *Alliances and Superpowers*, New York. 1966, p. 29.

⁵⁵ Stephen David, *Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991, p. 236.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 25. David is essentially describing a regional „security complex" in which the small state threatened by two revisionist powers balances with the lesser or more temporally distant threat - i.e., a political versus a military threat or a less immediate military threat - against a greater or more immediate military threat. See Buzan (1983), pp. 105-106.

⁵⁷ See, c.g., Reiter (1994), p. 504: „A minor power can also be threatened (and therefore prefer alliance) if it perceives the possibility of being attacked based on a more specific, local issue, such as a demand for the revision of a territorial border. Such a threat could come from one or more states, great or minor".

⁵⁸ It follows that the alliance may be prolonged if the revisionist great power ally possesses the ability to penalize the small state with what it considers unacceptably harsh sanctions should it try to leave the alliance. This is not equivalent with capitulation which presupposes a lack of alliance. Rather, it represents entrapment, a development occuring while under alliance

⁵⁹ For example, concerning Romania, see: Kurt Treptow et al., *A History of Romania*, Iași, Center for Romanian Studies, 1997; Mark Axworthy et al., *Third Axis, Fourth Ally: Romanian Armed Forces in the European War 1941-1945*, London, Arms and Armour Press, 1995; Keith Hitchens, *Rumania 1866-1947*, Oxford, University of Clarendon Press, 1994, pp. 437-500; Watts (1993); Dov B. Lungu, *Romania and the Great Powers 1933-1941*, Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1989. For Hungary, see: Jorg K. Hoensch, *A History of Modern Hungary 1867-1994*, London, Longman, 1996; Ignac Romsics, editor, *20th Century Hungary and the Great Powers*, Boulder, Social Science Monographs, 1995; Thomas Sakmyster, *Hungary's Admiral on Horseback: Miklos Hortly 1918-1944*, Boulder, East European Monographs, 1994; Sugar (1990); Fenyó (1972), *op. cit.*, Carlyle A. Macartney, *October Fiteenth: A History of Modern Hungary 1929-1945*, Two Volumes, Edinburgh, University of Edinburgh Press, 1956-7. For Finland, see: H. M. Tilloşon, *Finland at Peace and War: 1918-1993*, Norwich, Michael Rassel, 1993; Jukka Tarkka, *Neither Stalin Nor Hitler: Finland During the Second World War*, Helsinki, Ottawa, 1991; Stig Jagerskiöld, *Mannereim: Marshal of Finland*, London, C. Hurst and Co, 1986; Wuorinen (1983); Max Jakobson, *The Diplomacy of the Winter War. An Account of the Russo-Finnish War 1939-1940*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961; C. Leonard Lundim, *Finland in the Second World War*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1957. Even in his excellent comparative work, Joseph Rothschild draws no conclusions about the fundamental orientations of the states which entered into alliance with Germany during World War II. See Rothschild (1992), especially, pp. 137-199 and 281-322. In a more recent work, Gerhard Weinberg notes the common points which made both Finland and Romania incompatible allies of Germany. See, Weinberg (1994), pp. 99-100, 134-8, 182-5, and 194-6.

⁶⁰ Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut*, *Journal of International Affairs*, Spring, 1990, 108.

⁶¹ Schweller (1994), p. 88.

⁶² Schweller (1993), pp. 83-84.

⁶³ Constantine P. Danopoulos, „Alliance Participation and Foreign Policy Influence: The Military's Role”, *Armed Forces and Society*, Volume II, No. 2 (Winter 1985), pp. 286-287.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ Rothschild (1992), p. 177. Rothschild explains this as the result of Hungary's need to assure German support of Hungarian revisionist aspirations, but the primary dynamic was that of Hungary surrendering independence because of its compatible alliance with Germany.

⁶⁷ While this phenomenon is not entirely unidirectional, it is clearly the small state that undergoes the greater assimilation and becomes the most vulnerable through the loyalty convergence of some of its key elites. This is somewhat akin to Snyder's „halo” effect. See Snyder (1997), p. 8.