



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
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EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY*

Practically, there are two fundamental trends within the Euro-Atlantic interlocking security structures, overlapping and hopefully supporting each other. One is pointing out to the effort by NATO to develop its European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), and the other is aiming at shaping the EU's European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

Since 1996 Berlin North Atlantic Council, when NATO reiterated its intention to "build a European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance", the North Atlantic Organisation has gone quite a long way envisaging the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept. The concept has provided the modality through which the Europeans have able to use NATO assets in operations other than those referred to in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The creation of CJTF was a clear consequence of the line of thinking that led to the missions underlined by the new Strategic Concepts, adopted in 1991 and 1999, and established an even stronger relationship the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO since CJTF was primarily intended to enable WEU operations.

The EU, supported by WEU, also embarked on a very ambitious plan which started with the WEU Ministerial Council in June 1992, at Petersbeg, when the 10 member states of the Western Union (which are also EU and NATO members) declared their readiness to undergo missions not connected to common defence. The so called "Petersberg missions" were essentially crisis management missions. Since then the developments within EU have been quite remarkable. The Amsterdam Treaty introduced the concept of "mutual solidarity" referring to decisions on the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and created the post of "High Representative for CFSP".

The December 1998 joint Declaration by Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Jacques Chiriac in St. Malo, France followed and very clearly indicated that EU "must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises".

The June 1999 European Council in Cologne decided that those WEU prerogatives regarding "Petersberg operations" would be included in the EU, according to the Amsterdam Treaty, and consequently gave direction to the setting up of several committees and decision-making bodies in order to make this possible. Moreover, it introduced a much-debated dimension of the new operations undertaken by EU in direct connection with NATO. "For the effective implementation of EU-led operations the European Union will have to determine, according to the requirements of the case, whether it will conduct:

- EU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities or
- EU-led operations without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities".

In December 1999, at its meeting in Helsinki, the European Council set a concrete military "headline goal": "by the year 2003, cooperating together voluntarily, they will be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the

* Talking points at the 4th International Security Forum, 15-17 november, 2000, Geneva.

Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50000–60000 persons). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements. Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level within this to provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness. They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year. This will require an additional pool of deployable units (and supporting elements) at lower readiness to provide replacements for the initial forces”.

At this point in the development of such a complex undertaking changing the whole philosophy of the security arrangements in the Euro-Atlantic area, there were two fundamental questions to be addressed which still keep alive their meaning and inevitability:

1) Will the new EU security and defence structures in the making be capable to act in terms of sustainable troops deployment, adequate equipment, logistical support and reliable communications?

2) Will the EU be able to establish a practical working relationship based on transparency and complementarity with NATO without undermining the cohesiveness of the Alliance and to provide the maximum possible inclusiveness for non-EU NATO Allies?

The outcome at the Santa Maria da Feira European Council, in 19-20 June 2000, gave much room for hope since the Council decided to address the aforementioned issues: “Principles and modalities for arrangements have identified to allow non-EU European NATO members and other EU accession candidates to contribute to EU military crisis management. Principles for consultation with NATO on military issues and modalities for developing EU-NATO relations have also been identified in four areas covering security issues, capability goals, the modalities for EU access to NATO assets, and to definition of permanent consultation arrangements”.

Yet the two issues are still to be addressed in practical matters and we think this is the real challenge for the new Euro-Atlantic security structure.

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THE ACTORS WITHIN THE POWER EQUATION OF THE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Constantin HLIHOR
(Romania)

If in the internal political field and in the case of classic actors – the states – there are institutions that coordinate and order the entire action, these institutions don't exist within the system of international relations and when they exist, they don't usually have the capacity of enforcing their own will. For this reason, some analysts consider that the ensemble of international relations could be defined as “anarchical”¹. This opinion could be right if they referred to the fact that some institutions with universal vocation, constituted for creating and keeping the security within international relations didn't have the possibility of enforcing their will – the case of Nations Society² or, when they had such possibility, the use of force for imposing their will was strictly limited, as the case of ONU in the postwar period and after the Cold War³.

It is remarkable how the fact that the institutions and the organizations, which in one way or the other are involved in the management of international relations, refer more to the classic actors, namely the states, and less to the other actors – the trans or multinational organizations, namely the non-statal powers which usually develop independently of the states and the inter-state relations⁴.

Systemically, the international life, formed by traditional actors, owners of sovereignty – the states – which somehow submit to the rules of public international law and to the decisions taken by the institutions with universal vocation and by non-statal powers, which sometimes transcend the rules and the standards of

international life, can be assessed within a dynamic balance. From this point of view, Samuel Huntington was right when he said that “The world can be chaotic, but the order doesn't miss totally”⁵.

In this context, the actors are in a permanent competition / fight, using all their means, including violence / over for enforcing their will within the system of international relations. An actor's ability of becoming or not established in the system depends on its power potential, on its place and role within the equation. It is on useful vector for the prediction of the actors behaviour within the international field because their grouping will be done in such way to avoid the power preponderance of one / some of them⁶.

The place and the role of an actor in the power equation result from its power potential. Defining and identifying the source, quantifying and perceiving the power are very important for unravelling the potential of an actor. Alvin Toffler believed that, no matter “how many bumpings, saw acts and hardware the actors do”, the power balance “will depend less on their words than on the quantity and quality of the power that each of them brings, to the negotiations”.

The notion of power has a great semantic richness and is used for a very broad area of the social, economic and military reality. Alvin Toffler considers that “the power involves the employment of violence, of wealth and of knowledge (in the largest meaning) for making people act in a given manner. Robert A Dahl thinks that the power is “the ability of determine

people to do what they wouldn't do otherwise"⁷. We can notice that the two definitions have a common element: the imposing of force by an actor over other /others. But this thing can be realized only if that actor has the capacity of enforcing himself, in other words, if it has a potential.

Traditionally, the power potential was assessed as the sum of human and economical resources, the territorial area, the capacity and the quality of military forces. From antiquity till the beginning of industrial revolution, within the policy of the first tofflerian tendency, the power potential was given by the capacity and the quality of the population of a state. This aspect ruled and was taken into account where the issue of the confrontations between actors was assessed. The beginning of the XIXth century of the policy of the second tendency, transformed the industry and the modern means into predominant elements in projecting judging the power potential for an actor. The uneven rhythm of development and applying of the achievements of industrial revolution in arms production was disturbed the balances and the power hierarchies. The focus of the world power system has begun to move from the states with a huge demographical potential – qarist Russia and Otoman Empire for example – to Europe under the way of industrialization a situation which has dominated the actors of the first tendency⁸.

Within the policy of the third tendency, the actors include understands the importance of quality the power potential, an element given by knowledge, economical, growing, political stability and will / national cohesion, this actors was an important strategical advantage in the power equation. Nowadays, the best quality power comes from the applying of knowledge. The advantage is that in a confrontation the will is not imposed in a traditional way, namely by force. The opinion of Alvin Toffler is that the knowledge can be used "to punish, to reward, to convince and even to transform. It can transform the enemy in an ally"⁹. This problem was spotlighted during the Gulf war, by one of the military analysts of C.N.N. who said that the military planners have to look over the use of bomb's and rockets in order to accurately attack

the targets. The technology will permit very soon the distroyning of the key-elements of a military objective without killing the soldiers or distroying completely the target"¹⁰.

The knowledge made up the information as a very important element for the power potential of an actor. The american military analyst Larry Staquist considers that the power potential must be redefined because untill now it was limitedly conceived, with a specific reference on "arms application systems and certain spatial systems"¹¹. Concerning the measuring of the power potential of an actor, technology, educational system and economical growth are more important than people and the size of its geographical surface. The machineries numerically controlled can be found in a lot of countries of the Third World. A pharmaceutical factory necessary for them has the inherent faculty for marking biological meapons. The numerical, controll installations which manufacture vehicles of a high quality in the Third World can also make rockets of high quality"¹². From this point of view, the authors consider that the leaking of some electronical information over the borders can cause security problems, not less serious than troupe movement"¹³.

The actual lock of poise concerning the global communication and information causes spectacular mutations within the power equation. The actor who dominates informational flows can enforce its values, its aspirations and its proper view on the world can produce serious problems for other / others who, concerning the classic power potential is / are his enemy's equal. An exact information is so important as the precise weapon and the new mass media will make it possible in an unprecedented degree"¹⁴.

Within the Cold War, decision was given by a gun loaded with images / information. If Nicolae Ceaușescu had understood the revolution impact over mass media and if he had studied the role of mass media in the overthrowing of Ferdinand Marcos in Filipinas, maybe a "Velvet revolution" would have taken place in Romania, as in most of the former comunist countries.

In the battle for "informational space" – in the so called "imagological" war, the victory does no more mean the physically eliminating or subduing the enemy and occupying his

sovereignty space, but occupying his mind through those representations and persuasion which turn the enemy into an ally.

An actor must own the most performant technology in order to accurately use the information weapon. The economical power, a fundamental indicator of the power potential of actors in the future is more assessed only through tangible resources, but especially through the intangible performance resources. The quantity, as in other fields doesn't mean power. Many states own huge economical primary resources, but they are not in the same time the great economical powers of the world. This thing is also valid for the economical resources of the power potential of a state.

The competition for the control of the untangible resources within the power potential tends to remove the one for arms and military technology its the military threatenings will dinamish their force, the competition / conflicts for economical resources will intensify. Edward N. Luttwak thinks that the fear of a nuclear war, with incalculable consequences for humanity will determine a change of place from military means to those economical in order to solve the conflicts between states. "Economical" weapons have functional for both Gulf conflict and the Yugoslavian one¹⁵. An idea appears frequently: the military means are substituted by trade means; – available funds instead of fire power, civil innovation instead of technical – military development and the penetration of markets instead of military bases and garrisons¹⁶.

If a country obtains a faster rhythm for its economical growth, this thing will be reflected in both its power potential and its position within world hierarchy¹⁷. Besides the quantity indicators, for the assessment of the economical power of a state, the productivity dynamics and the added value for the manufactured products are very important for the perception of economical evolutions.

Nowadays, the military dimension of power potential is still considered the one which gives the place and the play of an actor within the power equation in the system of international relations at a certain moment. As nobody would ever eliminate totally the importance of the raw

material or of the raw work in the production process, it is unreasonable to ignore the material elements of the destroying capacity or the human element within the military potential. Alvin Toffler considers a fantasy the idea that the Gulf war was a high – tech war, where the human element was eliminated from the fight¹⁸. The superior officers Rosanne Boiley and Thomas Kearn, participants in the Gulf conflict said: the crucial factor which drives to success in the technology exploitation continuous to be the human element, typically illustrated by the performance of the "Desert Thunder" of the fighter pilots who used the air-air rocket Aim-7. It was a progress five times Sigger than the performance from Vietnam, a direct result of a much better drill¹⁹. The intelligent weapons require intelligent soldiers, well trained so that they would be able to use an ultrasofisticated technology.

The quality, not quantity, is the essential element for evolution of human dimensions within the military factor. Nowadays, a fight aircraft is like a super computer with wings. Its efficiency depends almost totally on the knowledge about aircraft technology and ornament and also on the pilot's intelligence. The same thing, but on smaller dimensions happens with fighter from other branches. The Gulf War demonstrated this thing. The wellknown french military analyst and theorist Pierre Gallois said that United States sent 500000 soldiers in the Gulf, keeping between 200000 and 300000 soldiers in the rearguard, for logistic purposes. But the reality is that the war was won by only 2000 soldiers²⁰. On the other side, Saddam Hussein put up an army of over a million soldiers, with a war experience of almost 10 years, but of inferior quality as to the drill and the general level of training. Over 98% from the american volunteer's from Gulf were high school graduates and many of them had degrees²¹.

That's why nowadays, the use of a quality indicator is more important than the quantity one for the dimension of human factor within the power potential. The number of people in a state is not so important for the strength of its future army. A simple comparison between the demographical maps and the maps that show the

level of urbanism and of people education spotlights an well known thing: the best armies don't belong to the states with the biggest population densities.

For the dimensions of the power potential of a state, the discussions about the place and the role of nuclear arms from the period after the Cold War, are very interesting. The american analysts Janet and Chris Morris, experts in strategy consider that the place of classic military arsenal could be taken by a system of new technologies which can be used in order to defeat the enemy with minimal bloodshed. These can anticipate, detect, avert or block the use of lethal means, taking the loss of human lifes to minimum²². The list of these technologies would include infrasound generators set for the people's control, substances for crumbing the metals or for topping the shifting of fight vehicles by altering of chemical structures of their fuel, etc.

Morris ideas, even if they are sometimes disputed²³, can be found in some american official documents about military strategies²⁴, and it a global level, we could say that these ideas were verified in the final port of the Cold War, within the confrontation. Setween the two superpowers: USA and U.S.S.R. the former U.S.S.R. vanished from the power equation and then it vanished as a state from the system of international relations, obviously because of the regime crise, but the impact of S.D.I., programme (Strategical Defense Initiative) on U.S.S.R. can not be ignored. This put a question mark over efficacy of russian long ray action rockets. If S.D.I. could block effectively the soviet rockets before they stroke USA territory then they would become useless and Moscow would be attacked without the offender having fear of reprisals. The economical decline of the former U.S.S.R. made impossible a soviet answer to S.D.I. programme. Moscow concluded that it can not defend its empire without unacceptable costs so it withdrew from the lost satellite countries. USSR lost the Cold War without using its huge nuclear arsenal for its rescue.

On the other hand, there are specialists and analysts who consider than the nuclear arms will continue to have a special role within the power potential of a state after the end of the Cold

War²⁵. Sir Michael Quinlan said about this aspect: "The lock of war between the advanced states was the key of success. We must perpetuate this situation. The weapons are the way – the aim is to prevent a war. It's better a world with nuclear weapons but without a major war, than a major war, but without nuclear weapons²⁶. The some opinion is sustained by some specialists and analysts from France, who "oppose vehemently to the reducing of the role of nuclear weapons for the disheartening of any agression"²⁷.

The national security strategy of USA, stipulates that also in the future "the strategical nuclear weapons will remain the keystone of the disheartening strategy of USA²⁸. It is wellknown the fact that U.S. and also Russian Federation keep in a permanent fight status a big part of their nuclear arsenal²⁹. In the same time, these status will continue to act against the nuclear weapons proliferation: through political, economical pressure combined, at case, with some concessions: a control over the nuclear technology sales to the countries that would persevere in the line of nuclear weapons introduction.

But in the world there are countries engaged in the programmes of nuclear arming, as India, Egypt, Brazil, Argentina, Indonezia, Pakistan. From this point of view, the nuclear proliferation will be only deloyed, not stopped. There is also the opinion of some specialists who thinks that the american and russian cuts in their nuclear supplies are not considerable because through those pacts the americans and the russians take out from their equipment the old-fashioned nuclear arms and keep the ultramodern, mobile and high precion arms"³⁰. So we are present at an ample process of distroying rockets and other vectors capable of nuclear weapons transportation to the target, but not at the reduction of the nuclear arsenal.

Political and military analysts allege that the nuclear arsenal must be taken into account within the power potential of a state. Even if the world didn't have an experience of a nuclear war – Japon was a tragic experiment – the use of nuclear weapons dominates the strategical thinking of the main actors of international relations after the Cold War. The states – owners

of nuclear weapons – have concrete plans of using them and within the military strategical they play scenarios with the calculation of the consequences of using the nuclear arms for passing over the different levels of the conflict.

For a long time the historians³¹ then the political analysts and the geopoliticians have been interested in unravelling the mechanisms that drive to the climbing or to the decline of an actor within the top of the power equation. Paul Kennedy considers that the climbing of some states among the great power is encouraged by the establishing of a long term report of balance between their economical potential and their military power. The breaking of this balance and the appearance of a delay between the economical potential and the military costs from unrealistic strategical objectives drives to the decline and to the collapse from the power equation top³². The opinion of the american analyst is valid for the correlation between the economy and the army of the second tendency, but not for these of the XXI century. There are cases when the military power and the economical one don't diminish simultaneously. An illustrating example is the Russian Federation during the transition period. There are also some cases when the economical development of military potential, if we take into account the development of Germany and Japan after the second world war.

The analyst George Modelski considers that climbing / decline of the powers within the system of international relations is given / confirmed in the major conflicts the actors are involved in. Studying the major conflicts from the contemporary and modern times, G. Modelski has identified a series of hegemonical cycles associated with long economical cycles associated with *“long economical cycles in which the process growth and the lack of resources determine power loss, the concentration of power take place when the prices are low and the resources are abundant”*³³.

The historian and military analyst Mihail E. Ionescu considers that, in fact, a uni-directional hierarchy cannot be established the power equation because of the structural interdependence from the system of international relations.

The hierarchies within the military or economical level or within the inferior level of transnational interdependences “are not the same. The order of the world is not given by the traditional power balance”³⁴. The conflicts in which the two superpowers USA and USSR – were involved during the Cold War – confirm the opinion of romanian analyst. Sometimes, the ones who appear weak win or the ones who appear unorganized outrun the ones more settled, as in the war from Algeria, Vietnam or Afghanistan.

The geopolitical analysis must take into account not only the potential elements, but also the relations between actors, when it makes assessments of the power potential and when, according, to these assessments it establishes the hierarchies of the actors in a certain space or at a global level. In the opinion of James Rosenau, the political relations are more than the foundations of the actors power³⁵. The place occupied by an actor within the power hierarchy at a certain moment or, as we will see, the perception about his position determines the actor to act / to react in order to impose / affirm his interest in a given geographical area.

The actors' behaviour within the system of contemporary international relations is very diverse and complex concerning their orientation, attitude and the intensity of their implication in international problems solving can vary from maximum to minimum or to a total unimplication. For everybody, the crisis of 1991 in the Persian Gulf, was a major problem, but the actors implication in its solving was different. USA and its allies acted directly in order to determine Irak to withdraw from Kuwait, while China, for example, even if it is a member of the security Council of ONU, confined itself only to a diplomatical way. Monaco and Liechtenstein didn't involve at all in this crisis. Why?

A possible answer for such a question is given by Henry Kissinger, the remarkable diplomat and political analyst, who affirms in his memoirs that what makes a state move is, among others its concern in salvaging national interest³⁶. The conclusion of the american analyst is confirmed by historical analysis, especially for the periods when the main actor of the international life was the state.

Nowaday's not only the number, but also the actors importance in the international life modifial radically. More and more, the non-statal actors, appear in the foreground of the events. After some statistics, in 1995, from 100 economic actors only 55 were states, the others being transnational companies³⁷. But a big part of the activity of these economical-financial giants is not under the settlements valid for the traditional actors-states, so their interest can become, in some cases, incompatible with the national interest of the classic actor. This thing is reflected by some syntagmes that appear mar that of "national interest" such "specific interest", "economical interest", "political interest", "ideological interest", etc.

Some analysts consider the notion of "national interest" as an instrument for the analysis of the contemporary geopolitical phenomenon³⁸. We don't have the same opinion with the ones who deny this thing on the reason that there is not on exact definition of this notion³⁹, but only a notion is enough, taking into account the big number of the actors in the international life.

National interest is a specific feature of the interest as to the life and the activity of a colectivity clotted in a form of political organization, which is the national state.

The interest was completely analysed and studied in psychology, sociology⁴⁰ from which it was taken by the political analysts without on ample debate on the semnifications and meanings that it gets in the analysis of the contemporary political phenomenon. The notion of interest has a lot of meanings and it is used in various disciplines that deal with the analysis of the international political relations. The necessity of defining the notion of "interest", of establishing the causes and the considerations that generate – its sources – and also the elements that determine its intensity and its temporal stability becomes preemprory nowadays.

In psychology, the interest is considered an active and lasting orientation, as a favorable attitude and a personal, predilection to certain things, phenomena or branches of activity⁴¹. Serghei L. Rubinstein defined the interest as a

manifestation for fixing a need⁴². From this we can see the classification of the interests, depending on the fields of activities that the individual it involved on: the interest in knowing, in sports, economical, scientific, political activities a s.o...⁴³

From the sociological perspective, the notion of interest has other valences. The interest is not reduced to the subjective preference of the individual, but it is rather a subjective modality of establishing an objective relation between the situation and the real needs of the human / colectivity and the determinations of the action and its results. The interest is essentially connected with the individual / collective pursuing of an advantage, regarding a certain action and its result.

In this meaning, the interest always has a concrete and determinative character, meaning that at refers to a certain action, to a certain result or to one of its aspects, to the value anal the aim of the action regarding the social agent which can be an individual or a group. The interest necessarilly requires the wording of the individuals / group's aims determined by the needs and the reasons that are essential for that group at a certain moment.

Hans I. Morgenthau gives the exemple of France and England from 1939, when USSR attacked Finland. Moscow infringed the Nations League Pact, so France and England had to react in order to restore the situation. But they didn't act and they didn't do it either when USSR attacked Poland because their reaction would have affected their interests for a long time⁴⁴.

In the analysis of the international relations, the notion of interest refers only to the human groups organized in political, economical, social-cultural, religions options of a group or community which becomes an actor of the international life⁴⁵. Depending on the nature of the pursued aims, of the undertaken actions and also of the promoted, the interest can be manifested in the economical, political or spiritual field, or even in the military field.

On the individual level, the interest, is generated by the existence of the fundamental human needs, from those organical (hunger, air, thirst, reproduction) and of security up to those

aesthetical and cognitive⁴⁶. The sources of interests and their way of appearance are more complex as the community or the group which constitutes as an entity of the system of international relations is never the sum of the individuals that compose it. On this level, the interest can appear from the functional requirement of that entity /actor which is acting in a geopolitical field at a certain moment⁴⁷.

The functional requirement appears as a need and it is conched as an aim as a pursued objective. From this perspective, the classic actors of the international relations – the states – act in order to get their security objectives of keeping peace, of economical and cultural cooperation, a s.o. The objectives are established depending on the evolution of the power relations between actors, on the alliances that the actors can realise and also on the existence / non-existence of a security credible structure.

From the perspective of political realism, Hans I. Morgenthau defines the interest as power because it is in relation with “the substance of politics and it is not affected by the spacial or temporal circumstances”⁴⁸.

In geopolitics, an interest can be considered as such only if the actor, as an element of the system of international relations has the capacity to obtain its materializing. If this thing is not possible, we don't talk about interests, but only about aspiration that can be proclaimed and claimed⁴⁹.

In the opinion of the american analyst Hans I. Morgenthau, if all the states are considered as “political entities that pursue their own interests defined as power, we will be able to make justice for everybody in a double meaning: we will be able to judge fridge other nations as we judge our own nation and in this way we will be able to draw up strategies that respect the interest of other nations protecting and promoting our own interest”⁵⁰. Appealing to historical analysis, Morgenthau ascertains that these ideas were noticed in action from antiquity until nowadays. For example, Tucidide said that the identity of interest is the safest connection between states and individuals. The idea was revived in the XIX century by Lord Salisbury, who noticed that the “only lasting connection between nations is the lock of opposite interests”⁵¹.

In the opinion of James Rosenau, the interest has a double quality. It is an instrument of analysis for the researcher and for the analyst of the contemporary international political phenomenon, but it is also on instrument of action for the actors. “As an analytic instrument. James Rosenau specifies – it is used for describing, for explaining or for assessing the source of external politics of a nation or its adequate character. As the instrument of the political action it serves as a modality of proposing, justifying or sentencing policies”⁵².

In the geopolitical field, the interest can be seen from a threefold perspective. Within the geopolitical phenomenon, *the interest* is the one to determine and direct an actor in order to act in a certain space. In the geopolitical theory and analysis, *the interest* becomes an instrument for identifying and measuring aproximately extent the implication of an actor in solving a problem which can appear in a world region. In propaganda geopolitical cartography, *the interest* can become an instrument of the manipulation of international or internal public opinion. In a world more and more dominated by mass-media, the “guns” waded with information and image can easily convince the public opinion about the “righteousness” of the undertaken actions, but not necessary about the truth or the aims that determined that action.

The criteria of classification and evaluation of the interests that the actors promote in the system of international relations are many and very diverse. This thing drives to very large and sometimes opposite definitions. In the geopolitical theory, the analysis and the assessments would be unrealistic and without objectivity if from the perspective of political action, some analysts had a certain degree of ambiguity in defining and classifying the interests within the contemporary geopolitical phenomenon because it is very difficult to obtain an agreement with a partner, if one of the personal interests was defined so preciously than it would become inflexible⁵² and therefore unnegociable.

From the geopolitical perspective at least two elements, are relevant for specifying the interests, nature and dimensions: the actors

nature and the geopolitical value of the disputed space. From the actors point of view, the interests can be classified by the pursued aims in the system of international relations and they can be national, economical, political, territorial, ideological, strategical. Second, the actors interests are different as to the priorities established in a certain moment and in this case, they, can be classified as essential or secondary. Concerning the objectives intensity and stability in their action within geopolitical field, the interest are defined as steady, variable, general or specific⁵³. Not least, the actors interest can be identified concerning the actors' position in the system of international relations. The interest's can be common if the aims and the adjectives pursued by two or more actors in a space are common, complementary, if the strategical objectives are not antagonical and one of the actors can give up a specific interest which runs counter to other from the some category and conflictual when the strategical objectives pursued by an actor in a space are irreconcilable concerning the objectives of another actor.

The time factor is important for the identifying of the actors' interests. For a short time, the interests of two or more actors can be the same, but they can be divergent or even irreconcilable for a long time. During the second world war, England, USA and USSR had a common interest a short time: eliminating Germany from the power equation on the european continent. After obtaining the pursued objectives in the war the partners of United Nations Coalition situated themselves on irreconcilable positions because the strategical objectives for a long term of USSR and of the Greate Occidental Democracies were totally opposite this thing generated a whole new aspect within the confrontations between actors, known in the contemporary geopolitical phenomenon under the name of *Cold War*.

In their action in the geopolitical field, the actors can also promote indirect interests on a short term, namely instruments or reasons for the promoting of completely different interests but not so obvious. The romanian government's declaration of february 1998, about its participation with all its means, including the

military to operation "Desert Thunder" was justified by the necessity of White House's sensitizing about the requirement of Romania concerning its joining to NATO, but also of refreshing the external image of the country and its international credibility.

The intrinsic geopolitical value gotten or attributed to a geographical space has on important role for the actors orientation, hierarchy and intensity in their disputing of interests in that space, in a certain moment. We take into account only the geopolitical space – that territorial from where the natural conditions make possible the life and the human activity⁵⁴, but not the space in generally. The geopolitical value of the space is given by its valences, namely by its economical, human and natural potential.

The actors of the contemporary geopolitical phenomenon are attracted in a different way in one or the other world region depending on their interests priority. Ion Conea noticed fiveteen 50 ago, that the world's political map had points and regions of a maximum or a minimum political interest". He defined the first as "region of on intense political life" and the latter as those zones "were the political rhythm of the Globe is more quiet"⁵⁵. The famous romanian analyst and theorist identified some interests and disputes' region of friction or of convergence for the forth decade of the XXth century: Mediteranean sea Red Sea and Pacific Ocean"⁵⁶.

Nowadays such friction or convergence maps are kept all arround the big areas of energetical resources and strategical points⁵⁷. The serious crisis form Gulf and the dispute for the control of the routes from the Caspic Sea zone are only two of the many areas of maximum interest for the actors of the century and milenium end.

The conflict or the convergence of the interest in a resourcefull space of the actors don't depend only on needs, from the security ones to the specitual ones. So in Geopolitics, the geographical space must be seen on different ways, from many analysis eagles, depending on the main cathegories of interests. In this way, the actors affirm their sovereignty or establish their control in a POLITICAL SPACE, are in

competition in an ECONOMICAL SPACE put their stamps in a SPECIAL SPACE. Finally, when the of compromise is outrun and the interests become irreconcilable, the actors resort to war in a GEOSTRATEGICAL SPACE.

The understanding of the role played by such territories or territorial elements for the actors of the contemporary geopolitical field gives the analyst the possibility of a correct

evaluation of the military and political crisis and of offering viable selections for, their administration. In Geopolitics, the space, is by definition one the actors competition, but this thing doesn't require automatically aggressive or conflict behavior. The resorting to force, in its military form is repudiated more and more often and considered as a final argument for the interests' settlement in a space or the other.

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L'ORIGINE DELLA GUERRA FREDDA: IDEOLOGIA E GEOPOLITICA

La guerra fredda era inevitabile ? Credo di si

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Dopo la disfatta della Germania nazista e i suoi satelliti, dopo la sparizione del nemico comune le staffe principali della coalizione antihitleriana si sono disgregate. La diversità profondissima del regime politico-sociale, del sistema dei valori e dell'ideologia dell'URSS d'allora, da una parte, e dell'Occidente, in primo luogo USA, dall'altra, e anche i cambiamenti gravi nel rapporto di forze tra le potenze-leader sono diventati i fattori decisivi della scissione dell'alleanza di stati-vincitori e del passaggio alla contrapposizione dell'Oriente all'Occidente.

É la guerra fredda che é diventata la forma di questa opposizione, cioè la totale confrontazione ideologica e politico-militare, gravida di crisi e di conflitti. Il ruolo importante hanno avuto la mentalità e il sistema dell'idee dei dirigenti della "grande tre". Né l'una né l'altra parte (in primo luogo si tratta dell'URSS e degli USA) non hanno manifestato la disponibilità di comprendere e accettare la realtà del mondo postbellico, adattare a queste novità il suo corso politico.

Secondo l'intenzioni di J.Stalin la sistemazione del mondo postbellico includeva il consolidamento della sua dittatura personale dentro dell'URSS, l'ulteriore accelerazione di costruzione del socialismo secondo il modello sovietico nel proprio paese e in alcuni altri stati, assicurare all'Unione Sovietica del le frontiere vantaggiose e creare una sfera d'influenza ben controllata, acquistare all'URSS delle posizioni forti sull'arena internazionale e il ruolo di rivale a pari poteri con le potenze-leader dell'Occidente.

La dirigenza sovietica ha rivelato l'ostilità profonda quanto al mondo capitalistico tanto ai paesi-leader dell'Occidente come agli avversari eventuali. J.Stalin ancora nel gennaio del 1945, durante l'incontro con i dirigenti dei comunisti dell'Jugoslavia e della Bulgaria prevedeva la possibilità del conflitto venturo con gli alleati di coalizione antihitleriana: "La crisi del capitalismo si é rivelata con la divisione dei capitalisti in due frazioni: l'una - fascista, l'altra - democratica. É sorta un'alleanza tra noi e la parte democratica dei capitalisti, poiché quest'ultima non avrebbe potuto tollerare il dominio di Hitler, giacché tale dominio violento avrebbe ridotto la classe operaia al limite, all'abbattimento del capitalismo stesso. Ora noi ci troviamo con una frazione contro l'altra, ma in futuro saremo anche contro questa parte dei capitalisti"¹.

Molto caratteristico era l'atteggiamento malevolo del leader sovietico nei riguardi della Gran Bretagna manifestatosi durante la discussione con G.Dimitrov del problema della Germania il 17 marzo 1945. "Gli inglesi vogliono smembrare la Germania (la Bavaria e l'Austria, la regione del Reno e ecc.), - ha detto Stalin, - Cercano con tutti i mezzi di annientare il loro concorrente. Fraudolentemente bombardano le fabbriche e le industrie tedeschi. Noi non lasciamo entrare la loro aviazione nella nostra zona di Germania.

Peró loro cercano in tutti i modi di bombardare anche quella"². La Gran Bretagna veniva palesemente considerata come un rivale principale dell'Unione Sovietica, come avversario eventuale.

La diffidenza e il sospetto del dittatore del Cremlino nei confronti dell'Occidente sono stati aggravati al massimo livello dalla "sindrome del 22 giugno". Lui ha adempiuto gli accordi con Hitler e Ribbentrop, ha rispettato la demarcazione di sfere d'influenza, ha anche effettuato le forniture regolari alla Germania! Ma che cosa né risultó? Il 22 giugno 1941!

L'atteggiamento ostile verso l'Occidente borghese si é abbinato con l'aspirazione di non tollerare nessuna liberalizzazione della politica interna³. Da qui – la tendenza di creare l'atmosfera di sospetto nei riguardi degli stranieri, il controllo rigido di tutti loro contatti con i cittadini dell'URSS. Tutte le visite all'estero dei sovietici e le visite degli stranieri in'URSS venivano controllate direttamente dalla Segreteria del Comitato Centrale del VKP (b). Così, ad esempio, il 10 maggio del 1946 la Segreteria del CC VKP (b) discusse sul problema "Dell'invito in'URSS del dottore in scienze filologiche dell'Università di Colombia Dorothy Bruster". Fu approvata la risoluzione: "Incaricare il comp. Suslov di verificare le circostanze nelle quali Dorothy Bruster si é trovata in'URSS e riferire alla Segreteria del CC"⁴. Nel paese fu stabilito un regime di censura rigidissimo. Particolarmente rigorosamente veniva controllato qualsiasi contatto con l'estero. Persino i libri selezionati dagli enti sovietici di propaganda per l'invio all'estero venivano sottomessi ad un esame attentissimo. Così, nel settembre del 1947 la Direzione del dipartimento di censura (Glavlit) nella lettera al CC VKP(b) raccomandó di escludere dalle liste di letteratura, predestinata per l'invio all'estero, una serie di libri, e, in particolare, l'opera di Ja.C. Rosenfeld "L'industria degli Stati Uniti d'America e la guerra" (Mosca, Gospolitizdat, 1947). I censori si sono riferiti alla recensione nel giornale "Cultura e vita", dove veniva notato che il libro di Ja. Rosenfeld era scritto in modo di elogiare i grandi successi dello sviluppo dell'industria americana durante la guerra" e conteneva una grande quantità di tesi sbagliate.

Immediatamente dopo la fine della guerra in'Europa, nell'estate e nell'autunno 1945, la propaganda ufficiale ha richiamato il popolo sovietico a non indebolirsi, a essere vigilante la

ea condurre sino alla fine la lotta contro il fascismo e tutte le forze fasciste. É molto caratteristica l'affermazione del giornale "Pravda" del 2 settembre del 1945, nel giorno della fine della guerra: "La seconda guerra mondiale é finita... Ma questo significa, che non ci sono piú i nemici della pace e della sicurezza? Significa questo, che é possibile lasciar perdere di tentativi di seminare discordie e ostilità tra i popoli amanti della libertà, in primo luogo tra gli alleati di ieri? Certo che no. La vigilanza, la massima vigilanza – e una delle primarie condizioni della lotta efficace per una pace stabile"⁵.

Nell'estate e nell'autunno del 1945 la propaganda sovietica ha messo in rilievo la crescente attività dei circoli estremamente reazionari e filofascisti negli USA e nella Gran Bretagna. Il giornale "Pravda" nel luglio del 1945 così caratterizzò la nuova disposizione delle forze nell'arena internazionale: "Sotto i nostri occhi vengono poste le fondamenta della pace stabile nell'Europa. Ciò porta all'agitazione particolare e comprensibile di tutte le forze di reazione fascista. É assolutamente logico, che loro sfogano la loro rabbia prima di tutto contra l'Unione Sovietica, che ha giocato un ruolo decisivo nella guerra contro la Germania hitleriana e adesso si é schierata per la salvaguardia della pace nell'Europa"⁶.

Il principale colpo propagandistico veniva vibrato contro le forze filofasciste dell'Occidente, anche la definizione stessa di esse veniva interpretata arbitrariamente e la loro influenza veniva manifestamente esagerata.

Dalla fine del 1945 – inizio del 1946 gli accenti per caratterizzare la situazione politica nei paesi dell'Occidente si spostarono. Certo, lo smascheramento del fascismo veniva continuato. Tutta la stampa sovietica pubblicava gli adebiti comparsi nel i materiali processo di Norimberga contra i principali criminali di guerra tedeschi.

D'altronde si trattava non solo dei circoli filofascisti, ma delle forze reazionarie in genere. Il tema dei contrasti tra le forze di democrazia e di reazione diventava principale nella propaganda sovietica. Ecco alcuni passaggi caratteristici dal bollettino a distribuzione riservata "Voprosi vnešnej politiki" ("Problemi della politica

estera”), pubblicato a tiratura limitata dall’Ufficio d’informazione del CC VKP(b): “Il contenuto essenziale della vita politica contemporanea italiana é l’intensa lotta tra le forze di democrazia e di reazione.” (15 marzo 1946); “La situazione politica interna della Turchia si caratterizza dal dominio assoluto delle forze reazionarie...” (15 aprile 1946); “La politica reazionaria dei circoli imperialistici d’Inghilterra, degli USA e dei paesi europei viene appoggiata dal Vaticano e dalla chiesa cattolica, che attualmente si sono trasformati in uno dei principali strumenti della reazione.” (15 luglio 1946)⁷. Con tutto ciò veniva impostato il quadro “bianco-nero” semplicizzato del mondo: le forze di democrazia – sono i comunisti e le personalità schierate con loro, che hanno approvato e sostenuto la politica dell’Unione Sovietica; le forze di reazione – sono tutti gli altri, tutti quelli che hanno criticato l’azione del Cremlino nella politica interna ed estera. Veniva predicato il principio: “ Chi non é con noi, – é contro di noi”.

La situazione negli Stati Uniti d’America veniva dipinta in colori piú cupi. Disoccupazione, inflazione, discriminazione razzista, scioperi – proprio questo quadro penoso della vita americana é stato richiamato per accentuare piú spiccatamente i vantaggi del regime socialista sovietico.

D’altronde le debolezze e i vizi del modo di vivere americano in nessun caso avrebbero dovuto placare il popolo sovietico. Ai sovietici suggerivano persistentemente l’idea di strapotere nella vita politica degli USA degli ambienti militari e dei monopoli legati a loro che hanno formato l’alleanza pericolosa. Commentando la dimissione del ministro di commercio, liberale G.Wolles, “Pravda” scrisse nel settembre 1946: “La faccenda di Wolles fa vedere quale grande influenza esercita sulla politica americana l’unificato fronte reazionario, che fa ostinatamente e con insistenza il suo lavoro sovvertitore, indirizzato contro la pace e la sicurezza dei popoli”⁸. Può darsi che in quel periodo postbellico fosse difficile trovare un altro tema, che sarebbe state cosí morbosamente sentito dai sovietici come una minaccia alla pace, l’attività dei “guerrafondai”.

Il tema della preparazione di una nuova guerra da parte degli ambienti reazionari dell’Occidente é stata trattata dalla fine del 1946 – inizio del 1947 anche nella stampa a distribuzione riservata, destinata ai militanti di partito. Prima di tutto veniva accentuato il carattere globale degli sforzi politico-militari dell’Occidente e la sua attività nelle piú varie direzioni. Nel febbraio del 1947 il “Bollettino dell’Ufficio di informazione del CC VKP (b)” ha comunicato ai lettori: “Gli USA insieme con l’Inghilterra fanno una politica ostile all’Unione Sovietica nel Vicino e Medio Oriente, in primo luogo in Turchia, in Iran e in Afghanistan, raesi confinanti con l’URSS. Consolidando i regimi reazionari in questi paesi, loro mirano a trasformarli in piazze d’armi contro l’Unione Sovietica”⁹. Il giudizio ancora piú duro é espresso nella rassegna, pubblicata nel marzo del 1977, dell’organizzazione e delle forme della propaganda antisovietica inglese. Gli autori hanno affermato, che gli imperialisti mirano a minare l’autorità dell’Unione Sovietica e formare una opinione pubblica ostile. “Alla realizzazione di questi obbiettivi é appunto sottomessa l’antisovietica propaganda inglese, indirizzata in fin dei conti a fomentare una guerra nuova contro l’URSS”¹⁰. Così nel paese veniva formato lo spirito di guerra fredda.

Il nuovo irrigidimento del tono della propaganda sovietica é avvenuto dopo la proclamazione della dottrina di Truman. Nelle pubblicazioni sovietiche sono emersi gli attachi rozzi. Per esempio, l’intervento di un membro della Camera del congresso degli USA viene commentato nel modo seguente: “Questi appelli cannibalistici a lanciare le bombe atomiche sulla popolazione pacifica non sono affatto la finzione di un singolo-strampalato, ma é un programma degli istigatori di guerra, ai quali Truman ha sciolto la lingua... Anche i responsabili ambienti governativi furono presi dal’isteria anticomunista e antisovietica”¹¹.

In tal modo veniva imposta l’immagine del nemico. Si era intensificata la sensazione della minaccia crescente, nella coscienza venivano inculcate le idee delle menti perfide degli imperialisti. Veniva formata la psicologia di “fortezza assediata”.

Stalin non sapeva e non capiva l'Occidente, lo guardava con antipatia e ostilità. Nella primavera del 1947 ha iniziato la nuova compagnia propagandista contro l'Occidente, la sua cultura e la sua scienza. Secondo le memorie di K.Simonov, il 13 maggio durante l'incontro con i dirigenti dell'Unione di scrittori il dittatore del Cremlino richiamò i "maestri di parola" a prestare più attenzione al tema che il patriottismo sovietico, intervenisse contro l'ammirazione infondata dell'intelligencija alla cultura straniera¹². La dichiarazione di Stalin significò una importante direttiva ideologica. Nella stampa sovietica è stata svolta una campagna massiccia contro la cultura occidentale, contro la letteratura e l'arte. Veniva accentuato, che essa è stata distinta dal formalismo, dalla decadenza e dalla degradazione¹³. Sferzando il cosmopolitismo dell'Occidente, la propaganda sovietica ha opposto ad esso i sentimenti patriottici, l'appoggio alle tradizioni della cultura russa. Tutta questa campagna si è stata svolta con il tono rozzo e sfacciato. Così, per esempio, il giornale "Pravda" ha scritto della contemporanea letteratura borghese: "Proprio da questo campo della cultura moralmente-depravata vengono reclutati i più sfrontati calunniatori, i Koestler, gli Orwell e i simili a loro chi sputano saliva, eruttando la calunnia al popolo sovietico"¹⁴. Ci resta solo aggiungere, che a quell'epoca nell'Unione Sovietica le opere di Koestler e Orwell erano praticamente ignote, le leggeva un gruppo assai ristretto. La direzione stalinista ha rotto la collaborazione nella sfera di cultura, ha assodato la superiorità dell'Unione Sovietica. I propagandisti ufficiali hanno affermato: "Ora, quando l'ideologia borghese reazionaria si leva contro la cultura vera, contro l'umanità progressiva, tutte le forze d'avanguardia nel mondo si consolidano attorno alla nostra cultura, nata e rifiorita sulla base della democrazia vera, della collaborazione fraterna dei popoli a uguali diritti"¹⁵. In tal modo nelle immagini del popolo sovietico viene fissata la contrapposizione rigida "noi - loro", "democrazia - reazione", "cultura vera - decadenza e degradazione", "bene - male". In effetti si sono formati l'argomentazione e l'attrezzamento ideologici della guerra fredda.

Se all'interno dell'Unione Sovietica nelle condizioni di duro controllo ideologico il trattamento propagandistico della popolazione è riuscito e anche con successo, all'estero l'influenza sovietica sull'opinione pubblica è stata molto meno efficace¹⁶. I funzionari dell'apparato ideologico già nell'autunno del 1945 proposero di attivizzare e irrigidire la propaganda rivolta all'auditorio estero. Per esempio, il caposervizio di audizione di controllo delle radiotrasmissioni estere e di esame dell'informazione ricevuta B.Geminder nell'ottobre del 1945 scrisse al viceresponsabile del Settore di informazione internazionale del CC VKP(b) A.S.Panjuškin: "Vi mando la rassegna delle radiotrasmissioni da Londra in lingua tedesca dell'agosto e del settembre 1945, che rivela la tendenziosità e gli attacchi provocatori della propaganda londinese contro l'URSS e i nuovi governi democratici. Bisogna notare il fatto che, la propaganda esaminata è indirizzata alla popolazione tedesca. Questa propaganda non ha dalla nostra parte la risposta dovuta (le radiotrasmissioni da Mosca in lingua tedesca). Ritengo opportuno mettere questo problema in discussione"¹⁷. Con il documento citato echeggia il referto sulle radiotrasmissioni in Bulgaria, fatto nell'ottobre del 1945 dal funzionario del Settore di informazione internazionale del CC VKP (b), in futuro accademico, F.Konstantinov. Lui scrisse: "Bisogna in generale più nettamente definire la linea della nostra contropropaganda. Da noi in questi ultimi tempi appaiono solo gli interventi contro i reazionari più evidenti, i nemici ben noti da molto tempo, per così dire "collaudati". Ma questi dopo la disfatta della Germania e del Giappone non sono restati in tanti. Oggi forme e metodi di propaganda antisovietica sono cambiati. Gli hitleriani sopravvissuti si son messi in agguato, hanno mutato colore. Nei tempi attuali i reazionari più accaniti intervengono sotto il velo "democratico". Ecco perché continuando fino alla fine a smasherare e estirpare l'ideologia hitleriana, bisogna già da oggi badare alla lotta contro i nemici camuffati dell'Unione Sovietica e dei lavoratori di tutto il mondo. È ora di definire il nostro atteggiamento nei confronti ad alcune personalità social-democratiche e laburiste". Il responsabile del Settore G.Dimitrov appose la

deliberazione a margine del documento: "Ritengo le osservazioni del compagno Konstantinov in fondo giuste. Bisogna conferire con la Direzione del Radiocomitato. 2910.45."¹⁸. I contrasti acuitizzati con l'Occidente hanno richiesto di intensificare gli sforzi propagandisti. V.O. Peèatnov è legato in modo convincente alla svolta nell'irrigidire la propaganda politica sovietica all'estero con il discorso di W. Churchill a Fulton - il Settore di politica estera del CC VKP(b) ha emanato una direttiva assai severa di "intensificare fortemente il lavoro di smascheramento delle intenzioni antisovietiche degli anglo-americani"¹⁹.

Però i provvedimenti presi risultarono non sulticenti. Nell'estate del 1946 per incarico di Stalin il Settore di politica estera del CC VKP (b) effettuò un'ispezione speciale dell'attività di Sovinformbiuro. La nota presentata a Stalin conteneva un giudizio molto negativo del lavoro di Sovinformbureau, diretto da C. Losovskij. Nella nota venne sottolineato: "Mentre la situazione internazionale in seguito alla fine della guerra è cambiata radicalmente e, nei più grandi paesi capitalisti (gli USA, l'Inghilterra ecc.) avviene l'intensificazione dell'attività antisovietica e della propaganda da parte della reazione, Sovinformbureau non ha effettuato la riorganizzazione necessaria del suo lavoro in conformità alle condizioni postbelliche, non ha esteso la adeguata contropropaganda. Sovinformbureau risultò nell'aspetto politico-organizzativo non approntato al compito di elucidare fuori del paese la politica estera dell'URSS nel dopoguerra e resistere alla propoganda antisovietica svolta dopo la guerra dalla reazione imperialista... L'obbiettivo di gestire la contropropaganda, incaricato dalla delibera del CC VKP (b) al Sovinformbureau, non si realizza"²⁰.

In base a questa nota la Segreteria del CC VKP (b) ha elaborato le misure per intensificare la propaganda e l'informazione sovietica all'estero²¹.

Dall'autunno del 1946 tutte le organizzazioni sovietiche, che in un modo o in un altro avevano rapporti con l'estero, hanno manifestato l'atteggiamento rigido, senza compromessi, nello spirito della guerra fredda.

Assai caratteristica era la definizione dei compiti per la preparazione dei materiali per i paesi esteri della Società sovietica dei rapporti culturali con l'estero per il 1947. Nel promemoria segreto questi obiettivi sono stati formulati nel modo seguente:

"1. Condurre attivamente la lotta offensiva contro l'ideologia borghese e, prima di tutto, contro la propaganda antisovietica della reazione inglese e americana che nella sua politica interna ed estera mira ora ad unificare tutte le forze reazionarie fino ai resti del fascismo per contrapporre alla crescente influenza internazionale dell'URSS...

6. Far vedere, che la politica estera postbellica, condotta dai circoli reazionari degli USA e dell'Inghilterra, rappresenta la politica di forza ("diplomazia atomica", "diplomazia di dollaro" ecc.), che riguardo ai metodi e ai compiti contraddice le libertà democratiche, per quali lottavano contro il fascismo i popoli di questi paesi e di tutte le nazioni Unite.

Far vedere, che contrariamente a tutto ciò, l'URSS che ha svolto un ruolo decisivo nella guerra contro il fascismo e nella lotta postbellica per la pace stabile e giusta, sta a capo di tutta l'umanità progressiva, smaschera coerentemente gli istigatori di una guerra mondiale..."²².

In tal modo nella vita internazionale veniva fissato il sistema delle rigide contrapposizioni polari, venivano formati gli stereotipi e i miti diffusi in riguardo alla politica estera dell'URSS e dell'Occidente.

Diffidenza e sospetto erano del resto tipici non solo per la dirigenza sovietica. Molotov in seguito così ha ricordato i giorni di vittoria del maggio del 1945, quando lui fu alla conferenza a San Francisco: "8 maggio loro si sono congratulati con me. Ma la loro festa era di scarsa importanza. Come si deve, il minuto di silenzio. Ma non si sentiva una festa vera... Non è che non tocca a loro, ma loro stanno all'erta nei nostri riguardi e noi nei loro confronti ancora di più..."²³.

La diffidenza e la rigidità dei dirigenti dell'Occidente nei riguardi dell'URSS venivano intensificati dalla "sindrome di Monaco di Baviera". Gli accordi di Monaco di Baviera risultarono essere un errore politico.

L'esperienza ingloriosa degli accordi con Hitler veniva applicata a Stalin. "Per gli artefici della politica americana postbellica l'accordo di Monaco di Baviera sembró la prova che all'aggressione bisogna opporsi dappertutto e che pacificazione (trattato come qualsiasi contatto diplomatico effettivo con l'autorit  totalitaria) sia sempre una pazzia", - afferm  il politologo americano Chr.Layne²⁴. Da qui il rifiuto dei compromessi degli accordi reciprocamente accettabili, il puntare sul respingere con la forza le azioni sovietiche in politica estera.

I dirigenti occidentali hanno visto il mondo postbellico come il trionfo dei principi di economia di mercato e della democrazia occidentale, come il mondo del predominio anglosassone e del sistema di sicurezza internazionale. D'altronde loro hanno potuto appoggiarsi sul grosso potenziale economico e finanziario degli USA, sul monopolio atomico americano. Tutto quanta sopra inenzionata veniva moltiplicato per la fede americana nella propria infallibilit , per la convinzione che le ricette politico-sociali americane andassero bene a tutto il mondo, che gli USA fossero dotati della vocazione di riempire il vuoto del potere rivelatosi dopo la guerra nelle molte regioni del mondo. "La convinzione, che essi siano non solo "la citt  su una collina", ma anche il faro per tutto il mondo insieme combinazione con le possibilit , ha portato l'America postbellica ai successi impressionanti e anche a qualche fallimento spettacolare", - scrive il noto politologo americano S.Hoffman²⁵.

Nei confronti dell'Unione Sovietica erano elaborate due possibilit : l'inclusione nella comunit  internazionale a patto che il Cremlino rispetti le regole del gioco studiate e accettate dall'Occidente (il corso di F.Roosevelt) oppure la restrizione massima dell'influenza sovietica tramite la contrapposizione rigida ai limiti di cooperazione (il corso di H.Truman).

L'atteggiamento degli americani verso l'URSS alla fine della guerra era ambiguo. Da una parte, nella loro memoria erano sedimentate le impressioni pi  negative: le repressioni di Stalin negli anni trenta, la collaborazione dell'URSS con la Germania nazista nei 1939-1941, la guerra sovietico-finlandese, l'annessione

all'Unione Sovietica dei paesi baltici. D'altra parte, durante la guerra l'URSS si   presentato come un alleato coraggioso e tenace nella lotta contro la Germania hitleriana. Anche l'immagine di Stalin ha subito una metamorfosi: da un dittatore spietato nel 1943 si   trasformato in un leader duro, ma benevolo della nazione - nel "zio Jo" che ogni tanto fa una fumata dalla sua pipa.   vero che a misura del crescere delle tensioni e delle divergenze tra l'URSS e gli alleati occidentali l'immagine di Stalin si   man mano appannata²⁶.

I dirigenti americani percepivano con preoccupazione e angoscia la crescita dell'influenza internazionale dell'URSS e l'instaurazione della preponderanza sovietica nell'Europa Orientale. Al ritorno da Mosca a met  dell'aprile del 1945 A.Harriman inform  il presidente Truman, che i leader sovietici aspirano al dominio sull'Europa orientale e anche ad una certa influenza sull'Europa occidentale. Secondo Harriman bisogna fermarli immediatamente. Prima di tutto, sarebbe necessario avvisare i dirigenti sovietici, che nel caso in cui proseguissero nella loro espansione Europa orientale loro rimarrebbero privi dell'aiuto finanziario americano. L'avviso di Harriman ha avuto l'appoggio dei dirigenti di Washington. L'ammiraglio Leahy scrisse il 23 aprile nel suo diario: "  giunto il tempo di prendere una posizione forte rispetto all'URSS"²⁷.

La prova del cambiamento della politica americana nei confronti all'URSS fu il colloquio molto duro di H.Truman con V.Molotov il 23 aprile a Washington sui problemi della realizzazione degli accordi di Jalta. Il senatore A.Vanderberg not  a proposito: "Con la politica di F.D.R. (Franklin Delano - aut.) la collaborazione con la Russia   finita"²⁸. A Mosca le parole del presidente americano venivano giudicate come provocatorie: "Truman di fatto ha mandato Molotov al diavolo"²⁹.

In seguito   avvenuto l'intermezzo conciliante - la visita di H.Hopkins a Mosca, le sue trattative con Stalin, la conferenza di Berlino (Potsdam) tra i dirigenti dell'URSS, degli USA e della Gran Bretagna.

Potsdam ha rivelato una nuova struttura bipolare del sistema formato di rapporti internazionali. Il presidente H.Truman e il generalissimo J.Stalin sono presentati alla conferenza come gli oppositori principali. Era la prova del fatto che gli USA e l'URSS stanno diventando i due poli del mondo postbellico, i centri d'attrazione delle forze social-politiche contrastanti.

Potsdam ha marcato il cambiamento considerevole del rapporto dei potenziali militari delle due potenze-leader. Alla vigilia dell'inaugurazione della conferenza, il 16 luglio, negli Stati Uniti furono effettuate con successo le prove della bomba atomica. Già prima dello scoppio Truman disse: "Se essa scoppierà, e io credo che ciò avvenga, Saprò ridurli questi ragazzi [russi] alla ragione"³⁰. Il leader britannico W.Churchill ha apprezzato la grande importanza militare e politica dell'arma atomica: "Da questo momento, - ha ricordato, - tutte le prospettive sono cambiate, abbiamo a che fare con un fattore nuovo nella storia dell'umanità e abbiamo una forza invincibile"³¹. Mi pare che anche Stalin apprezzò l'importanza della bomba atomica.

Il possesso dell'arma atomica ha immediatamente irrigidito la posizione degli USA rispetto all'URSS, gli ha attribuito un carattere offensivo. Il monopolio atomico degli USA ha influito anche sulla linea sovietica negli affari esteri. Lo storico americano D.Holloway ha espresso una considerazione assai interessante: "Essa (la bomba atomica - aut.), probabilmente, ha fatto l'Unione Sovietica più discreta riguardo all'uso della forza per paura che si scatenasse una guerra, ha fatto l'Unione Sovietica anche meno trattabile e meno disposta ai compromessi per timore di farsi notare debole"³².

Nell'agosto del 1945 il presidente Truman e il segretario di stato Byrnes hanno assicurato il capo del governo francese De Gaulle, che la sicurezza nel mondo sarà garantita in primo luogo dalla collaborazione nell'ambito dell'organizzazione internazionale. "Gli Stati Uniti, - hanno continuato, - dispongono di una arma nuova, della bomba atomica, che costringe al ritiro qualsiasi aggressore"³³. Gli osservatori francesi hanno rilevato ancora una ragione della

posizione irrigidita presa dal segretario di stato degli USA J.Byrnes riguardo all'URSS sui problemi dell'Europa orientale - Il terminare della guerra contro il Giappone, che ha dato la carta bianca ai dirigenti degli USA³⁴.

La nuova disposizione delle forze sull'arena internazionale e l'accrescimento della tensione tra l'URSS e gli USA si sono manifestati durante la sessione del Consiglio dei ministri degli Affari Esteri - CMAE, tenutasi a Londra dall'11 settembre al 2 ottobre del 1945³⁵. Non toccando la sostanza dei contrasti, scatenatisi a Londra, mettiamo in rilievo solo il tono assai più duro e la contrapposizione intensificata, da una parte, di V.Molotov e, dall'altra, di J.Byrnes e E.Bevin. Ecco come il ministro degli Esteri G.Bidault nel telegramma del 12 settembre al generale de Gaulle descriveva la disposizione delle forze nella sessione: "Sig. Molotov é sig. Molotov. Sig. Bevin é brutale e, sembra, quasi cerchi l'incidente. Sig. Byrnes, visibilmente convinto della forza che lui rappresenta e, di solito molto abile, si permette talvolta di entrare negli argomenti vaghi, che di nuovo fomentano le discussioni accese che ormai sembravano finite..."³⁶.

Il fiasco della sessione di CMAE, la responsabilità che fu addossata all'Occidente, e non senza ragione, da V.Molotov, ha aumentato all'Occidente, gli umori antisovietici negli USA. I diplomati francesi scrivevano da Washington a Parigi nell'ottobre del 1945: "In tal modo l'opinione, tanto diffusa che si é impadronita parzialmente anche de gli ambienti di governo che con i Soviet sia impossibile mettersi d'accordo, ha trovato la conferma. L'antisovietismo ha ricevuto la possibilità di farsi vedere. Non vale la pena neanche di parlare che nei riguardi dell'URSS sarà presa una posizione assai dura"³⁷. É proprio dalla contapposizione sull'URSS nella politica estera che sono rinati i ragionamenti dell'espansione del totalitarismo, sulla minaccia del comunismo. Antisovietismo e anticomunismo diventavano sempre più tipici sia per gli ambienti governativi degli USA sia per l'opinione pubblica americana in generale.

Il 27 ottobre a New York il presidente Truman fece un discorso importante in occasione

del giorno della flotta della marina militare. Secondo l'opinione dei giornalisti, il discorso è basato sulla sintesi delle ideologie delle libertà principali di Franklin Roosevelt, presentate nella carta Atlantica, e di concezione di "manganello grande" di Theodor Roosevelt. La folla enorme, radunatasi nel parco Centrale, salutava con entusiasmo le parole di Truman riguardo alle riflessioni che la riduzione dell'esercito e della flotta USA garantite dalla deterrenza della bomba atomica fossero "assolutamente sbagliate" e che anche dopo la smobilitazione gli Stati Uniti dovessero restare una "la fortissima potenza marittima militare sul globo terrestre".

Il presidente ha dichiarato che gli USA non hanno intenzione di scambiare altre informazioni circa la produzione della bomba atomica, e che la forza militare è l'unica garanzia della sicurezza americana, che gli Stati Uniti nella propria politica estera non reggiungeranno "nessun compromesso con il diavolo"³⁸.

Malgrado ciò il segretario di stato Byrnes ha intrapreso ancora un tentativo di riorganizzare un compromesso con l'URSS - è stata la conferenza dei ministri degli Esteri dell'Unione Sovietica, degli Stati Uniti d'America e della Gran Bretagna a Mosca nel dicembre del 1945. Però i risultati positivi della conferenza erano accolti con lo scontento ufficiale da Washington. Il presidente Truman era infastidito dall'iniziativa troppo autonoma di Byrnes e della sua arrendevolezza a Mosca. Nell'inizio del gennaio del 1946 lui scrisse nel suo diario: "Se i russi capiscono solamente il linguaggio duro e il pugno forte, allora le cose vadano verso una nuova guerra. Loro capiscono solo un tale linguaggio: "Quante divisioni avete?" Non credo che noi continuiamo a giocare con loro con compromessi". In quel tempo lui ha rilevato nella lettera a Byrnes: "Mi sono stancato di stare troppo dietro ai Soviet"³⁹.

All'inizio del 1946 negli ambienti governativi degli USA erano elaborati i principi del corso di politica estera nei riguardi all'URSS. Essi erano formulati più esplicitamente da G.Kennan nel ben noto "telegramma lungo" del 22 febbraio spedito da Mosca. Il diplomatico americano ha espresso la sua visione dei principi della politica estera dell'Unione Sovietica come

il proseguimento delle tradizioni espansionistiche della Russia zarista, moltiplicato per l'aspirazione permanente del marxismo-leninismo all'espansione della propria influenza. G. Kennan affermò: "... In questo caso noi abbiamo a che fare con la forza politica che si attiene fanaticamente all'opinione che con gli USA non sia possibile ottenere *modus vivendi* e sia auspicabile e indispensabile minare l'armonia interna della nostra società, annientare l'influenza internazionale del nostro stato per garantire la sicurezza del potere sovietico"⁴⁰.

"Il tetelegramma lungo" di Kennan ha avuto una estesa circolazione negli ambienti governativi di Washington e ha gettato le basi della politica di "containment" americana. Proprio in questo periodo è avvenuta la svolta nella politica degli USA rispetto all'URSS. Secondo l'affermazione di J.Gaddis, dal febbraio-marzo del 1946 i dirigenti della politica americana hanno considerato l'Unione Sovietica non come l'alleato allontanatosi ma come l'avversario probabile, di cui gli interessi vitali non potevano essere accettati senza giudicarli come una minaccia agli interessi analoghi degli Stati Uniti"⁴¹.

Non a caso, nello stesso tempo, il 5 marzo 1946, W.Churchill fece il suo famoso discorso a Fulton (gli USA) richiamando alla costituzione "dell'associazione fraterna dei popoli parlanti lingua inglese". Tale associazione era predestinata ad opporsi al rafforzamento delle posizioni internazionali dell'URSS - "cortina di ferro", secondo le parole dell'ex-primo ministro, calò sul continente dell'Europa e la divise secondo la linea da Stettin al Mar Baltico a Trieste al Mare Adriatico. "Non è tale Europa per la quale noi abbiamo lottato", - lui dichiarò magniloquente. Il discorso di W.Churchill a Fulton veniva giudicato come la dichiarazione di guerra fredda all'Unione Sovietica"⁴².

In tal modo si è formato il sistema di idee, proprio della guerra fredda: la contrapposizione globale e totale di due superpotenze, la rappresentazione dei rapporti tra l'URSS e gli USA come "un gioco con la somma zero", la retorica ostile da ambedue parti.

In realtà questo sistema era fissato dai fatti del 1947: la dura repressione nei paesi dell'Europa

orientale, l'annuncio del piano Marshall, il rifiuto dell'URSS e dei paesi suoi alleati di partecipare alla realizzazione di questo piano, la formazione del Cominform. L'intensificare della tensione portò alla spartizione dell'Europa e del mondo su due blocchi politico-sociali contrastanti. Nella dichiarazione della riunione in Polonia dei rappresentanti dei nove partiti comunisti alla fine del settembre del 1947 veniva accentuato: "In tal guisa, si sono formati due campi - un campo imperialistico e antidemocratico, lo scopo principale del quale è stabilire nel mondo il dominio dell'imperialismo americano e sconfiggere la democrazia, e l'altro democratico, il compito principale del quale è minare l'imperialismo, rinforzare la democrazia e liquidare i residui del fascismo"⁴³.

In effetti dai tempi degli inizi della guerra fredda i ricercatori sono in disputa riguardo le sue cause. Alcuni ritengono che la ragione sufficiente sarebbe l'opposto dei sistemi politici e socio-economici: socialismo e capitalismo, totalitarismo e democrazia. Certo, questo era una premessa importante per l'ulteriore contrapposizione dell'URSS e degli USA e dei loro alleati nel mondo bipolare. Ma forse non è vero che Stalin collaborava con la Germania nazista negli 1931-1941? Veniva ad intesa con i leader della coalizione antihitleriana nei tempi della "grande"? È anche poco probabile che F.D. Roosevelt e W.Churchill credessero nella trasformazione capitalistica dell'URSS nel secondo dopoguerra. Inoltre, i governanti americani mica erano molto schizzinosi nei riguardi dei regimi dittatoriali. Basta ricordare la politica reale nella zona del potere assoluto degli USA - nell'America Latina, dove nient'affatto tutti gli stati erano delle democrazie. Sarebbe troppo ingenuo percepire sul serio la retorica sia americana sia sovietica.

Talvolta considerano la politica di Stalin, la teoria e la prassi della stalinismo come la ragione fondamentale, e anche l'unica, della guerra fredda⁴⁴. Ma la guerra fredda sarebbe continuata per un periodo abbastanza lungo anche dopo la morte del "capo dei popoli", prendendo a volte forme ancora più esasperate. D'altronde, la guerra, e pure fredda, è sempre la contrapposizione delle parti e inevitabilmente sorge la questione sul ruolo dei dirigenti occidentali nella sua origine.

Sembra che capire la genesi della guerra fredda sia impossibile senza prendere in considerazione la lotta di due superpotenze per esercitare il proprio potere sulle relazioni internazionali, e per la lotta per le sfere di influenza.

L'esame della politica sovietica durante la seconda guerra mondiale rivela il ruolo prioritario dei calcoli geopolitici. Stalin si dichiarava inflessibilmente in favore dell'annessione all'URSS dei nuovi territori e del cambiamento rispettivo delle frontiere. In tal modo nei 1939-1941 la revisione delle frontiere sovietiche veniva effettuata in collaborazione con la Germania nazista e nei 1941-1945 - in cooperazione con gli alleati di coalizione antihitleriana. Stalin ha usato al massimo la favorevole situazione politico-militare per realizzare gli accordi con i partner negli interessi dell'URSS⁴⁵. Nei 1941-1945 la dirigenza sovietica è riuscita ad ottenere il ritorno alle frontiere dell'URSS esistenti al giugno del 1941 e anche qualche nuove annessioni territoriali: la zona di Petsamo, Königsberg con dei territori adiacenti, Ucraina transcarpatica, Sachalin del sud, Curili.

Oltre ciò, la dirigenza staliniana mirava a creare una zona sovietica di influenza lungo tutto il perimetro delle frontiere che l'URSS aveva e in primo luogo con l'Europa. La concezione di formare la sfera di influenza sovietica veniva elaborata durante la guerra molto attivamente nel Narcomat (ministero) degli Esteri. Il dirigente della commissione per i problemi dei trattati di pace e di sistemazione postbellica M.Litvinov presentò il 15 novembre del 1944 la sua nota di servizio "Sulle prospettive ed una eventuale piattaforma per la collaborazione sovietico-britannica". M. Litvinov ha proposto l'accordo con la Gran Bretagna "sulla base della divisione amichevole delle sfere di sicurezza in Europa secondo il principio del "confinante più prossimo". L'Unione Sovietica può considerare come la sfera massima dei suoi interessi la Finlandia, la Svezia, la Polonia, l'Ungheria, la Cecoslovacchia, la Romania, i paesi slavi della penisola Balcanica e, ugualmente, la Turchia"⁴⁶. L'esame della nota di servizio di Litvinov consente di giungere alla conclusione che la leadership sovietica identificava la sfera di sicurezza con la sfera di

interessi dell'URSS. Essa si è impegnata al massimo per realizzare un programma ambizioso formulato nella nota di Litvinov e indirizzato a creare una vasta sfera di influenza sovietica.

Il passo decisivo per la strada alla realizzazione della concezione sovietica della sistemazione postbellica sono state le trattative di J. Stalin con W. Churchill a Mosca nell'ottobre del 1944. I due leaders hanno raggiunto il compromesso sul problema polacco. Dopo di ciò Churchill ha proposto di concludere l'accordo sulla spartizione delle sfere di influenza nei Balcani. "Non litigheremo per delle inezie" – ha detto il Primo Ministro britannico e ha proposto di fissare il rapporto in percentuali delle zone di influenza della Gran Bretagna e dell'URSS in Ungheria, Jugoslavia, Grecia, Romania e Bulgaria⁴⁷. Dopo le discussioni di Stalin con Churchill e di Molotov con Iden le parti hanno concordato di accettare la predominanza della Gran Bretagna in Grecia (90% : 10%), la preponderanza dell'URSS in Bulgaria e Romania (80% : 20%) e l'influenza a pari in Jugoslavia e Ungheria (50% : 50%)⁴⁸. L'esistenza delle intese viene confermato dai documenti diventati ora accessibili negli archivi del Cremlino.

Degno di nota è il fatto che Stalin era disposto per un po' di tempo a ottemperare gli impegni convenuti con Churchill. Lui non ha ostacolato l'intervento britannico e si è astenuto dall'immischiarsi nei fatti della Grecia alla fine del 1944 e ha raccomandato ai comunisti greci di non cominciare la lotta armata per giungere al potere. Il 10 gennaio del 1945 diceva a Dimitrov: "Io consigliavo di non avventurarsi in questa lotta in Grecia. La gente dell'E.L.A.S. (l'Armata Popolare di Liberazione della Grecia – aut.) non avrebbe dovuto uscire dal governo di Papandreu. Si sono imbarcati in un affare per il quale non hanno le forze sufficienti. Probabilmente contavano sul fatto che l'Armata Rossa sarebbe discesa fino al Mare Egeo. Noi non possiamo farlo. Non possiamo inviare in Grecia le nostre truppe militari. I greci hanno commesso una sciocchezza"⁴⁹.

Nella Jugoslavia in conformità all'accordo Tito-Šubašić sono riusciti a formare il governo di coalizione riconosciuto dagli stati occidentali. Nell'Ungheria le prime elezioni postbelliche nel

novembre del 1945 erano veramente democratiche, i comunisti erano in minoranza (17% dei voti).

Tuttavia, Stalin aspettava che i governanti di Gran Bretagna e degli USA di accettassero le sfere di influenza dell'URSS. Proprio da questo punto di vista il Cremlino ha giudicato le deliberazioni prese a Jalta e Potsdam dai dirigenti dei tre paesi alleati. Il 6 agosto del 1945 Molotov durante il colloquio con Dimitrov disse sui risultati della Conferenza a Berlino (Potsdam): "In grandi linee queste decisioni sono vantaggiose per noi. In effetti, questa sfera di influenza viene riconosciuta come la nostra"⁵⁰.

Però uno dei punti deboli dell'accordo sui percentuali Stalin – Churchill era quello che non veniva tenuto presente nel modo adeguato la posizione degli USA. È vero che Roosevelt accettò con calma l'informazione delle intese fatte a Mosca. L'idea di spartire l'Europa in sfere di influenza fu appoggiata dal funzionario del dipartimento di stato G. Kennan, specialista sui problemi russi. Mettendo in nota la crescente influenza dell'Unione Sovietica nell'Europa orientale, G. Kennan scrisse all'inizio del 1945 al sottosegretario di stato degli USA Ch. Bohlen: "Perché non andremo al compromesso onesto e definitivo: francamente dividere l'Europa in sfere di influenza – tenersi fuori della sfera di influenza russa e tenere i russi fuori della nostra sfera?... E nell'ambito della sfera d'azioni concessa a noi potremmo almeno provare dopo aver finito la guerra a ristabilire una vita fondata su principi onesti"⁵¹. La risposta di Bohlen era negativa. "La politica estera di questo genere non potrebbe essere effettivata da una democrazia. Solo gli stati totalitari possono attuare una politica del genere" – scriveva Bohlen. (In tal modo W. Churchill veniva registrato tra i leader degli stati totalitari). Successivamente ritornando a questo problema nelle sue memorie Bohlen affermò: "Il popolo americano che ha vinto la guerra lunga e pesante si è conquistato almeno il tentativo di elaborare una sistemazione del mondo più perfetta"⁵².

Ma la possibilità di creare il regime internazionale più perfetto, esendoci delle discordanze così cardinali tra le due superpotenze nell'impostazione del problema,

era più che critica. Criticando la politica estera sovietica nel secondo dopoguerra, nel giugno del 1946 M. Litvinov diceva a proposito della "realizzazione della concezione di vecchio stampo della sicurezza geografica - avrete un territorio, più grande la vostra sicurezza"⁵³. La leadership staliniana ha effettuato coerentemente questo corso della politica estera: i territori e le sfere di influenza. Washington, puntando sulla preponderanza economica e finanziaria americana, sulla sua forza militare e sull'influenza politica, ha scelto il modo di stabilire un nuovo ordine mondiale - tramite le organizzazioni internazionali: ONU, Fondo monetario Internazionale e altre. Il ricorrere a esse assicurava a gli USA "il gioco secondo le norme americane".

Ancora nel febbraio del 1946 Ch. Bohlen a proposito del "telegramma lungo" di Kennan ammetteva che sulla base della spartizione delle sfere di influenza in Europa sarebbe possibile risolvere con l'URSS le divergenze discusse e raggiungere un certo *modus vivendi*. Però in quel caso il ruolo dell'ONU sarebbe ridotto alla facciata esterna e "il potere reale sarebbe concentrato nelle mani di Stati Uniti, Gran Bretagna e Unione Sovietica"⁵⁴. Ma Washington non voleva tornare al sistema del "grande tre", riconoscere l'URSS come il partner con pari diritti. Gli USA non hanno pensato neanche di rifiutare dalla propria sfera d'influenza esclusiva l'America Latina.

Il rifiuto dei governanti degli USA di accettare la sfera di influenza sovietica e, in primo luogo, il predominio sovietico in Polonia, Romania e Bulgaria ha suscitato i primi contrasti - preannunziatori di guerra fredda. I tentativi della leadership americana di mutare la situazione politica in questi paesi (secondo l'accordo di Stalin con Churchill nelle Rumania e nella Bulgaria prevista la prevalenza sovietica) si sono imbattuti nell'opposizione dura del Cremlino. È la situazione politica in Romania e in Bulgaria che è stata l'oggetto delle acute discussioni a Potsdam e di controversie ancora più accanite nella sessione di CMAE a Londra e che hanno contribuito al suo fallimento"⁵⁵.

La paura di un ulteriore ampliamento della sfera di influenza sovietica era una delle ragioni

principali per cui la dirigenza degli USA non poteva tollerare il suo consolidamento. Basandosi sull'analisi della situazione politica in Romania e in Bulgaria fatta dagli osservatori americani, Ch. Bohlen ha concluso: "Tollerare adesso la sfera limitata di influenza significherebbe stimolare di allargarla in futuro". Dal punto di vista degli specialisti americani in problemi internazionali la divisione in sfere di influenza sarebbe stata per gli USA una balzaglia perduta. Il regime dittatoriale nell'URSS per la sua sostanza "sarebbe capace di consolidare la sua sfera di influenza in un blocco monolitico, mentre le democrazie occidentali, secondo la loro natura erano incapaci fare la stessa cosa nella loro sfera di influenza"⁵⁶. Quindi, opponendosi al predominio sovietico nell'Europa orientale, Washington si era orientato alla variante, più vantaggiosa, del sistema postbellico delle relazioni internazionali, nonostante non potesse in realtà scongiurare la scissione successiva dell'Europa. La lotta delle concezioni opposte del sistema postbellico è diventato una alla premessa della guerra fredda.

I metodi di instaurazione del predominio sovietico nell'Europa orientale erano non di poca importanza. Adesso sono studiati abbastanza bene - l'uso delle forze dell'Armata Rossa e NKVD (Narodnyj komissariat vnutrennyh del [Comissariato del popolo per gli affari interni]), l'istituzione del controllo dei comunisti sugli enti della sicurezza dello stato e sul ministero degli interni, la contraffazione delle elezioni, la fabbricazione dei falsi processi politici⁵⁷. Tutti questi metodi i dirigenti sovietici di quell'epoca li consideravano convenienti e giustificati anche se portavano all'inasprimento della tensione internazionale. È peculiare il giudizio di V. Molotov, espresso nelle sue conversazioni con F. Èuev: "Ma che cosa significa la guerra fredda? I rapporti tesi. Tutto questo è semplicemente dipende da loro o dal postro attacco. Loro, certo, si sono accaniti contro di noi, ma noi dovevamo consolidare quello che abbiamo conquistato. La una parte della Germania dovevamo creare la nostra Germania socialista, e dovevamo portare l'ordine dappertutto - in Cecoslovacchia, Polonia, Ungheria e Jugoslavia che si trovavano in uno stato difluida"⁵⁸. Questa frase sfuggita

dalla bocca di Molotov – “quello che abbiamo conquistato” – rispecchia l’atteggiamento del Cremlino verso tutto il territorio, occupato dall’Armata Rossa, verso i paesi e i popoli dell’Europa orientale.

Secondo l’opinione di J.Gaddis, Roosevelt e Churchill erano pronti a consentire la creazione della sfera di influenza sovietica dal Mar Baltico al Mare Adriatico a forma di “finlandizzazione” dei paesi che ne fanno parte. Però Stalin ha adoperato metodi troppo duri, assai lontani dal potersi chiamare democratici. In definitiva la sfera di influenza americana in Europa si è formata in gran parte di reciproco consenso, “ma il suo analogo sovietico poteva reggersi solo con la coercizione. L’assimetria risultata ha influito più di tutto sull’origine, l’escalation e l’ulteriore scatenarsi della guerra fredda”⁵⁹.

L’assimetria notata dallo storico americano è del tutto comprensibile e spiegabile. Stalin come leader politico si è formato dai metodi di coercizione, dalle repressioni e dal terrore, dall’eliminazione di qualsiasi dissidenza, dal totale disprezzo delle norme democratiche. Sarebbe stato difficile aspettare da lui una politica diversa nei principi nei paesi dell’Europa orientale che lui non giudicava appartenenti alla sfera di influenza sovietica, come ma territorio conquistato. D’altro canto, nei paesi negli stessi, ad eccezione della Cecoslovacchia, le tradizioni democratiche erano meno radicate che nell’Europa occidentale. Nella maggioranza degli stati dell’Europa orientale prima della guerra (e durante la guerra) era presente l’una o l’altra varietà di regime autoritario, perciò uno ristabilimento semplice alla democrazia prebellica era impossibile.

Infine (the last but not least), l’assimetria dei metodi sovietici e di quelli americani in Europa veniva condizionata dalle possibilità completamente diverse nel secondo dopoguerra degli USA e dell’URSS. Gli Stati Uniti hanno posseduto un enorme potenziale economico e finanziario: più della metà delle riserve mondiali d’oro, circa un terzo dell’esportazione mondiale delle merci, pressapoco due terzi della produzione industriale del mondo capitalistico. L’URSS ha subito durante la guerra sacrifici enormi e demolizioni colossali. Al popolo

sovietico e all’Armata Rossa fu richiesto un consolidamento grandissimo di tutte le forze per ottenere la vittoria. Anche la stessa Armata Rossa non era così potente. Il 21 agosto del 1945 i diplomati francesi hanno comunicato da Washington al ministro degli Esteri G.Bidault: “Malgrado tutto, la Russia è uscita stanca da questa guerra. I contatti che le autorità americane in Germania hanno avuto con le truppe sovietiche le hanno convinte della superiorità innegabile dell’esercito degli Stati Uniti. Tutti i funzionari che sono stati a Potsdam sono ritornati in preda alle stesse idee. I russi hanno la gente, ma manca loro la tecnica”⁶⁰. Washington ha potuto offrire agli europei l’aiuto finanziario, le forniture di merce, le tecnologie moderne. L’URSS non ha avuto tali possibilità. Se i soldati americani compravano certi servizi delle affamate donne tedesche, i soldati sovietici le violentavano.

D’altronde, la leadership staliniana mirava non solo a fissare la sfera di influenza dell’URSS ma anche ad allargarla. Dalla primavera del 1945 veniva intensificata la pressione sovietica sull’Iran. A questo scopo venivano usate le truppe dell’Armata Rossa che si trovavano nella zona settentrionale dell’Iran dove erano state introdotte nell’agosto del 1941 in conformità all’accordo irano-sovietico del 1921 e di intesa con il governo della Gran Bretagna. L’Unione Sovietica cercava di ottenere alla fine della guerra al minimo – dei diritti esclusivi sull’estrazione del petrolio nelle provincie settentrionali dell’Iran, e al massimo – l’autonomia larga per l’Azerbajgian Iraniano e la sua orientazione prosovietica⁶¹. In conformità agli accordi interalleati le truppe britanniche e sovietiche avrebbero dovuta lasciare l’Iran sei mesi dopo la fine della guerra, cioè al 2 del marzo del 1946.

Ma il governo dell’URSS cercava in ogni modo di rimandare il ritiro delle proprie truppe dalla zona settentrionale del paese. Durante la riunione dei ministri degli Esteri delle tre potenze nel dicembre del 1945 E.Bevin ha interrogato direttamente V. Molotov: “Voi non siete d’accordo per fissare il 2 marzo come la data del ritiro delle truppe? – Noi su questo non siamo d’accordo”, – rispose il ministro sovietico⁶².

Eseguendo gli accordi conclusi, le truppe britanniche e americane hanno lasciato l'Iran all'inizio del marzo del 1946. L'URSS non solo non ha fatto i passi analoghi, ma, anzi, ha introdotto nell'Azerbajdžan Iraniano le truppe complementari dell'Armata Rossa attrezzate della tecnica moderna. È nata una grave crisi internazionale.

I governanti della Gran Bretagna e degli USA hanno manifestato la fermezza decisa di non accettare il consolidamento delle posizioni dell'URSS nel Medio Oriente. Il 3 marzo il ministro delle finanze britannico H. Dalton incontrò E. Bevin, ministro britannico degli Esteri. Quest'ultimo era molto agitato e disse che l'avanzata dell'esercito russo verso Teheran "significa la guerra" e che gli USA stavano per spedire la loro marina militare nel Mediterraneo. La corazzata americana "Missouri" ha ricevuto effettivamente l'ordine rispettivo. Il presidente H. Truman negli stessi giorni, cercando di convincere A. Harriman a fare l'ambasciatore a Londra, gli ha comunicato confidenzialmente: "È una cosa importante. Probabilmente, noi intimeremo la guerra all'Unione Sovietica a causa dell'Iran"⁶³. Nel marzo-aprile il Consiglio di Sicurezza dell'ONU ha esaminato la querela di Teheran "sull'intervento dei poteri sovietici negli affari interni dell'Iran". Alla riunione il rappresentante sovietico A. Gromyko, da una parte, e i suoi colleghi americano e britannico, dall'altra, si scambiavano dagli attacchi duri e ostili.

La posizione inflessibile degli USA e della Gran Bretagna in combinazione con le manovre politiche del governo iraniano hanno spronato l'Unione Sovietica a terminare nel maggio del 1946 il ritiro di tutte le proprie truppe dal paese limitrofo. Scontrandosi con la drastica opposizione, Stalin ripiegò - "la crisi iraniana" fu fina. La pressione sovietica sull'Iran representò solo una parte della lotta per l'influenza sul Vicino e Medio Oriente. Nel gennaio del 1946 E. Bevin durante il pranzo con J. Dulles e con il senatore A. Vandenberg, mostrando sulla carta geografica, spiegava ai suoi ospiti americani che le azioni dell'URSS nell'Iran sono indirizzate anche contro Turchia, che il controllo sovietico sull'Azerbajdžan Iraniano creerebbe le condizioni favorevoli per rafforzare la pressione sulla Turchia.

I ragionamenti del ministro britannico non erano parole vane. È vero che la leadership staliniana dalla primavera del 1945 sferrò la campagna antiturca. Il 19 marzo il governo dell'URSS denunciò il patto sovietico-turco del 1925 di non aggressione e neutralità "a causa del cambiamento della situazione internazionale"⁶⁴.

Durante le trattative successive con Ancara della probabile conclusione del patto di alleanza la parte sovietica ha posto la questione di revisione della convenzione a Montreux in tal modo che il transito per gli Stretti venisse controllato solo dagli stati del Mar Nero. L'Unione Sovietica insisteva anche per ottenere la concessione della base navale nella zona degli Stretti. Oltre tutto, il governo sovietico ha rivendicato la restituzione delle regioni di Kars, di Artvin e di Ardahan, passate alla Turchia dopo la prima guerra mondiale⁶⁵.

Dal punto di vista degli interessi strategici sovietici grande importanza era rappresentata dalla revisione della convenzione di Montreux e della partecipazione attiva dell'URSS nel controllo sugli Stretti del Mar Nero. Tuttavia, Mosca, intensificando la pressione sulla Turchia, insisteva sulle sue pretese territoriali. Il 20 dicembre del 1945 i principali giornali sovietici hanno riprodotto l'articolo redato dai due storici giorgiani "Sulle nostre rivendicazioni alla Turchia"⁶⁶. Nell'articolo venivano motivate le pretese territoriali ancora più grandi della Georgia Sovietica che includevano la striscia strategicamente importante di litorale sul Mar Nero. Sembra che l'avanzare delle pretese territoriali sulla Turchia era l'idea stabile conforme alla mentalità di J. Stalin. Nel novembre del 1940 discutendo con G. Dimitrov lui affermò: "Noi scacciamo i turchi in Asia. Ma che è Turchia? Lá ci sono due milioni di giorgiani, un milione e mezzo di armeni, un milione di curdi etc. Di turchi ci sono solo 6-7 milioni"⁶⁷.

Nel 1945 Stalin giudicò la situazione internazionale favorevole per realizzare le sue intenzioni maturate da molto tempo: stabilire il controllo sugli Stretti e cambiare le frontiere con la Turchia negli interessi dell'URSS. La gravità della campagna antiturca viene confermata dalla segreta informazione sovietica sulla preparazione alla guerra da parte della Turchia e della Grecia. Il

1 agosto del 1945 il capo sezione dell'informazione internazionale del CC VKP(b) G.Dimitrov ricevette il materiale della Direzione politica principale dell'Armata Rossa sui preparativi militari della Turchia e della Grecia contro l'URSS e la Bulgaria. Nella relazione si diceva: "Gli ufficiali fanno propaganda tra i soldati turchi per la preparazione alla guerra contro l'URSS". Stando alle parole delle notizie trafugate, "tra i soldati e gli ufficiali corrono discorsi sulla probabilità della guerra contro la Russia. Gli ufficiali affermano che la Russia cercherà di occupare gli Stretti, ma la Turchia li difenderà..." A quel che dice una notizia trafugata dall'esercito greco, "i nazionalisti greci fanno una propaganda intensa per l'occupazione della Bulgaria. Con tutto ciò vengono nominate le città Plovdiv e Sofia. Alcuni parlano anche della marcia su Mosca". I funzionari della Direzione politica principale affermavano: "Le deposizioni delle notizie trafugate sulla preparazione politica in Turchia e in Grecia al conflitto militare con l'URSS e la Bulgaria coincidono con i dati sulla costruzione delle fortificazioni, effettuata dalle autorità turche e greche"⁶⁸. A dire il vero, era incomprensibile il perché turchi e greci costruissero delle fortificazioni, se loro pensavano di intraprendere una offensiva a Plovdiv, a Sofia e anche a Mosca. Tuttavia, il documento citato rifletteva l'intensificazione da parte di Mosca della tensione nei rapporti con la Grecia e la Turchia, su quest'ultima l'URSS aumentava la pressione per via dei preparativi militari.

L'ulteriore lotta politica e diplomatica era svolta attorno a tentativi dell'URSS di cambiare il regolamento degli Stretti del Mar Nero. Nell'agosto del 1946 il governo con insistenza ha sovietico di nuovo proposto alla Turchia che il regolamento degli Stretti sia determinato dagli stati del Mar Nero con la partecipazione dell'URSS nella difesa del Bosforo e degli Dardanelli. In tal modo è stata avanzata, e non per la prima volta, la richiesta della concessione all'Unione Sovietica della base navale nella zona degli Stretti⁶⁹.

La Gran Bretagna e gli Stati Uniti d'America si opponevano decisamente al rafforzamento delle posizioni dell'URSS nel Mediterraneo orientale. Il 14 agosto durante

l'incontro con i rappresentanti del comando dell'esercito e della marina militare il segretario di stato per interim degli USA D.Acheson rilevò che la Turchia costituirebbe un bastione naturale contro il dominio degli Soviet nel Mediterraneo orientale e contro la penetrazione sovietica in Africa. Prendendo quindi in considerazione la strategia globale gli USA dovrebbero prestare alla Turchia tutto l'appoggio e l'aiuto necessario, inclusa la minaccia di azioni militari contro l'URSS. I dirigenti militari americani hanno appoggiato Acheson. Il giorno dopo hanno esposto le sue idee al presidente H.Truman. Il segretario di stato per interim di nuovo rilevò l'importanza strategica e geopolitica della Turchia. "A nostro parere, - dichiarò Acheson, - la dislocazione da parte Sovietica di basi navali nei Dardanelli o l'introduzione con qualche pretesto di forze armate sovietiche in Turchia comporterebbe la caduta della Grecia, di tutto il Vicino e il Medio Oriente e del Mediterraneo orientale sotto il controllo sovietico; queste regioni saranno staccate dal mondo occidentale"⁷⁰. Per fermare l'espansione sovietica Acheson ha proposto anche di ricorrere alla minaccia di guerra contro l'URSS. Il presidente H.Truman condiscende a questi argomenti. Approvò la spedizione nel Mediterraneo delle navi americane, incluso la portaerei "Franklin D.Roosevelt". Proprio a causa dell'aggravarsi della situazione nel Mediterraneo orientale i militari americani per la prima volta cominciarono ad elaborare i piani bombardamenti del territorio dell'URSS, incluso l'impiego di bombe atomiche⁷¹.

Da qui restava veramente poco alla proclamazione nel marzo del 1947 del "dottrina Truman" - del programma dell'aiuto finanziario e militare americano alla Grecia e alla Turchia a causa del rifiuto della Gran Bretagna dell'ulteriore appoggio attivo ai governi di questi paesi.

Nel luglio 1947 l'ambasciatore americano a Parigi J.Caffery durante la cena, dopo una abbondante porzione di ottimo vino francese, ha snodato la lingua con il collega sovietico A.Bogomolov. L'ambasciatore dell'URSS in Francia ha informato Mosca del parere assai franco del diplomato americano: "Alla domanda

che cosa lui pensa dei crediti americani alla Grecia e alla Turchia, Caffery ha risposto che la Grecia e la Turchia – questo è petrolio. Noi (USA – aut.) siamo pronti ad accettare il rastro inghiottimento delle repubbliche baltiche, ma Voi dovrete allontanarvi dall'Ungheria, dai Balcani e avanzate troppo in Medio Oriente. Noi difendiamo i nostri interessi. Questa è la spiegazione dei nostri crediti⁷². È difficile esprimersi in un modo più chiaro. I motivi strategici e geopolitici, la lotta per le sfere di influenza sono stati i principali fattori d'origine e dello svolgimento della guerra fredda.

La paura dell'Occidente nei riguardi delle aspirazioni sovietiche nel Mediterraneo veniva rafforzata dalla posizione di Mosca nei confronti dei possedimenti ex coloniali d'Italia in Africa. Secondo il progetto sovietico veniva prevista la possibilità di stabilire la tutela di alcuni stati o la tutela congiunta dell'URSS, degli USA e della Gran Bretagna sopra le ex colonie italiane⁷³. Il problema è passato al Consiglio dei ministri degli Affari Esteri.

Alla sessione CMAE a Londra la delegazione sovietica in conformità alle direttive del CC VKP(b) insisteva sulla concessione all'URSS della Tripolitania in qualità di territorio tutelato⁷⁴. L'attività dei rappresentanti dell'URSS era indirizzata a fissare e allargare l'influenza sovietica nei Balcani e nel Mediterraneo. E. Bevin così la giudicò durante la conversazione con G. Bidault: "Molotov voleva mercanteggiare con gli Stati Uniti per avere le mani libere nei Balcani, ottenere il riconoscimento del governo Groza in Romania e ottenere qualche cosa in Africa"⁷⁵. Però Gran Bretagna, Francia e USA erano contrari e di conseguenza non fu presa nessuna decisione rispetto alle ex colonie italiane. Alla tappa successiva della discussione sul trattato di pace con l'Italia alla conferenza dei viceministri degli Esteri a Londra la delegazione sovietica doveva attenersi alle direttive di Politbureau di CC VKP(b) approvate il 7 gennaio del 1946. Esse prescrivevano: "Durante la discussione sulla questione delle colonie italiane in prima istanza sostenere l'istituzione di una tutela individuale e la concessione all'Unione Sovietica della tutela sulla Tripolitania per un periodo di 10 anni." In seconda istanza, la delegazione sovietica potrebbe accettare

l'istituzione sulle ex colonie italiane di una tutela collettiva delle cinque potenze: USA, URSS, Gran Bretagna, Francia e Italia – assicurarsi che in uno dei territori (in Tripolitania o in Cirenaica) il ruolo d'amministratore venga assegnato all'Unione Sovietica. "La delegazione sovietica dovrebbe dare il proprio consenso alla costituzione della tutela collettiva dipendentemente dalla concessione all'Unione Sovietica di una base conveniente per una flotta commerciale e per la marina militare in uno dei porti della Tripolitania o della Cirenaica". L'URSS cercava di ottenere in affitto una base per navi commerciali su una delle isole del Dodecaneso, annesse alla Grecia⁷⁶.

Tuttavia, l'URSS non è riuscita a raggiungere nulla durante la ulteriore discussione sul trattato di pace con l'Italia. Però l'intenzione del Cremlino di ampliare la propria sfera di influenza nel Mediterraneo era veramente seria. Ciò viene confermato dal telegramma del 5 febbraio del 1946 di V. Molotov all'ambasciatore sovietico a Roma con l'incarico di spiegare al leader dei comunisti italiani P. Togliatti: "Lo scopo della nostra proposta è fare in modo che l'Unione Sovietica ottenga la possibilità di inserirsi nel Mediterraneo dove l'Inghilterra sta cercando di occupare una posizione quasi monopolistica, contro gli interessi degli altri Stati mediterranei. Se l'Unione Sovietica si inserirà nel Mediterraneo e stabilirà contatti con l'Italia – tutto ciò andrà a vantaggio di un'Italia democratica"⁷⁷.

Insomma si delinea un quadro imponente delle pretese ampie della leadership staliniana per fissare l'influenza dell'URSS nel Mediterraneo, sul Vicino e Medio Oriente: Iran Settentrionale, la zona degli Stretti del Mar Nero, Tripolitania o Cirenaica con una testa di ponte della marina militare sovietica e una base per navi commerciali su una delle isole del Dodecaneso. Se aggiungere a tutto ciò l'indeterminatezza dell'esito della guerra civile in Grecia e della lotta politica in Italia, diventa chiaro che le aspirazioni sovietiche minacciavano gli importantissimi interessi strategici e geopolitici dell'Occidente. La lotta aspra per le sfere di influenza diventò uno dei principali componenti del germoglio della guerra fredda, la causa delle gravi crisi internazionali.

Se gli USA hanno usufruito largamente le proprie possibilità economico-finanziarie (il piano Marshall), l'URSS ha contato più sui metodi della pressione politico-militare, sul controllo rigido dei paesi dell'Europa orientale e sud-orientale (da qui è nato il conflitto sovietico-jugoslavo). Nello stesso tempo esaminando le crisi internazionali bisogna prendere in considerazione che nessuna delle parti voleva scatenare una grande guerra vera e propria. Nel novembre del 1947 CC VKP (b) informò P.Togliatti sull'incontro di un rappresentante del CC con il leader dei socialisti italiani P.Nenni. Durante l'incontro era formulata la posizione della leadership sovietica rispetto alla probabilità di una nuova guerra: "Noi non crediamo che la guerra sia vicina. L'America non è capace nel

momento attuale a confrontarsi con l'URSS, perché non può convincere il proprio popolo della necessità di una guerra con l'URSS. I clamori intorno ad una nuova guerra hanno come l'obiettivo incoraggiare i reazionari, domare la classe operaia degli USA e impaurire l'URSS e i suoi alleati, farli diventare ubbidienti. Ma l'URSS non cederà al ricatto"⁷⁸. Riassumendo gli ultimi studi sulla storia della guerra fredda, J.Gaddis è venuto alla conclusione: "Stalin non fu mai pronto al rischio di un confronto militare, almeno nel futuro previsto"⁷⁹. La dirigenza staliniana come i leader del mondo Occidentale sapevano manovrare e ritirarsi. È proprio per questo che la guerra fredda, nonostante i conflitti e le crisi che le erano inerenti, non si è trasformata in una lotta armata, in una vera guerra calda.

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THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR: A HISTORIOGRAPHICAL REVIEW

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No issue in recent American history has produced more controversy than that of the origins of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Historians have disagreed, often sharply, over the question of who was responsible for the breakdown of American Soviet relations, and on whether the conflict between the two superpowers was inevitable or could have been avoided. Even if the Cold War is over now, this is definitely not true of the debate over its origins.

One might observe that, in recent years, the substance of the controversy has shifted somehow from the initial, often visceral, confrontation between the "orthodox" and the revisionist theses to a subtler, but not less ardent, argument. This last, but definitely not the least dispute, among the Cold War historians is generated by the new evidences emerged in

recent years from the former Soviet and Eastern European countries archives and by the new approaches proposed as a result.

The debate over the origins of the Cold War may be important not only for historical accuracy, but also for the impact it may have on theoretical issues since scholars of international relations both learn from historical accounts and utilize them as examples and evidence. Thus, it is my belief that a review of the major schools of historical thought on the Cold War and their statements on its origins may be appropriate. The literature on this topic is undoubtedly immense, and the effort to summarize the different views could not cover it thoroughly in consequently this study, focusing mainly on the most representative works of the American historians, has inherently shortcomings.

Traditionalists and Revisionists

Initially, leading Western statesmen like Winston Churchill, Harry Truman, Anthony Eden or first level policy-making diplomats such as James F. Byrnes, Charles Bohlen, Dean Acheson, George F. Kennan and others dominated the field.¹ They were followed, in the 1950s and 1960s, by scholars like William H. McNeill, Herbert Feis, Arthur M. Schlesinger, jr., Gaddis Smith, Martin F. Herz and others, all presenting what came to be known as the "orthodox" or "traditionalist" point of view.²

Basically, this perspective was focused on the idea that, if blame is to be attributed for the outbreak of the Cold War, the Soviet Union

deserves to be credited with full responsibility for the onset of the conflict, while the United States was, according to this view, totally innocent. Soviet aggressiveness, in its leaders and system alike, is considered to be a primary, if not the sole factor behind the Cold War. For example, Herbert Feis is convinced that under Stalin, during the war, the Russian people, "were trying not only to extend their boundaries and their control over neighboring states but also beginning to revert to their revolutionary effort throughout the world. Within the next few years this was to break the coalition [...]"³

In the same manner, Gaddis Smith affirms that, in the face of Soviet determination to embark upon a policy of expansion, the United States had to protect both its own legitimate security interests and democracy in the various European nations, and it would probably have mattered little what other policies the American policy makers had initially followed.⁴ Or, as Arthur Schlesinger, jr. concluded: "[...] The Cold War was the brave and essential response of free men to communist aggression".⁵

For more than a decade after the end of World War II, few historians in the United States saw any reason to challenge the most accepted American interpretation of the beginnings of the Cold War. However, as the years passed, the first works in what become known as the "revisionist" interpretation began to appear and as early as 1959 William Appleman Williams challenged the accepted wisdom in his book *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*. The United States had operated in world affairs, Williams argued, in response to one overriding concern: its commitment to maintaining an "open door" for American trade in world markets. The confrontation with the Soviet Union was less a response to the Russian aggressive designs than an expression of the American belief in the necessity of capitalist expansion.⁶ Even if the thesis proposed by Mr. Williams has been repeatedly revised by the author⁷, and later revisionists modified many of Williams's claims, some of the basic outlines of his views were accepted by most historians of the new-born school of "revisionist" or "New Left" historiography.⁸

Initially the revisionists were few in numbers and attracted relatively little attention⁹. In the 1960s and 1970s, however, partly because the American involvement in Vietnam disillusioned many historians with the premises of the containment policy, and partly because of an increased tendency by the American public to criticize their country's foreign and domestic policies, the revisionists became more numerous and influential; and New Left historiography has drawn the attention of specialists and non-specialists alike.

An outline of the revisionists thesis includes statements such as: the United States had been primarily to blame for the Cold War; the Soviet Union had displayed no aggressive designs toward the West (and in any case was too weak and exhausted at the end of the Second World War to be able to pose a serious threat to United States); America had used its nuclear monopoly to attempt to threaten and intimidate Stalin; President Truman had recklessly abandoned the conciliatory policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt and taken a provocative hard line against the Russians; and the Soviet responses had reflected a legitimate fear of capitalist encirclement. Or, as the moderate revisionist Lloyd Gardner asserts, the United States, the strongest power at the time, ought to have shown more understanding of Moscow's essential economic and security interests: "responsibility for the way in which the Cold War developed, at least, belongs more to the United States. At the end of the war it had much greater opportunity and far more options to influence the course of events than the Soviet Union, whose situation in victory was worse in some ways than that of the defeated countries".¹⁰

The new and challenging approaches of the New Left historiography set the stage for one of the most intriguing and passionate disputes between historians and political scientists about the origins of the Cold War, a topic which, as J.L.Gaddis affirms, "was capable of eliciting torrents of impassioned prose, of inducing normally placid professors to behave like gladiators at scholarly meetings, of provoking calls for suppression of unpopular points of view, threats of lawsuits, and, most shocking of all, the checking of footnotes."¹¹

There are at least three observations to be made regarding this fierce debate between traditionalists and revisionists. First concerns the sources used by each side. The early "orthodox" scholars tended to see the conflict much as American officials of the time did. Because they had only limited access to classified documents from various departments and governmental agencies involved in United States Cold War policy-making, they had to rely mostly on public papers, unclassified materials and, not least, on personal experiences. The revisionist scholars

and the later traditionalists, however, benefited from the emergence of a huge quantity of documents on American foreign policy in the early 1970s, and the arguments between the two historical schools were fueled even more. But neither of the two schools grounded their studies on Soviet archives, still unavailable at that moment.¹²

Second, the aforementioned division in only two broad schools was not as widely accepted by the historians at that moment as it appears to be at the present time. Differences existed among historians within each school, particularly in the revisionist camp¹³, underlining the complexities involved in interpreting the Cold War.¹⁴ But other scholars have now gone beyond simply stressing those internal differences and have identified more than the two usual historiographical schools ("conventional, liberal-realist, moderate revisionist, and radical or New Left revisionist"¹⁵) some even identifying as many as six major groups: "right-wing idealists", "hard realists", "soft or restrained realists", "liberal moralists", "moderate revisionists", and "radical revisionists".¹⁶

Third, the controversy over the Cold War between traditionalists and revisionists can be observed in at least three major questions: 1) which political and economic system, American or Soviet, bears the most responsibility for the onset of the conflict? 2) what was the driving force of American foreign policy, idealism or capitalism (economic expansion and protection of markets)? 3) what lay behind Stalin's moves during the first postwar decade, a policy of expansion or merely defense? Until the 1980s, the answers to those questions were crucial for placing an author in one of the two major historiographical schools on the Cold War history.¹⁷

1. Concerning the first issue, some revisionists¹⁸, for example, affirmed that the main characteristic of the United States followed from its capitalist economic system, and the American policy-makers were obedient to the representatives of the big business. For New Left historians these facts shaped the policies of the United States toward Soviet Russia and other countries during and after the Second World

War. The effects of this malign influence, as summarized by Thomas T. Hammond, were: "a) the leaders of the American government were bitterly hostile toward communism and the Soviet Union; b) American capitalists and their governmental cohorts were determined to keep Eastern Europe open to American business interests; c) the US government opposed all leftists, whether Communist or not, and supported only rightists, thereby coming into conflict with the democratic aspirations of the masses in Eastern Europe"¹⁹. In opposition, the traditionalists focused on the nature of Soviet system considered to be "possessed by convictions both of the infallibility of the communist word and the inevitability of the communist world"²⁰, and actively expansionist due to a combination of many factors among which communist ideology, imperial (tsarist) traditions, security obsessions, messianic thought, economic interests, and Stalin's paranoia.²¹

2. A second point of contention between the revisionists and the traditionalists was offered by their different answers to the question of what was considered to be the motivating force behind the actions of American leaders, particularly towards the Soviets. In general, the traditionalist historians affirmed that American foreign policy in the aftermath of the Second World War was built on generous principles as: securing world cooperation through the United Nations, improving the "moral law and freedom"²² of the nations, protecting its own legitimate security interests and democratic values, promoting the welfare of various countries.²³ Revisionist writers disagreed with the traditionalist on these points stressing the idea that the driving force of United States foreign policy, despite its superficial idealism, was capitalism and economic expansion, not the security threat posed by Soviet Union. Most revisionist theses follow the views of William A. Williams but reach from an extreme stand²⁴ toward a moderate one²⁵.

3. Regarding the motives for the Stalin's actions the revisionist claimed that the Soviet Union could legitimately desire friendly states along its borders and, at least for the first years after the war, Stalin had no preconceived plan

to communize Eastern Europe. He tolerated the capitalist economies and the non-Soviet political regimes of the region, and the sovietization of the Eastern Europe was a reaction to hostile actions and policies of the West.²⁶ The defenders of the orthodox position have viewed the Soviet actions as part of a general policy of expansion, and they have strongly opposed the description of Stalin's policies in Eastern Europe as "moderate",

"cautious", or "conservative".²⁷ Regarding the legitimate Soviet interests in establishing a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe in order to protect its own borders, some traditionalist scholars argued that the policymakers in the United States considered such a development inevitable but by recognizing "special [Soviet] security interests"²⁸ in Eastern Europe they did not meant the imposition of Soviet - style dictatorships in region.

Post-revisionism

In the later years of the Cold War, the revisionist interpretations began to produce yet another kind of reaction of its own, what some have called the "post-revisionist" view of the conflict.²⁹ Historians of American foreign relations, the foremost among them being John Lewis Gaddis³⁰, have tried to forge a synthesis that integrates both the domestic and the international dimensions of American diplomacy, and to take the best elements from both approaches, modifying some of the traditional arguments, accepting some of the revisionist positions. At the same time, the post-revisionists have criticized revisionists for their limited perspectives and ideological baggage, while disagreeing with some of the biases and assumptions of the orthodox camp.

In their attempt to strike a balance between the two historiographical camps, the post-revisionists essentially identified areas of blame and misperception on both sides of the argument. They accepted some American responsibility for the Cold War and were strongly critical of American intervention in the developing countries, for example, yet still found credible the Soviet threat to Europe and Japan. The post-revisionist scholars insisted on mutual misperception, mutual reactivity and shared responsibility between the superpowers. But the ultimate goal of those writers was, as Gaddis states, to reach "a third stage, beyond orthodoxy and revisionism, in the historiography of the period."³¹ meaning a new perspective on the history of the Cold War.

In his article, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War", John Lewis Gaddis attempted to

summarize the fundamental assertions of the new historiography in contrast with the main New Left and traditionalist propositions.

First, he argued that if "there was [for American policymakers] concern about a postwar depression [...] was only one aspect of a more general preoccupation with what was now coming to be called "national security"³², stressing that domestic economic interests have not been the driving force in American policymaking and "economic instruments were used to serve political ends, not the other way around as the Leninist model of imperialism would seem to imply."³³

Second, Gaddis criticized the simplistic assumption of the revisionist historiography that Stalin was eager for cooperation and American intransigence actually frustrated him. Relying on Vojtech Mastny, William Taubmann and other scholars' interpretation of the fragmentary Soviet and East European sources, Gaddis indicates that, consistent with the new documents, "the primary cause of the Cold War was Stalin's ill-defined ambition, his determination to seek security in such a way as to leave little or none for other actors in the international arena."³⁴

Third, in opposition to the New Left argument that the United States imposed its empire on unwilling clients, forging mandatory alliances and compelling its allies into economic dependency, the post-revisionist scholarship has given more attention to the decision-making processes in countries from Western Europe to the Near East, and the arguments seem to demonstrate that "the United States was not alone in perceiving the Soviet Union as a threat after the World War II. Other countries shared

this impression and sought to bring in the United States to redress the balance."³⁵

Fourth, in response to the revisionist idea that the policy of containment was implemented against the will of the American people, who were heavily manipulated by the government's use of the communist threat, some post-revisionists have suggested that public and congressional opinion shifted in the direction of containment ahead the policymakers. Other historians stressed the ability of policymakers to shape public opinion in predetermined directions, but as Gaddis states, the two visions may not be as opposed, as they first appear.³⁶

Fifth, post-revisionist analysis differs from the traditionalist views and confirms the revisionist thesis regarding: 1) the assertion that the United States government consciously overestimated the external dangers from time to time in order to achieve certain domestic goals and 2) the use of the "imperial" paradigm for an American "empire" built "at the invitation of those seeking security".³⁷

The post-revisionist synthesis was labeled in various forms – "neo-orthodox", "eclectic" and produced differing reactions and interpretations in its own right³⁸, varying from admiration³⁹ to denial⁴⁰. Anyway, the post-revisionist scholars made a breakthrough in the debate on Cold War by borrowing insights from the psychological decision-making and realist literatures in political science and producing, if not an effective synthesis, at least a dominant approach based on the "national security imperative". In other words the major concern of the new historiography was not over the question of who has to bear the responsibility for the onset of the Cold War, but with the way that policymakers (American and Soviet) perceived global threats to the nation's security and how they responded to those threats.⁴¹

The common element of different, sometimes controversial, post-revisionist works is their view on the "national security" concept, broadly defined to mean the relation between domestic and international factors affecting a country's security and to include the social, economic, political and military considerations that influence the process of policy-making.

Moreover, seen in this light, the concept also included consideration of the cultural context and the mentality of the decision-makers.⁴² But the handling of such a complex and ambiguous term proved to be extremely difficult and produced disputes of its own.

The use of the "national security" concept for the explanation of the U.S. actions was questioned from the beginning, some scholars stressing the fact that this term did not exist before the Second World War and the substance of the concept emerged only when the context of the Cold War was already established, thus accusing the post-revisionists that "they have made the same discursive turn that Cold War policymakers themselves made: conflating a wide variety of contexts and complexities into a symbolically powerful but increasingly diffuse phrase – national security"⁴³. The main argument of the critics of the "national security paradigm" was that this complex, if not ambiguous, term excluded other crucial elements, especially the ideological ones.⁴⁴

But in the 1980s the use of the "national security paradigm" became a scholarly fashion and during that period well over 90 percent of nearly two thousand books on this topic were published.⁴⁵ Meanwhile the complexity of the concept generated confusion and different approaches encompassing geopolitical and geostrategic discourses, considerations of the perceptions of the Cold War policymakers and various definitions of American national security interests during the Cold War.

Some observations must be made regarding this subject. First, the emergence of this concept did not entirely obviate the question of responsibility for unleashing the Cold War. Such post-revisionist historians as Melvyn Leffler have also asserted that the Cold War was largely caused by the actions of the United States, with the Soviets responding defensively to American initiatives.⁴⁶

Second, applying the national security model, post-revisionist scholars led the historiography on the Cold War to a more profound study of the internal mechanisms of foreign policymaking, outlining different visions and behaviors of the various agencies, departments and institutions

involved in the United States decision-making process during the early years of the Cold War. For example, John Lewis Gaddis, gives much emphasis to the role of George Kennan, the Policy Planning Staff and the State Department for establishing the national security policies at the beginning of the Cold War⁴⁷ while Melvyn P. Leffler analyzes the perceptions and objectives of "those defense officials most concerned with defining and defending the nation's security and strategic interests"⁴⁸.

Third, the national security approach stresses the truism that foreign policy is made by

Realism

At the same time, another effect of the proliferation of the "national security" concept among historians of the United States foreign policy was that diplomatic history was moved close to a political science subdiscipline of international relations – realism. This outcome was possible mainly because the post-revisionists allegedly rejected the ideological factor as a determinant for the superpowers confrontation and the theoreticians of the "national security" schema were looking for new concepts and instruments in order to provide a sound systematization of the international environment at the beginning of the Cold War.

Nonetheless, during the 1980s the domain of international relations was developing substantially in the direction of building abstract models; and the new, post-revisionist, historiography offered historical examples to illustrate the new theories of international politics.⁵⁰ Also it must be mentioned the fact that the field of international relations produced a even more complex view concerning the controversy over the Cold War and the theoreticians in this field identified at least four approaches based on geopolitical and geostrategical arguments: "realist", "subjectivist", "internalist" and "inter-system".⁵¹

Basically, the realist theory states that policies are determined by the competition over capabilities among states and although there are major conceptual differences between the two schools of thought, both "classical" realism and neorealism affirm that the basis for international

policymakers and the study of their mentality is important in order to understand their decisions. The early post-revisionists rejected the ideological viewpoints of traditionalists and revisionists alike; but by placing a strong emphasis on a supposedly consistent misperception by the political leadership that shaped the American foreign policy after the Second World War, they actually opened a substantial debate concerning the beliefs, the values and the personality of the first and second-level characters involved.⁴⁹

relations is the nation-states non-ideological quest for power.⁵² Thus the realist theory states that in the early years of the Cold War there was no communist bloc unified by a common ideology but only individual actors-states seeking to protect their national interests and largely misperceiving the legitimate desires for security by others states. This view sustained the post-revisionist theories of mutual reactivity between the Soviet Union and the United States and their joint responsibility for the beginning of the Cold War.⁵³

One of the results of adopting input from the field of international relations was that some historians advocated a so-called "corporatist" model to explain the behavior of the United States at the beginning of the Cold War. Michael J. Hogan, Chester J. Pach, Jr., David S. Painter or Robert A. Pollard, argued that collaboration among corporations, public and private agencies, and supranational organizations influenced the American decision-making process in the first years of the Cold War. By proposing such a concept they tried to provide a multidimensional tool for analyzing such policies as containment or the Marshall Plan, stressing the role of big business and describing such developments as "military assistance policy", "national oil policy" or the attempts to establish a "corporative world order".⁵⁴ Focusing on geo-economic forces, however, the corporatist approach stressed the influence of domestic factors in the formulation of American foreign policy during the first years of the Cold War.

Another outcome of the realist theory in late 1980s and early 1990s in the historiography of the Cold War was the "internationalization"⁵⁵ of American diplomatic history, both in encouraging a closer collaboration between American and non-American historians, and in focusing research on the study of bilateral relations between United States and various countries at the beginning and during the Cold War.⁵⁶ Such an opening led not only to a more accurate analysis of the American influence and of the impact of United States policies in early years of the Cold War, but also to a more

balanced perspective of the role of the smaller states which, in order to protect their security, "invited" the United States to assume increased responsibilities.⁵⁷

In the early 1990s the realist perspective on the origins of the Cold War seemed to remain, despite the critics, the predominant view of the history of the Cold War. These considerations of geopolitical, social, cultural factors involved in American foreign policymaking after the Second World War rested almost unchallenged, and continued to represent a dominant presence in American history textbooks.⁵⁸

The "new Cold War history"?

Then, in 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist and an opening of Soviet archives followed the complete collapse of communist power in Russia. The resulting flow of new evidences revived the controversy over the origins and evolution of the Cold War and, at the same time, reinvigorated the debate over the American policymaking in the postwar era.⁵⁹

The collapse of Soviet power had other effects on the historiography of the Cold War. It produced a real and effective "internationalization" of the history of the conflict, both in terms of available documentation and the active historians alike. Numerous researchers coming from the former Soviet Empire took their rightful places at the discussion tables and enriched the Cold War historiography with sound perspectives and descriptions.⁶⁰

Also, the profound impact of the newly gained access to the once forbidden sources can be easily seen in the dimensions of an initiative like the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, established in 1991 in Washington, D.C.⁶¹ The scientific quality of the *Working Paper Series* (more than 30 studies at the time of writing) has to be stressed in this context because it covers a multitude of topics and it provides new findings and interpretations on Cold War phenomenon from historians around the globe.

For American researchers, the opening of Russian archives in 1992 meant the opportunity to complete their analyses of the origins of the Cold War with sound studies on Soviet foreign

policy; and historians had great expectations from the fact that finally "the era of serious and detailed study could begin, yielding definitive answers to a whole series of questions, most particularly whether or to what degree the Russians were responsible for the outbreak of the Cold War"⁶². Even those "definitive answers" have not been forthcoming, the archival opening, not only from the former Soviet Union but also from such ex-satellite eastern countries as Poland, Hungary, Romania and Czechoslovakia, fueled a new debate, this time on Stalin's policies and motivations.⁶³

This more recent dispute of historians⁶⁴ on the early Cold War years reveal a tendency, present in the new Russian historiography on the Cold War as well⁶⁵, to re-evaluate the role and the importance of ideology and perceptions in the analysis of the Soviet foreign policymaking processes.⁶⁶ For example in his new study "Revolution by Degree: Stalin's National-Front Strategy for Europe, 1941-1947" Eduard Mark states that "a socialized Eastern Europe [...] was, explicitly, the ultimate aim of his [Stalin's] policies in Eastern Europe—an aim deeply rooted in his regime's ideology and his personal beliefs. From his Marxist-Leninist perspective, moreover, it was obviously more prudent that the military security of the USSR should ultimately be entrusted to a glacis of socialized states in Eastern Europe than to agreements with capitalist states that he viewed as intrinsically predatory potential enemies."⁶⁷

But symptomatic of the impact of the new sources on the evolution of American historiography on the Cold War during the last two decades are the changes produced in the approaches of two important scholars: Melvyn P. Leffler and John Lewis Gaddis.

In 1984, Leffler, following the classical realist pattern, was convinced that "American conception of national security [is] based on geopolitical and economic imperatives"⁶⁸; in 1990, as his vision became more subtle, he stated that "national security policy encompasses the decisions and actions deemed imperative to protect domestic *core values* from external threat", and "national security approach demands that as much attention should be focused on how the American government determines its core values as how it perceives external dangers".⁶⁹

His definition of the "core values" concept fully demonstrate the shift in Mr. Leffler's perspective from a pure geostrategic and geoeconomic approach to a more cunning vision of the complexity of the policymakers motivations: "the term core values is used rather than vital interests because the latter implies something more material and tangible than is appropriate for a national security imperative. The United States has rarely defined its core values in narrowly economic or territorial terms. Core values usually fuse material self-interest with more fundamental goals like the defense of the state's organizing ideology, such as liberal capitalism, the protection of its political institutions, and the safeguarding of its physical base or territorial integrity". Later in the same study he fully explain this view: "Core values are the goals that emerge as priorities after the trade-offs are made; core values are the objectives that merge ideological precepts and cultural symbols like democracy, self-determination, and race consciousness with concrete interests like access to markets and raw materials; core values are the interests that are pursued notwithstanding the costs incurred; core values are the goals worth fighting for."⁷⁰

Moreover, in 1998, during a conversation with William R. Ferris, Professor Leffler affirmed that "the ideological rivalry assumed more importance in the 1950s and 1960s and

took on a momentum of its own. In the immediate postwar years, as a result of the war itself and as a result of the fact that all belligerents in the war were extraordinarily concerned with security issues, there was an overriding preoccupation with security. But [...] security and ideology were always linked", and later during that interview, "the very success of American actions – the reconstruction of Western Europe and the rebuilding of Western Germany, which I think were positive long-term steps – nonetheless heightened the Cold War."⁷¹ These statements contain a reassessment of the role of ideology in shaping the Soviet's perceptions, although Mr. Leffler remains a strong supporter of the "Soviet quest for security" thesis.⁷²

In 2000, at the 19th International Congress of Historical Sciences, Oslo, during the discussion held on the topic "The Cold War Revisited: A Half-Century of Historical Writing" (Round Table 21), Mr. Leffler argued that the Cold War was not produced by idealism but by ideology, a larger concept which includes the way policymakers conceived the world and the necessary actions. He also stressed the fact that in order to understand the origins and evolution of the Cold War, scholars should pay more attention to the complexity of internal processes such as the complicated interactions between governmental agencies and departments and the business world, or the cultural dimensions of American society in the early postwar years. Mr. Leffler's conclusion, as presented in the volume of "Proceedings", was that the historiographical literature on the Cold War has come full circle and, with the fall of the Soviet Union, it seems to revive to the original interpretations.⁷³

From another position, the opinions of John Lewis Gaddis seem to have suffered some changes in the late 1990s. Thus, in his article "On Moral Equivalency and Cold War History" he detach himself from a post-revisionist view seen as "a well-intentioned but ill-defined effort to find some ground between the earlier "orthodox" and revisionist interpretations", stating that the different schools of "the old Cold War History" have in common at least three out of date features: "Americocentrism" – the

unilateral approach from the American perspective on the Cold War, "neglect of ideology", and absence of a "moral dimension"⁷⁴.

Then, Gaddis confirmed the new thesis in his comprehensive comparative history of the Cold War, *We Now Know*, accusing the "old" history of the Cold War that "it emphasized interests, which it mostly defined in material terms – what people possessed, or wanted to possess. It tended to overlook ideas – what people believed, or wanted to believe."⁷⁵

Afterwards, in his essay "The New Cold War History" (1998) Gaddis stresses the idea that Cold War historians' arguments during the late 1980s were seriously affected by the fact that they "were working within rather than after the event they were trying to describe"⁷⁶. Because of the final outcome of the Cold War, and in the light of the new evidences emerging from Soviet archives, Gaddis finds reasons to criticize the "old" historiography stating that "despite the fact that both the United States and the Soviet Union were strongly ideological states, neither historians nor theorists of international relations tended to give sufficient attention to the comparative content of these ideologies, or to extent to which they elicited support from the people who had to live with them." This stress on the validity of ideology is obvious, and the solution founded – a "new" Cold War history.

What Professor Gaddis is proposing as a "new" history of the origins and evolution of the Cold War is actually a reappraisal of the traditionalist's thesis but now using the instruments and concepts derived from the various approaches that emerged in more than 50 years of historiographical discourse on this topic. The features of the new approach to Cold War history should be according to Mr. Gaddis' vision:

1. A more profound inquiry on the mentality and background of the policymakers because "what people believe is at least as important as what they do" and historians should take into account "the ideas, ideology, and moral frameworks" given the fact that Cold War was also "a struggle for people's minds as well as for their bodies and possessions";
2. A better understanding of the indeterminate borderline between domestic and international

spheres during the Cold War years required by the different nature of the two systems engaged in battle, democratic and authoritarian, which "made an enormous difference in how they behaved in the world at large",

3. The necessity "to cultivate the art of critical celebration as well as condemnation", inviting thus historians to praise as well as to blame Cold War decisions and personalities;
4. The abandonment of the thesis of "moral equivalency" between the United States/Western democracies and the Soviet Union/Marxist-Leninist states.⁷⁷
5. A more multi-archival and multi-disciplinary approach, grounding the research on the records of all the major participants in that conflict and on the input from related disciplines.⁷⁸

Once again Mr. Gaddis's considerations led to new debates among Cold War historians, not only on his interpretations of various moments at the beginnings of the conflict but on his methodological assumption as well. Some historians are reticent about turning back to earlier controversies over responsibility for the Cold War and their scientific efforts, grounded also on the Soviet records, seem to avoid assigning blame, at least explicitly, focusing instead on definitions as "security" or "insecurity".⁷⁹ But even these scholars connected their quest for understanding the national security imperatives with new assessments of the ideological influence in Soviet policy. For example, Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, the scholars who have written one of the most influential books to date on Soviet Cold War policies under Joseph Stalin and Nikita Khrushchev, explain Stalin's actions in the early years of the Cold War using the thesis of a revolutionary-imperial paradigm, a "symbiosis of imperial expansionism and ideological proselytism"⁸⁰. In their conclusion, however, the Russian historians reassess the role of ideology in shaping the perspective of Soviet policy makers stating that "ideology was neither the servant nor the master of Soviet foreign policy, but it was the delirium tremens of Soviet statements, the core of the regime's self-legitimacy, a terrifying delusion they could never shake off".⁸¹

At the beginning of a new millenium, looking back at the variety of approaches, interpretations, topics, areas and events involved in the historical research on the origins and evolution of such a complex phenomenon as the Cold War, one might observe that scientific efforts have not yet reached a consensus. But, as John Lewis Gaddis said, the "new Cold war historians should retain the capacity to be surprised"⁸², because the future held out the promise of new evidence and innovative perspectives.

- 1 Some of the most representative memoirs of the Western statesmen that deal with the origins of the Cold War are: Winston S.Churchill, *The Second World War*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1948 – 1953, 6 vol.; Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, Garden City, New York, Doubleday, 1955-1956, 2 vols.; James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, New York, Harper, 1947; Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, New York, Norton, 1969; Charles Bohlen, *Witness to History, 1929 – 1969*, New York, Norton, 1973; Anthony Eden, *The Memoirs of Anthony Eden*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1965; W.Averell Harriman and Elie Able, *Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin*, New York, Randon House, 1975; George F. Kennan, *Memoirs 1925 – 1950*, Boston, Little Brown, 1967; Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War*, New York, Harper, 1947;
- 2 The best-known works of the early traditionalist scholars are: William Hardy McNeill, *America, Britain and Russia: Their Cooperation and Conflict, 1941 – 1946*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1953; Herbert Feis, *The Atomic Bomb end the End of World War II*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966, *Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960, or *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin. The War they Waged and the Peace They Sought*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Origins of the Cold War" in *Foreign Affairs*, vol.46, October 1967; Gaddis Smith, *American Diplomacy during the Second World War.1941 – 1945*, New York, Wiley, 1965.Martin F. Herz, *Beginnings of the Cold War*, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969
- 3 Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin. The War they Waged and the Peace They Sought*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957, pg.655
- 4 Gaddis Smith, *American Diplomacy during the Second World War.1941 – 1945*, New York, Wiley, 1965, pg.11, 146,177 – 178.
- 5 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Origins of the Cold War" in *Foreign Affairs*, vol.46, October 1967, pg. 51
- 6 William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, New York, WWNorton &Company, 1988.
- 7 As demonstrated by Mr. Bradford Perkins' keen essay "The Tragedy of American Diplomacy : Twenty-five Years After", in William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, New York, WWNorton &Company, 1988, pg.313 – 334
- 8 Some of the most characteristic revisionist works are: D.F. Fleming, *The Cold War and its Origins, 1917 – 1960*, Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1961; Gar Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam: The Use of Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power*, New York, Vintage Books, 1965; Barton J. Bernstein, ed. *Politics & Policies of the Truman Administration*, Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1970; Lloyd C. Gardner, *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941 – 1949*, Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1970 and *Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1964; David Horowitz, *The Free World Colossus: A Critique of the American Foreign Policy in the Cold War*, New York, Hill and Wang, 1965; Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World and the United States Foreign Policy 1943 – 1945*, New York, Random House, 1968; Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and the United States Foreign Policy 1945 – 1954*, New York, Harper and Row, 1972; Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia and the Cold War 1945 – 1966*, New York, John Wiley, 1967
- 9 Bradford Perkins, *op.cit.*, pg. 314
- 10 Lloyd Gardner, *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941 – 1949*, Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1970, pg. 317
- 11 John Lewis Gaddis, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War" in *Diplomatic History*, vol.7, no.3, Summer 1983, pg. 171
- 12 Even Vojtech Mastny's excellent work *Russia's Road to Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1941 – 1945*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1978, is based on fragmentary Soviet sources.
- 13 Michael Leigh, "Is There a Revisionist Thesis on the Origins of the Cold War", in *Political Science Quarterly*, March 1974, pg.101 – 116
- 14 See for example J.Samuel Walker, "Historians and Cold war Origins: The New Consensus" in Gerald K. Haines and J. Samuel Walker, Eds. *American Foreign Relations: A Historiographical Review*, Westport, Greenwood, 1981, pg. 207 – 236.

- 15 David S. Patterson, "What's Wrong (and Right) with American Diplomatic History? A Diagnosis and Prescription" in *SHAFR Newsletter*, no.9, September 1978, pg.4
- 16 Jerald A. Combs, "Cold War Historiography: An Alternative to John Gaddis's Post-Revisionism", in *SHAFR Newsletter*, no.15, June 1984, pg.11-16.
- 17 Among critics of the revisionist thesis are: Robert J. Maddox, *The New Left and the Origins of the cold War*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1973; Charles Mayer, "Revisionism and the Interpretation of Cold War Origins", in *Perspectives in American History*, vol.4, 1970; Robert W. Tucker, *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy*, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1971.
- 18 For example, David Horowitz, *The Free World Colossus: A Critique of the American Foreign Policy in the Cold War*, New York, Hill and Wang, 1965; Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World and the United States Foreign Policy 1943 - 1945*, New York, Random House, 1968; Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and the United States Foreign Policy 1945 - 1954*, New York, Harper and Row, 1972;
- 19 Thomas T. Hammond, "Introduction. The Great Debate over the Origins of the Cold War" in Thomas T. Hammond, ed. *Witnesses to the Origins of the Cold War*, Seattle and London, University of Washington Press, 1982, pg.8, n.11.
- 20 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Origins of the Cold War" in *Foreign Affairs*, vol.46, October 1967, pg. 24
- 21 Thomas T. Hammond, *op.cit.*, pg.9
- 22 Herbert Feis, *Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960, pg. 78
- 23 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *op.cit.*, pg.23
- 24 See for example Joyce and Gabriel Kolko: "The perception of Soviet danger that successive administrations fostered was [...] based largely on the crisis of domestic legitimacy and the need to maintain a sustaining tension to enact extremely costly legislation generally desired for reasons having little, if anything, to do with Russia" (Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and the United States Foreign Policy 1945 - 1954*, New York, Harper and Row, 1972, pg. 715)
- 25 For example Lloyd Gardner presents a moderate version stating that the attitude of the policymakers in Washington was dominated by "their nightmare-like memories of the depression, their new found economic power, and the reality of a profound challenge seemingly centered in the Soviet Union" (Lloyd C. Gardner, *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941 - 1949*, Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1970, pg.313)
- 26 For example, Gabriel Kolko states that "the Russians [...] had no intention of Bolshevizing Eastern Europe if - but only if - they could find alternatives" (Gabriel Kolko, *op.cit.*, pg. 619); Or Barton J. Bernstein : "Stalin was pursuing a cautious policy and seeking accommodation with the west", *op.cit.*, pg. 38
- 27 J.L. Richardson, "Cold War Revisionism, A Critique" in *World Politics*, vol.24, no.4, July 1972, pg. 587 - 589
- 28 Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, Speech of October 31, 1945, *Department of State Bulletin*, November 4, 1945, pg.710. As a matter of fact, Byrnes objected to Moscow determination to "deny their neighbors the right to be friends with others" and to impose "exclusive spheres of interest".
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- 30 See John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1972; *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1982; "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War" in *Diplomatic History*, vol.7, no.3, Summer 1983, pg.171 - 190; *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997.
- 31 John Lewis Gaddis, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War" in *Diplomatic History*, vol.7, no.3, Summer 1983, pg.172
- 32 *Ibid.*, pg.173
- 33 *Ibid.*, pg.175
- 34 *Ibid.*, pg.176, and n.14
- 35 *Ibid.*, pg.177
- 36 *Ibid.*, pg.179
- 37 *Ibid.*, pg.181
- 38 Overviews of this trend might include Geoffrey Smith "'Harry, We Hardly Know You': Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945 - 1954", in *American Political Science Review* no.70, 1976; J. Samuel Walker, *op.cit.*; Geir Lundestad *America, Scandinavia and the Cold War, 1945 - 1949*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1980; Lloyd

- Gardner, Lawrence S. Kaplan, Warren Kimball and Bruce R. Kuniholm "Responses to John Lewis Gaddis" in *Diplomatic History*, vol.7, no.3, Summer 1983, pg. 191 – 204.
- 39 Jacob Heilbrunn, "The Revision Thing" in *The New Republic*, August 15, 1994, pg.31- 34, 36 – 39
- 40 Warren Kimball, *op.cit.*, pg. 198 – 200; Jerald A. Combs, *op.cit.*, pg. 9 – 19
- 41 Howard Jones, Randall B. Woods, "Origins of the Cold War in Europe and the Near East: Resent Historiography and the National Security Imperative", *Diplomatic History*, vol.17, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 251-276
- 42 See "A Round Table: Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations", *Journal of American History*, no.77, June 1990, pg.93 – 180; Thomas G. Patterson, "Writing the History of U.S. Foreign Relations: A Symposium", *Diplomatic History*, vol.14, Fall 1990, pg. 553 – 605; Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1987, pg.17 – 18 and "The Long Crisis in U.S. Diplomatic History: Coming to Closure" in *Diplomatic History*, vol.16, Winter 1992, pg., 115 – 140; or the impressive work of Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1992, and Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945 – 1954*, Cambridge, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- 43 Emily S. Rosenberg, "Commentary: The Cold War and the Discourse of National Security", *Diplomatic History*, vol.17, no.2, Spring 1993, pg. 283
- 44 Anders Stephanson, "Commentary: Ideology and Neorealist Mirrors", *Ibid.*: 277-384; David Reynolds, "America's Europe; Europe's America: Image, Influence, and Interaction, 1933-1958", *Diplomatic History*, vol. 20, no. 4, Fall 1996 pg. 664-668.
- 45 Emily S. Rosenberg, *op.cit.*, pg. 282
- 46 Melvyn P. Leffler, *op.cit.*, pg.511 – 515; Melvyn P. Leffler, "New Approaches, Old Interpretations, and Prospective Reconfigurations", *Diplomatic History*, vol.19, no.2, Spring 1995, pg.173 – 196.
- 47 John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1982.
- 48 Melvyn P. Leffler, "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945 – 1948", *American Historical Review*, vol. 89, April 1984, pg.346 – 381. The term "defense officials" includes "civilian appointees and military officers in the departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force, in the office of the secretary of defense, in the armed services, in the intelligence agencies, and on the staff of the National Security Council" (pg.348, n.6)
- 49 Only a few examples: Robert L. Messer, *The End of an Alliance: James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1982; Deborah Welch Larson, *Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1985; Walter Issacson, Evan Thomas, *The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made: Acheson, Bohlen, Harriman, Kennan, Lovett, McCloy*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1986; Walter L. Hixson, *George F. Kennan: Cold war Iconoclast*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1989
- 50 See for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, , New York, Random House, 1979, or Waltz's later work "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory" in *Journal of International Affairs*, 44, Spring 1990, pg.21 – 37; also Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and its critics*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1986
- 51 Vasile Puscas, "The Origin and the End of the Cold War. Historiography in the Geopolitical and Geostrategic Context", quotations are from the web published version on the site <http://www.tellur.ru/~historia/archive/06-00/puskas.htm>
- 52 For a classical realist view see Hans Morghentau, *Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th ed., New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1978; for a Neorealist point of view see Kenneth N. Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory".
- 53 The works of John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1987 and Melvyn P. Leffler's, *A Preponderance of Power*, (1992) are usually quoted as "empirical elaborations" of classical or neo – realist thesis. See Anders Stephanson, *op.cit.*, n.11, pg.290 – 291.
- 54 A few examples of the "corporatist" historiography: Thomas J. McCormick, "Drift or Mastery? A Corporatist Synthesis for American Diplomatic History", *Reviews in American History*, vol.10, December, 1982, pg.318-330, David S. Painter, *Oil and the American century: The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Oil Policy, 1941-1954*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University press, 1986, Michael J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1987, *idem.*, "Corporatism", *Journal of American History*, vol.77, June 1990, 151- 165, Robert A. Pollard, " The national security state reconsidered: Truman and economic containment, 1945 – 1950", in Michael J. Lacey, ed., *The Truman Presidency*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, pg.205-235, Chester J. Pach, Jr., *Arming the Free World: The Origins of the united States Military Assistance Program, 1945-1950*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1991.
- 55 As formulated by Robert J. McMahon, "The Study of American Foreign relations: National History or International History?", *Diplomatic History*, vol.14, Fall 1990, pg.565 – 575 and Michael H. Hunt, "Internationalizing U.S. Diplomatic History: A Practical Agenda", *ibidem*, vol.15, Winter 1991, pg.1 – 16.

- 56 Strong examples are the works of Geir Lundestad *America, Scandinavia and the Cold War, 1945 – 1949*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1980, and James Edward Miller, *The United States and Italy, 1940 – 1950: The Politics and Diplomacy of Stabilization*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1986.
- 57 Geir Lundestad, "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945 – 1952", *Journal of Peace Research*, Sept.1086, pg.263 – 277, developed later in idem., *Empire by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945 – 1997*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1998
- 58 J. Samuel Walker, "The Origins of the Cold War in United States History Textbooks", *Journal of American History*, vol.81, no.4, March 1995, pg.1652 – 1661.
- 59 For a comprehensive overview on the relevance of Soviet archives see "Symposium. Soviet Archives: Revelations and Cold War Historiography", *Diplomatic History*, vol.21, no.2, Spring 1997, with contributions from Jonathan Haslam, William C. Wohlforth, Raymond L. Garthoff, Odd Arne Westad, Robert C. Tucker, Robert D. English, Vladislav Zubok.
- 60 In a brief and, of course, incomplete enumeration: Vladislav Zubok, Constantin Pleshakov, Edvard Radzinski, Leonid Gibianski, Alexander O. Chubarian, Ilya V. Gaiduk, Natalia I. Yegorova, Mikhail M. Narinsky, Andrzej Paczkowski, Leo Gluchowski, Florin Constantiniu and many others.
- 61 The statement of this extraordinary initiative is evident: "The Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War as it emerges from previously inaccessible sources on "the other side" of the post-World War II superpower rivalry. The project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by governments on all sides of the Cold War, and seeks to accelerate the process of integrating new sources, materials and perspectives from the former "Communist bloc" with the historiography of the Cold War which has been written over the past few decades largely by Western scholars reliant on Western archival sources. It also seeks to transcend barriers of language, geography, and regional specialization to create new links among scholars interested in Cold War history.". See also the CWIHP web site at <http://cwihp.si.edu> .
- 62 Jonathan Haslam, "Russian Archival Revelations and Our Understanding of the Cold War", *Diplomatic History*, vol.21, no.2, Spring 1997, pg.217
- 63 For an insightful view of the new perspectives on Stalin's statesmanship see Mr. Melvin Leffler's essay "Inside Enemy Archives: The Cold War Reopened", *Foreign Affairs*, vol.75, July/August 1996, pg.120-135.
- 64 The controversy over the origins and evolutions of the Cold War gained a worldwide dimension when it was posted on the Net through H-Diplo web site. See for example the 1997 debate on Lloyd Gardner's Cold War essay (brought about Gaddis's book *We Now Know*) which involved more than 25 historians including John Gaddis, Frank Kofsky, Tom Nichols, Eduard Mark, Jerald A. Combs, Warren F. Kimball, Donald Struckmann, Robert English, Anders Stephanson, Leopoldo Nuti, Joachim Wintzer and many others. See <http://h-net2.msu.edu/~diplo/reGardner.htm> .
- 65 Alexander O.Chubarian, Iliia V. Gaiduk, Natalia Yegorova, eds., *Stalin and the Cold War, 1945-1953*, Moscow, Institute of General History, 1998
- 66 The role of ideology as an explanation for the evolutions of the international system in the post World War II era is assumed by international relations theorists as well : Nigel Gould-Davies in his recent work on the role of ideology in the Cold War suggests the need for evaluations that distinguish between personality, ideology and culture and notes "ideological states seek power to spread their domestic system rather than to enhance their own security.[...] They define security in terms of the expansion of their domestic system and threat in terms of the expansion of their adversary's domestic system." in Nigel Gould-Davies, "Rethinking the Role of Ideology in International Politics during the Cold War," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, I, no. 1, Winter 1999, 102-103
- 67 Eduard Mark, "Revolution By Degrees: Stalin's National-Front Strategy for Europe, 1941-1947", *Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 31*, February 2001, pg.45
- 68 Melvyn P. Leffler, "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945 –1948", pg.380
- 69 *Idem*, "National Security", *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 77, no.1, June 1990, pg.143 –152, pg. 143, 145).
- 70 *Ibid.*, pg. 145
- 71 "New Perspectives on the Cold War: A Conversation with Melvyn Leffler", <http://www.neh.fed.us/html/magazine/98-11/leffler.htm>
- 72 "Soviet actions in eastern Germany and Eastern Europe, though ruthless and counterproductive, might not have been a consequence of Stalin's revolutionary fervor, or an imperial/revolutionary paradigm, or an inbred irrational paranoia. They might have been a result of his quest for security." in Melvyn P. Leffler, "The Cold War: What Do 'We Now Know'?", *American Historical Review*, vol.104, no. 2, April 1999, pg. 503.
- 73 Amado Luiz Cervo, "Introduction", *The 19th International Congress of Historical Sciences. Proceedings*, Oslo, University of Oslo, 2000, pg.455
- 74 John Lewis Gaddis, "On Moral Equivalency and Cold War History", *Ethics & International Affairs*, vol.10, 1996, quotations are from the web published version at www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/gaddis.htm
- 75 *Idem*, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*, pg. 282
- 76 In order to suggest the limits of the opinions on the Cold War history he is using an amusing quotation from one of the Marx brothers, Groucho, "Outside of a dog, a book is a man's best friend. Inside of a dog, it's too dark to read."

Quotations are from web published version of "The New Cold War History", keynote address delivered by Professor Gaddis at the Foreign Policy Research Institute's History Institute Program on "The Cold War Revisited", May 1-2, 1998 and published in *Footnotes*, The Newsletter of FPRI, vol.5, no.5, June 1998, see http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/amdipl9/gaddis_coldwar.html,

77 *Idem*, "On Moral Equivalency and Cold War History", pg. 11-12

78 *Idem*, *We Now Know*, pg.282. Mr.Gaddis call for a "new history" might be linked with the arguments of Beatriz Ines Moreyra which stresses the methodological shifts produced in historical research since the 1970s: "a shift from the economic and demographic issues to the anthropological problems. Historians are no longer preoccupied exclusively with the clear analytic categories – production, economy, population and social structures – but with all aspects of human behavior and the systems of values. In other words, there prevails a multisided approach which extends the field of historical inquiry.[...] Another significant aspect was the shift from the group to the individual, from quantification to individual example, as a way of throwing light on the internal development of societies. [...] Another aspect is seen in the rebirth of political history – defined as the interpretation of any given unit or society – in terms of how powers is sought, practised, challenged, abused or denied.", discussant's comment at the 19th International Congress of Historical Sciences, Oslo, 2000, Specialised Theme 1 "An Assessment of 20-th Century Historiography: Professionalisation, Methodologies, Writings", in *The 19th International Congress of Historical Sciences. Proceedings*, Oslo, University of Oslo, 2000, pg.123-124

79 Some examples may be considered Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, 1998; Vojtech Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years*, New York, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996; Vladislav Zubok, Constantin Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War. From Stalin to Khrushchev*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1996.

80 Vladislav Zubok, Constantin Pleshakov, *op.cit.*, pg.3

81 *ibid*, p. 275-76

82 John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know*, pg.294

THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE. "THE END OF AN ERA"

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“In Germany and Austria we face the crucial test of our ability to create the conditions of peace in Europe and, in fact, in the world”¹. These were the words of ex-Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, in July 1947. At that time, the impact of the Moscow Conference made itself fully felt inside the official circles of the Western Powers and generally, in the Western public opinion. The Moscow Conference was rightly considered as “the end of an era”. It was the end of the rooseveltian era or of the rooseveltian dream of futile attempts to cooperate with the Russians.

If this was the case, we should ask ourselves why it took the Allies two years to commence a serious discussion at the highest level on the German problem. The Potsdam Protocol which created the Council of Foreign Ministers gave birth to a paradoxical situation. The document was not only extremely vague in regard to Germany, but it practically denied the possibility of negotiations at levels higher than the Allied Control Council in Berlin. The chosen strategy (an American Initiative), despite what Byrnes thought, proved to be a fundamental error: the Anglo-Americans were going to approach a series of problems (the treaties with Germany's former allies) where their bargaining position was extremely weak with the exception of Italy². What Byrnes didn't understand was that he was wasting precious time discussing apparently less controversial issues and simultaneously was altering the international climate trying to solve problems not decisive for the fate of Europe. The European problem was essentially the German

problem. Finding a reasonable answer to the German question could have brought a comparable compromise over Europe as a whole. Dealing with the secondary treaties first meant instead that only a minor step towards general compromise was made, but could also mean creating new barriers, new misunderstandings and generating an unprecedented mistrust between the Allies. Indeed, this was the case. Because of this prolonged delay in discussing the German problem conditions were created for the Soviet and Western Zones to evolve rather divergently. Lack of serious negotiations is even more difficult to understand when we see that during the first phase of the Cold War Germany remained the main key to the future peace³.

The two years of negotiations at all levels and concerning every single problem fully demonstrated that the peace settlements in Europe and elsewhere would be the results of tough bargaining and of power-politics and all these at a time of unprecedentedly rise of Russian-Soviet power and influence⁴. Under normal circumstances the Council of Foreign Ministers should have combined the authority and the prestige of the foreign ministers with the expertise of the specialized committees. Instead, the institution have already become something of a propaganda platform, the best example being Molotov's discourse of 10 July 1946 regarding Soviet German policy⁵.

The Moscow Conference was preceded by a reunion in London of the deputies for Germany and Austria (14 January-25 February) designed primarily at finding the proper formula in order

to involve the lesser Powers in the peace treaty with Germany. It failed and the final report sent to the foreign ministers by their deputies was simply a list of demands posed by those states. It was in fact a failure of the Anglo-Americans to put pressure on the Russians by involving the "international community" outside the borders of Soviet influence⁶ in the German peace settlement. The failed attempt overlapped another failure in reviving the German economy and the continuous growth of the Bizonia institutions. In fact, after creating the Bizonia the Anglo-Americans had two choices: to transform it into a completely separate and soon sovereign country or to maintain it simply as a basis for a unified Germany. The British had made their choice: in their opinion, the advantages of economic unification of the Bizonia wouldn't be felt unless there was a political unification also. These were the steps to follow in lack of a compromise with the Russians and because the high risks such a compromise would involve. Still, hesitations persisted because everybody understood that this type of measure meant the division of Germany and Europe, but by the time of the second Paris Conference (June-July 1946) the majority of the British officials were convinced that there would be no compromise with the Russians and that the Russian threat was in fact bigger than the menace posed by a war ravaged Germany⁷. The American officials converted themselves step by step to the "Riga axioms" and the few months between the creation of the Bizonia and the Moscow Conference were crucial for this process.

At the beginning of 1947 the Three Grands have already begun to follow the logic of the zero-sum game: someone's gain represented irreversibly the other's loss. In this case the stakes were high because both sides felt threatened by a possible combination between Germany's technological and human potential and one of the victors. This rising bipolarity imposed a traditional type of solution: the division of Germany into spheres of influence as a direct mean of avoiding direct confrontation.

On the British side, Bevin submitted to the Cabinet an action plan on February 20. Its main objective was to prepare the conditions for a

breakdown of the negotiations with the Russians while preserving the appearance of quadripartite unity and thus putting all the blame for this huge failure on the shoulders of the Soviets. In fact, the basic idea advanced by the Secretary of the Foreign Office was that of revising the very Potsdam Protocol to make sure that an eventual compromise was built on Anglo-American terms⁸. The Bevin Plan was an extremely complex document with long-range objectives. It was *de facto* a new Potsdam, the old document being no longer adequate, but at the same time – Bevin emphasized – the Soviets had to play the scapegoat for the failure of the quadripartite administration. According to Foreign Secretary's words the Soviet tactics were to agree on revising the Level of Industry Plan established in March 1946 asking in return for reparations from current production. That is why for the British delegation at Moscow refusing this demand would become an axiom. Close related to this refusal was another British objective: reducing the occupation cost: "we should obtain Russian agreement to bearing a reasonable share in the burden already borne and to be borne by the Occupying Powers".⁹ So not only the Russians would begin to pay for German essential imports, but they would also pay a part of the sums already spent by the Anglo-Americans. It is unquestionable that the Soviets could not have accepted this. In fact, that is exactly what Bevin counted on. On the other hand, his position is quite understandable. The British Zone included around 85% of the pre-war German industrial potential, but it was also the most expensive to administer and the most likely to produce large commercial deficits as long as its industry wasn't functioning at full capacity. In 1946 alone Britain spent 400 million dollars¹⁰. Even after the creation of the Bizonia she had to support 50% of the new entity's deficits, all this at a time when she was practically bankrupt. More, she still perceived herself to be alone in front of the Soviet danger and unable to rely entirely on the United States. In regard to political matters the British wanted the immediate establishment of central economic agencies to be followed soon by the creation of a German representative institution which could make recommendations

for holding elections for a provisional government functioning on the basis of a temporary Constitution. A trial period would be followed by the drafting of a permanent Constitution.

The preparatory documents of the British delegation had also an ultimative trait. First of July was the time-limit for drawing-up of a common export-import program. It is difficult to believe that what had proved impossible to achieve since Potsdam could be realised in only four months. One can easily see that the British delegation was not prepared for a compromise. They came to Moscow only to block an eventual compromise and to develop the "Western approach"¹¹.

Fortunately enough for the British American planning followed essentially the same main lines. "As they [the Americans] approached the Moscow meeting, the overriding factor for US officials was the deteriorating economic situation in Western Europe"¹². Reconstructing Germany was therefore a matter of emergency. This doesn't mean that an accord with the Russians was completely excluded, but by that time many American officials came to see even possible Russian concessions only as misleading actions having hidden objectives¹³. In February 1947 John D. Hickerson, a leading member of the Division for European Affairs in the Department of State thought that Soviet actions can only prove the aggressive intentions of the USSR. Soviet Russia is explicitly compared to Hitler's Germany, so there could be no "appeasement" because concessions would only lead to more Soviet demands¹⁴. On January 7 Walter Beddel Smith, the American Ambassador in Moscow, sent to the new Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, his own estimate regarding the Soviet purposes in Germany. According to him, Stalin's objectives in Germany could be fulfilled only through complete domination of the entire Germany. This kind of domination could be achieved by closing entirely the Soviet zone to any outside influence and by creating inside Western Germany conditions as favourable as possible for a future Communist offensive. Marshall was warned that the Russians would use German central agencies primarily to fulfill their

political objectives: blocking any effective attempts for the rehabilitation of the Western Zones and infiltrating Western Germany. The only remaining solution was total separation between spheres of influence¹⁵. The Ambassador's point of view was largely shared by policymakers in Washington. Truman's inclination until 1946 had been to regard the difficulties in American-Russian relations basically as failures of communication¹⁶. At Moscow things had to come to a head. There would be a showdown with the Russians (one year and a half after Churchill had wanted one at Potsdam) over the main problem in Europe. The most important thing about American planning before the Conference was that the German problem gained truly continental dimensions. During the preceding months German unification stopped actually being an end in itself. "Recovery in Denmark, Holland, France and Switzerland particularly is impeded and delayed so as long as the cadaver of Germany sends its stench of decay into all these countries"¹⁷. The main emphasis was placed on the economic recovery of Western Germany understood as an essential stage on the path towards continental rehabilitation. Economic reconstruction of Germany meant free circulation of food, raw materials and industrial products between the four zones (the British even in this case found disadvantages because the Eastern Zone was lacking industrial products which in consequence wouldn't be available for the distressed areas in Western Europe); creation of a common export-import program (which meant, I emphasize, that Russia would assume financial responsibilities). The Americans acknowledged that the latter condition would certainly not be accepted by Stalin¹⁸. Planning activities took also part outside the State Department. The Council on Foreign Relations lead by Allen Dulles concluded in January 1947 that at the coming Moscow Conference "a beginning be made towards measures of reconstruction". Although there was no explicit intention of excluding the Soviets, for practical reasons there could be no more delays. CFR's conclusions ran along the lines of Bevin's: Potsdam had been "hastily-drafted...ill-considered...and unsatisfactory in its practical

application"¹⁹. The State Department's position was a little less rigid than that of the Foreign Office: while the British excluded from the start the possibility of reparations from current production, the American planners believed that this option should not be ruled out from the beginning if the Soviets agreed to a substantial increase in the industrial production²⁰. At the same time it was recognized that reparations from current production were not included in the Potsdam Protocol, nor forbidden by it. In case of satisfactory Soviet concessions, this was a possibility to think about²¹. The final preparatory document for the American delegation seemed to solve the dilemma: the Secretary of State had to resist any Soviet demands for reparations from current production because the commercial deficit of the Bizonia would increase even more²². Differences between Americans and British, with the notable exception of the attitude towards drafting a provisional Constitution in Germany, were generally only apparent. Even in political matters the Anglo-Americans placed themselves between the extreme federalism preached by France which they considered non-compatible with the requirements of a modern state, on one side, and the centralization supported by the Soviets which was thought favourable to a single-party state and extremely dangerous if one keeps in mind the weak democratic traditions in Germany²³.

Anyway, "the chief impetus towards the division of Germany was the wish for a free hand in combating its economic stagnation"²⁴. The American policymakers came to the conclusion that "almost any action would be an improvement" compared to the present lack of decision²⁵. In forming this perception a vital role was played by the extensive Hoover reports. The conclusion of the last one, entitled "The necessary steps for promotion of German export so as to relieve American taxpayers of the burdens of relief and for economic recovery in Europe" deserves extensive quoting: "The violation by Russia and France of the agreements for the economic unification and the additional burdens this imposed upon us is in consequence certainly warrant our ignoring all agreements for <<level of industry>>, transfer and destruction of

non-arms plants. If this interregnum is to endure for long, we could build a self-sustaining economic community out of Anglo-American Zones alone. This could only be a temporary expedient, not a final solution. Building a lasting peace in Europe should be our objective"²⁶. The reports emphasized also the immense financial contribution of the Anglo-Americans estimated at around 600 million dollars. Developing exclusively the light industries would mean tough commercial rivalries in Western Europe and would affect the little nations while the products of the German heavy industry were badly needed throughout Western countries. The reports preached also eliminating all types of limitations on German heavy industry which was seen as the engine for European recovery.

It was a first open step towards a complete shift in emphasis of the US German policy. The rehabilitation of the Western Zones would become the main task of the American occupational policies and was acknowledged as a sine qua non condition for Europe to solve the question of economic stagnation. Historians have been talking since about a shift from security to reconstruction. In reality, for many reconstruction meant security, although even in the eyes of some contemporaries Hoover reports' main objective was the reconstruction of Germany and not the security of Europe²⁷.

The French delegation found itself at the time of the Moscow Conference in an extremely delicate situation. The rigid stand adopted so far in regard to Germany was becoming less and less tenable and the French diplomats knew it, but strong internal pressures prevented them from reaching a compromise with their Western partners. In a discussion with the American Ambassador in Paris, Caffery, Bidault apprehended that "neither your Government, nor the British, nor the Soviets will approve our memoranda, but no matter; I must defend my country's interests. I am only too well aware that France is a defeated country and our dream of restoring her power and glory at this juncture seems far from reality. While I can admit that privately to you, I cannot admit either to the French public or to the world at large"²⁸. France's interests were presented to the other members of

the Council in a series of memorandas between January 17 and the first of February. The documents centered around the constitutional formula compatible with the peaceful future of Germany. The key-question was represented by the balance between the central German authorities and lander governments. Even though the necessity for a central government for the uniform treatment of the German territories was acknowledged, its powers were vaguely defined, the only clear task being that of coordinating the länder which kept for themselves extensive powers in the industrial, financial, commercial, communications fields and even in that of external affairs. However, the main concern for France in Moscow was to obtain a substantial increase of German coal exports, a condition which she posed in order to agree at least to the Byrnes treaty. Quai d'Orsay shared the same scepticism in regard to the outcome of the Conference and considered the issue of reparations from current production to be (France was also opposed to this, but for reasons different of those of the Anglo-Saxons: it was believed that the main result would be a built-up of the German industrial-and therefore military potential, the material advantages being largely exceeded by the threats of a revived Germany) the main cause for the failure of the Moscow Council²⁹. France still enjoyed the dream of a third force between the aggressive capitalism of the Anglo-Americans and the totalitarian communism (a dream already abandoned in part by Britain, despite Bevin's own views³⁰). The Moscow meeting will have almost traumatizing effects for Bidault because it fully exposed the failure of his (and de Gaulle's) equilibrium policy and the increasing isolation of his country unless a fundamental change occurred³¹. The transition of the French diplomacy was to prove more than difficult especially because of the cleavage created between a public opinion (and a powerful Communist propaganda) convinced of the priority of the German menace and the unexpressed opinion of the majority of the policymakers which were becoming increasingly aware of the risks of maintaining the present stand³² and were more and more conscious of the dangers posed by an eventual Soviet preponderance in Central Europe.

The Moscow Conference which began on the 10th of March was to become one of the decisive moments of the crucial year 1947 together with the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan or the Paris Conference of June. Of these four it received the least attention from the historians perhaps because it was overshadowed by the Truman's speech which enjoyed at that time much more publicity as it was designed to overcome internal opposition to an increasing American presence in Europe³³. Its impact on the diplomatic environment was immense, perhaps bigger and in any case more profound than that of the crisis which led to the formulation of the Truman Doctrine. From this moment on the possibilities of a compromise with the Russians were close to none. Kremlin's intentions were clear for anyone in Washington or in London. W. B. Smith characterized the Conference as a "successful failure" because in spite of all frustrations it had caused, it had brought also a clarification beyond any doubt regarding Soviet attitudes regarding Germany and Austria and drew closer Britain, France and the US³⁴. In 1952 Marshall established in an interview a direct relationship between the Moscow reunion and his speech of June 5³⁵. Although this can be easily argued with³⁶, it is also true that without the consensus created by Truman's speech and by the Moscow Conference the Marshall Plan would have been unconceivable. It matters less that a considerable part of the American delegation has come to Moscow without really believing a compromise possible. And, indeed, disillusionment is not the word to describe the state of mind of the US delegation after the Conference³⁷. For many others failure in Moscow was the final confirmation they sought and it fitted the cognitive pattern they began applying to understand Soviet behaviour.

The first days of the Conference, on the contrary, seemed to confirm the expectations of the optimist minority. Bevin was surprised to find out that his demand for the suppression of Prussia received unanimity. Then, the Allied Control Council Report was discussed, but it didn't generate any debates simply because it was a simple list of the four powers' grievances³⁸. But from this point on the situation

was to become more and more tense. Discussions about the implementation of the four "d"s brought to the surface the old charges and countercharges of Bevin and Molotov to which everyone was accustomed except Marshall³⁹. Despite minor differences⁴⁰, Bevin and Marshall were rapidly forced on essentially the same positions by Molotov's aggressive allegations related to the Bizonia. In fact, that is the pattern that the negotiations followed for a month and a half, especially after March 17, the day when economic matters began to be considered. From the minute of that day's meeting one can easily understand the difficulties which the Westerners encountered in grasping the real tactics behind Molotov's harsh and puzzling rhetoric: Molotov began by criticizing the bizonal arrangements which had brought only chaos in Germany and which favour the penetration of the German economy by the Anglo-American imperialists. Western Powers were also accused that they have been acting in bad faith in regard to reparations while the Soviets did all their "homework". And then, suddenly, to the assistance's entire surprise and confusion Molotov subscribed to the necessity for quadripartite cooperation in restoring the German economy which could furnish essential industrial products and equipments for the devastated countries⁴¹. When was he sincere? It was a legitimate question, but a question which the British and a big part of the American delegation had already lost interest asking. In fact, Molotov didn't waste any opportunity to throw the anathema on the Bizonia which was interpreted as an obvious infringement on the Potsdam Protocol. At the same time, Bevin and Marshall had to deal with a stubborn Bidault who would not agree to anything unless the Anglo-Americans met his demands on coal particularly. The French initially refused to agree to raise in the industrial level and supported an acceleration of the equipment deliveries from Germany⁴². Their support for economic unification and for the changing the Level-of-Industry Plan depended on the Anglo-Americans satisfying a set of fundamental conditions: economic integration of the Saar Basin with the economy of France, a special regime for the Ruhr (and eventual

separation from Germany) – possibly an international one, satisfying her demands for a fix percentage of the German coal to be exported. The Moscow Conference- as I earlier said- was a last attempt of Bidault to play the Anglo-Americans against the Russians in order to get concessions from both. It was the weakness of his position and Molotov's rigidity which prevented him from doing so. But, in effect, the same weakness is partly responsible for the concessions made by Bevin and Marshall⁴³ concerning German coal. The situation arrived at caught the French a little by surprise if we take into consideration the estimates of the Commander-in-Chief of the French zone of occupation in Germany, general Koenig: "Under the circumstances, the French delegation will have a relatively easy task. After presenting all the French demands, it will be sufficient to ask our partners to present theirs in detail; the disputes between the Anglo-Saxons and the Soviets will burst out anyway. These tactics will have the advantage of furnishing us with plenty of time. When things will calm down, in Moscow or elsewhere, the French delegation will begin serious negotiations with an intact plan which will give us a good bargaining position". Koenig, as a matter of fact, maintained the same constant short-sightedness even after the Moscow Conference when he wrote Bidault that adhering to the Bizonia would force France to choose between "two blocs fighting for the world supremacy"⁴⁴. Short-sightedness not because he didn't understand the meaning of an eventual Trizonia, but because he didn't see that France had already made her choice.

I have mentioned March 17. Economic matters were put on the table after a few days of "refreshing" Russian charges against the British demilitarization and denazification policy and after futile attempts by Marshall to obtain a complete definition of the human rights concept rejected by Molotov as "theoretical generalities"⁴⁵ (Molotov's words revealed the conceptual gap between the two sides which contributed decisively to making the agreement really impossible). Molotov simply didn't understand this preference for "theoretical generalities" such as guaranteeing fundamental civil rights, the rights

of the political parties and of the trade-unions, the freedom of the press or the free-movement between the four zones and for that he could not understand the fact that an agreement on these principles could mean a breakthrough in the negotiations. In Molotov's opinion, for example, freedom of the press should not include freedom for Nazi propaganda. Experience had shown what Nazi propaganda meant in Eastern Europe.

There was no mood for a compromise even if the Americans would have envisaged meeting the Russians half-way. Bevin described it to his Prime-Minister: "It looks to me like we are getting perilously near a position in which a line-up is taking place. There is courtesy, there are no high words being used, no tempers, but all of it is cool and calculated and between the two big boys looks to me to be pretty determined"⁴⁶. On that day Bevin started the delicate discussion on economic matters reaffirming the primacy of achieving economic unity in Germany. Economic unity had to be accompanied, in his opinion, by a substantial increase of the industrial production. It was highly important to preserve the economic potential of the German peace economy as it was to destroy her capacity to wage war, but without unity there could be no effective disarmament and certainly no reparations plan. Molotov couldn't disagree to a statement like this one⁴⁷. But beyond this point there was no agreement. Neither part believed that its concessions would be properly reciprocated. Inside the British delegation there was no doubt: reparations from current production should not start at least until Germany had a balanced economy, although after that date it is hard to believe they would have accepted because they would always find better destinations for German products⁴⁸. The key-question of the Conference proved to be exactly Bevin's obstinate attitude. London's resolution stimulated in fact American rigidity in economic matters and was vital in convincing Marshall to abandon any intermediate solutions. Anyway, the majority of the Americans in Moscow didn't need such a stimulus to acknowledge: "The Molotov economics are of course fantastic... Germany shall be able to to pay Russia its reparations, pay reparations in coal to France,

balance its export and import trade so that no occupying power has to bear any cost, increase its standard of living and particularly food level, bear internal and external occupation costs, and all simultaneously"⁴⁹. The dispute over reparations affected every other topics on the agenda and obviously altered the atmosphere⁵⁰. The decision was essentially a political one⁵¹ and the only real problem was the dispute between the State Department and those of the OMGUS in Berlin from which general Clay came defeated⁵². Clay had tried to impose a reconsideration of the Soviet intentions in Germany and believed that paying reparations from current production was in fact the only to avoid loosing Eastern Germany and Eastern Europe. All he could demonstrate instead was that he didn't understand the real scale of the developments inside the State Department particularly and inside the Truman administration generally. If Bevin was more than resolute not to give in, Marshall had to deal with the "Frankfurt tyrant", but also with his own doubts. During an informal discussion, Bevin wondered if the Potsdam Agreement specifically forbade reparations from current production, but at the same time he admitted that it didn't matter much, because His Majesty's Government was opposed to it anyway⁵³. At the same time, the Americans maintained a dosage of ambiguity. While Marshall seemed adamant in refusing current production reparations, American experts lead by Ben Cohen drew up a project which would grant this type of reparations but only after Germany has balanced itself. What was new was that Germany could begin paying reparations from current production at anytime if the beneficiary accepted to pay 75% of the value of the products it received. Anyway, the same experts believed that the Soviets would not find that scheme satisfactory, but that was how far they could go⁵⁴. Caught between a hard-headed Bevin and a Soviet Union harder to deal with, Marshall made attempts to mediate, but the formulas he found were usually rejected by Bevin⁵⁵.

The harmony between the four Great Powers maintained itself again exclusively at the level of general principles: economic unity was accepted by all delegations, but when it came to

establishing the conditions and the practical measures to implement it, they had different sets of priorities and disagreements came into sight immediately⁵⁶. On April 23, after more than a month discussing economic matters there was no agreement on any of the significant questions: a common import-export plan, sharing of the commercial deficits, financial reform, control of the Ruhr, inter-zonal free movement of goods and persons, economic decentralization and decartelization, allied control over internal allocation of resources in Germany⁵⁷. A possibility of a compromise and a first step towards a deal had appeared during the discussions dedicated to the future political structure of Germany. Molotov had presented a few moderate projects which followed essentially the constitutional pattern of the Weimar Republic and which insisted on diminishing the executive powers of the presidency. The Americans, the British and the Russians, they all agreed on the necessity of establishing rapidly a provisional government (Bevin and Molotov sustained also the necessity for a provisional Constitution to which the Americans disagreed) and Marshall forwarded a three-stage plan: establishing a government including the chiefs of *länder's* governments, drafting a Constitution and finally electing a new government based on that Constitution⁵⁸. It looked like a major breakthrough, but Bevin conditioned political unification with the economic unity: "we cannot act in some matters as if economic unity had been achieved while in other important matters the principle is not applied"⁵⁹. On March 31 Marshall could only admit total lack of progress: "We are now locked in the final discussion regarding economic and political unity and regarding the political organization of Germany. The vital points are the level of industry, with related demands for reparations from current production"⁶⁰. However, the same survey of the negotiations admitted that the problem of reparations could be solved: "acceptance of the four-power treaty would ensure our security to the extent that an increase in the German level of industry for peace-time purposes can be permitted. Such increase would reduce deliveries of capital equipment as reparations

but might allow use of current production of reparations, taking into account that Germany should share with the Allies any resultant increase in its standard of living above the European average⁶¹. During the few days preceding March 31 the most difficult task for the British delegation was to block a compromise on these lines, although it is now obvious that they overestimated American desire for a compromise. Marshall acknowledged himself during a regular meeting that "we should not seek agreement just for the sake of it". Bevin's option was beyond any doubt: reparations from current production were not possible then and would not be possible in the near future. That is why things did not look very encouraging to him when on March 22 the Secretary of State told him during a private meeting that a compromise could be reached by "operating in Germany of reparations plants for the benefit of the Soviets, they providing the raw material". This solution had the net advantage that it didn't delay the recovery of the German economy. Marshall's dilemma would be resolved by a message from president Truman: "No reparations from current production will be permitted which would diminish the availability of exports, proceeds from which must be utilized in the first instance to pay for essential imports, including the reimbursements of the US and UK for advances already made to Germany"⁶². From this moment there would be no more serious diplomacy. Marshall and Bevin could only agree that "our time would run out before we even reach the Austrian Treaty". Under the circumstances Bevin was able to force an American option for the Western strategy in Germany (including a unilateral determination of a new industrial level in the Bizonia which meant drastically reducing reparation deliveries beneath the quotas established at Potsdam)⁶³. It was a success for Bevin's strategy described correctly by general Draper, one of Clay's aids: "According to our information he will seek an opportunity at the Council to propose Four-power agreement on a revised level-of-industry based on a steel production of ten million tons (11,5 million tons capacity to be left in place). The British expect (and so do we) that the Soviet delegation

immediately raise the question whether this provides for reparations from current output in accordance with the Soviet demand. The answer being <<no>>, it is expected that the Soviet Government will not agree. It is also expected that France will not agree because of the steel figure. If this is the outcome, Mr. Bevin plans to indicate that he regards himself as free to take whatever action is appropriate regarding the level-of-industry⁶⁴.

The only method of avoiding an open rift seemed to be the success of another American initiative: the quadripartite treaty for the demilitarization of Germany. Soviet objections made the Treaty unpractical. Molotov asked that new clauses be added to the American draft of a treaty to keep Germany demilitarized for twenty of forty years. These clauses altered the original intent of the American proposal. In fact, Marshall "pointed out that Molotov's attempts to introduce all the disagreements of the five past weeks into the discussion of the four powers meant in effect no four-power treaty". Molotov's amendments included quadripartite control of the Ruhr, land reform, fulfillment of the German obligations to the Allied states (including reparations). These virtually transformed the Demilitarization Treaty into a *de facto* peace treaty⁶⁵. Extremely important for the American perception of Soviet intentions, besides the refusal of the quadripartite treaty, was the Stalin-Marshall meeting on April 15. Hoping to influence the Soviet behaviour (following the model of Byrnes in Moscow in December 1945), the Secretary of State confessed his great disappointment regarding the Conference. Stalin's answer, in a conciliatory tone, had a reversed effect on the American: "After all, these are the first skirmishes and brushes of reconnaissance forces on this question. Differences has occurred before on other questions, and as a rule after people had exhausted themselves in dispute they then recognize the necessity of compromise. It is possible that no great successes would be achieved at this session, but that should cause anyone to be desperate"⁶⁶. Marshall will later interpret Stalin's interventions as an attempt to delay any positive action in Western Europe and


in Germany in order to get a "compromise through exhaustion". The rehabilitation of Europe could not wait any longer, the centrifugal forces becoming more powerful each day⁶⁷. During the last stage of the Conference, however, Marshall found a different meaning in Stalin's words. He thought that his interview with Stalin would have benefic consequences, at least in regard to the Austrian Treaty: "While a number of disagreements have been passed over the impression I have at the time [April 17] is that the prospects are not so black...I think that we are now seeing some of the results of my interview with Stalin"⁶⁸. Anyway, during the same last days of the Conference Marshall became a lot more favourable to Bevin's projects⁶⁹.

The Moscow Conference more than anything gave substance and motivation to the "Western approach". Despite the opinions of the OMGUS differences between the Anglo-Americans proved to be insignificant. Bevin's proposal got US attention and approval. An increasing sense of emergency dominated all their discussions especially when it became obvious that at the level of military administrations there were divergences. Every major topics regarding the Bizonia (concentration of economic agencies in one city, making these agencies more efficient, creating a German Advisory Council, financial reform) were discussed and agreement reached on most of them, even if, at first, Clay considered the ten-million tons steel figure as "pulled out of the hat". The Conference contributed decisively to the defeat of the advocates for cooperation with Russia even at a high price. Preparing for the London session of the Council Marshall would tell John D. Hickerson: "Now I do not wish to repeat the experience in Moscow; seven weeks and getting nowhere...If there's any hope, I have all the time in the world...but I just want to tell you here and now that I'm going to look to you, in consultation with your British and French opposite numbers, to make reviews from time to time, and if you conclude that there's no hope, then we're going to wind it up"⁷⁰.

Arrived in London, Marshall would very soon convince himself that "we're not going anywhere" and that he had "to wind it up".

1. James F. Byrnes: *Speaking Frankly*, New York, 1947, p.155, 159
2. Walter Lippmann: *The Failure of the Peacemakers*, p.19-22 in Thomas G. Paterson (ed.): *The Origins of the Cold War*, Lenxington, DC Heath & Co., 1970; Nicolas Werth: *Histoire de l'Union Sovietique*, Paris PUF, 1990, p.269
3. *Documents on British policy Overseas. Series I. Eastern Europe. August 1945-April 1946*, London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1991, p.195
4. A. Bullock: *Ernest Bevin. Foreign Secretary 1945-1951*, New York & London, WW Norton & Co, 1983, p.138
5. Vyacheslav Molotov: *Questions de politique exterieure. Declarations et discours. Avril 1945-Juin 148, Moscou, Editions en Langues Etrangeres, 1949, p.64-70*
6. For the proceedings of the Conference of London see ****Foreign Relations of United States 1947 II. The Council of Foreign Ministers. Germany and Austria*, Washington, United Staes Government Printing Office, p.1-138. Generally, two thesis confronts each other: the Anglo-American one regarding a deeper involvement of the lesser Allies and the Soviet one which tended to curtail this participation.
7. Anne Deighton: *The Impossible Peace: Great Britain, The Division of Germany and the Origins of the Cold War*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990, p.115. For the American position see C Riddleberger's telegram of August 13 1946 http://www.whistletop.org/study_org/marshall/large/folder5.html
8. For the text of the Bevin Plan see A. Deighton, Annex A, 244-255
9. *Ibidem*, p.244
10. Hugh Thomas: *The Armed Truce: The Beginning of the Cold War, 1945-1946*, New York, Atheneum, 1987, p.341.
11. A. Deighton, p. 123-125, 244-245, 247, 249, 251-253
12. Carolyn Eisenberg: *Drawing the Line. The American Decision to Divide Germany 1944-1949*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.278
13. ***Central Intelligence Group. *Revised Soviet Tactics in International Affairs (January 6 1947)*, p.2, <http://www.seas.gwu.edu/nsarchive/coldwar/documents/episode-2.html>
14. Daniel Yergin: *Shattered Peace. The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1977, p.271-272
15. ****Foreign Relations of united States 1947 II. The Council of Foreign Ministers: Germany and Austria*, Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1972, p.139-141
16. J.L. Gaddis: *The Insecurities of Victory: the United States and the Perception of the Soviet Threat after World War II*, in Michael J. Lacey (ed.): *The Truman Presidency*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p.252
17. Michael Wala: "Ripping Holes in the Iron Curtain": *The Council on Foreign Relations and Germany, 1945-1950*, p.11 in Jeffry Diefendorf, Axel Frohn, Hermann-Josef Rupieper (eds.): *American Policy and the Reconstruction of Germany, 1945-1955*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996; C.Eisenberg, p. 282
18. *FRUS 1947 II*, p.215-216, 226
19. Michael Wala, p.12, C.Eisenberg, p. 282
20. *FRUS 1947 II*, p. 160-162, 164-166, 199
21. *Ibidem*, p.198. The condition was that reparations from current production should be strictly limited in time and quantity. This made it hard for the Russian to accept.
22. *Ibidem*, p.219
23. *Ibidem*, p.162,165, 182, 199-201, 201-206
24. C. Eisenberg, p.285
25. Michael J. Hogan: *The Marshall Plan. America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe 1947-1952*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995 , p.35
26. See ****The President's Economic Mission In Germany and Austria. Report No.3: The necessary steps for promotion of German exports so as to relieve American taxpayers of the burdens of relief and for economic recovery of Europe* in http://www.whistletop.org/study_org/marshall/large/folder4.html Highly significant is the conclusion of the first report ****The President's Economic Mission In Germany and Austria. Report No.1. German Agriculture and Food Requirements*: "It had come as a gret shock to American taxpayer that, having won the war over Germany, we are now faced for dome years with large expenditures for relief of these peoples...Whatever policies might have avoided this expense, we are now faced with it. And we are faced with it until export industries of Germany can be sufficiently revived to pay for their food."
27. *FRUS 1947 II*, p.394
28. *Ibidem*, p.154-155
29. The texts of the three memorandas can be found in ****Documents francais relatifs a l'Allemagne (Aout 1946-Fevrier 1947)*, Paris, 1947, p.42-64 passim, *FRUS 1947 II*, p.188, 190-194
30. see Sean Greenwood: *The Third Force Policy of Ernest Bevin* in ****Wartime Plans for Postwar Europe 1940-1947. Contributions to the Symposium in Brussels, May 12-14, 1993*, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1995, p. 419-436
31. Frederic Bozo: *La politique exterieure de la France depuis 1945*, Paris, Editions La Decouverte, 1997, p.8-9

32. For a discussion on this see Genevieve Maelstaf: *Que faire de l'Allemagne? Les responsables francais, le statut international de l'Allemagne et le probleme de l'unite allemande (1945-1955)*, Paris, Diresction des Archives. Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, 1999, p.5-109 passim, Pierre Gerbet: *Le relevement. La politique etrangere francais 1945-1949*, Paris, 1987, A Grosser: *Les Occidentaux. Les pays de l'Europe et les Etats-Unis depuis la guerre*, Paris, Fayard, 1978, p.54-95
33. Rober A. Pollard: *The National Security State Reconsidered: Truman and Economic Containment, 1945-1950*, p.214 in Michael J. Lacey (ed.): *The Truman Administration*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990
34. Walter Beddel Smith: *Moscow Mission 1946-1949*, London, William Heinemann Ltd., 1950, p.201
35. ****Interview with George C. Marshall. 30 October 1952* in http://www.whistletop.org/study_org/marshall/large/folder7.html In thi interview the ex-Secretary of State also admits that preparations were well under way at the time of the Moscow Conference for a program to aid Europe.
36. See John Gimbel: *The Origins of the Marshall Plan*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1978; Michael J. Hogan, p.26-54 passim
37. C. Eisenberg, p.311-312 See also Daniel Yergin, p.297: "The American delegation was disinterested in finding a common groun with the Russians...A get-tough attitude had become an end in itself". Bohlen about Marshall's mission: "Marshall is going to Moscow knowing in advance that nothing will be decided for the peace of the world...Our experience with them has provedby now that it is impossible to negotiate with them".
38. Peter Cavolcoressi: *Survey of Internatioal Affairs 1947-1948*, p.239, 242-243
39. *FRUS 1947 II*, p.252-254, 256, Lucius D. Clay: *Guerre froide a Berlin*, Paris, Editions Berger-Levrault, 1950, p.145
40. Differences were perceived almost exclusively perceived at the level of the OMGUS
41. *FRUS 1947 II*, p. 256, V. Molotov, p.366-387
42. *FRUS 19547 II*, p.263
43. *FRUS 1947 II*, p. 262-263, 323, 400, 466, 487-488
44. G. Maelstaf, p.49, note 3. G. Maelstaf explains the hardships such an option brought for Bidault in the aftermath of Moscow: "il reste en fait a Paris a faire accepter ce principe a l'opinion, qui ne doit avoir l'impression que, en choisissant l'Occident, Paris abandonne tout de sa politique allemande " (p.52)
45. *FRUS 1947 II*, p.250-251, 252-253
46. D. Yergin, p.297
47. *FRUS 1947 II*, p.258
48. See the chapter dedicated to the Moscow Conference by Anne Deighton, p.131-164
49. D. Yergin: p.288-289
50. See Fourth Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. Report by Secretary of State, April 28, 1947 in ****Documents on German Problem 1944-1961*, Washington, united States Government Printing Office, 1961
51. *FRUS 1947 II*, p.484
52. Eisenberg, p.251
53. *FRUS 1947 II*, p.275
54. *** *Delegation of United States, Council of Foreign Ministers, Moscow, March 24, 1947* in <http://www.whistletop.org/Study...Marshall/large/folder5.html>
55. *FRUS 1947 II*, p.275-276
56. Alan Bullock: *Ernest Bevin. Foreign Secretary 1945-1951*, New York&London, WW Norton&Co, 1983, p.376
57. *FRUS 1947 II*, p.466
58. *FRUS 1947 II*, 271-272, 276-278
59. A. Deighton, p.146
60. *Ibidem*, p.298
61. *ibidem*, p.299. This partly contradicts opinions according to which the four-power treaty would not have been followed by other concessions to the Soviets (C. Eisenberg, p.308)
62. *FRUS 1947 II*, p.302, 309-311; A. Deighton, p.145-146
63. *FRUS 1947 II*, p. 315-317: "He [Bevin] generalized on what might be the best procedure in the event, as now seemed practically certain, that we had to fall back for the time-being on a bi-zonal procedure. He thought we should endeavour to determine a new level of industry and suggested again ten million tons of steel as the basis of departure for the investigation".
64. *FRUS 1947 II*, p.474
65. *ibidem*, p.333, 335
66. *ibidem*, p.334-335
67. ****Fourth Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. Report by Secretary of State. April 28, 1947* in ****Documents on German Problem (1944-1961)*, Washington, United States Governement Printing Office, 1961
68. *FRUS 1947 II*, p.351
69. *Ibidem*, 357-358; *Bizonal Trouble. Delegation of United States of America, Council of Foreign Ministers, American Embassy, Moscow, April 18, 1947*, <http://www.whistletop.org/study...Marshall/large/folders5.html>
70. ****Oral History Interview with John D. Hickerson* in <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/hickerson.html>



THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE IN THE NEW GLOBAL CONTEXT

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I. PREAMBLE

The 20th century offered the world an extremely interesting spectacle; a period of huge evolution in the technical field and an increased degree of sensibility towards international common interests; a period of impressing conquests of humanity, a period when people ended by being able to do things that their parents wouldn't have even dreamt to do.

We must not forget that at the same time, the 20th century brought to the humanity the atomic bomb and chemical weapons. It brought Holocaust and Apartheid. It brought terrorism and massive consumption of drugs. And it didn't change too much about poverty and hunger in the developing countries.

The 20th century brought the Declaration of Human Rights. Unfortunately, it allowed and still allows existence of situations that totally disconsider human rights.

In this respect, one of the most important challenges we have to face is the attack against human rights, even in the case of a single individual, and the ways the international community can intervene in order to preserve the fundamental rights we have won at least declaratively.

International peace has to be understood in a much broader sense than that related to the classical war. Human rights and self-determination should also be subjects for the international peace matter.

An analysis over the international law in the 20th century shows that there have appeared deep

changes in this field. The international society has developed in parallel with the international law and this way we got to the point where traditional approaches of international law came to be replaced by new orientations. Bilateral contacts' importance seems to fade in front of multilateral contacts within regional or world organisations. Still, the system does not move towards a centralised structure but a decentralised form of international organisation, within the limits established by general regulations.

The importance of human rights, freedom and human dignity rose in the eyes of most of the people of the world and this way, defending these values has become more and more important. This led to an evolution of all the international organisations towards a more active role. The trend here went *from being re-active to being pro-active*.

International security organisations started to intervene **not only for keeping peace** (by preventing parties to fight each other) **but also for ensuring peace or even making peace** (by developing military operations within the conflict area). NATO assumed extended responsibilities during its interventions against Serbian army. The present situation in Macedonia shows that international fora are no longer going to accept violence and massive human rights violation. The concept of threatening peace extended to actions that consist of grassed and massive human rights violation, genocide, ethnic

cleansing or disrespect for the right to self-determination.

In this context, the international law comes to get a higher importance as the present contact between states and non-states entities involves the interests of larger communities. In this respect, the international law institutions are facing a very important challenge: adaptation to the new situation, a lot more different than the existing situation at their creation date.

The lines below concentrate on the issue connected with international justice, and first of all with the activity of the International Court of Justice. Despite the appearance of subsidiary international Tribunals, specialized in different

matters, the ICJ remains the most important legal institution of the world community. The adaptive challenge it has to face could find a solution by increasing the advisory role of the Court. This could also take into consideration the general reluctant attitude of states towards accepting compulsory jurisdiction and the trend of international cooperation rather than conflict.

Globalisation is a process that cannot be stopped and the increased advisory role of the International Court of Justice would provide a better approach for a world constitution, necessary in such a context, where borders dramatically fade in almost any field.

II. INTERNATIONAL LAW WITHIN THE DYNAMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

The international society is completing the transition from the Westphalian order to the global characteristics of the 21st century. The major changes appearing in this process are incentives for decentralized organization of the society. Basically, the need to ensure human freedom, dignity and welfare highlights the role of individuals and diminishes that of superstructures in the emerging society. The driving force of regionalism has resulted in centralized action only being possible when supported by effective regional cooperation and based on the principle of "subsidiarity" already enshrined in the activity of the European Union. The multi-centric and multi-cultural bases of society, the enforcement of international law, technological innovations and the dispersion of economic power are all elements reinforcing a decentralized international society.

The changes of the international society have significantly influenced the structure of international law, which has evolved from relatively simple mechanisms for law-making to the highly complex contemporary arrangements. State and non-state entities participate in the formation of contemporary international law. The interactions between international and domestic law are significantly increasing and the borderline is progressively fading.

Within this decentralised framework, law-making bodies have proliferated and this led to a fragmentation of the law and even lack of coherence in many occasions. The role of basic international law principles is to keep this structure together and to create conditions for a uniformed interpretation in order to provide universality of the international legal system.

The efforts undertaken along the 21st century to ensure peaceful settlement of disputes represented a key element in the dynamics of the international law. The various methods that have been used in the international practice always offered occasion for controversial attitudes.

We have to underline in this context, that some methods pose no threats to state sovereignty, but to the extent that third parties intervene in the procedure, there is a growing perception of restriction on such sovereignty and a proportional reluctance on the part of the states to use them.

While negotiation will present no threatening aspect (and it is the most frequently used method), good offices, mediation, inquiry and conciliation require the intervention of a third party.

The case of arbitration and judicial settlement is different. While originally conceived as a more flexible method that might attend to elements other than the strict

application of the law, arbitration has increasingly been organised in the image of judicial settlement. A number of institutional rules point in this direction. Although arbitration is favoured when the disputants have comparable legal cultures and technical resources and when they share roughly the same economical and political influences, this method may not have the same efficiency when there is a substantial difference between the disputants.

Judicial settlement in the context of the International Court of Justice, the International Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the initiatives for the establishment of the International Criminal Court are discussed in the light of their experience and likely contribution to the development of this method of settlement. Regional courts are also brought into consideration in this context.

III. THE TRANSITION TO THE GLOBAL SOCIETY OF THE 21ST CENTURY

The many changes that international society has experienced since 1899 mark the transition from the Westphalian model that emerged with the establishment of the modern sovereign State and the Groatioan legal order that gradually came into being, to the global society of the 21st century. As the 21st century is the bridge between these two important historical periods, many features of the traditional order have still been largely predominant while at the same time new elements of change have begun to emerge, especially in the past three decades.

The trends of change have prompted a variety of theories about the obsolescence of conflict, the absence of war and the decline of empires, but regrettably it does not appear realistic to exclude such elements from the discussion of future prospects of world society.

What we can see is that when major developments and changes which begin to shape the international society are examined in the

context of the prospects for 21st century, they lead to the conclusion that the main trend is towards decentralisation of the structure of society and the international legal order.

The most important arguments for this conclusion consist in the growing importance of the individual and his/her rights and the permanently increasing role of regionalism. Besides these elements, we also have to mention that the role of non-state organisations has become so prominent that in some occasions it even threatens the very existence of States and certainly its traditional exclusivity.

At last but not the least, enforcement of the law in international society continues to be highly decentralised and based more on solidarity than in a central enforcement mechanism, a trend that it is most likely to continue and to increasingly rely on mutual convenience rather on commands, as it is already evident in environmental and trade matters.

IV. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE – A CHANGING AND VITAL ROLE

A new role for the International Court of Justice is proposed in the context of the changing structures of both international societies and international law. Such a role is associated more with a constitutional function and the need to identify and improve the basic principles of international law than with the traditional approaches of an ordinary court of law solving routine conflicts among States. Reluctance of States to accept compulsory jurisdiction continues unabated, while voluntary submission

does not usually include cases of great significance. Furthermore, there is clearly a preference to establish other international tribunals of a more specialized nature.

The new role envisaged for the Court concerns the need to develop its guiding role in respect of the basic principles of international law in order to establish a structured legal order of international society. Such a role reaches beyond mere dispute settlement and makes of the Court the central judicial body of the

international community, a capability that has been only occasionally exercised by the ICJ. Although the attitude of states towards compulsory jurisdiction will not change in respect of ordinary disputes to be brought before a court of general nature under international law, the situation might be totally different if looked upon from the perspective of the new role suggested.

A first step in this direction is to expand the advisory functions of the International Court of Justice, including the authorisation to the United Nations Secretary-General to request advisory opinions connected with the discharge of its responsibilities and a similar authorisation to other United Nations organs and specialized agencies as well as inter-governmental and nongovernmental organizations and even individual states. A special committee attached to the International Court of Justice would clear the requests for advisory opinions in order to ascertain that they meet the requirements of relating to issues of substance in the development of basic treaties or other significant rights and questions.

The central judicial role of the ICJ could be enhanced by a greater participation in institutional dispute settlement arrangements. This is particularly so in the context of the United Nations procedures for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Another important step would be to broaden the access to the contentious jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, including

international organisations and eventually non-governmental organizations member states, corporations and individuals. Also important improvement proposals have been made for establishing a reference procedure to the ICJ by other international courts and tribunals and by domestic courts, a procedure which should also be subject to the clearance of the special committee mentioned above.

The role of the International Court of Justice is also discussed in the light of a comparison with the powers and functions of other major international tribunals. The consideration of a power of judicial review, such as that exercised by the Court of Justice of the European Union has become particularly relevant in the case of the ICJ and its interactions with the United Nations system mentioned above. Although there are some opinions giving favourable consideration to such questions, the United Nations is much too complex an organisation to be considered a "community" or for the UN Charter to be considered a State constitution, while the poor delineation of functions does not allow to consider that there is an executive function subject to judicial review.

In this context, the development of the advisory functions of the ICJ might provide an appropriate answer to this point, without prejudice to the views gradually being expressed by the Court itself, or by other Tribunals on the question of the legality of actions of the Security Council.

V. NEW MEANINGS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AS "PRINCIPAL JUDICIAL ORGAN" OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The new global context and the new approaches in international law problems raise the question of new meanings for the International Court of Justice as *Principal Judicial Organ* of the United Nations, as stated in the Charter.

The term *principal* must be juxtaposed to the term *exclusive* judicial organ, which the Court is not. This leads us to raise the issue of the relationship between the Court and the other tribunals within the UN system. In this respect, it

is obvious that the concept of *lispendence* – which in domestic legal systems normally prevents conflicting decisions between different tribunals seized of the same case – it is not applicable in this context, in the absence of any formal hierarchy.

This leads us to add that the term *principal* can also be seen in juxtaposition to the term *subsidiary* organ. The Court is not dependent on the political organs either for its creation or for amendment of its Statute, which significantly

bolsters its independence. There is no need for it to seek further legal grounds in order to assert its independence from the political organs, as the other tribunals have had to do by reference either to the decision-making powers embedded in their Statute (UN Administrative Tribunal) or to their inherent judicial powers (The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia). As subsidiary organs, these, however, remain vulnerable to the amendment of their Statute.

However, while on the one hand the ICJ's separate amendment procedure laid in its Statute renders difficult formal institutional reform, the Court, on the other hand, lacks the flexibility of the political organs in adapting to changing circumstances. *As a result, the Court's structure and process have remained far more rigidly*

embedded in the international society than it was originally set up to service. The increase in the number of cases brought before the ICJ is creating, together with the financial problems, the danger of blocking its operation.

The term *principal* organ has also to be viewed in the context of the international system as a whole, for the Court is no longer the exclusive judicial tribunal. In this new free-market climate, the Court's future strength will lie, therefore, in carving a niche for itself, in other words in strengthening its specificity. This specificity lies in the fact that it does not offer States merely another choice of means of settlement, but that it is a Court of the United Nations and, as such, a Court of the world community.

VI. THE COURT AS AN ORGAN OF THE UN

The statute of the Court is an integral part of the United Nations Charter. This means that the Court is bound by the purposes and principles of the UN, even when acting as an autonomous judicial organ. At the same time it is servicing states in the settlement of their disputes and it is also servicing the United Nations and through it, the international community.

In the past, the Court has been well aware of its specificity in this sense. In both its contentious and advisory capacity, it promoted the expansion of the powers of the Organisation. It affirmed the UN's international personality and it promoted the normative activity of its organs.

At the moment, when important changes have appeared in the international environment, with deep changes for the international law and relations, the Court faces one of its most important challenges: adaptation to this new global context.

The Charter's purposes and principles are not static – they have come to reflect the global values of the international community. These represent a move away from the traditional bilateralism and voluntarism which characterised traditional international law, to a more fluid system. One of the most significant developments of contemporary international law

has been the development of a core of norms deemed fundamental, in the sense that they are directed to the protection of certain overriding universal values.

There has been a reconceptualization of the notion of threat to the peace. In several recent cases, the Security Council has gone beyond the traditional framework of interstate relations determining under article 39 of the Charter that ethnic cleansing, genocide and other gross violation of human rights, including the right to self-determination, as well as grave breaches of humanitarian law – in other words serious violations of fundamental norms of international law – constitute today the main threats to international peace and security.

On the other hand, some basic principles of international law, as the principle of non-interference in internal affairs are evolving. More and more the idea of the obligation to interfere in cases of massive human rights violations (le devoir d'ingérence pour des raisons humanitaires) is considered a normal development in international law.

The Court has not remained on the periphery of these changes and it is clearly enlisted in the process of shaping a constitutional law of the international community. A consistent proof for this is the quantity and the quality of

the Court's current docket. The recent cases before the court are evidence that States and international organisations are bringing the kinds of cases which directly or indirectly involve fundamental community values or interests: international terrorism (Lockerbie), self-determination and use of force (East Timor), genocide and self-defense (Application of the Genocide Convention), environment (Gabcikovo-Nagy Maros), legality of nuclear weapons.

Nevertheless, the jurisprudence of the Court has consistently shown that it does acknowledge these recent developments in international law. Certain of its pronouncements have shed light, not only on the *content* (self-determination, human rights, use of force) but on the

assumptions underlying such fundamental norms. On a number of occasions, the Court has juxtaposed the traditional bilateralist structure of international law with the "collective" interest.

This way, it has underlined the non-syllagmatic nature of human rights treaties, from which it has drawn a number of implications. The Court has made reference to the concept of international community, as well as to that of the organised international community, personified by the United Nations. It has referred to the underlying ethical and moral values of the international community, as well as to the universality of certain general and well-recognized principles, such as considerations of humanity, general principles of humanitarian norms, notions of justice or of equity.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

Out of all these considerations we can only stand for the important role of the International Court of Justice and for its need to better adapt to the challenges of the present global context. We also have to mention that this is not only a desire, but also it comes to be a fact. This is a problem that the UN experts are seriously taking into account.

This way, the efforts for peace and stability ensuring around the globe will find the necessary support within an institution that supported the increased role of the international principle of

common interest.

From the recognition of a common interest, the Court has been led to affirm not only that every State had a legal interest in the protection of certain obligations, but that they also had not only a right, but an *erga omnes duty* to react to certain situations of objective illegality. And this is the trend that the international community is following, so the Court proves to be able to maintain itself as a necessary institution of the 21st century.

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PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

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Today, with varying degrees of urgency, both developed and developing countries are faced with major energy choices to meet the needs of their economies.

I. NUCLEAR ENERGY – TO THE BENEFIT OF MANKIND

As mankind faces new challenges such as global environmental issues and sustainable development, the importance of nuclear power as an energy resource will not diminish, but increase, as it has such advantages as: 1. stable supply; 2. low environmental impact².

Due to population growth, the improvement of living standards and other factors, the world energy demand is forecast to continue to increase. Under these circumstances, the international community has a duty to ensure "sustainable development while economizing the use of fossil fuels, in view of their limited supply and impact on global environment"³. Nuclear technology has the potential "to make substantial contributions in areas as varied as the eradication of pests in Africa, geothermal energy development in Latin-America, child nutrition in

Asia and water resources management in the Middle East"⁴.

Such nuclear activities should be given the full attention they deserve being in the benefit of mankind.

There are many reasons to choose the nuclear power option: a. proven technology; b. cost factor; c. environmental considerations; d. national security of supply⁵. For such reasons, national authorities and energy investors choose the nuclear power option. They have objective comparative assessment between nuclear and other sources of energy. These comparisons include energy demand and supply options; economic analysis, the health and environmental impacts; the risks of energy systems; sustainable energy development⁶.

§1. Contribution to national electricity production

During last years, global electricity demand is growing, driven mainly by developing countries with expanding population.

In several countries, energy markets are being deregulated and privatized to create more competitive energy supply market. Power plant operators are searching for greater efficiency from existing plants and greater economy by reducing costs.

Only in one year, 1997, world energy consumption rose some 3%; nuclear energy continued to contribute about 17% to the world consumption. At the end of 1997, 437 nuclear reactors operating in 31 countries: 152 reactors were in Western Europe; 69 in Eastern Europe; 123 in North America; 5 in Latin America; 11 in Middle East and South Asia; 2 in Africa; 75 in the Far East⁷.

¹ Professor Dumitru MAZILU, in his capacity as ambassador, Resident Representative of Romania to the International Atomic Energy Agency, was elected, by consensus, in 1996, as Chairman of the Working Group on the 40th Anniversary of the IAEA.

On the basis of the Annual Report of the IAEA⁸, the largest contributor to the world installed nuclear capacity was the United States, with 28%. Next are France with 18% and Japan with 12%; Germany with 6%, Russian Federation with 5.6%; Ukraine with about 4%; United Kingdom with 3.7%; Canada with 3.4%; Sweden and Republic of Korea with about 3%.

§2. Water resources development

a. It is known that, in particular, in Africa several countries are currently facing acute water shortages that threaten public health and impede social and economic development. In these circumstances, the United Nations included water among the set of priorities in Africa with the aim of ensuring sustainable freshwater resources. In order to support national programmes in this field, the IAEA established in 1995 a large technical co-operation regional Model project which seeks to apply isotope hydrology in the development of ground-water resources and significant resources were already identified.

b. In last years, new efforts focused on seawater desalination using nuclear energy, and it was concluded that nuclear desalination is technically feasible and highlighted priority¹⁰.

§3. Human health

a. Particularly in last decades, new related methods and treatments were concentrated in human health. New and interesting developments were registered in nuclear medicine¹⁴; molecular biology employing radioactive isotopes¹⁵; in radiation therapy; nutritional and health related environment.

b. Different methods were tested on increasing the effect of radiotherapy on tumours. These methods include the addition of heat to the tumour area and giving the patient medication as a chemical sensitizer of radiation¹⁶.

c. Taking into account that hundreds of millions of people, particularly in developing countries, continue to be affected by nutritional deficiencies of energy, protein, vitamins and minerals, the programmes were directed to the use of isotopic techniques to identify populations at risk, and to monitor and improve the effectiveness of dietary intervention.

It has to be noted that nuclear power's contribution to national electricity production was remarkable: in Lithuania 80% of electricity was produced by nuclear; in France 78%; in Belgium approximately 60%; in Ukraine 47%; in Sweden 46%; in Bulgaria 45%; in Slovak Republic 44%; in Switzerland and Slovenia 40%. At the same time, we have to underline that in seven other countries, more than 25% of the electricity was produced by nuclear power⁹.

c. Adequate supplies of water and nutrients are important inputs in sustainable crop production. It is remarkable that neutron moisture probe¹¹ is finding expanding application in the quest for more efficient use of scarce water resources. The studies have shown that the amount of irrigation water applied to wheat could be reduced by up to 30% compared with conventional practices¹².

Through a technical Model Project, the feasibility of using saline groundwater in arid and semi-arid environmental to irrigate salt tolerant plant species¹³ has been tested in seven countries.

d. It has to be underlined that efforts were made to determine the presence of radionuclides in the environment focused on the completion of a radiological study on terrestrial samples collected at Mururoa and Fangataufa Atolls in the South Pacific where nuclear weapon testing took place.

The sediments and biota samples, collected during the 1996 expedition to the Mururoa and Fangataufa Atolls were analysed and another expedition to the atolls carried out underground sampling of water from cavities and monitoring wells.

It has to be pointed out that seawater samples collected during the 1996 expedition in Caspian Sea were analysed. At the same time, a Global Marine Radioactive Database was developed and data on radionuclide concentrations in seawater, sediment and biota of the Arctic Sea and the North Pacific Ocean were evaluated¹⁷.

The analysis made in the last annual reports (1994-1997) of the International Atomic Energy Agency shown that the benefits of atomic energy are not limited solely to energy production, but also include improvements to **human health and welfare**¹⁸.

Over the past years has developed co-operation among nations to help increase the availability of radioisotopes for medical purposes. It was proved that by applying the energy of the atom to the medical sciences, we

are able to reduce the cost and intrusiveness of treatments. As was announced by the Delegation of the United States¹⁹ "the Department of Energy, working with Belgium and Finland, will supply the IAEA with surplus radioisotopes for the production of isotope generators"²⁰. Such an effort is a part of the IAEA's Coordinated Research Programme involving experts from 14 nations who are working on the treatment of heart disease, cancer and the relief of borne pain²¹.

II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY

Member States underlined anytime that a precise legal framework for nuclear safety²² is absolutely necessary. The experience showed that "the safe use of nuclear power requires **high standards** of management systems and personnel qualifications"²³. It was pointed out that every Member State and International Community as a whole should ensure that radiation – producing devices **used for peaceful purpose** are handled and disposed on safety.

Multilateral, legally binding agreements, became increasingly important mechanisms for

improving nuclear, radiation and waste safety around the world²⁴.

Nuclear safety is a **national responsibility**, but at the same time it is a **global public concern**. Having in mind these major coordinates, Member States have developed a comprehensive nuclear safety regime by adopting: **a.** international agreements; **b.** Safety standards; **c.** the necessary measures to provide for the application of those agreements and standards²⁵.

§1. *International agreements*

Over the years, the International Community has negotiated and adopted important international legal instruments through which **to achieve and to maintain** a consistently high level of safety at nuclear power plants around the world and, in general, to guarantee that radiation – producing devices, **used for peaceful purposes are handled and disposed on safety**. All together, some 30 global legal instruments and some 35 regional legal instruments which are referring to the safety use of nuclear energy and constitute a **comprehensive nuclear safety regime** were negotiated and adopted. In this study we would like to refer to some of them in chronological order of their adoption:

a. Convention concerning the Protection of Workers against Ionizing Radiations²⁶. This Convention applies to all activities involving exposure of workers to ionizing radiation in the course of their work.

b. Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage²⁷. This Convention – following

the regional Paris Convention – establishes special private law rules that hold the operator of a nuclear installation strictly and exclusively liable for nuclear damage²⁸.

c. Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material²⁹. This Convention seeks to exonerate persons liable for nuclear damage by virtue of an international Convention or national law applicable in the field of transport in those cases where of a operator of a nuclear installation is liable for such damage under the Paris Convention, the Vienna Convention or national law if it is in all respects as favourable to persons who may suffer damage as either the Paris Convention or Vienna Convention. As a result, in those cases where liability is redirected pursuant to this Convention to an operator liable under either Paris Convention or Vienna Convention, their respective provisions regarding liability during the transport will come into play³⁰.

d. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material³¹. Recognizing the right of all States: to develop and apply nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and their legitimate interest in the potential benefits to be derived from the peaceful application of nuclear energy and convinced of the need for facilitating international co-operation in the peaceful application of nuclear energy, States Party stressed the importance of the physical protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport. In this Convention nuclear material is defined as "plutonium except that with isotopic concentration exceeding 80% in plutonium - 238; uranium enriched in the isotope 235 or 233; uranium contained the mixture of isotopes as occurring in nature other than in the form of ore or ore-residue; any material containing one or more of the foregoing"³². Under the provisions of this Convention, the intentional commission of a. an act without lawful authority which constitutes the receipt, possession, use, transfer, alteration, disposal or dispersal of nuclear material and which causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury to any person or substantial damage to property; b. a theft or robbery of nuclear material; c. an embezzlement or fraudulent obtaining of nuclear material; d. an act constituting a demand for nuclear material by threat or use of force or by any other form of intimidation; e. a threat to use nuclear material to cause death or serious injury to any person or substantial property damage or to commit an offence in order to compel a natural or legal person, international organization or State to do or to refrain from doing any act, an attempt to commit such an offence and an act which constitutes a participation in any such an offence "shall be make a punishable offence by each State Party under its national law"³³. The Convention establishes that "each State Party shall make the offences described above punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature"³⁴. More than that, the Convention "does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law"³⁵.

Such rules and regulations had an important contribution for physical protection of nuclear material in that complex process of its peaceful uses.

e. Convention of Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident³⁶. This Convention applies to any accident involving facilities or activities of a State Party or of persons or legal entities under its jurisdiction or control, from which a release of radioactive material occurs or is likely to occur and which has resulted or may result in an international transboundary release that could be of radiological safety significance for another State. This legal instrument establishes that facilities and activities include those relating to the transport and storage of nuclear fuels or radioactive wastes and the manufacture, use, storage, disposal and transport of radioisotopes for agricultural, industrial, medical and related scientific and research purposes³⁷. In that circumstances in which an accident took place, the Contracting Parties have to immediately notify, directly or through the IAEA, those States which are or may be physically affected and the IAEA of the accident, its nature, the time of its occurrence and its exact location where appropriate³⁸.

f. Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency³⁹. This Convention establishes an international framework which facilitates the prompt provisions of assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency, in order to mitigate its consequences. In accordance with its rules, the States Parties are required to co-operate between themselves and with IAEA to facilitate prompt assistance to minimize the consequences of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency and to protect life, property and the environment from the effects of radioactive releases⁴⁰.

g. Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention⁴¹. This Protocol establishes a link between the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention, combining them into one expanded liability regime. Parties to the Joint Protocol are treated as though they were Parties to both Conventions and a choice of law rule is provided to determine which of the two Conventions should apply to the exclusion of the other in respect to the same nuclear incident.

h. Convention of the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous

Wastes and their Disposal⁴². The main objectives of this Convention is the **protection of human health and the environment** against the adverse effects which may result from the generation, transboundary movement and management of hazardous wastes and to help reduce the transboundary movements and amounts of hazardous wastes to minimum⁴³. Under this Convention a broad set of rules are devoted to co-operation between parties⁴⁴.

i. Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management⁴⁵. This Convention applies to spent fuel and radioactive waste resulting from civilian nuclear reactors and applications and to spent fuel and radioactive waste from military or defence programs if and when such material are transferred permanently to and managed within exclusively civilian programmes⁴⁶. In accordance with the provisions of this Convention, the Contracting Parties are obliged to establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory framework to govern the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management and to ensure that individuals, society and the environment are adequately protected against radiological and other hazards, inter alia, by appropriate siting, design and construction of facilities and by making provisions for ensuring the safety of facilities both during their operation and other their closure.

j. Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage⁴⁷. This Convention is free-standing legal instrument, which may be adhered to by all States irrespective of their participation in the Vienna Convention or in the Paris Convention. Its main objectives is to generate the compensation of nuclear damage in addition to that available under the national legislation implementing the Vienna Convention or the Paris Convention, or under the national legislation consistent with the principles of these two conventions⁴⁸.

k. Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage⁴⁹. This legal instrument provides, inter

alia, for: **a.** the coverage of nuclear damage suffered in a Non-Contracting State⁵⁰; **b.** an enhanced definition of nuclear damage which covers costs of reinstatement of damaged environment; costs of preventive measures; **c.** substantially higher minimum liability limit⁵¹; **d.** an extension of the period for submission of claims for loss of life and personal injury⁵². The Protocol has preserved the fundamental principles of the Vienna Convention⁵³.

At the same time, the Protocol provides for broader scope⁵⁴ / increased amount of liability⁵⁵; enhanced means for security adequate and equitable compensation⁵⁶.

Also, were negotiated and adopted some **35 regional legal instruments** which are referring to the safety use of nuclear energy. Between them are the following: **a.** Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community⁵⁷. Under the authority of this Treaty, The European Atomic Energy Community has issued some binding instruments in this field⁵⁸; **b.** Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 29th July 1960 as Amended by the Additional Protocol of 28th January 1964 and by the Protocol of 16th November 1982⁵⁹; **c.** Nordic Mutual Emergency Assistance Agreement in Connection with Radiation Accidents⁶⁰; **d.** Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous for the Environment⁶¹; **e.** Energy Charter Treaty and one Protocol⁶². This Treaty establishes a legal framework in order to promote long-term co-operation in the energy field; **f.** Convention on the Ban of the Import of Hazardous Wastes into Africa and on the control of their Transboundary Movements within Africa⁶³; **g.** The African Nuclear-Weapon – Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty of Pelindaba) and Protocols⁶⁴; **h.** Treaty of the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in the Latin America and the Caribbean (the Treaty of Tlatelolco)⁶⁵; **i.** Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon – Free Zone and one Protocol⁶⁶.

§2. Safety standards

Peaceful use of nuclear energy requires, at the same time, **high standards of management** which cover the areas of nuclear, radiation, waste management and transport. Member States agreed on such standards acting for their implementation. During the regular sessions of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency was pointed out that

§3. The implementation of safety standards

After the elaboration and adoption the safety standards, it is necessary to be taken the appropriate measures to implement them⁶⁷. To fulfil this task it is important to use services offered by the IAEA, including several peer review services, information exchange, education and training, and co-ordination of safety related research and development⁶⁸. Such peer review

these standards should be: a. comprehensive; b. scientifically accurate and; c. current.

It has to be recognized the contribution of Member States, of advisory groups of experts and of the professional staff of the IAEA in the elaboration and adoption of high quality safety standards.

services can contribute to the improvement of operational safety and the development of safety culture and also the regulators and operators who provide the expertise for such services.

Through high level standards, a truly global safety culture is being effectively encouraged and an integrated strategy on nuclear safety infrastructure it is implemented⁶⁹.

III. THE NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES IN ROMANIA – IN CONFORMITY WITH THE INTERNATIONAL RULES, REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS

§1. The nuclear safety program

The National Agency for Atomic Energy was in charge with the elaboration of National R & D Nuclear Programme, called "Nuclear Safety", based on IAEA and EURATOM recommendations. The main goals of this Programme, are: a. to elaborate, develop and use advance technologies in nuclear field; b. to ensure the safe operation of nuclear facilities; c. to estimate the radiological impact on public and environment⁷⁰.

The Program is structured in the following areas: 1. Nuclear reactors and nuclear fuel cycle;

2. Radioactive waste and spent fuel management and nuclear facilities decommissioning; 3. Nuclear safety, assessment and management of nuclear accident risks; 4. Assessment of nuclear activities impact on environment and environment restoration; 5. Application of nuclear techniques; 6. Support actions, international co-operation, informatics, manpower development, nuclear installations of national interest by starting and implementing the National Plan⁷¹.

§2. Nuclear activities control

In 1998 the Act on Safe deployment of nuclear activities was modified and completed in order to observe the requirements of the Nuclear Safety Convention. The main modifications of this Act are as follows: a. the National Authority for regulations, licensing and control in nuclear field in the National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control. This body became independent, being under direct authority of Government, after its separation from the Ministry of Waters, Forests and Environment Protection; b. the environment radiation monitoring network was transferred from that

Ministry under CNCAN's authority; c. the Regulatory Body has more prerogatives⁷².

More than 60% of the Regulatory Body's specialists are involved now in monitoring of radioactive activity, which created new opportunities for improving regulation, licensing and control activities⁷³.

In last period, new specialists in the field of nuclear power plant and nuclear facilities, such as research reactors; high capacity irradiators; common irradiation sources joined the Regulatory Body⁷⁴.

§3. Implementing the international rules, regulations and standards

The nuclear activities in Romania are developing in conformity with international rules, regulations and standards⁷⁵.

Safeguards agreements

a. Between Romania and the International Atomic Energy Agency was signed an **Agreement for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**⁷⁶. In accordance with this Agreement, Romania undertakes – pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article III of the Treaty – to accept Safeguards on all source or special fissionable material **in all peaceful nuclear activities** within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out, under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices⁷⁷.

On the basis of the Agreement, the Government of Romania and the Agency “shall co-operate to facilitate the implementation of the safeguards provided for in this Agreement”⁷⁸.

Through the Agreement, Romania established and maintain a system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under its provisions⁷⁹. At the same time, the IAEA applies safeguards “in such a manner as to enable it to verify, in ascertaining that there has been no diversion of nuclear material from **peaceful uses** to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, findings of the system”⁸⁰.

Safeguards shall terminate on nuclear material upon determination by the Agency that the material has been consumed, or has been deluded in such a way that it is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards, or has become practically irrecoverable⁸¹.

b. On 30 March 1973, Romania signed an **Agreement for assistance by International Atomic Energy Agency to Romania**, in establishing a project consisting of the dual – core **TRIGA training and research reactor** at

the Institute of Nuclear Technology at Pitești and in securing the special fissionable material necessary therefor⁸².

Pursuant to the Supply Agreement, concluded on 30 March 1973, between the IAEA, Romania and the United States of America, as amended, supplies and enriched uranium were to be delivered to Romania in connection with the project⁸³.

c. On 15 July 1975, the IAEA and Romania concluded the **Second Supply Agreement** relating to an additional supply of approximately 16710 grams of uranium enriched to approximately 90 per cent by weight in the isotope uranium – 235 and of approximately 20 grams of uranium enriched to approximately 93 per cent by weight in the isotope uranium – 235⁸⁴.

d. On 15 June 1990, the IAEA, Romania and the United States concluded an exchange of letters constituting the **Third Supply Agreement** relating to an additional supply of enriched uranium for the reactor⁸⁵ and on the same date⁸⁶, the IAEA and Romania concluded an exchange of letters constituting an agreement amending the Project Agreement, through which Romania has requested the assistance from the Agency in securing from the United States the supply of low-enriched uranium in lieu of the 93 per cent enriched fuel material to be supplied under the Second Supply Agreement.

e. As a sequel to the assistance which the Agency has provided to Romania in connection with a research reactor project⁸⁷, the Agency and the Government of Romania and the United States concluded on 14 June 1991 the **Fourth Supply Agreement**, through which the Agency requests the United States to permit the transfer and export to Romania of approximately 102000 grams of uranium enriched to approximately 20 per cent by weight in the isotope uranium – 235⁸⁸.

Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

This Convention was opened for signature at Vienna and New York on 3 March 1980. Romania signed the Convention at Vienna, on 15 January 1981 and adhered to it in June 1993. Through this Convention, Romania applies,

within the framework of its national law the levels of physical protection during the storage incidental to international nuclear transport and during international transport, the specific measures for detection and prevention any

assault, unauthorized access or unauthorized removal of nuclear material⁸⁹. Also, Romania takes – in accordance with this Convention – appropriate steps “to ensure as far as practicable that, during international nuclear transport,

nuclear material within its territory, or on board of ship or aircraft under its jurisdiction in so far as such ship or aircraft is engaged in the transport to or from the State, is protected on the levels described in the Annex” to the Convention⁹⁰.

Convention on Early Notification of the Nuclear Accident

Romania signed this Convention on 26 September 1986. The Convention applies to any accident involving facilities or activities of a State Part or of persons or legal entities under its jurisdiction or control, from which a release of

radioactive material occurs or is likely to occur and which has resulted or may result in an international transboundary release that could of or radiological safety significance for another State.

Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency

Romania signed this Convention on 26 September 1986. The Convention aims at establishing an international framework which

will facilitate the prompt provision of assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency in order to mitigate its consequences.

Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage

a. Romania signed the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and acceded to this Convention on 29 December 1992.

b. Romania signed the Protocol to amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, on 29 September 1997.

c. On the same date – 29 September 1997 – Romania signed the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage.

Convention on Nuclear Safety

a. Romania signed the **Convention on Nuclear Safety** on 20 September 1994 and ratified the Convention on 1 June 1995. The basic concept of this Convention is the obligation of the Contracting Parties to apply widely recognized principles and tools for high quality safety management and to submit the **national implementation** of these principles to peer reviews with international participation.

b. On 29 September 1997, Romania signed the **Joint Convention on Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management**. Through this Convention, Contracting Parties are obliged to establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory framework to **govern the safety** of spent fuel and radioactive waste management and to ensure that

individuals, society and the environment are adequately protected against radiological and other hazards.

Romania took the necessary steps to fully implement these rules and regulations⁹¹. As was pointed by the delegation of Romania before the General Assembly of the United Nations “it is our duty to do everything in our power to guarantee full protection of the public from exposure to radioactive materials and to prevent every possible incident given rise to potential exposures”⁹².

The nuclear energy should be used for exclusively peaceful purposes⁹³, in the interest of the development and the progress of mankind⁹⁴.

2 See the Message of Prime Minister of Japan to the Forty-First Regular Session of the General Conference of the IAEA, Vienna 21, September 1997.

3 Statement of the Delegation of Japan to the Forty-First Regular Session of the General Conference of the IAEA, Vienna 21, September 1997.


4 Message of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Forty-Second Regular Session of the IAEA, 21 September 1998.

5 Statement of the Director-General of the IAEA to the Forty-Second Regular Session of the General Conference of the Agency, Vienna, 21 September 1998.

- 6 Ibid.
- 7 The Annual Report for 1997 of International Atomic Energy Agency, GC(42)/5.
- 8 In accordance with this Report, three nuclear plants were connected to electricity grids, two in France and one in the Republic of Korea, representing 3555 MW (e) of electricity capacity. Also, construction started on three plants in China and two in the Republic of Korea. (Nuclear energy and the Agency: The year in Review, p. 1).
- 9 Meeting Global energy needs sustainably, in "The Annual Report for 1997 of the IAEA", pp. 1-2.
- 10 Producing potable water, in "The Annual Report for 1997 of the IAEA", p. 2.
- 11 An instrument developed more than 40 years ago for measuring soil water context.
- 12 Optimal use of water also prevented water tables from rising and promoted the efficient use of nitrogen fertilizer by avoiding nitrate leaching, which causes environmental degradation through groundwater pollution and soil acidification.
- 13 Including food crops, forage and fuel woods. The proper management of saline irrigation water requires the monitoring of soil water and estimation of the water balance in order to avoid accumulation of salt in the soil profile.
- 14 One of the major tasks has been to re-examine the current prevalence of hepatitis B carries in 11 countries of the Asia-Pacific region using common immunoradiometric assay bulk reagents. The rates of prevalence ranged from 0.2 to 18% in blood donors and 0.4 to 10.6% in pregnant women.
- 15 This method was used for the diagnosis of infectious diseases.
- 16 Applied radiation biology and radiotherapy, in "The Annual Report for 1997 of the IAEA".
- 17 See the Annual Report for 1997 of the IAEA, pp. 29-30.
- 18 See the Annual Report..., pp. 1-38.
- 19 See the Statement of the United States Delegation to the Forty-Second Regular Session of the General Conference of the IAEA, Vienna, 21 September 1998.
- 20 Expand Nuclear Technical Co-operation, in "The Statement of the United States Delegation to the Forty-Second Regular Session...", p. 6.
- 21 In radiation therapy, there were renewed efforts to improve the quality control of cancer treatment. In the field of nutrition, agreement was reached with WHO on Coordinated Research Program on infant monitoring to define a new growth reference for breastfed babies.
- 22 See the Statement of the United States Delegation to the Forty-Second Regular Session of the General Conference of the IAEA, Vienna, September 1998; the Statement of the Russian Federation Delegation to the Forty-Second Regular Session...; the Statement of the Delegation of Romania to the Forty-Second Regular Session of the General Conference of the IAEA, Vienna, September 1998 etc.
- 23 Statement of the Delegation of Canada to the Forty-First Regular Session of the General Conference of the IAEA, Vienna, 30 September 1997.
- 24 See the Statement of the Director-General of the IAEA to the Forty-Second Regular Session of the General Conference of the IAEA, Vienna, 21 September 1998.
- 25 Ibid.
- 26 Geneva, 22 June 1960, International Labor Organization No. 115.
- 27 Vienna, 21 May 1963.
- 28 The Convention establishes, at the same time, a minimum amount of liability of the operator, which must be covered by some form of financial security, e.g. insurance. Also, this legal instrument has defined such terms as "operator"; "nuclear incident"; "nuclear damage"; "nuclear installation"; "nuclear material" etc.
- 29 Brussels, 17 December 1971.
- 30 Article II, Vienna Convention; Article 4, Paris Convention.
- 31 Vienna, 3 March 1980. The Convention was opened for signature at Vienna and New York on 3 March 1980.
- 32 Paragraph 1, article 1 of the Convention. At the same time, the Convention defined "uranium enriched in the isotope 235 or 233" as "uranium containing the isotope 235 or 233 or both in an amount such that the abundance ratio of the sum of these isotopes to isotope 238 is greater than ratio of the isotope 235 to the isotope 238 occurring in nature". (Paragraph 2, article 1 of the Convention.)
- 33 Paragraph 1, article 7 of the Convention.
- 34 Paragraph 2, article 7 of the Convention.
- 35 Paragraph 3, article 8 of the Convention.
- 36 Vienna, 26 September 1986.
- 37 Paragraph 2 (d), article 1 of the Convention.
- 38 The Convention establishes that the Contracting States should promptly provide additional information, when available, relevant to minimizing the radiological consequences in the States that may be affected.
- 39 Vienna, 26 September 1986.

- 40 The Convention will apply whether or not such accident or emergency originates within the territory of a State Party, under its jurisdiction or control.
- 41 Vienna, 21 September 1988.
- 42 Basel, 22 March 11989.
- 43 And to manage and dispose of these wastes in an environmentally sound manner.
- 44 Ranging from simple exchange of information to technical assistance. Convention does not address radioactive waste because the radioactive waste is subject to another international control system. The other control system need not necessarily be identical with that of the Basel Convention. (See Convention on Safety Fuel Management and on Safety of Radioactive waste Management, Vienna, 5 September 1997.)
- 45 Vienna, 5 September 1997.
- 46 The Convention also applies to planned and controlled releases into the environment of liquid or gaseous radioactive materials from regulated nuclear materials.
- 47 Vienna, 12 September 1997.
- 48 States which are not party either to the Vienna Convention or Paris Convention could join the Convention if they have in place legislation that is consistent with the provisions contained in the Annex to the Convention.
- 49 Vienna, 12 September 1997.
- 50 An exception is allowed if such a State has a nuclear installation and does not afford reciprocal benefits.
- 51 At least 300 million SDRs which may be divided between the liable operator and the Installation State.
- 52 A period to 30 years.
- 53 Such as no fault liability.
- 54 Article 2 of the Protocol.
- 55 Articles 6 and 7 of the Protocol.
- 56 Article 15 of the Protocol.
- 57 Rome, 25 March 1957.
- 58 See Council Directive 92/3/Euratom of 3 February 1992; Council Regulation (Euratom) No. 1493/93 of 8 June 1993; Commission Decision 93/552/Euratom of 1 October 1993.
- 59 Paris, 29 July 1960.
- 60 Vienna, 17 October 1963.
- 61 Lugano, 21 June 1993.
- 62 Lisbon, 17 December 1994.
- 63 Bamako, 30 January 1991.
- 64 Cairo, 11 April 1996.
- 65 Mexico, 14 February 1967.
- 66 Bangkok, 15 December 1995.
- 67 See the Statement of the Director-General of the IAEA to the Forty-Second Regular Session of the General Conference of the IAEA, Vienna, 21 September 1998.
- 68 See the Annual Report for 1997 of the IAEA, p. 6.
- 69 The application of safety standards is a priority matter. To fulfil in better way this task it would be necessary: **a.** to inform in due time Member States on the new standards; **b.** to develop documents providing guidance for the identification of Y2K problems, together with the necessary remedial action, and by offering a forum for information exchange.
- 70 Horia Ene, Statement to the Forty-Second Regular Session of the General Conference of the IAEA, Vienna, September 1998.
- 71 Ibid.
- 72 See Government Decision No. 28/27 May 1998.
- 73 Horia Ene, Statement to the Forty-Second Regular Session of the General Conference of the IAEA, September 1998.
- 74 Ibid.
- 75 Dumitru Mazuili, Statement before the General Assembly of the United Nations on the Report of the IAEA, Doc. A/50 P.V. 47, 1 November 1995.
- 76 The Agreement entered into force on 27 October 1972, the date on which the Agency received the notification provided for in Article 25 of that Agreement (INFCIRC/180, 19 April 1973).
- 77 Article 2 of the Agreement.
- 78 Article 3 of the Agreement. The safeguards provided for in the Agreement shall be implemented: **a.** to avoid hampering the economic and technological development of Romania or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including international exchange of nuclear material; **b.** to avoid undue interference in the peaceful nuclear activities of Romania and in particular in the operation of facilities, and **c.** to be consistent with prudent management practices required for the economic and safe conduct of nuclear activities. (Article 4 of the Agreement.)

- 79 Paragraph a, article 7 of the Agreement.
- 80 Paragraph b, article 7 of the Agreement.
- 81 Consumption or dilution of nuclear material, Article 11 of the Agreement.
- 82 Document INFCIRC/206/Part II.
- 83 The dual-core TRIGA training and research reactor project.
- 84 Reproduced in Document INFCIRC/206-Add. I.
- 85 See Document INFCIRC/206/Add. 2.
- 86 15 June 1990.
- 87 See Documents INFCIRC/206; INFCIRC/206/Add. 1 and 2 and INFCIRC/206/Mod. 2. The Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency approved – on 14 June 1991 – the assistance requested by Romania for the project.
- 88 See Article 1 of the Fourth Supply Agreement.
- 89 See Levels of Physical to be Applied in International Transport of Nuclear Material, Annex I to the Convention.
- 90 In that Annex are described levels of physical protection for nuclear material during the storage incidental to international nuclear transport and of physical protection for nuclear material during international transport.
- 91 See Horia Ene, Statement to the Forty-Second Session of the General Conference of the IAEA, Vienna, September 1998.
- 92 Dumitru Mazilü, Statement before the General Assembly of the United Nations on the Report of the IAEA, Doc. A/50/P.V. 47.
- 93 Article III, Statute of the IAEA.
- 94 Paragraph 2, article III of the Statute of the IAEA.



LA MONDIALISATION : QUELS ENJEUX POUR LES PAYS EN VOIE DE DÉVELOPPEMENT?

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1. APPRÉCIATIONS GÉNÉRALES

Force dominante de la dernière décennie du XX^e et du début du XXI^e siècle, la mondialisation façonne une nouvelle ère d'interactions entre les pays, les économies et les individus. Elle accroît les contacts entre les individus par de-là des frontières, que se soit dans le domaine de l'économie, de la technologie, de la culture ou de la gouvernance. Ainsi, la mondialisation comporte à la fois des aspects positifs, novateurs et dynamiques, et des aspects négatifs, perturbateurs et marginalisateurs.

L'intégration mondiale est tirée par des changements de politique visant à promouvoir l'efficacité économique via la libéralisation et la déréglementation des marchés nationaux et le désengagement de l'État de nombreuses activités économiques, ainsi que par la restructuration de l'État-providence. Mais ce sont surtout les innovations récentes dans la technologie de l'information et des communications qui favorisent l'intégration.

Le monde offre davantage d'opportunités aux individus qu'il y a 20, 50 ou 100 ans. Dans les pays en voie de développement (PVD), le taux cumulé des inscriptions dans l'enseignement primaire et secondaire a été multiplié par plus de deux. Et le pourcentage d'enfants fréquentant l'école primaire est passé de moins de la moitié à plus de trois quarts. Le taux d'alphabétisation des adultes a également progressé, de 48 à 72% entre 1970 et 1997. La plupart des pays sont à présent indépendants et plus de 70% de la population mondiale vit sous un régime démocratique

relativement pluraliste¹. Le monde est plus prospère. Le revenu moyen par habitant a plus que triplé au cours des cinquante dernières années.

Cependant ces tendances masquent de grandes divergences tant dans les avancées que dans les nouveaux reculs. Malgré les immenses progrès réalisés au XX^e siècle, le monde se heurte aujourd'hui à d'énormes arriérés, qui se manifestent par des carences et des inégalités creusant de profondes disparités entre les pays et les régions².

La pauvreté est partout. Selon l'indicateur de pauvreté humaine (IPH-1), plus d'un quart des 4,5 milliards d'individus vivant dans les PVD ne bénéficient toujours pas de certains éléments les plus essentiels : une espérance de vie supérieure à 40 ans, l'accès au savoir et un minimum de services privés et publics³.

L'IPH d'un pays décomposé en régions révèle aussi d'immenses disparités. Ainsi en Inde, le niveau de pauvreté humaine dans la Région du Bihar (54%) est deux fois supérieur à celui constaté dans celle du Kerala.

En outre, les disparités entre hommes et femmes restent marquées. Dans les PVD, il y a toujours 60% plus de femmes analphabètes que d'hommes. Le taux d'inscription des filles dans l'enseignement primaire reste inférieur de 6% à celui des garçons. C'est dans le domaine politique et économique que les disparités sont plus criantes. L'indicateur de la participation des femmes et l'indicateur sexo-spécifique du développement humain révèlent l'existence d'inégalités dans tous les pays.

LE MONDE A CHANGÉ

Au cours des dix dernières années, des événements spectaculaires ont bouleversé l'ordre, apporté des progrès technologiques et modifié les politiques économiques. Ces événements définissent la nature de la mondialisation et accélèrent grandement ce processus. La fin de la guerre froide a déclenché une vague d'intégration politique mondiale. La technologie de l'information et des communications rend possible des millions de conversations planétaires. Et l'Accord de Marrakech de 1994 a changé les règles du commerce mondial⁴. Tout cela c'est fait dans le sillage d'un tournant idéologique mondial.

L'ordre politique a été modifié au moment où la chute du Mur de Berlin en 1989 et la fin de la guerre froide ont levé les barrières politiques et économiques⁵. Plus de 400 millions d'individus en Europe de l'Est et la Communauté des États indépendants et près de 1,3 milliards de personnes en Chine et au Viet Nam sont entrés dans le monde des contacts et des communications planétaires. Les idées et l'information ont commencé à circuler librement à mesure que les pays levaient la censure, l'interdiction de circuler et de former des partis politiques et des organisations de la société civile.

Le progrès technologique, notamment le lancement du *world wide web* d'Internet en 1990, suivi de la fourniture gratuite du navigateur Netscape en 1994, ont transformé ce moyen d'information de communication, existant mais peu connu, destiné au départ à la communauté scientifique, en un outil convivial pour le grand public. Le monde des communications s'est rétréci, rendant possible l'interaction à distance et en temps réel. Ces innovations dans les télécommunications offrent des possibilités inédites de bâtir la solidarité sociale et de mobiliser les individus du monde entier dans des sociétés en réseau.

La gouvernance économique s'est aussi manifeste au niveau mondial. Signé en avril 1994 et clôturant les négociations de l'Uruguay Round sur l'Accord général sur les tarifs douaniers et le commerce (GATT), l'Accord de

Marrakech a réduit la quasi-totalité des droits de douane et des autres obstacles aux échanges. Il a également instauré un système de règles pour les échanges mondiaux. Il a en outre innové en mettant sur pied l'Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC).

En ce qui concerne le tournant idéologique mondial, les PVD sont de plus en plus nombreux à adopter une approche libre-échangiste, se détournant des politiques de substitution aux importations. En 1997, l'Inde avait ramené ses droits de douane à 30%, contre 82% en moyenne en 1990, le Brésil à 12%, contre 25% en 1991, et la Chine à 18%, contre 43% en 1992.

La déréglementation des marchés financiers est plus lente dans les PVD mais elle avance tout même, avec le soutien du FMI et de l'OCDE. L'Argentine, le Mexique et la Thaïlande ont ouvert leurs marchés des capitaux. La Chine n'encourage pas les mouvements de capitaux à court terme. Et le Chili a suivi une voie unique en son genre en choisissant de réduire la volatilité excessive des flux à court terme par l'introduction d'une taxe sur les dépôts. La Mongolie et le Viet Nam ont également commencé à libéraliser leur économie et à refondre profondément leurs relations commerciales, ouvrant leurs économies aux échanges et à l'investissement direct étranger.

Ces changements ont accéléré la mondialisation et approfondi les interactions entre les individus. Ils ont également défini la nature de l'intégration mondiale, donnant naissance à de nouveaux marchés, de nouveaux acteurs, de nouvelles règles et de nouveaux instruments.

Le tableau est en train de changer de trois manières :

- *Rétrécissement des distances* : la vie des individus – emplois, revenus, santé – subit l'influence d'événements qui surviennent à l'autre bout du monde.
- *Raccourcissement des délais* : les marchés et les technologies évoluent aujourd'hui à une vitesse sans précédent, ce qui permet des opérations à distance en temps réel. Citons

l'exemple de la sortie rapide des capitaux des marchés est-asiatiques et la propagation de ce phénomène de la Thaïlande à la Corée, en passant par l'Indonésie, et même à l'Afrique du Sud, pourtant à des milliers de kilomètres de là.

- *Disparition des frontières* : les frontières entre les pays disparaissent, non seulement pour les échanges, les capitaux et l'information, mais aussi pour les idées, les normes, la culture et les valeurs. Les frontières s'estompent

également en politique économique. De plus, les activités des entreprises multinationales et des associations mondiales de malfaiteurs sont intégrées à l'échelle de la planète.

Le temps, l'espace et les frontières ont-ils été abolis pour former un village mondial ? Cela dépend pour qui. Tous les individus ne peuvent pas en faire partie. L'élite mondiale rencontre peu de frontières, mais pour milliards d'êtres humains, les frontières sont toujours aussi infranchissables.

L'INTÉGRATION MONDIALE : UN PROCESSUS RAPIDE, MAIS DÉSÉQUILIBRÉ

Les nouvelles règles de la mondialisation, et les acteurs qui les établissent, sont axées sur l'intégration des marchés mondiaux, négligeant les besoins des individus que les marchés ne sont pas en mesure de combler. Ce processus concentre le pouvoir et marginalise les pays et les individus pauvres.

L'économie mondiale a subi des modifications fondamentales. L'expansion régulière des exportations et la croissance phénoménale des mouvements de capitaux masquent d'immenses disparités dans l'expérience des pays et des régions.

Les exportations du Botswana, de la Chine, de la République de Corée et de la République dominicaine ont enregistré une croissance annuelle moyenne de 10 à 13%. Mais de nombreux pays n'ont pas bénéficié de ces avantages. Les exportations ont en effet baissé en Bulgarie, au Niger, au Togo et en Zambie. La part des produits manufacturés dans les exportations de biens marchands a fortement progressé dans certains pays : de 13 à 71% à Maurice, de 32 à 81% au Mexique ou encore de 25 à 78% en Tunisie. En revanche, dans 28 pays, les produits manufacturés représentent toujours moins de 10% des exportations de biens marchands.

Dans les années quatre-vingt-dix, plus de 80% de l'investissement direct étranger des PVD et des économies en transition bénéficient à 20 pays seulement, principalement la Chine.

En 1996, un an avant la crise en Asie de l'Est, quelque 94% des investissements de portefeuille et des autres mouvements de capitaux à court terme en direction des PVD et

des économies en transition ont été réalisés seulement dans 20 de ces pays. Aujourd'hui seuls 25 PVD ont accès aux marchés privés pour les obligations, les prêts des banques commerciales et les investissements de portefeuille. Les autres pays en sont exclus car ils ne disposent pas d'une cote de solvabilité.

Pour résumer, le cinquième de la population mondiale vivant dans les pays les plus riches absorbe 82% des exportations et 68% de l'investissement direct étranger, contre à peine plus de 1% pour le cinquième de la population qui se trouve en bas de l'échelle.

Ces tendances aggravent la stagnation économique et la faiblesse du développement humain. Elles marginalisent encore davantage de nombreux PVD en les empêchant d'accéder aux secteurs les plus dynamiques de la croissance économique mondiale. Pour 59 pays – essentiellement d'Afrique subsaharienne, d'Europe de l'Est et de la CEI – le PNB par habitant a baissé⁶.

L'intégration économique opère ainsi un partage des PVD et les économies en transition qui profitent des opportunités mondiales et ceux qui n'en profitent pas. Cette division inégale s'opère indépendamment du niveau de revenu et de développement humain ainsi que de la région : d'un côté, on trouve, par exemple, la Chine, le Chili, le Costa Rica, Maurice et la Pologne et, de l'autre, le Cameroun, le Niger, le Venezuela et la Russie.

Ironie du sort, les pays laissés pour compte sont profondément intégrés dans les échanges mondiaux. L'Afrique subsaharienne affiche un

ratio exportations/PIB (29% dans les années quatre-vingt-dix) plus élevé que l'Amérique latine (15%). Cependant les exportations africaines restent pour l'essentiel constituées de produits de base et l'investissement direct étranger se concentre dans l'extraction minière. L'intégration apparente de cette région la rend donc vulnérable aux caprices des marchés des produits de base⁷.

Dans les années quatre-vingt et quatre-vingt-dix, de nombreux pays ont pu saisir des opportunités mondiales, ce qui a fait avancer à grands pas la réduction de la pauvreté mondiale et le développement humain. La Chine, l'Indonésie, la Malaisie, la République de Corée et de nombreux autres pays sont parvenus à une croissance en développement humain et en réduction de la pauvreté. De nombreux pays ont généré des opportunités d'emplois satisfaisantes en puisant dans les marchés mondiaux. On peut citer le logiciel à Bangalore, en Inde et l'assemblage des ordinateurs au Costa Rica. D'autres ont utilisé l'investissement direct étranger pour améliorer la qualité de l'emploi.

Mais l'expansion des échanges n'est pas toujours synonyme de croissance de l'emploi et des salaires. Dans de nombreux pays, les individus sont confrontés à une situation où coexistent destruction et création d'emplois du fait de la restructuration des entreprises, des fusions et acquisition, de l'avancée de la production mondiale intégrée pratiquée par les multinationales.

Dans le monde d'aujourd'hui, la migration est également marquée par des opportunités et des conséquences humaines inégales. On peut citer trois caractéristiques de la migration.

- *Premièrement*, les opportunités d'emplois mondiales s'ouvrent certes pour les uns, mais elles se ferment pour la majorité des autres. L'Australie, le Canada et les Etats-Unis disposent de programmes pour attirer les migrants disposant de qualifications. La fuite des cerveaux se poursuit donc dans les PVD. Quelque 30 000 Africains titulaires d'un doctorat vivent à l'étranger, alors qu'il ne reste en Afrique qu'un scientifique et un ingénieur pour 10 000 habitants⁸.
- *Deuxièmement*, la migration clandestine se poursuit sans relâche. Ne possédant pas de

papers" les immigrants clandestins sont non seulement victimes de discrimination, mais se voient denier les droits humains fondamentaux.

- *Troisièmement*, il existe des différences entre hommes et femmes sur le plan des mouvements migratoires. Au moins 50 millions de migrants sont des femmes, dont 30 millions dans les PVD. Une grande proportion des migrants venant notamment des Philippines et du Sri Lanka sont des femmes. Nombre d'entre elles finissent dans des activités salissantes, dangereuses et dégradantes⁹.

Quant à la culture mondialisation se manifeste dans le cadre d'un processus qui comporte des tendances divergentes. La circulation des cultures et de leurs produits est aujourd'hui fortement déséquilibrée : elle va essentiellement dans un sens, des pays riches vers les pays pauvres. En devenant un bien économique, la culture entre dans la catégorie des marchandises que l'on peut vendre et échanger : l'artisanat, le tourisme, la musique ou les films. Même si la diffusion des idées et des images enrichit le monde, il y a un risque lorsque l'on réduit les préoccupations culturelles à la protection de ce que l'on peut vendre et acheter, sans tenir compte de la communauté, des coutumes et des traditions. Les nouvelles technologies constituent le moteur de ces échanges de biens culturels. Le développement d'Internet permet également de diffuser la culture à l'échelle planétaire.

Le marché mondial des produits culturels subit une concentration, évinçant les petites entreprises locales. Les produits américains dominent de plus en plus le secteur du divertissement. Face à cette "menace", de nombreux pays affirment que les produits culturels ne devraient pas être soumis aux accords de libre échange. La progression de la « culture de consommation mondiale » et de l'homogénéisation culturelle suscite des inquiétudes. Mais il existe aussi des tendances inverses. La culture ne va pas toujours dans la même direction. La salsa des Caraïbes, la cuisine éthiopienne et thaïlandaise et nombre d'autres traditions se propagent à travers le monde.

Certains anthropologues prétendent que la mondialisation est un processus idéologique imposant une culture mondiale. D'autres affirment que même si les produits culturels circulent de par le monde, les individus les reçoivent et les utilisent à leur manière.

Une forme de gouvernance mondiale est en train d'apparaître, mais les déséquilibres de ce processus sont sources d'inquiétude. La gouvernance est le cadre constitué de règles, d'institutions et de pratiques qui fixent des limites au comportement des individus, des organisations et des entreprises.

La politique intergouvernementale qui régit l'économie mondiale d'aujourd'hui est entre les mains des principales puissances industrielles et des institutions qu'elles contrôlent : la Banque mondiale, le Fonds monétaire international, la Banque des règlements internationaux. Les règles qu'elles élaborent peuvent créer un environnement sûr pour les marchés ouverts, mais il n'existe pas de garde-fous pour protéger les droits de l'homme et favoriser le développement humain. Comptant près de 80% de la population mondiale mais moins d'un cinquième du PIB planétaire, les PVD n'ont qu'une influence limitée¹⁰.

Fonctionnant selon le principe de la coopération et sensés débattre de thèmes spécifiques, des instances se retrouvent à élaborer, depuis une dizaine d'années, des mesures économiques pour le monde entier en dehors des Nations Unies ou de tout autre système officiel sanctionné par des processus et d'une participation démocratique. En 1998, les États-Unis ont pris l'initiative de former le G22 composé des pays du G7 et de 15 autres (dont les grandes économies émergentes) pour réexaminer le système financier mondiale suite à la crise qui a frappé l'Asie de l'Est. Parmi les autres organisations, le G7 et le G10, seul le G22 tient une consultation avec les PVD, et encore uniquement avec certains d'entre eux¹¹.

Les pays pauvres participent peu à la formulation et à la mise en œuvre des nouvelles règles qui régissent les marchés mondiaux. Sur les 29 pays les moins avancés membres de

l'OMC, seuls 12 avaient des missions à Genève. La plupart disposaient d'une équipe restreinte pour couvrir l'éventail des travaux des Nations Unies. Rares sont les pays africains à disposer de délégations soutenues par une équipe ou par une analyse approfondie pour défendre leurs intérêts nationaux¹².

Depuis le début des années quatre-vingt-dix, l'effondrement de la position commune des pays du Sud sur les questions liées au commerce mondial, ainsi que la divergence des intérêts, aggrave encore les faiblesses de cette capacité de négociation. La diversité des situations des PVD, depuis les nouveaux pays industrialisés jusqu'aux pays les moins avancés, ne fait que creuser l'écart.

L'accord sur les aspects des droits de propriété intellectuelle qui touche au commerce (ADPIC) n'est pas équilibré : il fournit un environnement favorable aux multinationales, en renforçant leur domination sur la détention de la technologie, en faisant obstacle à son transfert en direction des PVD ou en augmentant le coût de ce transfert.

Heureusement, deux forces importantes de la gouvernance sociale gagnent en puissance :

- *Institutions œuvrant pour les droits de l'homme.* Un haut commissaire aux droits de l'homme a été nommé aux Nations Unies et il a été décidé de créer un tribunal pénal international reconnu par 120 pays. La Convention relative aux droits de l'enfant a été ratifiée par la quasi-totalité des pays. L'absence de mécanismes d'application pour ces instruments juridiques est malheureusement flagrante.
- *Réseaux mondiaux d'ONG.* Par leur puissance et leur influence croissantes, les ONG contribuent largement à ouvrir aux individus des possibilités de participer à la gouvernance mondiale, tant au Nord qu'au Sud. Les ONG sont véritables avocats du développement humain, incitant les gouvernements, ainsi que les organisations internationales et multinationales, à assumer leurs engagements et à respecter les droits de l'homme et les règles environnementales.

FRAGMENTATION SOCIALE, RETOURS EN ARRIÈRE ET MENACE POUR LA SÉCURITÉ HUMAINE

Inégale, la mondialisation se traduit non seulement par l'intégration, mais aussi par la fragmentation, en opérant, au sein des communautés, des pays et des régions, une division entre « intégrés » et « exclus ». Les inégalités extrêmes qui séparent marginalisés et nantis attisent les tensions et les conflits sociaux. Le raccourcissement des délais et le rétrécissement des distances créent de nouvelles menaces pour la sécurité humaine qui peuvent aujourd'hui se propager très rapidement dans le monde. C'est le cas, par exemple, de l'effondrement des marchés des capitaux, du sida, du réchauffement de la Terre ou de la criminalité internationale.

Des écarts de revenus croissants entre les plus riches et les plus pauvres, entre pays riches et pays pauvres continuent de se creuser.

En Asie de l'Est, le revenu par habitant est aujourd'hui plus de sept fois supérieur à son niveau de 1960 et trois fois supérieur à son niveau de 1980. En revanche, en Afrique subsaharienne et dans d'autres pays parmi les moins avancés, il est actuellement moins élevé qu'en 1970. Les inégalités de revenus se sont aussi accrues nettement en Chine, en Indonésie, en Thaïlande et dans d'autres pays d'Asie de l'Est et du Sud-Est qui avaient, au cours des décennies précédentes, enregistré une forte croissance ainsi que des progrès dans la répartition des revenus et la réduction de la pauvreté. Ces tristes performances offrent un contraste frappant avec l'extraordinaire concentration des richesses autour des très riches. Par exemple, en 1998, les patrimoines des trois personnes les plus riches du monde dépassaient ensemble le PNB global des 48 pays les moins avancés.

Insécurité de l'emploi et des revenus est présente dans les pays riches comme dans les pays pauvres... Les perturbations liées aux restructurations de l'économie et des entreprises, ainsi que le démantèlement de la protection sociale, font disparaître de nombreux emplois et entraînent une détérioration des conditions de travail. Sous la pression de la concurrence mondiale, pays et entreprises adoptent des

politiques de l'emploi plus « flexibles » et les contrats de travail de courte durée se multiplient. En 1996, la part des travailleurs employés sans contrat ou dans le cadre de ces nouveaux types de contrats augmentaient de 30% au Chili, de 36% en Argentine, de 39% en Colombie et de 41% au Pérou. En Egypte, la pratique qui consiste à faire signer une lettre de démission aux nouveaux embauchés est de plus en plus fréquente¹³. La situation de chômeur étant de moins en moins tenable, ceux qui ne parviennent pas à accéder au secteur formel de l'économie se tournent fréquemment vers le secteur informel.

L'Alternance de phases d'expansion et de récession, la volatilité financière sont aussi des traits caractéristiques du phénomène de la mondialisation. La crise financière en Asie de l'Est a déstabilisé la vie de millions de personnes et réduit les perspectives de croissance dans cette région et dans le reste du monde. En Indonésie, en République de Corée, en Malaisie, aux Philippines et en Thaïlande, le coût humain de cette crise a été très élevé. Les premiers signes de reprise économique apparaissent cette année. Cependant, l'étude de crises précédentes montre que le chômage persiste longtemps après que l'inflation a reculé et que les taux de change se sont redressés. Les économies se remettent plus vite d'une crise que les individus.

L'analyse de la crise asiatique permet de dégager deux grandes leçons concernant les marchés mondiaux :

- *Premièrement*, l'instabilité est une constante des marchés financiers d'aujourd'hui, mondialement intégrés. De plus, la confiance des investisseurs et l'évaluation des risques peuvent basculer du jour au lendemain. En outre, les marchés sont de plus en plus sophistiqués et d'innombrables instruments et dispositifs financiers nouveaux sont apparus. En théorie, ceux-ci ont été inventés pour que les investisseurs puissent transférer et répartir le risque. En pratique, ils contribuent aujourd'hui directement à la volatilité des marchés des capitaux.

- *Deuxièmement*, les pays doivent faire preuve d'une extrême prudence en s'ouvrant aux capitaux étrangers à court terme (souvent spéculatifs), surtout lorsque les institutions régissant les marchés financiers sont peu développées.

La contagion et la menace de récession mondiale font part des défis et des risques de nos jours. Sous l'effet de la propagation de la crise les reculs du développement humain se multiplient. Beaucoup de pays pauvres souffrent d'une baisse des prix des exportations consécutive au tassement de la demande mondiale. Les pays exportateurs de pétrole, comme l'Angola et le Koweït, sont particulièrement touchés tout aussi que les pays africains qui dépendent des exportations de produits primaires, comme la Zambie qui exporte du cuivre.

La criminalité internationale a enregistré un essor due à la mondialisation qui ouvre de nombreuses possibilités aux malfaiteurs. En 1995, le trafic de stupéfiants était estimé à 400 milliards de dollars. Le trafic d'armes est aussi en plein développement. Il déstabilise les sociétés et les pays, et alimente des conflits en Afrique et en Europe de l'Est. Une autre activité florissante est la traite des femmes et des petites filles à des fins d'exploitation sexuelle. Rien qu'en Europe de l'Ouest, chaque année, environ 500 000 femmes et filles originaires de pays en transition ou en développement sont prises au piège de ce véritable trafic d'esclaves.

Au cœur de tous ces drames se trouvent le pouvoir et l'influence croissants des gangs, dont l'activité est estimée à 1 500 milliards par an, ce qui en fait une véritable puissance économique, rivalisant avec celle des multinationales. La criminalité peut infiltrer les milieux d'affaires, la politique et le gouvernement. Tous ces gangs opèrent au-delà des frontières nationales et développent des alliances stratégiques formant un réseau mondial.

Le SIDA est un fléau qui a atteint des dimensions planétaires. À la fin de 1998, à l'échelle mondiale, plus de 33 millions de personnes étaient infectées par le VIH. Le *SIDA* est aujourd'hui une maladie des pauvres, puisque

95% des personnes contaminées vivent dans les PVD. Ce virus réduit fortement l'espérance de vie gagnée au cours des trois dernières décennies. De plus le VIH se répand rapidement dans des régions que l'on pensait jusque là relativement protégées, telles que la Chine ou les grandes zones rurales de l'Inde¹⁴.

Les conflits civils, une sorte d'agitation mondiale, affection en grande mesure le développement. La défense est aujourd'hui de plus en plus souvent confiée à des intérêts privés et les sociétés internationales de services paramilitaires se multiplient. Les clients des mercenaires sont de plus en plus souvent des multinationales qui cherchent à protéger leurs actifs dans des pays où les conflits sont fréquents. Des sociétés telles que Executive Outcomes, Sandline International et Military Professional Resources Incorporated proposent des services et des formations militaires aux pays et aux grandes entreprises, et se montrent particulièrement actives en Afrique. Leurs activités sont très difficiles à contrôler. Les comptes rendus annuels du Rapporteur spécial des Nations Unies sur les Droits de l'homme concernant les mercenaires pressent régulièrement les pays de mettre au point une législation interdisant le recours à des mercenaires sur leur territoire.

La dégradation de l'environnement est devenue une urgence silencieuse. La dégradation de l'environnement est un problème planétaire qui dépasse le champ d'action national. La mondialisation peut améliorer les perspectives de la gestion de l'environnement, via la diffusion de technologies propres et de normes environnementales, ainsi que sous la pression des consommateurs et des militants.¹⁵

La dégradation de l'environnement est une « urgence silencieuse » et chronique qui menace les moyens de subsistance de certaines des populations les plus pauvres du monde. Les scientifiques prévoient un relèvement graduel des températures, et une montée du niveau des eaux du globe, qui pourraient inonder une partie du Bangladesh, de l'Égypte et des Maldives. Les réserves halieutiques, d'eau et forestière ont diminué dramatiquement en menaçant la sécurité économique, alimentaire et sanitaire des plus

pauvres pays. Les populations sont également les ouragans dont la violence semble être la vulnérables aux phénomènes climatiques comme conséquence du réchauffement planétaire.

QUE FAIRE ?

Quelles stratégie et politique de développement humain peut ou mener le contexte des la mondialisation, en tenant compte de ses opportunités et défis en même temps? La mondialisation est un processus complexe et contradictoire. D'un côté, la mondialisation multiplie les chances de réaliser des progrès humains sans précédent. De l'autre, elle réduit ces possibilités, tout en menaçant la sécurité humaine. Elle induit en effet l'intégration de l'économie, de la culture et de la gouvernance, mais elle fragmente les sociétés. Elle favorise l'efficacité économique, la croissance et les profits, mais néglige complètement d'autres objectifs : l'équité, l'éradication de la pauvreté et l'amélioration de la sécurité humaine.

Dans l'optique du développement humain, la mondialisation doit donc reposer sur les principes suivants :

- *l'éthique* : pour atténuer, et non aggraver, les violations des droits de l'homme et le non respect des valeurs humaines ;
- *le développement* : pour atténuer, et non aggraver, la pauvreté des pays et des individus ;
- *l'équité* : pour atténuer, et non aggraver, les disparités entre et au sein des pays et des générations ;
- *l'intégration* : pour atténuer, et non aggraver, la marginalisation et l'exclusion de pays et d'individus ;
- *la sécurité humaine* : pour atténuer, et non aggraver, la vulnérabilité des pays et des individus ;
- *la viabilité à long terme* : pour atténuer, et non aggraver, l'appauvrissement et la dégradation de l'environnement.

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L'OSCE ET L'OTAN: UNE APPROCHE INSTITUTIONNELLE

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Les années '90 témoignent de grandes possibilités et modélations des instruments pour une synergie institutionnelle dans la prévention et la gestion des crises, ainsi que dans la réhabilitation après-conflictuelle. Les deux piliers indispensables et "instruments du choix" dans l'architecture de sécurité européenne émergente sont l'Organisation de Sécurité et

Coopération en Europe (OSCE) l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord (OTAN).

L'ouvrage comporte deux sections; dans la première, nous allons présenter leurs principales évolutions structurelles et conceptuelles des deux acteurs internationaux, afin de mieux établir la portée des interactions existentes entre eux; dans la seconde, nous allons présenter quelques commentaires personnels sur le thème.

I. APPROCHE INSTITUTIONNELLE.

1. L'Organisation de Sécurité et Coopération en Europe (OSCE)

Avec ses 55 Etats participants, l'OSCE peut prétendre être la plus large organisation de sécurité régionale. Sa zone inclut l'Europe continentale, le Caucase, l'Asie Centrale et l'Amérique de Nord, et coopère avec des partenaires méditerranéennes et asiatiques; donc, l'OSCE réunit ensemble les communautés euro-atlantiques et euro-asiatique, de "Vancouver à Vladivostok", étant dans sa région l'instrument primaire pour la prévention des conflits, la gestion des crises et la réhabilitation après-conflictuelle.

Si durant les années du processus Helsinki, la Conférence pour Sécurité et Coopération en Europe était plutôt un forum contacté par de différentes organisations internationales, régionales et non-gouvernementale, avec la fin de la Guerre froide celle-ci a commencé à élargir et approfondir ses contacts externes et la coopération; cela est résulté, d'une part, de la

conscientisation du fait que le caractère multiple des défis de la sécurité demandait une réponse pluri-institutionnelle et, d'autre part, du fait qu'au début des années '90, la Conférence est devenue une Organisation reconnue par ses Etats participants comme étant "un instrument primaire pour l'avertissement, la prévention des conflits, le management des crises et la réhabilitation après-conflictuelle".

L'OSCE est une part intégrante du réseau des institutions qui agissent dans le domaine de la sécurité européenne, des droits de l'homme et des aspects économiques. Tenant compte du spectre vaste et de la nature complexe des aspects de la sécurité et des défis auxquels se confronte maintenant l'Europe, le renforcement mutuel de la coopération entre l'OSCE et les autres organisations de sécurité et institutions est cruciale également au niveau des consultations politiques et sur le terrain.

Vision globale de la sécurité

- ◆ la protection et la promotion des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales, ainsi que la coopération économique et l'environnement sont considérées être tout aussi importants pour le maintien de la paix et de la stabilité que les aspects politico-militaires.
- ◆ les différents aspects de la sécurité sont vus comme étant en corrélation et interdépendantes – la sécurité est vue comme étant indivisible.
- ◆ l'organisation est active dans toutes les phases du cycle conflictuel, depuis l'avertissement, jusqu'à la gestion et la réhabilitation après-confliktuelle.

Approche coopérative de la sécurité

- ◆ partant de la prémisses que la sécurité est indivisible, il résulte que les Etats participants ont un intérêt commun dans la sécurité de l'Europe et donc ils doivent coopérer afin de prévenir le déclenchement des crises et/ou réduire le risque que les crises déjà existantes s'aggravent. Autrement dit, la coopération peut apporter des bénéfices à tous les Etats participants, alors que l'insécurité dans un Etat ou dans une région peut affecter le bien-être de tous; la clé est de travailler ensemble, accomplissant la sécurité avec les autres et non pas contre ceux-ci.
- ◆ la sécurité coopérative implique un comportement non-hégémonique de la part des Etats participants; elle demande un partenariat vrai, basé sur responsabilité mutuelle, transparence et confiance, également au niveau de la politique interne et étrangère.

Evénements-clé de la coopération au niveau politique

- ◆ le Document de Budapest (1994), intitulé "*Vers un partenariat authentique dans une nouvelle Europe*" a marqué le début de la discussion sur un modèle de sécurité commune et globale pour l'Europe au XXI-ème siècle, basé sur les principes et engagements de l'OSCE.
- ◆ ce processus a été accéléré par la "*Déclaration de Lisbonne sur un modèle de sécurité commune et globale pour le XXI-ème siècle*" (1996) dans laquelle les Etats participants ont plaidé pour le "renforcement de la coopération avec d'autres organisations de sécurité qui sont transparentes et prédictibles dans leurs actions, et dont les membres – individuellement et collectivement – adhèrent aux principes et engagements de l'OSCE et dont l'adhésion est basée sur des engagements ouverts et volontaires".
- ◆ le développement du cadre d'une coopération pragmatique entre l'OSCE et ses partenaires internationaux a été impulsé à l'occasion de la réunion du Conseil Ministériel de Copenhague, de 1997, lorsque les lignes directrices d'un Document-Charte sur la Sécurité européenne ont été tracées; il s'agissait d'un concept commun pour le développement de la coopération entre les institutions qui se renforcent mutuellement qui établissait les paramètres d'une Plate-forme pour la sécurité collective destinée à accentuer la nature mutuellement-renforçante des relations entre les organisations et institutions qui traitent de la promotion de la sécurité dans la zone de l'OSCE.
- ◆ lors de la réunion au Sommet tenue à Istanbul, en novembre 1999, les dirigeants des 54 Etats participant à l'OSCE ont signé la *Charte de sécurité européenne*; celle-ci n'est peut-être pas vraiment révolutionnaire, mais elle ne doit pas non plus être considérée comme une simple "coquille vide".

Eléments principaux de la Charte de sécurité européenne

- ◆ *risques et défis existants*: la Charte se limite à énumérer un certain nombre de risques pour la sécurité en Europe, dont le terrorisme international, l'extrémisme violent, la criminalité organisée, le trafic de drogues, la dissémination des armes de petit calibre et armes légères, les graves problèmes économiques, la dégradation de l'environnement et l'instabilité dans le bassin méditerranéen et en Asie centrale.

◆ la Charte réaffirme sans ambiguïté le droit naturel de chaque Etats participant de l'OSCE de choisir ses propres arrangements de sécurité, y compris les traités d'alliance. A la demande de la Russie, la Charte souligne toutefois que "Dans le cadre de l'OSCE, aucun Etat, aucun groupe d'Etats ou aucune organisation ne peut revendiquer une reponsabilité première dans le maintien de la paix et de la stabilité dans l'espace de l'OSCE". Mais on lit ensuite, dans la même disposition: "ni considérer une quelconque partie de cet espace comme relevant de sa sphère d'influence" – ce qui est une allusion évidente au concept russe de l'"étranger proche".

◆ structures de l'OSCE: la Charte a exclu d'envisager un remaniement institutionnel, les gouvernements considérant, à une écrasante majorité, que l'OSCE ne doit pas s'écarter de sa souplesse et de son pragmatisme traditionnels. Pour les prises de décision de l'OSCE, la règle du consensus a été maintenue, mais il a été décidé d'améliorer les procédures décisionnelles du Conseil permanent, qui sont notoirement insatisfaisantes. Ainsi, pour des raisons d'urgence, la consultation n'impliquait les petites Délégations qu'au tout dernier moment, lorsque les décisions du Conseil permanent étaient sur le point d'être officiellement adoptées. Un nouvel organisme informel, à composition non limitée, va maintenant tenir des réunions en tant que "comité préparatoire" du Conseil permanent.

◆ dimension humaine: il convient de mentionner ici un développement normatif qui concerne la question des minorités nationales; au paragraphe 19 de la Charte, les gouvernements des pays de l'OSCE reconnaissent, de façon inattendue, que le respect des droits de l'homme, y compris des droits des personnes appartenant à une minorité nationale constituée, non pas seulement une fin en soi, mais aussi une manière de renforcer l'intégrité territoriale et la souveraineté des Etats. Ils reconnaissent également que l'un des moyens de préserver et de promouvoir l'identité ethnique, culturelle, linguistique et religieuse des minorités nationales à l'intérieur d'un Etat existant est d'accorder à ces minorités une certaine autonomie.

◆ renforcer les capacités opérationnelles de l'OSCE: les opérations sur le terrain sont montées cas par cas, et le plus souvent sous la forme de "missions à long terme". Avec le Haut Commissaire pour les minorités nationales, ce sont là les instruments qui ont permis à l'OSCE de se tailler un créneau dans le domaine de la gestion des conflits depuis les années 90. La Charte présente la première liste complète (et non restrictive) des tâches prévues pour les opérations sur le terrain: aide et avis d'experts dans tous les secteurs de compétence de l'OSCE; appui technique spécialisé à la primauté du droit et aux institutions démocratiques et maintien et rétablissement de l'ordre public; bons offices et médiation dans les situations conflictuelles; surveillance de la mise en oeuvre des accords de paix, de la conduite des élections et du respect des engagements de l'OSCE; relèvement après un conflit.

Le maintien de la paix au niveau paneuropéen est apparu comme sujet à controverse au sein de l'OSCE au début des années 90 – et il a gardé ce caractère; les Etats-Unis ont fait valoir que si l'OSCE n'est pas équipée militairement pour le maintien de la paix, elle a un rôle politique utile à jouer dans le soutien des opérations entreprises par d'autres organisations (c'est-à-dire l'OTAN). En revanche, la Russie a affirmé que les textes existants fournissent une base qui permet à l'OSCE de mener des opérations de maintien de la paix, si de telles opérations sont préalablement approuvées par une Résolution des Nations Unies.

Le paragraphe 46 laisse toutes les options ouvertes. Il confirme que "l'OSCE peut jouer, au cas par cas et par consensus, notamment un rôle de premier plans lorsque Etats participants estiment qu'elle est l'Organisation la plus efficace et la plus appropriée". En même temps, il prévoit que l'OSCE pourrait "décider de définir le mandat d'opérations de maintien de la paix menées par d'autres et solliciter l'appui d'Etats participants de même que d'autres organisations pour réunir les ressources et compétences voulues" et qu'elle pourrait offrir un cadre permettant de coordonner ces efforts.

Cependant, un examen plus approfondi de certaines des autres dispositions de la *Charte* – en particulier de celles qui traitent des opérations de police et du concept d'Equipes d'assistance et de coopération rapides (REACT) – montre qu'en fait, l'accord a été réalisé à partir de la position des Etats-Unis, qui vise à sauvegarder le rôle nouveau et prépondérant de l'OTAN dans le maintien de la paix par des moyens militaires en Europe.

En ce qui concerne les opérations de police, le paragraphe 44 engage sans réserve les gouvernements à renforcer "le rôle de l'OSCE concernant les activités relatives à la police civile en tant que partie intégrante des efforts de l'Organisation dans le domaine de la prévention des conflits, de la gestion des crises et du relèvement après un conflit". Le fait de limiter l'OSCE à ce type de fonction – qui consiste à fournir des services de formation, à réformer les forces paramilitaires, à empêcher la police de se livrer à des activités discriminatoires, etc. – correspond clairement au point de vue des Etats-Unis concernant la division idéale du travail: un rôle militaire pour l'OTAN et un rôle civil pour l'OSCE.

Le concept de REACT, qui a été élaboré par les Etats-Unis et adopté par l'OSCE, apporte une nouvelle confirmation de cette idée. Il engage les gouvernements à mettre en place, au niveau national comme à celui de l'OSCE, les moyens nécessaires pour créer des équipes possédant de larges compétences dans le secteur civil, que l'OSCE pourrait déployer pour contribuer à la prévention des conflits, la gestion des crises et au relèvement après un conflit. Le paragraphe 42 indique que le concept de REACT a été mis au point pour permettre à l'OSCE d'aborder les problèmes avant qu'ils ne dégèrent en crises et de mettre rapidement en place "la composante civile d'une opération de maintien de la paix" ou de déployer rapidement des opérations de grande envergure ou spécialisées, si nécessaire.

Les REACT auront généralement pour effet de "spécialiser" l'OSCE dans des opérations à caractère essentiellement civil. Afin de répondre aux besoins de la planification et de la conduite de plus vastes opérations de l'OSCE sur le terrain, y compris celles qui feront appel aux

ressources des REACT, le paragraphe 43 prévoit la création d'un *Centre d'opérations* dans le cadre du *Centre de prévention des conflits* de l'OSCE.

♦ *Un armistice interinstitutionnel* La *Plate-forme pour la sécurité coopérative* qui est annexée à la *Charte*, part du principe qu'aucun Etat ni aucune institution n'est capable d'affronter par ses propres moyens et de façon isolée les risques et défis de l'environnement de l'après-Guerre froide. Elle offre une sorte de contrat de partenariat aux institutions de sécurité se renforçant mutuellement, sur la base de leurs avantages comparatifs, de la complémentarité, d'une synergie pragmatique, de la transparence et de relations non hiérarchiques. Ce contrat est ouvert aux institutions dont les membres coopèrent entre eux (à titre individuel aussi bien que collectif) librement et en toute transparence, adhèrent aux principes et aux engagements de l'OSCE ainsi qu'à son concept d'un espace de sécurité commun exempt de lignes de division, et honorent leurs engagements dans les domaines de la maîtrise des armements, du désarmement et des mesures de confiance et de sécurité (MDCS).

La coopération entre institutions pourrait s'exercer sous différentes formes: agents de liaison ou point de contact, représentation réciproque aux réunions appropriées, échanges réguliers d'informations, missions conjointes d'évaluation des besoins, détachements d'experts, organisation en commun de projets et d'opérations sur le terrain, activités de formation conjointes, etc. Afin de réagir à des crises spécifiques, l'OSCE s'offre également à servir de "cadre souple" pour la coopération.

L'objectif ultime de la *Plate-forme* est de développer une culture de coopération institutionnelle visant à éviter la duplication des efforts et le gaspillage des ressources. Le Secrétaire général de l'OSCE est ainsi chargé d'établir un rapport annuel sur l'interaction entre les institutions internationales dans l'espace de l'OSCE.

En un sens, la simple existence de la *Plate-forme* revêt une importance plus grande que son contenu. Devant la concurrence effrénée qui

était devenue la caractéristique des activités des institutions de sécurité depuis l'effondrement du communisme, en particulier lors des premières phases du conflit survenu dans l'ex-Yougoslavie, la *Plate-forme* propose une sorte d'armistice interinstitutionnel. Aucune de ses dispositions n'est contraire aux intérêts ou aux pratiques de l'OTAN. Elle représente dans une large mesure une codification de la fructueuse coopération

établie entre l'OTAN et l'OSCE pour la surveillance conjointe de la situation au Kosovo, après la rencontre, en octobre 1998, entre l'envoyé spécial des Etats-Unis, Richard Holbrooke, et le Président yougoslave, Slobodan Milosevic; en 1999, une mission OSCE de 700 agents internationaux et de plus de 1000 employés locaux a été mise sur pied au Kosovo et travaille étroitement avec l'OTAN.

2. L'OTAN AUJOURD'HUI

◆ L'Alliance actuelle a commencé à prendre forme en novembre 1991, lorsque les Chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement réunis à Rome ont adopté à Rome le *Concept stratégique* qui proposait une approche large de la sécurité, fondée sur le dialogue, la coopération et le maintien d'un potentiel de défense collective. Il intégrait les aspects politiques et militaires de la doctrine de l'OTAN en matière de sécurité dans un ensemble cohérent, faisant de la coopération avec les nouveaux partenaires d'Europe Centrale et Orientale un élément à part entière de la stratégie de l'Alliance. Le concept prévoyait une dépendance moindre à l'égard des armes nucléaires, ainsi que d'importants changements concernant les forces intégrées de l'OTAN, notamment des réductions substantielles de leur taille et de leur niveau de préparation, des améliorations de leur mobilité, de leur souplesse et de leur capacité d'adaptation aux différentes circonstances, et un plus large recours aux formations multinationales. Des mesures étaient également prises pour rationaliser la structure de commandement de l'OTAN et adapter les dispositions et procédures de planification de la défense de l'Alliance, en particulier dans l'optique des besoins futurs en matière de gestion de la paix.

◆ A la réunion au Sommet qu'ils ont tenue à Rome, les dirigeants des pays alliés ont également publié une "*Déclaration sur la paix et la coopération*", définissant les missions et les orientations qui seraient celles de l'OTAN par rapport, d'une part, à l'ensemble des institutions s'occupant de la sécurité future de l'Europe et,

d'autre part, au développement du partenariat et de la coopération avec les pays d'Europe Centrale et Orientale, dans les domaines politique, militaire, économique et scientifique [c'est ainsi que fut créé un *Conseil de Coopération Nord-atlantique* (CCNA) chargé de suivre l'évolution future de ce partenariat].

La *Déclaration* de Rome constatait qu'aucune institution ne peut relever à elle seule tous les défis auxquels la nouvelle Europe est confrontée. Il faut pour cela un ensemble d'institutions se renforçant mutuellement, associant les pays d'Europe et d'Amérique du Nord dans un réseau de structures interdépendantes et s'apportant un soutien mutuel.

C'est pourquoi l'Alliance oeuvre à la mise en place d'une nouvelle architecture de sécurité européenne qui facilite la réalisation de cet objectif en faisant en sorte que les rôles de l'OTAN, de l'OSCE, de l'Union Européenne, de l'Union de l'Europe Occidentale et du Conseil de l'Europe soient complémentaires. D'autres cadres régionaux de coopération dans les régions de la Baltique, de la Mer Noire et de la Méditerranée, jouent également un rôle important. Si l'on veut éviter l'instabilité et les divisions que pourraient engendrer, par exemple, des disparités économiques et un nationalisme violent, il faut assurer une interaction efficace entre ces différents éléments

◆ Après la publication de la *Déclaration* de Rome, dans le contexte institutionnel, le premier événement marquant a été la séance inaugurale du CCNA, réunissant des représentants des pays

de l'OTAN et de six pays d'Europe Centrale et Orientale, ainsi que des trois Etats baltes. Le CCNA avait pour rôle de faciliter la coopération concernant la sécurité et les questions apparentées entre les pays participants, à tous les niveaux, et de superviser l'établissement de liens institutionnels plus étroits ainsi que de relations informelles entre ces pays. Les onze Etats successeurs de l'Union Soviétique, qui forment désormais la Communauté des Etats Indépendants (CEI), sont entrés dans ce processus en mars 1992. La Géorgie et l'Albanie ont rejoint les autres Etats, respectivement en avril et juin 1992, et en 1997, lorsque le CCNA a été remplacé par le *Conseil de Partenariat Euro-atlantique* (CPEA) – les Partenaires de la coopération CCNA/PPP étant au nombre de 22.

La coopération dans le cadre du CCNA a été mise en oeuvre sur la base de programmes de travail qui, à l'origine, étaient établis tous les ans, mais qui, depuis 1995, couvrent des périodes de deux ans. Le *Conseil de Partenariat Euro-atlantique* a franchi une nouvelle étape pratique dans ce processus en élaborant un plan d'action du CPEA pour 1998-2000 qui servira de base à ses travaux futurs.

♦ En janvier 1994, à la réunion au Sommet du *Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord* tenue à Bruxelles, l'OTAN a lancé une nouvelle initiative visant à renforcer la stabilité et la sécurité dans toute l'Europe. Elle a invité les membres du CCNA et d'autres Etats à participer à un nouveau et vaste programme de coopération avec l'OTAN, appelé "*Partenariat pour la paix*" (PPP). Ce Partenariat, qui est devenu depuis lors une composante fondamentale de la sécurité dans la zone euro-atlantique, joue un rôle central dans l'Alliance d'aujourd'hui. Les Etats participants aux travaux du CCNA et les autres pays membres de la CSCE qui étaient capables et désireux de contribuer à ce programme ont été invités à se joindre à ce Partenariat. L'invitation a été acceptée par 27 pays. Les activités menées par chaque Partenaire sont fondées sur des programmes de partenariat individuels élaborés conjointement.

♦ En mai 1997, à Sintra, le CCNA a été remplacé par le *Conseil de partenariat euro-atlantique* (CPEA), qui a pour but de lancer une nouvelle phase de coopération. Les principes du CPEA, élaborés en étroite coopération par l'Alliance et les Partenaires, sont énoncés dans son *Document de base*.

L'adoption du *Document de base* du CPEA a marqué la détermination des 44 pays membres de porter à un nouveau degré de qualité leur coopération politique et militaire. Ce document réaffirmait l'engagement commun des pays membres de consolider et d'étendre la paix et la stabilité dans la zone euro-atlantique. Les valeurs et principes partagés qui sous-tendent cet engagement sont énoncés dans le "*Document cadre du Partenariat pour la paix*" (PPP); le CPEA est en fait le cadre général institué pour les consultations sur des questions liées à la politique et à la sécurité et pour le renforcement de la coopération au sein du PPP.

En décembre 1997, le CPEA a approuvé son plan d'action pour 1998-2000, qui traduit le souhait de ses pays membres d'établir entre eux un partenariat plus solide et plus opérationnel. Ce plan d'action a notamment pour objectifs d'encore mieux cibler et approfondir les consultations et la coopération sur des questions liées à la politique et à la sécurité dans le cadre du CPEA et d'accroître la transparence entre les 44 Etats membres. Les Ministres des affaires étrangères siégeant au CPEA ont également approuvé le principe de la création d'un *Centre euro-atlantique de coordination des réactions en cas de catastrophe* et d'une *Unité euro-atlantique de réaction aux catastrophes*.

Le CPEA offre la possibilité de procéder à des consultations multilatérales axées sur les résultats, de renforcer la coopération pratique, d'améliorer la consultation et la coopération sur les questions régionales et d'accroître la transparence et la confiance en matière de sécurité entre tous ses Etats membres. Le CPEA conserve deux principes importants, qui ont assuré le succès de la coopération entre Alliés et Partenaires: le premier est celui de l'ouverture à tous, c'est-à-dire que tous les Alliés et tous les

Partenaires pourront exploiter sur un pied d'égalité les possibilités de consultation politique et de coopération pratique, et le second est celui de l'autodifférenciation, c'est-à-dire que chacun des Partenaires pourra décider lui-même du niveau et des domaines de coopération avec l'Alliance. Conformément à ces principes, le CPEA peut se réunir en séance plénière, en configuration limitée – Alliance et groupe de pays partenaires à composition variable – afin de se concentrer sur des questions fonctionnelles ou, selon les besoins, sur les questions régionales appropriées.

Le nombre des activités menées en coopération sous l'égide du CPEA a également augmenté. Ces activités, fondées sur les principes de l'ouverture à tous et de l'autodifférenciation, portent sur l'économie de la défense, la science, les questions d'environnement liées à la défense, la coopération en matière de maintien de la paix et les plans civils d'urgence. Le PPP renforcé demeure, à l'évidence, un élément de coopération pratique pour ce qui concerne la défense et les questions militaires, dans le cadre souple du CPEA. La plupart des pays partenaires ont aussi établi des missions diplomatiques et des bureaux de liaison auprès de l'OTAN, qui apportent une contribution significative aux communications et aux contacts dans tous ces domaines.

♦ Au *Sommet de Madrid*, en juillet 1997, le processus de changement et d'adaptation interne et externe de l'OTAN a atteint un stade crucial; la République tchèque, la Hongrie et la Pologne ont été invités à entamer des pourparles d'adhésion avec l'OTAN en vue de leur entrée dans l'Alliance comme membres à part entière. Par ailleurs, ils ont approuvé le maintien d'une politique "de la porte ouverte" pour d'autres adhésions et la poursuite de dialogues intensifiés avec les Partenaires désireux d'entrer à l'OTAN. Ils ont annoncé la mise en oeuvre d'un Programme de partenariat pour la Paix sensiblement renforcé, ainsi que l'intensification des consultations avec les Partenaires par le biais du Conseil de partenariat euro-atlantique et celle du dialogue mené par l'Alliance avec des pays méditerranéens non-membres de l'OTAN.

♦ Le second jour du Sommet de Madrid, le 9 juillet 1997, les dirigeants alliés ont signé avec le Président de l'Ukraine une *Charte sur un partenariat spécifique entre l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord et l'Ukraine*. Ce document énonce les principes du développement des relations OTAN-Ukraine et définit des domaines de consultation et de coopération.

♦ Au *Sommet de Bruxelles* ont été également prises des décisions qui visaient à rendre les structures de l'OTAN plus souples et mieux adaptées au nouvel environnement de sécurité en Europe. Parmi ces décisions figurait l'adoption du concept de *Groupes de Forces Inter-armées multinationales* (GFIM); l'intérêt des GFIM réside en particulier dans leur polyvalence, qui améliore la capacité de l'Alliance d'accomplir toute la gamme de ses tâches et de ses missions – de la défense collective au maintien de la paix et à la gestion des crises.

♦ Le 27 mai 1997, à Paris a été signé l'*Acte fondateur sur les relations, la coopération et la sécurité mutuelles entre l'OTAN et la Fédération Russe*; ce document a non seulement institué un mécanisme de consultation et de coopération – le Conseil Conjoint Permanent (CCP) OTAN – Russie – mais aussi défini des domaines spécifiques d'intérêt mutuel dans lesquels l'OTAN et la Russie peuvent construire un partenariat solide, efficace et durable.

L'Alliance a toujours cherchée à réaliser ses objectifs essentiels – la sauvegarde de la sécurité de ses membres et l'établissement en Europe d'un ordre pacifique juste et durable – par des moyens à la fois politiques et militaires. Cette approche générale reste la base de sa politique de sécurité. Or, dans la situation nouvelle qui s'est créée sur le plan de la sécurité, les possibilités de réaliser ces objectifs par des moyens politiques et de prendre en compte les dimensions économique, sociale et environnementale de la sécurité et de la stabilité sont bien meilleurs.

La poursuite par l'Alliance d'une politique active de dialogue et de coopération avec de nouveaux Partenaires et avec d'autres institutions s'appuie sur la volonté de maintenir un dispositif efficace de défense collective et de développer la

base indispensable de la gestion des crises et de la prévention des conflits. Ces approches complémentaires de l'actuel environnement de sécurité en Europe contribuent à réduire le risque de conflits découlant d'un malentendu ou d'un acte délibéré, à accroître la compréhension et la confiance entre tous les Etats de la zone euro-atlantique, à améliorer la gestion des crises qui mettent en cause la sécurité des Alliés et à étendre les possibilités d'un partenariat

authentique entre tous les pays européens face aux problèmes de sécurité communs.

La politique de sécurité de l'Alliance se fonde donc aujourd'hui sur les trois éléments complémentaires que sont le dialogue, la coopération et le maintien d'une capacité de défense collective. Chacun de ces éléments doit permettre de prévenir ou de résoudre pacifiquement les crises touchant à la sécurité de l'Europe.

3. L'INTERACTION DE L'ALLIANCE AVEC L'OSCE

Le ferme développement d'une coopération étroite entre l'OSCE et l'OTAN est un des plus importants aspects des modèles de la coopération interorganisationnelle dans la période de l'après Guerre Froide.

L'Alliance a activement soutenu la CSCE/OSCE depuis sa création, et elle a compté parmi les promoteurs de l'institutionnalisation du processus, décidée au Sommet de la CSCE qui a eu lieu à Paris en 1990. Lors du Sommet qu'elle-même a tenu à Rome en novembre 1991, l'Alliance a confirmé son attachement au processus de la CSCE et a déclaré que les deux Organisations jouaient des rôles complémentaires dans le développement du dialogue et la coopération entre les différentes institutions traitant de la sécurité, ce qui allait contribuer grandement à désamorcer les crises et à prévenir les conflits.

L'importance que l'OTAN a attaché à la CSCE a encore été soulignée en juin 1992, à Oslo. Les Ministres des affaires étrangères des pays alliés ont alors déclaré qu'ils étaient prêts à soutenir les activités de maintien de la paix menées sous la responsabilité de la CSCE, y compris en mettant à disposition les ressources et les compétences de l'Alliance. Cette importante décision a ouvert la voie à un renforcement de l'interaction de l'OTAN avec l'OSCE, particulièrement dans le contexte des nouvelles missions de l'OTAN telles que les opérations de maintien de la paix.

Depuis le Sommet qu'elle a tenu à Budapest en décembre 1994, l'OSCE s'est engagée dans un large examen de tous les aspects de la sécurité, l'objectif étant d'élaborer dans ce domaine un concept pour le XXI-ème siècle.

Depuis 1996, l'OSCE et l'OTAN se sont engagées dans un processus étendu d'interaction et coopération politiques. Régulièrement, des contacts sont établis entre le Président en exercice de l'OSCE et le Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord et il y a aussi un échange d'informations sur l'application des Mesures de Confiance et de Sécurité (MCDS) entre le Secrétariat de l'OSCE et la Section de Coordination de la Vérification et l'Application du Secrétariat de l'OTAN.

En décembre 1996, dans leur *Déclaration* du Sommet de Lisbonne sur un modèle de sécurité commun et global pour l'Europe du XXI-ème siècle, les Chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement des pays de l'OSCE ont réaffirmé leur intention de renforcer la coopération avec les autres organisations compétentes en matière. L'Alliance a apporté sa contribution aux travaux ainsi menés par l'OSCE concernant un modèle de sécurité.

En 1997, avec le remplacement du CCNA par le Conseil de partenariat euro-atlantique (CPEA), un partenariat plus fort et plus pratique s'est instauré entre l'OTAN et ses Partenaires. Le CPEA constitue le cadre global de la coopération entre l'OTAN et les pays partenaires, dont ceux du PPP, et il porte cette coopération à un plus haut niveau de qualité. Un organisme appelé *Comité directeur politico-militaire/ Groupe ad-hoc sur la coopération en matière de maintien de la paix*, fonctionnant dans le cadre du CPEA, établit un lien institutionnel important avec l'OSCE. Un représentant du Président en exercice de l'OSCE assiste régulièrement à ses réunions et y fait part de l'évolution des questions traitées à l'OSCE qui intéressent le groupe. Cet arrangement officiel est particulièrement important dans le domaine du maintien de la paix. Il démontre la

complémentarité et la transparence qui caractérisent le développement de la coopération en matière de maintien de la paix qui a maintenant lieu dans le cadre du CPEA et du PPP.

En 1997, dans leur *Déclaration* de Madrid sur la sécurité et la coopération euro-atlantiques, les Chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement des pays de l'OTAN ont reconnu que l'OSCE était l'organisation de sécurité la plus large à l'échelle européenne. Ils ont mis l'accent sur le fait qu'elle joue un rôle essentiel, s'agissant de garantir la paix, la stabilité et la sécurité en Europe, et ont souligné l'importance des principes et des engagements adoptés par l'OSCE en tant que bases du développement de structures de sécurité européenne globales et coopératives.

A Madrid, l'OTAN a aussi déclaré qu'elle continuait d'appuyer les travaux de l'OSCE sur un modèle de sécurité commun et global pour l'Europe du XXI-ème siècle et la réflexion à mener concernant l'élaboration d'une *Charte sur la sécurité européenne*, conformément aux décisions prises au Sommet de l'OSCE tenu à Lisbonne en 1996.

Le concept commun pour le développement de la coopération entre institutions se renforçant mutuellement, tel qu'il a été agréé à la réunion du Conseil ministériel de l'OSCE de Copenhague, en décembre 1997, comporte une liste de principes et d'engagements en ce sens, dans le cadre de la *Plate-forme pour la sécurité coopérative*. Au sein des organisations et institutions concernées dont ils sont membres, les Etats participants s'emploieront à faire en sorte que ces organisations et institutions apportent leur adhésion à la *Plate-forme*.

Dans un premier train de mesures concrètes visant à développer la coopération entre l'OSCE et ces organisations et institutions, le *Concept commun* prévoit des contacts réguliers, y compris des réunions, dans un cadre permanent de

dialogue, de transparence accrue et de coopération pratique. Cela inclut la désignation d'agents de liaison ou de points de contact, une représentation réciproque aux réunions appropriées et d'autres contacts destinés à faire mieux connaître les instruments de prévention des conflits dont dispose chacune des organisations. L'OTAN et l'OSCE ont développé leurs relations sur la base de ce *Concept commun*.

Les deux organisations travaillent aussi synergiquement afin de monitoriser l'application des sanctions et de vérifier le contrôle des armes dans les Balkans. La Force d'Implementation (IFOR) de l'OTAN et, respectivement, la Force de Stabilisation (SFOR) ont assuré le support vital pour les opérations de terrain de l'OSCE: la sécurité du personnel de l'OSCE, ainsi que l'assistance humaine et matérielle demandée par l'organisation et le déroulement des élections. Mais tous les deux éléments étaient critiques quant au succès des Accords de Paix de Dayton. L'exemplification peut continuer avec le cas de Kosovo où la coopération a été également très étroite; aujourd'hui, la Mission OSCE au Kosovo entretient d'étroites liaisons avec la Force de Kosovo (KFOR) qui est mandatée d'assurer un environnement sûr pour les activités de la communauté internationale.

Un autre cadre pour une coopération étroite entre les deux organisations internationales est le *Pacte de Stabilité pour l'Europe de Sud-Est*; suivant une décision de l'Union Européenne, en juillet 1999, le Conseil Permanent a décidé de placer le Pacte sous les auspices l'OSCE; les Etats participants ont décidé de travailler étroitement avec les organisations internationales, les institutions et autres corps (OTAN, Union Européenne, Conseil de l'Europe, OECD, UEO, institutions financières internationales).

II. COMMENTAIRES

◆ Regardons le contexte international dans lequel sont apparues les deux alliances: l'OTAN – a vu le jour en 1949, en tant qu'Alliance de la Guerre froide (par la suite, à l'époque l'idée d'y ajouter de nouveaux membres était largement impensable); l'OSCE – s'origine en 1975, lorsque les Etats

oestiques et estiques ont créé un cadre pour une coexistence pacifique; les principes communs qui ont fondé leur relation ont été établis par les trois piliers de l'*Acte Final d'Helsinki*.

◆ La détente a consolidé la division de l'Europe, garantissant aux régimes communistes de

- l'Europe une légitimité dont ils n'avaient pas joui antérieurement. Le processus de Helsinki a été politisé dès le début, les Etats de chaque bloc interprétant sélectivement le document: ceux démocratiques soulignaient les valeurs ouestiques, et en particulier la primauté des droits de l'homme, alors que les Etats estiques agréaient surtout les aspects liés au désarmement, la non-interférence dans les affaires et espéraient dans une aide économique.
- ◆ La Guerre froide est finie et le contexte dans lequel ces deux organisations internationales sont apparues s'est modifié; selon l'approche constructiviste wittgensteinienne, les intérêts sont construits dans des circonstances historiques spécifiques, c'est-à-dire que le contexte des normes sociales et culturelles modèlent l'identité et le comportement de l'acteur politique; donc nous allons nous concentrer sur un contexte historique changeant dans lequel les identités et les intérêts sont mutuellement construits à travers un processus d'interaction. Si le sens d'un acte discursif est dépendant d'un contexte, il en résulte logiquement, que si le contexte change, va changer également le sens d'un acte.
 - ◆ Par la suite, les deux organisations se sont retrouvées dans un milieu changeant intersubjectif qui a été transformé à travers l'interaction des différents acteurs. Si au début de la période de l'après-Guerre froide les intérêts de l'OTAN se sont essentiellement dirigés vers un projet de survie, les contradictions de la situation existante, ont mené plutôt vers une relevance institutionnelle que militaire, son objectif central actuel étant la "défense collective". A son tour, l'OSCE est devenue un forum de "Vancouver à Vladivostok" et premier instrument lorsqu'il s'agit de promouvoir les droits de l'homme et la démocratie en Europe.
 - ◆ Après dix années depuis la cessation de la Guerre froide, nous pouvons émettre le jugement de valeur que tant l'OTAN que l'OSCE ont fait preuve d'une extraordinaire mobilité et adaptabilité; autrement dit, elles se sont montrées être des organisations de succès, peut-être les plus de succès à l'heure actuelle.
 - ◆ Avec le PPP ouvert à tous les Etats participant à l'OSCE, va éventuellement l'OTAN devenir OSCE, ou inversement?
 - ◆ Si l'OTAN continue son but déclaré du processus d'élargissement, elle pourrait devenir à long terme une tout autre organisation, c'est-à-dire une organisation globale de sécurité régionale, surtout maintenant lorsqu'il paraît que les missions non-conformes à l'article 5 commencent à devenir les affaires "tête-d'affiche" sur son agenda.
 - ◆ Cette hâte récente d'expansion pourrait être le symptôme d'une OTAN s'efforçant de justifier son existence maintenant que sa mission fondamentale de la Guerre froide d'empêcher l'URSS ait pris fin. Bien que l'OTAN se voit elle-même comme part "d'une architecture de sécurité européenne inclusive qui évolue à travers notre contribution avec les organisations européennes", au fait l'Alliance éclipse plusieurs fonctions de l'OSCE. Par exemple, l'OSCE a déjà établi des tables régionales qui s'adressent aux aspects localisés qui ont été remplacées par le Conseil de Partenariat Euro-atlantique dans la zone baltique, Asie Centrale et Balkans. Ainsi, l'OSCE a été forcée de quitter le Kosovo, au moment du commencement des bombardements, bien que ses observateurs agissent afin de prévenir que des atrocités arrivassent dans la province. L'OTAN n'a pas appuyé les efforts de l'organisation afin d'assurer une solution viable sans utiliser les bombes et d'autres formes de la force militaire.
 - ◆ D'autre part, l'OSCE a l'habileté incomparable de jouer deux fonctions-clés dans le maintien général de la sécurité et de la stabilité en Europe: premièrement, l'OSCE est la plus large organisation globale dans l'architecture de la sécurité européenne, qui inclut non seulement les Etats-Unis, le Canada et la Russie, mais tous les Etats de l'Europe et de l'Asie Centrale; deuxièmement, l'OSCE a un succès sans pareil dans l'accomplissement des solutions diplomatiques et la cessation des conflits. Mais l'OSCE ne peut faciliter une entente pacifique ou même un cesse-feu que si les parties conflictuelles sont disposées à coopérer en relativement bonne foi; si une attitude coopérative est exclue, le mécanisme se trouve pratiquement bloqué, car l'OSCE n'est pas une organisation avec de grandes habilités militaires.
 - ◆ En somme, depuis la fin de la guerre froide, l'OSCE a prouvé son habileté d'aborder


- l'aspect crucial préventive/diplomatique de la sécurité européenne a travers des missions de monitorisation, médiation et d'envoi dans de potentielles zones de conflit; dans ce sens-ci, le bilan de l'OSCE est impressionnant. [des missions de succès de l'OSCE étant celles de Bosnie-Herzégovine, Croatie, Skopje, Georgie, Estonie, Moldavie, Lituanie, Tadjikistan, Ukraine, Kosovo; il y ont eu lieu aussi des activités de terrain, comme par exemple celles de Tchéchénie, Albanie, Belarus ou Nagorno-Karabakh.] Par conséquent, les organisations militaires, comme l'OTAN et l'UEO pourraient être utilisées plus efficacement dans des contextes strictement limités et définis, en tant que bras armés de l'OSCE.
- ◆ Les aspects politiques et internationaux doivent être résolus aussi efficacement que possible; si parfois cela signifie employer l'OTAN, parfois l'OSCE, parfois le Conseil de l'Europe, il veut dire qu'il n'y a pas vraiment une hiérarchie des organisations et qu'elles doivent être utilisées selon le cas échéant.
 - ◆ C'est entièrement possible, quoique peu probable jugeant selon le rôle de l'OTAN dans des conflits récents, que le CPEA pourrait être développé comme un "lien logique" entre l'OSCE et l'OTAN, permettant à tous les Etats intéressés et non seulement aux quelques pouvoirs plus grands d'assumer la responsabilité pour la stabilité européenne. Celui-ci pourrait être développé d'une manière similaire à la relation entre l'Union Européenne et l'OSCE à travers la Politique Etrangère et de Sécurité Commune (PESC).
 - ◆ On a besoin également de fortes OSCE et OTAN, avec l'OSCE en tant que forum primaire, mais si le sens politique échoue, capable de mandater le CPEA d'entamer le pas suivant.
 - ◆ La sécurité au XXI-ème siècle sera ce que nous en ferons; l'avenir peut-être modelé pour autant qu'existent une vision commune, les moyens nécessaires et la solidarité pour les mettre en oeuvre.

LISTE DES SIGLES

- CCNA – Conseil de Coopération Nord-Atlantique
 CCP – Conseil Conjoint Permanent
 CPEA – Conseil de Partenariat Euro-Atlantique
 GFIM – Groupe de Forces Inter-armées multinationales
 MCDS – Mesures de Confiance et de Sécurité
 PPP – Partenariat pour la Paix
 REACT – Equipes d'Assistance et de Coopération Rapides

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LA NOUVELLE EUROPE – LA ROUMANIE

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Les multiples initiatives européennes et nord-atlantiques portent en elles une vision profondément novatrice de la triade Etat-nation-territoire. En outre, chaque Etat est des lors engagé dans une réflexion sur le concept de sécurité commune.

A partir de la mise en commun de leurs ressources minières et sidérurgiques a travers la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier, la France et l'Allemagne de l'après-guerre visaient évidemment la meilleure des politiques d'empêchement de l'agression par une surveillance des le temps de paix du potentiel du voisin. Ce contrôle mutuel et volontaire n'est plus de mise aujourd'hui dans le cadre de la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune de l'Union élargie a 15 membres. Mieux, l'espace Schengen, parce qu'il suppose l'action collective européenne, et donc le dépassement de l'espace national, est comme l'affirme Dominique David¹, *a la fois une manoeuvre politique offensive (aller plus avant dans la constitution d'un espace politique commun) et une manoeuvre technique de défense (avancer dans la coordination des structures répressives au niveau de pertinence internationale exigé par le développement du grand marché européen).*

En fait notre sécurité n'est plus circonscrite a notre territoire. Précisément nos frontières ne sont plus la référence de la réflexion de défense et il convient, désormais, pour assurer la sécurité de notre communauté politique nationale, de savoir reconnaître, identifier et anticiper ce que l'on nomme les «menaces transverses», non classiques, telles que l'économie illicite, le commerce des drogues, le terrorisme etc.

Michel Foucher² observe que le nouvel état du monde paraît marqué par la coexistence de deux types de comportements entre Etats: d'une part, les relations fondées sur les rivalités territoriales et les ambitions contradictoire, et d'autre part, la promotion d'intérêts nationaux dans le cadre d'actions a long terme reposant sur le dialogue et la conciliation entre partenaires. Des sociétés closes occupées a déterminer leurs espaces, leurs frontières et les attributs de leur souveraineté côtoient les sociétés ouvertes, soucieuses de faire partager a l'extérieur les comportements démocratiques internes. Bref, des temps socio-historiques distincts coexistent au sein même des relations inter-étatiques.

De fait, Raymond Aron³ rappelait que *l'Etat territorial était l'unité d'action d'une unité politique, souveraine a l'intérieur de limites tracées sur la carte.* L'Etat territorial et national est l'idéal du XXe siècle. Le conflit yougoslave a de ce fait le caractère anachronique du retour violent au fait national au moment où les Européens sont engagés dans un processus de mise en place d'un système d'Etats nationaux ouverts.

L'Europe entame une réflexion sur les valeurs qui la fondent, notamment la démocratie et le sens de la personne. L'idée de nation, telle qu'elle a été imposée au XIXe siècle a l'Europe tout entière et qui a conduit a exacerber les divisions jusqu'en notre siècle, n'est plus de mise aujourd'hui si, en s'adjoignant la puissance de l'Etat, elle cherche a s'affirmer comme valeur totalisante. La démarche des démocrates-chrétiens qu'étaient Gasperi, Monnet, Schumann n'avait pas d'autre but que mettre en commun, de façon pratique, des valeurs universelles

partagées, en particulier celles relatives à la personne humaine, à ses droits.

L'Europe est aujourd'hui le lieu où peut se faire l'expérience de l'altérité: la perception de l'Etat, du fait national diffère entre un Français et un Allemand. Les débuts de la Communauté Economique Européenne ont été vécus par l'Allemagne comme le cadre de sa démocratisation. Elle était pour nous, ainsi que le souligne Alfred Grosser, un moyen de limiter la liberté d'action allemande, plus «acceptable» qu'un contrôle unilatéral sur la Ruhr. Aussi, ce qui se joue aujourd'hui, est moins la question d'une nationalité européenne que celle de l'identité.

De plus, la question de la souveraineté revêt en France, Etat centralisé par excellence, une importance particulière. En fait la construction européenne ne suit aucun modèle juridique et politique préalable. A cet égard, elle ressortit au volontarisme politique de notre temps, volonté⁴, à la fois de tourner le dos à un déterminisme historique fondé sur l'idéalisme et les nationalismes et de mettre en place les institutions qui favoriseront avec réalisme, la solidarité et l'action.

A un journaliste qui lui demandait son sentiment sur la pérennité de l'idée de nation du fait de la mise en place de l'union économique et monétaire, M. Laurent Fabius, président de l'Assemblée Nationale répondait:

«Nous allons entrer dans le siècle des pays-continentaux. Si nous voulons passer sur la marche du monde, défendre notre niveau de vie, préparer harmonieusement le futur, il faut que nous disposions d'outils à la mesure des problèmes. Voilà pourquoi nous devons passer à l'échelon européen. C'est désormais notre espace pertinent de souveraineté. (...) Tout en renforçant notre coopération monétaire et politique, nous devons réaffirmer le rôle de la nation, ce qui n'a rien à voir avec le chauvinisme. Sur le plan économique, culturel et social, la nation demeure en effet une référence. Les idéologies violentes en éclats, les familles souvent aussi, le monde apparaît menaçant, les peuples ont fréquemment perdu leurs marques: dans ce contexte, un affaiblissement du repère national risquerait de susciter des phénomènes de désorientation, de déshérence insupportable. Je me sens pleinement

Français et européen à la fois. Telle est notre responsabilité: faire l'Europe sans défaire la France»⁵.

Comme en réponse à ce qui précède, nous pouvons observer l'évolution amorcée des 1990 au sujet de la future loi sur la nationalité allemande qui associera droit du sang et droit du sol. Il s'agit là d'une révolution qui bouleverse profondément la perception que les Allemands ont d'eux-mêmes. Car depuis deux cents ans, la nation est comprise comme un fait ethnoculturel. On est Allemand parce qu'on appartient au peuple allemand, dont les caractéristiques ont notamment été forgées par les intellectuels romantiques, qui ont imprégné la pensée politique du XIXe siècle. Dorénavant, on pourra être Allemand parce qu'on est né en Allemagne. Tout comme en France, où la nation est une notion politique centrée sur l'Etat. Des facteurs ont contribué à cette nouvelle approche: la force d'immigration en provenance d'Europe de l'Est; la construction de l'espace communautaire européen; l'émotion profonde qu'ont provoqué plusieurs crimes racistes au milieu des années 90; et l'unification. A travers ce dernier facteur, l'Allemagne a été forcée de résoudre la question qui la minait depuis des siècles: celle de l'étendue de son territoire et du statut des millions d'Allemands vivant plus à l'est. Des lors que l'identité nationale se conjugait plus avec un espace présentement délimité et moins avec la notion de peuple, le droit de la nationalité fondé sur le droit du sang devenait caduc.

Par ailleurs notre monde est confronté à une autre distorsion provoquée par la confrontation d'un système de relations commerciales, traduisons plutôt sur un mode territorial par mondialisation – et qui repose sur un vocabulaire et des codes bien rodés tandis que le politique des Etats n'en est qu'à ses balbutiements et ceux-ci souffrent de se voir déposséder – ou de se déposséder eux-mêmes – de leurs compétences au profit des institutions européennes: la souveraineté. Une exigence qui consiste à détenir en dernier ressort l'autorité sur le territoire. Or, dans la pratique, «on assiste à un dépérissement de l'Etat comme autorité souveraine capable de maintenir l'ordre et la paix à l'intérieur et d'engager la nation dans des actions extérieures et, éventuellement, dans la guerre» constate Pierre Hassner⁶.

Pour lui, il est impératif de «*Maintenir les cultures et les identités nationales dans un cadre postnational commun, (...) l'ultranationalisme étant très souvent une réaction au déclin de l'identité nationale*».

Plus globalement, partout en Europe, force est de constater qu'il y a hiatus entre la pratique commerciale qui obéit à des codes universels très bien rodés et de discours politique qui se recentre volontiers à l'intérieur de barrières nationales. Pourtant Jean-Louis Guigou⁷ observe que nous sommes passés de l'ère industrielle à l'ère de l'information. Au rythme lent d'une évolution économique et politique nationale, a succédé, sur un *tempo* désormais accéléré, une prospérité régionale. L'ordre économique ancien était le résultat du développement des exportations et de la croissance de la production manufacturière. Le nouveau régime, post-industriel, est le fruit d'une capacité d'adaptation que crée des services d'échanges d'information intensifs et générateurs de forte plus-value. Dans ce contexte disparaît l'harmonie entre l'Etat, la nation et son territoire. «*On assiste à la divergence et à la dislocation au profit d'entités supranationales essayant d'organiser leur espace (Union européenne) et d'entités régionales, de beaucoup plus petite taille, qui ont tendance à s'autonomiser*».

Ainsi, les relations tendent à s'ordonner «*autour d'espaces fonctionnels, spécialisés, efficaces comme l'espace rural, l'espace urbain, l'espace agricole, l'espace commerciale, l'espace aérien, l'espace inter-communal, l'espace européen, l'espace de Schengen, l'espace méditerranéen... autant d'espaces fractionnés, spécialisés et disjointes*».

Aussi, les Etats pour se pérenniser devront-ils produire de l'unité et de la cohésion: l'unité politique autour d'un projet collectif, accessible à tous les membres de la communauté sans distinction de classe sociale, d'âge ou d'origine ethnique afin de favoriser la communication. La prospective stratégique – voir loin et grand – constitue un des moyens pour élaborer une vision commune de l'avenir et des territoires autour de laquelle se définit un projet. Cette mission noble et souveraine est dévolue à l'Etat car, selon le mot d'André Malraux, «*Toute civilisation est échange*». Et parce que la ou il n'y a pas de projet commun, il n'y a que des rivalités.

Fondamentalement, il s'agit d'aborder le problème de la fracture entre identité politique (citoyenneté européenne) et identité culturelle (le sentiment d'appartenance nationale). Une question qui se pose en des termes quasi-identiques aux Etats d'Europe médiane dans la mesure où postulant à l'intégration dans les institutions euro-atlantiques, ils affirment vouloir tourner le dos à l'héritage de divisions nées de partages territoriaux de l'entre-deux-guerre.

L'Europe médiane et la Roumanie dans ce contexte nouveau

Notre monde avait pris l'habitude de diviser l'Europe en deux, de part et d'autre du «rideau de fer». Nos parents et grands-parents avaient connu, avant-guerre «Europe centrale»; de la vallée du Rhin au Delta du Danube et aux plaines polonaises. Cette représentation servait volontiers les visées allemandes⁸.

Avec la réunification de l'Allemagne, l'implosion du système communiste qui consacre la fin de la bipolarisation du monde, nous sommes confrontés à la nécessité de renommer cet espace. A la suite d'Yves Lacoste⁹, il nous semble juste de préférer le terme d'Europe médiane en lui donnant une signification nouvelle et de tout autre ampleur. C'est la géo-histoire qui rend compte de cette définition.

«*On tient alors grand compte des conditions naturelles, des grandes configurations du relief, des grandes formations végétales et des données climatiques, et tout autant des facteurs culturels, politiques et démographiques qui poussent et facilitent le déplacement des peuples et des idées sur des vastes territoires, et de tout ce qui y fait obstacle. Dans ces vastes mouvements séculaires, il y a aussi pour les empires de soudaines avancées et des brusques reculs, d'où une série de changements et de mutations brutales, marqués par de brusques exodes de populations, si ce n'est pas des génocides.*

Bref, tout cela s'applique tout à fait à cette vaste portion d'Europe que j'appelle Europe médiane, entre Baltique et Méditerranée. C'est la vaste étendue, que je reconnais à cet ensemble qui permet de se rendre compte de sa grande originalité en termes de géo-histoire. Il faut en effet voir large pour se rendre compte des rivalités entrecroisées des quatre empires (...) qui se sont affrontés dans cette partie de

l'Europa ou, de surcroît, se trouvaient déjà un très grand nombre de peuples plus ou moins différents (par leur langue et leur religion).

Leur développement économique, culturel et politique a été longtemps bloqué ou ralenti du fait de la domination de ces empires étrangers, et c'est au XIXe siècle que chacun de ces multiples peuples dominés a entrepris, de se constituer en nation indépendante, c'est-à-dire avec un Etat national, ce qui a accentué leurs différences culturelles et surtout leurs antagonismes territoriaux, ces rivalités étant d'ailleurs renforcées et manipulées par les rivalités des empires».

La fin de notre siècle voit se développer en Europe un faisceau d'initiatives d'ordre divers: elles se nomment nouveau concept stratégique de l'OTAN, UEO, Partenariat pour la Paix, Accord de libre-échange d'Europe centrale (ALECE ou CEFTA), groupe de Visegrad, Initiative européenne (ICE), Zone de coopération économique de la Mer Noire, Union Européenne, Eurorégions etc. Le XXe siècle s'est structuré autour de deux grands conflits mondiaux et la moitié du siècle a été dominée par un équilibre artificiel fondé sur la terreur. Les responsables de notre temps reconnaissent une urgence et, ensemble, sont amenés à oeuvrer pour l'avènement d'une Europe unie; sans doute peut-on reconnaître la vieille ambition politique d'un Empire d'Occident, ambition partiellement réalisée dans le domaine spirituel par la papauté. De fait, la dynamique européenne procède de ce triple enracinement culturel: l'héritage greco-romain et la réflexion politique qui en découle, le christianisme et sa vision de la personne humaine ainsi que le prolongement naturel que représente l'universalité attribuée à l'affirmation des droits de l'homme. La dynamique européenne aujourd'hui cherche à se dégager de tous les antagonismes historiques¹⁰.

La Roumanie s'engage dans cette dynamique¹¹. Certes lors d'un colloque consacré à la Grande Union roumaine de 1918¹², aussi bien M. Dudu Ionescu, alors secrétaire d'Etat à la Défense, que le Général Constantin Degeratu, chef d'état-major général, ont reconnu les lacunes relatives à la stratégie de sécurité nationale, en précisent par ailleurs que les institutions politiques démocratiques et la société roumaine

devaient parvenir à une compréhension plus fine de la nécessité de planifier les efforts liés à la réforme conformément à la réalité économique, par le biais des lois budgétaires. A cet égard, il faut remarquer que le pays vient juste d'inaugurer une telle réflexion en publiant sa doctrine de sécurité.

La faveur que rencontrent les forces armées d'une façon générale au sein de la population est prolongée par l'intérêt que suscitent au parlement les questions de défense. L'ensemble devant être relativisé compte tenu de la grande austérité du budget de l'Etat.

Il y a tout juste un an, les remaniements au sein du gouvernement et de l'administration de l'Etat, sans omettre le nécessaire positionnement des différents partis de gauche à la suite de la révolte des mineurs de la vallée du Jiu furent un bon critère de maturité de la vie politique à Bucarest. La crise¹³, dont s'est fait l'écho la presse internationale, a eu ce résultat positif qui devra être compté à l'actif de l'ensemble de la société roumaine dite de transition: celui de révéler aux yeux de tous que, rejetant l'engrenage du rapport de force violent et fondé sur la peur, la société se prononçait en faveur de la voie démocratique qui privilégie la négociation entre acteurs représentatifs.

Des lors, la candidature roumaine en vue d'intégrer l'OTAN doit être lue dans le contexte roumain, c'est-à-dire dans une région encore perçue comme une zone de confins; là, l'actualité politique dans l'espace russe¹⁴, les crises dans l'espace yougoslave et la récession économique¹⁵ à l'intérieur du pays sont autant de signaux d'alerte et d'inquiétude qui revêtent une ampleur considérable.

A elle seule, la Roumanie résume la complexité de la démarche visant à définir l'Europe médiane. Sa richesse est dans sa diversité. La Transylvanie et le Banat ancrent la Roumanie dans l'Europe centrale. Le sud du pays, bordé par son delta en font un pays d'Europe danubienne mais quel sens recouvre ce terme sinon encore une idée de diversité du fait des étendues traversées par le grand fleuve? La Roumanie pour ne pas être balkanique et parce qu'elle ne l'est pas totalement, se veut d'Europe du sud-est. Ainsi, la Roumanie apparaît comme cet espace de transition au même titre que l'Europe médiane est, sur une plus vaste échelle,

un espace intermédiaire entre l'Europe du Nord-Ouest et le monde méditerranéen, entre les isthmes de l'Ouest et l'espace continental oriental¹⁶. En Roumanie, on cherche à se définir autrement que comme un pays en marge des Balkans et de l'Europe centrale *stricto sensu*, pour sortir d'une insularité pourtant fondatrice (la langue). La représentation en vogue actuellement est celle d'une centralité dans le continent, d'une plaque tournante de rencontres¹⁷. L'enjeu est de taille car il s'agit d'attirer la construction des grands corridors européens de transport¹⁸. Cette stratégie des carrefours permet d'affirmer la vocation de pays-pivot¹⁹ des relations entre l'Europe et le flanc méridional de l'Eurasie.

L'espace roumain ne se laisse pas appréhender avec des schémas simplificateurs.

Selon Jaffrey Simon, de l'Université Nationale de Défense de Washington:

«L'histoire est très importante pour quiconque souhaite comprendre l'identité, la spécificité de chacun des peuples des Balkans. Il me semble que, dans cette région en particulier, l'histoire tend à emprisonner les habitants dans leur passé. Pour ce qui est de l'avenir, du problème de l'intégration dans l'Union Européenne, l'Union de l'Europe Occidentale ou dans l'OTAN, les différents processus présupposent que soient éliminés les malentendus hérités du passé. Il convient que les peuples de pays voisins entretiennent des relations paisibles, humaines et pleines de compréhension, même si leurs grands-parents ou leurs arrière-grand-parents se sont entretués.

(...) (Pour ce qui concerne le rôle de la Roumanie avec ses voisins, avec les organisations régionales et sous-régionales et, bien entendu, avec les institutions et les organisations telles que l'Union Européenne, l'Union de l'Europe Occidentale, l'OTAN ou le cadre offert par le Partenariat pour la Paix. Dans la mesure où elle réussira à intensifier les liens et la coopération avec ces institutions, tout en mettant aussi l'accent sur les relations de bon voisinage avec d'autres États, alors la Roumanie pourra vraiment devenir un membre de la communauté européenne et ne plus être associée au passé des Balkans)»²⁰.

L'histoire a laissé en Roumanie l'empreinte paradoxale de référents antagoniques: sa foi la

fait se tourner vers Constantinople et sa raison vers Rome. La force d'un tel mouvement aboutit inmanquablement à un déchirement. Un auteur polémiste du début du siècle a bien exprimé cet orgueil national intrinsèque dans un ouvrage intitulé *Byzance après Byzance*²¹. L'Orient tombé aux mains des Ottomans, c'est l'Eglise orthodoxe roumaine qui recueille le précieux dépôt. On peut également reconnaître en filigrane la volonté d'affirmer une voie nationale face au panslavisme du Patriarcat de Moscou.

Cette posture fut un moyen pour le pouvoir communiste de brouiller un peu mieux les cartes: des 1948, la suppression du culte gréco-catholique et l'affectation, après leur confiscation, de tous les biens de ces catholiques unis à Rome au bénéfice de l'Eglise orthodoxe a insensiblement confirmé la société dans le postulat suivant: Roumain = orthodoxe. La religion de la majorité a des lors acquis, de façon simpliste, un quasi statut de nationalité²². Est étranger celui qui est non orthodoxe.

Ce n'est pas anodin si l'on sait que le pays a préservé son identité à travers une problématique de combat avec ses voisins: les Empires russe, ottoman, austro-hongrois, c'est-à-dire la latinité contre le panslavisme, la christianisme contre l'islam, l'orthodoxe contre Rome.

Il convient certes de nuancer cette approche aujourd'hui et, s'il faut bien reconnaître la persistance d'une telle tendance, elle est le fait catégories n'ayant pas encore intégré la capacité réelle du pays à s'ouvrir.

Une autre clef de compréhension nous est donnée par Camil Mureșanu²³.

«L'identification de l'Orthodoxie avec le caractère national roumain a conduit à des conclusions erronées et désastreuses pour notre histoire, en niant la prééminence du substrat latin et son tropisme en direction des valeurs culturelles occidentales. Pour de nombreux siècles, l'Orthodoxie a diffusé l'influence slave et grecque sur notre langue et notre culture et, en dépit de nombreux mérites qu'il convient de lui reconnaître, elle a contribué au retard de notre vie spirituelle en lui imposant un horizon intellectuel statique. Et la persistance du mythe de l'autochtonisme, qu'incarne de façon privilégiée l'Orthodoxie, nous ralentit aujourd'hui encore, comme par le passé, dans

notre aspiration à satisfaire les exigences de l'intégration dans l'Europe».

Mais à l'opposé, le Professeur Andrei Pleșu, alors Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, dénonce l'existence, en Roumanie, d'un courant de pensée aux racines anciennes, qui rend l'orthodoxie responsable de la passivité, de l'inertie, du conservatisme ambiants, tandis que le catholicisme, ou le protestantisme, serait doté de vertus offensives: l'initiative, la volonté de construire, l'esprit d'entreprise²⁴.

Le dialogue désiré par une partie de la hiérarchie de l'Église orthodoxe autocéphale de Roumanie avec les autres religions pratiquées en Roumanie est réel²⁵. Il est le relais d'une volonté explicite de la part des autorités politiques de conduire la Roumanie dans la voie de l'ouverture et du respect entier des droits de l'homme. D'ores et déjà, la visite que le pape a d'emblée placée sous le signe de l'oecuménisme, qualifiée par tous les commentateurs de «retrouvailles fraternelles», peut être considérée comme un élément spirituel de grande portée politique sur le chemin de l'ouverture à l'Ouest. Le succès de cet événement montre non seulement la volonté de Rome d'avancer résolument vers la réconciliation dans une Europe libre désormais de respirer de ses «deux poumons», mais la possibilité d'une synthèse harmonieuse entre les deux cultures. Mieux encore, cette visite, la première du Souverain Pontife en terre orthodoxe, conforme la Roumanie comme pays cadre du dialogue entre l'Orient et l'Occident; la presse roumaine n'hésitait d'ailleurs pas à titrer: «Après Bucarest, Moscou?»

Il ressort, dans la mouvance des convulsions nationalistes qui ont agité l'Europe médiane tout au long des XIX^e et XX^e siècles, des problèmes liés aux groupes ethniques isolés. Mais la Roumanie, dans le respect de ses engagements pris vis à vis du Conseil de l'Europe²⁶, s'est attelée à une politique de reconnaissance des minorités présentes sur son territoire. Les effets de telles mesures ne sont pas immédiatement perceptibles ni contrôlables. Seul le temps permettra d'en mesurer l'efficacité. Pour l'heure, ces populations partagent les difficultés du quotidien dans une période de transition qui dure et tend à exacerber les ressentiments mutuels.

Ainsi que le souligne Catherine Durandin²⁷, «c'est à l'Europe que s'adresse le questionnement roumain, à la difficulté des Européens à s'accorder une définition de la minorité nationale et sur le rapport entre les droits de l'homme et ceux des minorités. Si les questions posées sont bonnes parce qu'elles nécessitent des réponses appropriées sur la conception de l'État, de sa souveraineté, du contrat de citoyenneté, il n'en demeure pas moins que Bucarest prend acte d'une incertitude des rapports de force et des équilibres idéologiques à l'échelle européenne pour passer comme modèle de stabilité et de respect de l'État-nation».

Car la dynamique de la réconciliation implique dans la longue durée les sociétés et se distingue de celle des négociations diplomatiques, en dépit de l'engagement en ce sens des médiateurs occidentaux, eux-mêmes confrontés de près à des forces centrifuges: rappelons à titre d'exemple le cas de la Lombardie, de l'Irlande, de la Catalogne ou de la Belgique²⁸.

Pourtant dans le même esprit qui préside à la rénovation des liens entre ethnies naguère hostiles, on voit fleurir les projets de coopération entre régions voisines. La connaissance mutuelle, selon les recommandations du Conseil de l'Europe et conformément à celles du Conseil Européen de Copenhague en 1990, travaille à fonder une société nouvelle dans cette partie d'Europe. Selon Antonela Capelle-Pogăcean²⁹, «la thématique minoritaire (est désormais) rattachée à une problématique plus vaste, celle de la démocratisation de la société roumaine dans son ensemble (avec le souci) de distinguer l'autonomie culturelle à base ethnique de celle, territoriale, fondée sur la subsidiarité et la décentralisation, visant par conséquent l'ensemble du territoire national».

Quant à la coopération militaire roumano-hongroise, elle a précédé un dispositif plus politique issu du «Traité d'entente, de coopération et de bon voisinage»³⁰ roumano-hongrois de 1996. Ce traité conclu sous la présidence Iliescu dans le contexte des élections qui ont porté l'actuelle majorité démocrate-chrétienne au pouvoir, est en soi révélateur d'une volonté, par le fait qu'il met un terme à toute revendication territoriale entre les deux États et

parce qu'il y est fait renonciation de toute ingérence dans les affaires intérieures relatives aux minorités.

L'avance des militaires est de bon augure. Citons en outre la création d'un bataillon mixte roumano-hongrois qui s'inscrit parfaitement dans la démarche de candidature dans l'OTAN tant de la Hongrie, accueillie dès la première vague, que de la Roumanie. Le rythme d'entraînement de cette unité originale, à l'image de la brigade franco-allemande, sera fonction du budget qui lui sera alloué. Ce qui confirmera la valeur hautement symbolique de l'existence de ce bataillon.

Les coopérations transfrontalières³¹ révèlent le pragmatisme avec lequel est envisagée la politique d'ouverture requise dans une démarche en direction des institutions euro-atlantiques. Le principe de subsidiarité trouve la matière à s'exprimer.

Michel Foucher³² invite à une intéressante réflexion sur la portion de territoire que constituent les frontières. Les régions frontalières européennes, par endroit désertiques et du ressort du ministère de la Défense, sont ailleurs, habitées par d'importantes minorités qui cherchent à retrouver une identité au-delà des frontières.

La période 1989-1996 a présenté en Europe médiane un caractère exceptionnel concernant l'évolution des espaces frontaliers. Une multitude de concepts nouveaux, comme «politique extérieure locale» ou «biorégionalisme» tente de répondre aux défis posés par l'effondrement des systèmes socialistes, l'unification allemande et la recherche d'un nouvel équilibre européen.

Alors que les nouveaux États retrouvent leur autonomie et leur identité à l'intérieur de leurs frontières historiques plusieurs régions affirment des identités culturelles et sociales spécifiques. Ces régions dont les habitants sont souvent des minorités qui s'identifient ou s'opposent à l'État national. Dans cette Europe où chaque camp a cherché à survaloriser les éléments de sa culture, l'un et l'autre tendus par la question nationale ou produisant un discours enfermé dans une dialectique identitaire en fonction de satisfactions ou de revanches nationales, on a longtemps constaté l'absence de toute réflexion sur la citoyenneté. Le traité évoqué ci-dessus constitue, à ce titre, une approche satisfaisante.

De plus, les régions frontalières sont créditées d'une ouverture et d'une flexibilité plus grandes, d'une capacité d'innovation plus grande en matière économique et, à ce titre, elles attirent des capitaux étrangers. De front, séparation entre deux antagonismes, ressortissant à l'action militaire, la frontière est appelée à devenir, à l'intérieur d'un espace pacifié et ordonné, un lieu d'échange, de coopération, producteur de richesses.

Mieux, au début des années 90, le régionalisme s'affirme en tant que moyen d'identification, ou plutôt, en tant que moyen d'enracinement sur un fond d'histoire commune partagée même s'il a été conflictuel. Les spécialistes mettent désormais l'accent sur l'opposition entre la pratique régionaliste de la logique de la Guerre froide³³, ou région = territoire administratif, et l'apparition des «régionalismes organiques et spontanés». Les initiatives en Europe médiane peuvent s'inspirer de cette expérience. Alors que la Roumanie entre progressivement dans cette démarche³⁴, les coopérations aux frontières de la Hongrie foisonnent. Par exemple, l'Eurorégion des Carpates³⁵, une des huit eurorégions, a été créée sur l'initiative des autorités locales. L'idée est due à un groupe de géographes des pays du groupe de Visegrad³⁶ et de Roumanie.

À l'heure où s'exerce à l'Est un tropisme occidental évident combiné à une difficulté réelle l'identité politique de l'Europe³⁷, les eurorégions constituent une réponse à la question fondamentale relative à l'identité et à la citoyenneté, non plus vécue comme alimentant les divisions interethniques et autres conflits, mais tout au contraire, lieux de reconnaissance et de communication, d'échanges culturels aptes à démultiplier les ressources. Parce qu'à l'heure de la mondialisation, la rationalité de l'État-nation parvient de plus en plus difficilement à être planétaire. Il faut donc réfléchir à des mécanismes d'intégration³⁸ plus vastes.

Pour l'État roumain, une fois encore, la volonté politique exige d'être soutenue par des moyens financiers qui, pour l'heure, lui font cruellement défaut.

Enfin, le renforcement des liens avec l'Union Européenne reste problématique, pour des raisons multiples, pas seulement économiques;

aussi la coopération régionale s'inscrit dans cette période transitoire. Les autorités roumaines elles-mêmes le reconnaissent: le simple saut de l'autonomie nationale, récemment acquise et chèrement gagnée, a une intégration globale n'est pas envisageable. Une forme quelconque de régionalisme est nécessaire. C'est pourquoi un redécoupage territorial est à l'étude visant à renforcer les institutions de l'administration décentralisée³⁹. Il s'agit d'un projet coûteux qui exigera le soutien financier européen dans le cadre des investissements PHARE.

Nous retrouvons les paramètres explicitant la démarche roumaine dans l'intervention relative à l'espace balkanique de M. Catalin Harnagea:

«Nous considérons que au lieu de ce qu'on a coutume de nommer divergence de civilisation, au lieu de la fausse opposition catholicisme-orthodoxie, au lieu de cette grande crainte liée à l'incompatibilité entre chrétiens et musulmans, au lieu des terribles rivalités entre l'Est et l'Ouest, il faudrait que les efforts se concentrent sur une coopération étroite, constructive, dans le respect absolu de la spécificité de chacun, pour construire la Nouvelle Europe, dans laquelle les Balkans, fidèles aux valeurs communes de la démocratie pluraliste, des droits de l'homme et de l'économie de marché, peuvent devenir une zone de stabilité, de sécurité et de prospérité»⁴⁰.

Le discours d'investiture⁴¹ du Président Constantinescu est révélateur de cette nouvelle posture, parallèlement à un attachement très ferme à l'ambition nationale qui est devenue l'intégration de la Roumanie dans les structures euro-atlantiques:

«Si nous ne démontrons pas notre capacité à coopérer effectivement avec nos voisins, qui resteront, nos partenaires, même après l'intégration européenne, nos chances de rejoindre les structures européennes seront nulles».

À ce jour, la Roumanie a mis un point d'honneur à parfaire son discours en vue de l'intégration. Rappelant comment son pays a été

détourné de la voie démocratique voilà cinquante ans, le Président Constantinescu⁴² souligne que l'expérience ainsi acquise, à la fois complexe, dramatique et profitable, peut être mise au service de l'idéal européen, fondé sur la coopération et le partenariat. Il ajoute:

«Pour la Roumanie, l'isolement est désormais devenu un fantôme du passé. Nous construisons maintenant le présent et l'avenir à travers l'intégration et la coopération, une intégration et une coopération toujours plus actives, toujours plus responsables.

(...) Notre approche se veut réaliste. Nous croyons que la Roumanie n'a rien à craindre d'autres nations. Bien au contraire, nous pensons que lorsque la démocratie triomphera dans le monde entier, le mot guerre disparaîtra de notre vocabulaire. C'est précisément pour cette raison que nous ne souhaitons pas que notre candidature comme membre de l'OTAN soit interprétée comme un appel au secours en vue de confier à d'autre la responsabilité de notre défense».

Au travers de l'actualité des initiatives européennes et notamment l'émergence d'un débat relatif à la citoyenneté et de son corollaire qui est la définition d'une Europe des régions préservant la cohésion interne des États, nous avons tenté d'esquisser les réalités roumaines. C'est dans le contexte de ce questionnement européen et de ce pertinence d'une nouvelle Europe que la Roumanie exprime aujourd'hui sa volonté d'ancrage à l'Occident.

À la croisée des chemins, sans méconnaître ses pesanteurs, elle se doit de valoriser ses atouts, riche non pas de ce qu'elle chercherait à défendre jalousement mais de ce qu'elle est prête à partager. Tirant profit de sa démarche, tandis qu'elle se considère encore comme un pays de confins, alors ce pays européen, riverain de la Mer Noire, pourra être le pays-pivot, acteur de réconciliation dont la sécurité de la nouvelle Europe a besoin.


1. Dominique David, chargé de mission auprès du directeur de l'IFRI, professeur à l'ESM de Saint-Cyr, dans *Politique étrangère: L'ampleur du doute*.
2. Michel Foucher, directeur de l'Observatoire européen de géopolitique dans la revue *Politique étrangère: La fin de la géopolitique? Réflexion géographiques sur la grammaire des puissances*.

3. *Démocratie et totalitarisme* (1965).
4. *Le monde especes et systemes*, de Marie-Françoise Durand, Jacques Lévy, Denis Retailé, notamment le chapitre *Europe(s)*.
5. Enjeux – Les échos nr. 135 – avril 1998. Dossier: *Le choc de l'Euro*.
6. *Entre Union et nations, l'Etat en Europe*, ouvrage collectif sous la direction d'Anne-Marie Le Gloannec, Presses de Sciences po.
7. Jean-Louis Guigou, directeur a la Délégation a l'Aménagement du Territoire et a l'Action Régionale (DATAR) lors d'une conférence prononcée a l'Université de Rabat (avril 1996). *Futuribles* numéro de septembre 1996.
8. Cette vision de la Mitteleuropa était aussi partagée par le géographe français Emmanuel de Martonne, conseiller de Georges Clemenceau pour les affaires de frontieres en Europe centrale, qui eur un rôle de premier plan au secrétariat du Comité d'études pour la préparation de la Conférence de la Paix de février 1917 a mars 1919. Il en est résulté notamment le nouveau tracé des frontieres de Roumanie en réponse a la volonté de démanteler l'Empire austro-hongrois.
9. *Géohistoire de l'Europe médiane*. La Découverte/Livres Hérodote, sous la direction de Béatrice Giblin et Yves Lacoste, 1998.
10. *L'autre Europe* de Jacques Rupnik 1990. Crise et fin du communisme. Avoir pour objectif a l'horizon 1992, une forteresse Europe serait néfaste pour la transition a l'Est, mais a terme aussi pour la coésion de la Communauté européenne elle-meme. L'Europe occidentale ne pourrait se protéger par un nouveau «rideau de fer», communautaire ou autre, des convulsions de l'autre Europe. Plus récemment (*op. cit.*, note 6) Pierre Hassner écrit: «La première condition de la sécurité occidentale est l'évolution pacifique de l'Est vers la démocratie».
11. *Courrier des Pays de l'Est*, nr. 341 – juillet 1998. Consulter notamment les tableaux relatifs aux sous-ensembles régionaux post-CAEM. La Roumanie appartient a 3 unions régionales, outre les accords signés avec l'Union Européenne. Précisons que ZCEMN et ICES ont davantage pour la coopération que le libre échange. La Roumanie s'est jointe a la Croatie et a la Slovénie dans de l'ALECS. Accord de libre échange Croatie-Slovénie. Enfin, pour ce qui est de la Zone de coopération économique de la Mer Noire, on en doit pas ignorer qu'elle s'ouvre vers des projets civilo-militaires.
12. Colloque anniversaire de la *Grande Union roumaine de 1918 – Dimensions et significations* organisé par l'institutut pour la politique de Défense et d'Histoire militaire. Bucarest 26-27 novembre 1998.
13. La colère des mineurs en janvier 1999 peut être interprété comme une conséquence de la situation difficile de l'économie roumaine. Une breve analyse peut en être faite.
 - 1° Cette «grande marche» vers Bucarest illustre le choc de deux temps socio-historiques.
 - 2° derrière ce groupe, manipulé ou non, porteur de revendications qui le dépassent, se profile certes, bien d'autres enjeux exclusivement politiques et sociétaux – et non plus économiques ou salariaux –.
 Pourtant, force est de constater que les grands pouvoirs en Roumanie se sont révélés non seulement stables, mais actifs et matures: le gouvernement dans son approche du probleme, le parlement et partie de la classe politique, mais également les médias comme relais d'information destinée a la société civile.
14. La Roumanie, pour des raisons évidentes, ne peut rester indifférente aux événements qui se déroulent chez son voisin russe. La géopolitique de Mackinder peut ici être revisitée. La réticence russe devant l'extension de l'OTAN s'explique alors par la persistance de l'illusion impériale qui retarde la mise en place en Russie d'un systeme moderne et démocratique. Les initiatives euro-atlantiques se révèlent un test facilitant le passage de l'aspiration impériale a l'insertion dans le dispositif européen comme un État «normal». Alors, l'accueil des anciens pays satellites dans une OTAN élargie pourra être compris, non plus comme une extension offensive, mais comme un basculement vers l'Oust des démocraties d'Europe médiane.

On peut également se reporter au dossier publié par la *Revue de l'OTAN*, nr. 3 – mai-jouin 1997: *La relation OTAN – Russie, élément-clef de la sécurité européenne*, notamment *Mythes et illusion: l'optique russe* (p. 11-15) de Tatiana Parkhalina, de l'Académie des Sciences de Russie.
15. Selon les estimations produites par les institutions internationales, la Roumanie serait le seul pays d'Europe centrale et orientale présentant une diminution du PIB d'environ – 2,8%. (Etudes Transition Report de la BERD, FMI, Economist Intelligence Unit et Vienna Institute. par ailleurs, la République Tchèque est qualifié du taux de progres le plus faible de la zone avec +0,9%; en revanche, la Bulgarie enregistrerait une croissance de +3,1%. Il est néanmoins ordinaire de distinguer les résultats de l'économie officielle, déficitaires, et ceux de l'économie non officielle qui, eux, enregistre un large taux de croissance.
16. Il est intéressant ce confronter cette approche géographique a celle proposée dans *Revue de Défense Nationale* 1997: *Un axe latin: une nécessité pour la défense européenne*, par Jean-Michel Bréjot. Sans faire de la référence culturelle un absolu géostratégique au sein des alliances, la présence de la Roumanie s'impose tout naturellement en vue du rapprochement et de la cohésion des forces européennes.
17. Cité par Michel Foucher, *op. cit.* Dan Berindei, *Romanian Journal of International Affairs*, vol. II, 4/1996.

18. Revue *Commentaire* nr. 83 – automne 98: *Les transports mondiaux*.
19. Cf. Les travaux de Matei Cazacu, chercheur au CNRS. Etudes sur le Danube 1998.
Consulter également. *La Documentation photographique*, février 1999: *L'Europe médiane*.
20. Dr. Jeffrey Simon, chercheur à l'institut pour les Etudes Stratégiques Nationales de l'Université Nationale de Défense de Washington. Cité par *Revue d'Histoire Militaire* 4(50) 1998.
21. Nicolae Iorga (1905).
«Le roumanisme orthodoxe ou l'orthodoxie roumaine», c'est ce qu'exprime et défend en 1919 Miron Cristea, premier patriarche orthodoxe et sénateur de la Grande Roumanie, grande figure politique de l'entre-deux-guerres.
22. Il est surtout intéressant de constater que son discours est cité et commenté dans la Revue d'Histoire Militaire RIM nr. 6(52) 1998: *Tenons compte de la tradition de l'Eglise orthodoxe*.
23. *Bulletin of the Center for Transylvanian Studies*, Volume VI, nr.1, 1997.
24. Intervention tirée du quotidien *Curentul* (4 septembre 1998): *Dérapages sur le chemin de l'oecuménisme*.
Rappelant que la même orthodoxie n'a pas empêché la Grèce d'intégrer l'Union Européenne, M. Pleșu ajoute: *L'Europe vers laquelle nous nous dirigeons doit être aussi une nouvelle Europe. Il nous faudra, en d'autres termes, la réinventer, la façonner ensemble avec audace et confiance dans l'avenir. L'idée européenne doit être enrichie, non pas restaurée comme une pièce de musée. L'esprit européen ne nous donne pas le droit d'être des adorateurs d'une variante traditionnelle de l'Europe, qui serait achevée. La Roumanie croit que la nouvelle recette européenne n'aura pas assez de saveur s'il lui manque des ingrédients des vertus nationales et régionales et donc les arômes roumains».*
25. A cet égard, il convient de mentionner la réunion à Bucarest les 30 et 31 août 1998 sous le vocable: *La Paix est le nom de Dieu – Hommes et religions*. En juillet, le Premier Ministre, lors d'une visite à Rome, exprimait au Pape Jean-Paul II le souhait du Président Constantinescu, au nom du le voir entreprendre une visite en Roumanie. Le Patriarche Teoctist, qui préside aux destinées de l'Église orthodoxe roumaine depuis plus de vingt ans – hormis une courte interruption au moment de l'épisode révolutionnaire de 1989 – doit tenir compte des réactions de son synode et de celles du Patriarcat de Moscou. Le 1^{er} septembre, l'Église orthodoxe entrait dans un nouveau temps liturgique pour une année entière. Le 28 octobre 1998 était officiellement rétabli le dialogue entre l'Église orthodoxe roumaine et l'Église gréco-catholique.
26. Cf. recommandation 1901 du Conseil de l'Europe. Convention-cadre pour la protection des minorités nationales signée entre les gouvernements de Bucarest et de Budapest.
27. Revue *Politique étrangère*, n°2/96: *Roumanie/Hongrie: peut-il y avoir réconciliation?*
28. Etat fédéral, composé de communautés et de régions, depuis la réforme constitutionnelle de 1993.
29. Diplômée de l'INALCO dans *Politique étrangère* n°1/97: *Hongrie/Roumanie: rivalités et synergies dans la marche vers l'Europe*.
30. Traité suivi par un accord de réconciliation et de partenariat.
Dans la revue *Balkanologie*, vol. 1, n°2 – décembre 1997 (édité par Homo Balkanicus): *Danube détente: Romania's reconciliation with Hungary after 1996*. Par Tom Gallagher, professeur d'Ethnic Conflict and Peace à l'Université de Bradford.
31. Cf. *Courrier des Pays de l'Est*, n°413 – octobre 1996.
Dans ce contexte, les acteurs «subnationaux», provinces, régions, départements, villes et communes, sont appelées à jouer un rôle de plus en plus grand dans les relations internationales: une diplomatie régionale apparaît prenant en charge les problèmes transfrontaliers, et cela par une coopération informelle ou des accords tacites entre autorités locales de deux Etats.
L'Eurorégion germano-néerlandaise mise en place en 1958 et déclarée modèle de la coopération locale et régionale par l'UE, a servi d'exemple à l'établissement des eurorégions en Europe centrale et orientale après 1989.
Le régionalisme transfrontalier est représenté au niveau de l'UE par l'ARFE, l'Association des Régions Frontalières Européennes, fondées en 1971 et émanant d'autorités locales. En liaison avec la Commission Européenne et le Conseil de l'Europe, elle joue un rôle actif dans les débats européens sur les régions et les problèmes qui se posent aux frontières intérieures de l'UE.
32. *Fronts et frontière*.
33. Une logique qui prend sa source dans les conflits d'émancipation nationalistes qui ont surgi tout au long du XIX^e siècle, particulièrement dans le monde clos qu'est l'Europe médiane.
34. Une approche progressive et qui n'est pas sans difficulté comme peut le laisser entrevoir l'article par le Lieutenant-colonel Ion Munteanu. *L'Etat national unitaire roumain – Histoire et réalité* dans la *Revue d'Histoire Militaire* (*op. cit.*, p. 17-21).
35. En 1994, a été créée une Fondation internationale à vocation régionale et sa consacrant en particulier aux régions frontalières (FDCE, Fund for the Development of the Carpathian Euroregion). Au-delà de la promotion de la démocratie locale et de la société civile, elle s'est assignée pour mission de promouvoir des coopérations transfrontalières intersectorielles.

36. Accord signé le 15 février 1991 entre Pologne, Hongrie, République Tchèque et Slovaquie, à l'origine de l'accord de Libre-échange centre-européen (CEFTA).
37. *Le bouleversement du monde Géopolitique du XXI siècle* de Marisol Touraine.
38. Cette coopération régionale se fonde sur un vécu et des affinités historiques: la Mitteleuropa, espace de coexistence entre toutes les nationalités, est aujourd'hui encore une réalité. L'Empire des Habsburg donne son identité à l'Europe centrale au point que François FEJTO peut écrire:
«Une certaine nostalgie lie davantage et plus sûrement les peuples du Bassin danubien que les frontières qui les separent».
Quant à l'Allemagne qui a tiré les leçons de la réunification, le croix de Berlin, sans dissocier le couple franco-allemand, souligne clairement sa volonté de réorientation politique et économique autour de l'Europe médiane, zone naturelle de son action.
39. Courrier des Pays de l'Est, déc. 1998.
40. M. Catalin Harnagea, Directeur du Service roumain de Renseignements Extérieurs. (ndr. équivalent de la DGSE) dans *Revue d'Histoire Militaire* 4(50) 1998: *Événement : Séminaire international «Sources d'insécurité dans les Balkans, Risques et conflits»*.
41. Discours prononcé en décembre 1996 devant le Parlement roumain.
42. Allocution au Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord, à Bruxelles, le 4 février 1997.



IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION AND REGIONALISM ON THE GOOD NEIGHBORLY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATES

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Good neighborhood, as a principle of the international relations, as well as an element of the theory and analysis of politico-diplomatic realities, at regional or global level, has been a permanent concern for statesmen, analysts or public opinion. The meaning of good neighborhood has been differently perceived and understood from epoch to epoch in the modern evolution of states¹.

After the collapse of the socialist system and the end of the Cold War, in Eastern and Central Europe, a process of reestablishment of the relations began between former actors of the bipolar world² or between the new actors appeared on the history scene as a result of the implosion of the former soviet empire³ and disintegration of former Yugoslavia. New states appeared on the political stage over the ruins of former soviet empire, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, or some other actors disappeared, if we take into account the German unification. Good neighborly relationship that should have appeared between these countries was hit especially by frontier litigation or ethnic and religious contradictions. Bloody wars took place on the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia territories. These conflicts undermined the illusion of a post Cold War world where to prevail good neighborly relationship.

The existence of important national minorities in several neighbor states, such as: Hungarians in Croatia, Slovenia, Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine; Romanians in Hungary, Serbia, Ukraine; Slavs in Hungary, Romania, led to the revitalization of a nationalist extremist movement, without weight in the political

landscape of these countries, but with explosive outbursts that could hit the good neighborly relationship.

An example of right understanding of the evolution direction of post Cold War politico-diplomatic events in Europe, was the establishment of the Visegrad Group. Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia very quickly found a way to pass over what separated them and combine their efforts to integrate in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. This resettlement process is influenced, in most specialists' view, by two complementary but also somehow antagonistic processes: globalization and regionalism!

For a better understanding of the impact of globalization and regionalism on the good neighborly relationship, we think it is necessary to add some conceptual and methodological specifications in order to discern its causes and forms in which today's mega-tendencies of the political world manifest themselves.

The globalization concept has a wide circulation⁴, but concerns about the accuracy of its meaning were not at the same extent. The causes of this situation are similar to those that produced much confusion in the field of concepts within the social and humanistic disciplines: the interests of those who used it. Let's see the extremes only: the globalization defenders emphasize the increase of profit and economic efficiency as a result of financial market globalization, border control abolition, or competition principle application at planetary level, and, on the other hand, the globalization opponents describe globalization as a new form

of imperialism, domination, or ignoring the fundamental human rights. We believe that in both positions there are also sufficient truth elements, but the fervor which they faced generated confusions and even contradictions.

We also cannot ignore a less considered aspect of globalization that could moderate many apologies. Globalization, which in fact is an older phenomenon, came back into reality the moment in which force projection became possible anywhere in the world. During the Cold War, such an action would have risked immediate global destabilizations. But we shouldn't cherish illusions. Force projection will generate, sooner or later, similar reactions, and, in such a case, who can tell how globalization will evolve?

F. Fukuyama, global liberalism partisan, believes that "the global economy did not generalized yet and globalization is still at money market level; most institutions, commerce especially, are still regional; most companies are predominantly national and governments remain very national etc."⁵

Some specialists consider regionalism as a type of relations resulted from a simple reflection effect of the economic globalization⁶. Supporters of this model of international relations believe that regionalism, will be more important than globalization phenomenon. They affirm that, in the future, three large regions will be structured, each with an incontestable leader: the Asia-Pacific region with Japan as leader, the Western Hemisphere with the U.S.A. as leader, and the European Block with France-Germany axis.

Today it's difficult to say which of the models will be victorious, however one thing is sure: good neighborly relationship will become more and more important in the regional policy, but it will not evolve within its classic paradigm under the circumstances of the reconsideration of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity concepts. Economic, political integrity within a regional union, such as E.U., for example, or a NATO-type politico-military organization, implies giving up, at different degrees, some prerogatives of the political, economic and military sovereignty. On the other hand, the development of the politico-military events in Romania's immediate neighborhood demonstrates that when a political regime

flagrantly violates the fundamental human rights, the international community intervenes to restore these rights⁷.

Creating the community space in Europe through the extension of political, economic and security structures implies not only a "market without frontiers"⁸ but also the existence of a good neighborly relationship. Integration is a phenomenon that manifests itself in the world, and Romania cannot avoid it and therefore proceeds more and more in the direction of the integration within E.U. This is an awareness of the fact that Romania cannot solve its problems by itself because these problems acquire a more international characteristic, and their solving implies cooperation between states. Hence, essentially, cooperation and good neighborly relationship in a broad sense are the key to success.

Although the creation of a space without internal borders within EEC was planned, even before the fall of the "Iron Curtain", through the Unique Act signed on 28 February 1987 in Luxembourg, this became possible only about a decade later when the "Schengen Space" was created. Natural frontiers, though they have become more transparent, have not disappeared for political reasons (border control appears as a major prerogative of the state, the reflex of its sovereignty), fiscal reasons (each state has its own indirect taxes; keeping the borders allows the state to take the national value-added tax for entering its territory), and public security reasons (the products entering a territory are in accordance with the national health regulations). It is difficult to say today when and how frontiers could disappear in Europe⁹. Therefore, good neighborly relations will continue to exist as a basic principle of the relations between states and as a rule of conduct for the European actors.

Romania, after 1989, in spite of all vacillations and sometimes awkwardness made in the European and world diplomacy¹⁰, has consistently acted to strengthen the good neighborly relations with all states, excepting those in which an authoritative or dictatorial regime manifested at one time. It is the case of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia after the outbreak of the Kosovo crisis. Opinions regarding our position on the R.F. of Yugoslavia and Bosnian crisis are divided, especially in the public opinion,

however, at the political class level, there were especially nuances, not essential differences.

Our position on the Kosovo crisis led undoubtedly to a coolness of our neighborly relations with the regime of President Milosevic and created a dilemma for some analysts¹¹. The dilemma which NATO intervention in Kosovo and its consequences put to us is as old as the hills: we can unilaterally renounce cooperation and take advantages in the short-term, or we can continue to cooperate in order to take greater advantages in the long-term. From a theoretical point of view, it is recommendable to renounce cooperation if you have no intention to maintain the relationship with the other partners. In this case, Romania would get economic advantages from restoring the suspended relations with Yugoslav firms and benefit from the stability achieved by KFOR in the region and from the democratization of Yugoslavia in the eventuality that Milosevic regime would collapse. It would be, in other words, "a sly country"¹². On the contrary, maintaining cooperation would be beneficial in case there is the wish to continue the relationship with the other partners in the future, because there are much more advantages in the long-term than those in the short-term, the latter being diminished from the beginning by the disadvantages of being considered an unreliable partner.

Concretely, even if Romania was not being promised admittance to the Euro-Atlantic structures as a reward for cooperation, it proved, in this case, adherence to the standards and principles of these structures, and unity of interests with the western states. Thus, Romania has become a reliable partner for the West, considerably increasing its opportunities to get advantages in the long-term out of the economic, political and military cooperation with the Euro-Atlantic structures. For example, at political level, the clear option on NATO side during the war in Yugoslavia incontestably counted for Romania and this could be seen at Helsinki Summit on 10-11 December 1999.

Now we'll point out only some consequences of globalization on the good neighborly relations between Romania and its Balkan neighbors.

As it is known, in this area the dissolution of the former security architecture, the trends

towards globalization and regionalism, and the extension of the new security institutions were made in extremely difficult conditions, crises, wars, ethnic and religious conflicts that left their mark on these states, including Romania.

Romania, devoted to its traditional good neighbor policy and interested in the process of integration in European and Euro-Atlantic structures as well, has maintained and developed friendship relations and fruitful cooperation with all Balkan states. The Balkan cooperation was not a purpose in itself, but a way of economic and social development for each state, a sure and essential way to build a peace and security system in the region, the strengthening of cooperation in southeastern Europe meaning not a security regionalization, an isolation of Balkan area from the European security theater¹³.

Meanwhile, Romania has insistently acted for the establishment of a proper relationship framework to support a rapid integration process of the region within the Euro-Atlantic organisms, as a form to achieve the Europe's political and economic development unity and secure stability and cooperation prospects for the states involved.

Permanently maintaining the diplomatic relations with all Balkan states represented a secure way to make efficient an intense bi- and multilateral Balkan cooperation, combine efforts in order to arrive at a consensus on strengthening the mutual confidence and respect climate. Dialogue and cooperation, with multilateral implications, materialized in a thick network of political, economic and other nature documents, constituted the logic of Romania's cooperation policy. It permanently insisted upon the necessity that all Balkan countries participate in the actions to be taken, their solid preparing, in order to effectively contribute to clarify positions and differences, diminish tensions, stimulate and diversify bi- and multilateral relations. The President, Parliament, Government, other national institutions including the army, in a common effort, contributed to this ample activity.

As a result of the constructive, active and in the same time equidistant characteristic of the Romanian foreign policy towards all perturbing factors in the Balkan area, Romania has won a convincing position, of respect and esteem, among the states in the area. Through its direct involvement, Romania has offered, in lieu of

confrontation, an important key to improve the interbalkan climate.

In the relationship with ex-Yugoslav states, Romania has promoted an equal approach policy, which permitted to continue the traditional cooperation relations with ex-Yugoslavia and their translation to each new entity. This position favors our country's contribution to the process of political solving of the open crisis in the area. In this context it is also included Romania's participation in peacekeeping operations within IFOR, SFOR, and actions organized to normalize the social life in Albania, within "ALBA" mission.

In the effort to revive the Balkan cooperation, which represents an integration means of Balkan states into Euro-Atlantic organisms, a secure way for building a peace and security system in the region, Romania offered numerous services, materialized at political, economic, scientific and cultural level¹⁴.

These services aimed to eliminate mistrust, deformed perceptions, make mutual information exchanges, bilateral clarifications and consultations on various aspects of good neighborhood and peace consolidation. The principles of Paris Charter for a new Europe, the commitments under the aegis of OSCE for the promotion of a wider opening and transparency in the military activity, and the provisions of Vienna Agreement on the measures to increase confidence and security¹⁵. For example, the amplification of contacts between Balkan armed forces commands, participation in joint exercises, exchange of experience, documentation visits etc., and the activities within the Partnership for Peace contributed to the optimization of cooperation in the military field.

"Romania - Romania's President said - is acting to intensify military cooperation with neighbor countries, the latest action in this sense being Romania's participation in the Multinational Peace Force in Southeastern Europe"¹⁶.

The actions taken in the Balkan cooperation field opened a very positive perspective. Nevertheless, Yugoslav crisis, aggressive nationalism, religious, ethnic and territorial tensions slowed down the successful course of Balkan multilateral cooperation. Many initiatives, such as the convocation in August 1991 of a Balkan extraordinary ministerial conference on the enhancement of security and stability in the area,

an International Forum on the Balkans (January 1992), the establishment of the Balkan Economic Union (August 1992) etc., were not finalized¹⁷.

Therefore the question: Is it possible that cooperation in the Balkans have a larger dimension in the future? In the present geopolitical context, extremely fluid, that could generate dangerous situations for the subregional and even global security, it is not easy to give a clear answer. But we consider that there are still sufficient factors that can plead for an affirmative answer, such as:

- the Balkan cultural identity, conceived as an aggregate of material and spiritual values, the common patrimony of traditions and aspirations throughout the centuries;
- the necessity to secure the individual and collective security of the Balkan countries and to increase mutual confidence;
- belonging to the group of small and medium-sized states with similar economic potential and complementary interests;
- Balkan states' responsibility for the Balkans future and increasing stability in the region;
- the states' wish to ensure integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures;
- the will to capitalize the resources and materials existent in each country;
- increase living and civilization standards of each state in the area;
- role of the Balkans as a turn-table between northern, southern, eastern and western Europe on one side, and Middle East and Asia on the other side.

The embargo and economic blockade imposed by the UN Security Council against Serbia and Montenegro resulted in dysfunctions in the Balkan bi- and multilateral relations, strangled navigation on the Danube in a moment in which this river, through the Danube-Black Sea and Main-Rhine Canals, could become the most important navigation artery for both riverside and Balkan countries¹⁸.

There are also other disturbing factors, such as:

- Litigations regarding territorial, ethnic, and religious aspects between some Balkan states;
- Traditional confrontation between the great powers' interests in the Balkans;
- The appearance of new states, as a result of Yugoslavia's dismemberment, confronted with political and economic instability and with problems related to patrimony sharing, their

right to existence is contested not only by some neighbors but also by minorities from territories ethnically and religiously mosaicked.

In return, the appearance of the new multilateral cooperation structures – the Economic Cooperation at the Black Sea, Central European Free Trade Agreement, Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe which is of more and more interest for the Balkan states in the cooperation development in various fields, and Partnership for Peace, are elements that influence the future of the regional cooperation and the process of relaxation and understanding between the Balkan nations¹⁹.

In spite of all extant uncertainties, we consider that peacefully solving the problems in discussion, first of all the conflicts in Yugoslavia, will lead to the cooperation resuming and intensification. The Balkans can affirm their identity only under the circumstances of a focused action of the Balkan partnership and subregional nations' will.

The Balkan fluid and contradictory medium needs to readapt to the new realities excluding improvisations as much as possible. Cultural-spiritual, economic and political unity should be the Balkan states' strategy for the future. A unitary policy, within the general European context, can favor multilateral cooperation and efforts, and the identification of possible and necessary common strategies. Overcoming prejudices and cliches of history, prioritizing the common interests regarding some controversial problems that exist or may occur, the subregional countries can find right solutions to promote cooperation and good neighborly relationship and enhance stability and peace.

Solving peacefully the problems of ex-Yugoslav area, surpassing the transition period which is present in most Balkan states, imply passing from the exchange of views phase to concrete multilateral agreements.

Romania having had no conflicts of interest with other Balkan country, can and must actively contribute to designing and putting into practice solutions necessary to the Balkans "transition" toward peace and prosperity. In the same sense, our country has to reiterate a number of initiatives and proposals or initiate other actions²⁰.

It can actively contribute to combat potential sources of regional instability through permanently developing the relations with the

states in the region and through commonly managing, on this basis, the threats.

From this perspective, Romania considers of great interest the establishment of a mechanism to prevent conflicts and settle disputes, able to mediate and solve conflicts to which OSCE and other European politico-military organisms have not found optimal solutions yet. For example, a Balkan forum could act within an institutionalized framework, like the European Parliament or as a regional OSCE. Establishing and functioning of such a forum would represent an important step toward the Balkans integration in democratic Europe, accelerating the joining process of these countries to the extant European structures, with benefic effects on Balkan states and whole European community as well. The actions organized and developed at subregional level shall observe the principles and standards stipulated by the Paris Charter and OSCE.

We consider that developing cooperation and bi- and multilateral relations represent the unique solution to crisis situations, a benefic instrument, so that the whole Balkan area could have peace and nations could materialize the revived aspirations for a prosperous life.

Increasing confidence and transparence, and eliminating animosities imply the following conditions:

- willing to dialogue and mutual understanding;
- giving social and economic support in order to eradicate the causes of tension and conflict situations;
- identifying and diagnosing pre-conflict situations;
- generalizing and firmly applying the principles proposed by OSCE, such as: transparence of all military activities, application of confidence measures regarding the security of each state and European community;
- considerably reducing the conventional arms;
- controlling the interdiction of arms trade;
- providing identical rights to the minorities of these states.

In conclusion, we believe that only through the will and determination of the Balkan nations there is the possibility to eliminate the spirit of confrontation and sources of tension, and on this basis of multilateral cooperation development to face globalization and regionalism impact on good neighborly relationship.

Having has the same historical fate, the states in the area are linked and associated in the same time, speaking about future.

This is why Balkan cooperation constitutes a sine-qua-non condition of Balkan nations' security and welfare and their integration in the developed Europe.

1. Liviu Druguș – *Nationalism and Etatism vs. Globalization and Individualism: A Postmodern and Transdisciplinary Analysis*, in vol. *History and Theory of the International Relations. Studies*, coordinator Cătălin Turliuc, Iași, 1999, p. 116-141.
2. Kumiko Haba – *Globalism and Regionalism in East Central Europe: Nationality Problem and Regional Cooperation under the E.U. and NATO Enlargement*, Oslo, 2000, p. 2.
3. Helen Carere – *The Scattered Empire*, Humanitas, 1994, p. 12-70, d'Encause.
4. Andrew M. Dorman and Adrian Treacher – *European Security*, Dartmouth, 1995.
5. see at large – *Globalisation, Regionalisation and the History of International Relations*, 4th General Assembly, Oslo, 11-12 August 2000, *The State, War, and the State of War*, Cambridge, 2000 etc.
6. Hans-Peter Martin, Harold Schuman – *Traps of Globalization Attack on Democracy and Welfare*, Bucharest, 1999, p. 121.
7. Charles Oman – *Globalization and Regionalization: the challenge for developing countries*, OECD, Paris, 1994, p. 17.
8. see at large – *The E.U. and Human Rights*, Edited by Philip Alston, Oxford, 1999; *Classical Theories of International Relations*, Edited by Ian Clark and Iver B. Neuman, Oxford, 1999; Charles Zorgbibe, *The European Construction. Past, Present, Future*, Editura Trei, 1998, p. 208-236.
9. *The European Construction. Past, Present, Future*, Editura Trei, 1998, p. 309.
10. see at large – Valentin Stan, *Playing Foreign Policy*, in "Sfera Politicii", no. 76, year VII, 1999, p. 41-46.
11. Cătălin Crețu – *Kosovo: Politically Real Lesson*, in "Sfera Politicii", no. 76, year VII, 1999, p. 46-48.
12. *Ibidem*.
13. Minister of national defense of Romania at the 4th Southeastern Europe Ministers' Meeting, Bucharest, 2000.
14. Organization of several workgroups, a interbalkan conference on economic problems, similar with the Bonn Conference on the Economic Cooperation in Europe and with the Palma de Mallorca Conference on the Mediterranean Zone; meetings on the cooperation in mountain exploitation (Păltiniș, 17-19 September 1991), computer science (Bucharest, 10-12 September 1991), small and medium-sized companies (Bucharest, 26-28 November); taking initial measures in order to establish a Balkan Institute for Medical Studies in Bucharest (Rm. Vâlcea, 16-18 October 1991); establishment of the Regional Center for Fighting against Organized Crime.
Romania has been also engaged in preparing the workgroup for promoting cooperation in the production and selling of machine tools, auto hydraulic and pneumatic equipment.
Following the decision of the experts in cultural, humanitarian and mass media fields at the Ankara meeting (March 1991), Romania addressed to the OSCE Symposium on cultural traditions (Cracow, 25 May – 7 June 1991) a message from the Balkan countries on their experience in producing and developing cultural traditions.
In Romania were also organized the first meeting of the Balkan Chambers of Commerce Conference (Neptun, 20-22 September 1994), the first General Assembly of the Balkan Small and Medium-sized Companies Cooperation Centre (Bucharest, 9-10 January 1994), the Balkan Anthropology Congress (Bucharest, 4-7 September 1997), and the Balkan Chambers of Commerce and Industry Conference (Bucharest, 19 February 1998).
15. Through these treaties and agreements it has been stipulated a series of cooperation fields (military and security policy, defense and military legislation, military activity planning, military medicine, military history, arms control and disarmament, military publications and museums, military scientific research, cultural and sports activities) and forms (formal and working visits, sharing of experience at various levels, contacts between similar military institutions, exchanges of documentation and regulations, participating in joint exercises) to provide the improvement of military legislation and training, the use of the countries' scientific, technical and industrial resources to produce defense materials, the development of military scientific research, logistics, cultural and sports relations etc.
16. Emil Constantinescu – **European security: heritages of the past, challenges of the future**, **Speech at the 15th NATO Workshop, 20 June, Vienna**, in "Cronica Română" (The Romanian Chronicle), 22 June 1999.
17. *The YearBook of the Institute for Political and Defense Studies and Military History*, year 1998, p. 34.
18. *Ibidem*, p. 34.
19. After the end of the Kosovo conflict, in the countries of the area, including Romania, some extraordinary expectations have arisen, explained by the international community's interest in this region. "The West should attempt to do for Southeastern Europe what it did for Western Europe after the World War II and for Central Europe after the Cold War", U.S. President Bill Clinton said on 12 April 1999, and the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe adopted on 10 June in Koln aims to support Yugoslavia's neighboring countries "in their effort to secure peace, democracy, observance of human rights and economic prosperity".
20. *The YearBook of the Institute for Political and Defense Studies and Military History*, year 1998, p. 36.

THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE (SEE)

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It is widely accepted that stability offers countries a greater capacity to cooperate and be preoccupied by the economic prosperity of their citizens. Cooperation stimulates economic prosperity and decreases the chances of conflict. This means more business and consequently more money¹. And that because prosperity, employment and profit in one area of the world are dependent on economic developments in other parts of the world. The same situation we find with the opposite, when economic underdevelopment, corrupt banking practices and unrealistic monetary alignments affect faraway societies².

Today it is almost unanimously recognized that security has a multidimensional aspect. If during the Cold War security had only a military-political component, today it has gained new dimensions: social, environmental, educational and economic³. These are reunited under the non-military aspects of security and comprise everything from macroeconomic stability to environmental health. The result is clear: where there is harmony and well being, chances for conflict eruption are lower and the gain is exclusive financial and economic. The exploitation of economic interests has favorable consequences for all parties involved. Even in cases of more modest economic levels cooperation can work wonders⁴.

The economic factor has become to be considered of primary importance also by the military alliances and the international organizations. For example, NATO – mainly a military alliance, regards economy as a very important factor when discussing accession with

its partner countries. Disregarding speculations according to which NATO expansion would weaken the alliance, it is actually true that military cooperation cannot be satisfied except with strong economic potential. This is also related to the non-traditional security threats that are more and more frequent today, thus replacing the traditional ones like external armed attack.

Therefore, the expansion of NATO started with those countries whose potential was very strong and well exploited and which could grant guarantees regarding regional security by addressing non-traditional threats (internal inter-ethnic or trans-border conflict, corruption, organized crime, environmental hazards, etc.). In this respect the US know that the EU is an institution far more attractive from an economic point of view than NATO. Thus, the EU has taken leadership among the preferences of citizens from aspirant countries. The danger of competition between the US and Europe arises again and the US need to be prepared to address that competition economically and not just militarily. But the battle among the Europeans and the Americans over who should “rule” Europe is about to move in the economic realm of military security.

Along this line of thought, Europe started to build its own defense and security identity (ESDI) separate from US interests in Europe, including an elaborate pan-European defense system as a significant part. Thus, Europe applies economics (one of its strongest points) in the military security (one of its weakest point). The merger of 1999 between German DASA and

French Aerospatiale which resulted in EADS (European Aeronautic, Defense and Space Company), a European alliance closed to the American market, is considered to be a landmark for the establishment of ESDI. Thus, military aeronautics becomes a new battlefield between Europe and the US over supremacy in Europe. The US were not indifferent in front of those regroupings among European companies. In order to stay in business the Americans encourage the development of liaisons between European and American firms. In this respect, in 1999, the US applied the "globalization strategy" which stipulates the relaxation of American legislation in the field of hi-tech transfers. The American market hereby opens its doors to the military sector⁵. It goes without saying that Washington encourages transatlantic partnerships, rather than intra-European ones.

The above mentioned merger was still an economic one primarily. But things cannot be regarded entirely separately in today's world. An economic event of such magnitude enables the EU to take a leading position in terms of security and defense. The EU may become an equal competitor to the US and not just a mere subcontractor⁶. The irony is that although this ESDI consolidation project, of forming an exclusively European defense system, was started by a French-British initiative through a public statement in December of 1998⁷, the UK and British Aerospace (BAE) respectively, were left out. This leaves the British in position to rally with the Americans in what the aeronautic defense industry is concerned⁸.

One aspect worth discussing when talking about the economic dimension of security is the change in the nature of the "economic integration" term, which has gained new meanings in the specialty literature⁹. The first of those meanings refers to the interdependence between the industrial economic sectors and the horizontal and vertical industrial integration, aspect that can be limited to the national level. The second meaning refers to uniting economies through free trade areas, common markets, cooperation agreements, bi- and multilateral treaties, aspect that can be extended to the bilateral, regional and international levels. The first concept is strictly economic, while the

second is also political¹⁰. Where does then security fit in this context?

The sudden change that happened in the world order in 1989 has totally modified the structure of the European states system and intensified the relationship between military security and economy bringing about new cooperation possibilities in the military and economic realms, as well as recalibrate the national economies to fit the new security configuration². This does not mean Europe has been completely united by the end of the Cold War. The continent still continues to be divided by differences in GDP/capita and by the very differentiated level of institutional and economic reform¹¹.

The economy-security dilemma is dependent upon four variables as described by Sperling and Kirchner¹². The fear of exploitation, the subjectivity of decision-making factors in what national interest is concerned, the tendency to spend more on armament with the purpose of reducing security risks – when in fact those can be reduced by other means – and finally the offensive-defensive balance. Some authors argue that defensive is more beneficial because it diminishes the possibility of armed conflicts. Of course that in the end, there comes the question of allocation of national resources between economic welfare and national security, or between what is called in the Anglo-American literature, between "guns and butter". This is however, determined by the production capability of a country and the preferences of a society. In the U.S. for example, many polls show that the population is equally willing to have a military secure environment, as well as an arms-free, economically prosperous environment for the next generations. The U.S. is an example in which both possibilities are equally desired and possible¹³. But there are countries, even in Western Europe, which cannot strike such a balance between "guns and butter". Those countries need to opt in favor of one or the other, situation that may at some point disrupt the global security system.

The EU, although similar in many respects with the US, differs fundamentally through that the member countries are less willing to let go of national pride, historic collective memories and the identities they gained fighting one another.

These still greatly influence them in the decisions they are making¹⁴. In 1993, after the entering in force of the Maastricht Treaty, amidst Balkans at war, it became clear that although the walls in Europe have fallen some things will not change, at least for a while. The concept of Europe has always referred to economic prosperity. This prosperity makes Europe stay an exclusive club in relation to the less wealthy Eastern countries. Nevertheless, the EU member countries have come to realize that supporting distress economies – although with many conditions and strings attached – is the only way the union can become a strong institution subordinated to powerful democratic values.

The Yugoslav crisis has clearly slowed down the process of European integration and at the same time has raised new question to the European leaders, questions that in other circumstances they may have never raised themselves. Some of those questions refer to the relation between economic prosperity and multiethnic understanding, to the power of historical grievances and collective memories and their impact on internal state dynamics, to the nation-state and its current limits, and the list may go on.

From the perspective of those questions united Europe is not the best example for the new democracies. But as a product of the Cold War and of the political circumstances of the past 50 years, former enemies who, driven by common economic interests, have learned to overcome their differences and work together built united

Europe. That is why the future has all chances of becoming defined by economic cooperation, as a means of thwarting conflict, rather than by the well-known classical military intervention.

As mentioned already, in light of events that took place in SEE over the past 10 years, in their great majority tragic events, security has become a complex, multidimensional notion encompassing political, military, social, environmental, educational and last but not least economic. Today the new security threats are less and less defined by traditional external armed attack. The non-traditional threats arise from inside a state and can have dramatic effects on regional stability. Economic degradation, environmental hazards, organized crime and corruption, the refugee crisis are the most important factors that have shattered SEE as a result of ethnic and religious conflicts.

Economics have become with no doubt the most challenging aspect of the new security system. The Kosovo crisis and the global situation in the Balkans shed a new light on the importance of economic development and prosperity for the countries in Central and Southeast Europe (CSEE). The economic aspect of security in the area can be seen from 2 perspectives: that of the past and present – hereby discussing the macro- and micro-economic aspects, and that of the future – hereby discussing the potential of cooperation programs and post-conflict reconstruction.

II. MACRO – AND MICRO-ECONOMIC CONCERNS IN SEE

It is widely admitted today that the discrepancies between the desires and the clarity of the European integration process have been extremely wide on both the part of the member countries and of the candidates¹⁵. Recent data reveals major differences in the economic indicators of the candidate countries from CE and SEE to the EU. This seriously prevents the EU from regarding the region as a compact entity. The region is rather formed by individual and distinct cases. Geography is an important aspect to be discussed here. European geopolitics plays an important role in defining the integration purposes of the candidate countries

and in justifying enlargement on behalf of the member countries¹⁶.

From strictly an economic point of view and from the development stage perspective it is useful to divide SEE in smaller sub-areas, like the Occidental and the Oriental Balkans. The first sub-area characterizes the countries of former Yugoslavia, countries torn either by war or severe ethnic tension and who need emergency assistance. The second sub-area refers to Romania and Bulgaria, countries that have stayed out of armed or violent conflict but have suffered a great deal of collateral damage and a different kind of assistance. SEE is a region whose geographical layout has encouraged the

development of a variety of cultural and religious communities and implicitly conflict among them. In order not to overlook significant regional aspects, it may therefore be wise that for the global state of affairs to regard SEE as a whole and not as an entanglement of sub-regions and disrupted states.

Transition is a complex process with many interdependent variables: social, psychological, political, and obviously economic. That is why when we talk about macroeconomics we need to bear in mind 4 essential aspects³: a. the first one deals with the macroeconomic overview of performance, including an analysis of passive transformation of recession to active transition, a look at the rising disparities between the CSEE countries, the influence of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the evolution of "the catching up with the EU" process, which is a task for the decades to come. A first conclusion to be drawn from such an analysis brings us to the fact that only a very small number of countries from CSEE will become EU members in the near future; the rest would probably need up to half a century to catch up; b. the second aspect is the integration into the international division of labor, including trade reorientation, de-industrialization, de-agrarization, technical upgrade, competitive unit labor costs and sharp drop of employment; c. the third aspect refers to the EU accession process taking into account the gap between vision and unsolved problems of the present. In order to tackle such an issue one needs to realize that the institutional structure of the EU is a problem sometimes higher than the economic issues; d. the fourth and last aspect of this approach refers to the costs of Europe vs. non-Europe which show that not moving toward achieving a united Europe would end up costing much more than working toward achieving a united one. The problem here lies in the political nature of the integration process, as the enlargement of Europe will produce, on short-term, relative winners and losers. Thus, one would need to look at the political argument, as the losers resulting from this process in the short run would have to be compensated in order to gain their political support.

The globalization of the economy, in other words the process that leads to the integration of intermediary and final products, is oftentimes

regarded as decisive in determining public policies and business strategies¹⁷. But the levels of economic integration can be regarded also from a national level. In this case they refer to indicators related to institutions and the restrictions those pose in front of economic flow, as well as to the indicators related to the final results of economic processes at institutional or firm levels. The first show the readiness and the potential for integration, while the second show the relationship between trade and GDP¹⁸.

The misunderstandings regarding the macroeconomic aspect of integration and implicitly of security appears due to the fact that macroeconomic indicators do not reflect directly the quality and level of life. We may then ask ourselves why keep using macroeconomic analysis? Although those indicators do not directly reflect the standard of living, they do reflect a correlation between economic efficiency and some aspects linked to the quality of life such as the education and the health system, the environment, etc.

From the microeconomic point of view one can discuss European integration from the perspective of economic flows. According to this approach SEE is not an economically compact region because economic flows do not take place between countries of the region but to and from the region in various directions. This shows that European integration must become a long-term and individual process according to each country in part. The specific integration models we see are the consequence of multilateral and distinct answers to crisis.

As opposed to the military and political dimensions of security, the economic dimension has benefited in time of a more modest attention on behalf of the international community. The economic aspects of security limited themselves to migration reduction, limited assistance for infrastructure reconstruction, restrictive conditions for loans, limited foreign investment, minimal exports and imports.

This dimension has become a priority only in the recent past. In short, one can say that the main economic problems that influence communication between East and West are "commerce, foreign investment, mobility of labor force and foreign assistance"¹⁹. The micro-economic side of integration includes 3

important aspects. The first two account for the distant and more recent past, while the third looks at the future. The first aspect is the end of the dependency rate and it regards points like legal vs. illegal migration and the changing nature of long-term loans and assistance from the unconditional format to the "strings attached" one. Before 1989 some countries in the region benefited from extremely advantageous conditions for loans and barter agreements which helped them survive sometimes quite decently. Today we are witnessing new types of loans, with extremely difficult conditions regarding the reception, spending and destination of the money. Thus some countries in SEE ended up being less subsidized than during the Cold War having to deal with economic difficulties by themselves independently of external factors. In the past 10 years SEE was overwhelmed by a multitude of initiatives some of which have not even been activated. The idea for the future is that intentions must move to action plans rather than remain in the area of signatures and declaration with even less chances of being applied. Based on past experience and the prospect of the future, the Stability Pact can become an instrument to change the ad hoc emergency assistance policies in the region into a long-term strategic investment tool.

The second aspect, the closure of Europe, is a consequence of war and conflict and has to do, among others, with the "unfair" nature of economic sanctions. This aspect affects SEE at the microeconomic level through mobility restrictions of human (migration) or economic nature (sanctions). Migration is another phenomenon that has significantly changed after the fall of the bipolar world. Today the legal

transfer of work force is being done restrictively, thus reducing the legal form of migration in favor of its illegal form. Actually the closure of Europe in what the Balkans are concerned is the consequence of war and conflict, as well as a collateral damage linked to the "incorrect" nature of economic sanctions. A key factor for opening Europe is opening Serbia, because without Serbia, a profitable economic flow is inconceivable.

Regarding the 2 aspects described above, Daniel Daianu explains that Eastern Europe might be regarded as a threat to Western Europe due to the cheap working force and due to the fact that labor force migration could become a constant migration that would disturb the domestic market in the West²⁰. On the other hand, the cheap labor force from the East could also disturb the weaker sectors in the EU thus justifying protectionism in the West²¹.

The third and last aspect consists of working with the family and underlines the importance of the family as both the target and the matrix of criminal organizations but with no doubt a valuable capital in the Balkans. The family is a basic economic unit and it is the only one that has not been totally destroyed by conflicts. At the same time the family needs to be targeted by the Stability Pact as the only reliable economic unit, and therefore must determine a grass-roots approach to economics in the region. Thus, the three "S" can be achieved: security, stability and safety. In close connection with the "safety net", lies the refugee resettlement problem. Those need not be forced to return home before they have had the opportunity to reconstruct the lost capital in order to obtain the material assurance of their return.

III. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS VS. POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION IN SEE

Europe and the West in general have invested enormously in the Balkans both in troops and money. But these alone do not account for long-term, successful post-conflict reconstruction. That is why the Stability Pact for SEE was initiated. This endeavor represents Europe's commitment to SEE and especially to the areas devastated by armed conflict and its consequences. Discussions around mismanagement, responsibility, blame and the effects of economic sanctions – which in fact

cause more suffering through their collateral effects – can be counteracted through immediate concrete actions.

But first it is important to analyze international conflict related to economic sanctions. These have been used with a very high frequency from 1990 onwards and although they are accompanied by the perception that they are punitive they rarely attain their true purpose²².

However they do represent an important aspect of economic security.

But, economic sanctions and embargoes are also a serious issue as they have hurt through collateral damage more people than all WMD in the history of the world²³. Economic sanctions imposed on Belgrade following the Serbian aggression in Kosovo have blocked major commercial routes and have brought tremendous losses to the neighboring countries. More so the Serbian people have been placed under huge restrictions while Slobodan Milosevici, the one initially targeted by the embargo, remained in power for an unacceptable length of time defying the international community, running for office and contesting the democratic election results in the fall of 2000. In other cases economic sanctions have been totally absurd, like the one imposed on FYROM by Greece in 1994 that brought the country on the verge of economic collapse.

Economic sanctions have created great internal problems in the states they have been oriented towards, oftentimes degrading the human rights situation even more and affecting the most disadvantaged categories, women, children and those dependent on the safety-net provided by the humanitarian agencies²⁴. Those consequences have played many times against the political benefits they were intended to attain. The conclusion has been reached that economic sanctions can be justified only if they produce a certain amount of difficulties or suffering but do not lead directly to the loss of human lives.

There are 3 areas in which redefining economic sanctions is being discussed: their authority, efficiency and morality²⁵. The authority of sanctions refers to the necessity of the UN Security Council's endorsement without which those measures would be illegal. The UN imposes such sanctions with the purpose of punishing general violations of international norms. Under those conditions the efficiency of sanctions is implicitly not very high. Other sanctions that do not abide by UN norms may function in a different manner but rely on the assumption that one or more states consider another state guilty of an illegal form of action.

A study of the Institute of World Economy shows that economic sanctions have a global success rate of 34%²⁶. Their efficiency on the other hand, does not refer only to the success sanctions have in attaining their purpose. The

economic sanctions imposed on FRY by the EU and the US have, in a way, reached their purpose, namely the democratization of Yugoslavia and consequently of Serbia. However, this process was not a timely one and moreover was not a direct consequence of those sanctions. Slobodan Milosevici was driven out of power by the pressure of the will of the people and not due to the sanctions. In fact the above mentioned study also states that economic sanctions rarely manage to achieve major political objectives like removing a dictator. That is why it would be ideal if the state or the institution placing a sanction would also have clear standards of lifting it.

In 1994 when the Milosevici regime took measures for removing the Bosnian Serbs it was rewarded with an easing of the sanction regime imposed by the UN, thus stopping the war in Bosnia. This was a clear case of realistic conditioning and expectation horizon. In opposition with this last case, in Iraq the UN has adopted a much more rigid position that was conditioning the lifting of sanctions by the removal of Saddam Hussein, which of course was never likely to happen. In both cases the collateral effects of sanctions had damaging consequences on the population of the respective territories rather than on the targeted leaders.

This brings us to the issue of morality in what sanctions are concerned. The sanctions have brought major prejudice to the "safety net", affected disadvantaged categories, encouraged internal displacement and accentuated the refugee crisis, in other words caused damage similar to war. The humanitarian impact of sanctions became a morality issue. The authority imposing the sanction needs to be aware it holds the responsibility of ensuring civil immunity²⁷. Thus sanctions may be targeted against those who are directly responsible of violating certain norms. These may be financial-banking sanctions, movement restriction, military embargoes, etc. For this to be successful it is absolutely necessary to have a multilateral coordination between financial and legal experts and institutions when elaborating the content of sanctions.

In this context it is therefore necessary to take a different approach in sanctioning dictators that in fact do not represent their people, but themselves or a small group of interests. In the future sanctions should concentrate more on military aspects rather than on economic ones

and would thus lift some of the burden that is usually placed on common people's shoulders²⁸. Sanctions will need a redefinition of the framework they are imposed in and an evaluation of their necessity in order to make them clearer in expressing diplomatic and political disagreement vis-a-vis forms of inadequate behavior on behalf of states. Actually, economic sanctions have oftentimes been used by the diplomatic community to demonstrate that it does "something" for the punishment of those who step outside the international legal system. This has been done due the fact that other more effective or creative methods were lacking, while the collateral disastrous consequences of the sanctions failed to be thoroughly evaluated. Redefining economic sanctions as an integral part of European and international crisis management is essential for the years to come.

The modalities of implementing post-conflict reconstruction strategies are, among others, the promotion of regional cooperation, the creation of an adequate environment for economic progress and the opening of the EU market for Balkan trade. Last but not least technology is extremely important, as global

instant communication is indispensable to multilateral cooperation. As far as the reconstruction strategies and their application are concerned, Daniel Daianu draws attention on certain realities and premises on which those should be based upon²⁹. The author says that for those measures to be successful and determine the population to confidently look at the future it is necessary: to create a positive expectation horizon; for those expectations to materialize plans must be credible and tangible; to have the strategy coordinated by the main financiers; to grant substantial credits for avoiding the continuous debt of the SEE countries; assistance must be concentrated on the development plans and the plans must contain major infrastructure projects which should facilitate connecting SEE to Western Europe; the strategy must take into account prevention measures against social and institutional peril like corruption, organized crime, etc³⁰. Along the same line of thought with other authors, Daianu believes that it is absolutely necessary to include Serbia and FRY in the circuit for a real reconstruction and have a significant part of the financial aid oriented toward them.

IV. SECURITY REDEFINED

It is with no doubt that security is both the incentive and the determinant of security. Democracy is a complex process and political democratization is an oftentimes difficult endeavor in opening the door to peace and stability. That is why economics alone cannot accomplish the heavy task of achieving prosperity. It does not and it cannot act alone but in close connection with other factors of political, social, societal and environmental nature. Of those, the political factor is of utmost importance. SEE and the Balkans in particular have been many times associated with the countries of Southeast Asia known as the "Asian tigers". The economy of those countries has boomed in the past 20 years, but one can also find here non-democratic values like institutionalized corruption and constant violation of human rights. And that is not something we want in Europe, not after we have worked so hard to pull it together. That is why politics matters and economics need to work in close relationship with it.

In attempting to offer an economic definition to security we can identify 3 aspects in which economics influence the transformation of the nation-state and the national security policy of a state³¹: the first refers to the instrumental relationship between military expenditure, economic growth and national security; the second refers to the link between the opening of national economy and the erosion of national autonomy (including here the high levels of commerce, monetary interdependence and financial integration); the last aspect refers to the connection between macro-economic policy and national security policy (budget deficits and payment incapacity are direct threats to national security). Having in view the multitude of factors involved, one can notice that it is difficult to construct a definition of security from an economic point of view. Among others, the difficulty is enhanced by the fact that the nation-state's responsibilities in the economic realm are less clear than in the military and political ones.

Due to these aspects there are many economic definitions of security.

It is essential to keep 3 aspects in mind when we speak about the economic aspects of security³²: economic security reflects a worry on behalf of the state in what the capacity to protect the social and economic structures of a society is concerned; this type of security also implies the ability of a state to act as an efficient guarantor for social integrity; and last, economic security shows the capacity of a state to cooperate with other states and to ensure a stable international

economic environment. Having in view that economic security is not as precise as the military one, and economic threats are not as well structured as the military ones, economic security is oftentimes regarded as an annex to the military and political one³³. In order to better conceptualize this definition, it is necessary to redefine the international economic system in such a manner as to enable it to create a stable and safe environment which, in turn, could contribute both to economic welfare and to interstate military and political cooperation.

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THE STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE – AN OVERVIEW

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THE REGIONAL FRAMEWORK AFTER THE END OF THE COLD WAR

Myths, traditions, geography, dreams, symbols, prejudices, perceptions, power, arrogance, ignorance and hope; mix them in a pot and the picture of the Balkans is ready.

The Balkans – a part of Europe sometimes unrightfully associated with barbarism and primitivism but undoubtedly plagued by dramatic inter-ethnic conflicts.

A closer look to the Balkan countries, 10 years after the communist regime collapsed allows to identify a number of **regional characteristics** to be considered before any attempt to stabilize and democratize the region:

1. First of all, there are the undeniable, historical **territorial and minority problems** further more complicated after the two World Wars, with the redrawing of borders and the emergence of the newly independent states.

One of the most challenging ethnic problems in Europe concerns the Hungarian communities living outside Hungary; thus approximately 2 million Hungarians live in Romania, 600.000 in Slovakia and 450.000 in the Serbian province of Vojvodina. Particular minority problems are related to the Hungarian minorities in Romania and Slovakia as proved by a line of violent confrontations, which occurred in the 90's; thus in March 1990 in Targu Mures, the conflict between the Hungarian minority and the Romanian population of the town have fully received the "support" of both Hungarian irredentism and Romanian nationalism.

2. The **ethnic, cultural, religious, linguistically, economical and political heterogeneity** that applies particularly to countries part of the EU Regional Approach (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, FYROM, Croatia) – a reality that caused most of the conflicts in the region.

3. **The shortfalls in the democratization process and in building up the civil society.**

For many centuries, people in Southeast Europe have been subject to foreign occupation and this has negatively influenced their political development and hindered the cultural one. In add to this the 50 years of communist regime, a regime that priced the ethnicity so highly that the democracy was merely forgotten, by providing ethnic rights instead of fundamental human rights (the most striking example being that of Tito's Yugoslavia) – the risk for violent confrontations becomes obvious.

As for the civil societies in Southeast European countries, they are still weak, fragmented and disoriented.

4. **Economies plagued by organized crime and corruption.**

5. **Reluctance to resort to peaceful conflict settlement mechanisms and confidence-building measures.**

6. **Insufficiently developed regional cooperation structures.**

Considering the complexity of these aspects it becomes even more obvious for any part interested in the process of stabilization and democratization of the Balkans that this is a long-time process, both costly and difficult.

It will take time for countries in the region divided by decades of rivalries, conflicts and hatreds to come to terms with each other, to understand that ethnic cleansing is a crime no matter who commits it and that the diversity and multi-ethnicity of the Balkans are not sins but virtues in themselves.

ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

After a long period of complacency leading politicians and the public opinion in Western Europe seem now more concerned than ever before with finding out the causes and providing the solutions for the conflicts that plagued Southeastern Europe for many centuries.

Particularly, there is *a special emphasis on the issue of economic reconstruction in the region* explained by the role the economic weakness of these countries has played in the emergence and further evolution of the regional conflicts.

After the collapse of the communist regime in 1989 countries in Central and Eastern Europe suddenly found themselves confronted with the difficulties associated with the transition from a centrally planned system to market economy.

At the beginning of 1990's, *three characteristics* applied to the economic situation of all Central and East European countries: a very poor infrastructure, a very high inflation rate and the lack of demand for their products. Thus, in 1990 Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia (at that time), Romania and Bulgaria all experienced an average drop of 10% in their industrial growth combined with dramatically increasing national deficits determined by large decreases in their export figures and an accelerating demand for expensive Western goods.¹

It is almost unbelievable the trigger effect the economic difficulties have when associated with fragile democracies (as was the case for all Central and Eastern European countries after 1989). In almost all these cases this "cocktail" brings uncertainty and instability in the whole region.

10 years after the collapse of the communist regime, the economic performance of Central and Southeast European countries shows significant differences; on the one hand there is the leading group, consisting of the Visegrad Four: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia all experiencing solid rates of economic growth and reasonable rates of inflation.

On the other hand, there are the Balkan countries: Romania, Bulgaria, the republics of former Yugoslavia and Albania, with Romania and Bulgaria in a better position but, still having much lower economic indicators than those of the Visegrad Four.

The new Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe comes to prove the interest Western countries have in the Balkans and their problems.

For the last 10 years Brussels and other European capitals have been almost exclusively focused on the Visegrad group. The **new Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe** represents the necessary change in the way West European countries have usually approached the Balkan region.

The economic reconstruction of the Balkans that the Western world pledged itself – in the framework of the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe – to facilitate will not be possible without a clear understanding of the **economic realities** of the region that might complicate the present blueprints:

1. This region is by far *the less developed of the continent* and here the economic transition proved to be extremely difficult and painful. The example of Albania – the poorest in the region – is sufficient: after the 1997 major crisis, governing the country has become a rather "suicide mission".
2. The *discrepancies inside the region* – with countries like Slovenia and Croatia more economically developed and having higher living standards – adds more to the already existing division lines in the region.
3. Since 1990, countries in Southeast Europe have constantly experienced a *massive decrease in their GDP combined with accelerating inflation*; moreover, economic estimations indicate that unless the military conflicts in the area will be put a final end, Southeast European countries will further experience large declines in their GDP and a

massive deterioration in their balance of payments terms.

4. To these should be added *the negative perception investors have on the whole region*, due to the recent military conflicts and the political instability.
5. *A manifest crisis of management.*

Many commentators on the Stability Pact agree on the fact that the *economic reconstruction* of the Balkans should embrace *two dimensions*²:

- An exercise of the management of crisis that should take into account the nature of rivalries among the local players; this is definitely a long-term project and it might require the presence of Western states in the region for many years;
- The reconstruction both in physical terms (a reconstruction of the infrastructure destroyed by the ten years of civil wars) and in terms of development, including political and institutional change.

As for the price such a stabilization plan for the Balkans involves, an EU estimate released in Washington calculated the cost of economic reconstruction after the Kosovo conflict at around 30 billion USD³. Thus, Albania, with its already very fragile economy is in a desperate situation as 450.000 refugees have fled the country since the beginning of the civil war in Kosovo.

In the case of Macedonia the economy was also affected by the 240.000 of refugees; for Romania the loss caused by the conflict in Kosovo was estimated at 794.3 million only for one year.

The Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe provides the opportunity for countries in the area to build economic networks that will eventually boost the reform processes and create stronger links among them thus diminishing the risks of military conflicts in the region.

Several joint projects have already been developed and put into practice and they include a regional task force on gender issues and a project to fight organized crime on a region wide-basis that opened its office in Bucharest in November 1999.

Efforts are being made towards drafting a regional Investment Charter and reducing the flow of small arms across the region.⁴

In the process of economic reconstruction, Southeast European countries need the help and assistance of Western states while keeping one thing clear: **neither the aims nor the goals of the Pact can be imposed from outside**. It is essential for the success of the Stability Pact that Southeast European countries identify national and regional priorities and create a synergy between the institutions involved in the process and the regionally developed initiatives that have already proved their efficiency.

WHY A STABILITY PACT FOR SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE WAS NECESSARY?

The aim, dimensions and implications of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe

The ambitious idea of drafting a Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe took shape in 1999, as a reaction to the dramatic conflict in Kosovo and its consequences.

Under a German initiative – who at that time had the chair of the European Council – officials from more than 30 countries reunited in Bonn on May 27, 1999 to debate the German proposal of creating the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe.

The idea behind the Pact was to avoid the possibility for another Kosovo to emerge by pledging ten Southeastern European countries to democracy, economic and political reforms and peaceful borders.

The final version of the Pact was signed on June 10, 1999 in Cologne, Germany. The Pact aims to:

- promote democracy, a greater degree of tolerance and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights of individuals belonging to minorities;
- increase the role of civil society in these countries;
- encourage deeper economic reforms that will boost foreign investment in the region and create prosperity;
- foster the process of integration in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures for those countries who “need and desire it”.

The *structure* of the Pact is consist on *three working tables*:

- democracy, human rights and civil society
- economic development and reform

- security, civil and military.
- The security table has two components:
- police and judicial affairs
 - military and defense security.

Participants in the three tables are representatives from all countries in the region plus those of EU, OSCE, OECD, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Western European Union (WEU), the European Investment Bank, the World Bank, the IMF, NATO, Japan and Canada.

Since its coming into existence, The Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe was often referred to as a new Marshall Plan; thus, President Bill Clinton said in April 1999 in one of his speeches: "We should try to do for Southeastern Europe what we helped to do for Western Europe after World War II and for Central Europe after the Cold War – to help its people build a region of multi-ethnic democracies, a community that upholds common standards of human rights, a community in which borders are open to people and trade, where nations cooperate to make war unthinkable"⁵.

A better way of understanding the Pact is to look at it as a political bargain: in the framework of the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, the international community commits itself to assist the Southeast European countries in their efforts to create stability and prosperity in the region, while these countries pledge themselves to promote the values of democracy, human rights and market economy and to increase the degree of cooperation among them.

The opportunities the Pact opens for all Balkan countries are significant. First of all, it creates the possibility for a wider range of **bilateral relations to develop**; this will not completely eliminate the possibility of conflicts in the region but will definitely make them less

probable, thus improving the region's overall security.

In the economic field, the Pact provides the opportunity for developing joint programs aimed at promoting trans-border investment and entrepreneurship

If each country in the region strongly commits itself to make the necessary internal reforms and bring its contribution to the regional stability, The Pact will ensure a steady region-wide development and increase the chances for the Balkan countries to accede the European and Euro-Atlantic structures.

Notwithstanding the advantages it brings to all countries in the area, The Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe was not spared of *criticisms*; thus some commentators have referred to it as long on rhetoric and short on specific. As the Balkan commentator Christopher Bennett noted: "for all the talk of a mini-Marshall Plan, the Stability Pact is at most a vague commitment to the peoples of the Balkans, assuring them that they have never been forgotten and promising them that they will, somehow, be assisted making a successful transition to democratic rule"⁶.

Whether very specific or more rhetoric, The Pact represents a clear shift in the way major powers used to deal with the conflicts in this region in the past. By promoting The Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, Western powers finally started to regard Balkans and Balkan countries as an entity, as a single political and economic zone. They finally understood that the causes of conflicts are rather regional than state-specific and Southeast European countries are intimately and ultimately linked by history, culture, politics and geography. A truth that can ever be denied.

The Role of the European Union

For countries in Southeast Europe, EU represents the guiding light in all political and economic matters. EU has already manifested its interest and commitment to bring prosperity and stability in the area through a series of regional projects – *The EU Regional Approach* – involving Croatia, FYROM, The Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia, and through its large-scale efforts to reconstruct Bosnia and Herzegovina.

For increasing the efficiency of its presence in the region, EU has developed a **Common Strategy for the Western Balkans** – commissioned by the Vienna European Council – involving the neighboring states and decided to

nominate a **EU Special Representative for Southeastern Europe**.

Also, the EU and the major financial institutions involved in the process will provide **the bulk of the financial resources** for the stabilization and reconstruction in the Balkans.

For those countries that have not yet concluded association agreements with EU, this will be done through a new kind of **contractual relationship by fully taking into account the particularities** in each country (with the perspective of EU membership based on the Amsterdam Treaty).⁷

The Role of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

After the EU, *OSCE* represents *the second major presence in Europe*; its pan-European representation makes of OSCE the necessary forum for enforcing a long-term strategy as the one proposed by the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. Moreover, the OSCE involvement in the Pact could act as a guarantee that other OSCE members – like Russia and US – will also contribute to the process of stabilization in the region.

Acknowledging the key role OSCE plays in fostering the security and stability dimension, the signatory states decided on June 10th 1999 in Cologne to place the entire Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe under OSCE's auspices.

Since its initiation, the Pact clearly stated that OSCE and EU will closely and constantly cooperate; in this respect it was established that **EU will develop a special initiative for the**

For countries in the Balkan region, the perspective of a EU accession – even if the time limit is not mentioned – is very important and it can act as an incentive for promoting internal economic and political reforms. From this perspective, the role EU can play – by reaffirming its willingness to accept new members from these countries once they fulfill the criteria set out in the Amsterdam Treaty and the Copenhagen Declaration – is crucial for the process of democratization and development in the region.

Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe within the OSCE.

OSCE's role – rooted in its long-term experience in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation – is essential for assuring *the functionality of the working tables*, especially of the one on Human rights issues.

OSCE's task is far from being an easy one: *it has to act as a catalyst in bringing together all states in the region at the same round table*, which could result difficult. On the one hand, OSCE will have to deal with the deeply-rooted mutual distrust among Balkan countries, on the other hand it will have to take into account the fear of these countries of being ruled by Europe, a fear rooted into centuries of domination by West European powers.

CONCLUSIONS

Fifty years of communism resembled for Central and Eastern Europe to fifty unbreakable walls that separated nations in this part of the world in a way history of the European continent never experienced before.

Now, ten years after the fall of the Berlin wall, the European security architecture has changed.

The end of the Cold War has put a final line to the East-West confrontation but, it did not have the same effect on the insecurity nations of Europe – and especially those in Southeastern Europe – still feel.

The last ten years have shown a revival of nationalistic tendencies in Southeastern Europe, a desire to set up new division lines this time not based on different political ideologies but, on ethnic, religious or, cultural grounds.

Security of the Balkans is part of the European security and is precisely for this that the Balkan region needs concrete actions and a Europe's clear commitment to solve the problems of this area. Otherwise the effect could be a perpetuated instability in the region that

would endanger the security on the whole continent.

The Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe is an essential part of the efforts Europe makes to create stability and prosperity in Southeastern Europe.

The aim of the Pact is to act as a catalyst between the nations and institutions involved in this process and not to provide patterns.

The role of the international community is to provide the necessary assistance and help for the process of reconstruction but the "owners" of

Pact are Southeast European countries; the success of the Pact depends on the commitment those who are directly affected are able and willing to make.

The challenges the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe pose both for the international community and for the countries in the region are complex and time-consuming but they can be overcome if a true cooperation between all the parties involved is reached. Balkans need Europe just as much as Europe needs the Balkans.

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 2 Daniel Dăianu, Reconstruction of Southeastern Europe, http://www.eliamep.gr/CEIC/Balkan_Reconstruction/Daianu.pdf
 3 Reuters News, *Europe Studies Kosovo Marshall Plan*, <http://www.msnbc.com/news/273499>
 4 Tim Donais, *Steering a New Course in the Balkans*, Peacemagazine Home Page, <http://www.peacemagazine.org/0001/donais.1>
 5 United States State Department website on Balkan Stability Pact, http://www.usis.it/file_9906/alia/99062518.1
 6 Tim Donais, *Steering a New Course in the Balkans*, Peace Magazine Home Page, <http://www.peacemagazine.org/0001/donais.1>
 7 The Text of the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe concluded on July 10, 1999, Cologne, Germany, <http://www.government.bg/eng/kosovo>.

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BOOK REVIEW

IDENTITY AND INTEGRATION*

The end of the Cold War set the entire world into a process of changes and developments, that did not fit into the pattern of predictability. Economic globalization has made it that, at the outset of this millennium, the economic capitalist system will work on other bases and at a different level. The accelerated trade exchanges, the interconnected markets, the power gained by multinational companies and the unprecedented mobility of the financial capital narrow down a country's capacity to control its own production of assets and their distribution. International relations are under a crossfire of tensions that are hard to decipher. The nation state that came into being as the outcome of the developments within the European societies and as a solution to the challenges of the modern age, sees today its own sovereignty restrained *de facto* by the economic agents for which territorial borders have lost their significance. The process of European integration follows the same trend.

Therefore, under the pressure of these contexts, the historical, social and political sciences have a new agenda today. Globalisation and the reshaping of political structures, supranational integrations and regional tendencies to fragment national spaces, interstatal cooperations, the changing of spiritual identity under the impact of mediatic aggressions and consumption culture, multiculturalism and postmodern hybridization of the way of thinking, are just a few of the most disputed themes in the contemporary intellectual environment.

Moreover, the interest in the analyses on the developments and trends of the societies at local, regional or global level, has generalized today and it doesn't belong only to the cultural and political elites as it was in the past. What will it happen in the European area? – here is a question with a major geopolitical scope. Will the integration logic defeat the differential logic? Will the European Union be configured as the federal superstate or as an association of national states? Will Europe keep in tomorrow's world the avant-garde position that it has had in the modern epoch? What are the effects of the process of globalization, including the indirect and "perverse" ones? Do they standardize the world or do they deepen the disparity between the states, do they attenuate or do they stimulate the interest in the cultural identities? Many theoreticians are exercising their analytical force upon such themes, promoting various approaches, diagnoses and previsions.

The publication of a book that frontally deals with this problematical complex represents an editorial event in the Romanian scientific and cultural world. It's the book entitled: *Identity and Integration. From Disjunction to Conjunction* by Professor and Researcher Grigore Georgiu.¹ I specify, from the beginning, that the reader is before a reference work, with a systematic construction, the outcome of the author's long-standing research and theoretical meditation. The work imposes itself both through the topicalness of the issues approached and through its theoretical standard, through the problematization level and through fertile interrogations that find expression. The book is also a sharp retort to the random "theoretical products" which, unfortunately are flooding today the mediatic market. At the other antipode the author shows a particular concern for the conceptualization and methodology used in the analyses of the politic and cultural phenomena, and the critical approach is present in the studies dedicated to the evolution of the Romanian society, either about the historical dimensions or the post communist period. This assumed rigour allows the author to point out what many other analysts cannot see, and especially cannot explain: it is about the discrepancy between the "real history" and the

¹ Author: Grigore Georgiu; The book is published under the aegis of the Romanian Academy, at the Social Theory Institute Press, Bucharest, 2001, 274 pages.

interpretation role, which many theoreticians are applying to this history. The author's warning is concerned about the fact that, through its long-lasting geopolitical implications, "the European integration is one of the most important historical processes nowadays. It has to be approached in its own complexity from combined interdisciplinary perspectives, which is a difficult matter because the social and the political thinking are facing a new problematic field and there is a risk to apply schemes of over fulfilled interpretations on this one (page 20).

Although it is very difficult and risky to propose hierarchizations in the structure of a book with such density of ideas, I consider that the epicenter of the analyses undertaken by Grigore Georgiu is represented by the rapport: national identity/European integration (where the theme concerning the evolution of the national state in the postmodern world is also included) and the necessity or the reconstruction of the Romanian culture self consciousness. This appreciation starts from two premises: first of all, the Romanian elite is today in a dispute of ideas regarding our integration in the European structures, a process that also involves a severe comparative examination, through which we rediscover the accumulated disparities, internal weaknesses, geopolitical vulnerabilities and the unfavorable external image. Secondly, for the Romanians, the identity and the integration issues are aspects intimately conjugated and intense problematized including the political level.

They must be considered from a historical perspective, because, as the author says "the ratio between identity and integration was, in fact, the main theme of our modern way of thinking, from Cantemir to Noica". The integration imperatives are feeding today the process of self-evaluation and reconstruction of the Romanian culture self-consciousness.

A fine analyst of historical challenges which have fundamentally modified the geopolitical configuration of different geographic regions and especially of Europe, Grigore Georgiu makes a real *tour de force* to decipher the meaning of some contradictory tendencies from contemporary world. He considers that we witness two simultaneous processes, one of increasing the interdependence between societies and cultures (expressed by the globalization of the commercial markets and the expansion of new ways of communications), on the one hand, and one of rebirth of the interest in the local ethnic and national identities, on the other hand.

The author takes into review the ideas and analyses of some famous authors (such as M. Duverger, P. Drucker, R. Reich, S. Huntington etc.) which frequently talk about the suitability of the civilization structures to the local conditions, even about the "indigenization" of development projects of the societies. The work does not avoid the uncomfortable questions concerning "civilization conflict" from the globalization world and gives clear answers when the national identity issue is tackled or the issues on the structural model for the future Europe. The stake of discussions on national identities space is made by one of the specific cultures in the integration process. The author organizes the analytical approach to demonstrate that many of these representations regarding the relations between cultural identities and the process of European integration operates with a "disjunctive paradigm", through which both aspects are in opposition relation. This fact is seen in the publicist confrontations in our country on this theme. Concerned about the "logic model" through which we can interpret the process of integration, about thrilling debates concerning "the variable geometry" of Europe's integrating structures, the author identifies in the new political views and in some searching of contemporary thinking "a mutation of paradigms" a displacement of conceptions to a "conjunctive paradigm" which allows us to understand in a more adequate way the dynamic and complex conjunctions between unity and diversity in today's world.

Therefore, through his moderate and realistic point of view, Grigore Georgiu distances himself both from the trends of prointegration radical supporters who consider that "the European integration would be incompatible with the national idea and with the national values promotion", and from that one of the tight nationalism and anti-Western trend which, by joining the euroatlantic structures, sees a loss of identities and cultural matrix. "The two extreme positions –

says the author – are fed by two utopias, as aggressive in the theoretical register as in the community mindframe. The first has its support in the recent ultra-liberal ideology of globalizations (ideologies which took back from the Marxists the utopia that humankind moves toward unified, homogeneous and linear structures under the pressure of some free forces of the market and of the new means of communications, and the second is an inappropriate reaction and as utopic in this historical tendencies which can be appreciated as being anti-national just from a perspective that has been exceeded by real history”.

Accepting the idea that history repeats itself “but at other dimensions and in other forms” and being convinced that today, the Romanian culture “needs to rebuilt its self-consciousness,” a new review of the trends of ideas which marked the transition period of the Romanian society to modernity. Grigore Georgiu undertakes a thorough analysis on “a doctrine of conjunction between national and European – i.e. the poporanism”.²

The study of the poporanist doctrine, one of the most debated from the modern Romanian culture, is inscribed organically in the author’s project, the one that demonstrates that our representative personalities conceived the development of the country in close connection with the European space of civilisation. The author essentially describes the content of the poporanistic doctrine and equally points out the contribution of a great political thinker and man of culture, Constantin Stere, who founded the trend. The authors’s merit consists in the fact that, making a spiritual archeology work, suggests another interpretation perspective on poporanism, the one which restores the authentic meanings of the trend which influenced profoundly the Romanian political thinking in the first half of the 20th century. With the special analytical force, the author manages to displace a series of wrong interpretations and etiquettes about poporanism, marked by an obvious ideological partisanship, etiquettes perpetuated until today. Against standard interpretations, the author proves that the representatives of cultural direction from *Viața Românească* (*The Romanian Life*) Magazine – Constantin Stere, G. Ibraileanu and then M. Ralea – worked with a doctrine of conjunction between national and European and not one of disjunction. “Starting to be good Europeans, says Mihai Ralea, we will end to be good Romanians. The conclusion? Romanianism is learned through Europeanism” (p. 157)

Fairly, Grigore Georgiu appreciated that “reconsideration of this trend is an urgent task of the active generation from today’s Romanian culture”, because in its essential problematic we meet ideas an attitudes which can be reactualized to better understand “the challenges to which the Romanian post communism society has to answer in its period of transition, transition that means on the other level, of course, a resumption of the modernization process, interrupted or deviated, anyhow, unconsummated, uncompleted” (p.58). Studying carefully and analyzing critically the ideatic substance of some trends of ideas from the period of transition to modernity, Grigore Georgiu draws the conclusion that “one can find very expressive similitudes between the present opening towards western metropolis and that one from a century and a half ago”. Extremely interesting is the use of the distinctions made by Samuel Huntington between “modernization” and “westernizing”, to see in a new light the concern of the poporanists about looking for a proper way of modernization, of blending the national spirit and the critical one, an acute problem for the delayed societies and the one which desire to synchronize with western Europe model.

In the end, we point out the fact that the author anticipates a model of European integration in which the monetary unification, the coordination of economic programs, the common external politics and the existence of some political community institutions will not necessarily lead to the attenuation of national identities, but to their redefinition in the new polycentric environment.

² Poporanism (popor = people) was an early 20thc. reform-minded democratic current, which strived to set in place political democratic reforms (such as: the universal suffrage, a.o.); however, from an economic viewpoint, it considered that Romania should preponderantly rely on its agricultural potential. It fiercely opposed the implementation of Marxism in Romania.

There is the wider point of view conveyed nowadays. Thus, the analyst Barry Buzan,³ pointed out the fact that, for growing up a state-like political construction, there must exist a physical base, institutions and an organising ideology. However, we can see that EU has a physical base – the Schengen space –, has political institutions and the Euro currency, but “it lacks that symbolic patrimony through which the nations knew how to propose to individuals a collective interest, a fraternity, a protection”.⁴ In this context, it is not surprising at all the fact that the ideas and conclusions drawn by Grigore Georgiu are in harmony with the theses asserted by one of the main artisan of European construction: Hans Dietrich Genscher. In a recent interview in *Die Welt*, the well-known German political man stated that “there is no such a thing as a European identity. In all that Europe has achieved, each nation contributed in one way or another” and, therefore, in a multipolar world, the confrontation with other cultures should not automatically take place, but “it only has to admit the identity of the others”.⁵

There are just a few of the many valuable ideas included in the book by Grigore Georgiu. At the same time, the book will strongly appeal to the reader interested in the evolution of the European and national idea in the Romanian culture, and a useful and efficient tool for those interested in building up possible models for a quicker integration of the Romanian society in the European civilization ensemble.

Constantin HLIHOR

³ Barry Buzan, ... (in Romanian, *Popoarele, statele și teama*, ediția a doua, București-Chișinău, 2000, p. 274).

⁴ Anne - Marie Thièsse, ... (in Romanian, *Crearea identităților naționale în Europa. Secolele XVIII – XX*. Iași, Editura Polirom, 2000, p.12).

⁵ Apud, RADOR Press Agency, Year IV, No.67 (1143) of March 8, 2001, p.35.

“Diplomație în vreme de război. De la Carta Atlanticului la Carta ONU”, Diplomacy in The Second World War. From the Atlantic Chart to The United Nations Organization Chart

Writing about the foundation of the United Nations Organization is, undoubtedly, a challenging task for at least two reasons. First, the topic was, and still is, subject to ideological debates, and a serious academic effort to understand the diplomatic premises, the historical context and the basic intentions of the “founding fathers” of United Nations has to be immune to contemporary political approaches. In the same time, the need for an objective evaluation of the role and performances of the UN is irresistible and of course, necessary. The question which stands, after more than fifty years of UN history, is at what extent the complex and delicate mechanism built in the years of the Second World War remains appropriate for the problems of to-day’s world. And it is obvious that the answers have to begin with a clear view on the historical moments and figures of the emergence of the United Nations Organization.

Mr. Constantin Buse and Mr. Nicolae Dascalu, prominent figures of the Romanian academic community, assumed this difficult task in their book “Diplomacy in the Second World War. From the Atlantic Chart to United Nations Organization Chart”. This eminently readable book is astounding in being both an engaging and informative account of the historical process of UN creation. The volume is divided into four comprehensive main chapters that each present a clear idea, while maintaining chronological accuracy.

In the first chapter, “From the Atlantic Chart (august 1941) to United Nations Declaration (January 1942)”, the authors are inviting the readers inside the diplomatic laboratories of both major and minor powers, the policy-making mechanism being very accurately described. Thus, one can easily understand the interests and the objectives of the United States foreign policy before and after their engagement in the War, the specific goals of the United Kingdom’s proposals, or the problems raised by Soviet Union, France, China or India.

Basically, the authors stressed the idea that the efforts to reach a diplomatic agreement, firstly between Great Britain and US and afterwards with a larger international dimension, in fact give birth to the basic principles for postwar international cooperation and security. From this point of view, the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Declaration, carefully unraveled by the authors, stands at the very beginning of the creation of an international security organization. Or, how the authors put it “ [...] for the birth of the United Nations Organization, the years 1941 – 1942 meant a stage of seeking during which were outlined the fundamental ideas and directions. [...] Both basic documents actually built the framework where the postwar issues will be debated and which will constitute the basis for the international security and cooperation structures.”

The second chapter of the book, “The Establishment of the postwar international organization’s bases: 1943, the Moscow Conference (October) and the Teheran Summit (November)”, goes a step forward, taking into account the period between the British initiative called “The United Nations Plan” (January 1943) and the American planning for an international organization devoted to maintain international peace and security issued in December 1943. Given their best, the two authors are fully observing not only the dynamic of United States policy making, from individuals to the various governmental and non-governmental structures involved in designing the postwar international organization, but also the patterns of British or Soviet views on this issue. Meantime, the Moscow Conference and the Teheran Summit are analyzed in

detail, Mr. Buse and Mr. Dascalu pointing up the different positions of the main actors and the difficult road to consensus.

At the end of this chapter, reviewing the facts, the researchers are proposing a sound interpretation on the diplomatic dimension of the year 1943, emphasizing at least three major elements: 1. "because of the war context, all efforts were aimed to solve the postwar security issue and, basically, the fundamental idea was to maintain at high level the cooperation between the great powers"; 2. "there was a major difference between the American and the British plans for the organization, which was perceived at a global scale by the Americans and more at a regional level by the British counterparts"; 3. "[...] the first successes were seen in the economic field with the convocation of the United Nations Conference for Food and Agriculture and with the emergence of the UNRRA, making clear the importance of the economic issues for the structures of the future international organization".

In the third chapter, "Working out the proposals for the foundation of an international organization: Dumbarton Oaks (August – October 1944)", the authors are focusing their analytical effort on the diplomatic work for the first common project of the future international organization statute, and are concluding with the convocation of the Conference in Dumbarton Oaks in August 1944. With the same chronological accuracy and sound academic demonstration the two authors are going from moments of international diplomacy to domestic confrontation, reconstructing in detail the negotiations held between the great powers, especially those involving United States, Great Britain and Soviet Union, on issues as postwar security, human rights and economics. During this part the specific policy making processes of Foreign Office, State Department, US Congress or White House and Stalin's Kremlin are observed in depth after a very careful analyze of a variety of documents ranging from memoirs to diplomatic papers.

Concluding this chapter, the authors' statement is that "the year 1944 was a decisive moment for the forging process of the United Nations Organization. [...] the Dumbarton Oaks Conference has worked out the first homogenous plan regarding the structures, the functions and the mechanism of the future international organization. Meanwhile, important steps were made toward creation of dedicate agencies in the economic, social, cultural domains, thus preparing the field for the final stage, the convocation of the Conference for creation of the new international organization".

The fourth chapter, "The foundation of the United Nations Organization: San Francisco (April – June 1945)", is structured in a series of snapshots meant to explain the historical and diplomatic premises of the San Francisco Conference. Thus, one can follow the course of high level diplomacy during events as Malta Meeting between British and American delegations, Yalta's Big Three Conference, Inter-American Conference in Mexico City (February – March 1945) or Washington Conference of juridical experts (April 1945).

Mr. Buse and Mr. Dascalu are focusing, of course, on the San Francisco Conference beginning with the preparations made by the diplomats from United States and Britain and ending with the works of Conference itself. In this part the details are almost overwhelming, but the scientific discourse stands sound and clear. Every issue present in the diplomatic action is acknowledged in its dimensions, from the location, name and languages of future organization to the final adjustments of the United Nations Chart. The authors are taking into account all the discussions on major and minor issues as well, providing the reader with a complex picture of specific goals, negotiations instruments, perceptions, all confronting and interlocking.

The final remarks on the genesis of United Nations Organization that ends the volume consider the key elements, which mark their influence on the aforementioned process. The authors are underlining the impact of previous experience of the Society of Nations, the

confrontation between national and international interests, the constructive contribution made by the minor states. Also, are present in the final conclusion ideas as the influence of public opinion and the decisive role played by the Great Powers.

The research effort made by Professor Buse and his colleague Professor Dascalu is, undoubtedly, a comprehensive and extremely solid academic work and its appeal is provided by its in-depth documentation and literary attractiveness. It contains less of a "thesis" than an analysis of historical events and it presents the process of United Nations founding as an erratic and often contentious one. The biggest contribution this text makes to the burgeoning body of literature on the United Nations is to bring alive the issues that the founding fathers of the UN faced with each successive step toward the final creation.

Bogdan ANTONIU

GEOPOLITICS-HISTORY INTERFERENCE. "HISTORIA, QUO VADIS?"*

On 16th and 17th of April 1998 held in Bucharest, the International Conference "Geopolitics-History Interference. *Historia quo vadis?*" This conference represented the sixth scientific event of the kind organized by "Military History Review" within 1994-1998. The participants were university professors, researchers, political and military analysts, generals, active and retired officers and also war veterans. These were representatives of the Universities in Bucharest, Iassy and Craiova, as well as of The Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History, Academy of High Military Studies, "Nicolae Iorga" Institute of Romanian Academy, Air Force and Air Defence Academies, Naval Academy, EURISC Foundation, all of them from Romania, and also Military History Institutes in Ankara and Bratislava.

The communiqués of the conference were divided within two sections: *Military History Between Tradition Conservatism and Futures Challenges* and *A Possible Way for History: from a Europe of Nations towards the European Community*. The papers presented at the conference were published in a volume coordinated by the commander Gheorghe Vartic, the editorial staff chief of "Military History Review", in the collection "Military History Review" of Military Publishing House from Bucharest, in 1999, under the same title as of the conference: "Geopolitics-History Interference. *Historia, quo vadis?*"

The volume opens with an Argument, signed by the coordinator, in which he specified the aims of the conference and the book, insisting on the fact that "we support the idea that is need to give back and not write again the past, that the historians have to be the savants of truth and not of the transient political power (...). Only in this way the history will fulfill its mission of *magistra vitae* (...). The change of opinions between historians and political analysis facilitate the finding of the answer at obsessed question *Historia, quo vadis?*". The coordinator of the volume ended his argumentation in an optimistic view, saying that: "history demonstrated that our country was, is and can be a powerful factor, generator of stability in Central and South-East Europe".

As we know, the scientific debates of the historians and military analysts, indifferently if there are internal or international character, are developed in a restricted background, between specialists, and that is the reason why their mediation is restricted. The main merit of this volume is exactly of the papers of this conference, through offering the participants' opinions to the attention of a large public, who want to know new points of view concerning the international historical realities of the present. These opinions are so much of interest as they are representing the

* Edition coordinated by commander Gheorghe VARTIC, Bucharest, Edited by Military Publishing House [1999].

points of view of the best specialists in military specialists help to identify necessary solutions for residing the conflict and crises situations, that can appear in a certain moment.

After the introductory parte, the volume presents the open speeches of the conference offered by the state secretary, the chief of the Department for Defense Policy, his deputy and the Director of the Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History (colonel Nicolae Uscoi), the editorial staff chief of Military History Review, the conference host.

The main part of the volume is divided in the parts, according with the two sections of the conference. So, the first section: "The Military History Between Tradition and Futur Challenges" starts and ends with two interesting studies: "Considerations on History and Philosophy of History" (by colonel dr. Costică Prodan) and "Are Dogmatism, Reductionism and Isolationism Evergreen Companions of Military Historiography?" (by Commander <ret> Emilian Munteanu). The second Part "A Possible Way for History: from a Europe at Nations towards European Community" starts with the communique of colonel Prof. Cemalettin Taskiran and Major dr. Kadir Kasalak, "Historical Realities and International Relations" and ends with the communique of Colonel (ret) Florian Gârz "Military Alliances in XXI Century".

Because many of the points of view supported and argued by participants are new it have been useful to publish a tehniçal case and bibliographical card of these, so anyone who is interested in one of the topic has the possibility to get thoroughly into it.

Another merit of the volume is represented by fact that the text is presented in Romanian and English languages. So in this way the text can be read by large number of readers of English language.

Trough the points of view presented, the volume represented a fascinating reading, opening new themes of reflection on the contemporary realities.

Nicolae VIDENIE

GEPOLITICS AND HISTORY AT THE CROSSROAD BETWEEN MILLENNIA*

"Geopolitics and History at the Crossroad Between Millennia" is the result of two scientific reunions that were held in Bucharest, in May 1999: the International Symposium on Military Historiography at the End and the Beginning of a Millenium – Achievements and Perspectives and the Fourth International Colloquy of Military History where a special theme was debated:

"The Development of Political and Military Relations in Central and South – Eastern Europe in the 20'th Century".

Those two scientific reunions were attended by historians representing the research institutes and the commission of national history from Bulgaria, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Israel, Holland, Poland, Hungary and Turkey. As representatives of Romania participated both military and civilian historians from Romania Academy, the Universities of Bucharest and Craiova, the Institute of History and European Civilization – Iassy, from Romanian Military Archive and Military Academies, from National Military Museum, The Museum of Romanian Marine and the National Association of Veterans of War.

This volume, coordinated by col. Dr. Alesandru Duțu, col. Dr. Petre Otu and col. Gheorghe Vartic, and published by the Military Publishing House, contains all the documents and presentations made by the invitates. It may be considered a study dedicated to the Central and

* Edition coordinated by Col. Dr. Alesandru DUȚU, Col. Dr. Petre OTU, Comandor Gheorghe VARTIC, Edited by Military Publishing House, Bucharest, 2000.

South – Eastern Europe, a part of Europe that had experienced during a century dynamic changes, periods of peace that alternated with confrontation and war. The states of this geographic and geopolitical area, found themselves in the middle of major conflicts – being at the crossroad between the interest of Great Powers – and, also they provided the “facto” cause of the Two World Wars. During the so-called “cold war” some of these countries were protected by western alliances as NATO (Greece, Turkey), others were included in the socialist block – members of Warsaw Pact (Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Republic of Germany, Poland) and others were declared neutral (Austria, Yugoslavia).

History proved that Balkans and the rest of this part of Central and Eastern Europe are one of the most flamed part of Europe, concerning both military and politically point of view. Unfortunately, the latest conflict in Yugoslavia provided such a clear, but terrifiant example!

All the remarkable personalities that this scientific assembly gathered together tried to find new answers, to open new and subtle perspectives and to define and, possibly, make certain some hypotheses concerning the question: “What is the place and what is the role of Central and South – Eastern Europe at the end of this century?”

Answering to this specific question, historians analyzed the political and military relationships starting with the situation of the Balkans on the brink between the 19'th and the 20'th century, involving not only Romania, but also Serbia, Bulgaria and the creation of the first important alliances of this zone at the beginning of the century. There are presented different points of view, coming from both Romanian and Bulgarian documents and archives. There are also overviewed in accurate studies the development of the relations between the Balkan states during difficult and uncertain periods like First World War, the coalitions and the importance of the peace treaties before and after this world conflagration. At the same time, it is taken into discussion the less known aspects of the Romanian and Serbia relation (1918–1919); between Romania and the Hungarian Republic of People's Councils and the establishment of new political and military alliances in Central Europe; the military relations concerning Romania and France in the interwar period (1919 – 1939).

Special studies are dedicated to the Second World War, especially to the policy of alliances that all the states of this area were interested in, in order to consolidate their security and national borders and the effort of Romania's system of treaties for friendship and mutual assistance, may be considered an example. Secondly, there is analyzed the problem of intervention of the Great Powers and how the “Third Reich” included Romania into its expansion's calculation (Univ. Prof. Dr. Hans-Erich Wolkmann).

If we consider the “cold war” as the third world war, once again the Balkans played a dramatic role between the edge of a new precipice. Being situated at the crossroad of the interest of two Great Powers (USA and URSS), being deceived by the peace treaties and the agreements after the Second World War (“Romanian Perceptions on the Dispute Between the East and the West at the Beginning of the Cold War”, by Lt.-col. Dr. Constantin Hlihor), the evolution of the Central and South-Eastern European states during the “cold war” period involved special relations and attitudes (for example “Romania in the Soviet Plans of Agression Against Yugoslavia – 1948-1953”, by Lt.-col. Mircea Chiritoiu, “The End of The ‘Prague Spring’ “, by Dr. Adrian Pop).

The end of the “cold war” and of the bipolar relation brought up new perspectives of analyzing the present and the future. Now, it is necessary to re-consider the problems of NATO and EU enlargement versus Balkan's instability, the process of ensuring the security for the states that liberated themselves from the Soviet Block and the issue of the recent NATO presence “out of area” in the conflict of Yugoslavia. One of the conclusion of the Lect. Dr. Valentin Stan is that : “The Balkans represent a very important area in the process of consolidating the Euro – Athlantic security framework. The internal developments within the

Balkan societies indicate a democratic transformation, which is strongly supported by the Western democracies and organizations. Yet, only a few states have the prospects of becoming Western community members. The way they fulfil the qualitative transformation criteria is very relevant for the performance of these Balkan actors in their striving for NATO or EU membership." ("New Alliances in Europe and Balkan Instability" – pag.347).

As we have mentioned at the beginning, this volume is the result of two scientific reunions. That is the reason why, we could have never take into discussion only the political and military relations during the 20'th century in this area of Europe, unless the issue of the evolution of the means of studying history and military theory – methods and concepts – had been approached.

There were presented the contributions to the military historiography from different points of view, Romanian, German, Italian and Israeli, but all of them were related to the history of these states and they represented their own contribution to the world military history.

In the German history, the birth of German military historical writing is dated more than 200 years ago. Since then, the German military history has been preoccupied by the achieving of the "perfection of the art of war" (Scharnhorst) and understanding strategy and tactics in the context of politics, state, economic and army condition. Nevertheless, German military history recognized a great impasse after the Second World War as a result of the total defeat of national – socialist Germany. There was the moment when German military historians had to find new paths and new principles to be passed on. In "Challenges for German Military Historical Research on the verge of the 21'st Century", Col. Fredhelm Klein considers that in the recent years, an incredible phase of awakening has been produced due to a younger generation of historians. The fundamental concepts of "military", "war" and "gender" concerning the Two World Wars are presented as research objects in cultural and mental – historical perspective. A new view for a new approach: "the relationship of war and genocide in the social and cultural – historical perspective and the experience of the individual mental dimensions of war."

Also, "In the 50 Years of Existence of the State of Israel" the concept of "war" has a very thorny significance as it has been used as synonymous with "history" since the very day of birth of the new state of Israel (November. 1947). Prof. Dr. J.L. Wallach presents the development of Israel and its changing and unsecured relations with the Arab World. He underlines that Israeli history, especially the military one, has different meanings in comparison with others military histories, due to the conditions and causes that influenced the military and political actions of Israel. A study "Struggle for Israel's Security" edited and published by Israel Society for Military History is most concerned on the security matters and every chapter deals with a particular war between Israel and the Arab World. Also, Col. Benny Michelsohn shows in his presentation the new research methods in the military field: photo interpretation and monitoring the communication nets, as the most recent methods learnt from Yom Kippur War (1973), Peace for Gallilee War (1982) and Golf War.

One of the great achievements of Romanian military historiography is the "Military History of Romanian People" treaties – a "scientific scrutiny over the Romanian military phenomenon throughout the centuries" (Col. Dr. Aurel Pentelescu), an impressive work of research sustained by historians from all over the country, by publishing not only these treaties but other studies of great value and significance for Romanian people and for the world history, too.

Concerning Romanian Military historiography of the 90's, Lt.-col., Dr. Mircea Dogaru's opinion is that "the field of history research should reveal sine ira et studio the image of the past offering also, on the basis of the experiences of humanity, solutions for the present." Mircea Dogaru expresses the general opinion of the Romanian historians that the moment of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 was, on one hand, a moment of relief, a new beginning and, on the other hand, it represented a crossroad for the Romanian military history towards new directions of research: re-analyzing the military phenomenon, covering the "black holes" of

national history, opening for pluridisciplinary research and universality. Though there have been some difficulties for the Romanian military historians, the work of research in this field continued by individual efforts of great personalities whose work results consists in over 200 volumes of documents, memories, studies and monographs. All of these may confirm the value of a new kind of specialists formed during the 9'th decade of the century.

The conclusion is that military history can never lose its increasing attractiveness and its universality. Knowing that the 20 'th century was one of war, from this perspective, military history has a special importance with the preoccupation of the dark side of men, too.

At the crossroad between Millennia, a rethoric question has been often asked: "Historia quo vadis?". This volume, piece by piece, has gathered many answers. It is the choice of the reader to find its own answer and it was the effort of the historians to present "de facto" or the realistic clues.

Ileana ZAMFIRESCU

IMAGE MANAGEMENT IN THE COMMUNICATION PROCESS*

The issue information control and, through this, of the image on the individual, the organization, the state, has always existed in an empirical way, and efforts have been made to place the evolution of the others in the positive range. In their turn, those who encountered difficulty in forming a vision as close to reality as possible, tried to get beyond that image. The significance of image has gained spectacular dimensions in the technological era, due to the ever more complex means of creating the image, including, maintaining, manipulating, denying it and so on. This is because it is on the very vector, which shapes the image and renders value to, it that the succes of certain actions depends, from the most common ones, such as the launching and maintaining a product on the market, to action related to credibility of state institutions or private companies. Image management is a largely discussed topic in our times. Apart from such discussions, it is important to note that people are trying hard to make the image attain those characteristics which are able to generate credibility and, finally, success in business or political strategies.

From here, from the fabulous investments of intelligence, money and energy, used to generate and promote a certain image, there is just one more step to the negative side of the issue. Quite often, image may also mean only appearance (let us remember that Machiavelli was advising the Price to distinguish between "to be" and "to seem"), that is a false. We have to admit, however, that in the dialectic of the phenomenon, it is exactly such appearance that is necessary and often requested by the publiy itself. This occurs, of course, on condition that veridicality limits are not exceeded, and that the process stays within the morality sphere. This sphere widens constantly, and its bounderies are flexible due to the relativity and perishability principles of concepts. Therefore, in contemporary times the state itself turned into a "show producer", as Roger-Gerard Schwartzberg wrote in his book on the topic. Besides, we all see that the show, namely the image, is the one governing the period, when both democrats and dictatorships make use of identical means in order to maintain the *status quo* inside diffent countries, or to maintain honorability appearances for other countries' leaders, media and public opinion.

Communication, and its relevant result – the image –, are domains on which many researchers in linguistic and social sciences, in philosophy and antropology, are focusing their efforts. The reason is the fact that "communication projection and the deriving image production are responsible for major consequences in all fields of people's activities", as Ion Chiciudean puts it in a recent book dedicated to this phenomenon. One of the great merits of his book is, without

* Author: Ion CHICIULEAN; Edited by Licorna Publishing House, 2000.

doubt, his multi-disciplinary approach with regard to the modalities by which images are generated, come into systems, are coded in the intragroup communication and especially in the mass communication process, then how they become bearers of value and sense, have effects, exercise power and prove to be efficient in the diagnosis of certain situations of the state of the social systems.

Analyzing the most recent trends which pretend to appeal to psychology, social psychology, anthropology, history of mentalities and psycho-analysis, the researcher draw very accurate lines to the sphere of the phenomenon, in an effort to give an explanation based on the crucial coordinates of the bio-psycho-social incentive and articulations of images. The pertinence of this analysis is amplified by a very deep theoretical spirit in clearly identifying the intimate relations between all the dimensions responsible for the generation, dissemination and reception of images, with a beneficial emphasis on the need to establish a multifactor pattern for the interpretation and usage of such entities characterized by a great power and an irrefutable efficacy.

A thesis of undoubtable subtlety and with most useful further consequences for future scientific investigations, is the one stipulating that "images and mentalities are the products of collective mentality infused with a certain cultural pattern", which come out following the specific interpretation of social information". Hence, the idea that "there are very complex determination and mutual influence relations between mentalities and images". Combined with Fernard Braudel's theory regarding the historical periods, this leads to an interesting conclusion, which further leads to the interpretation of images as products of historically determined civilizations that also generate self-images. It also leads to effects of a pragmatic nature; no one can ignore the specifics of each message depending not only on the information to be conveyed, but also on the target-public, on its mental background and on its expectancy. It is rather easy to envisage the consequences that such an integrating, dynamic concept can have on military actions, which use images both as a propaganda and for more combat-like action.

The second part of the book presents "the possibilities of decreasing the vulnerability of organizations through the management of their images" by the use of three elements considered as essential: "managing the image of the organization, deliberate promotion of a favourable image, deliberate distortion of the image in order to affect the organisation". A special chapter briefly describes the methods and directions of investigation for assessing the image of an organization, which representats a necessary familiarization with the practical aspect of the phenomenon, with the action to be taken for correcting errors and malfunctions.

Ion Chiciudean's book is one exemple of the great effort to connect Romanian theoretical research and thinking to what is the latest investigation of a complex phenomenon – even a defining one for the contemporary world, I could say – due its extremely various ways in which it is manifested.

Nicolae BABOI

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE GLOBALIZATION ERA*

One of the most important processes the society is nowadays, confronted with is that of globalization. Generated by the globalisation tendencies of the national economic systems and by informational revolution, this process has profound consequences in the area of internatrional relationships, that of management and of the security systems.

* Author: Teodor FRUNZETI; Edited by Land Forces Academy Publishing House, Sibiu, 2000.

The recent paper written by Professor Teodor Frunzeti "International Organizations in the globalisations era" issued in Sibiu by the Land Forces Academy Publishing House is an analysis of these changes and their implications in the international organizations.

This paper is based on the idea that in a world which has multiple power centers, where the role and the influence of the international organizations are increasing, it is necessary to completely understand their relationships with different actors in the geopolitical field, especially with national states, ensuring in this way, proper conditions for understanding the activities meant to maintain national and international security.

An important aspect in the study is that of the relationship between the actors in international arena.

The states were until the end of the XIX th century, the main actors of the international relationship, arguing about their interests and harmonizing them in a geopolitical area.

Beginning with the second half of the XX th century, the inter-dependencies created in the post-industrial world, the world wide spread of information, the globalization of the security problems, determined the emergence of new actors within the contemporary geopolitical phenomenon, of non state powers where the international organizations play an important role.

Taking into account the relationship between state actors and the non-state ones, there is a tendency that the latter become the main actors in international relationships.

This is the conclusion drawn by Professor Teodor Frunzeti in his paper (pages 9: 23).

Having in view this tendency in the contemporary reality the author gives a special attention to the conceptual limitations regarding the type of international organizations.

From this perspective, he outlines two types of organizations: the inter-governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations. (page 9).

The first type includes those organizations whose members are the states and the second one includes private agencies groups of persons or private persons.

As related to the place of such organizations in the international relationship system, the author underlines the idea that the inter-governmental bodies, because of the number of members, the reason of being and their objectives, can be classified as having a world wide character (UN, UNESCO, HWO, IMF) or an inter-continental, regional or sub-regional ones (pages 13).

The NGO's cover, from a functional point of view, all the components of the political, economical and social activity.

Speaking from the geographical point of view, although they are largely spread, all over the world, the NGO's are more active in the Northern hemisphere where the most of the economically developed countries are situated, countries that have a mature political system and a democratic regime (page 12).

An interesting issue outlined in this paper is that of the future of the national state in the context of the changes produced by the globalization. As a result, the states are forced to face a double process of determination: an internal one as well as an external one.

In spite of all these, author thinks that human society still needs the national state "in order to give identity to people, to collect taxes and fees, to make the social security system functional, to ensure protection and preserve environment and to ensure, at least, the stability and internal security" (page 9).

When it comes to the analysis of the existing inter-governmental organizations, the author didn't plan to present them in an exhaustive way, he just wished to talk about the most representative ones, taking into account their field of expertise and the number of members. The organizations presented in the paper are as follows: United Nations Organization, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, European Union, Western European Union, European Council.

Starting with the conditions of their appearance, these organizations are presented in evolution, we are made aware of their aims and objectives, the principles they are based on the structure, the institutions and their functioning mechanisms.

Establishing such indicators gives the opportunity of having in one book, extremely important information regarding the main international organizations, and furthermore, a scientific analysis which provides unity and consistency to the paper.

It is noticeable that in the same context, Romania's position, demarches and actions within these organizations are also presented.

As concerns the numerous existing non-gouvernemental organizations (NGO's), Professor Frunzeti focused on four types: ethno-political groups, religious movements, terrorist groups, and multinational corporations. The reason for his choice was the fact that "all those organizations are very active from the political point of view exerting a continuous pressure on states, in order to accomplish their objectives; (page 235).

There are approximately 6000 ethnic groups in the world, while the UN includes only 179 states. The people belonging to such groups consider themselves persecuted most of the time because they are not allowed to participate in politics and don't have a complete representation in the states they live in. In order to settle these dissatisfactions, a number of states in Europe promoted a decentralization policy and granted extended local and regional autonomy to some ethnic-political groups. It is interesting that the increase of these dissatisfactions, which have appeared lately, have been generated by the end of the Cold/War, which conducted to the decrease of the population's loyalty towards the state (page 239) and to the appearance of "inter-ethnic competition" and of "ethnocentrism" (pages 290-241).

When analyzing the religious movement, the focus is set on the possibility that these movements could become a source of tensions in the international environment.

The extremist religious movements could produce five types of effects: irredentism, segregation or separatist revolt, immigration, diaspora and international terrorism (page 244).

In the author's opinion, the international terrorism "aggravates international tensions and undermines the authority and power of state" (page 245). It is important to keep in mind the fact that terrorism represents a strategy used by many movements, by political, religious, or ethnic minorities and even by states (state terrorism).

The analysis of multinational corporations and of their influence upon the international environment is a controversial issue which gives the author the opportunity to consider that "the benefits and the costs attributed to multinational corporations, (as soon as they reached the important position they detain nowadays), have increased and have become too important for the future evolution of the global society and therefore, they cannot to be ignored" (page 250). The synthetic outline of the positive and negative aspects of the influence of these non-state actors, within the geopolitical area, represents an important contribution of the author, to the analysis of the globalization process.

A thorough study on the multiple implications the new actors that emerged on the international arena have over the evolution of the contemporary society and "a proper concept on the present day world politics "are needed" (page 257). This is the conclusion reached by Professor Frunzeti.

"International Organizations in the globalization era" represents, therefore an excellent and necessary study, concerning the actors who govern and influence the present geopolitical area. It addresses both the experts in the political field and the non-experts readers, the people interested in the human society evolution.

GEOPOLITICS TODAY" *

The end of the Cold War, the des-integration of the former Soviet Union, the fall of the Berlin wall, the expansion of the Islamic world, the emergence and consolidation of the high regions are some of the contemporary processes and tendencies that give a new meaning and significance to the discipline and theory of Geopolitics. Redrawing frontiers between states, delimitating sheres of influence, intensifyin economic battle as the new form of conflict are processes that take place regularly and ask for a deep analysis of the attributes of the state, of the elements constituing the basis for the power of the state, an analysis of who the new performers on the international arena are. That is, the processes and tendencies that cross contemporary and give it its distinctive character as to past periods ask for a geopolitical approach.

In this context in which Geopolitics regains its status as a powerfully explanatory theory of the state and its performance, the book "Geopolitics", issued at the beginning of this year by the School of Communication and Public Relations, offers the Romanian reader the opportunity to gain insight into the main changes brought about by contemporary period, to acquire a conceptual apparatus which to scrutinize and better understand what happens in today's world politics and economics. The endeavor of the authours to present the main concepts of classical and modern Geopolitics, to use these concepts in order to present and explain some contemporary phenomena is of interest not only to specialists, to people directly connected to the field or the field of international relations, but is of interest to the public at large because, more than anytime before, international processes are of national or local interest and they influence the lives of everyday citizen in a way and proposition that hasn't happened in history until now.

The book has a threefold aim pursued in the following chapters: "Birth of Geopolitics", "The German Scholl of Geopolitics", "The Anglo-American School of Geopolitics", "Romania: Geographical Position/ Geopolitical Position", "Romania's Geopolitical Strengths and Weaknesses", "Population", "Islam-an Expanding World", "The Russian Laboratory", "European Union", "Europe: Enlargement or Consolidation", "NAFTA-North America's Model of Economic Integration", "Asia-Pacific Region".

The first aim is to offer a thourough presentation of the basic notions, ideas and perspectives of the **main schools of geopolitics**, such as the German School, the French School, the Anglo-American School, Roumanian School, so as to easy the insight into the way that various authors and thinkers have conceptualized and explained the performance of the state over time.

In presenting various schools of Geopolitics, the authours have the purpose of signaling what are the geopolitical inquires and answers that have a high degree of viability, irrespective of various historical or geographical context. For exemple, what is most significant in relation to the discipline here of interest is that it tries study the **potential of states**, to "offer an equation of the power of the state. It is less important whether the elements that compose this equation change over time, are replaced by new ones order to keep up with changes in the real world, or entertain relations with one another. What is essential is the effort to establish such an equation" (p. 19). Thereforem Geopolitics, can retain its explanatory power if it maintains a dynamic equilibrium between the physical attributes of the state and its attributes in the field of knowledge, information, culture, economy, if it manages to "incorporate the main points and perspectives of a modern theory of development" (p. 23).

* Authors: Paul DOBRESCU, Alina BARGAOANU Edited by "David Ogilvy" School of Communication and Public Relations Bucharest, 2001

Classical and Modern Elements of Power – A Necessarily Dynamic Equilibrium

The second aim to present in a geopolitical perspective some “hot spots” of today's world and some of the economic and social processes that have a deep geopolitical significance. By such “hot spots” the authors understand: Russia and, generally, the former Soviet space, the Islamic world, Central Europe, Asia-Pacific zone. Such zones allow the testing of former geopolitical laws regarding the importance of the territory of state, its size, position, neighborhood, population, access to sea routes and proximity to natural resources. Equally, such zones challenge the propositions, of classical Geopolitics and constitute genuine laboratories where to put to work new concepts such as: ge-culture, crono-politics, eco-politics, geo-government.

Some of such “hot spots” seem to give more credit to classical elements of power, for example, the Islamic world, dwelling on sheer size of the population, on territory and proximity to oil reserves and to important commercial routes of the moment. Some other, such as Japan, seem to grossly contradict the classical attributes as power, forcing the conceptualization of power starting from the **soundness of the national strategy of development** and from the **political will to implement it** (p. 202). Russia, on the other hand, finds itself in the dilemma of whether to embrace a classical model of development, dwelling on size, massiveness, expansion of territory, powerful and numerous army and a modern development track asked for by the postindustrial age, characterized by internal economic performance, power to coagulate a region, to act as its legitimate, acknowledged leader (p. 123). And the development of a country like China seem to bring to light all the elements, classical and modern, that can explain and predict the evolution of a state in contemporary times: size and natural resources, population, geographical position, military might, and most important and in line with one of the main propositions of the book, mastery of a sound national strategy of development and political will to stick to it (pp. 193-194).

A separate discussion is allotted to Romania, drawing upon an important distinction between geographical position and geopolitical position and upon the costs of mistaking one for the other. The problem of Romanian development and economic reform is regarded not only a national context, but in the context of getting connected to European and international tendencies, of integrating in what is usually called “global neighborhood”. The consequences of failing in the field of economic reforms, of not catching up with modern trends do not regard integration as such, but rather the marginal position occupied in an integrated world (p. 83).

Regionalization vs. Globalization

The third aim of the book that we are presenting is to draw attention upon some processes that give contemporary world a distinctive mark and bear geopolitical consequences: **regionalization** and the tension, sometimes even conflict between this trend and the other all-encompassing process of **globalization**. The existence of the main economic regions of today's world: European Union, Asia-Pacific, NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) challenge and put into new light the geopolitical competition, no longer headed by any individual state, now matter how important and powerful, but by a coalition of states. These two processes give a different configuration to the relationship between the individual state and the region, to problems of sovereignty and independence, the relationship between the state and the multinational companies, the relationship between regional economy and commerce and the international ones. The state is no longer the main performer on the international arena, but the economic region plays this role in a more and more pregnant manner, which leads to a new form of continentalism, even to the redrawing of ordinary persons' mental maps.

As the same time, two processes of regionalization and globalization and the tension between them launch and amplify the debate about the elements that compose classical Geopolitics (mainly physical and natural attributes of the state) and modern Geopolitics (economy, information, culture, knowledge, technology).

Thus, the problem of European regionalization, for example, is placed in a larger international context, the knowledge of which may help a more national approach to Romania's adherence to European structures and the design of a more sound strategy of integration. Recent events, such as the European summit at Nice are interpreted in the context of **European dilemma between deepening and widening**, a dilemma brought about by the fact that Europe itself is caught in a "head-to-head" competition with the other two big economic regions.

Geopolitics and Political Decision

The analyses and insights offered by the book "**Geopolitics**" are based on a rich thorough bibliography, offering the Romanian reader access to literature that could hardly be known otherwise. The book also forces the reader to get involved into a genuine dialogue with maps, a dialogue that facilitates access to things and realities otherwise taken for granted: the compact mass of land known as Eurasia, the expansion of the Islamic world, China's strategic position in the South China Sea.

"**Geopolitics**" contributes to the larger debate regarding the connection between research centers and the centers of political decision, regarding the practical virtues of a discipline, its strategic character, of whether a discipline should guide political action or should isolate itself from what happens in the real world and maintain its complete neutrality.

As mentioned before, the signals the consequences of lacking a larger perspective when dealing with the performance of the state, of lacking a long-term strategy and vision, the costs of missing the regional and global context. That is, the consequences that the state may come to bear when lacking a geopolitical approach.

Dumitru IACOB

THE HISTORY AND THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS*

In the actual geopolitical context of Europe, when the problem of Euro-Atlantic integration is primordial for Romania, there is an acute need for knowing the history and the theory of international relations. In Romanian scientific scenery we notify a publication at Cantes publishing house (Jassy-2000), the volume *"The History and the Theory of International Relations – Studies"* under the coordination of Mrs. Catalin Turliuc. This publication encompasses important studies and researches of repute historians and analysts of international relations. These were presented at The National Symposium *"Concepts and Methodologies in the International Relations"*, edition IV, 21-22 may 1999, organized by "Petru Andrei" University from Jassy.

Mrs. Emilian Munteanu, defining the "subject" and the "object" of history points out in his article *"The General Characteristics of Policies : status, relations, transformations, predictions"*, the phenomenon of Romania's transformation from *object* of history in *subject* of history in the period of Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceausescu communist regime.

This intellectual initiative must be viewed as a defense against the isolationism applied by the *subject* of history, that is the certain agents who influence the way of history (e.g. USA nowadays). Obviously we must not transform ourselves in an *object* of history, meaning a material easily to model by the agent (*subject*). On the contrary we must fight to go out from so-named "gray zone" which represents those nations incapable of being subject of history, but in the same time do not arouse interest for being transformed in "object" of history, just remaining out of the history.

Here a question arises: Which is the leader's role of a nation in guiding his people for becoming a "subject" or an "object" of history? There are few studies that have tried to give an answer.

Mrs. Dumitru Ivanescu, a minute researcher of documents from historical archive, presents in his article *"The Union of Romanian Principates and the Position of Great Powers"*, the importance of a nation chief's verticality in international relations, making a case study of Romanian position at the beginning of A.I. Cuza rule. Although two of the Great Powers of that moment (Ostrich, Turkey) tried to stop the Union, the ruler A.I. Cuza did not hesitate to be firmly decided concerning the interference in internal affairs. He affirmed in front of the time powers: "if Turkey lose the time coming with military forces in Muntenia ... I go in front of my people and if we have to die, i will be the first who offers his chest..."

The rule was conscious that a real war would have been fatal for Principates, as the ambassador of France at Constantinople said, who received the mission to gather information concerning the economical, demographically and military-strategically potential of these-one. Cuza intended to take advantages of France's interest in Principates. It is remarkable the rule ability "to percept" the interest accorded by France in controlling the South Eastern Europe, Bosfor and Dardanele's straits. A war in this area would have affected the interests of France. So, the history underline the role of perception in historical and geostrategical analysis. Mrs. Constantin Hlihor in his study: *"Perception as an Element of Geopolitical and Geostrategical Field in the Analysis of International Relations"* believes that according with the nature of perception the actors adopt a certain type of political, military, economical or other type of comportment. In geopolitical field the perception could be on geographical area, on the place and their role in power equation, on the self-interests or on the opponents too. In geopolitical field the perception is directed through the cognition of sensible or hard points of the opponents in the economical, political or military point of view. In this regard the actors tend to analyze the

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deficiencies of potential, for occupying a better position in the power equation. During the Cold War this continue correction of perception on self-potential, but especially on that of the enemy, led to the beginning of course of armament among the Great Powers.

The perception together with political, economical or geostrategical interest can determine the way of an actor's action in geopolitical field. Mrs. Liviu Drugus in his study "*Nationalism and Etatism vs. Globalism and Individualism – a Postmodern and Transdisciplinary Analysis*" bring into relief the necessity of interests correlation between any states with his partner. Regarding this point the application of the game theory so-named "The Prisoners Dilemma" is very suggestive. It is the simplest game relies on to actors each of them having two possible actions, no matter if they are economical or political decisions. Let's suppose that the two actors are named A and B. If A cooperates with B, they will have a low profit of 10 monetary units, but sure. That one who is not agreed with such a modest profit tries a way that could bring to him a profit of 40 monetary units. This could happen only if his partner continues to respect the contract of cooperation while he trade him. Of course he assume the risk of loosing, situation that could happen only if his partner makes his mind not to respect the contractual relation. This is the case of the two World Wars in which all the actors had unrecovered damages. So it reaches at the paradoxical formula: everyone depends on everyone, meaning that nobody is capable to impose absolutely free a certain conduit on the international arena. The consciousness of the situation that we are all together in the same boat, led to the idea: any attack against somebody is directly or indirectly an attack against everybody. So, here we have a possible explanation for the globalization tendency.

Trying to give some explanation to the globalization impact on international relations Mrs. Catalin Andronic emphasis in his article "*To 21st Century. Models and Tends of International System Evolution*" possible ways of power structure evolution at international level, such as "the planetary village". The global interdependence at economical, technological, informational, cultural and environment level, the increase of corporation's role and transnational firms, the apparition and development of Internet are appreciated as having an effect of diminution of national state role in international relations. The word of 21st century viewed through the idea of "the planetary village" will be one in which her main parting lines will not be between civilizations (S. Huntington theory) or ethnic, religious or national groups. On contrary between those who will be integrated in the "network" of global system and those who will not take part from this *network*.

At European level it can be viewed a break into this *network* of global system. Facing with USA hegemony, with the extension of NATO through East and with the increasing investors interests in Caspian Sea, Russia tries to stop these objectives which are viewed as main threats to her security. As follows, Russia proposed herself as primordial objectives for external policy, the integration of Independent States Community (CSI) and to close the relations with China and Iran, posting for being cold with Europe.

Concerning the Russian policy before Europe, Mrs. Constantin Buchet in his study "*Germany and Russian Federation in '90s. Geopolitical, geoeconomical and security perceptions*" says that Germany do not accept the neutrality belt between Russia and East European states eager for integration in euro-atlantic structures (UE, UEC, NATO). Germany insist on the theory elimination affirming that Russia have not to view the integration of east and Central European states in UE as a threats, but rather an increasing area of stability in region.

Bonn tends to spare the Russia susceptibility of isolation in system because of the occidental structure extinction by spoiling this sentiment through financial assessment accorded to Russia, in fact "the bill" for reunification support. I addition as a confirmation of what it was said,

the Germany closes a bilateral treaty with Russia at 9 November 1990 where is mentioned a non-aggression clause: "when one of these parts is aggressed, the other one do not sustain the aggressor".

Russia follows "the non-alignment" of ex-unional republics and east states, by maintaining their neutrality joined with the elimination of unfavorable alliance for Moscow. Trying to stop their "occidentalisation", Russia pose as a stabilization factor of "gray zone" – East Europe and the ex-soviet empire space – giving the impression of mesianism and Russian imperial mentality.

The dispute between Russia and European states has her roots – as Mrs. Catalin Turliuc emphasis in his study "*National Programs in the Great Power Policy – France, Prussia, Russia – and the Extinction of European Order to East*" – even during Petre the Great, from the very beginning of Russian nationalism aparition. Mrs. C.Turliuc believes that the evolution of russian nationalism had three stages: a) the recognition and acceptation of Russia inferiority on the way to European modern development, temporal situated during Petre the Great and his successors; b) the optimistic entrance in competition with European Powers and the ways found for redraw when there was no potential and forces available, the stage characteristic for Ecaterina IInd and her successors, and finally c) the cultural relativism and the resentment before Occident and his values, especially at the end of 18th century and the beginning of the new one. These three perspectives had to mark definitively the historical destiny of this great power.

Other opinions regarding similar problems – the political, economical and geostrategical role of Russia at international level – we could meet in the study "*Is the American Message Credible Yet?*" wrote by Mrs. Liviu Marius Bejenariu.

A crossroads moment of 1990's – the disappearance of Soviet Union and unional republic's coming out of Moscow tutelage – leded to a hard fight for the exploitation of natural wealth from ex-soviet space. A divergent problem is the juridical aspect of Caspian Sea, that is the elucidation of property on petroleum and gas reserve, which generates great disputes between riverside states.


Mrs. Marius Bejenariu affirmed that USA have not remained impassible to the Caspian Sea problem. Risking to become a Russia rival, these affirm their selves interests by sustaining the states of region to split economical and political from Russia. This will make impossible a Union directed by Moscow. However in December 1991 immediately after the disintegration of USSR, relying on their economical dependence the setting up of CSI represented an important tramp of Moscow for bringing back to the order of ex-republics.

The most efficient way used by Russia for bringing back "to listen" of ex-republics is the army. In 1992 CSI under Moscow pressure close a security treaty by witch they accorded to the Russian army the defense of their own borders.

Except Baltic states and Azerbaijan, the troops are deployed all over the ex-soviet republics. The official mission of these forces is to defend the borders of these republics and to protect the Russian ethnics, but in reality these are a screen for imperial way of Moscow. The adviser for external policy of president Aliev said that: "Moscow intends to provoke interethnic, interstate and religious conflicts for keeping the region in a continuous instability" just for justifying her interventions and the guardian role of peace in region.

As we could observe, this volume "The History and Theory of International Relations – studies" (Cantes publishing house – Jassy 2000) is a relatively heterogeneous study but very wealthy in historical and geostrategical significances. Considering fulfill the intellectual mission, it remains the hope that this initiative would open other debates on such a complex and incitive domain not only for analyst of international relations but also for public opinion.

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