

# *The EU Policy Concerning the Disintegration of Former Yugoslavia*

*Cases: Slovenia, Croatia, FYROM*

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## 1.0 Introduction

*"Yugoslavia was dead before its corpse was dismembered by the secession of Croatia and Slovenia although delay in issuing an internationally valid death certificate and the timing and way in which its heirs were and were not recognized would tragically prolong and aggravate violent and brutal post-mortem agony"*\*

At this time we are finally able to see the lights in the end of the tunnel for the former Yugoslavia. Only a year ago the world witnessed the fall of Slobodan Milosevic. We all had a little bit hard to breathe at the time when the TV-cameras caught the historic moment when the tractors invaded the city of Belgrade. The fall of a despotic regime had begun. And then came the results of the elections of the 23<sup>rd</sup> of December 2000. Milosovic and his socialist-party received a heavy blow in the democratic elections in the Republic of Serbia. Suddenly it was much easier to breathe, although there is too early to get a clear picture of where this democratic revolution will stop, and what the final outcome will be.

Why do I began this paper writing about this? As the heading clearly shows, this paper is not about Serbia, it is not even about the same moments in time. In my defence, I see the fall of the Milosovic-regime as one of the

final steps for the former Yugoslavia on its way to democracy and its new place on the arena of post-Cold War Europe. As I see it, the whole process of Yugoslav dissolution is interconnected. You have to go back in time and look at the first moves from republics like Slovenia and Croatia towards independence, to get a better understanding of the situation in former Yugoslavia today. The disintegration of Yugoslavia raises a huge amount of questions, and in this essay I will try to answer some of these. As the heading shows three cases will be at the focus of my attention. These cases are: Slovenia, Croatia and FYROM<sup>1</sup>. My analytical focus will be on one of the main external actors in the disintegration process, The European Union (EU)<sup>2</sup>.

I will begin this paper with some comments on why the EU did involve itself in the situation in the first stance. After this short section I will go deeper into the question of:

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\* Dennison Rusinow, "The Avoidable Catastrophe", in Sabrina Petra Ramet and Ljubisa S. Adamovich (eds.): *Beyond Yugoslavia: Politics, Economics, and Culture in a Shattered Community*. Westview Press: Boulder, 1995, p. 33.

***The EU policy concerning the disintegration of former Yugoslavia.*** Under this section I will go through some different aspects of the approach from this external actor. First I will take a look at *how the policy was shaped, if it was changed during the process and if we can notify some differences between the cases.* Second I will take a closer look at *the role the EU played during the process of disintegration.* Third and last under

this section, I will discuss some of *the actions and means taken in use* by the EU during the difficult months. My time focus will be mainly on *the early 90s.* After this section I will present *a short discussion on the future role of the EU towards the three mentioned states.* In the conclusions at the end of this paper I will present the results of my analysis, and some comments on the successfulness of the EU approach towards the disintegration.

## 2.0 Why would the EU involve itself?

During the Cold War Yugoslavia had been a special case among the communist countries in Europe. After Tito broke with Stalin in 1948, a whole new situation emerged, both for Yugoslavia and for the rest of Europe. Tito chose to keep his ties to the communist states, but he also established certain strong ties to the western world. The republics in the Yugoslav federation could build relationships with the West, during the area of the communist regime. This is important, and can, alongside with Yugoslavia's favourable geographical localisation in Europe, help us to explain the important question: Why did the EU involve itself?

James Gow<sup>3</sup> presents four reasons why the EU had to get involved. First of all, the EU felt a sense of responsibility. Second, Yugoslavia seemed like a good opportunity to demonstrate the capacities of its new Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It was at the beginning of this project, but some member states like Italy, Germany and France had longed for this moment for years. Third, Italy and Greece share borders with some of the republics and borders are important for many reasons, but the threat of refugees and instability are keywords. The powerful member state Germany and the soon-to-become member state Austria were also not far geographically from some republics. And there must be mentioned that

both Slovenia and Croatia had strong ties to the powerful catholic societies in western Europe. Fourth there was a strong worry about the impact of self-determination and nationalism. In these times the member states of the EU was busy discussing the meaning of "the European Idea". It is the idea of a more integrated Europe, where borders become less important and where national interest is exchanged for higher common goals and interests. Although you can not compare the EU with the Yugoslav federation, the fall of the federation let loose ideas that could not easily go along with the EU's understanding of the European Idea as described. The EU wanted to build an economic and political union, and the understanding of central politicians in former Yugoslavia of the European Idea could in this sense be seen as "old-fashioned".

Some of this has to do with the well-being of an organization as a collective body. The old saying goes like this: if one part is sick, the whole is sick. You can apply this to both the member states and the Europe as a whole. If some member state is not feeling well, because of a situation, the organisation is not feeling well either. Or, if some part of Europe is not feeling good, how can the rest of Europe feel good? There became a pressure from within the organization so that the EU should involve itself in the situation and act as a mediator.

### 3.0 The EU policy concerning the disintegration of former Yugoslavia.

*"...competing national interests and domestic disagreements among Western states led to ambiguity and mixed messages."*\*

#### 3.1 Shaping a policy

When things started to happen in Yugoslavia in the late 80s, it seems that the EU did not care very much about it. The message from the EU and its member states was pretty clear to all. As long as things happened without violence, there was no reason to mess with the outcomes. And of course the EU had other "businesses" that made its hair grey at this time. The EU together with the rest of the West was busy worrying about the situation in the Soviet Union and also the events in Hungary and Poland was more important at the moment. They were also of course pre-occupied with the unification of Germany.<sup>4</sup> But after a while the EU could no longer relax about what happened in Yugoslavia. The pressure became tighter. The EU had to develop a policy towards the situation in Yugoslavia.

Some basic goals was lined up for the EU policy. The first goal that determined much of the policy, was the goal of *keeping the former Yugoslavia together*. The second goal was to *encourage democratization and free elections*. Sad, but true, these goals were in this situation contradictory, and could not fit together when we look at the case of Yugoslavia. Attempts to preserve unity were undemocratic, and the promotion of democracy encouraged disintegration<sup>5</sup>. But one of the main problems was that the first goal was not shared by all the members of the EU. After the unification of Germany, Germany wanted to reassure its role as one of the major political locomotives in European politics. It was in a kind of freedom trance and had problems to understand why other nations who had the same longing for freedom and independence shouldn't get it.

Some have compared Germany in its role in the beginning of the disintegration as the bull in the china-shop<sup>6</sup>. Germany as the bull could have good intentions, but good intentions is not enough when you are surrounded by easy breakable stuff on all sides.

On the 13<sup>th</sup> of March 1991 The European Parliament passed a resolution saying *"that the constituent republics and autonomous provinces of Yugoslavia must have the right freely to determine their own future"*. This statement was harshly criticised by some. The EU had until now defended the position on the Yugoslav Problem, that it wanted to preserve the federation. On the 4<sup>th</sup> of April 1991 The Troika, representing the presidency of the European Council (Luxembourg, Italy, Netherlands) visited Belgrade. The Troika tried to allay doubts about the EU's position and to reaffirm the EU's support for the preservation of the federations unity. The Troika made its point clear by meeting only with federal office holders and refraining from direct contact with leaders of the republics. Only a week after, the Slovene president, Milan Kucan, met with the German foreign minister, Hans Dietrich-Genscher in Bonn. As we already can see, the approach from the EU toward the situation was so far both ambiguous and fuzzy. In May the EU's position was again modified. Another trip to Belgrade was arranged. The president of the European Council, Jacques Santer, and the president of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, visited Belgrade and this time they also had meetings with the presidents of the "troublesome" republics. But again the EU rocked the boat when the crisis made by Slovenia's and Croatia's attempt to independence made the EU do their final

\*Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War*. The Brookings Institution: Washington DC, 1995, p.161.

attempt to solve this first crisis of the Yugoslav dissolution. On the 23<sup>rd</sup> of June 1991 The EU's foreign ministers agreed *not* to acknowledge unilateral declarations of independence and affirming that they would *refuse* any contact with the secessionists<sup>7</sup>. Only a few weeks earlier Italy had begun to reverse Italian policy. They received official visits from both Slovenia and Croatia. Some member states acted more and more on their own. France was not very satisfied with the situation and criticized the moves from the pro-independence member states.

Slovenia was the most westernized of the republics inside former Yugoslavia. The Slovenia has a distinct culture and history, and less than two million inhabitants. The fact that there is no significant minority population has simplified domestic politics and permitted the emergence of a relatively democratic political ethos.<sup>8</sup> Slovenia's first democratic elections in more than 40 years were held in April 1990.<sup>9</sup> The democratic elections had brought to power forces that worked for independence for Slovenia, and the secession of Slovenia from Yugoslavia.

The Croat case is maybe the most difficult case. The centre became the battle between two types of nationalism. The Serbs were the largest minority with 12 percent of the population.<sup>10</sup> On the one side you had the Croat nationalism and on the other side there was the Serb nationalism. The Serbs of Croatia took up armed resistance, that were aided by the Yugoslav army units that were in the territory<sup>11</sup>. This made the situation difficult, and war was inevitable. In Slovenia and FYROM, nationalism was not the biggest troublemaker. There must be noted that the nationalist rhetoric of Franjo Tudjman in Croatia was not of the lightest sort. Croatia is possibly the only one of the cases, where a minority group was in fact threatened by the disintegration process.

FYROM is a special case. This small Yugoslav republic was the poorest of the republics in former Yugoslavia, and it was one of the most supportive of the federation. As

was the case for Slovenia, someone had to pay more than it receives in a federation. FYROM was among the republics that received more than it contributed. FYROM had the goal of keeping the federation together. But they were out of line with reality. After a while they also moved towards the goal of independence from the Yugoslav federation.

### 3.2. Action and means in use

*"Neither the EC nor the CSCE had the military capacity to act or even to mount a credible threat to intervene with force that might deter those willing to use force in Yugoslavia"*

Once involved in the conflict, what was the means available for the EU? There was no military force available to them. As we know the first moves from the disintegration happened at the same time as the EU became serious on discussing a common foreign and security policy. So the EU had two options: the use of political/moral means or the use of economic means. The EU chose both. The "carrot and stick"-method was used when they made use of their economic means. To make use of this in what seems to be an ethnic conflict is discussable and some will say, doomed to failure. The people in the conflicts had a pre-occupation with their psychological need to assert their national identity, and with their nations physical security, rather than economic prosperity.

After some time of verbal involvement, the EU decides to get physically involved in the situation. On the 15<sup>th</sup> of June 1991 the first observers from the EU come to Slovenia. Something was going on, but one have to ask if the EU knew *what*. On the 23<sup>rd</sup> of June 1991 the EU offered help to the Federal Government and the Republics to draw up a new constitution. This was two days before the declaration of independence from Slovenia and Croatia! On the 25<sup>th</sup> of June both Slovenia and Croatia declared themselves for independent states. Two days

<sup>7</sup>Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War*. The Brookings Institution: Washington DC, 1995, p.165.

later Slovenia is attacked by the Yugoslav National Army (JNA). The fighting lasts for 10 days only, but the impact of this episode is far-reaching. The "outer-world" had just witnessed the first "war-like" situation, descending from the disintegration of Yugoslavia. From this event, the "headache" for the EU is starting to get real heavy. And it will be heavier. On the 5<sup>th</sup> of July 1991 the EU decides weapon embargo and the suspending of almost \$1 billion in economic aid against the federal government of Yugoslavia. On the 7<sup>th</sup> of July 1991 the EU troika, representatives from the Yugoslav federal government and the republics sign a cease-fire. This happening has been named the Brioni Declaration. It was the very first test for the EU as mediators, but it is also the EU's first ever effort at peacekeeping. The EU demands that Slovenia and Croatia shall wait 3 months with their declarations on independence and start negotiations instead. This move can be seen as a recognition of the legitimacy of their declarations<sup>12</sup>. On the 8<sup>th</sup> of November the EU decides economic sanctions on all the republics of Yugoslavia, but the door is left open for bilateral agreements with republics that are willing to cooperate. On the 2<sup>nd</sup> of December the foreign ministers of the EU decide that the economic sanctions are only for Serbia and Montenegro. The EU is no longer neutral in the conflict. But on the 17<sup>th</sup> of December, the Council of Ministers decide to recognize within 15<sup>th</sup> of January 1992 those Yugoslav republics who want it, and fulfil the obligations put forward to them. The EU had already the day before on the 16<sup>th</sup> of December decided not to recognize FYROM.<sup>13</sup> Six days later Germany recognizes Slovenia and Croatia as independent states. As promised, on 15<sup>th</sup> of January 1992, Slovenia and Croatia are recognized by the EU.

One of the most interesting aspects of the relationship between the EU and FYROM is how the EU could let one single member state decide the whole policy towards this state. FYROM was singled out for discriminatory treatment<sup>14</sup>. In December 1991 FYROM appealed for recognition by the EU as the other former Yugoslav republics had

done. The European Community Arbitration Commission (the Badinter Commission) determined that of the four ex-Yugoslav republics seeking recognition, only Slovenia and Macedonia met the criteria for recognition, including those related to human rights.<sup>15</sup> These criteria centred on CSCE principles concerning human rights, democratic rule, and inviolable borders.<sup>16</sup> But Greece used their power, their right to use veto to stop the recognition. As late as 12<sup>th</sup> of March 1993 the EU decides to give recognition to FYROM<sup>17</sup>. It was in fact possible because of the change of name from *the Republic of Macedonia* to *the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*. This name was easier for Greece to swallow. This name is the international name for the state, but it is not recognized for use internally in FYROM.

The lack of the right means is probably one of the reasons for explaining why the EU approach was so fuzzy and ambiguous. The EU was still largely a bureaucracy for economic coordination. So when it was placed in a new role, that demanded the use of different means, it was not an easy situation. As long as the EU did not have the means to follow up on threats, they did not have the credibility to present such threats.

As we have seen, there was a sort of split among the member states of the EU, according to how to handle the situation. If the EU in fact had the means available to follow up on their threats, there is not sure that they had presented such threats. There is a probability that there could have been a lack of will.

### 3.3. *The different roles*

As I now have looked at both the shaping of the EU approach, and the means taken in use by the EU, it is time to take a more close look at the different roles the EU had in the process. At the beginning of the process, after the EU had decided to engage in the situation, there was a great problem that had to be dealt with. The Yugoslav federation was recognized by the international community, and the republics was subdued to the authority of the federal government. The

question raised was how the EU or other external actors should play their role. The problem discussed was if external actors could intervene, in what seemed to be another states internal affairs. This must have been one of the premises that the EU based their first approach to the situation on.

Gow<sup>20</sup> identifies three different roles for the EU during the disintegration process. He argues that the EU shifts focus from *an mediating role* to *an bullying role* to *an operational role*. In the beginning we can clearly see the EU in their mediating role. The approach was soft in its style, but tightened after pressure from individual member states and from the Yugoslav actors themselves. In this role the EU tried to balance between the support for changes and democratization to the support for continued life for the federation. The mediation the EU was involved in at this time was to try to be the neutral external player, that only had the goal of peace and stability in their mind when operating.

After a while the EU became tougher in their approach and started to use threats and promises as means to receive control over the situation. They promised economic support to the actors who would follow the preferred policy choice of the EU, and economic sanctions on those actors who did not support this. After a while this combination of mediation and bullying seems to have been what ignited the end of the period for the EU as a neutral player. This has of course also something to do with the shift in policy from the EU towards what was the preferred outcome. Individual countries in the EU gave pressure to this change. After this mentioned combination of the roles things changed. The Brioni meeting was a milestone in this sense. Here the EU had its first ever test as a mediator between actors using force against each other. When the EU took this role, they did in a way recognize the causes of the republics seeking independence. But they had no other choice. After this meeting the EU also had their very first operational role. As mentioned, the EU was involved in a series of cease-fire negotiations first in Slovenia and a while after in Croatia. The EU was also

responsible for organizing a CSCE monitoring force to oversee the implementation of the agreements.

The disintegration in former Yugoslavia became the first big test for the EU as an foreign policy actor to rely on, and who could manage to coordinate the wishes and interests of its member states. As we have seen, the EU was itself in the middle of a process of change. This was indeed the time where words like integration, cooperation, supra-nationalism and coordination were trying to get a more meaningful and deeper location in the visions for the future of the organization. But of course it was a difficult situation for the EU, as it wanted the role as the main foreign policy maker in Europe, when important members could not agree on how to handle the Yugoslav crisis, their first big test. They chose instead to rely on the old way method, spreading their message under their national flags. When the tactics of weapon embargo was brought into use, it was in the beginning seen as a collective punishment to the actors involved. But after some days the EU must have realised how bad this approach was. So they lifted the embargo for all the republics, but not for Serbia and Montenegro. They must have understood that the Serbs had little problems getting their hands on weapons through their control over the JNA. And that this policy therefore did only make problems worse for the other actors.

#### 4.0 The future role of the EU

Now that the three states in question are independent, and it seems like its going better in the rest of former Yugoslavia, has the EU still got a role to play? The answer must be a definite yes! The EU has some very important tasks in the future to work with. Firstly, all the countries see membership in the European Union as one of their major goals for the future. Whether or not this will become a reality, it is important that the EU supports Slovenia, Croatia and FYROM in a broad range of aspects. The EU must support further democratization, institution building and provide needful help for keeping the

stability in both the economical and political sense. Now almost ten years after the disintegration of former Yugoslavia took start, there is still a high sense of uncertainty and instability for the states mentioned in this essay. It seems like Slovenia has moved fast forward compared to the others. Slovenia is accepted as a candidate for membership in the European Union, and is likely to become a member in the nearby future.

The situation for the cases as a whole is not yet decided. Much of this has of course to do with what will happen in the rest of former Yugoslavia. Another factor that is important, is what kind of politicians the people in the different states elect to rule their states. If for example the Croat people go for another Tudjman, the future might not look so bright after all. The single most important economic contribution the EU provides to the states is financial funding under the PHARE programme. The second is the OBNOVA programme. PHARE is currently the main

## **5.0 Conclusions**

The main goal of the policy from the EU towards the future for Yugoslavia after the Cold War was to keep it together. This should happen without violence. These two goals did not get fulfilled. What happened to Yugoslavia was rather different from this. The disintegration of former Yugoslavia started with Slovenia. This was also the first arena for violence stemming from the disintegration process. Croatia broke out at the same time as Slovenia, and when the JNA troops leaved Slovenia, they headed straight for Croatia. Of the three cases I have chosen for this essay, only FYROM survived the break-up of Yugoslavia, without the spilling of blood. The JNA forces was of course also stationed on the territory of FYROM, but they left rather peacefully and voluntarily.

As became clear for the EU after a while, the goal of keeping the federation together was not shared by all its member states, and not shared by the newly democratic elected political forces in the republics in question. So the approach from the EU was not supported by all of its own

channel for the European Union's financial and technical cooperation with the countries of central and eastern Europe. This funding helps among other things to build up institutions and provides help on investment. OBNOVA is an EU initiative for rehabilitation and reconstruction in the countries of the former Yugoslavia. Croatia was suspended from PHARE in 1995, but after the Dayton-Paris agreement ended the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, Croatia was taken in from the cold by the EU. FYROM was the first country to start negotiations with the EU to conclude a Stabilization and Association Agreement, and has started to normalize also the relations with their old archenemy Greece.

The EU will continue to play a role in the area. It is in the interest of the EU that the Balkans in the future will be a stable and good place to live. There is a possibility that the EU will meet a brighter future if the future in the Balkans will be bright. It is important for a lot of issues, for both economy, markets, politics and security.

member states, and that was a great problem. These were the times of integration and coordination in Europe and specially for the EU. So the policy became fuzzy, uncoordinated and ambiguous. The main problem was that the EU reacted to rather than anticipated events. There should be made a difference between the approach from the EU in the early stages of the disintegration process and the EU approach to the later stages of the process. The EU approach to the disintegration of former Yugoslavia, with the cases of the Slovenia, Croatia and FYROM, cannot be characterized as successful. In fact, I will rather use the strong term of "political failure" in characterizing this. The EU did not have the right means for use. It could have been an easier task and some outcomes could have been different. If the EU had military force to their dispose, they could have used this with credibility under the well-known tactics of coercive diplomacy. When the EU lacked this force, they could not make use of such tactics, because their credibility was worth nothing

in this sense. It could have been different for the EU, if they had been prepared for the situation from the start. They were completely unprepared.<sup>19</sup>

The length of this paper clearly states that I could not discuss all interesting aspects of the theme. But one question that needs to be explored further is if the intervention of external forces like the EU made the process of disintegration any different. The disintegration of Yugoslavia happened with conflict and violence. Was this inevitable, or

had the external forces the role of catalysts? My opinion is that this question deserve its own paper. And maybe Richard Holbrooke, the famous diplomat and architect of the Dayton-agreement is right when he refers to the former Yugoslavia as the greatest collective security failure of the West since the 1930s.<sup>20</sup> And maybe he was right when he said: "*Europe believed it could solve Yugoslavia without the United States; Washington believed that, with the Cold War over, it could leave Yugoslavia to Europe*".<sup>21</sup>

### Notes:

<sup>1</sup> I will use the term FYROM throughout the whole paper for convenience to refer both to the period before 1993 when the term the Republic of Macedonia was used, and the period after the international recognition, with the name Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

<sup>2</sup> I will use the term EU throughout the paper for convenience to refer both to the European Union and the European Community, although properly, the latter term EC, should be used when referring to the period before 1 November 1993. I rely on James Gow for this decision, but I take the full responsibility for adopt this solution to my essay.

<sup>3</sup> James Gow, "Security and Democracy: the EU and Central and Eastern Europe", in Karen Henderson (ed.): *Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union*. UCL Press Limited, London, 1999.

<sup>4</sup> Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War*. The Brookings Institution: Washington DC, 1995, p.161.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* pp.144 -155.

<sup>5</sup> Sabrina Petra Ramet, "Slovenia's Road to Democracy", in Sabrina Petra Ramet and Ljubisa S. Adamovich (eds.): *Beyond Yugoslavia: Politics, Economics, and Culture in a Shattered Community*. Westview Press, Boulder, 1995a

<sup>6</sup> Saadia Touval, "Lessons of Preventive Diplomacy in Yugoslavia", in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Oster Hampson with Pamela Aall (eds.): *Managing Global Chaos: Sources and Responses to International Conflict*. United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC, 1996, p. 410.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.* p. 412.

<sup>8</sup> Jim Seroka, "Yugoslavia and its Successor States", in Stephen White, Judy Batt and Paul G. Lewis (eds.): *Developments in East European Politics*. Macmillan Press: London, 1993, p. 109.

<sup>9</sup> Sabrina Petra Ramet, "Slovenia's Road to Democracy", in Sabrina Petra Ramet and Ljubisa S. Adamovich (eds.): *Beyond Yugoslavia: Politics, Economics, and Culture in a Shattered Community*. Westview Press, Boulder, 1995a, p. 192.

<sup>10</sup> Svein Mønnesland, *Før Jugoslavia og etter*. Syress Forlag, Oslo, 1995, p. 355.

<sup>11</sup> Alex N. Dragnich, "The West's Mismanagement of the Yugoslav Crisis", in Alex N. Dragnich: *Yugoslavia's Disintegration and the Struggle for Truth*. Boulder: New York, 1995, p. 72.

<sup>12</sup> Sabrina Petra Ramet, "The Macedonian Enigma", in Sabrina Petra Ramet and Ljubisa S. Adamovich (eds.): *Beyond Yugoslavia: Politics, Economics, and Culture in a Shattered Community*. Westview Press, Boulder, 1995b, p. 215.

<sup>13</sup> Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War*. The Brookings Institution: Washington, D.C., 1995, p.165.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 218.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 216.

<sup>16</sup> Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War*. The Brookings Institution: Washington DC, 1995, p.121.

<sup>17</sup> Svein Mønnesland, *Før Jugoslavia og etter*. Syress Forlag, Oslo, 1995, p. 373.



<sup>18</sup> James Gow, "Nervous Bunnies: The international community and the Yugoslav War of Dissolution, the Politics of Military Intervention in a Time of Change", in the *Political Quarterly Publishing*. Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1994, p. 16.

<sup>19</sup> Misha Glenny, *The Balkans 1804-1999: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers*. Granta Books, London, 1999, p. 635.

<sup>20</sup> Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War*. Modern Library, New York, 1999, p. 21.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.* p. 29.

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