UNIVERSITY OF BUCHAREST

CENTRE FOR EURO-ATLANTIC STUDIES

EURO-ATLANTIC

STUDIES

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Geopolitical progress in the Euro-Atlantic Area, at the end of this century, has determined the critical changes within the global security environment. The end of the Cold War opened the way to the bipolar world dissolution and redifined Europe as an important actor in establishing a new security architecture.

Consequently, the nuclear confrontation possibility was dramatically diminished in Europe. 21 st. at the beginning of the twenty first century Western Europe, as a pilar of Euro Atlantic security architecture, will face two major challenges.

Firstly Western Europe must redifine the relationship with United State and the Euro Atlantic Security Structures.

Secondly it must streamline the attitude with regard to the Central and Eastern European Countries.

During the Cold War era, the primary mission of NATO and EU was to strengthen Western Europe, from the military and economic point of view, to oppose firmly the Moscow and Communism offensive. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the breaking down of the communist regime within its satellites, the role and mission of NATO and EU were fundamentally changed.

Now, these key institutions, must create a democratic, prosperous and undivided Europe and a new Security architecture.

This purpose can not be reached without a coherent and appropiate solution to the conflicts, more specifically, the ethnic-religious ones, and moreover, without a harmonization of interests among EU, US and the Russian Federation. An enquiry into the major trends of the last century meant at unveiling the complex links between today's historical events and the legacy of distress and confrontation of the Cold War might offer a sound direction towards understanding tomorrow's construct. This is what the following texts aim at.

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LE RÔLE DU CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE DANS LA NOUVELLE ARCHITECTURE EUROPÉENNE ET SA COMPÉTENCE DANS LE DOMAINE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME

Discours de Hans Christian Krüger
Secrétaire Général adjoint du Conseil de l'Europe

Université de Bucarest, le 24 mars 1999

C'est un grand honneur pour moi de m'adresser à vous ici, aujourd'hui, dans cette prestigieuse université.

Je suis très heureux d'être de nouveau en Roumanie. Ce n'est pas la première fois que je viens dans votre grand pays mais je suis chaque fois impressionné. La Roumanie est membre du Conseil de l'Europe depuis octobre 1993. Elle est donc bien établie parmi les pays démocratiques européens où elle joue un rôle important et rassurant dans les conflits qui nous entourent. Nous comptons sur vous, les Roumains, pour aider à établir la paix et la stabilité dans les régions encore très tourmentées des Balkans et d'ailleurs.

Je voudrais vous soumettre à votre attention un certain nombre de réflexions sur le rôle du Conseil de l'Europe dans son nouveau contexte paneuropéen et sur la compétence de notre Organisation dans le domaine des droits de l'homme. Je rappellerai tout d'abord les motifs qui ont contribuer à la création du Conseil de l'Europe, ainsi que les mandats qui lui ont été confiés à l'origine. Puis j'évoquerai brièvement l'évolution de l'Organisation; et enfin, je dirai quelques mots sur sa situation actuelle et sur le rôle qu'elle joue et qu'elle doit jouer par rapport à ses États membres, en particulier dans le domaine des droits de l'homme.

À l'origine du Conseil de l'Europe, il y a deux facteurs importants, qui constituent en quelque sorte sa raison d'être. D'une part, il a été fondé dans le sillage de la Deuxième guerre mondiale pour manifester la volonté des États européens d'interdire à tout jamais que les peuples soient traités de la manière dont ils avaient été traités sous le joug nazi. D'autre part, le rideau de fer venait de s'abattre et la guerre froide avait commencé, guerre qui allait pendant 40 ans diviser l'Europe en deux camps: le camp occidental, soucieux de promouvoir la démocratie et les droits de l'homme; le camp de l'Est qui disait, lui aussi, aspirer à la démocratie et aux droits de l'homme, mais dont les conceptions à cet égard ne correspondaient nullement à ce que nous entendons aujourd'hui par démocratie et droits de l'homme.

- adhésion à divers traités en matière de droits de l'homme, et respect des droits de l'homme en général;
- exécution scrupuleuse des arrêts de la Cour des Droits de l'Homme;
- coopération pour les exercices de suivi, tant au niveau de l'Assemblée parlementaire qu'à celui du Comité des Ministres.

J'en viens maintenant au développement de la protection des droits de l'homme en Europe. La protection des droits de l'homme en Europe a connu ces dernières années, comme tout le reste, un développement exceptionnel. Du point de vue historique, la chute du mur de Berlin est encore récente. Il n'y a pas longtemps, le bloc de l'Est existait encore; même placé sous le signe de la glasnost et de la perestroïka. Il y avait encore l'état d'urgence en Pologne, le régime musclé de Ceausescu en Roumanie et le régime d'Enver Hodxa en Albanie. Tout cela est à présent de l'histoire. En un laps de temps extrêmement court, le système politique des pays de l'Europe centrale et orientale s'est fondamentalement réformé. Presque partout, les valeure de la démocratie pluraliste et de l'État de droit ont inspiré les lignes directrices des réformes globales qui, naturellement, ne peuvent trouver du jour au lendemain leur traduction dans les faits.

Le Conseil de l'Europe et d'autres organisations internationales, telles que l'Organisation pour la sécurité et la coopération en Europe - l'OSCE- ainsi que l'Union européenne, apportent dans une large mesure ce qu'on pourrait appeler une aide au développement pour permettre à nos voisine de se doter d'un nouvel ordre démocratique incluant la prééminence du droit. On déploie des efforts particuliers pour leur transmettre l'expérience qui est celle des États de l'Europe occidentale dans le domaine de la protection nationale et internationale des droits fondamentaux, sur la base de la Convention européenne des

Droits de l'Homme. Quoi qu'il en soit, les États de l'Europe centrale et orientale se sont fondé, pendant les décennies, sur une interprétation des droits fondamentaux qui était focalisée non pas sur les droits individuels du citoyen, mais sur les droits de la société qui existait sous le régime communiste.

On peut toutefois se demander si les institutions, telles qu'elles existent aujourd'hui, sont à même de remplir cette mission de façon satisfaisante. À cet égard, il ne faut pas perdre de vue que le système européen de protection des droits de l'homme se trouvait lui-même, à l'époque des bouleversements en Europe de l'Est, dans une phase dynamique de développement. Le système fonctionnait déjà au maximum de sa capacité; avec ces nouveaux défis, il devenait indispensable de le réformer. C'est pourquoi, avant d'aborder les évolutions les plus récentes, il est utile de rappeler les origines de la Convention européenne des Droits de l'Homme et d'évoquer brièvement sa trajectoire et les succès qui l'ont accompagnés.

Les débuts de la Convention s'inscrivirent dans un tournant historique comme celui que nous connaissons aujourd'hui. Peut-être est-ce uniquement pour cette raison que les États de l'Europe occidentale étaient prêts à consentir à d'importantes concessions et à se soumettre à un contrôle international dans un domaine qui, jusqu'alors, relevait sans conteste de leurs affaires intérieures. D'un côté, la protection internationale des droits de l'homme devait empêcher ces pays de sombrer à nouveau dans la barbarie qui avait caractérisé le régime fasciste; d'un autre côté, il s'agissait de faire barrage à toute extension du totalitarisme stalinien en Europe. Le Statut du Conseil comporte un engagement envers la démocratie, l'État de droit et la protection des droits fondamentaux.

Très rapidement cette protection a acquis, et conservé, une place centrale dans les activités de la nouvelle organisation. Dès 1950, dix-huit mois seulement après la création du Conseil de l'Europe, la réaction de la Convention européenne des Droits de l'Homme était achevée. Entrée en vigueur en 1953, la Convention s'applique aujourd'hui aux quarante pays membres du Conseil de l'Europe, et tous les nouveaux membres du Conseil de l'Europe sont censés à la ratifier.

Il existe un lien entre la Convention et la Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme adoptée par les Nations Unies le 10 décembre 1948, à laquelle son préambule fait référence. Comme il était impossible, à l'époque, dans le cadre des Nations Unies, de convertir la Déclaration universelle en un traité contraignant en droit international, les États européens optèrent pour une solution régionale. Toutefois cela ne se fit pas sans difficultés. La proposition initiale d'instituer une Cour unique des Droits de l'Homme, dotée d'une compétence obligatoire pour examiner les recours des États ou des citoyens directement concernés, recours dits individuels, ne fit pas l'unanimité. On se mit finalement d'accord sur un compromis sous la forme d'un mécanisme complexe comprenant plusieurs instances d'examen des requêtes. Outre la Cour européenne des Droits de l'Homme, on créa la Commission européenne des Droits de l'Homme, et il fut prévu d'attribuer au Comité des Ministres du Conseil de l'Europe, organe politique, la compétence pour statuer définitivement sur le bien-fondé des requêtes dans le domaine des droits de l'homme. La Cour ne fut investie d'aucune compétence obligatoire, et la Commission elle-même ne fut reconnue compétente pour examiner des recours individuels qu'à la condition que les États concernés aient fait des déclarations supplémentaires.

Tous les États signataires ne ratifièrent pas la Convention immédiatement; et parmi ceux qui la ratifièrent, nombreux furent ceux qui prirent leur temps pour faire les déclarations facultatives par lesquelles ils reconnaissaient le droit de recours individuel et la compétence de la Cour. Cela explique certains retards initiaux. Il fallut attendre 1955 pour que le système des recours individuel devant la Commission, c'est-à-dire la pierre angulaire de la protection des droits de l'homme en Europe, commence à fonctionner. Quant à la Cour, elle, ne fut créée qu'en 1959. Par la suite, le système de la Convention ne tarda pas à s'affirmer. La Convention fut ratifiée par un nombre croissant d'États, qui firent tous, plus tôt ou plus tard, les déclarations facultatives; si bien qu'en 1989 tous les „vieux" États membres du Conseil de l'Europe, au nombre de ving-trois, furent entièrement soumis au contrôle international exercé par les organes de la Convention; c'est-à-dire que le mécanisme des recours était susceptible d'être utilisé tant par les citoyens que par les États de la Convention.

Dans le domaine de la protection des droits fondamentaux, il était né, un espace judiciaire unifié, s'étendant du Cap Nord à la Sicile et du Portugal à la Turquie. Au fil des années se développa à Strasbourg une vaste jurisprudence concernant les questions des droits de l'homme et couvrant pratiquement tous les domaines de l'activité gouvernementale. Il y eut un certain nombre de requêtes étatiques, sur la toile de fond des questions politiquement explosives, comme par exemple, en 1967, la suppression de la protection des droits fondamentaux par les colonels en Grèce; ou encore, les restrictions imposées à ces mêmes droits par le régime militaire turc en 1981; ou bien le traitement des terroristes présumés dans le Tirol du Sud et en Irlande du Nord; ou l'intervention de la Turquie

On ne peut pas „expliquer" le Conseil de l'Europe que si l'on a à l'esprit de ces deux facteurs historiques. Ils nous permettent de comprendre un grand nombre de caractéristiques de notre Organisation, en même temps que la grande force qui est la sienne - une force qu'elle tire de sa volonté de mettre l'accent sur les convictions morales et les valeurs spirituelles, plutôt que sur la puissance économique ou militaire.

Le but du Conseil de l'Europe est „de réaliser une union plus étroite entre ses membres, afin de sauvegarder et de promouvoir les idéaux et les principes qui sont leur patrimoine et de faciliter leurs progrès économique et social" (article 1 a du Statut). Et dans le préambule du Statut, les États se déclarent „inébranlablement attachés aux valeurs spirituelles et morales qui sont le patrimoine commun de leurs peuples et qui sont à l'origine des principes de liberté individuelle, de liberté politique et de prééminence du droit, sur lesquels se fonde toute démocratie véritable". Toutes les activités du Conseil de l'Europe procédent de cette conviction et ont cette finalité. Tout est orienté vers les valeurs spirituelles et morales de notre société.

Les conditions d'adhésion au Conseil de l'Europe, adhésion qui est, bien entendu, volontaire, sont clairement définies; et les nouveaux États membres ont dû, eux aussi, y souscrire; ces conditions sont les suivantes:

- adhésion au Statut et aux valeurs de l'Organisation, telles qu'elles se sont développées au fil des années;
- mise en conformité des institutions de l'État et des systèmes juridiques avec les principes fondamentaux de démocratie, de prééminence du droit et de respect des droits de l'homme;
- choix des représentants du peuple au moyen d'élections libres et régulières, fondées sur les principes du suffrage universel;
- respect de la liberté d'expression et de la liberté de la presse, y compris des pensées et des propos qui peuvent choquer;
- respect et protection des minorités nationales.

Conscient du fait que personne n'est parfait, le Conseil de l'Europe a pu, à tel où tel moment, admettre en son sein des États que n'avaient pas encore satisfait intégralement aux conditions d'adhésion. Il en est résulté une certaine controverse, voire une polémique, entre les membres du Conseil de l'Europe. Certains considéraient qu'il était préférable d'exiger aux États qu'ils remplissent intégralement les conditions avant d'être admis; ils estimaient en effet que l'Organisation devait affirmer ses principes et que la probabilité était plus grande de voir les principes en question respectés par des États extérieurs à l'Organisation plutôt que par des États déjà membres. D'autres, au contraire, pensaient qu'il serait plus facile et plus efficace d'imposer les normes de l'Organisation à des membres aussi bien qu'à des non-membres; et, par conséquent, ils approuvaient la politique déclarée du Conseil de l'Europe consistant à admettre des États avant même qu'ils n'eussent rempli toutes les conditions - étant entendu, naturellement, que les gouvernements de ces États prenaient l'engagement de faire le maximum pour aligner leur législation et leurs pratiques sur les normes de l'Organisation.

Personellement, j'ai toujours appartenu à ce dernier groupe; ma position s'explique d'ailleurs par une raison supplémentaire. Je suis en effet convaincu que pour les citoyens le droit d'introduire un recours devant les organes de la Convention européenne des Droits de l'Homme constitue l'une des meilleures garanties du respect, par les États, de leurs engagements. Les 30 dernières années nous en ont apporté la preuve. Or, une telle possibilité de recours pour les citoyens suppose que l'État concerné soit membre du Conseil de l'Europe.

Une adhésion qui intervient lorsque l'État concerné ne satisfait pas entièrement aux normes du Conseil de l'Europe a pour corollaire l'acceptation, par le nouveau membre, de certaines obligations:

dans le nord de Chypre. En même temps, il y eut une quantité énorme et croissante de recours individuels: plus de 30000 depuis 1955, et environ 4500 par an actuellement, le nombre augmentant continuellement.

Certes, la quantité des recours qui aboutissent est beaucoup plus modeste; malgré tout, quelque 2500 ont été jugés recevables, parmi lesquels 200 environ ont été réglés par la Commission européenne des Droits de l'Homme, tandis que plus de 1000 ont donné lieu à des arrêts de la Cour européenne des Droits de l'Homme. Dans de nombreux cas, un dédommagement a été versé aux requérants; des décisions ont été annulées ou revues; des grâces ont été accordées; des procédures ont été suspendues etc.

Outre les solutions apportées à tel ou tel cas individuel, les États ont souvent pris, à la suite des procédures engagées au titre de la Convention, des mesures d'ordre général, telles que des amendements législatifs, voire constitutionnels, ou une modification de leur pratique judiciaire ou administrative. Il n'y a quasiment aucun pays européen qui ait échappé à un constat de violation de la Convention. Certes, dans la plupart de nos États, les citoyens européens ne sont heureusement pas soumis à la torture ni à des peines ou traitements inhumains - encore que, même ici, dans certains États européens, des griefs fondés à cet égard aient pu être formulés. Les citoyens européens se plaignent bien plus fréquemment de la lenteur des procédures judiciaires et de leur manque d'équité, de la durée et des conditions de la détention, ainsi que de l'ingérence de l'État dans la vie privée et familiale, qu'il s'agisse de perquisitions, d'écoutes téléphoniques ou de la déchéance de l'autorité parentale. Beaucoup de requêtes, également, sont introduites par des étrangers faisant l'objet d'une mesure d'expulsion vers leur pays d'origine, dans lequel ils prétendent qu'ils subiront de mauvais traitements, ou avec

lequel ils ont rompu les liens depuis longtemps, mais dont ils sont demeurés ressortissants. Les requêtes qui parviennent quotidiennement à Strasbourg sont d'une infinie variété.

C'est dans ce contexte qu'il convient de considérer quelques - unes des évolutions les plus récentes en manière de protection des droits de l'homme en Europe. L'acquis principal est sans aucun doute, comme nous l'avons dit, l'acceptation pleine et entière du système de la Convention par tous les États européens - ce qui, à l'origine, était loin d'aller de soi et n'a pu être obtenu qu'au prix d'efforts importants. Ce n'est qu'en 1989 que cette évolution est parvenue à son terme.

L'acceptation intégrale des obligations conventionnelles par la plupart, puis par l'ensemble des pays membres du Conseil de l'Europe, a entraîné un énorme accroissement du nombre de requêtes, qui a triplé depuis 1985, pour atteindre aujourd'hui environ 12000 par an. Cela a induit une charge de travail considérable pour les organes de la Convention, qui n'étaient plus à même, de remplir avec les moyens mis à leur disposition, leur tâche dans de délais raisonnables. La durée des procédures à Strasbourg faisait l'objet des critiques sans cesse plus nombreuses, d'autant que les organes de la Convention ont, entre autres, pour mission de contrôler le caractère raisonnable de la durée des procédures judiciaires internes. Des mesures s'imposaient donc pour simplifier et accélérer la procédure engagée au titre de la Convention. Un certain nombre d'améliorations a pu être obtenu grâce à la réorganisation interne de l'infrastructure et de la procédure, notamment celles de la Commission.

Un problème structurel subsistait toutefois, à savoir la surcharge des organes de la Convention, problème aggravé par la perspective d'une nouvelle augmentation du nombre des requêtes, consécutive à

l'accroissement du nombre des États membres. La sollicitation accrue du système de recours s'accompagnait également d'une complexité et d'une importance croissantes de la matière des requêtes. La structure de décision interne était devenue de plus en plus lourde, à mesure que les représentants des nouveaux États membres prenaient leurs fonctions au sein des organes. L'entrée en vigueur des protocoles additionnels entraînait un élargissement de la matière entrant dans le champ d'application de la Convention, ouvrant ainsi la voie à des nouvelles possibilités de recours. Enfin, s'ajoutaient à cela les tâches supplémentaires attribuées aux organes de la Convention dans le contexte de l'élargissement vers l'Europe orientale. C'est pourquoi on examinait, dès 1983, la possibilité d'une refonte complète de l'ensemble du système de recours au titre de la Convention.

Ces efforts de réforme ont porté aujourd'hui leurs fruits. Le Protocole N°11 est entré en vigueur le 1er novembre 1998, et la nouvelle Cour européenne permanente des Droits de l'Homme, à Strasbourg, a été inaugurée le 3 novembre 1998. Ainsi, le mécanisme de décision a été simplifié et est devenu plus souple. Tout citoyen considérant que des mesures prises par l'État portent atteinte à ses droits fondamentaux, pourra saisir directement la Cour. Outre les fonctions de l'ancienne Cour, la nouvelle Cour assumera les principales fonctions de l'ancienne Commission. Il devenait plus facile de trouver une solution de ce genre, dès lors que l'acceptation générale de l'ensemble des obligations au regard de la Convention privait d'une grande partie de sa justification cette structure organisationnelle complexe reposant, à l'origine, sur un compromis.

Quoi qu'il en soit, le résultat de cette réforme est que la protection des droits de l'homme sur la base de la Convention européenne est aujourd'hui entièrement „judiciarisée". Il y manque désormais l'élément politique, qui était incarné dans une certaine mesure par la Commission, et qui, bien entendu, était très présent dans le pouvoir de décision du Comité des Ministres, s'agissant des requêtes qui n'étaient pas déférées à la Cour. La disparition de ces compétences a créé un vide qu'il est nécessaire de combler. À cet égard, il convient de mentionner deux aspects importants.

Tout d'abord, on envisage de mettre en place un Commissaire européen aux Droits de l'Homme, qui aurait une mission de sensibilisation, de protection et de promotion des droits de l'homme dans le contexte politique, tout en se situant à l'extérieur de la Cour. Sa mission devrait aussi s'exercer préventivement, afin d'éviter d'éventuelles violations des droits de l'homme. Nous espérons que la fonction de commissaire sera instituée le 5 mai 1999, c'est-à-dire à l'occasion du 50e anniversaire du Conseil de l'Europe.

Le second aspect, c'est que l'importance du Comité des Ministres en tant qu'organe chargé de contrôler l'exécution des arrêts de la Cour est appelée à s'accroître sensiblement. Il faut en effet veiller à ce que les arrêts de la nouvelle Cour soient effectivement appliqués par les États concernés, du point de vue de la législation aussi bien que de la pratique, et à ce que tout dédommagement fixé par la Cour soit versé. Je considère que cette tâche constitue, en fait, le principal défi auquel est confrontée la protection des droits de l'homme dans une Europe qui a changé.

Comme je l'ai dit, l'acceptation pleine et entière, par chaque État membre du Conseil de l'Europe, de tous les engagements au titre de la Convention n'a été obtenue qu'en 1989, juste au moment où survenaient, en Europe orientale, des bouleversements qui allaient conduire les États concernés à se rapprocher du Conseil

de l'Europe. C'est à cette époque que des voix s'élevèrent pour réclamer qu'on ouvre aux États non membres la Convention et les deux autres grands instruments du Conseil de l'Europe dans le domaine des droits de l'homme, à savoir la Charte sociale européenne de 1961 et la Convention contre la torture et les traitements inhumains de 1987. Or, les pays membres du Conseil de l'Europe n'étaient pas prêts pour cela. Dans le but de préserver la norme déjà atteinte, la décision de principe fut prise, décision selon laquelle la Convention européenne des Droits de l'Homme, en particulier, demeurerait un „traité fermé", accessible seulement aux États membres du Conseil de l'Europe. Mieux encore, on a fait de l'acceptation de la Convention et de toutes les obligations qui en découlent la condition politique de l'adhésion au Conseil de l'Europe.

Dans la pratique, cela signifie que les États que le Conseil de l'Europe a décidé d'admettre en son sein, signent la Convention au moment de leur adhésion, et la ratifient ensuite dans un délai raisonnable. C'est ce qui s'est passé pour tous les nouveaux États membres du Conseil de l'Europe.

La ratification de la Convention européenne des Droits de l'Homme nécessite - c'est bien compréhensible - une préparation exhaustive, au niveau interne, de la part des nouveaux États membres. Le Conseil de l'Europe prête ici son concours, dans le cadre de son programme de coopération avec l'Europe centrale et orientale. Cette assistance inclut notamment les conseils d'experts internationaux en matière de législation constitutionnelle. L'Assemblée parlementaire apporte également son concours, à la fois par des conseils en matière de législation électorale et par l'observation des scrutins. En même temps, elle demande à des experts - qui sont généralement, dans la pratique, des

membres de la Commission et de la Cour européennes des Droits de l'Homme - de rédiger des rapports, pendant la procédure d'adhésion, au sujet de la compatibilité de principe du système juridique concerné avec les critères internationaux en matière de droits de l'homme. C'est cette procédure qui a été suivie, d'abord dans les États baltes, puis en Roumanie, en Slovénie, et enfin dans les Républiques tchèque et slovaque. Des examens ont également été menés au sujet de plusieurs autres États, candidats à l'adhésion au Conseil de l'Europe. Il s'agit des États du Caucase - Arménie, Azerbaïdjan et Géorgie - ainsi que de la Bosnie-Herzégovine.

Compte tenu du grand nombre des candidatures à l'admission au Conseil de l'Europe - il n'est pas exclu qu'on arrive à plus de 45 États membres - la question de savoir où s'arrêtent les frontières de l'Europe est fréquemment soulevée. Géographiquement parlant, on considère souvent que c'est l'Oural qui marque la limite de l'Europe. Cela exclurait cependant une bonne partie de la Russie, ce qui, d'un point de vue politique, est impensable. Il y a également ceux qui définissent l'Europe en fonction de son esprit et de sa culture, ce qui conduit à repousser ces limites beaucoup plus loin. La réponse à cette question n'a pas encore été finalisée.

Pour que les nouveaux États puissent être considérés comme ayant réussi leur „examen de passage" au chapitre des droits de l'homme, il ne suffit pas qu'ils aient aligné, *grosso modo*, leur législation sur les normes européennes applicables dans ce domaine; encore faut-il que cette nouvelle position juridique se reflète dans la pratique quotidienne. Il est donc nécessaire de surveiller systématiquement cette pratique pour qu'on ait la certitude qu'elle est conforme aux normes en question. Il peut s'agir d'un contrôle assuré par l'État concerné ou, mieux encore, d'un contrôle

international. Ce problème est en permanence à l'ordre du jour du Comité des Ministres du Conseil de l'Europe.

La désintegration de la Yougoslavie et les violations massives des droits de l'homme qui ont lieu actuellement dans cette partie de l'Europe, pèsent lourdement sur nous tous. Étant donné que la Bosnie-Herzégovine et la République fédérale de l'Yougoslavie ne sont pas membres du Conseil de l'Europe et, par conséquent, ne sont pas parties à la Convention européene des Droits de l'Homme, les organes européenns des droits de l'homme n'ont en l'espèce aucune compétence. On a pourtant étudié la possibilité d'exercer au moins une influence. C'est ainsi que dans l'Accord de Dayton on a créé les conditions préalables d'une paticipation du Conseil de l'Europe au système interne de protection des droits de l'homme en Bosnie-Herzégovine: le Conseil de l'Europe désigne des experts qui sont appelés à jouer un rôle dans des organes de contrôle nationaux, tels que les cours constitutionnelles. On a également envisagé la mise en place d'une Commission des droits de l'homme pour la Bosnie-Herzégovine, qui comprendrait un médiateur s'occupant des questions politiques et une Chambre des droits de l'homme à vocation judiciaire.

Ces nouvelles structures de protection des droits de l'homme pour les États de l'Europe orientale soucieux de procéder à des réformes, requièrent une coordination avec les activités de l'OSCE en matière de protection des droits de l'homme. N'oublions pas qu'à l'origine des mouvements de réforme dans ces pays il y a eu souvent des groupes de défense des droits de l'homme comme la Charte 77 ou les comités Helsinki, qui ont rappelé à l'ordre leurs gouvernements sur le terrain du respect effectif des engagements internationaux que ces gouvernements avaient donné dans le domaine des droits de

l'homme. C'est pourquoi l'ancienne OSCE, et particulièrement ce que l'on a appelé sa „dimension humaine", qui s'est développée à partir de la troisième „corbeille" de la Conférence d'Helsinki de 1975, est pour ces États une institution extrêmement importante. Ses acquis, qui comportent notamment un mécanisme d'intervention politico-diplomatique en cas de graves violations des droits de l'homme, ne peuvent être purement et simplement transférés au Conseil de l'Europe. Certains États membres de l'OSCE ne peuvent pas ou ne veulent pas adhérer au Conseil de l'Europe. Les États-Unis et le Canada, en particulier, jouent un rôle sans l'OSCE, de même que les Républiques d'Asie centrale de l'ex-Union soviétique, qui s'efforcent de coopérer dans une certaine mesure avec le Conseil de l'Europe, sans pour autant chercher à y adhérer.

Cette répartition des tâches entre l'OSCE et le Conseil de l'Europe vaut également pour l'un des domaines les plus importants et les plus explosifs de la défense des droits de l'homme, à savoir la protection des minorités nationales. Le Conseil de l'Europe poursuit depuis longtemps, sur cette question un travail préparatoire. Il existe à présent deux mécanismes de protection, sous la forme d'accords multilatéraux du Conseil de l'Europe: la Charte européenne des langues régionales ou minoritaires, d'une part, et la Convention - cadre pour la protection des minorités nationales, d'autre part. Elles sont toutes deux entrées en vigueur au début de l'année dernière.

Le Conseil de l'Europe poursuit actuellement une réflexion sur son nouveau rôle. Il a notablement évolué avec le temps, en particulier - nous l'avons vu - au cours de ce qui aurait été la dernière décennie de ce siècle. Les changements doivent être „digérés", et le Conseil de l'Europe doit s'adapter à la nouvelle situation.

Le Conseil de l'Europe est devenu une organisation paneuropéenne; personnellement j'espère que son rôle ne pourra qu'en être renforcé. Il est exact que le Conseil de l'Europe n'est peut-être pas le point central de l'intégration européenne; mais il affiche une importante complémentarité par rapport à d'autres organisations européennes qui poursuivent des objectifs identiques ou analogues à ceux qui sont définis dans son Statut. Le Conseil de l'Europe demeure une organisation qui représente la ,,conscience" de l'Europe, car elle est proche du citoyen européen. Le Conseil a vocation à améliorer les conditions de vie des gens ordinaires. C'est là sa mission historique, une mission qu'il continue d'accomplir à travers ses organes statutaires que sont l'Assemblée parlementaire et le Comité des Ministres, et aussi à travers son secrétariat.

Le Secrétariat du Conseil de l'Europe, qui n'est pas un organe statutaire de l'Organisation, est unique en son genre dans le monde des organisations internationales traditionnelles. Il est exclusivement au service de l'Organisation, joue un rôle indépendant, mais aussi impartial, vis-à-vis des États membres; et il est souvent le moteur de l'Organisation, en ce sens que c'est lui qui prend l'initiative de certaines activités, activités qu'il mène à bien grâce à des partenaires dans les gouvernements membres - au lieu que ce soit la démarche inverse. Les États qui sont membres de fraîche date et se familiarisent avec les méthodes de travail de l'Organisation sont souvent surpris du rôle que jouent les agents. Contrairement à leur homologues qu'ils rencontrent dans les bureaucraties nationales ou internationales, les membres du Secrétariat du Conseil de l'Europe - ces ,,bureaucrates sans visage", comme on dit parfois - ont une influence et une importance considérables, qui s'explique, là encore, par les origines historiques de l'Organisation.

Dans les années à venir, l'Organisation continuera de mettre l'accent sur trois grands secteurs:

- la démocratie, la prééminence du droits et les droits de l'homme;
- la cohésion sociale, notamment la lutte contre la pauvreté et l'exclusion sociale;
- la protection de notre patrimoine culturel dans toute sa diversité.

En cette fin de siècle, le Conseil de l'Europe se trouve assurément dans une nouvelle situation. Sa composition s'est sensiblement élargie, sa ,,couverture démographique" est actuellement de quelque 800 millions de personnes, sur un territoire qui s'étend de l'Atlantique au Pacifique. De nouvelles missions devront être entreprises, en une période où les ressources sont peu abondantes. Je suis néanmoins convaincu que le Conseil de l'Europe continuera, avec l'aide de ses membres, à jouer un rôle important dans la sauvegarde des principes qu'il défend, et qu'il continuera à aider ses membres à inscrire ces principes dans la réalité de leur environnement national.

Un Comité des Sages, présidé par Monsieur Mario Soares, ancien Président de la République du Portugal, a été chargé par le Comité des Ministres, à l'occasion du Deuxième Sommet du Conseil de l'Europe qui eut lieu à Strasbourg les 10 et 11 octobre 1997, de se pencher sur ces questions. En novembre 1998 le Comité des Sages a présenté son Rapport intitulé ,,Construire la Grande Europe sans clivages" et a fait des recommandations dans les domaines suivants:

- le rôle politique du Conseil de l'Europe et la coordination avec d'autres organisations, surtout l'Union européenne et l'OSCE;
- les relations entre les organes du Conseil de l'Europe, notamment le

Comité des Ministres, l'Assemblée parlementaire, mais aussi le Congrès des Pouvoirs Locaux, le Secrétaire Général, la Commission de Venise et le Fonds de développement social;
- les structures du Secrétariat et les procédures de la coopération intergouvernementale;
- les procédures de suivi du respect des engagements, et
- la visibilité du Conseil de l'Europe.

La „nouvelle donne" en Europe est étroitement liée à la politique européenne des droits de l'homme. Au Conseil de l'Europe au premier chef, mais également dans d'autres institutions, plusieurs projects de réforme ambitieux et de première importance sont en cours. Il faut espérer qu'ils aboutiront, qu'ils contribueront à stabiliser la situation politique et qu'ils profiteront, au bout du compte, aux destinataires de tous les efforts en matière de droits de l'homme, c'est-à-dire aux hommes et aux femmes qui vivent sur notre continent.

THE ROLE OF GEOPOLITICS IN THE ANALYSIS OF THE CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHENOMENON

– I –

Constantin HLIHOR

The powerful reassertion of geopolitics over the last decades is a certain reality and it was determined both by an extremely complex evolution in international life and the theoretical definitions of the contemporary meanings and concepts of geopolitics[1].

The notion of geopolitics - as we noticed in the previous chapters - is accepted and used from a threefold perspective: the geopolitical action, the geopolitical theory, analysis and scenery, the doctrine and the geopolitical propagandistic cartography.

1. From the standpoint of social reality, the geopolitical phenomenon is part of the international relations occurring in a certain geographical area. A geopolitical situation can be defined as a more or less important rivalry for power among actors inserting or disputing their interests in a certain geographical area.

Depending on both the proportions - macro or micro spacial level - and the statute and the role in the system of international relations, a geopolitical situation involves more categories of actors[2]. The actors can be subjects endowed with sovereignty which limits their actions through its rigors and subjects without sovereignty, much more independent in their actions in the system of international relations.

By the end of the 20th century, in the geopolitical action, the states, big or small, were the leading actors which disputed or harmonized their interests in a certain area.

The interdependence developed in the postindustrial world, the decrease of the adaptation capacity in front of the 20th century's challenges had a real influence over some analysts which consider that the states, as the main actors in the system of international relations, are more limited in their actions[3]. They believe the state can not respond efficiently to some outside "aggressions". Sometimes the experts ask themselves: "Which nation can defend its borders against deseases, ballistic rackets, drug trafficking or broadcasting of subversive images? Which nation can protect its atmosphere and water against the radioactive cloud going from Cernobîl to west? Which nation can protect its currency from the damaging speculations on the world currency market?"[4].

On the other hand, we notice an increasing economical ability of the states in their home affairs. Depending on internal and external circumstances they interfere more and more often both in modelling

economy in investments, consumption and in financing some new industrial branches or in reviving other older ones so as to face the internationalisation process of the market and of the banking systems.

At international level, the increasing or decreasing tendencies of the part played by the states as the main actors in the contemporary geopolitics are neither absolute nor uniforme. At the end of the 20th century, we notice a double movement: an increasing and decreasing of the state's role in international relations.

We talk about decreasing because the interdependences - economical, political, cultural, spiritual - will continue; so, the activity of the state will be more limited[5]. Experts consider that not all the consequence which the migration of capitals and of the industrial capacities in one or another area, hove over the states, as sovereign entities - actors - in the international life, are known as yet. For example, the Honda cars made in the USA are they American or Japanese? Is this thing important for the consumer? On the other hand, the growing of the decisive role as an actor is established by a large mass of people that wish to have their own state. There are aproximatively 5000 nations in the world while only 179 states belong to the U.N's. The Kurds condition is meaningful: they are a nation with over 20 million people within three states without having their own state. In January 1991, the representatives of 35 nations and states set up. UNPO - Unrepresented Nation Organisation - whose headquarters were established in Geneva; its aim was to draw the attention of the public opinion to the legitimate wish of having their own state[6]. On the other hand, the role still prevalent of the states, as actors of the geopolitical phenomenon, is sustained by the growing preponderance of the USA in the world politics after the end of the Cold War, or of

Germany in Europe. As part of a seminar organized by the National Defence University in 1991, Colin L. Powell, the former head of the joint committee of the heads of the General Staff and former assistant of the American president, said: "After half a century of titanic struggle against fascism and communism, America has found its place in the world beyond the natural limits of its national territory"; he also said that the USA would confirm the people's hope of „exerting the leading role that it has assumed"[7].

The changes developed within the world economy, the world - wide spread - information, the overall security problems have turned the nongovernamental powers into the main actors of the contemporary geopolitical phenomenon, where the transnational, international and supranational organizations will play a special role.

The former manager of the Central Information Agency (CIA) in the USA concerning the actors' multiplication within the present international relationship said: "Yes, we killed a giant dragon (an allusion to the former USSR) but now we are living in a jungle where a variety of poisonous snakes are swaming disorderely. In many ways, it was easier to pursue the dragon"[8].

After the Cold War, the disputed problems among the classical actors of the international scene - the states - generated serious military and political crises and the role and importance of some nongovernmental actors have grown up (for exemple the U.N.) reading unprecedented quotas. The peace Duping operations became a specific feature of the international relations and practically the U.N. is involved directly in every problem. In the last half of our century, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have got the greatest importance as actors within the geopolitical field. To a large

extent the states in the third world and in the former Soviet Empire as well as the former communist states also depend on the policies of the two organs, concerning the decisional act at both internal and external level.

To illustrate the multiplication of the actors within the contemporary geopolitical phenomenon, James Rosenau presents the two crises which broke out in a space disputed by the two superpowers at the end of 1974: the seizure of American Embassy in Teheran by Iran and the invasion of Afganistan by the USSR. No less than 29 transnational actors, beginning with the U.N. and ending with the Olympic Committee and Supervising Committee in Helsinki were deeply involved in one or both of the crises[9].

Some analysts of the contemporary geopolitical phenomenon[10] admit that a geopolitical situation can also arise within a state without any direct implication of other states; they also say that the ethnical, political or religious comunities can be considered "actors". The problem is controversial and difficult to accept if we take into account that nowhere in the world has descentralization gone so far that the authority of the actor - state - over its sovereign space should be purely nominal. On the other hand, the enumerated comunities are not legal subject within the international relations system, although they are internationally recognized.

2. The theory, analysis, scenario and geopolitical cartography are products of the analysts' and statemen's effort of observing, investigating and interpreting within the analysing process of the geopolitical realities, namely of the power rivalries among the actors disputing their interests in a certain geographical area. If we examine the geopolitical research as a whole, we notice that the results of the investigations are divided into two distinct parts, depending on the following purposes: the

theory, more or less systematized, which tends to identify itself with the social sciences field and the doctrine with its inseparable chapter, the cartography of geopolitical propaganda, which has as fundamental purpose the justification of an actor's policy depending on its interests in a certain geographical area.

Nevertheless, without accepting the assertions according to which "cartography fascinates, but it teaches us nothing"[11], we have to accept that the geopolitical map could be an instrument of public opinion manipulation. The geopolitical maps have not been depicted as a faithful copy of a geopolitical reality in one geographical area or another, but they are not necessarily objective and neutral copies[12]. The geopolitical maps which are used as a support for an actor's propaganda are by no means a product of the present. They have been used from the 19th century, during the periods of tension, crisis or conflicts within the system of international relations. Such products of the propaganda geopolitical cartography circulated both in the West, and especially in the East during the Cold War. Their role was to justify and convince the public opinion about the necessity of defeating the evil, which was represented by the adverse party. The red and the blue spaces were separeted by the Iron Curtain, and in these maps they became targets for neutralization or conquest. It didn't matter that this "Iron Curtain" was "permeable" from the economic or dplomatic standpoint (the famous red phone which linked the Kremlin and the White House).

Thus, the geopolitical maps have become a propaganda support. They were projected for a certain guiding of the readers'/outlooker's thinking in the direction wanted by their designers[13]. Taking into account the fact that in the future the role of the image will grow in spreading information, the geopolitical

role of the propaganda maps will not diminish. To be efficient, the propaganda will use every strategy and every method of conveying information directly to its target, including those typical of the geopolitical theory. But we do not think that the propaganda having a geopolitical support and the geopolitical analysis could be the same because nowadays nobody mixes up the political speech with the political theory and analysis.

Geopolitics, as a branch of the socio-humanistic sciences, can be defined as a discipline dealing with the power rivalries among the actors disputing their interests in a certain geographical area in the historical evolution. Ion Conea defined geopolitics as a "political game between states"[14]. Although nowadays geopolitics is still defined from a multitude of view-points, it is no longer perceived as a discipline which studies the influence of the geographical environment over the policy of a state as it was the case of Ratzel and Hanshofer's period[15]: Space is no longer an "actor" of the history, which can determine the developement of the political events, but it is a medium support in which the actors involved in a contemporary geopolitical phenomenon dispute their interests.

The rigid geographical determinism must be abandoned because the space value for the geopolitical action is determined by objective elements which can belong to economical, political, war or even ideological domains, but it can not determine directly the policy of one actor or an other within the system of international relations. Napoleon's assertion according to which "the policy of the states lies in their geography"[16] was justified in the 19th century, but nowadays it has only a historical value.

Therefore, the main aim of the geopolitical theory is to point out the ways in which an actor within the system of international relations may impose its own interests in one particular geographical area or another. Within this corroboration of the policy with the geographical space, the actors are the political forces which have relations ("games") in an area, depending on their interests and their capacity, but not at all depending on the proper geographical environment[17].

Almost half a century ago, this aspect was noticed by Professor Ioan Conea, who stated that geopolitics does not study the geographical area because "it only suggests to us the idea of dimensions", so it must study "the political game between states" which he also defined sometimes as "pressure among states"[18].

The great actors of the contemporary world - USA, Russia, Japan, France, Germany etc. would have been equally interested in the Iraki action of annexing Kuwait and in other conflicts in Africa, if those states had one of the largest oil reserves of the world and these exemples could continue with other geographical areas.

The subject of geopolitics has not been defined yet in unanimously accepted terms because there are a lot of viewpoints in tackling this subject depending on different tendencies in thinking or even on the intelectual authority of some famous authors and researchers of the contemporary geopolitical phenomenon. I consider that the subject of geopolitics can be Kjellen's "planettarischer zustand" (planetary situation) or a part, a certain zone from it, which is observed and explored with geopolitical instruments, but also with some other sciences taking into account that geopolitics is a subject between history, economy, demography, politology, geostrategy and geography[19]. It must take into account "every thing which is organized within hierarchy of forces, especially political and military ones, but also economical and cultural forces, states

and their alliances - destinies and aims - in all the aspects of force and of its evolution, of law and of its application[20].

Therefore, the problem tackled by geopolitics can be more or less ample and it is in connection with the policy of the states and of the other actors of the international life because it can unravel the interest manifested generally or in a certain area by these actors. Geopolitics must observe and research the changes which have occurred in the power relations at the international level or in a particular area under study.

Eventually, the power prise or the lack of prise are those which determine the condition of the international relation system, therefore of the geopolitical medium at a certain moment. The prise has always been associated with peace and security. The intensity and the measure of lack of prise securring within the equation of power at a certain moment, led to crises situations, to various kinds of conflicts - diplomatic, economic or ideological - and eventually to war.

The role of an actor within the equation of power and especially within the relations with others, defines its geopolitical position which must not be mixed up with its geographical location. The former is defined under the relations among actors, which are usually neglected by geography, while the latter is defined by a state's location on the Globe. If the geographical position is static, the geopolitical one is characterized by a large degree of dynamism, which can be influenced by a lot of objective or subjective factors, among which the political interest or wish have a decisive role.

The geopolitical position of a state - the actor most frequently met within a geopolitical analysis - could be a favourable or an unfavourable one, in its historical moments. When a state has agreeable and mutually favourable relations with the other states and international organizations, it has a favourable geopolitical position. But its geopolitical position could be extremely difficult, as in the summer of 1940, when Romania lost an important part of its territory because of its total isolation within the international relations and of the rapports with its neighbours.

The object of geopolitics can also be particularized by referring to the object of other sciences which deal with the study of international relations, statal or complex social phenomena, such as crisis and war. Experts have often discussed about the relations between the study object of the political geography and that of geopolitics. This aspect has generated a strong dispute[21]. By comparing and analysing the domain of research and its study object, as they have been defined by specialists, we notice the specific features and the similitudes between geopolitics and political geography.

For a long time, the French school of Geography considered that the object of this subject was identical with that of geopolitics. Jacques Ancel considered geopolitics, "a geography serving the policy which assumed the role of history in Bismarck's time"[22] while Albert Demangeau considered it "a political life geography, an ill one, but still a political geography"[23].

The progress registered by the geographical science, especially by improving the investigation instruments, the statistics of the data obtained by theorizing, conceptualizing and modelling[24], have shown that its object is different from that of geopolitics.

Nowadays, political geography is defined as the discipline "dealing with the differences between the political phenomena according to the area where the people live"[25]. Christian Dandel considers political geography as "the science of territories, organization and of the differentiation of the places"[26]. The American geographer Whittlesley thinks

that "the political geography nucleus is the political space"[27] and Otto Mauhl declares that this science deals with "the geographical nature and geographical phenomena of a state, or, in other words, with the study of the geographical uniqueness of a state, depending on its cultural and natural background"[28].

The analysis of these definitions points out that the element "space" is common both to political geography and to geopolitics. Both are disciplines which study space and various actors, generally the state, but each of them in a different way and having specific aims.

Political geography deals with the aspect and the political division of states at a certain moment. It offers momentary images of a momentary situation. Unlike the political geography, geopolitcs is not interested in states (or other actors) as a natural phenomenon, namely in the position, dimentions, form and borders of the state. It deals with the dynamics of the relations among states in connection with a space they are interested in. Therefore, geopolitics will study the power relations among states.

Talking about the specific features and about the common elements of geopolitics and of political geography, the American researcher Ladis K.D. Kristof is categorical: "Political geography is geography. It is a geography modified by the interest in the effect of the political phenomena over the surface of the earth, while geopolitics is not a study of geography but of the politics changed or influenced only by geographical factors"[29].

Very often, geostrategy and geopolitics are synonymous[30] in the political analysis and speeches, even if they have a different object of study[31]. The notion of "geostrategy" was initiated by the Italian general Giacomo Durando[32] in the middle of the 19th century and it appeared again at the middle of the following century

through the contribution of Admiral Castez[33], and American analyst Colin S. Gray[34].

We do not intend to analyse the initial use, especially the military one, of the term in relation with force or with the idea of using force. Within the security and defence field, the military specialists developed and anticipated reflections on the dynamics of space and on the science capacity of determining space, so that peace could be concluded and a political decision could be reached in an area affected by conflicts. Geostrategy, as well as geopolitics, includes war, but in the geopolitical conception, war does not involve only military dimension. Showing that war is more than a military confrontation, Paul Kennedy wrote in his, famous work "Birth and Decline of Great Powers": "Within a prolonged war for hegemony among the great powers, there are no doubts that the victory will be of that power which has the most thriving structure of production - or, as the Spanish captain said, will be of the one who has the last «escuedo»"[35].

General Pierre Gallois thinks that geostrategy is "the study of the relations between the political attitude of a great international power and its geographical environment"[36]. Acording to the Larrouse dictionary on "La Défence et des Forces Armées", geostrategy is defined as the science which "analysis the relations between the geopolitical environment and the defence policy promoted by a state or group of states at international level[37].

André Vigorie's conception is that geostrategy is "the ensemble of defence attitudes related to the vastest dimensions and the largest variety of action means"[38].

We can easily notice that the above mentioned definitions and the others which I have not presented here, contain the same paradigm: the conflictual relations among actors in relation with

space. This explains why some military and civilian analysts speak about geopolitics and geostrategy as being a couple[39] or as being two relatives or even sisters"[40]; their opinion is that geopolitics says what must be conquered or preserved and geostrategy also says if this thing is possible"[41].

Nowadays, geostrategy must conceive the conflictual rapports in another space than a classic one, in other terms that those used by Clausewitz Mahan or Foch because this discipline changed both its land marks and mode of action. Even a summary analysis of the fundamental paradigms of geostrategy shows that epistemological, technological and polemological breaks occurred vis-à-vis the strategically classic thinking[42], because the fields of military struggle have multiplied. The actors of the international life tend to turn the economic, informational, imagological and even cosmical spaces into battle fields. We admit that geopolitics and geostrategy will join to identify if war takes place within an economic, informational and imagological space.

The system of international relations is also the object of history generally and of political history specially. From this perspective, history interferes with geopolitics and also particularizes. This discipline study object also includes the analysis of international relations and implicitly of the rapports among the traditional actors - states - but only for the events in the part. Ion Conea was right when he said: "Geopolitics will always be a present science, a discipline of the present phenomenon. The geopolitics of our days will be history tomorrow as the history of every past was geopolitics for the times when the events we regard as history happened"[43].

Geopolitics or the history of the present can unravel the evolution tendencies and the future situation of the system of international relations. The geopolitician, unlike the historian, expresses "his wish of anticipation of the humanity development in a logical world"[44]. Therefore, we appreciate that complementary rapports are established between the objects of study of the two disciplines. Continuity of some perenial phenomena and processes which are not in relation with crisis and the development of the system of international relations is unrevealed within the historic research and analysis. In their turn, these find their role within the substantiation of the geopolitical research and analysis.

The object of geopolitics is also in relation with economy, demography, politology, sociology etc. Therefore, the object of geopolitics is interdisciplinary or, as Christian Dandel concludes: "A little history, a little geography, a few different aspects of the present and of the intelectual news, different, but almost the same, these are the ingredients of any geopolitical writing"[45].

The need of knowing and understanding the processes and phenomena which occured within the system of international relations, and the simplicity of some different geopolitical situations impose the geopolitical there as an efficient instrument for unravelling the interests of the actors - states, international organizations - in some particular geographical areas as a capacity of imposing or mentaining these interests at a given moment. Geopolitics unravels the spot and the role the actors have within the balance of power. Both at global and general level, therefore showing the dynamics of the forces which determine the present and the long term architecture of security.

The present or the future geopolitical regions of a maximum convergence/

divergence and also the geopolitical position of an actor at a certain moment are determined by means of specific methods of geopolitical analysis. The consequences of the maximum convergence geopolitical fields and if the power centers generally over the actor are known and anticipated with a certain amount of probability. Nowadays, for example, more analysts consider that the Asian-Pacific area will be the geopolitical region with the most spectacular ascent"[46]. This thing will have consequences over the traditional power centers: West Europe and the USA. The major economic regions will be interconected through multinational firms and banks, but each one will have a technological and industrial independent base, its own financial resources. From this perspective, the struggle for the control over raw material resources and over the sale markets will increase, and its form of manifestation will be more and more varied.

The geopolitical methodology is used in studying, analysing and administrating politico-military crisis or of other nature.

Within the international relations field, a crisis is a phenomenon which occurs in the framework of a dispute and/or of a conflict among more actors, frequently states, but also entities or nations, supra or multinational organizations[47]. It can modify completely the geopolitical situation within a particular area.

The complexity of the contemporary geopolitical phenomenon calls for a systemic analysis, in which every element (relation is/can be the key to grasping the dynamics and the directions of force. The paradigms of analysis are: position and role of an actor) same actors in the power equation; the international actors interest in a certain geographical area; the perception of the actors on their own power; the perception on the intensity of an actor's interest in a specific geographical area. With the help of all these paradigms, the geopolitical position of an actor within the field of international relations as well as the dynamics of the geopolitical phenomenon in a region or at the global level are correctly described and evaluated.

The terms used in an geopolitical analysis are also used by other sciences which deal with the study of the contemporary, geopolitical and social phenomena, but these have sometime particular meanings in the geopolitical theory and methodology.

NOTES

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THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Teodor FRUNZETI,

Today's world is very close to the new millennium's beginning of a new age. Stimulated by the end of the Cold War, the number and the importance of the changes to which we have been witnesses or particpants in the last 10 years were overwhelming. The conflict between U.S.A and U.R.S.S., which practically gave colour to each dimension of the political, economical and social aspects of the international politics for half a century got to an end. Berlin's wall crashed, Soviet Union came to nought, the comunism collapsed, Germany reunified and the European Union and NATO are in course of widening. Even more, democracy spread itself in many parts of the world, and international economic changes increased and intensified, reaching an unreachable level yet.

In spite of all these, the hope that the world after the end of the Cold War will be a more peaceful one shattered, many conflicts bursting out or becomming active again in various areas of the war, especially in the developing countries. How can we better understand the political convulsions of the international system with which we come across almost every day? How can we possibly anticipate their future meaning? It would be better to begin with an estimation of the interraction between older ideas and theories and recent events, or in course of development. As the philosopher George Santayana, said "Those who can not remember the past are compelled to repeat its mistakes". In the same way, the British ex-prime-minister Winston Churchil remarked "The more you look back the more you will see ahead".

That is why, to understand the dramatic changes which occur nowadays in world politics and how these will model the future, we have to analyse them in a broader context, examining the way in which the international political system has changed, and the way in which its characteristic features resisted to the changes.

Continuity, Change and Cyclicity in International Politics

Every historical period is marked by a certain degree of change. Now the rythm of the changes seems much quicker and the consequences are deeper than ever. To many analysts, the real cascade of events on the verge of the third millennium, suggests that a reorganization having a revolutionary character is on the brink of occuring in the international system. The many integrative tendencies suggest this possibility. The

countries of the world became closer because of some fields like communications the change of ideas, economic changes, international security and peace problems. Even the integrative tendencies suggest the reorganization.

The end of the stability period imposed by the bipolar distribution of the power between U.S.A. and U.R.S.S. and their allies (an international system which has two prevailing centers of power), the proliferation of the conventional armament, of the mass-distructive and of the unconventional one, the total deterioration of the natural environment, the reappearance and intensification of the nationalism and ethnical conflicts all lead us towards the image of the reorganization based on disorder.

The simultaneous occurance of two opposing tendencies, integrative and desintegrative suggest a transformation in the world politics equally important to those that followed the first and the second World War, radically changing the previous political systems.

How can we determine if a characteristic tendency that occured in the international relations will lead to a new international system? The politician Stanley Hoffman affirms that in order to have a new international system we should get a new answer for each of the following three questions[1] :

1) which are the basic units of the system? (for example the national states, or transnational religious movements);

2) which are the predominant political objectives which these units intend to have taking each other into account? (for example territorial conquests, or welfare getting through economical changes);

3) what these units can do to each other, using their military and economic ability?

These criteria would lead us to the conclusion that today a new international system is already in course of making up. First of all, new economical partnership relation were constituted and consolidated in Western Europe, Norths America, South East Asia and in Pacific area, and these economic unions behave today as unitary entities, independent actors on the world arena, competing with each other. Even more the international organizations as for example the European Union, try their strengths competing with individual states. Transnational religious movement as for example islamic fundamentalism, are in competition, defy the statal system in itself (a system based on national states, independent and sovereign political units, whose citizens perceive themselves unified by language identity, culture, ethnic entities have been desintegrated in smaller units.

Secondly the territorial conquests are no more the primordial objective of the external politics of most of the states. Besides the stress has changed from traditional - military methods of exercising the influence to economical means and instruments. At the same time, the ideological competition between capitalism and comunism is no longer a touchstone in international politics.

Thirdly the proliferation of military technology fundamentally modified the way in which the states may act one over the other. The great powers no more exercise an exclusive control over the most destructive armament systems.

Image and Reality in the International Politics

Each of us already has a moulded image of the world politics explicit or implicit conscious or subconscious.

This is but a simplified image of reality, exaggerating certain aspects of the real world, and ignoring the others.

That is why, we may say that we live in a world defined by our own expectances and images.

Many of the images of the political reality of the world may be built on illussion and wrong conceptions. Even images which now are accurate may easily become obsolete if our image about the world does not succeed in considering the changes that occur permanently.

Many of us, including the politicians, even those who take part in the decision aparata, look for the information which strengthen the preexisting beliefs about the world, assimilating new data and information to a familiar preexisting image, equalizing what we think and what we know, and denying the information which deny former expectanties.

At the same time, there is the risk of generating conclusions which are legitimate only for some isolated individuals, and to apply them to some collectivities, even to entire nations. The images which political leaders have built about the historical circumstances, predispose them to adopt a certain partisan position in spite of the objective facts.

The Forces and Actors of the International System and the Levels of Analysis

In order to prognosticate what forces will dominate the future, we should think in multicausative terms. No tendency shows isolated, but simultaneously interract with other tendencies of the forces on the international arena.

The future is influenced by many dominant tendencies, each connected with the others in a net of connections.

Jointly, all these may produce stability by inhibiting the impact of the structures of a single force. But if the forces act convergently, their combined effect may speed the rythm and scope of the changes in world politics.

In approaching the international politics there is a macropolitic perspective which turns the attention to:

1) characteristics, the abilities and interests of the main "actors" in the world politics (nations, states and various non statal entities taking part in the international affairs);

2) the main problems concerning the international welfare and security which enters the total agenda;

3) the main directions of the cooperation which influences the interaction between actors and problems.

Gradually analysing these interactions, we find out why the politics - the exercising of certain influences which affect the distribution of some particular values as for example the power, the prestige the welfare - is one of the most disputed aspects of the international affairs[2].

The macropolitic perspective does not turn our attention to the interaction between change and continuity at the beginning of a new millennium, but it avoids to billet every phenomena, country, individual or any transitive subject, the significance of which in a long time may diminish. On the other hand, is identified the behaviour which joins the total tendencies showing coherence, coresponding to the tendencies and forces which affect, in a quantifiable measure the life standard at global level.

Many analysis of international relations affirm that international politic state may be better understood by concentrating on one or many of the three levels. Known under the name of levels of analysis this clasification includes: *a.* the individuals; *b.* states, or other politic actors; *c.* the international system in itself.

The individual level of analysis concerns the individual characteristics of human beings, including the middle citizen whose behaviour has important political consequences and whose responsabilities are

important in making the decision - or at least influence - on behalf of the states or other actors. Here we may localize, for example the impact of the images which every individual forms as far as his political attitude, beliefs and behaviour are concerned.

The national level of analysis refers to the ability of authoritative decision which reigns the processes of external politics of the states and the attributes of these states (for example the type of the politic system and the level of economic and military power), which together models and limits the leader's power of decision. The processes through which the states make decissions concerning war and peace, the ability of the states to fulfil these decisions, for example, enter the national level of analysis.

The systemic level of analysis refers to the interaction of the total actors (states and non states) whose behaviour, finally models the international political system and the levels of conflict and cooperation which characterize the international politics. The ability of the rich states to impose their will and to dictate to poor states the way of behaving, enter the systemic level of analysis. O.N.U.'s ability or inability to mantain the international peace enters the same level.

Differentiating the levels of analysis is important for emphasizing that there is not but a single source of the transformations that occur in the world politics. Because the system of relations and interconnections occur from one level to the other, the tendencies and transformations that occur in the political world are affected both by the forces that operate at each level and by the interractions that occur between them.

Important Questions at the end of the Second Millennium

A. Is the concept of state obsolete?

The state based on its own territory, had been the main actor in the international politics for more than three centuries.

The reappearance of nationalism as an important force in the international arena in many regions of the world, prove the tendency of the various movements of national liberation to reach statehood "while the main course of the action of the ethnonationalist movements is to protect the security of their own national existence within the area of existence of that particular nation.

Although in some respects the state is still thriving, in some others it is on the verge of dying as the French political scientist Pierre Hasner estimates, the state no more being able to fulfil some of the most habitual tasks[3] . In fact some political scientists proclaimed the end of the state and concluded that the sovereignty of the states rapidly ruined because of the internal and external defiances.

A very large variety of forces made more and more difficult for the states to maintain the power exerted over their own citizens, and to send forth decissions which were considered exclusively their prerogatives. Among these forces mention should be made of the revolution in communications, the emergence of transnational companies, the increasing wave of emigration towards the economically developed states, the economic fitting in and the totalization of economic problems and those of the environment.

The increasing lack of control, the inability to solve the important problems and even the fact that for few states the boundaries traced out between the interests of various groups of citizens like the statal boundaries coincide with the boundaries between the ethnic groups living in those states, had increased the lack of trust in the political leaders and in the state institutions in many countries of the world. The governments in their turn, are perceived as

not representing the interests, not giving security and not providing the welfare of the ones they govern. As a result, citizens look somewhere else for spokesmen for their own oppinions, solutions for solving their needs, ruining more the authority of the states[4].

Can the states cope with the present defiances? The political scientist expresses the idea that societies produce institutions to face the problems and answer certain human needs.

When they are no longer able to solve these problems, these institutions must disappear. Today, when the management abilities of states, dissregarding their way of governing, no longer inspire trust, the future of the states as institutions are placed under question.

B. Is Independence a Solution or a Trap?

The total independence is the base of external defiances which nowadays states have to cope with. The more independence increases the more their management capacity reduces and their exercise area gets narrower.

From a certain perspective, the states realization of having a common destiny, together with the progressive reduction of the ability to solve total problems, which they have to face using only internal, national means, can energize the effort of cessation, or at least of reducing the competition in the international arena. In this perspective the conflict will regress while fewer and fewer states would be able to free themselves of the interdependence connections, which unify and maintain them as a whole. Therefore, we should regard as a positive evolution, the continuous strengthening of connections between the states which maintain together the fragile consistency of the international relations.

From another perspective, a more pessimistic one than the first, the interdependency will not lead to a transnational cooperation.

Dependency and mutual contacts will furnish the enemy relations between states and not the friendly ones, no matter how beneficient the latter could be.

If the absence of a total comunity will perpetuate it will assure the perpetuity of international anarchy and that of nostalgia for a much more independent state.

In the conditions in which the economic relations will worsen the political relations more than we may think, the harsh competition, the decrease of natural resources and the renaissance of the nationalism, the estranging tendency from the foreign economies could become irresistible. This could materialize in the setting of some barriers against international economic changes, with negative consequences both in the stability of national systems and in the national one and the population's welfare.

At the same time, the tendency to obtain political or economical benefits by using military force or by protective economic measures will show down continuously. That is why, the consolidation of total interdependency is not exclusively a beneficial consequences generator, creating at the same time a tension which may degenerate into conflicts.

C. Technological Development a Blessing or a Burden?

The dynamic of totalization is determined by technology which is the catalyzer of the changes in international politics. The consequences are not estimated for sure. Technological development, just like interdependence may solve certain problems but may cause others. As the Nobel Prize laureat Vasile Leontief has warned ever since 1987: "Technology is now, be it good, or be it bad, the main moving force exceeding in rythm the changes in economy, politics and society in general as any force which can not be limited by artificial obstacles, the new technologies may turn us into the owners of some unhoped benefits, but at the

same time they may produce unredeemable damages"

Not only that technological development created new methods of preventing the diseases but it also assures the increasing of the armament's ability of destruction.

Discoveries in microelectronics, the processing of information transports, production of energy, agriculture, medicine and biotechnology profoundly affect the lives of the inhabitants of our planet and mould our future.

All of these have unified the Earth, in a common market and a common culture, at the same time paradoxically reducing the citizen's and communities spirit as some political scientists assert[5].

The chatalyzers represented by the new technologies need a constructive and competent management but could this be achieved in a world in which the antagonistic tendencies (integrative and desintegrative) occur with equal force?

Will geopolitics be replaced by geoeconomy?

Along modern history the states have been the dominant political actors in the interactive politics and they were competing (from military point of view) each other for prevailance in the international hierarchy of power. For over three hundred years, international politics has generally been a series of war preparations, military operations and activities of rebuilding and reconstruction after the end of the wars.

Military power had been regarded as a source of prestige and influence, and military conquest became ameans of winning a certain predominant position from an economical and political point of view.

According to some authors the next area of confrontation in the international politics will center upon economic problems. The nations' destinies will be determined by the commercial competitions and not by military conquests. If the problems of geoeconomy wealth and welfare became more important than geopolitics conventional problems (the distribution of political and military power) is the international politic promoted by various states expected to change?

If wealth is transformed into political power, national pride and even ultranationalism may generate competition.

Even economic interdependence and tight commercial relationships may decay in economic disputes and political rivalry. No doubt, the apparent change of priorities towards the economic

dimension of the international politics is able to mould the total power distribution in the XXIst century. This change will probably speed the degree of malleability of national boundaries and the homogenity of comercial product offered to a market more and more submitted to an entire integration.

In what resides the human welfare on a planet whose ecological equilibrium is so fragile?

The utterance, once very popular in the west referring to the "limits of growing" - the belief that people can not endlessly intensify their productive ability - had been replaced by the utterance "the growth of limits which stresses upon the going on of development". So, the development which may be sustained has also the significance of living on a planet whose health has to became a chapter to be continuously taken into account.

The national gross product - the entire value of the goods and services done by a nation in a specific period of time usually a year - is the common measure of the economic welfare all over the world.

The human welfare has other dimensions besides the economic ones, but it is still determined by the economic element. The more powerful an economy is, the more significant its contribution to the human welfare, is according to Daily and Cobb[6]. The increasing of economic activity

of a certain state has a remarkable significance for the poor states as compared to the rich ones. For the inhabitants of the third world, the increasing of the national gross product means more food, better living conditions, the improvement of education conditions and the growing of the living standard. At the same time most of the people living in the developed countries already enjoy these basic needs. As a conclusion, the suplimentary incomes which they might have do not concern the satisfaction of certain basic needs but the non-essential (non vital) fields.

The total impact of the population's as well as the continuous struggle for economic increasing have an increased scope.

The population of poor countries has an almost insignificant contribution to the production of goods and services, but require less of the natural assets of the Earth, while the population of rich countries in order to be able to maintain and improve the living standard substantially contribute to the exhaustion of the natural resources and to the pollution of the environment. In both cases the continuous growth of population has a negative effect... For poor societies, because it inhibits the growing of the income, for rich societies because it consists in a real burden for the delicate ecological system of the Earth.

The exploitation and the unlimited consumption of the resources without taking into account the responsability for the future is in fact a way of self destruction.

These ideas are a challenge addressed to the basis of the western civilization.

Although the continuous development is the most realistic prognosis for the next period of time, this, as well as the increasing of the wealth and welfare at a total and local level needs a real concern not only for the economic development but also for the exhaustion of natural resources, the spoiling of natural environment and for the value of freedom[7].

Is there any alternative to this situation? Can the growth in a finite world be infinite? For how long can the finite resources of energy sustain an uncontrolled consumption before vehicles and industry stop and the lights of the great city turn off? How many pollutions can the atmosphre of the Earth absorb before the irremediable spoiling of the environment? How many people can feed an ecosystem in a delicate equilibrium if not even in a critical stage?

The understanding of nowadays world's problems needs the desire to face an extremly complex situation. The defiance is hard to accept and even disheartening but reward is equally worth the effort. The ability of human species to image an encouraging future is related to our ability to develop complex ideas, to liberate ourselves from the motionlessness of the anchoring in the past, to develop an investigative attitude about the perspectives of the realities of the international system.

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ROMANIA AND THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION: 1968

Mihai RETEGAN

1968 was a very busy year: international party conferences stipulated by the Warsaw Pact, bilateral visits, different kind of activities, and so on. Among these, the Non-Proliferation of Armament Treaty occupied a central place; intense negotiations were held in Geneva, aiming at adopting an appropriate text that would be accepted both by the countries which posessed this type of armament and by those with no nuclear capabilities. Nicolae Ceauşescu was not happy with the negotiations. He had been demanding, since the summer of 1967, the convocation of the Political Advisory Committee of the Warsaw Pact in order to discuss the positions that were to be adopted in Geneva. His proposal was rejected under the pretext that the discussions had already taken place between the representatives of the 18 signatories in Geneva; their duplication by the socialist countries was deemed unnecessary[1].

Meanwhile, the Committee of "the 18" presented a new proposal, which the authorities in Bucharest objected to. The Romanian Communist Party renewed, at the end of January, the demand for a convocation of the Czechoslovak Communist Party at the Warsaw Pact[2]. The initial negative position manifested by the Czechs was also shared by the Germans who replied that the purpose of such a meeting was not clear to them. But Moscow's answer was an affirmative one. Consequently, the opening of the session was established for 6 March in Sofia.

Why did Ceauşescu insist so much on the convocation of the Political Advisory Committee? The new proposal contained a number of prerequisites that upset the leaders in Bucharest, because, as Ceauşescu said in the Central Committee Plenum on the 1st of March, "It is practically unacceptable" as "it leads to the perpetuation of the atomic monopoly both in the military and the political field. It allows the countries in posession of nuclear weapons and American imperialism to intrude upon the domestic affairs of other states. There is no guarantee that nuclear weapons will be given up..."[3]. Taking into account all these aspects, Ceauşescu proposed that the Plenum approve the following amendments at the summit in Sofia and to develop them further at the Geneva session:

a) Even after the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, states possessing nuclear armament should continue their efforts of disarmament, this should begin as soon as possible, and five years after signing the treaty, the results should be analyzed.

b) The countries whose armies are equipped with nuclear armament should

guarantee the other states (which do not and will not have this technology) that nuclear weapons will not be used against them.

c) The application of the stipulations of the treaty should be periodically verified[4].

The amendments proposes two additional statements concerning the exercise of control. "The present draft attempts to prevent the non-nuclear states included in the treaty to use special fissionable materials in order to produce nuclear weapons or other explosive nuclear devices. Peaceful nuclear activities of the nuclear states included in the treaty, which, by their nature or by the quantities of raw and special fissionable materials they process or use may lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, should be controlled". A second statement read: "The states included in the treaty agree to the proper regulations by the Security Council. These nuclear states guarantee that the foreign military bases of nuclear states on their territories will not have access to nuclear weapons through the mediation of these bases"[5].

What made the discussion of these amendments even more difficult was the fact that: "The Soviets and the other comrades were of the opinion that all the proposals made on this occasion - and which were also analyzed in Geneva - were the best we could get, that the Americans would never agree to other propositions and we would have be contented with what we had"[6]. Even in these circumstances Ceauşescu did not seem very willing to stop: "Even if we do not agree - he declared in the Central Committee Plenum on 1, March - we should present these proposals to Geneva and insist upon them in the United Nations, where the introduction of amendments to the treaty will be deliberated upon. At the same time, we shall try to discuss the issues openly with other states the United States included, in order to explain our view and to improve this treaty"[7].

At the beginning of February, Moscow agreed to the organization of a summit during which the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be discussed. The Soviets proposed that two more problems should be included in the agenda: the Vietnamese question (an issue on which the seven members had the same oppinion) and a military problem. The military questions constituted an obstacle in the relationships between Bucharest and Moscow. One should regard these military questions through the perspective of Romania's efforts for independence within the Soviet bloc, and from its economic and military (national and foreign) policy. Equally important was Romania's independence in its reconsideration of the Soviet military doctrine which put an even greater stress on the satellite forces, while the positions of command were monopolized by the Soviet marshals. Ceauşescu wanted Romania's independence to be recognized not only by the West, but by the Soviet Union as well.

It has been said that one of the reasons that determined Khruschov to withdraw his troops from Romania in 1958 was Romania's secondary strategic position. Although this is true, the Romanian territory remained important for anti-aircraft Soviet defense, partly due to the Romanian radar installations. The Kremlin also thought that in certain strategic circumstances, Soviet troops could be introduced again into Romania and thus exercise a constant pressure upon Yugoslavia. This is also the reason which determined Brezhnev to accelerate the transformation of the Warsaw Pact into an institutional mechanism that would assure the Soviet hegemony in the region. In 1965 the Kremlin leader had asked for the further improvement of the Warsaw Pact, especially in the field of "coordination of the foreign politics of socialist countries"[8].

However, Romania took the opposite course, representing a military challenge.

"For almost two decades Romania has declined to cooperate with Moscow when the latter has called for 'strengthening' of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the Romanians had a common theme: control over troops in Romania should be exercised by Romanian authorities, and the actual orders to fight should be administered by Romanian authorities. After the 1963 exercises, Romania never again permitted maneuvers on Romanian land, although it has sent to the WTO exercises personnel whom the Romanians have described as observers, and the Soviets have described as participants"[9]. In the last couple of years, the duration of military service in Romania has been reduced from 24 to 16 months, and the army has been given a basically internal doctrinal orientation.

The Romanian leadership also attempted to limit the actions of the Pact to a reduced number of scenarios (an attack from NATO) and to oppose the Soviet intention to use it against China. According to its leaders, Romania would only fulfil its obligations in the first case. The Romanian options materialized in the counter-proposals made in 1966 (regarding Brezhnev's program), which suggested that the function of the chief - commander of the Pact should be occupied by all the members in turn, and the decisions concerning nuclear weapons should be the result of open discussions[10]. Moscow was soon to be confronted with the demand for a substantial reduction of its Military Mission in the Romanian capital[11].

Taking advantage of Ceauşescu's proposal, Brezhnev agreeed to the meeting and overbade the Vietnamese problem (which did not create any dispute, anyway) and the military one (which hurt him the most). What was his purpose? He actually wanted to gain control over the military organisms of the satellites, especially Romania's, whose negative example might be followed by other states.

Ceauşescu's perspective could be explained by the following words: "The real purpose was the creation of a central headquarters for the armies belonging to the member states of the Warsaw Pact, so that all armies would be subject to a central headquarters and become parts of a united army. We demanded a united headquarters of national armies belonging to the countries of the Warsaw Pact. We voted for a headquarters that would coordinate the activity, of national armies. The party and the government of each country was to be held responsible for the equipment and the deployment of armies in case of war. We could coordinate all these activities and adopt a unified policy from a common headquarters, but we cannot accept a position of subordination. We do not want the Romanian army to take orders from either Greciko or someone else. The Romanian army can only take orders from the Romanian party and government"[12].

There is obviously a conflict between the two organizational strategies here. The strategy argued for by Ceauşescu, demanded national control over the forces of cooperation, and the other plan emphasized military efficiency, which had become fundamental after the World War II. According to the latter "accepting certain sacrifices of national sovereignty" was necessary for the fulfilment of their military missions in case of a coalition war[13]. Consequently, before the opening of the sessions of the Political Advisory Committee in Sofia, the Romanian-Soviet file was quite sizable.

The Bulgarian capital hosted the leaders of the communist parties from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Romania, Hungary, and the Soviet Union, accompanied by their ministers of Foreign Affairs and ministers of Defence. Marshal Iakubovski, the supreme commander of the united army of the Warsaw Pact states, was

also present at the discussions[14]. The agenda included the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Vietnamese question, and the military problem.

According to the public communique[15], "during the discussions a powerful exchange of opinion took place regarding the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The participants in the conference, taking into account the positions expressed by the Political Advisory Committee in Bucharest and Warsaw, confirmed the absolute importance of avoiding the proliferation of nuclear weapons. They examined the project of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which had been ellaborated during the negotiations and discussions of the Committee for Disarmament of "the group of the 18", and they expressed their positions regarding this matter. The meeting took place in an atmosphere of friendship and comradeship"[16].

Not even the most attentive reader of *Scânteia*, accustomed to these encoded formulas could suspect what was happening in Sofia behind the festive atmosphere in the Peoples' Opera hall.

Several documentary sources exist for the meeting in Sofia. They include the minutes of the Executive Committee of the session of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party[17], the report of the common session of the Political Committee of the Socialist Hungarian Workers' Party and of the Hungarian Council of Ministers[18], and the information presented by Dubcek to the leading party forum[19].

Let us begin with the results.

There were two communiqués. The former was signed by all the participants in the meeting, whom we quoted earlier, and the latter bears only the six signatures belonging to the chiefs of delegations, except Ceauşescu (the communiqué was published only in the press of the signatory

countries). This was the first time in the history of the Warsaw Pact when a session ended in disagreement. Yet it wasn't the last one, the very fact that there were two communiqués was the consequence of serious conflicts regarding the subjects under discussion: the agenda, the Military Council and the General Staff, the Treaty of Non-Proliferation, and the responsible partners.

Concerning the agenda, the position of the Romanian Communist Party was: "We have agreed to the following formula for the third point of the agenda :'Certain military problems to be discussed at the meeting between the assistants of the ministers of Defence in Prague' - and this is how we referred to it until the last moment. But on Wednesday, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon, when the agenda was announced, only the first two points were as established, while the third had a different formula: 'The Creation of the Military Council and the General Staff'. I replied that the agenda and the protocol had been decided upon in Berlin. Then Comrade Gomulka, the president of the session, asked: 'Has anybody signed the protocol?' And, indeed, nobody had signed it. All the other participants agreed to the agenda proposed by Comrade Gomulka. We declared that we would make a decision when the third point was brought up for discussion. From the very beginning they tried to impose their point of view, which they had previously made public in Prague, to create the General Staff and the Military Council".

The position of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party was: "The agenda included three problems previously agreed upon: the problem of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, brought into discussion by the Romanian comrades, the attitude concerning the Vietnamese problem, shared by all the participants, and the last one - suggested by several parties - the report of

the Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact". The formula referring to the military problem - suggested by several parties - should be noted, as it refers to the majority, and not to a unanimous decision.

The position of the Czechoslovak Communist Party is not referred to regarding this matter.

The position of the Romanian Communist Party on the establishment of a Military Council and General Staff was: "As we have already stated, we have nothing against the creation of these two military structures, yet we think that the problem of the Statute for the United Command should be solved first, and only then should we consider the General Staff and the Military Council. Everybody agreed, and thus we solved the disputes created by the third point (this was prepared and discussed six months later)".

The position of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party on the Military Council and the General Staff was: "In the report presented by the commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact some ideas were expressed regarding the development of a General Staff and Headquarters, but, as we did not reach a common opinion, the discussion was postponed. The commander-in-chief of the united organization and several ministers of Defence were authorized to solve this matter. The authorization was given for a six month period".

The position of the Czechoslovak Communist Party on this same issue was: "The question of a united military command should have been finalized by now. We are directly interested in solving this problem".

The position of the Romanian Communist Party on the Non-Proliferation Treaty was: "Comrade Brezhnev reached the conclusion that the Non-Proliferation Treaty must be sanctioned as soon as possible. We took floor immediately after

him. We presented our amendments and ended our speech stressing the importance of this Treaty - of course, in the form Ceauşescu proposed - for the communist movement, and the fact that we should militate for the improvement of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Czechoslovak took the floor after us, and, although we did not understand very much of his speech (as he kept writing something), we can describe his opinion in the following way: He feels that the Treaty is, without any doubt, necessary, that Comrade Ceauşescu's propositions cannot be disputed and that they are extremely good, but they can hardly be put into practice. The Czechoslovak thinks that we should be contented for what we have acquired so far and sign the Treaty. Gomulka's speech was quite brief, stating that we should sign the Treaty, since this was the best we could do; Kádár also thought that the Romanians' amendments were interesting, yet that the Treaty should be signed in its present form. Jivkov's discourse followed the same course, but it was shorter, and eventually Kosighin took the floor, referring to our proposals for about half an hour. He disagreed with some of our points, thinking that the control was very good, and in the end, he invited everybody to reconsider the situation and unanimously sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty and then to launch a disarmament program. We made it very clear that these questions should only be decided upon by the Central Committees of the parties, and according to the Authorization of our Central Committee we shall present our amendments to the Committee of "the 18" from Geneva. We specified that we were not in a position to decide whether we should sign the Treaty or not, as this decision could only be made by the Central Committee. We had limited authorization. They could not approve the Treaty in a meeting, since this was a question that regarded each and every party

and government. We were there to consult each other, not to make decisions".

The position of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party was: "There has been a quite serious conflict of opinions between the Romanians and the rest of the participants, and we could not reach a common conclusion. The Romanians have offered different observations and suggestion for change. These suggestions take into account basic problems - so they have nothing to do with style - that would be in the best interest of the pacifist socialist countries to resolve. The nature of the proposals is the follwing: first of all the projected agreement does not stipulate the obligation of the countries possessing nuclear weapons to destroy these weapons, that is, to stop producing them and then to eradicate the armament stocks and the means of transportation. Another basic problem is that of the guarantees. The Romanian motion suggests that the powers possessing nuclear weapons should pledge themselves not to use these weapons against non-nuclear countries. The third essential obligation ascribes the control of our obligations regarding the agreement. The Romanian party proposed an amendment which stipulated that these controls be modified in the following way: the nuclear activity of a country should be controlled if this activity reaches the point - from both a qualitative and quantitative perspective - where the material produced could be used for the production of weapons. And the agreement stipulated one more aspect, the fourth essential observation: according to the projected agreement, the Treaty is valid 25 years. Related to this aspect, the Romanian initiative suggests the organization, after five years, of a meeting reuniting the representatives of all states, and if no progress in the destruction of nuclear weapons is noted, the essential elements of the agreement would be reconsidered. The six members, including

us, were of the opinion that these Romanian amendments are generally approved, or that they would generally be acceptable, but that they are illusory, as there is no chance that our adversaries would accept them or include them in the agreement. Far-fetched conclusions cannot be drawn, but we can define the Romanian attitude by the everything or nothing formula. They prefer not to sign the agreement at all rather than to sign something in the detriment of their country; the rest of the participants thought that anything is better than nothing. This is the fundamental disagreement between the two views".

The Czechoslovak Communist Party did not make any reference to this subject, which was actually the reason for the meeting.

The position of the Romanian Communist Party on who was responsible for the situation was: "How can we talk about negotiations when, while we were analyzing the problem of non-proliferation, they presented to Geneva a projected agreement, together with the Americans and the British. We have to analyze the content of this projected agreement which seems to be against China. According to France Press, up to now we were guarded by a gendarme, now we are guarded by two (Ceauşescu must have been very upset to describe the Soviet Union as an international gendarme). A good thing is that, willy-nilly, they have to understand that the Political Advisory Committee should be satisfied with this new role - the role of a forum where problems are discussed - instead of the one it played up to now, rubber stamping everything the Soviet Union did".

The position of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party concerning the situation was: "This session pointed out again, from a certain perspective, the differences of opinions which have appeared lately between the People's Republic of Romania - was Kádár really

unaware of the fact that the official denomination of Romania had changed three years earlier? - and the other members of the Treaty".

The position of the Czechoslovak Communist Party was: "The evolution of Romania must not be similar to ours. Yet we are worried that this may have bad effects. In the future was consider if necessary to agree upon the fact that we must deal very carefully with our Romanian comrades in order not to give them the opportunity of claiming that we exclude them[20] but also in order to exploit all possibilities"[21].

The consequences of Czecholovak Communist Party session in Sofia, held in an "atmosphere of comradeship", were: the appearance of the "the group of the six"; the exclusion of Czecholovakia, whose internal evolutions began to be doubted; the successful attempt of Ceauşescu to transfer the decision from the Political Advisory Committee to the authorized forums in the respective countries. This encouraged the actions of the military organizations with a nationalist bias (Czechoslovakia, for instance, but also Poland and Hungary)[22].

But where did Ceauşescu's desire to amend the Non-Proliferation Treaty come from? Perhaps the Americans were his real aim; it is possible that he wanted to prevent their control and espionage. Was he really worried that the West-German revanchists might "steal" American nuclear capacities deployed in the German Federal Republic? Or did he want to show, by means of his plans for the future, that his intentions were good? His position must be judged taking into account the energetic profile of Romania. The next five-year plan stipulated the commencement of a peaceful nuclear program. "Romania has decided to go in the direction of obtaining plants which can use Romanian uranium and this will involve obtaining heavy water plants. The Ambassador indicated that this subject had

been taken up with the Canadians and that there was some interest in obtaining a heavy water plant from Canada"[23]. This project had been proposed a few years before to the United States, which had rejected it, probably doubting that the secret would be kept[24] Ambassador Corneliu Bogdan's interlocutor, John M. Ledy, assistant of the secretary for European problems, promised that these matters would be reconsidered.

Above all, the position adopted at Sofia had immediate consequences on the military level. Feeling Romanians' lack of reliability, and wanting to exclude them, the Moscow authorities cancelled a military exercise that was to take place in Romania. It was supposed to have been a common exercise at the operative-strategic level, led by Marshal Iakubovski, commander-in-chief of the United Army Forces. Operative groups of three command centers - Romanian, Bulgarian, and Soviet - as well as operative groups of the Anti-aircraft Defence Department of the Romanian Territory and Military Navy of the three states were to take part in the maneuver which was to take place between 18 and 26 March (the last days of the operation coincided with the Dresden conference).

On 12, March the chief of the General Staff of the United Commandment announced in Bucharest that the Romanian operation was postponed until further notice, without any further information. The Ministry of Army Forces of Romania demanded explanations, but its representative at the Pact was told that the postponement was possibly due to multiple reasons, namely that the Defence minister of the Soviet Union was to leave for Iraq and Syria, and Marshall Iakubovski was named to replace him. Furthermore, the Romanians were told that a large exercise was to take place in the Soviet army, althought not much was known about and that there were also political reasons. When Colonel Iacob Ion demanded to be made

acquainted with these political reasons, the Army General Kazakov defined them as the problem of Europe and added no further explanation. Two days later, Kazakov announced that the military maneuvers would not take place in the near future[25].

Returning to the Sofia conference, "the group of the six" wanted to make itself heard in the first session, which was to be held in the same place where the group was created. The improvised agenda included: CEMA, the Political Advisory Committee, and the international communist movement. The conclusions reached at the end of the discussions represented a step forward on the way to the creation of a leading center of the socialist states, which would control the international communist movement, would be formed of the Soviet Union and its closest satellites. The unwanted were to be excluded from the table of the gods. Ceauşescu's exclusion was made without Moscow worrying that he would give up communism.

At the Sofia free composition meeting, as Dubcek called it, it was stated that "practice confirmed that the CEMA measures concerning the economic division and other matters - Bârlădeanu's reactions during other sessions of this organization were still fresh in everybody's mind - could not always be solved. No resolution has been found for the problem of a united command center within the Warsaw Pact". And, as the Sofia meeting confirmed, no agreement was reached concerning the measures taken by the United Nations regarding the non-proliferation of atomic weapons[26]. But, according to a participant of the smaller conference, the basic conclusion was that: "We should meet more often in this setting"[27].

This high society met again in Dresden (23 March). Yet, there was a great discrepancy between the way some of them (Dubcek, for instance) viewed this reunion and what really happened[28]. In this case the problem of sources reappears, since the published communiqué is actually a lie. The newspapers asserted that "the six" discussed the problems of CEMA, the problems of the economic collaboration, the united leadership of the Pact forces, the question of the military council, the technical committee, and the situation within each party. Through the perspective of this communiqué, Ceauşescu's reaction, expressed in the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party in April 1968, seems to be perfectly justified[29]. "We think that the discussions about the problems of the military command center of the Warsaw Pact and about CEMA that took place in Dresden, contradict the spirit of the relationships between socialist states of the Warsaw Pact and CEMA. Our opinion is that a group of countries, members of an international organization, do not have the right to meet separately and discuss the activity of international organizations of which other countries are members, as well. Because, no matter how lenient or sensitive we want to be, we must admit that what they did was an unilateral action which undermined these international organizations. [...] We think it is not fair that the problems concerning our country were debated in our absence, and we suggest that these discussions be held in the presence of all the members"[30].

The Romanian reaction would have been a natural one if these had been the real facts about what took place in Dresden. But too little of what was published in the socialist press was discussed afterwards. This is a typical example of the manipulation of public opinion which frequently occurred in the states mentioned above, and generally in all the countries.

Yet, one more obstacle was presented by Alexander Dubcek's report to the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party on the occasion of his return from Dresden[31]. According to

newspapereditors, his report was a "distorted presentation of the way the Dresden conference was held and the way it ended [...] The agenda of the Dresden meeting did not include any problem relating to 'the united leadership, the military council, or the technical committee', even if these matters were mentioned in the final communiqué of the Dresden meeting"[32]. Why Dubcek slipped and in reality misinformed the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party is a problem that belongs to the Czechoslovak historians.

But what happened in Dresden, after all?

This question is partially answered by the previous report. Dubcek communicated that. "During the meeting certain people were worried that, by a certain kind of activity, others could take advantage of the developments in our country. [...] can state that these concerns and our comrades' advice were the expression of their best intentions and care"[33]. The communist leader must have been really naïve to make such a statement! Or maybe he was an expert in the psychology of the people who were listening to him, and among whom were many supporters of Novotny (who had just been forced to resign from the function of president of the republic) and of Moscow. Another supposition would be that he simply wanted another kind of socialism, and the team around him was actually the driving force of action[34]. Other speakers (Drahomir Kolder, for instance) were more direct: "Our comrades seemed to be seriously worried that the party would not be able to handle the situation".

Partial explanations can be found in the telegrams of Romanian diplomats on missions in different capitals. Of course, in Bucharest, the most awaited were those coming from the firing zone, Prague, where Ambassador Obradovici and his team, Răsuceanu and Vlăsceanu, tried to and

succeeded in obtaining the most useful information for the Head Office of the Ministry of Foreign Defense.

On 23, March, two days after Novotny's resignation and on the very day of the Dresden reunion, an analysis of the events was telegraphed from Prague: "Novotny's resignation from the function of president of the Republic and the changes in personnel will continue to take place in the Central Committee Plenum on 28 March this year. They mark on a large scale the conclusion of the first stage of the democratization process started by the Central Committee Plenum in December and January and indicate the consolidation of the progressive wing within the Czechoslovak party leadership, providing it with public support. To reach this goal, the progressive forces within the Central Committee, supported by the mass-media (press, radio and television) started with district party conferences and passed on to the direct mobilization of the population against the conservative elements. Consequently, in the last few weeks, the democratization process has involved all social strata. [...] The influence of the conservative elements has decreased considerably. Their representatives have resigned from their functions in the party or in the state, or have been replaced. [...] The second stage of this process will be commenced after the Central Committee Plenum on 28, March this year, which will adopt the plan of action of the party up to 1970. It is characterized by concrete measures, first of all in the economic field and by the symmetrical reorganization of Czechoslovak society, made up of two nationalities". The communist leader in Bucharest did not mind these aspects, but others he regarded with apprehension: "Improper attitudes were manifested during the meetings with the students, among which was the request to take out of the Constitution the article stipulating the

leading role of the Romanian Communist Party, hostile statements against the army, the suggestion that the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia should promote a neutral politics, and so on". Eventually, the Romanian diplomats appreciated that the conclusion of this process of democratization would depend on the way the party succeeded in recovering the national economy and in avoiding the negative effects of an exaggerated freedom (which could create the premises for anti-socialist activities)[35]. Concerning this particular aspect, Ulbricht Gomulka, Tito, Brezhnev, and Ceauşescu seemed to have the same goal. Ceauşescu, exactly as his predecessor, was a liberal outside, but inside, he acted like a Stalinist (made of a more and more resistent steel). There was no getting out of the system, and seeing that the Romanian Communist Party had things under control, Brezhnev gave Ceauşescu a kind of liberty of movement[36], of which the latter took the best advantage, by rushing over to Czechoslovakia.

The possibility of the situation getting out of control was also mentioned by the diplomats of non-socialist states, accredited in Prague, who considered that excesses having a rightist bias might appear, which would lead to "internal and external reactions contrary to present tendencies". They also considered it essential that: "As soon as the critical objectives are attained, they must be replaced by positive actions which, in order to hold the masses' interest and adhesion, should follow each other in an accelerated rhythm. We refer basically to the economic field"[37].

On the basis of the telegrams received by the Ministry of Foreign Defense, Ceauşescu took the floor at the Plenum held in April 1968, speaking against the organizers of the Dresden conference and pointing out that: "A group of countries has no right to meet, especially when their aim is to exert pressure upon the Czechs, regarding their internal situation, as some of the countries wanted to do at Dresden"[38].

Ceauşescu's reaction was made public, as the authorized Romanian forums did not make a secret of their positions. All opportunities were used in order to promote the Romanian standpoint. Why? Maybe because Ceauşescu wanted to replace the Soviet imperialist communism by the communism of small countries and needed support from all over the world. Or maybe he wanted smaller parties to escape Moscow's influence.

NOTES

[1] *ANIC*, fond CC al PCR/Cancelarie, dosar nr. 31/1968, f. 40.

[2] Concerning the Romanian position vis-à-vis the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the American Embassy expressed the following view: "It is hard to say how seriously the Romanians consider their own objections to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Although the treaty confronts Romania with the same type of problems that the other non-nuclear countries encounter as well, it is most probable that these objections aim at pointing out to Moscow that Bucharest should be consulted when such questions are decided upon" (FRUS, vol. XVII, folder no. 158).

[3] *ANIC*, fond CC al PCR/Cancelarie, dosar nr. 31/1968, f. 41.

[4] *Ibidem*, ff. 43-44.

[5] *Ibidem*.

[6] *Ibidem*, f. 45.

[7] *Ibidem*.

[8] Robert L. Hutchings, *Soviet-East European Relations. Consolidation and Conflict*, 1968-1980, Wisconsin, 1983, p. 32.

[9] William Zimmerman, "Soviet Relations with Yugoslavia and Romania", in *Soviet Policy in East-em Europe* (eds. Sarah Meiklejohn Terry), New Heaven and London, 1984, p. 138.

[10] When we present Ceauşescu's position concerning nuclear weapons, we are not refering to its productivity from the coalition point of view.

[11] A. Ross Johnson, "The Warsaw Pact. Soviet Military Policy in Eastern Europe", in *Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe*, pp. 263-264.

[12] *ANIC*, fond CC al PCR/Cancelarie, dosar nr. 31/1968, f. 46.

[13] C.P. Stacey, *Armes, hommes et gouvernements. Politiques de guerre de Canada*, 1939-1945, Ottawa, 1970, p. 227.

[14] *Scânteia*, no. 7635 from 7, March 1968.

[15] *Ibidem*, no. 7637 from 9, March 1968.

[16] *Ibidem*.

[17] *ANIC*, fond CC al PCR/Cancelarie, dosar nr. 34/1968, ff. 2-14.

[18] *MKS*, 288, fund 5, folder no. 449, ff. 3-12.

[19] *Ceskoslovenske krize*, vol. 4/1, folder no. 13.

[20] "Which would be to their advantage", is stated later in Dubcek's report.

[21] The accommodation of Czechoslovakia to the fractional practice, proposed by Ulbricht, turned against Czechoslovakia later on.

[22] A. Ross Johnson, *op. cit*, p. 273.

[23] *FRUS*, vol. XVII, folder no. 159.

[24] Similar problems had occurred in 1965, when the Romanians wanted to buy technology from Firestone to produce synthetic rubber. At that time, the Firestone representatives stopped the negotiations because of a campaign organized against sales to Romania (16 April). Four days later, David Klein, from the National Security Council staff, presented a memo to McGeorge Bundy, the special assistant of the president for National Security. Several aspects should be noted: "It is increasingly clear that neither the Secretary of Commence nor Secretary Mann have looked carefully at the problems of Rumania to examine the characteristics which distinguish it from other Communist countries. The Firestone deal is over. But we may be able to save some of the political pieces. It is not clear at this juncture just how the Rumanians read the cancellation action. Bucharest sent in a cable this morning indicating that Vietnam has left the paged of the Rumanian papers - which could indicate that Rumanians consider the cancellation a reaction to their position on Vietnam" (*Ibidem*, folder no. 151).

[25] *Arhivele Militare Române*, fond Direcţia Operaţii, dosar nr. 3, vol. I/1968, ff. 156-157.

[26] *Ceskoslovenské krize*, vol. 4/1, folder no. 25.

[27] *Ibidem*.

[28] Cosmin Popa's article, "Succes militar, eşec politic", în *Dosarele Istoriei*, nr. 5/1998, pp. 28-35, is illustrative regarding the Soviet decisions on the Czechoslovak problem.

[29] *ANIC*, fond CC al PCR/Cancelarie, dosar nr. 67/1968, ff. 142-144.

[30] *Ibidem*, ff. 143-144.

[31] *Ceskoslovenské krize*, vol. 4/1, folder no. 25.

[32] *Ibidem*, note 3.

[33] *Ibidem*.

[34] Smrkovsky's testimony is interesting in this respect, quoted from Giorni by *Dosarele istoriei*, nr. 5, 1998, pp. 23-27.

[35] *AMAE*, fond Telegrame Praga (march 1968), telegrama nr. 77203/23 March.

[36] These aspects must be reconsidered when documents from the former Soviet Union are available.

[37] *AMAE*, fond Telegrame Praga (March 1968), telegrama nr. 77232/23 March.

[38] *ANIC*, fond CC al PCR/Cancelarie, dosar nr. 67/1968, f. 143.

LA POLITICA DI SICUREZZA E DI DIFESA ITALIANA DAGLI ANNI DEL CENTRO-SINISTRA AL CROLLO DEL BLOCCO ORIENTALE, 1968 -1991

Giuliano CAROLI

Non è semplice oggi analizzare gli aspetti caratteristici della politica di sicurezza e di difesa italiana nel periodo che va dai governi organici di centro-sinistra fino alla crisi di questa formula di governo, in uno scenario internazionale in cui si alternarono crisi e tensioni, nel quadro consolidato del bipolarismo USA-URSS, fino a che questo ebbe termine negli anni 1989-91.

La ricostruzione di quei fatti, ancora storicamente "recenti", non può ovviamente disporre di tutta la documentazione d'archivio necessaria, come è ormai possibile per gli anni del centrismo, malgrado il moltiplicarsi delle fonti di informazione e di analisi contemporanee ai fatti esaminati. Tuttavia, è ugualmente possibile esaminare in linea generale una serie di eventi e problematiche così da poter seguire gli sviluppi fondamentali della politica estera italiana in tema di sicurezza e le scelte prese nel campo della difesa nazionale, a partire dai primi anni, difficili, del centro-sinistra.

Non si può fare a meno di constatare in primo luogo l'esistenza di una fase di transizione negli indirizzi politico-strategici del paese all'indomani della firma del trattato di non proliferazione nucleare, in quell'estate del 1968, che segnò in qualche modo una svolta nel quadro dei pericoli che la guerra fredda si portava dietro dal periodo in cui il confronto aveva raggiunto i più alti livelli (l'invasione della Cecoslovacchia ne costituì forse l'ultimo tragico aspetto) ed allo stesso tempo definì un momento chiave nella politica di sicurezza italiana che proprio allora faceva della distensione il tema su cui ritagliare un ruolo internazionalmente importante per il paese.

In occasione di quella firma l'Italia, al pari di altri paesi europei, aveva contestato l'innegabile duopolio nucleare a favore delle superpotenze, attivandosi per l'adozione di quella "clausola europea" che avrebbe dovuto lasciare qualche spiraglio per lo sviluppo dell'industria nucleare del Continente ed evitare che il potenziale nucleare mondiale fosse accentrato nelle mani di Washington e Mosca, anche solo a scopi di sviluppo dell'economia civile.

E' tuttavia doveroso confermare come quella fase di transizione da un lato abbia visto la conferma generalizzata delle costanti fondamentali della politica estera italiana, in particolare dell'*atlantismo* e dell'*europeismo*, dall'altro abbia registrato una contrapposizione netta tra opposizioni e maggioranza di governo sui temi di fondo della politica estera, con alcuni "distinguo" nella stessa area governativa.

I governi italiani avevano contribuito attivamente al processo negoziale per il disarmo, soprattutto di quello nucleare, avanzando proposte e attivando iniziative che in qualche modo innovavano senza intaccarlo il filone della partecipazione all'alleanza occidentale. Dalle conferenze di Ginevra nell'ambito delle Nazioni Unite alle complesse trattative e discussioni che sfociarono nel trattato di non proliferazione del luglio 1968, una sua "voce" specifica l'Italia, tutto sommato, era riuscita a costruirsela, rinsaldando la posizione che vedeva la fedeltà alla politica di difesa occidentale unirsi senza contraddizione alla ricerca di tutte quelle occasioni che avrebbero potuto portare alla diminuzione della tensione Est-Ovest ed allontanare i rischi di un conflitto generalizzato. La ricerca di un rapporto particolare con l'URSS entrava in questo contesto che vedeva la supremazia concettuale della politica di "distensione".

Del resto, pochi anni dopo, nel 1971, il governo sovietico sorprese l'Occidente con la proposta di indire una Conferenza mondiale per il disarmo, implicante una dichiarazione generale di non ricorso alla forza. Proposta che trovò però gli occidentali generalmente divisi nelle loro valutazioni, timorosi che l'invito possa diventare uno strumento di propaganda della politica sovietica.

L'intenzione dei governi italiani di coniugare in una visione più ampia processo di disarmo e sicurezza portò comunque alla intensificazione di una attività ricca di contenuti da parte dei diplomatici italiani: senza dubbio uno degli aspetti più concreti nel quadro della partecipazione, niente affatto ritenuta marginale o secondaria, ai lavori della Commissione per il disarmo dell'ONU, a Ginevra. In questo contesto, un tema che attirava in modo particolare l'attenzione della diplomazia italiana era quello della limitazione delle armi chimiche e batteriologiche e su di esso ebbe modo di svilupparsi uno studio sempre più competente e dettagliato.

La posizione italiana era a favore del raggiungimento rapido di un accordo, ma con l'adozione di controlli tecnicamente perfetti, presupposto anche di una indispensabile volontà politica "europea" e di una grande chiarezza sul piano giuridico internazionale. Determinante poi si rivelò il contributo italiano per una intesa accettabile per tutti, con l'obiettivo di far adottare criteri univoci per la definizione degli agenti chimici e batteriologici da interdire.

Alla 27° sessione dell'Assemblea generale dell'ONU, nel settembre 1972, il rappresentante italiano, l'ambasciatore Vinci, lanciò alcune critiche ai colloqui sul disarmo, che sembravano non adeguati al ritmo assunto dalle relazioni internazionali, sempre più centrate sull'interdipendenza dei problemi e non sull'isolamento di un problema rispetto agli altri. Critiche lanciate soprattutto al duopolio USA-URSS nel trattare le tematiche nucleari. L'Italia era invece per il raggiungimento di una formula che non opponesse gli Stati nucleari a quelli non nucleari e definisse invece responsabilità e oneri diversi, con un maggiore impegno degli Stati "militarmente importanti".

Tuttavia, la clamorosa firma a metà del 1972 dei Trattati SALT I e ABM a Mosca, al termine di una lunga e travagliata stagione di negoziati fra Stati Uniti e Unione Sovietica, costrinse l'Italia come gli

altri paesi europei a confrontarsi ancora con la temuta ma ineliminabile dimensione bilaterale della gestione degli armamenti nucleari che toccò il culmine proprio in quell'occasione.

Il 1968 fu un anno chiave per la sicurezza europea. L'anno dell'esperimento praghese del socialismo dal volto umano e della dura repressione sovietica, dell'arrivo dei carri armati di Mosca nel cuore dell'Europa con una rapidità strabiliante dal punto di vista tecnico-militare, mentre l'organismo fondamentale della difesa europea, la NATO si rivelava sempre più alle prese con i problematici temi della ripartizione delle responsabilità finanziarie tra alleati europei e americano e con questioni che sembravano contrapporre spesso le valutazioni strategiche delle due sponde dell'Atlantico, mentre cresceva il divario a favore del Patto di Varsavia in termini di armamenti convenzionali.

Per uno strano paradosso della storia politica il tragico epilogo dell'esperimento cecoslovacco si venne a collocare all'inizio di un dibattito che allora era ancora confinato nelle cancellerie ma che progressivamente avrebbe riempito sempre di più il dialogo Est-Ovest, finendo addirittura per condizionare e mutare lo stesso processo di distensione: la Conferenza per la sicurezza e la cooperazione in Europa. Vecchio progetto di Molotov nel 1954-55, il tema di una Conferenza volta a creare un "sistema" di sicurezza cui avrebbero dovuto partecipare senza distinzioni tutti i paesi del Continente si era poi sganciato dal punto di riferimento iniziale, vale a dire il problema della riunificazione tedesca, ed era stata rilanciato con forza da Mosca e dai suoi alleati alla riunione del Patto di Varsavia nel 1966 e, per dargli una risonanza più vasta all'interno delle stesse opinioni pubbliche occidentali, alla riunione dei partiti comunisti di Karlovy Vary nel 1967.

Indubbiamente uno dei temi che maggiormente motivava l'iniziale diffidenza dei paesi occidentali era quello relativo alla presunta volontà sovietica di sancire con questa Conferenza, "sostitutiva" di un trattato di pace generale, lo status quo territoriale scaturito dal secondo conflitto mondiale e la legittimità politica dei governi est-europei. Senza contare anche il riconoscimento formale della Repubblica democratica tedesca da parte degli occidentali che sarebbe inevitabilmente derivato dalla convocazione di una Conferenza paneuropea per discutere della sicurezza di tutti.

L'Italia, che già nel giugno 1967 con l'allora ministro degli Esteri Fanfani riteneva di dover dare un respiro più ampio alla proposta sovietica, per impedire che l'Europa occidentale e gli Stati Uniti si arroccassero su un rifiuto che con il passare del tempo avrebbe potuto divenire controproducente per le opinioni pubbliche, iniziò a privilegiare in particolare gli aspetti politico-culturali, scientifici e tecnologici che il progettato evento paneuropeo avrebbe dovuto sollevare. Fin dall'inizio il governo italiano cercava così di far confluire nel dibattito tematiche attinenti anche alla cooperazione economica e soprattutto alla tutela dei diritti umani all'interno del blocco sovietico, onde evitare che una impronta rigidamente politico-ideologica finisse con il riaffermare proprio quella logica dei blocchi che il progetto invece, almeno sulla carta, puntava a superare.

L'impostazione particolare data dall'Italia al dibattito sulla CSCE divenne visibile in modo particolare quando nel marzo 1969 l'"Appello di Budapest" del Patto di Varsavia rilanciò, e questa volta definitivamente, il negoziato fra i due blocchi. La conferma di questo indirizzo della politica italiana giunse quando il ministro degli Esteri Nenni prese lo spunto dalla reiterata proposta di Mosca e dei suoi

alleati per auspicare un negoziato diretto Est-Ovest in cui l'Europa avrebbe avuto una parte preponderante in un contesto negoziale che coinvolgeva la sua stessa sicurezza. In altre parole, la progettata Conferenza paneuropea, se pur avrebbe coinvolto le due alleanze politico-militari contrapposte, avrebbe potuto consentire agli europei di giocare un ruolo non rigidamente inserito negli schemi della guerra fredda che privilegiavano le due più grande potenze nucleari della terra. L'approfondimento delle tematiche inerenti alla sicurezza europea rimase da allora in poi una costante della politica estera italiana sviluppando proprio questa cornice concettuale.

Il processo di sicurezza europea fu visto come un obiettivo possibile a partire dal 1969-70: anche se in seguito furono numerose le critiche rivolte al tentativo sovietico di scardinare grazie ad esso il sistema di difesa occidentale e di ottenere a poco prezzo il riconoscimento dello status quo territoriale in Europa. Un processo che stava però irreversibilmente proseguendo per tappe, con un rilievo attribuito a quelli che un po' troppo eufemisticamente venivano definiti i problemi relativi alle relazioni umane.

L'Italia, nonostante la sua preferenza per una accentuazione della politica di distensione, non era affatto intenzionata ad attenuare la sua tradizionale "fedeltà atlantica" e la partecipazione alle attività dell'Alleanza. Il governo italiano si mostrò contrariato, ad esempio, dal rifiuto sovietico di accogliere una missione guidata dal Segretario generale della NATO, Manlio Brosio, fatto che sembrava contraddire i negoziati ormai avviati fra i due opposti schieramenti.

Se il processo che avrebbe portato nel 1972 alla convocazione della Conferenza per la sicurezza e la cooperazione europea non si mostrava privo di ostacoli, il dibattito fra gli alleati occidentali si fece particolarmente intenso, senza che scomparissero le tendenze differenti sul come rispondere alle proposte dell'Est. Anche se dal 1969 l'Alleanza atlantica aveva ormai accettato il fatto che si parlasse di organizzare una "Conferenza", restava sul tappeto l'irrisolta questione tedesca a raffreddare gli entusiasmi circa l'appuntamento paneuropeo voluto dal Cremlino, mentre vi erano ancora resistenze al tentativo orientale di ottenere per questa via il riconoscimento dello status quo politico e territoriale nel Centro Europa e della RDT.

Per quanto riguardava questo aspetto del dialogo/confronto Est-Ovest, l'Italia nel contesto delle riunioni atlantiche (Consiglio NATO del dicembre 1970) favoriva quella che inevitabilmente era l'unica via percorribile per avere un risultato positivo: il riconoscimento reciproco tra i due Stati tedeschi nell'ambito di una nuova dimensione di sicurezza e di una fase ulteriore di negoziati.

L'avvio nel 1969 della "Ostpolitik" del cancelliere Willy Brandt, fu sempre sostenuto dai governi italiani sia nelle sue impostazioni concettuali che nei risultati concreti. Nei mesi successivi si ebbero come è noto gli incontri fra i governi delle due Germanie, i trattati di Mosca e di Varsavia, l'accordo quadripartito nel 1971 su Berlino e il Trattato fondamentale fra Bonn e Berlino Est. Eventi che segnarono la svolta decisiva nel dialogo fra Occidente e mondo sovietico: dopo il vertice di Praga del Patto di Varsavia nel gennaio 1972 - determinante per quanto riguarda la problematica della sicurezza e la cooperazione europea - nel Consiglio atlantico del maggio 1972 si decise finalmente di accettare la sfida della Conferenza paneuropea e, in quello del dicembre successivo, di ammettervi la RDT.

L'Italia, in prima linea nella svolta storica della preparazione della Conferenza paneuropea, fu tra i primi paesi ad accogliere l'invito del governo di Helsinki per fare della capitale finlandese la sede ufficiale dell'apertura dei lavori. Alla vigilia furono degne di menzione due importanti

prese di posizione da parte del governo italiano che più di altre illustrarono i contenuti della politica di sicurezza del paese.

La prima fu quella del Primo Ministro Andreotti il quale confermò la validità della simbiosi tra fedeltà all'Alleanza atlantica e la costanza nel portare avanti il dialogo Est-Ovest; la seconda consistette in un intervento del ministro degli Esteri Moro per il quale - "con realismo ed equilibrio" - la CSCE avrebbe dovuto assistere non solo alla nascita di un sistema di sicurezza europea, ma anche ad una nuova politica estera della Comunità, dotata di una particolare fermezza nell'avvicinamento all'URSS, ma in grado di far interagire nell'ambito del concetto della sicurezza europea le necessità di natura strategico-militare e gli aspetti economici e finanziari.

Anche il nuovo ministro degli Esteri, Medici, in un intervento del 1973 alla Commissione esteri della Camera, pose l'accento sulle grandi opportunità che alla CSCE si aprivano per il processo di integrazione europea, oltre che per il superamento dei blocchi contrapposti, la diffusione della fiducia, la collaborazione tra l'Est e l'Ovest.

Dopo i lavori della Conferenza preparatoria di Helsinki tra il novembre 1972 ed il gennaio 1973 seguì la riunione di Helsinki della Conferenza vera e propria, a livello di ministri degli Esteri, e successivamente la lunga fase di Ginevra a livello di ambasciatori, fino all'ultima tornata di incontri a livello di Capi di stato e di governo che il 1° agosto 1975 avrebbero firmato l'"Atto Finale" della CSCE. Nella Conferenza preparatoria l'ambasciatore Favale fu uno dei protagonisti della riunione, assertore della necessità di affrontare le varie tematiche sul tappeto con una buona dose di realismo politico. L'Italia aderì subito alla posizione di coloro che sollecitavano ad andare oltre la discussione sulla sola sicurezza militare,

affrontandone tutti gli altri aspetti ormai con essa interagenti, e cercò di introdurre per la prima volta la necessità di assicurare sicurezza e stabilità anche in Europa meridionale e nell'area mediterranea, in quegli anni condizionata da diverse sfide. Temi che non avrebbero più abbandonato l'azione della diplomazia italiana. Infatti, quello della sicurezza del fronte meridionale, il "ventre molle" della Alleanza atlantica, divenne uno dei temi più importanti, trasformandosi nelle intenzioni italiane in strumento di avvicinamento alle aspettative dei paesi del mondo arabo e del Terzo Mondo in generale.

Per l'approfondimento delle tematiche sempre più dominanti della sicurezza politico-militare e della cooperazione economica, commerciale, culturale, l'Italia intensificò la sua attività anche nelle varie sedi dell'Alleanza atlantica, dal Gruppo di pianificazione nucleare al Comitato di pianificazione della difesa ed all'Eurogruppo, pur non tralasciando di partecipare al dibattito anche su altri problemi, come quello della standardizzazione dei sistemi d'arma convenzionali. In quegli anni infatti la razionalizzazione della produzione della difesa e l'armonizzazione delle varie politiche di difesa nazionali venivano intese come parti dello stesso processo di riduzione degli armamenti e di riduzione della tensione Est-Ovest.

A partire dal 1972-1973 la problematica della sicurezza e della cooperazione europea divenne lo strumento di una più decisa politica italiana mirata a fare soprattutto della sede CSCE un luogo di confronto e di dibattito per l'avvicinamento tra i popoli delle due Europe ed il superamento delle tensioni, anche al di fuori del rigido schema delle trattative blocco a blocco. Si voleva favorire così lo sviluppo di una fitta trama di incontri e colloqui tra i due

schieramenti; con l'obiettivo sia di ammorbidire in sede bilaterale le posizioni prese in ambito NATO, che di promuovere uno specifico "desk" di negoziati aventi soprattutto la Comunità europea come protagonista, costruendo una rete negoziale in materia di cooperazione economica e commerciale non identificata *tout court* con la politica atlantica.

E' importante sottolineare come l'azione politica e diplomatica italiana in rapporto alla problematica CSCE trovò modo di attivarsi, al di fuori del mero contesto politico-militare. Proprio in questa direzione la Comunità istituì sul tema uno specifico gruppo di lavoro in cui l'apporto italiano fu ben visibile e coerente. Da questo avvicinamento tra le due dimensioni ebbero origine poi alcuni elementi fondamentali del dibattito CSCE come la dichiarazione dei princìpi, il codice di buona condotta, la libera circolazione delle idee, delle informazioni e delle persone, il rifiuto di giungere solo al riconoscimento "notarile" dello status quo nel Centro Europa. Temi tuttavia destinati di lì a poco a diventare terreno di scontro tra le diverse concezioni occidentali e sovietiche.

Decisivo per lo sviluppo dei lavori della CSCE si rivelò il fatto che la Commissione CEE divenne poco a poco un protagonista assoluto della cooperazione paneuropea e il referente principale di quel famoso gruppo di paesi neutri e non allineati cui negli anni della CSCE e dei suoi seguiti andò buona parte del merito dei successi del negoziato, soprattutto quando questo si trovò davanti ad uno stallo o ad una tensione fra i rappresentanti dei due blocchi.

Sarebbe lungo esaminare in dettaglio tutta l'attività italiana – confluente del resto in quella dei Nove della Comunità – durante i lavori della CSCE a Helsinki e soprattutto nella lunga sessione di Ginevra, fino alla firma dell'Atto Finale da parte di 35 paesi.

L'Italia sviluppò una attività negoziale dinamica e propositiva su argomenti quali la libera circolazione di idee, informazioni, persone (il famoso "terzo cesto" della CSCE), il diritto all'autodeterminazione dei sistemi politici interni, la non ingerenza negli affari interni, l'inviolabilità delle frontiere intesa come risultato della rinuncia all'uso ed alla minaccia dell'uso della forza, e non come ostacolo ai successi della distensione. Soprattutto come principio non ostacolante un fenomeno in crescita di primaria importanza quale il processo di integrazione europea.

In sede CSCE l'Italia trovò tra l'altro un grande e inaspettato spazio politico per poter coordinare le sue iniziative su queste tematiche con paesi del blocco orientale. Fra i tanti esempi di collaborazione si può citare in particolare quella avviata con la Romania (altro paese direttamente interessato a non far cadere il dibattito CSCE nello stretto limite del bipolarismo USA-URSS): ad esempio, quando Roma e Bucarest si trovarono unite nel chiedere l'aggiornamento dello Statuto dell'ONU riguardante la definizione di paesi ex nemici.

Dopo la firma dell'Atto Finale il rapido deterioramento delle relazioni Est-Ovest nella seconda metà degli anni '70 avrebbe tuttavia sollevato non pochi ostacoli a questo dinamismo sui temi della sicurezza, culminando nello sterile risultato della successiva riunione di verifica della CSCE di Belgrado nel 1977.

La CSCE si rese possibile non solo per gli spettacolari risultati dell'Ostpolitik e della distensione Est-Ovest. Il consenso degli occidentali alla convocazione della Conferenza paneuropea si verificò anche perché nel 1971 essi ottennero finalmente il consenso sovietico non solo alla partecipazione di Stati Uniti e Canada, ma anche alla convocazione di una Conferenza

"parallela" alla CSCE, destinata a trattare quello che agli occidentali stessi stava forse più a cuore: la riduzione degli effettivi militari in Europa centrale, squilibrati a favore del Patto di Varsavia. La Conferenza MBFR, per la riduzione "bilanciata" degli effettivi e dei sistemi d'arma di alcuni paesi centro-europei appartenenti alla NATO ed al Patto di Varsavia, si rivelò estremamente importante ai fini della stabilità ed all'equilibrio militari, con tutte le connessioni in sede politica, anche se manteneva - e ciò si avvertiva anche in Italia - qualche equivoco, in particolare perché la riduzione di truppe e armamenti avrebbe costretto in molti casi a far fronte ad un costoso rinnovo qualitativo di questi ultimi.

Inoltre, la MBFR vedeva la partecipazione solo di alcuni paesi dei blocchi politico-militari, in un'area interessata dalle eventuali riduzioni concordate, ma che non avrebbe dovuto isolare la sicurezza e l'equilibrio militare delle aree contermini, tanto europee che mediterranee.

Il ministro degli Esteri Medici nel Consiglio atlantico del dicembre 1972 - dato che l'Italia a rigore di logica avrebbe dovuto essere esclusa dalla Conferenza MBFR in quanto non appartenente all'area centroeuropea - sottolineò viceversa la necessità di una partecipazione del suo paese al negoziato, anche se con uno status speciale, proprio al fine di evitare che le riduzioni degli armamenti convenzionali nel cuore dell'Europa finissero per accentuare la instabilità politico-militare sui "fianchi" dell'Alleanza atlantica, a partire da quell'area mediterranea e medio-orientale che di instabilità ne aveva già molta.

Alcuni ambienti politici e diplomatici, nonché alcuni esperti in questioni strategiche, ritenevano in realtà la MBFR più "pericolosa" della CSCE per gli equilibri, in quanto apportatrice di ulteriori squilibri, dato che puntava a istituire zone a sicurezza differenziata, a tutto vantaggio del blocco sovietico, con un minore impegno americano nella difesa europea e con gli svantaggi psicologici di un più diffuso disarmo morale; obiettivo che allora si riteneva molto a cuore alla élite sovietica.

Di conseguenza, il governo italiano divenne un grande sostenitore di un negoziato, in sede CSCE, per la creazione di quelle "misure di fiducia" (CBM) che, pur riguardando la sicurezza politico-militare, investivano più direttamente il terreno del processo distensivo, contribuendo al suo miglioramento: particolare significato politico oltre che militare assumeva in particolare la reciproca notifica preventiva degli spostamenti di truppe e delle esercitazioni militari eccedenti un "tetto" prestabilito.

Come ribadì il ministro Medici in Senato nell'ottobre 1972, la "strategia globale della pace" portata avanti dall'Italia considerava essenziale per un concetto molto più ampio della sicurezza europea anche il superamento del divario tra mondo sviluppato e mondo arretrato.

La politica atlantica seguita dai governi italiani nel nuovo quadro negoziale paneuropeo fu dominata nella prima metà degli anni Settanta da sviluppi importanti. Fra i documenti a favore delle riduzioni reciproche ed equilibrate delle forze convenzionali vennero a inserirsi testi profondamente innovativi, come quello approvato alla riunione del Consiglio atlantico nel dicembre 1971 sulla "Difesa dell'Alleanza negli anni Settanta". Testo che riconfermò la validità della strategia della dissuasione e la necessità di un programma di potenziamento difensivo con i relativi oneri finanziari.

In occasioni come questa divenne costante per la politica di sicurezza italiana il riferimento all'Europa: il ministro Medici confermò infatti nel Consiglio atlantico del dicembre 1973 l'idea del suo governo che il

pur indiscutibile dialogo interatlantico avrebbe dovuto procedere di pari passo con una maggiore convergenza di interessi e di princìpi e con il processo di unità europea. Gli anni 1973-74 furono però anche gli anni del quarto conflitto mediorientale e del primo "shock petrolifero" per tutto l'Occidente; di conseguenza, il coordinamento delle politiche euro-americane fu messo a dura prova.

Un documento fondamentale venne firmato dal Consiglio atlantico a Bruxelles, nel giugno del 1974, la "Dichiarazione sulle relazioni atlantiche": esso tradusse in un certo senso - dopo il semifallimento della "Carta" comune sognata da Kissinger l'anno prima - il desiderio dei partners europei di rapportarsi in maniera più precisa alla politica dell'alleato nordamericano, impegnata in quegli anni nel consolidamento del "triangolo" strategico con Cina e URSS.

Gli europei, e quindi anche l'Italia, pur confermando la politica atlantica in quanto perno del processo di distensione, sottolineavano come la sicurezza fosse caratterizzata dal fatto di essere ormai "una e indivisibile", pur nell'evolversi degli equilibri strategici internazionali. In questo senso, confermare come indispensabile il contributo statunitense non significava che gli europei acconsentivano ad appiattirsi su un ruolo operativo secondario, alla luce soprattutto dei nuovi importanti accordi nucleari USA-URSS di quel periodo che nell'intesa di Vladivostok trovarono una ulteriore intesa.

Sul coordinamento degli sforzi e l'intensificazione della consultazione politica in seno all'Alleanza si pronunciò del resto il nuovo Presidente americano Ford, alle prese tra l'altro con un difficile momento di transizione per il suo paese; ma non superò le diffidenze europee. Per di più nel corso del 1974 venne sottolineato ancora una volta il divario esistente in termini di armamenti convenzionali tra lo schieramento della NATO e quello del Patto di Varsavia (alla luce anche delle notevoli difficoltà che incontrava fin dai primi mesi dei suoi lavori la Conferenza MBFR). Il tentativo di precisare l'"identità" europea in questa cornice trovava inevitabili limiti

Nell'anno del venticinquesimo anniversario della firma del Patto atlantico, l'Italia si fece interprete della necessità di andare verso una più equilibrata ridefinizione dei rapporti tra Stati Uniti ed Europa nell'ambito dell'alleanza occidentale e rispetto al tema centrale dei "compiti futuri dell'Alleanza": "il modo delle relazioni con l'America", come lo definì il ministro Moro, nel cui ambito l'Europa avrebbe dovuto far ascoltare sempre più la sua voce. E' ancora Moro all'inizio del 1975, in qualità di Presidente del consiglio, a fare del quadro atlantico e del quadro europeo un binomio operativo stabile per la politica estera italiana.

Quando si affrontava il tema della sicurezza non si parlava più solo della NATO nella politica italiana. L'Italia tornava anzi a porre un pur timido orecchio ai vari tentativi di rilancio dell'UEO di cui si stava sempre più facendo portatrice la Francia, partecipando con un crescente interesse ai dibattiti della sua Assemblea parlamentare.

Il governo italiano continuò anche in altre sedi, come la quasi dimenticata Conferenza per il disarmo di Ginevra, a sviluppare il tema della fine della corsa agli armamenti, insistendo sull'applicazione del fondamentale meccanismo "controllo-fiducia" e sollecitando proprio per questo lo sviluppo di più ampi sistemi di controllo dei sistemi di "distruzione di massa" chimici e batteriologici.

Il ridimensionamento che sembrava colpire in quegli anni l'importanza dell'Italia come di altri paesi europei, non impediva una serie di interventi sempre più definiti tecnicamente sui limiti alla

diffusione di sistemi di tale portata, consolidando quella preziosa e sempre più approfondita competenza nel settore del disarmo che innovava profondamente ormai nel modo stesso di partecipare al dibattito sulla sicurezza.

Se diventava sempre più centrale il tema del ruolo degli europei nella organizzazione della loro difesa, si faceva strada anche la esigenza di una maggiore integrazione nella gestione della politica estera comune, obiettivo che si stava sempre più ponendo al centro di appassionate e acute riflessioni, ma che si mostrava ancora lungi dall'avere una dimensione concreta.

Del resto gli sforzi per limitare la diffusione dell'arma nucleare, quasi un contrappeso alla prevalenza degli interessi bipolari, erano costretti a far fronte anche al diverso status fra i vari paesi membri dell'Europa comunitaria, in relazione alla disponibilità dello stesso strumento nucleare, subordinato con diverse modalità alla politica di difesa nazionale nei due soli casi esistenti, britannico e francese.

La sempre più pressante necessità per il governo italiano di arrivare alla ratifica del Trattato di non proliferazione del luglio 1968 – anche per evitare accuse di ostacolare la sua piena entrata in vigore – sembrava a volte legata soprattutto ad una esigenza di politica interna, e l'Italia ratificò finalmente il Trattato nell'aprile del 1975, una scelta, come disse il ministro degli Esteri Rumor, di "alta rilevanza politica" che esprimeva una scelta di ordine più vasto in quanto mirava a collocare l'Italia nel novero dei paesi sostenitori di una nuova visione del rapporto fra Est e Ovest. Da quel momento infatti l'Italia accentuò il suo interesse per una estensione dei controlli dello sviluppo nucleare a tutti i paesi possessori (o in via di esserlo) di tecnologia nucleare.

Occorre ricordare per inciso che la politica di sicurezza italiana si andava esprimendo in una sua direzione specifica,

riconducibile alla necessità di rendere irreversibile la via della distensione fra le due Europe. Nell'ottobre del 1975 si giunse infatti alla firma del trattato di Osimo con la Jugoslavia, risultato di grande importanza sul piano internazionale perchè pose la parola fine a quel problema di Trieste che aveva condizionato la politica italiana del dopoguerra e che il memorandum di Londra dell'ottobre 1954 aveva definito solo provvisoriamente.

Ma una certa fragilità nei rapporti interatlantici si evidenziava non appena i governi si confrontavano con problematiche nuove e inaspettate. Fu questo il caso, ad esempio, dell'adozione della cosiddetta "bomba N" o a radiazione rinforzata da parte della NATO tra il 1977 ed il 1978, questione che nella sua cattiva gestione da parte dei partners della NATO riportò alla luce quel contrasto tra gli obiettivi strategici di America ed Europa che negli anni precedenti si era rivelato sempre più condizionante; per di più in un momento di crescente debolezza per la posizione statunitense sugli scenari internazionali.

E' pur vero che il ministro degli Esteri Forlani confermò nel 1978 la solidarietà atlantica come linea portante della politica italiana, ma, riprendendo una "antica" precisazione, la prospettò non solo come tema di un possibile rilancio della difesa comune, ma anche come una nuova occasione per riprendere la vecchia aspirazione ad un processo di consultazione euro-americana sull'andamento del rapporto con l'Est; rapporto che si percepiva ancora sbilanciato perfino in quel contesto CSCE dove pure si era formata una sensibilità specificatamente "europea" della sicurezza.

Proprio al culmine del bipolarismo USA-URSS (è del 1974 la formulazione negli Stati Uniti della cosiddetta "Dottrina Schlesinger" sull'uso "controforze" e non "controcittà" dei sistemi nucleari), nuove nubi giungevano a causa dell'attivismo sovietico dal Corno d'Africa al Medio Oriente. Si aggravava così un processo di distensione ormai modificato rispetto alle

sue impostazioni originali e già reso difficile dalla piega che stavano prendendo problematiche particolari come l'instabilità del Mediterraneo e del Medio Oriente, il ruolo crescente del terrorismo, la pesante incidenza del divario di sviluppo Nord-Sud.

La percezione della sicurezza finiva così per dover fare i conti con nuovi imprevisti scenari, destinati ad avere notevoli conseguenze per la collocazione italiana nel contesto Est-Ovest.

Il 1977 fu un altro anno di "svolta". L'anno della denuncia dei nuovi potenti missili a raggio intermedio sovietici SS-20 da parte del Cancelliere tedesco Schmidt: punto d'inizio della travagliata vicenda degli "euromissili", i nuovi sistemi nucleari collocati sul suolo europeo dalla risposta della NATO a quella che venne identificata come una prova di una nuova aggressività sovietica verso l'Occidente.

In Italia come negli altri paesi occidentali essi segnarono l'inizio di un lungo dibattito interno e internazionale, tale da riproporre a volte gli schemi della vecchia contrapposizione ideologica della guerra fredda. Tra l'altro per l'Italia l'avvio della vicenda coincise con l'apparizione del primo "Libro Bianco" sulla difesa che ridefinì e "spiegò" all'opinione pubblica per la prima volta in modo organico i punti fermi della politica di sicurezza del paese: irrinunciabilità del processo di distensione, attiva partecipazione all'Alleanza atlantica, cooperazione militare con gli alleati europei, ricerca della stabilità in quel settore mediterraneo dove l'Italia era sempre più esposta a nuovi rischi di destabilizzazione.

Per la NATO il 1978 fu l'anno del "Programma difensivo a lungo termine", approvato nella riunione di maggio del Consiglio atlantico, profondamente innovativo per quanto riguardava il concetto di difesa comune, a fronte del più consistente potenziale nucleare e convenzionale del Patto di Varsavia. A sua volta il 1979, trentesimo

anniversario della firma del Patto atlantico, confermò la tendenza al rilancio della coesione alleata e anche l'importanza della posizione strategica italiana nell'ambito dello schieramento difensivo occidentale. Nel mese di dicembre, infatti, fu finalmente presa la fondamentale decisione alleata di schierare gli "euromissili", i Cruise e i Pershing 2, in Italia, Gran Bretagna e Olanda, pur confermando i partners dell'Alleanza la disponibilità al negoziato se l'URSS avesse manifestato la volontà di trattare per la riduzione o l'eliminazione di tutti i sistemi nucleari a raggio intermedio dal Continente.

Un serrato confronto iniziò da allora in poi sull'opportunità o meno di questa "doppia decisione" NATO all'interno dei paesi europei, nella consapevolezza particolare dell'Italia di trovarsi all'improvviso in una posizione rischiosamente avanzata tra Est e Ovest.

L'ammodernamento dei sistemi nucleari a raggio intermedio finì per diventare il perno di tutta la politica di sicurezza italiana in quegli anni e il ruolo assunto dall'Italia si rivelò decisivo per la credibilità della fermezza dei paesi NATO dimostrata in questa decisione, sia perché il ricevimento dei nuovi missili da crociera poteva garantire una più ampia influenza in sede di negoziato sul controllo degli armamenti, sia perché la decisione di mantenere la coesione con gli alleati contribuiva a eliminare dubbi e incertezze sull'affidabilità del nostro paese.

Il presidente del Consiglio Cossiga difese con forza in Parlamento, al momento della votazione, la scelta compiuta dal suo governo a causa del forte squilibrio creatosi in Europa con gli SS-20, pur respingendo la logica del confronto fine a se stesso e la logica del terrore della reciproca distruzione assicurata. Rafforzare la politica di distensione con l'URSS e l'Est europeo e mantenere la coesione tra i partners atlantici costituivano ormai due irrinunciabili punti fermi per l'Italia.

Il leader della DC Zaccagnini affermò che nella storia le manifestazioni di debolezza (come sarebbe stato il rifiuto allo schieramento dei missili) si erano rivelate più esiziali della volontà di potenza attribuita dalle opposizioni agli Stati Uniti. Lo scontro politico sul tema degli euromissili raggiunse in effetti toni molto aspri, ma la Camera dei deputati approvò infine, nel marzo 1980, la mozione decisiva che fornì il via libera allo spiegamento.

Anche con questo riequilibrio strategico-militare, inteso come presupposto indispensabile dello stesso dialogo Est-Ovest, il bipolarismo fra le due superpotenze non era venuto meno nei suoi lineamenti fondamentali. Lo stesso 1979, d'altra parte, fu anche l'anno del Trattato Salt II, firmato in giugno a Mosca da Carter e Breznev per una limitazione anche qualitativa del potenziale nucleare delle superpotenze, e il duopolio nucleare mondiale ebbe un'altra conferma, anche se questa volta il raffronto fra le due superpotenze in termini di prestigio internazionale sembrava giocare più a favore di Mosca, dopo l'inizio della dinamica fase "interventista" del Cremlino nel Terzo Mondo. La crisi della politica americana era del resto evidente: il pur rilevante prestigio guadagnato dall'amministrazione Carter con gli Accordi di Camp David per il Medio Oriente fu ben presto perso quando nel dispositivo strategico USA venne drammaticamente meno il pilastro rappresentato dall'Iran, dove la rivoluzione distrusse il potere dello Scià e consegnò il potere al regime islamico di Khomeini.

Anche questi eventi accentuarono il dibattito italiano sui temi della sicurezza e della difesa, inducendo a riflessioni che non riuscivano però a trovare nella politica interna una determinazione adeguata per elaborare una "strategia" complessiva degna di questo nome a tutela degli interessi

nazionali (il 1979 fu anche l'anno di nuove minacce all'approvvigionamento energetico). Una crescente attenzione per le aree extra-europee in crisi contribuiva in ogni caso ad attenuare le divisioni tra maggioranza e opposizioni in politica estera, disinnescando in particolare il contrasto sugli euromissili.

Tornò a riaffacciarsi in questo contesto la contrapposizione fra interessi europei e americani, tanto più che le riflessioni sulla difesa italiana facevano ormai riferimento ad una dimensione "europea" che ancora si presentava frammentaria ma che non sollevava troppi entusiasmi a Washington. "Riflessioni", che non intendevano comunque negare la centralità dell'organizzazione atlantica per la sicurezza collettiva. Non fu un caso che il ministro degli Esteri Colombo riproponesse allora un "atto formale di amicizia" come base per una rinnovata politica di cooperazione fra Europa e Stati Uniti.

Alla determinazione delle forze politiche di governo a andare avanti con il programma NATO si sovrappose l'improvvisa crisi dovuta all'invasione sovietica dell'Afghanistan, aggravatasi nel corso del 1980, e anche questo evento era destinato a causare altri motivi di contrapposizione in politica interna. Sulla politica di sicurezza nazionale influirono anche due altri fattori che in qualche maniera contribuirono a frenare la volontà di "pensare" in scala europea i problemi della sicurezza e della difesa tenendo conto di quelli che erano gli "interessi" strategici fondamentali del paese: lo sviluppo della politica di fermezza nei confronti del dinamismo internazionale sovietico fatta propria dall'amministrazione Reagan negli Stati Uniti e l'inizio di un difficile dibattito interno sui problemi della spesa militare, legata più che mai al problema di una ripartizione degli oneri finanziari fra i membri dell'alleanza occidentale.

Inoltre, la nuova dottrina di difesa americana, poi adottata dalla NATO, la "countervailing strategy", ripropose gli scenari di una eventuale guerra convenzionale e nucleare combattuta principalmente in Europa, mentre riprendeva la contrapposizione Est-Ovest, con una rinnovata importanza attribuita allo scacchiere del Mediterraneo, area suscettibile di essere utilizzata per "accerchiare" l'Europa occidentale. Ne era convinto anche il ministro della Difesa Lagorio, che iniziò a delineare quel "nuovo modello di difesa" che avrebbe sempre più dominato i temi relativi alla sicurezza nazionale, condizionati dallo spostamento della "minaccia" dal Centro Europa al Mediterraneo (a partire dal contrasto USA con la Libia), area su cui gravitava in maniera significativa ormai la stessa politica di sicurezza atlantica.

Negoziato e fermezza, punti qualificanti della vicenda degli euromissili, cominciarono a trovare qualche difficoltà sul piano interno. Nell'ora più difficile della nuova tensione tra l'Occidente e l'Unione Sovietica, l'ipotesi dell'"opzione zero" per gli euromissili sembrò guadagnare l'interesse del mondo politico italiano, poiché costituiva una via d'uscita da un confronto che nessuno in realtà sembrava volere più.

Anche se il presidente del Consiglio Spadolini denunciava lo squilibrio in Europa centrale, a causa della superiorità numerica e qualitativa del potenziale convenzionale e nucleare del blocco sovietico e rifiutava ipotesi di "congelamento" dei dispositivi esistenti, cresceva nel paese l'organizzazione della protesta anti-atlantica che certo non facilitava il rilancio dei temi della sicurezza e della difesa e la possibilità di gestire su questi problemi una politica coerente.

Per singolare coincidenza, erano gli stessi anni in cui alcune gravi crisi internazionali avevano per la prima volta portato l'Italia ad una "proiezione" esterna della sua "presenza", politica e militare insieme, nel quadro dei nuovi interventi eseguiti con l'impiego di unità militari multinazionali per separare i contendenti in situazioni conflittuali particolarmente destabilizzanti o per eseguire dei compiti particolarmente delicati e complessi. Fu questo il caso delle missioni in Libano nel 1982-83 e successivamente della missione di sminamento nelle acque del Mar Rosso. Al di là delle situazioni che motivarono queste prime esperienze internazionali dello strumento militare italiano, tali occasioni costituirono senz'altro una spinta in più ai fini della costruzione di un particolare "pilastro europeo" nel quadro politico-strategico dell'Alleanza atlantica. Soprattutto motivarono ancora la necessità di disporre di uno strumento militare più adeguato alle nuove sfide internazionali e la ricerca di un ruolo italiano nel settore della sicurezza internazionale meno subordinato ai condizionamenti dei rapporti fra le superpotenze.

Sul piano della sicurezza europea trattata affrontata nel dibattito CSCE nella seconda metà degli anni Settanta non si verificarono sostanziali novità sulla via del superamento della contrapposizione in blocchi, ed una strana miscela di stallo diplomatico e tensione politica sembrò diminuire l'importanza di questa pur preziosa sede negoziale. La CSCE trovò numerosi ostacoli nelle riunioni successive all'Atto Finale e forse ebbe sviluppi positivi solo nei vari seminari e riunioni su temi specifici che si svolgevano a lato delle riunioni periodiche di verifica. Non si registrarono perciò grandi risultati sia dopo la riunione di verifica di Belgrado del 1977-78 che dopo il più lungo appuntamento di Madrid che per varie fasi si svolse dal 1980 al 1983, attraversato per di più dalle

tensioni relative al caso polacco. Anche il negoziato MBFR sembrò fossilizzarsi nella ciclica alternanza di proposte della NATO o del Patto di Varsavia destinate a trovare un punto di incontro fra le parti sul tema della riduzione reciproca ed equilibrata delle forze convenzionali nel Centro Europa.

Nell'ambito dell'UEO fu l'Assemblea parlamentare a manifestare un certo dinamismo, dovuto al fatto che in essa erano rappresentate forze di governo e opposizioni che trovavano così un nuovo modo di evidenziare le rispettive posizioni; ma non si andò in questa sede oltre proposte particolari e limitate. Anche in questo caso, tuttavia, è doveroso ricordare come negli organi dell'UEO fosse rilevabile l'elevato livello dell'impegno politico-diplomatico italiano a favore di una concezione della sicurezza legata alla necessità di un più autonomo ruolo dell'Europa: tra l'altro proprio nell'Assemblea UEO fu avanzata una proposta italiana circa una articolazione tra la Comunità europea e la stessa UEO.

All'inizio degli anni Ottanta sulla infuocata questione degli euromissili il nuovo governo Craxi mantenne intatta la fermezza dimostrata negli anni precedenti e, così come era stato deciso in sede NATO, nel 1983 iniziò il dispiegamento dei nuovi sistemi missilistici così come avveniva negli altri paesi interessati.

La volontà degli alleati - e italiana in particolare - di non considerare chiusa del tutto la porta del negoziato con l'URSS non era stata rinnegata malgrado tutto. Quasi per singolare contrasto, nel 1983 il Gruppo di pianificazione della NATO decise una ulteriore, forte riduzione dei sistemi nucleari in Europa, ma il momento fu ugualmente uno dei più difficili nel negoziato Est-Ovest perché Mosca abbandonò, in seguito allo schieramento degli euromissili tutti i "tavoli" del negoziato militare, non solo quello sui

sistemi a raggio intermedio ma anche lo Start iniziato nel maggio 1982 con gli Stati Uniti e la MBFR.

Come se non bastasse, nel marzo 1983, con la famosa dichiarazione del Presidente Reagan per la costruzione di uno scudo spaziale a fini dissuasivi, nasceva la vicenda della Iniziativa di difesa strategica, subito battezzata delle "guerre stellari" perché avrebbe dovuto essere basata su un sistema di satelliti e basi a terra in grado di impiegare raggi laser e altre formidabili e sofisticate tecnologie per creare uno sbarramento a qualsiasi ipotetico attacco avversario, conservando quindi il proprio arsenale per la "risposta". Tale progetto fu tuttavia destinato fin dall'inizio a porre un nuovo ostacolo nei rapporti con l'URSS e a vivacizzare il dibattito politico interno ai paesi occidentali.

La posizione italiana in una prima fase rivelò preoccupazione per il deterioramento del dialogo e moderato entusiasmo per i risvolti scientifici e tecnologici che l'iniziativa USA prometteva di estendere a tutti i partners occidentali, grazie ad un forte impulso alla ricerca.

Il forte contrasto nato in politica interna sul senso da attribuire alla SDI americana contribuì a ritardare una riflessione omogenea sulla identificazione dei reali interessi strategici nazionali e sullo stesso nuovo modello di difesa.

Una certa confusione in quei mesi derivò inevitabilmente dal sovrapporsi a volte caotico di sviluppi in tutto il settore della sicurezza occidentale. In ambito atlantico, infatti, sul piano degli armamenti convenzionali, in cui ancora si lamentava la superiorità est-europea, la nascita più o meno contemporanea alla SDI della dottrina operativa "Fofa", pur con gli indubbi effetti positivi nel quadro della difesa occidentale, ripropose a sua volta i rischi che potevano provenire dallo scoppio di un conflitto anche solo a quel livello, mentre non a caso

nella riunione di Montebello dell'ottobre 1983 - come si è già rilevato - la NATO riduceva ulteriormente il numero delle testate nucleari tattiche presenti in Europa (1240).

Quando si riaprirono alcuni spiragli per una nuova fase di confronto negoziale tra le parti, il governo Craxi-Andreotti iniziò a sviluppare una nuova serie di sforzi politici rivolti a cercare spazi di manovra nel superamento delle tensioni, cogliendo e interpretando segnali e disponibilità al negoziato che intanto si verificavano con il mutare di atteggiamento da parte dell'URSS. In questo contesto si verificarono anche episodi non del tutto in linea con l'orientamento atlantico; ad esempio, con l'improvvisa proposta di Craxi al vertice atlantico di Lisbona nel marzo 1984 per una "moratoria" nel dispiegamento degli euromissili, nel caso di una nuova disponibilità sovietica a trattare: l'episodio rimase isolato, anche per le polemiche suscitate nei rapporti con l'alleato maggiore della NATO.

Nel 1984, tuttavia, l'evento destinato a incidere profondamente nella politica di sicurezza italiana fu senz'altro la svolta decisiva nel rilancio del ruolo e delle funzioni dell'UEO. Rilancio che fu da ricondurre a quella "insofferenza" di un'Europa che pure faceva fatica a trovare una politica comune nei confronti di un confronto USA-URSS sempre più soffocante. L'idea di restituire vigore e obiettivi alla UEO riprese quota grazie soprattutto all'iniziativa francese, ma fu lanciata in grande stile dal ministro della Difesa italiano Spadolini che convocò proprio a Roma, in ottobre, il Consiglio ministeriale dell'UEO, con l'intento di rivitalizzarne le funzioni per una sua migliore utilizzazione ai fini della sicurezza europea, in termini di miglioramento della difesa comune. L'iniziativa, a dire il vero, era rigidamente condotta nel quadro dei rapporti interatlantici, per nulla vista in contrapposizione alla NATO. Era molto

chiaro però l'intento di trovare nell'ambito dei paesi europei un nuovo momento di consultazione e di iniziativa politica diretta a incidere positivamente sul dialogo Est-Ovest, perché lo stallo nei negoziati comprometteva in primo luogo gli interessi della sicurezza europea.

Si aggiungeva anche un altro elemento non meno importante: con il rilancio dell'UEO si puntava da parte dell'Italia e di altri paesi europei a superare, nel quadro di una partecipazione più ampia, il pericolo di un supposto "direttorio" franco-anglo-tedesco nel settore dell'industria della difesa e della produzione di armamenti. Nella stessa occasione si ristrutturarono infatti i compiti dell'Agenzia di controllo degli armamenti della UEO, rilanciando per questa via il processo di riduzione, e il Comitato permanente degli armamenti

La "Dichiarazione di Roma" avrebbe dovuto dar vita ad una politica estera integrata per la sicurezza comune che aveva come punti fondamentali di riferimento sia l'Alleanza atlantica che la Comunità europea - come rilevò anche il ministro degli Esteri Andreotti - con la quale l'UEO era destinata ad assumere un ruolo del tutto particolare. Avrebbe dovuto essere soprattutto un elemento fondamentale della "Cooperazione politica europea", termine con il quale si indicava il primo nucleo di una politica estera comune, ma la proposta italiana di unità militari europee integrate non venne per il momento accolta. Al vertice di Roma il nuovo risalto attribuito alle funzioni dell'Assemblea parlamentare dell'UEO evidenziava inoltre l'esigenza di un raccordo dei temi della sicurezza e difesa europea con un più ampio consenso in ogni paese membro.

Il 1984 fu anche l'anno di un nuovo foro di discussione sui temi della sicurezza, la Conferenza sul disarmo in Europa (CDE) che aprì i battenti a Stoccolma, affiancandosi ai negoziati sulle INF ed alla

MBFR, nonché alla Conferenza di Ginevra per il disarmo, da decenni inquadrata nell'ambito dell'ONU.

Si cercava con la CDE di supplire in qualche modo allo stallo di cui soffriva la MBFR, bloccata su problemi relativi al conteggio di effettivi e sistemi d'arma da ridurre, senza mai raggiungere un terreno comune d'intesa. Sulla CDE come nuovo e più produttivo centro propulsivo del dialogo Est-Ovest si appuntò in particolare l'attenzione del ministro Andreotti, secondo il quale l'occasione andava colta perché l'URSS stava iniziando a mutare sostanzialmente la propria politica estera, a partire proprio dalle questioni del disarmo; fatto che introduceva un nuovo dinamismo nel quadro della sicurezza.

Un ulteriore approfondimento della logica che sovrintendeva alla politica di sicurezza italiana lo si ebbe con l'importante "Libro Bianco" della difesa pubblicato nel 1985: in esso si riformulavano gli obiettivi strategici del paese e lo stesso futuro modello di difesa. Si istituiva in particolare una forza di intervento rapido, in funzione dei nuovi rischi e delle nuove minacce provenienti dalle aree instabili a ridosso del Continente, con un previsto più decisivo ruolo operativo del Capo di stato maggiore della difesa. Il documento si inseriva inoltre nel crescente dibattito sul ruolo e sulle funzioni di uno strumento militare moderno, nel quadro delle aspirazioni di una "media potenza", come ormai si tendeva a considerare l'Italia.

Ma i problemi della difesa erano anche connessi con quelli sempre più importanti della protezione e dello sviluppo della industria italiana degli armamenti. Tema che a sua volta condizionava la politica estera e i rapporti con gli altri partners europei, comunitari e atlantici, ma sul quale l'Italia sembrava presentarsi in condizioni di debolezza strutturale che ne diminuivano la capacità di confrontarsi con gli altri.

Sulla partecipazione italiana alla SDI americana le polemiche non accennavano a diminuire. Il ministro Andreotti, fra i più critici del progetto, condannava qualsiasi eventuale violazione del trattato ABM del 1972 (bando ai sistemi anti-missili) e sottolineava la necessità anzi del rafforzamento della stabilità degli equilibri strategici Est-Ovest, pur essendoci un indubbio interesse economico nella partecipazione italiana alla SDI. Il ministro della Difesa Spadolini era invece per un sostegno politico più accentuato al progetto, con un interesse prioritario, comunque, attribuito al potenziale utile in termini di finanziamenti per la ricerca e lo sviluppo: ipotesi che veniva incontro alla necessità di svecchiare lo strumento militare italiano. Era tuttavia prevalente nelle forze politiche come nel governo la preoccupazione che non si arrivasse con la SDI ad una superiorità militare USA pura e semplice in grado di eliminare quell'equilibrio strategico che per tanti anni era riuscito ad evitare uno scontro fra i blocchi.

Mentre riprendevano quota i negoziati USA-URSS sui sistemi di difesa spaziale, strategici e a raggio intermedio - soprattutto con il vento nuovo che cominciò a spirare nella politica sovietica dopo l'avvento di Gorbaciov al potere in URSS nel 1985 - la politica di sicurezza italiana sembrava ancora trovare ostacoli soprattutto per la obiettiva difficoltà - comune anche agli altri governi europei - di trovare una politica davvero univoca e omogenea su tutti questi complessi problemi.

Il dibattito interno del resto si infiammava proprio sulla contrapposizione tra la temuta militarizzazione dello spazio e la partecipazione ai programmi tecnologici relativi alla SDI. Soprattutto quando al progetto americano si affiancò il programma "Eureka", lanciato dalla Francia per avviare un progetto di innovazione tecnologica specificatamente "europeo" e non militarizzato, rivelatosi poi non paragonabile allo sforzo ed ai mezzi della SDI.

La nuova fase dei colloqui nucleari e spaziali USA-URSS aveva tuttavia la particolarità di non lasciare molto spazio agli interventi europei. Solo nella MBFR con le nuove proposte di Gorbaciov la trattativa sembrava finalmente rimettersi in moto. Mosca infatti propose nuovi sistemi per le riduzioni progressive e accettò il principio delle ampie verifiche, fino a creare occasioni di sviluppo del negoziato molto più fattibili. Ma computo degli armamenti, definizione della loro portata tecnologica, metodologie di riduzione e di controllo e verifica, disputa sull'accettabilità della SDI, minacce dal Mediterraneo erano tutti argomenti che trovavano nello schieramento occidentale scarse occasioni per quanto riguardava la capacità di gestirli in maniera omogenea. I negoziati comunque si protrassero per tutto il 1986 senza che si potesse intravedere una soluzione vicina.

Il 1986 fu del resto un anno difficile per la sicurezza italiana e internazionale, segnato dal dirottamento della "Achille Lauro" dal confronto italo-americano di Sigonella, dall'intervento militare USA contro la Libia, dai missili libici su Lampedusa,.

La discussione con gli alleati nei vari organismi atlantici per un miglioramento dei sistemi di difesa e la ricerca di una specifica politica di sicurezza e difesa europea si fece più intensa e assistette anche a divergenze sul tipo di "risposta" da organizzare, mentre la politica di sicurezza italiana sembrava ancora alla ricerca di una strategia opportuna per gli interessi fondamentali del paese.

La riunione del Consiglio atlantico del maggio 1986 (subito dopo la decisione di Reagan di sospendere i limiti imposti dal trattato SALT 2) approvò una ampia "Dichiarazione sugli obiettivi generali dell'Alleanza" che consentiva a molti stati membri di iniziare a ordinare una materia ormai molto vasta e complessa che doveva cercare di armonizzare anche altri fattori, quali il controllo degli armamenti, l'applicazione dei princìpi CSCE, la lotta al terrorismo.

Nel settembre successivo, il documento finale della Conferenza per il disarmo in Europa di Stoccolma fornì una ulteriore occasione per mobilitare gli europei a favore di una concezione più concreta e ragionata della propria sicurezza, con la successiva piena approvazione da parte della NATO dei princìpi elaborati in quel negoziato e di un processo negoziale graduale per la riduzione degli armamenti convenzionali, spianando la strada anche alla MBFR.

Ancora nel 1986, nel novembre, partì infine a Vienna una nuova riunione di verifica della CSCE con il rilancio del dibattito che a Madrid aveva causato non poche delusioni. L'anno prima, a Venezia si era tenuto uno dei tanti seminari e riunioni specifiche su determinati argomenti o settori, imperniato sul tema della cooperazione culturale, economica e scientifica mediterranea, molto importante per l'Italia che da anni si batteva nella sede del negoziato paneuropeo perché il problema della stabilità di quell'area fosse agganciato in qualche modo ai temi CSCE.

Mentre dopo il nuovo vertice USA-URSS di Reykjavik si marciava ormai verso una soluzione sulle INF, la posizione italiana era definita: sì all'opzione zero, ma cautela sul ridimensionamento dell'indispensabile strumento nucleare nella difesa dell'Europa.

Nella seconda metà degli anni Ottanta la politica di sicurezza italiana - per la cui definizione si aveva nel paese un dibattito sempre più largo, non solo da parte di politici ma come si è già rilevato anche da parte di numerosi esperti di materie strategiche e militari - trovava ancora i punti più qualificanti nelle grandi scelte in sede atlantica ed europea (UEO, ma non la

necessità di continuare ad approfondire i rapporti con l'Est, superando le contrapposizioni degli anni precedenti.

Particolare interesse, ad esempio, stava rivelando la "Ostpolitik" che l'Italia approfondì in questi anni nei confronti dell'URSS e dei paesi dell'Europa centro-orientale; politica che riprendeva e potenziava una serie di rapporti politici ed economici già consolidati in passato e che per certi versi avrebbe consentito al nostro paese di non trovarsi del tutto impreparato davanti ai rivoluzionari cambiamenti del 1989-91.

Il Consiglio atlantico di Reykjavik del giugno 1987 fornì un altro momento di aggregazione per i disorientati partners europei con la approvazione di una "Concezione globale del controllo degli armamenti e del disarmo" che confermava e approfondiva nelle sue motivazioni l'obiettivo degli alleati per quanto riguardava le condizioni del negoziato Est-Ovest, rivalorizzando il confronto sempre più nell'ambito paneuropeo della CSCE. Successivamente, lo storico Trattato per la distruzione delle INF firmato a Washington da Reagan e Gorbaciov nel dicembre 1987 terminò la lunga e traumatica diatriba sui sistemi missilistici a raggio intermedio in Europa, costituendo una svolta storica per la politica di sicurezza e il futuro dei rapporti Est-Ovest.

Nonostante l'entusiasmo generale, in verità, alcune voci (fra le altre quelle del ministro della Difesa Zanone e dell'esperto di studi strategici Caligaris) espressero anche cautela e preoccupazione per l'indebolimento della dissuasione in Europa a favore del rinnovato dialogo USA-URSS. Inoltre, si ripropose nei mesi successivi il problema della modernizzazione dei sistemi nucleari tattici a più corto raggio (SNF), problema che suscitò altre divisioni sullo scenario internazionale e segnò l'attività dei governi Goria e De Mita.

La questione infatti alimentò notevoli contrasti nel mondo politico, portando a nuove contrapposizioni, anche all'interno dei singoli schieramenti, anche se era evidente che da parte del governo si tendesse a sfumare il contrasto, cercando di dimostrare l'artificiosità dell'argomento e lo scarso valore strategico delle SNF.

Era questa in particolare la posizione del ministro Andreotti. Si arrivò infine alla conclusione del nuovo contrasto con una mozione parlamentare contro una nuova corsa al riarmo e la riproposizione di temi ancora attuali che coinvolgevano più da vicino la sicurezza italiana: quella, ad esempio, di una Conferenza di sicurezza e cooperazione specifica per l'area mediterranea.

Quando l'UEO con la "Piattaforma degli interessi europei in materia di sicurezza", approvata dal Consiglio ministeriale all'Aja nell'ottobre 1987 ebbe la seconda grande occasione per rilanciare le sue funzioni di "braccio militare" della Comunità europea (era il momento del coordinamento navale europeo nel Golfo Persico), il ministro degli Esteri Andreotti si fece portavoce dell'esigenza ormai invocata da tutti di coordinare l'integrazione militare con quella a livello politico, in una stagione che sembrava promettente sotto questo profilo, dopo il vertice europeo di Milano e l'"Atto Unico".

Se era evidente da parte del governo italiano l'intento di evitare di accentuare solo i problemi militari della difesa comune, anche altri rappresentanti del governo, come Spadolini, accentuavano il crescente interesse per l'UEO, intesa come organismo dotato inevitabilmente di più ampie funzioni nell'ambito della politica di difesa comune.

La difesa europea era divenuto ormai un tema non più eliminabile dal dibattito sulla sicurezza, fattore in grado di suscitare

interessi ormai molto articolati dal piano politico a quelli militare e industriale. Il particolare momento di transizione che stava attraversando il rapporto Est-Ovest nella seconda metà degli anni Ottanta, la predominanza ancora una volta del dialogo USA-URSS anche dopo l'inizio della nuova fase di distensione tra Reagan e Gorbaciov agevolavano questo tipo di riflessione, mettendo governi e opinioni pubbliche europee davanti alla necessità non solo di non rimuovere più l'argomento come era stato fatto in passato, ma di approfondirlo nei contenuti.

E' in questo contesto particolare che si avviarono iniziative bi-trilaterali dirette a formare il nucleo di un futuro esercito europeo, sulla base del conferimento di unità militari da parte di quegli Stati che, per risorse disponibili e organizzazione nel settore della difesa, erano più in grado di assumersi tale onere. Iniziative che rischiavano (e le reazioni da parte del mondo politico italiano lo comprovavano) di alimentare però anche una certa confusione sui vari centri di organizzazione della difesa europea, senza che fosse ancora visibile una "politica" in questo settore e senza che fosse chiaro il legame istituzionale e operativo con le strutture della NATO.

L'esempio più importante fu quello dalla formazione della "brigata" franco-tedesca, destinata a diventare il trampolino di lancio per l'"Eurocorps", unità multinazionale costituita poi con il contributo anche di Spagna e Belgio. Iniziativa che apportò qualche motivo di sconcerto per chi era escluso, come l'Italia, per il timore che una tale nuova organizzazione finisse per rivelarsi addirittura dannosa per lo sforzo diretto a costruire tra mille difficoltà una "difesa comune", ritardandone ancora di più la realizzazione.

La politica di sicurezza e di difesa italiana, soprattutto nell'interpretazione che ne davano le forze politiche, mostrava

inoltre un particolare aspetto di vulnerabilità, perchè inquadrava le politiche atlantica ed europea in modo alternativo fra loro, paralizzando di fatto qualsiasi chiara esplicitazione di volontà politica.

Al di là dell'adesione formale ai nuovi obiettivi destinati a rinforzare il "pilastro europeo" della difesa occidentale, questo atteggiamento di rimessa italiano avrebbe avuto conseguenze negative anche dopo gli eventi inaspettati del 1989.

Il Consiglio atlantico di Bruxelles a livello di capi di stato e di governo nel maggio 1989 fu comunque segnato da una determinante convergenza di vedute dei partners NATO, con la redazione di un documento che sollevò nuovi consensi per una politica comune di sicurezza, stabilità e verificabilità delle intese per tutti i tipi di armamenti, dal nucleare al convenzionale.

L'Italia aderì prontamente a questa più elaborata impostazione della politica dell'Alleanza che faceva tesoro degli avvenimenti degli ultimi anni, anche se non nascondeva un certo disagio davanti a sviluppi in cui non riusciva a ritagliarsi un ruolo specifico e visibile, dotato delle risorse necessarie.

Intanto stava riguadagnando terreno anche il dibattito in sede CSCE. foro ormai determinante per i nuovi parametri del rapporto Est-Ovest e in questa cornice l'Italia si sentiva senz'altro più a suo agio. La Conferenza di Vienna di "riesame" della CSCE (che da novembre 1986 si era protratta fino al gennaio 1989) costituì infatti un passo decisivo nello stabilire - superando tutti gli ostacoli frapposti da Mosca negli anni precedenti - uno stretto rapporto tra protezione a tutto campo dei diritti umani e progresso della sicurezza politico-militare. Uno sviluppo di cui fu soddisfatta proprio l'Italia che rivendicava il fatto di aver appoggiato tale interpretazione fin dagli anni della Conferenza di Helsinki. La politica di Gorbaciov, d'altra parte. contribuiva a dare un più ampio respiro a questo approccio.

Non meno importante di questo rilancio positivo della CSCE, e segno anche essa della mutata politica sovietica, fu la trasformazione della vecchia MBFR in Conferenza per la riduzione degli armamenti convenzionali in Europa (CFE), che, affiancata alla nuova Conferenza per la creazione di misure di fiducia, stimolò un forte impulso alla ripresa del negoziato nel settore della sicurezza militare.

Questi progressi avvenivano anche perchè si stava rafforzando una concezione "trasversale" della sicurezza europea, articolata ormai in molteplici aspetti non più solo di natura politico-militare, ma anche e forse soprattutto economici, sociali, culturali.

Concetto che troverà modo di affermare la propria validità quando nel corso del 1989 si consumò il rapido e inaspettato crollo dei regimi totalitari in Europa centro-orientale, rappresentato simbolicamente dalla caduta del Muro di Berlino. Eventi epocali seguiti dal processo di riunificazione tedesca, dalla crisi irreversibile dell'URSS e dalle drammatiche vicende legate alla dissoluzione della Federazione jugoslava.

Nel 1990 la conclusione del trattato CFE sulla riduzione per aree di alcune categorie di armamenti convenzionali metteva fine ad un negoziato pluridecennale, anche se ancora fondato su un contesto di confronto fra blocchi militari, tanto da apparire quasi superato l'anno successivo, quando si dissolse lo stesso Patto di Varsavia.

Di fronte a questi storici eventi, che costringevano a ridiscutere le certezze e i dogmi della precedente politica di sicurezza e della stessa difesa nazionale, la politica italiana apparve presa un po' alla sprovvista, incapace di realizzare subito la portata degli eventi e di approntare una strategia coerente che garantisse una partecipazione attiva alla definizione del nuovo corso. Impreparazione

che si sarebbe fatta sentire negativamente quando si propagherà nei Balcani l'incendio della conflittualità etnico-nazionale, anche se le iniziative italiane dei primi anni '90 verso l'Est europeo per la creazione della "Quadrangolare", poi divenuta "Iniziativa centro-europea" costituivano l'inizio di una diversificazione degli interessi, destinata ad accentuarsi con la crisi jugoslava.

Per concludere questo rapido esame, alla vigilia di una indiscutibile quanto incerta "era nuova" e delineare lo scenario geostrategico in cui fu proiettata l'Italia è opportuno riferirsi ad alcuni eventi fondamentali che caratterizzarono in quei mesi di transizione la politica di sicurezza europea e internazionale.

In primo luogo il Consiglio atlantico di Londra del luglio 1990, punto di arrivo e al tempo stesso di partenza per il ruolo della NATO in Europa ai fini della stabilità e della sicurezza, all'insegna della ristrutturazione delle forze alleate e con una minore enfasi sulla dissuasione nucleare.

Quindi il vertice CSCE di Parigi del novembre successivo, tappa fondamentale per superare la logica dei tre "cesti" separati, con l'approvazione della "Carta della nuova Europa" che ridefinì completamente, fino al successivo vertice di "Helsinki 2" del luglio 1992, l'intera problematica della sicurezza europea; vertice che tra l'altro identificò un rapporto "logico" tra supporto della NATO e della UEO e iniziative nel quadro CSCE.

Successivamente, il Consiglio UEO di dicembre vide una più determinata iniziativa dei paesi membri per fare dell'Unione l'organismo "ufficiale" di difesa della Comunità. Circa un anno dopo l'Italia sarebbe stata uno dei protagonisti del tentativo di creare proprio in ambito UEO una forza di reazione europea per le situazioni di emergenza che si stavano sempre più imponendo nel primo confuso periodo dopo la caduta della cortina di ferro.

Infine, il più decisivo Consiglio atlantico di Roma del novembre 1991, quasi contemporaneo al crollo finale dell'URSS e quindi dello stesso equilibrio che aveva dominato per circa mezzo secolo il mondo della guerra fredda. Il Consiglio infatti approvò il famoso "Nuovo concetto strategico" dell'Alleanza, la cui politica fu così riformulata completamente in funzione dei nuovi rischi e delle nuove sfide alla sicurezza generale. Un primo passo concettuale ma con implicazioni inevitabili anche sul piano operativo, delle strutture difensive. Si pensi, ad es., alla problematica della ridistribuzione delle responsabilità dei Comandi NATO in uno scacchiere europeo-mediterraneo profondamente modificato dal crollo del bipolarismo.

Nello stesso mese di dicembre 1991 venne presentata al Parlamento la proposta del ministro della Difesa Rognoni per la creazione finalmente del "Nuovo modello di difesa" italiano - ultima fase di un lungo dibattito - documento che ristrutturava le forze armate italiane sulla base del modello

"interforze", adeguando obiettivi e funzioni della sicurezza e della difesa ai mutamenti internazionali.

E proprio con una rapida definizione di questi obiettivi si può concludere simbolicamente questo sintetico excursus sulla politica di sicurezza italiana nell'ultimo ventennio della guerra fredda: salvaguardia dell'indipendenza nazionale; inviolabilità dei confini; tutela degli interessi nazionali con una visione più ampia che in passato; salvaguardia delle comunità italiane all'estero; difesa della legalità internazionale; garanzia e protezione concordata con alleati e amici; tutela del ruolo e della credibilità internazionale.

La "sicurezza" assumeva così altre valenze, comprese quelle economiche e sociali, e la politica di difesa nazionale si inseriva così in un quadro operativo più ampio. La partecipazione alle missioni multinazionali di mantenimento della pace e di intervento umanitario, soprattutto nelle sanguinose guerre nei Balcani, lo avrebbe dimostrato.

Riferimenti bibliografici fondamentali

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GERMANY AND THE POLITICAL ENGINEERING OF *OSTPOLITIK*
(A HISTORIES APPROACH AND BONN'S PERCEPTIONS AFTER THE END OF COLD WAR)

Constantin BUCHET

Ostpolitik and the Cold War

The sintagma *Ostpolitik* entered the vocabulary of International Politics in the late 1960s in the middle of Cold War. To many analysts at the time and in our contemporary period[1] it seemed to mark that Germany's return to the International system as a national actor.

The traditional political-ideological goal of creating a liberal-capitalist international seder of democratic states was linked with geopolitical-strategic efforts to prevent Soviet hegemony in Europe.

This security interest could be realised during the East-West conflict *via* a complementary strategy. The containment of Germany through its integration into the West at the same time served to contain the Soviet Union by creating a counterbalance. This *double containment* was the key component of the American policy in Europe after the Second World. Accordingly, the transatlantic and trans-Pacific security should be retained to ensure that Japan and Germany do not succumb to hegemonic temptations.

Until then, the foreign policy's decisionmakers had mostly regarded Germany as a problem rather than a state which pursues its own national interests.

But this notion was quite wrong. Germany, in this case we need to say West Germany, had its own, foreign policy interests almost since it came into existence in 1949. By the time *Ostpolitik* came along, this was by 1969/1970[2], a set of policies, institutions and alliance was in place which had to become essential to the role played by the Bonn government - the terrible child of the Cold War - during the peak of the detente era.

Indeed, the treaties with Bucharest (1967), Belgrad (1968), Moscow (1970), Warsaw (1970), Prague (1973) and East Berlin (1972) - the landmarks of *Ostpolitik* - which the new government of Willy Brandt (S.P.D.) concluded between 1970 and 1973 can only be understood in the context of Bonn's foreign policy (especially the political and geoeconomical framework of Eastern policy) between 1949 and 1969.

The main step towards a coherent German policy in relation with the Eastern European Sovietization actors was taken by the government of Konrad Adenauer in the early 1950s. At that time the Bonn republic was still not sovereign, but the Western

powers realized that West Germany could not remain a Cold War bulwark against further Soviet expansion unless it was allowed to contribute to European recovers. Cold War policies to contain Soviet influence in Europe, and indeed beyond, could not without the consent of the majority of the German people and therefore without the consent of their elected government.

The emerging compromise between the Bonn government and the Western allies was wrapped in a very complex set of relationship which came to be called "European Integration". One set of relationships focused on economic issues and developed into what is now called the European Union. The other was N.A.T.O. and dealt with the security policy of the Occident.

Two points of view emitted by the first German Chancellor after W.W. II,

Konrad Adenauer, are of key importance to our topic research.

The first concerns his overall assesment of the options for German foreign and security policy. In hindsight it is clear that Adenauer was absolutely right in his assessment of the long-term nature of the German problem. The Americans and the West Europeans were of course pleased to see that the "Bonn republic" was led by people who had a clean record as far as the Nazi past was concerned.

In other words, Adenauer realized that there would have to be a voluntary and irreverssible surrender of German sovereignty. The chancellor would had been that basis of security for the Federal Germany to be under "N.A.T.O. umbrella" against the Soviet treat" (Germany of West was accepted in the Northern-Atlantic alliance in 1955).

The Ostpolitik *of Brandt's government*

The Paris Agreement of 1954 (was signed by the democratic Occidental powers) had preserved the German republic through stopping the regime of Interallied occupation.

A basic historical fact in the reconciliation process between Bonn and *Ostländer* was the Romanian political decision of the association of War's state declared at 23 August 1944. This political act had been accepted by the Great National Assembly (the legislation forum in the Communist Romania) which was emitted by it in 1955[3].

It was in relation with this background that Willy Brandt and his new coalition government opened a series of negotiations in 1969 which led to the bilateral treaties with Moscow, Warsaw, Bucharest, East Germany and eventually with Prague (there is a conflict referring to the Sudet question and the German minority in Czechoslovakia).

Except for the treaty with East Germany, there was nothing in those treaties which changed the *status quo* of the political and territorial transformation after W.W.II.

In our view, Germany had placed in the main targets of the *Eastern Policy* the relations with *Kremlin*; and Bonn displayed a coherent and utilisation policy which was rejected by the *Doctrine of Hollstein*, antithesis for a political strategy of compromise between the Western democracies and the Soviet power.

At the time of the Great Coalition between the Social-Democratic Party (S.P.D.) and the Democrat-Christian Union (U.C.D.) in the period 1968-1969 the "landscape of East" was developed, prepared by Willy Brandt and his constitutor, dr. Egon Bahr.

The Western powers, particularily U.S.A. could hardly oppose *Ostpolitik* since their own detente efforts went way beyond the *status quo* and were coming for a whole new

set or relationship with Moscow[4]. U.S. foreign Secretary, Henry Kissinger would have preferred to be the only one to the Kremlin leaders, in quality of political leader of the one Superpower.

Kissinger and other politicians were suspicious as to the motives behind Bonn's new *Ostpolitik*, but eventually they had to admit that such regional European detente efforts probably help strengthen rather than weaken the Western camp, and particularly N.A.T.O., as a main organisation of security for the Occidental powers.

The new dimmensions of Ostpolitik after the End of Bipolarism

The German geopolitical perception of the Eastern space[5].

The geopolitical and geoeconomical object of analysis for Ostpolitik was East Central Europe and in other terms the concept of "Central Europe" the location "between Germany and Russia (Soviet Union/Russian Federation)", between the Russian *near abroad* and the German *Mitteleuropa*, a geoeconomical building, especially, and also in the sense of georeligious (a Catholic-protestant component) dimension[6]. "South-Eastern Europe" is another term which should be examined. It's of a German origin, and has been traditionally applied to those countries located between Germany and Russia, situated south-east of the former.

Therefore, one may reasonably claim that there existed a strong and all-embracing tendency to study and examine the region of South-East (Balkan) Europe in the gratest possible and most accurate insight into the latter as a natural supplementary area of the German union (the term for "Ergönzungswirtschoft"[7]) and enable its economic capacities to be utilized to the highest possible degree for the purposes dictated by the ambitious German objectives.

If it is borne in mind that the overall trade relations of the German State (Wilhelmian Empire, the Republic of Weimar, the Nazi *Reich*, the Western Germany) with Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania[8], Greece and Turkey both in the sphere of commodity trade and financial transactions.

Among the various term which individualize possible sub-divisions of the area "between Germany and Russia", there is also a locution such as "the Danubian States". However, in the German approach, countries like Austria, former Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania, have usually been seen as its "core", and Germany it's "the soul" of this Danubia area[9].

According to paradigma which was emitted by the father of the Anglo-Saxon school of Geopolitics, Halfred I. Mackinder "a Middle Tier" of really independent states between Germany and Russia"[10], many German geopolitician analists in the interwar period (like Ernst Schmidt[11], H. Grothe[12], W. Francke[13], W. Hoffmann[14], G. Herlt[15]) wrote about the *Mittleuropa* question.

For the geoeconomical dinamics of German Power in *Mitteleuropa* ("Middle Europe") see C. Buchet, "Security of Eastern Europe in '90 years. The German Perceptions", in *Romanian World*, N.I.S.T., no. 25, 1997, p. 3; Idem, "Romania and Europa at the German Hour", in *Romanian World*, N.I.S.T., no. 36, 1998, p. 2; Pierre George and Jean Tricart, *L'Europe Centrale*, Paris, P.U.F., 1954, vol. I, pp. 292-293; Gordon East, *Historical Geography of Europe*, Paris, Gallimard, 1939, pp. 50-54.

Germany, *Ostpolitik* and Status Quo after the Cold War

N.A.T.O. is inextricably linked to solving the *German problem* without upsetting the European state system: A Germany that is structurally more powerful than any other European country except Russia must be accomodated. The Versailles Treaty attempted to solve this problem through discrimination and controls, only to foster resentment and ultimately the Nazi expansionism.

After World War II, a different conclusion was drawn: Germany was to be integrated by means of cooperative and multilateral arrangements, if possible in a European System that would neither have been unified in 1990, more strikingly and unexpectedly unified as a full member of N.A.T.O.

Through a new *Ostpolitik* in the post Cold War Era, Bonn followed a supremacy in the E.U.'s system of power (according to work hypothesis was predicted by Professor Werner Weidenfeld)[16] and a destruction of contents had been established in the system of the Treaty of Versailles.

Germany, the Balkans and the Jugoslavian crisis (1991-1994)

Historically, the Balkans had been an area of German interference and rivalry with other power (especially with Russia). During the W.W. II the Wehrmacht established a brutal occupation regime in Serbia, whereas the Croats had the opportuning to build up their own state, the Independent State of Croatia run by the notorious "ustasha" leader, Ante Pavelič.

In The First World War, the Germans entered the war on the side of their ally Austria-Hungary with the battle *Serbien mußsterben* ("Serbia has to die")[17].

The notion of Germany's special economic interest in the Balkans was transformed into a permanency of German foreign policy and remained active until the very end of the Second World War[18].

Many analists still insist that the economic interests that underlie Germany's contemporary Balkan policy betrays its ignorance of the available statistical data.

But after the beginning of the Jugoslavian crisis, every night German T.V. stations delivered reports about new Serbian attacks on towns populated mostly by Croats. The role of Croatian paramilitary groups was never discussed.

Bild published the results of a survey among its readers which asked whether the German government was doing enough to help Croatia. Allegedly, 89,2% answered "no"[19]. Whereas *Bild* and German T.V. were delivering quick information to the masses, the conservative abides *Die Welt* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* provided background for the political and intellectual élites. In editorials and commentaries, Serbia was called the "aggressor" that harbored "the obsession of a master race with conquests".

Serbian troops were referred to as non-European "barbarians" or as *Chetniks*, the name for Serbs during W.W. II who fought brutally for the restoration of monarchy.

In concluding, the *Realpolitik* of German recognition for Croatia and Slovenia was based on rebuilding the natural, traditional German sphere of influence: *Mitteleuropa*. Furthermore, the fact that most of the Croats were Catholic gave them some credit among Catholic circles in Southern Germany. Stephen Kinzer of the "New York Times" misquoted H. Kohl as saying "a great victory for Germany", but, also some critics called Germany "an unpredictable giant in our midst" and asserted that the political "dwarf" was gone forever, Croatia and Slovenia were labeled as "Bonn's new babies"[20]. Through this unilateral political act, Germany has eliminated the versaillean "containment" of "the risk of Serbies" (Jacques Bainville).

NOTES

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DIE ASEAN
Eine Region in Wettstreit der Weltmächte

D. GHERMANI

Prolegomena

Der Zweite Weltkrieg hat zwei Großmächte als Hauptauslöser gehabt, im Atlantischen Großraum, Deutschland, im südostasiatisch-pazifischen, Japan. Die Planung für eine Neugestaltung der Welt nach der großen Katastrophe des Zweiten Weltkrieges entstand freilich in beiden Fällen auf den Reißbrettern der Staatschefs der Siegermächte. Allerdings, nur der sowjetische Potentat Josef Stalin wirkte bei allen grundlegenden Entscheidungen mit. Am 12. April 1945 verschied nach langem Sichtum Franklin Delano Roosevelt und Winston Churchill mußte nach der Wahlniederlage vom Juli 1945, noch vor Japans Kapitulation, den Platz für den Labour-Politiker Clement Attlee räumen.

Sowohl in Europa als auch in Asien durften die kleinen Staaten, gleichgültig ob sie im Lager der Siegermächte oder der Verlierer gestanden hatten, nur am Rande über ihr Schicksal mitentscheiden. Auf dem „Alten Kontinent" sind bekanntlich, mit Ausnahme Griechenlands, alle Staaten jenseits einer willkürlich gezogenen Trennungslinie, später „Eiserner Vorhang" genannt, der sowjetischen Hegemonie preisgegeben worden. In Asien griffen zunächst die ehemaligen Kolonialmächte

nach den zeitweilig unter der japanischen Kriegswalze geratenen Staaten. Erst allmählich erlangten sie eine zunächst nur formale Unabhängigkeit. Mitte der fünfziger Jahre erfreuten sich dann die meisten einer mehr oder minder echten Souveränität.

Wieviel und wie lange galt freilich diese angesichts des althergebrachten oder des neu entfachten Machtstrebens der früheren Hegemonen? Kompliziert wurde die Lage durch das Aufkommen früherer, historisch motivierter Ansprüche und durch ihre Verstrickung mit den modernen Ideologien, von denen der Kommunismus die virulenteste war.

Nach dem durch die Kapitulation Japans entstandenen Machtvakuum war eine Zeitlang alles möglich; freigewordene Kräfte entwickelten wie so oft egozentrische Eigendynamik, Großmächte und kleinere "Haie" orientierten sich um; sie waren bestrebt jede Chance für eine Verbesserung ihrer eigenen Lage auf Kosten der Nachbaren zu nutzen. Angesichts dessen, daß der Sprung aus den Startlöchern nicht gleichzeitig erfolgte und die Länder sich durch unterschiedliche Strategien leiten ließen, blieben die Konturen des Geschehens eine Zeitlang

unscharf. Eine Hauptkomponente und zugleich eine Konstante der allgemeinen, chaotisch anmutenden Bewegungen, die sich in Asien ergaben, war zweifellos der Kommunismus.

Ein klares Bild lässt sich aus dieser Erkänntnis nicht gewinnen, da es ebensoviele Arten von Kommunismus wie viele Staaten und Fraktionen desselben es gegeben hat, und machmal noch mehr. Außerdem war dieser oft mit einem aus der Frustration über die Kolonialherrschaft entstandenen Patriotismus verschmolzen. Und es darf nicht übersehen werden, daß eine neue potentielle Großmacht in den Ring gesprungen war: das ehemals ohnmächtige China, das im 19. Jahrhundert ein Opfer der europäischen Kolonialmächte gewesen war und jetzt meinte, einen "angemessenen Platz an der Sonne" erreichen zu müssen.

Auch die Dynamik der Pekinger Motivation geht vornämlich auf zwei Antriebe zurück: einmal die bolschewistische Eschatologie, die an das Endziel "Weltrevolution" festhielt, zum andern jedoch, und dieses schien manchmal wichtiger zu sein, eine starke patriotische Komponente, gewißermassen eine Revanche für das von China erlittene Unrecht, das ihm, nach Pekinger Sprachregelung, durch "ungleiche Verträge" widerfahren war. Dabei handelte es sich um solche Verträge, die im vergangenen Jahrhundert unter Ausnutzung der Schwäche Chinas dem Lande durch die europäischen Großmächte - einschließlich Rußland - aufgezwungen wurden.

Ein weiterer gewichtiger Grund für den 1960 ausgebrochenen Konflikt zwischen Peking und Moskau war der in dieser Periode erfolgte "realpolitische Umschwung" unter dem neuen "roten Zaren" Nikita Sergejewitsch Hruschtschew; dieser leitete nach 1956 die Öffnung gegenüber dem "kapitalistischen" Westen, insbesondere jedoch gegenüber den Vereinigten Staaten ein. Dieser Bruch, der praktisch einem Verzicht auf das klassische eschatologische Postulat "Weltrevolution" gleichkam, versetzte sogar das unter der Knute des rabiaten Diktators Enver Hoxha ächzende winzige Albanien in eine euphorisch-patologische Transe und führte Tirana zudem zu einem ebenso absurden wie unversöhnlichen Gegensatz zu Moskau. Der chinesisch-sowjetische Konflikt bedeutete zugleich die wichtigste Zäsur in der Geschichte der kommunistischen Weltbewegung seit der "Okto-berrevolution" und war zugleich ein existenzgefährdender Bruch des bolschewistischen "Commonwealth". Dieser führte drei Jahrzehnte später zum Zusammenbruch des sowjetisches Imperiums.

China mußte sich freilich nach 1948 noch eine Zeitlang in Geduld üben, bis es soweit war, sich auf den Weg zu eigenen eschatologischen Zielen zu machen. Damals, in den fünfziger Jahren, war es durch den Bürgerkrieg und den Befreiungskrieg mit Japan noch zu schwach, um bei der Gestaltung einer neuen Landkarte des asiatisch-pazifischen Raumes, etwa in Widerstreit mit den Vereinigten Staaten, gleichzuziehen. Dennoch, es sprang von Anfang an in den Ring. Seine Ziele waren: den Kommunismus maoistischer Prägung möglichst weit in südlicher Richtung auszubreiten und, daneben, sich neue strategische Stützpunkte zu sichern. Damit verbunden waren beispielsweise die Einverleibung Tibets im Jahr 1950 und die mehrfach versuchte Einverleibung vom Gebietsstreifen entlang der chinesisch-vietnamesischen Grenze, was zu kriegerische Auseinandersetzungen mit dem "kommunistischen Bruderstaat" führte. Und schließlich galt es für Peking auch, die zahlreichen, zum Teil sehr starken, Minderheiten in den Staaten der ASEAN-Region für sich zu gewinnen und durch sie,

nach Möglichkeit, die Politik dieser Länder zu seinem Gunsten zu beeinflussen. Dies gelang nicht, auch weil Rotchina unrealistisch war und ungeschickt vorging.

Mao begann früh an den Rändern des asiatischen Kontinents zu knabbern. Selbstverständlich sprach er zunächst vorsichtig seine vermeintlichen Landsleute, die "Auslandschinesen", mit patriotischen Parolen an und errinerte sie dabei an die Größe und historische Bedeutung ihrer Herkunftsheimat. Es erreichte damit nicht viele Angesprochene, vor allem nicht ausreichend Intelligenzler und selbstverständlich kaum "Kapitalisten". In der Masse der Minderheiten gelang es aber dem chinesischen Kommunismus Fuß zu fassen und "Stützpunkte" zu errichtern, was freilich den jeweiligen Regierungen Anlaß gab, die chinesischen Minderheiten insgesamt zu verteufeln, zu unterdrucken und die Renitenten zu vertreiben.

Der Ruf als imperialistische Macht führte dazu, das China in der gesamten Region als Bedrohung empfunden wurde. Die Angst vor dem chinesischen Expansionsdrang ist bis heute nicht erlöscht und wird von den despotischen Führungen der Länder der Region als Rechtfertigung benutzt, die Bevölkerung mit "harter Hand" zu regieren. Dies ermöglichte den Vereinigten Staaten ihre Position als Hort der Demokratie in Errinerung zu bringen und zu festigen; ein Prestige, das erst durch ihren Einsatz in Vietnam Risse bekam. Trotz der nahezu einhelligen Ablehnung des Vietcongs durch die Völker der südostasiatischen-pazifischen Region wegen seiner eigenen kleinimperialistischen Anwandlungen entstand in den sechziger und siebziger Jahre eine Art Solidarisierung mit den Vietnamesen gegen die "Einmischung" der Großmächte - zumal jene kriegerischer Art - in ihren inneren Angelegenheiten. Eine Zeitlang machte man nicht viel Unterschied zwischen China, der UdSSR und den USA. Ähnlich

reagieren übrigens auch in das Europa unserer Tage viele linklastige Politiker und Teile der Bevölkerung wenn es darum geht, den "imperialistischen Einsatz" einer vermeintlich kriegslüsternen NATO gegen die "für ihre Unabhängigkeit kämpfenden tapferen Jugoslawen" anzuprangern. Die politische Kultur Asiens ist von jener der europäischen Nationen doch nicht so leicht auseinanderzuhalten.

Nach Jahren der Überlastung und Verwirrung, in denen die Vereinigten Staaten vorwiegend damit beschäftigt waren, in Europa die verherrenden Folgelasten des Krieges und der Entscheidungen von Moskau (Oktober 1944) und Jalta (Februar 1945) irgendwie logisch einzuordnen und zumindest Westeuropa vor dem Zugriff Moskaus abzuschirmen; in Asien wiederum, die schlimmsten Folgen der japanischen Besetzung behälfsmäßig zu beseitigen und für einige Ruhe zu sorgen, machte sich Washington Ende der vierziger Jahre daran, im südosasiatisch-pazifischen Raum wieder aktive Präsenz zu zeigen. Es trachtete, das nach der Niederlage Japans entstandene Machtvakuum durch neue Kräfte zu ersetzen; und es hatte dabei nicht immer eine glückliche Hand. Wie in Europa, wo Washington die Sowjetunion als Ansprechpartner und gewißermassen als Garant für Stabilität im östlichen Teil des Kontinents auserkor, griff es auch in den Staaten des ostasiatisch-pazifischen Region bei der Auswahl der Partner oft daneben. Kreaturen wie Ferdinand Marcos und Achmed Sukarno sorgten selbstverständlich für Stabilität in ihren Ländern, hinsichtlich deren Qualität machte sich Washington aber, fast wie überall sonst in der Welt und zu allen Zeiten, wo und wann es um die Herstellung von Law and Order ging, keine - zumindest keine auf Grundwissen und Erfahrung begründeten - Gedanken; es war zunächst und vordererst um die vordergründige Beseitigung der Schäden

bemüht, wobei es dabei oft bloß um kosmetische, innenpolitisch "verwertbare" Maßnahmen ging. Und es schritt zumeist ohnehin erst dann an die Beseitigung unliebsamer, vor der öffentliche Meinung daheim schwer zu vertretenden Mißerfolgen, wenn das Kind längst in den Brunnen gefallen war; wie in Bosnien und in Kosovo, wie in den Phillipinen und Indonesien.

Gegenüber den ehemaligen europäischen Kolonialmächten besitzen die Amerikaner einen entscheidenden psychologischen Vorteil bei den Asiaten: sie hatten hier, wenn man die Phillipinen ausnimmt, - zwischen 1898-1935 eine Art von Protektoratstatus inne - keine Kolonien. Darüberhinaus kämpften sie erfolgreich gegen den japanischen Invasoren und erklärten sich sofort nach dem Sieg bereit, den Staaten der Region finanziell und wirtschaftlich unter die Arme zu greifen. Sie gingen oft, aber durchaus nicht immer, mit guten Intentionen an die Sache. In Ermangelung gesicherter Sachkenntnisse und Erfahrungen mit fremden Völkern und Kulturen begingen sie aber fast ebenso oft schwerwiegende, manchmal nicht wiedergutzumachende Fehler. Ein ebensolcher war in Europa die Betrauung der Sowjetunion mit der Gewährleistung der Ordnung im Osten, in Asien und in Lateinamerika wiederum mit der Unterstützung von üblen Diktatoren. Sicher wurden solche Fehler von Politikern begangen. Diese mußten aber in aller Regel nicht mit der demokratischen "Zänsur" von an internationalen Fragen so gut wie gar nicht interessierten Wählerschichten zu tun. Die "Los Angeles Times", nach Auflagenstärke drittgrößtes Blatt des Landes, mußte 1997 das Erscheinen der Wochenbeilage "Internationale Politik" wegen Mangel an Interesse in den Reihen der Leserschaft einstellen.

Einem britischen Autor, dem genialen Henry Graham Greene (1904-1991), ist es in einem 1955 erschienen psychologischen Roman, "The Quiet American", vortrefflich gelungen, am Beispiel eines Bostoner, der im Strudel der widersprüchlichen Erreignisse jener Zeit in Vietnam verschlagen wurde, nicht mehr wußte, was ihm geschah, das Porträt eines archetypischen Exemplars der "Neuen Welt" zu zeichnen. Der Romanheld war nach Indochina als vermeintlicher Experte gekommen: ein vom Schicksal vorprogramiertes Opfer.

Eine der maßgeblichen Ursachen für die amerikanischen Fehlschlüsse und Fehlentscheidungen bei der Einschätzung von Umständen und von Eingriffsmöglichkeiten rund um die Welt ist der Mangel an gesicherten Kenntnissen und vor allem die Blauaugigkeit, mit der amerikanische Bürger sich in die "Höhle des Löwen" begeben. Von messianischem Drang getragen stürzen sich Amerikaner blindlings "ins Vergnügen" und sind dann frustriert, wenn sie von den Ansprechpartnern oft nicht verstanden werden. Dialoge zwischen Amerikanern und Asiaten (oder Europäern) geraten leicht "casualy" in Leerlauf; und der Dialog "zwischen Taubstummen und Blinden" führte zwangsläufig zu fatalen Mißverständnissen, deren Folge manchmal Kriege waren.

Besonders kontraproduktiv und manchmal gefährlich erweist sich das Sendungsbewußtsein vieler Amerikaner, wobei dieses bei vielen Politikern mit Blick auf die Wählerschaft oft aufgebauscht und noch ofters vorgespielt wird. Europäer und Asiaten sind vergleichsweise zurückhaltender, obwohl auch sie zunehmend an amerikanischen Beispielen zärren. So entsteht im interationalen Dialog ein Schleier, der die Wirklichkeit vernebelt, die Sicherheit verdrängt und den Spekulationen und Manipulationen Tür und Tor öffnen. Die amerikanischen Medien, von Politikern gebrieft und animiert, begleiteten den Vietnamkrieg in der ersten, Aufschwungsphase mit blumigen Metaphern

und euphorischen Floskeln. Der Leser und der Fernseh-"Pazient" wurden bewußt irregeführt. Erst als die eigenen Verluste sich zu Hekatomben summierten, ließ sich das zur Tragödie gesteigerte Blutbad nicht mehr verschweigen oder rechtfertigen. Die Hyperbolik wiech der blanken Kritik und ebnete den Weg zu Depression und Verzweiflung. Die "Heimatfront" war den Hiobsbotschaften und -kommentaren einfach nicht mehr gewachsen; und der Krieg ging dabei verloren. Was die Masse der Bevölkerung nach jahrzentelangen irreführenden Berichten und Auslegungen nicht mehr zu verdauen vermochte, war die krasse Diskrepanz zwischen den vielen als Realität verkauften Bildern und der tatsächlichen Wirklichkeit. Der deutsch-amerikanische Politikwißenschaftler, Historiker, Rechtsgelehrte und Philosoph Eric Voegelin sprach in diesem Zusammenhang von einer "zweiten Realität" der Menschen unserer Zeit, eine durch "comic strips" und "science fiction" zum Fabulieren gedrängten und animierten Zeitgenoßen. Man fragt sich unter den gegebenen Umständen, wie sich ehrliche Politiker in unseren Tagen noch anstellen müßten, um, ohne Verletzung demokratischer Postulate, eine vernunftige Politik zu betreiben; ein, wie es scheint, äußerst schwiriges Unterfangen.

Angesichts der vielen Dinge, die im südostasiatisch-pazifischen Raum im letzten Halbjahrhundert schief liefen, verwundert es nicht, daß auch bei den Asiaten Skepsis aufkam, daneben aber auch die Selbstkritik, bei schwindender Logik, zu verschwinden droht. Das mag erklären, wieso in den Gassen und Straßen der Städte in Krisensituationen das Gebrühll der Massen mit stereotyper Wiederholung des abgedroschenen Slogans "Amy go home!" widerhallt. Auch das eine Art Annäherung Asiens und Europas auf der überhandnehmenden Ebene des Absurden. An der Schwelle zum dritten Jahrtausend obsigt in vielen Teilen der Welt und sozialen Schichten die Irrationalität; und etwaige Gegenkräfte, etwa Intellektuelle und Amtsträger, werden von den Kochorten der Dümmlinge verdrängt oder verzichten selber, bei falscher Auswahl der Prioritäten, auf Gegenwähr.

Erster Teil

Die ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) Eine analytische Betrachtung

1. Eine Großregion im Werden.
(Eine Untersuchung der endo- und exogenen Gestaltungsfaktoren)

Der "Verband der südostasiatisch-pazifischen Staatengemeinschaft" (ASEAN), mit Sitz in Jakarta, wurde am 8. August 1967 in Bankok, Thailand gegründet. Gründerstaaten waren *Indonesien, Malaysia,* die *Philippinen, Singapur* und *Thailand.* Als Ziele wurden genannt: die wirtschaftliche, soziale und kulturelle Zusammenarbeit zur Festigung des Friedens in Südostasien. Zugleich wollte man eine "Zone des Friedens, der Freiheit und der Neutralität" (ZOPFAN) und eine "Südostasiatische atomwaffenfreie Region" (SEANWFZ) schaffen. 1984 trat der Organisation *Brunei* bei. 1997 wurden auch *Laos* und *Myanmar* (früher *Birma*) aufgenommen. Der Beitritt *Kambodschas* wurde über Jahre verzögert, weil gewisse "Hausarbeiten" noch nicht gemacht waren. Die Machtverhältnisse im Lande waren noch nicht restlos geklärt. Der Massenmörder Pol Pot ist erst im Frühjahr

1998, ein kranker Greiß, den Behörden übergeben worden; er verstarb Monate darauf in Haft. Die Aufnahme Kambodschas erfolgte am 30. April 1999. Die ASEAN zählt somit gegenwärtig zehn Mitglieder.

In der Gründungsakte der ASEAN fehlte bezeichnenderweise ein Land, *Vietnam*, das erst 1995 Aufnahme fand, das aber eigentlich den Anlaß für die Entstehung der Organisation geboten hatte. Vietnam befand sich seit 1946 im Krieg mit Frankreich (bis zur Schlacht von Dien Bien Phu, die letzte Bastion der Kolonialmacht Frankreich, die 1955 von der Vietcong eingenommen wurde). Diese Schlacht besiegelte bekanntlich auch die Niederlage Frankreichs. Nach zehnjähriger Unterbrechung, eine Zeit die freilich keineswegs friedlich verlief, begann der Krieg Vietnams mit den Vereinigten Staaten, der erst 1975 endete. In den zehn Jahren, in denen die USA Krieg in Vietnam führte, wurden bis zu 540 000 amerikanische Soldaten in die Schlachten geworfen. Davon fanden rund zehn Prozent den Ehrentod, wie man heute weiß, für nichts und wieder nichts. Schwer angeschlagen mußten die Resttruppen, unter abermaligen hohen Verlusten, übersturtzt das Land verlassen. Zurück blieb eine gemarterte, feindliche Nation. Ein neuer Graben war zwischen Asien und der westlichen Hemisphäre entstanden, von dem nicht einmal die Kommunisten, welche jahrzehntelanh den Konflikt geschurrt hatten, Profit schlagen konnten. Ein weiterer Scherbenhaufen in der Geschichte der Menschheit. Der Vietnam-krieg hat insgesamt mehr zwei Millionen Opfer gekostet.

Als die fünf Gründerstaaten 1967 zusammentraten, war der Vietnamkrieg bereits in vollem Gang. Und dieser Krieg war eigentlich der Anlaß für den Zusam-menschluß der ASEAN-Länder: eine eminent sicherheitspolitische Entscheidung einer bedrohten Region, die nach Jahrhunderten der fremden Knechtschaft nicht noch einmal in Abhängigkeit wesensfremder und aggresiver Mächte geraten wollte. Allein schon die Berührung mit dem Kapitalismus hatte den noch in Traditionen verwurzelten Asiaten am Anfang gravierende Probleme beschert. Darüberhinaus erging die Bedrohung diesmal von einer "ideologischen Subkultur" aus, die den Menschen in Asien noch fremder als seinerzeit der Kapitalismus vorkam.

Der Vietnamkrieg war von den beiden kommunistischen Supermächten, der Sowjetunion und Rotchina, zunächst ideologisch und dann auch machtpolitisch mitgetragen; und für die gesamte Dauer des Konflikts zwischen 1946-1975 ging es den beiden Bezugsmächten darum, ihre Macht nach Ost- und Südostasien zu verbreiten. Nicht einmal in der ersten Phase der Auseinandersetzungen gab es gemeinsame Interessen und Zielsetzungen. Die UdSSR, der vom Westen 1945 ein halbes Kontinent kredenzt wurde, war noch nicht zufrieden gestellt und wollte kraft ihres Selbst-verständnisses, den Sozialismus sowjeti-scher Prägung festigen und weiter verbreiten. China betrachtete demgegenüber Asien als seine Domäne und beabsichtigte die kommunistische Ausbreitung, nach Möglichkeit, selber in die Hände zu nehmen, und zwar entsprechend eigener Vorstellungen. Die Eskalation des Gegensatzes zwischen den beiden "Supermächten" war kaum noch aufzuhalten.

Vietnam ließ sich selbstverständlich gerne helfen, es wurde aber zu keinem Zeitpunkt hörig; Hanoi ging es ursprünglich nicht primär um den, auch ihm wesensfremden, Kommunismus und schon gar nicht um dessen maoistische Abart. Es

wollte vor allem die Kolonialmacht Frankreich und den "Eckpfeiler des Kapitalismus", die Vereinigten Staaten, ein für alle Mal aus dem Land vertreiben. Und was die späteren ASEAN-Staaten betrifft, so hatten diese seit dem Sieg Mao Tse Dungs über die Restarmee Tschang Kai Scheks, der 1948 mit den verbliebenen Truppen seines "Kuomingtangs" sich Hals über Kopf nach Taiwan (damals noch *Formosa*) absetzen mußte, panische Angst vor einem Überschwappen des Kommunismus über das Südchinesische Meer. Ihre politische Führung lag damals – und liegt zum Teil bis heute noch - in den Händen von Diktatoren, von denen die Völker zu Recht vermuteten, sie stünden im Sold, zumindest jedoch unter dem Einfluß, des Westens. Sicher waren die meisten politischen Chefs zu Beginn ihrer Karriere im geringeren oder stärkerem Maße Günstlinge des Auslands. Mit der Zeit gewannen sie aber weitgehende Ellenbogenfreiheit und, nach außen hin, Statur.

Bekanntlich hatten die verfeindeten kommunistischen Großmächte, die UdSSR und Rotchina, mit Bezug auf Vietnam nur bedingt gleiche Interessen. Moskau und Peking beabsichtigten zwar, nach Beendigung des zweiten Weltkrieges ihre respektiven Positionen weltweit zu festigen, jedes war aber darauf bedacht, sich eine größere Scheibe vom "Nachlaß" der Kriege zu sichern. Und China war noch, man darf nicht vergessen, nach jahrzehntelangem Krieg und Bürgerkrieg, auf sowjetische Unterstützung angewiesen. Auch nach dem 1960 erfolgten Bruch zwischen den roten "Supermächten" verband sie freilich noch die Ideologie.

Außen- und wehrpolitisch gingen sie freilich nach 1960 getrennte Wege und versuchten wiederholt, sich die ehemalige Klientel gegenseitig abzuwerben und, manchmal, sogar sich Schaden zuzufügen. Gründe dafür hatten beide Staaten zuhauf und machten davon fantasievoll gebrauch. Als der Gegensatz 1960 mit Wucht ausbrach, warfen sie sich leidenschaftlich die übelste Beleidigung an den Kopf: sie bezeichneten sich als "Sozialfaschisten", erstaunlicherweise den gleichen Begriff. Die anderen kommunistischen Staaten der Welt weigerten sich dieses *epitheton ornans* zu übernehmen; es blieb also über die ganze Zeit der Trennung, bis 1990, eine eigentypische Formulierung der kommunistischen "Supermächte". Seither wurden vordergründig die Beziehungen auf staatlicher Ebene wiederaufgenommen, von gegenseitiger Zuneigung kann jedoch dabei nicht die Rede sein.

Das Zusammenwachsen der ASEAN-Staaten verläuft in vielerlei Hinsicht langsamer und ist auch weniger erfolgreich als jenes der westeuropäischen Länder. Größtes Handikap stellt im Falle der südostasiatisch-pazifischen Gemeinschaft die Geographie dar und zwar nicht allein auf zwischenstaatlicher Ebene, sondern vielfach auch innerhalb der Länder selber. In solchen Fällen liefert meistens die Rivalität zwischen Ethnien und Konfessionen den Zündstoff für Unruhen. In den ASEAN-Haupstädten haben dann die jeweiligen Machthaber und weniger oft irgendwelche Schlichtungsgremien und Schiedsrichter das Wort.

2. Die Mitgliedstaaten

A. Von den Gründungsmitgliedern geht es dem an sich reichen Indonesien am schlechtesten. Die "Asienkrise", welche die gesamte Region gezeichnet hat, wirkte sich für den Archipelstaat in vielerlei Hinsicht Katastrophal aus. Jakarta ist seit der Erringung der Unabhängigkeit Indonesiens im Jahre 1945 wiederholt von Krisen unterschiedlichster Art geschüttelt worden und beretis einmal, 1965, mußte ein President, Achmed Sukarno, das Feld räumen. Die derzeitige Krise zwang seinen

Nachfolger Kamusu Suharto, sich "in die Büsche zu schlagen". Ebenso wie sein Vorgänger Sukarno wurde er von den revoltierenden Massen gestürzt. Beide Male mußten die Diktatoren für ihre Mißwirtschaft und korrupten Amtsführung ihr Amt aufgeben. Es ist nicht so, daß Indonesien ein leicht zu regierender Staat sei. Es ist aber ein wohlhabenes Land und es hätte durchaus die Möglichkeit gehabt, bei angemessener Führung sich über Wasser zu halten und den knapp 200 Millionen Bürgern einen vergleichsweise überdurchschnittlichen Lebenstandard zu gewährleisten. Wie es aber oft bei Diktatoren und in Diktaturen geht, haben die Korruption und die Inkompetenz des Systems das Rennen gemacht. Der Sturz Suhartos war längst fällig. Dieser konnte sich aber auf die von seinen "Obristen" geführten Armee, auf die Polizei und die Geheimpolizei, verlassen; bis es dann überhaupt nichts mehr weiter ging. Suharto hinterließ einen Scherbenhaufen.

Wie kann ein Land regiert werden, dessen Fläche drei Zeitzonen umfaßt und das aus 23 677 Inseln betseht, fragen sich viele Experten? Die Tatsache, daß nur 6044 davon bewohnt sind und viele hundert nur eine geringe Bevölkerungszahl aufweisen, erleichtert nicht nennenswert die Arbeit der zentralen Regierung und die Aufgaben der Verwaltung. Indonesien begegnet mit einer Gesamtfläche von 1,9 Millionen km^2 und einer Gesamtbevölkerung von nahezu 200 Millionen Einwohnern, Schwierigkeiten, mit denen auch Staaten wie etwa Rußland, das auf eine tausendjährige Geschichte zurückblicken kann, nur schwer fertig werden. Das Schwellenland Indonesien hat aber erst vor einem halben Jahrhundert den Kolonialstatus abschüttelt.

Einige der großen Inseln empfinden sich als weitgehend autonom und weisen ausgeprägte kulturelle Identität vor. Dazu zählen beispielsweise die größte Insel des Sunda-Archipels, Borneo (Kalimantan, ohne den nordwestlichen Zipfel), sowie die Inseln Sumatra und Java, dann das Sulawesi-Archipel, mit der Hauptinsel Celebes, die kleinen Sunda-Inseln, Bali, Lombok, Flores, und Timor, wobei letztere, sich erst seit kurzem auf dem Weg der Autonomie befindet. Timor, ein kleines Gebiet im Nord-Westen Borneos gelegen, ist ehemalige holländische Kolonie, wurde aber 1975 vom Diktator Kemusu Suharto (1965-1998) gewaltsam einverleibt. Seither war Timor vom Bürgerkrieg erschüttert. 1979 übernahm der Dichter und Zeitungsmann Xanana Gusmao die Führung der Untergrundbewegung, die "Fretilin". 1992 verhaftet und zu zwanzig Jahren Kerker verurteilt, saß er im Gefängnis der Hauptstadt Dili ein. 1998, nach dem Sturz des Diktators Suharto entlassen, hat er sich geweigert das Gefängnis zu verlassen. Da Gusmao von der indonesischen Regierung als Kommunist gestempelt wurde, weigerte sich der amerikanische Staatssekretär Henry A. Kissinger 1975 Einspruch gegen die Einverleibung Osttimors in den indonesischer Staatsverband zu erheben.

Die vielen Ethnien, die über zum Teil altehrwürdige Kulturen verfügen, die vielen Religionen, für die der Begriff Toleranz vielfalls ein Fremdwort ist, und die zahlreichen geographisch bedingten Unterschiede machen es auch vortrefflichen Politikern und Beamten schwer, eine nationale Einheit zu verwirklichen. Mit einem Anteil von 87,2% der Bevölkerung bilden die Muslime eine stattliche Mehrheit; ihr Bildungsstand ist aber von Insel zu Insel, von Region zu Region unterschiedlich und entsprechend verschieden ist auch deren Einsicht über das Zusammenleben mit den Angehörigen anderer Kulturkreise.

Zweitgrößte religiöse Minderheit sind mit 9,6% die Christen, von denen die Römischen Katholiken die Mehrheit bilden; Der Anteil der Hindus beträgt 2%, jener

derBuddhisten 1%. Probleme gibt es hauptsächlich zwischen den Angehörigen der Muslime und der Christen. Seit Winter 1998/99 haben islamistische Extremisten auf Sumatra die Christen brutal verfolgt und mißhandelt. Der Grund dürfte eher ethnischer als religiöser Natur sein. Ein Großteil der Christen sind nämlich ethnische Chinesen, und die Indonesier haben bereits in den fünfziger Jahren mehrmals ihr Haß gegen die wohlhabende chinesische Minderheit, damals unter dem Vorwand, sie seien "Maoisten", in Gewalt verwandelt. Die Indonesier fürchten nämlich, daß die fleißigen und erfahrenen Chinesen einen noch beträchtlicheren Anteil am Bruttosozialprodukt in ihre Hände bekommen könnten.

Weniger Probleme wirft die Sprachenfrage auf; es gibt zwar auf den tausenden von Inseln an die 300 Idiome. Dennoch, seit Jahren setzt sich allmählich ein "Pidgin"- Holländisch durch, ein "Nachlaß" der ehemaligen niederländischen Kolonialmacht, das von der Mehrheit der Bevölkerung verwendet wird. Ebenso wie das in Indien und in der Karibik gesprochene Pidgin-Englisch erfüllt auch die Sprache der Holländer die Rolle einer lingua franca, was niemanden zu stören scheint. Ob diese Sprache ein Vehikel hin zur gesellschaftlichen Einheit sein kann, steht in den Sternen.

Ein schwieriges Problem, das ein großes Hindernis für das Zusammenwachsen der Bevölkerungsteile darstellt, ist das Verkehrswesen. Der Verkehr ist teuer, unzuverläßig, gefährlich und schlecht. Die Verbindung zwischen den Inseln wird überwiegend durch Ferrys gewehrleistet; diese muten aber vorsintflutig an und tatsächlich versinkt nahezu monatlich eines davon, aus "Altresschwäche" oder wegen Überladung. Und, der Bestand wird kaum erneuert. Die Zahl der Passagiere die bei Unfällen von Ferrys ertrinken, geht alljährlich in die vielen Tausenden.

B. Ähnlich und dennoch in wesentlichen Aspekten anders stellt sich ein weiteres Inselreich dar, das aus der geogpolitischen Realität und der Geschichte mehr Vorteile als Indonesien zu holen vermochte: *die Philippinen.* Dieses Land zählt viele Inseln, genau 7100 an der Zahl, erreicht aber mit einer Gesamtfläche von "bloß" 300 000 km² nur einen mittleren Rang unter den Staaten der Großregion. Auch die Bevölkerungszahl, knapp 70 Millionen Einwohner, verschafft den Philipinen keinen besonderen Rang unter den Ländern der Welt.

Die Vorzüge der Philipinen gegenüber Indonesien beruhen auf mehreren historisch gewachsenen und auf geographischen Vorteilen: zum einen, "nur" 860 von den rund 7100 Inseln sind bewohnt, wobei 360 davon eine Fläche von weniger als 2,5 km² aufweisen, wodurch letztere weder eine demographische noch eine ökonomische Bedeutung für das Land besitzen. Zwei große Inseln teilen sich zwei Drittel der Gesamtfläche des Landes: Luzon cca 105 000 km², Mindanao 95 000 km². Auch der Bevölkerungsanteil dieser Inseln an der Gesamt-bevölkerung ist entsprechend groß. Auf Luzon leben sechzehn, auf Mindanao an die sieben Millionen Phillipinos. Weitere bedeutende Inseln sind Samar, Negros, Palawan, Panay. Die Verkehrsstrecken zwischen den Inseln sind – wiederum in Vergleich zu Indonesien – beträchtlich kürzer; und die Philippinen sind - auch ein Vorteil - lediglich auf einer Ozeanfläche verstreut, die eine einzige Zeitzone umfaßt: Zwischen dem 19. und dem 7. Längegrad, nördliche Hemisphäre.

Weitere, nicht gering zu schätzende Vorteile sind:

- die Philippinos sind auf Grund ihrer neueren Geschichte ein weitgehend geschlossenes Volk, obwohl sie unterschiedliche Ethnien aufweisen: 40% Jungmalaien, 30% Indonesier und Polinesier, 10% Altmalaien und Negritos, 10% Chinesen und 5% Inder.

- eine ebenfalls weitgehend gemeinsame Konfession trägt wesentlich zur politischen Geschlossenheit der Gesellschaft bei. Dies ist darauf zurückzuführen, daß die Philippinen zu einem frühen Zeitpunkt in den Kulturkreis der Europäer aufgerückt und zum Christentum übergetreten sind. Im Jahre 1521 von den Spaniern besetzt und 1543 unter der Herrschaft von Felippe II. in wenigen Jahrzehnten zum Christentum bekehrt, übernahmen die Philippinos nicht nur den Namen des spanischen Königs sondern auch viele spanische Weltanschauungen und christliche Verhaltensweisen sowie geistige und ethische Wertungen. Die geistlichen Orden führten ein strenges Regiment und waren damit weitgehend erfolgreich. Dank ihrer mustergültigen Bildungspolitik entwickelte sich bis zum 17. Jahrhundert neben einer vortrefflichen Beamtenschicht auch ein effizientes Unterrichtswesen. Die erste Universität wurde in Cebu errichtet. Die Sitten und Bräuche waren in vielen Einzelheiten den spanischen Verhaltensmustern entlehnt.

- die zivilisatorische Kontamination kommt auch dadurch zum Ausdruck, daß die Philippinos spanische Vor- und Nachnamen erhielten.

Im amerikanisch-spanischen Krieg von 1898 unterstützten die Philippinos zunächst die USA. Die politische Führungsschicht versuchte noch während des Krieges die Zusage Washingtons, nach dem Sieg die volle Unabhängigkeit zu erhalten, einzuholen. Die Amerikaner willigten zunächst zu, hielten aber das Versprechen nicht ein. So nahmen die USA die Stellung der Spanier, als hätte es niemals gegenteilige Absprachen gegeben, die Stellung der Spanier als Kolonialmacht ein. Die Philippiner griffen darauf prompt zur Waffe und führten einige Jahre einen mörderischen Guerillakrieg.

Ein Schritt hin in Richtung auf Emanzipation erfolgte 1907, als das 1902 gegründete Parlament mehr Befugnisse erhielt. 1916 brachte ein weiterer Schritt die Philippinen näher an ihren Wunschtraum: diesmal war es der Präsident Thomas Woodrow Wilson, der den nächsten Schritt veranlasste. Er erweiterte noch einmal die Kompetenzen des philippinischen Parlaments; und dies war schon der vorletzte Schritt bis zur Unabhängigkeit. 1935 gelang es den Philippinen die Würde eines Commonwealth-Mitglieds zu erlangen, was die volle Souveränität bedeutete; und dieser Status prägte entscheidend ihr Selbstbewußtsein. Es entwickelte sich darauf sogar eine Art solidarität zwischen Manila und Washington, was den Philippinen zuträglich war. Bei internationalen Treffen stimmten die beiden Staaten oft unisono. Die Herrschaft von Diktatoren, etwa jene von Ferdinand Markos, trübten die Beziehungen nicht weiter.

Größere und beständigere Unruhen verursachten Untergrundaktivitäten einheimischer Kommunisten, in ihrer Mehrheit Muslime (zum Islam bekennen sich etwa 5% der auf Mindanao lebenden Philippinos und selbstverständlich waren nicht alle Mahomedaner bekennende Kommunisten). Aber auch jene die keine Kommunisten waren, unterstüzten diese gelegentlich. So hielt die kommunistische Rebellion gegen Manila ununterbrochen 25 Jahre an: von 1971 bis 1996. Nach der Auflösung der UdSSR herrschte für kurze Zeit Ruhe und auch die zaghafte Annäherung der UdSSR an den Westen trug dazu bei. Die Philippinen gelten heute als stabiles Land.

C. Auch Malaysia belegt mit seinen 330 000 km² Fläche und einer Bevölkerungzahl von rund 20 Millionen einen mittleren Rang unter der Staaten der Region. Der Nachbarschaft Singapurs, das seinerzeit mit Malaysia verbunden war, und der Tatsache, daß 30% der Bevölkerung

Chinesen sind, hat Malaysia zu verdanken, daß die überraschend breite Oberschicht sich ohne weiteres mit einer beliebigen europäischen "Yuppie"- Gesellschaft vergleichen lassen kann. Auch in Malaysia wird High-Tech hochgeschrieben, auch in diesem Land gehören die Manager zur gesellschaftlichen Elite; und auch in Kuala Lumpur stößt man üblicherweise in Bars, Night Clubs oder im Bankenviertel auf jüngere und ältere Managertypen, die lässig ihr *Wall-Street Journal* oder ihr *Financial Times,* für alle Welt sichtbar in der Jackentasche tragen.

Freilich, auch diese Klasse bildet eine Minderheit, aber auch die anderen sozialen Schichten weisen einen höheren Standard als vergleichbare Gruppen in den meisten anderen ASEAN-Staaten auf. Und auch die große Masse ist vergleichbar mit der Mehrheit der Bevölkerung in den europäischen Ländern. Viele Malaien zeichnen sich durch Geschäftigkeit und hohe Arbeitsmoral aus. Sie sind im allgemeinen verlässlich und fleißig, Qualitäten die zwar auch anderswo in Asien anzutreffen, scheinen hier aber mit einem Schuß mehr an Weltläufigkeit behaftet zu Dein. Um den Anspruch zu untermauern, zu den wichtigsten Staaten der Welt zu gehören, ließ Präsident Mohamad Mahathir vor wenigen Jahren in Kuala Lumpur das höchste Gebäude der Welt errichten. Selbstverständlich ein Zug einer auch in anderen Schwellenländer anzutreffende Gigantomanie.

Zwischen der starken chinesischen Minderheit (rund 30%) und der bodenständigen Mehrheit der Malaien (62%), gibt es kaum Reibereien. Das leidliche Verhältnis zueinander geht auf die in hohem Maße vorhandene, ethnisch bedingte, Arbeitsteilung zurück. Die technische und wirtschaftliche Oberschicht stellen mehrheitlich die Chinesen. Viele Malaien wiederum sind Mittelständler, Werkmeister und Facharbeiter; die Masse

der Minderqualifizierten rekrutiert sich aus dem Ausland, sind "importierte Gastarbeiter" und viele davon sind Muslime.

In Anbetracht des traditionell gesitteten gesellschaftlichen Lebens hatte sich die Öffentlichkeit daran gewöhnt, in Malaysia singapurische Sittsamkeit vorzufinden. Die malaiische Justiz greift oft bei besonders schweren krimminälen Verfehlungen (etwa in Fällen von Rauschgift-, Mädchenhandel oder Geldfälschung und -wäsche) mit äußerster Strenge zu. Die Gerichte fällen immer öfters die Todesstrafe, wobei die Touristen und auch fremde Geschäftsleute nicht verschont werden, auch dann nicht, wenn ihre diplomatischen Vertretungen sich besonders eindringlich für sie einsetzen.

Vor diesem Hintergrund platzte der Versuch des seit 1981 regierenden Mohamad Mahathirs, sich seines Stellvertreters mit denkbar unfairen Methoden zu entledigen, im In- wie im Ausland wie eine Bombe. Eine Nation, die von ihrem Regime "in Zucht und Ordnung" gehalten wird und um dies zu erreichen geneigt ist, äußerste Strenge walten zu lassen, empfand sich angesichts dieses öffentlichen Skandals an der Spitze des Systems von ihrem Staatschef in Stich gelassen. Kaum jemand unter den Nichteingeweihten konnte begreifen, wieso der allgemein geschätzte und als vertrauenswürdig erachtete Stellvertretende Ministerpräsident Ibrahim Anwar über Nacht zu einem gemeinen und perversen Übeltäter geworden sein soll. Ibrahim Anwar wurde von keinem geringeren als seinem Chef und vermeintlichen Freund vor Gericht gezerrt und dies, unter unglaublichen und schwer nachvollzieh-baren Anschuldigungen. Er wurde nicht nur beschuldigt, große Verfehlungen im Dienst begangen zu haben, sondern - in ein islamisch geprägtes Land geradezu eine "Todessünde" - an den Pranger gestellt. Er wurde wegen homosexuellen Praktiken

verklagt, eine für einen Muslimen nicht allein ehrenrührige Anschuldigung, sondern unter besonderen Umständen auch ein Delikt, das mit der Todestrafe geahndet wird.

Der Ende 1998 begonnene Prozeß endete Anfang Mai 1999 mit seiner Verurteilung zu einer höheren Freiheitstrafe. Die Prozeßführung war bis zuletzt, bewußt oder unbewußt, ungeschickt. Der vorgeführte Angeklagte wies wiederholt sichtbare Zeichen von körperlicher Mißhandlung auf. Niemand war bereit, die Öffentlichkeit darüber aufzuklären, wer die Schuldigen wären; ein hoher Polizeioffizier gab immerhin zu, vom Verteidiger des Angeklagten in Kreuzverhör befragt, er sei "umgedreht" worden. Und ein weiterer Belastungszeuge machte, vom Verteidiger in die Mangel genommen, seine Aussage, auf eine Anweisung höherer Instanzen hin, unter psyhischen Druck stehend, gemacht zu haben. Die Nachrichten in den Zeitungen und elektronischen Medien belieferten ihrerseits, zwar unter Einhaltung formeller Zurückhaltung, jedoch recht anschaulich, ihr Publikum mit Informationen, die von jedermann richtig verstanden wurden. Sie werden in gewohnt schwammiger, euphemistischer Manier verabreicht und in Tarnredewendungen gekleidet. Es sah dennoch des öfteren danach aus, daß es dem Regime nichts ausmachte, wenn die Bevölkerung richtig versteht.

Übereinstimmend meinten die ausländischen Beobachter, daß Mahathir neben von persönlichen Gründen auch von politischen Ambitionen getrieben war. In der asiatischen und atlantischen Presse ist wiederholt die Ansicht vertreten worden, Mahatir habe "moralischen Schaden" erfahren, was ihm später die Karriere kosten könnte. Auch über seine Gründe wurde gemutmaßt. Im April 2000 sollten nämlich in Malaysia Wahlen abgehalten werden und der gegenwärtige Ministerpräsident

beabsichtige, anstelle Anwars den Außenminister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, einen "Spezi", zu seinem Stellvertreter wählen zu lassen. Die Stimmung in der Bevölkerung konnte nicht schlechter sein. Bis zu den Wahlen blieb aber noch ausreichend Zeit, um die Stimmung erneut "umzudrehen".

D. Neben Singapur gehört auch Thailand, trotz wiederholter ökonomischer Rückschläge und politischer Krisen, wirtschafts- und sozialpolitisch, zu den stabileren Staaten der Großregion. Selbstverständlich hatte auch die "Asienkrise" das Land zusätzlich zurückgeworfen. Das ehemals legendäre Siam wird jedoch von Kennern und Liebhabern oft mit einem Ball verglichen, der unentwegt, von einem Kind zu Boden gestoßen, sofort wieder hoch kommt.

Auf einer Gesamtfläche von einer halben Million km² leben rund 60 Millionen Menschen, von denen 90% Thais der Rest aber vorwiegend Siamesen sind. Eine winzige Minderheit besteht aus Zugereiste aus Laos, Myanmar (Birma), Kambodscha und Malaysia. Die gängige Sprache ist Thai, jedoch auch mit Chinesisch und Englisch kommt man im Geschäftsleben weiter. Verwunderlich ist, daß Thailand, trotz der Nachbarschaft mit dem von hinterwäldnerischen Obristen immer wieder terrorisierten Myanmar, und insbesondere mit dem nahezu zwei jahrzehntelang vom Massenmörder Pol Pot beherrschten Kambodscha, es immer wieder verstanden hat, davon nicht beeinflusst zu werden. Thailand mußte wärend des Vietnamkrieges und bis zur Kapitulation der "Roten Khmer" im Jahre 1998 jahrzehntelang Flüchtlinge aus Myanmar und Kambodscha aufnehmen, unter denen stets auch destabilisierende Elemente, Spione und Mafiosi, geschleust waren. Diese konnten aber keinen größeren Schaden ausrichten.

Der relativ hohe Bildungsgrad prägt die politische Kultur der Bevölkerung, diese

höher liegt als die in vergleichbaren Ländern. Dies erklärt, wiederum warum Krisen rascher und leichter bewältigt werden konnten, so daß die dem Volk angeborene und anerzogene Weltoffenheit nicht beeinträchtigt wurden Konnte. Bildung erwies sich auch in diesem Fall als geeignetes Fangnetz für Unzufriedenheiten und Konflikten. Die sozialen Unruhen, von denen selbstverstän-dlich auch Thailand nach dem Krieg nicht verschont wurde, mündeten niemals in Revolutionen. Die Soldateska feindlicher Truppen mußte Thailand nicht ertragen, weil es rechtzeitig den vorrückenden Japanern die Neutralität anbot. Es mußte zwar in vielerlei Weise "Tribut" zahlen, erlitten jedoch keine Menschenverluste und die materiellen Schäden ließen sich nach dem Krieg verhältnismäßig leicht beheben. Eine Bedrohung seitens Tokyo besteht gegenwärtig - wahrscheinlich für alle Zeiten - nicht mehr. So geht es dem Lande im Augenblick nicht schlecht und seit dem Winter 1998/1999 ist es wieder einmal dabei, sich von den Folgen der "Asienkrise" langsam zu erholen.

Verdienste bei der Regenerierung des Landes nach Krisen erwarb in aller Regel die Schicht der vielen jungen Wissenschaftler, die in Universitäten Großbritaniens und Frankreichs, seltener in den Vereinigten Staaten und in anderen Länder, ausgebildet wurden. In die Heimat zurückgekehrt besetzten die Rückkehrer die zu vergebenden Stellen in der Staatsverwaltung, insbesondere aber im Handel, im Gewerbe und in der Industrie. So enstand eine kompetente Führungsschicht, die es verstand, sich Respekt bei der politischen Spitze und bei der Bevölkerung zu verschaffen. Wiederholte, von Diktaturen geprägte Zwischenspiele, hinterließen keine bleibende, irreparable Schäden. Bei den Nachbaren erzeugte dies immer wieder Neidkomplexe.

E. Singapur ist ein Stadtstaat, aber nicht deswegen allein eine Ausnahmeerscheinung in der weltpolitischen Landschaft; bekanntlich gibt es mehrere davon. Auch die Tatsache, daß es sich zu einem wichtigen überregionalen Finanzzentrum emporgearbeitet hat, trägt nicht zu seiner Einzigartigkeit bei. Herausragende Ränge als Finanz-, Weltwirtschafts-, technologische und Handelsbastione erreichten nach 1945, wie allseits bekannt, auch andere kleine Gemeinwesen wie etwa Taiwan, Luxemburg und vor allem Hong Kong. Einzigartig ist Singapur aber durch seine schier unvergleichliche geballte ökonomische und technologische Potenz, seine Stabilität - "ein Fels in der Brandung" - und seine ausgeglichene soziale Struktur. Die drei Millionen auf einer Fläche von insgesamt nur 626 km^2 lebenden Bürger Singapurs, davon gleich 77% ethnische Chinesen, erreichten 1996 ein pro Kopf-Bruttosozialproduktquote von 30 550 $, wobei die Unterschiede zwischen Höchst- und Niedrigverdienste nicht enorm sind. Darüber hinaus, Singapur kennt keine Arbeitslosigkeit, gilt als eine der saubersten Metropolen der Welt, weist eine äußerst niedrige Kriminalitätsrate auf und erreicht Höchstpunkte hinsichtlich der Beschäftigtenstruktur. Rentabilitäts- und Produktivitätswerte erhalten im Weltvergleich Höchstnoten; auch die Steigerungsraten kennen in den meisten Fällen keinen Vergleich. Im Software- nimmt es ebenso wie im verzweigten Dienstleistungbereich eine Spitzenposition ein. Die globale Bedeutung Singapurs wird zusätzlich dadurch gesteigert, daß es zu einem Verkerskntenpunkt von überregionaler Bedeutung geworden ist. Bei manchen Produktionen erzielt Singapur hinsichtlich Qualität, Preis, Entwicklungszeiten usw. Spitzenwerte. Stadt ist darüberhinaus verkehrstechnisch für ganz Südasien, den Pazifik, die ostafrikanische Küste bestens ausgerüstet.

Dieses Ergebnis wird durch modernste Industrien wie Schiffbau-, Ölverarbeitung-, eine rasch expandierende Elektronik- und Metallindustrie sowie durch eine breitgefächerte Dienstleistungspalette gewährleistet. Unzweifelhaft gehört Singapur als Sitz von Niederlassungen aller wichtigen Banken der Welt zu den Umschlagzentren erster Guteordnung; und schließlich besitzen auch nicht näher genannte Dienstleistungsunternehmen hier einen wichtigen, diskreten, aber manchmal nobel ausgestatteten "Briefkasten".

Die überaus leistungsstarke Ökonomie des Stadtstaates läßt sich durch die einzigartige Beschäftigungstruktur veranschaulichen: 62% der aktiven Bevölkerung finden im Dienstleistungssektor Verwendung, 38% im industriellen Bereich. Im Agrarbereich verzeichnet die Statistik überhaupt keine Beschäftigten, sicher ein Ergebnis, das weltweit nicht einmal vom Vatikanstaat erreicht wird, der wahrscheinlich doch einige Gärtner beschäftigt.

* * *

Die drei noch fehlenden Staaten der ASEAN-Gruppe sind vor allem deswegen erwähnenswert, weil sie den heteromorphen Charakter der Organisation bestätigen. Jedes Land für sich ist ein Sonderfall, ergo weder untereinander noch mit den bereits erwähnten Ländern vergleichbar. Für die ASEAN sind sie freilich weniger bedeutend wie die bereits behandelten: zwei davon, Laos und vor allem Kambodscha, sind Problemfälle. Der dritte Staat ist hinsichtlich des Bruttosozialprodukts pro Kopf der Bevölkerung ein superreiches "Schlaraffenland", das in einem Märchenbuch eher passen würde als in einem Länderkatalog. Er hat unter diesen Umständen selbstverständlich keines der typischen Probleme viele andere Staaten der Region. Es heißt jedoch, daß auch Brunei, in Zusammenhang mit der "Asienkrise" die Einkommen der Untertanen drosseln müssen, wodurch der Lebenstandard ebenfalls gesunken ist; auf hohem Niveau, versteht sich.

F. Brunei wird von einem Sultan regiert und die Nachschlagwerke verkünden, es handle sich dabei um eine "absolute Monarchie". Auch diese Angabe, eine Bestätigung dafür, wie schwer es dem Wissenschaftler fällt, ein politisches Gebilde oder ein System aufgrund seiner spezifischen Merkmale in die eine oder andere Schublade einzuordnen. Sultan Mohamed Hassanal Bolkiah, der Papierform entsprechend seit 1967 "absoluter Monarch", geht mit seinen knapp 300 000 Schutzbefohlenen pfleglich um. Er verüfgt zwar als Quasi-Eigentümer des ganzen Landes über ein enormes Vermögen und ein entsprechend hohes Einkommen, jenes eines Ölmagnaten, der seinen Untertanen manches gönnt; bei einem pro Kopf-Bruttosozialprodukt von etwa 15000 $ pro Jahr läßt sich aber auch für die Mitbewohner eine ahnsehenliche Scheibe des Kuchens abschneiden. Jedoch, die Ölpreise schwanken und auf dem Ölmarkt drängt die Konkurrenz. Es ist freilich nicht zu erwarten, daß Brunei Pleite geht oder der ASEAN-Organisation wegen unbezahlter Schulden den Rücken kehrt weil es etwa nicht mehr in der Lage ist, die Mitgliedsgebühren zu begleichen. Verspätungen bei Zahlungen könnten sich aber ergeben.

G. Unter den drei Indochina-Staaten ist allein Laos in den Indochina-Krieg von außen hineingedrängt worden und zwar durch die Vietcong und die Vereinigten Staaten, selbstverständlich getrennt und mit gegensätzlicher Absicht. Und es hat am wenigsten von den dreien gelitten. Dennoch, da auch Laos eine starke kommunistische Partei besaß, die "Pathet Lao", die von der vietnamesischen Vietcong massiv unterstützt wurde, ließen sich auch in diesem Land blutige Auseinander-setzungen nicht vermeiden.

Selbstverständlich mußte auch Laos unter den gegebenen Umständen materiellen Schaden verkraften und

zehntausende von Menschenverluste hinnehmen; freilich sind diese Verluste mit den Hekatomben in Kambodscha und Vietnam nicht zu vergleichen. Von der Außenwelt weitgehend isoliert, führt Laos heute eine Art von "Dornröschenschlaf"; nach Beendigung des Vietnamkrieges hielt es für angebracht, die Isolierung aufzugeben und der ASEAN beizutreten. Es entwickelte sich nicht das, was man üblicherweise als "aktive Politik" bezeichnen würde; es geht der politischen Führung vielmehr um Präsenz, Beteiligung an Konferenzen und Mitmachen beim treffen von Entscheidungen in der Regel alldies im Gefolge Hanois.

H. In Kambodscha gelang es erst 1991 einer unter Zeitdruck zusammengebastelten, neo-demokratischen Opposition die Macht zu übernehmen. Die "Khmer Rouge" zog sich in ein schwer zugängliches Gebiet im Nord-Westen des Landes zurück und es leistete von dort mehrere Jahre hindurch erbitterten Widerstand, wobei es obendrein die vermeintlich befriedeten Landstriche ununterbrochen bedrohte. Der Großteil der Khmer Rouge - Führung gab 1997 den Widerstand auf und startete, zunächst Friedens- und danach auch regelrechte individuelle Kooperationsverhandlungen, mit Phnom Penh. Die Verhandlungen führten zu einer Art Eingliederung einzelner ehemaliger Rebellenführer in das legitime Regime. Was genau geschah und worum es dabei ging, läßt sich bislang nicht genau erkennen. Ein Ergebnis dieser Verhandlungen war freilich die Auslieferung Pol Pots, Anfang 1998; eines alten, sehr kranken, sterbenden Mannes, der angeblich blind und taub war und sich kaum artikulieren konnte oder wollte. Pol Pot verstarb am 15. April des gleichen Jahres. Die Roten Khmer hatten den Kampf aufgegeben, es ist aber ungewiß und wenig wahrscheinlich, daß sie letzlich im pseudo-demokratischen System ganz eingegliedert werden können. Ein

Fremdkörper, und ein gefährlicher dazu, bleiben sie allemal.

Es ist nicht erkennbar, welche Art Beitrag Kambodscha in der ASEAN-Organisation einbringen soll oder muß. Das Land ist durch die Ermordung von nahezu zwei Millionen Menschen, ein Viertel der erwachsenen Bevölkerung, dezimiert, eines überwiegendes Teils der Elite entledigt, ausgeblutet und innerlich zerrisen. Für die ASEAN-Mitglieder dürfte maßgeblich für die Aufnahme die Überlegung gewesen sein, daß es für die Region vorteilhafter ist, Kambodscha einzubinden, um es leichter zu kontrolieren. Nichts fürchten die südostasiatischen Nachbaren mehr, (auch Vietnam und Laos haben selbst nach langer Inkubation noch nicht im entferntesten die psychischen und physischen Wunden heilen können), als in ihrer Mitte eine "Zeitbombe" unbeaufsichtigt ticken zu lassen.

Eines ist gewiß, Kambodscha wird noch, lange brauchen, bis es ein einigermassen verträgliches Niveau der Normalität erreicht, um ein zuverlässiger Partner zu werden. Im Innen und auch außerhalb des Landes spekuliert man offenbar darauf, daß der biologische Prozess (das allmähliche Aussterben der Veteranen) dem Problem ein Ende bereiten wird.

Gerade in den letzten fünf Guerilla-Jahren wurden jedoch neue, junge Kräfte angeworben; und in den Köpfen und Seelen der Neuzugänge kann man selbstverständlich nicht sehen, man kann und sollte sich aber darüber Gedanken machen. Viele junge neue Revoluzzer dürften ihre Gräben und Verliese in den Maquis nicht verlassen haben; die patologische, blutdunstige Romantik in den Köpfen der jüngeren *Desperados* ist nicht leicht auszumerzen; somit das die labile Demokratie des jüngsten ASEAN-Mitglied politisch und militärisch nich abrüsten.

Eine *tabula rasa* mit der Vergangenheit läßt sich sobald sicher nicht bewerkstelligen. Zu vielfältig waren die

Dramen in den vielen Ländern der Region, zu zahlreich die persönlichen Tragödien. Wenn man auch noch die enormen materiellen Verluste hinzuzählt, wer kann sich vorstellen, daß man einfach über die Vergangenheit den Schwamm ziehen kann.

Für alle ASEAN-Staaten gilt, zunächst selber zu versuchen, klar zu kommen, und zur Vorbeugung künftiger überraschender, unliebsamer Bedrohungen ständig auf der Hut zu sein.

3. Revidierte Strategien
(Zwischen Kooperation und Konkurrenz)

Gleich anderen Gründungen gab es auch bei der ASEAN ursprünglich schier unüberwindliche Diskrepanzen zwischen den eingestandenen Vorsätzen und den verborgenen Intentionen und Ambitionen der einzelnen Mitglieder. Die Voraussetzungen, von denen die später aufgenommenen Mitglieder ausgingen, stimmten ohnehin nur selten mit jenen der Gründer überein. Nun müßen alle versuchen, ihre kurz- und langfristigeren Pläne umzuformulieren, anzugleichen und den neuen Erfordernissen anzupassen.

Dem ASEAN hat überraschenderweise in ihrer über dreißigjährigen Geschichte, trotz (oder vielleicht gerade wegen) äußerst bewegten Zeiten, kein einziges Mitglied den Rücken gekehrt. Ganz im Gegenteil: die südostasiatische-pazifische Region ist nahezu leergefegt worden. Hinzu traten dem Verband jene Staaten bei, welche zu Beginn des Prozesses unmittelbar im Indochina-Krieg involviert waren. Nach Beendigung dieses Ost-West-Konfliktes, der die gesamte Großregion in ihren Bann gehalten hatte, änderten sich auch viele Zielsetzungen und Prioritäten. Es galt nun, sich nach der neu entstandenen "Großwetterlage" zu richten, und diese hatte sich wahrhaftig grundlegend geändert.

Während des Indochina-Kriges war die ASEAN-Gruppe "eingemottet". Der Ausbruch neuer kriegerischer Konflikte war nicht ganz ausgeschlossen, aber auch nicht wahrscheinlich und vor allem nicht akut. So faßten die Gründerstaaten der ASEAN Mut, manche der ursprünglichen Pläne neu zu formulieren und zu beleben und dazu auch noch die Anwärterstaaten auf die

Zusammenarbeit im Verband vorzubereiten und zu motivieren.

Die Fluktuation der ASEAN ging verständlicherweise nach wie vor, Hand in Hand, mit dem Geschehen auf der Ebene der wechselhaften Beziehungen zwischen den Hegemonen. Bis 1975 beobachteten die Mitglieder, wie zu sehen war, extreme Zurückhaltung. Die Vorbereitung auf die Nachkriegzeit bestand aus vorsichtiges Herantasten an die Großmächte, eher zur eigenen Information als mit der Absicht, Kooperationnen in die Wege zu leiten oder zu vertiefen. Die Devise lautete: flexibel und offen zu sein, um dann, nach der Klärung des Wirrwars, in das richtige Boot zu steigen. Präferenzen gab es durchaus: das demokratische Lager war bevorzugt. Die Amerikaner waren aber weit und sie hatten sich zu stark im Indochina-Krieg engagiert, wobei sie bekanntlich auf die Nase fielen. In der Sowjetunion gab es ebenfalls, soweit man von außen erkennen konnte, Führungsprobleme, die unter anderem durch den raschen Wechsel an der Parteispitze nach Leonid Breschnews Tod im Jahre 1984 sichtbar wurden. So blieb allein China übrig, da Japan - bis heute noch - keine machtpolitischen Ambitionen hegt; und China wird bis in die Gegenwart als Bedrohung empfunden.

Eine grundlegende Umstellung der politischen Haltung Moskaus, mit möglichen Konseqenzen für die Region, war erst nach dem Tode Konstantin Ustinowitsch Tschernenkos am 10. März 1985 zu erwarten. Der Verschleiß des Führungsapparates der UdSSR war bereits

während der letzten Phase der Herrschaft Breschnews sichtbar geworden. Sein unmittelbarer Nachfolger, der alte, kranke und gebrechliche Jurij Wladimirowitsch Andropow verstarb ein Jahr nach seiner Berufung, und auch dessen Nachfolger, Tschernenko, lebte nur ein Jahr. Man hatte sich zwar daran gewöhnt, die Sowjetunion als ein gerontokratisches System zu betrachten aber der rasche Führungswechsel im Kreml wurde dennoch als zusätzlicher Unsicherheitsfaktor der Weltpolitik angesehen.

Der neue Mann, Michail Sergejewitsch Gorbatschew, wurde auch in Asien aufmerksam unter die Luppe genommen. Er wechselte rasch die Führungsriege und veränderte radikal den Führungsstil; seine Devise lautete: Wirtschafts-liberalisierung und er bestritt neue Wege in der Außenpolitik. Seine Kontaktfreudigkeit führte ihn in Eiltempo nach London, Washington und Bonn und man gewann den Eindruck, die Welt sei für ihn zu klein geworden. Die geflügelten Begriffe seiner revolutionären Doktrin waren *Glasnost* und *Perestrojka*, bald weltweit bekannt und fast in aller Munde. Sie verhiessen zwar Wirtschaftslibe-ralisierung und die Abschaffung bürokratischer Zwänge und Mißbrauche, das "Machtmonopol der Partei" wurde jedoch paradoxerweise uneingeschränkt beibehalten. Das Ergebnis war ein Zwitter, mit dem niemand wußte, etwas Vernunftiges anzufangen. Die von ihm proklamierte Offenheit in der Außenpolitik war auch für die ASEAN-Gruppe attraktiv, über die Entwicklungen der Beziehungen zu Peking blieb man aber im Unklaren und gerade dieser Aspekt war für die Aseanstaaten von höchstem Interesse. Der 1960 erfolgt Bruch zwischen Moskau und Peking kam seinerzeit der ASEAN-Gruppe äußerst gelegen, aber beide kommunistische

"Supermächte" hatten den Vietcong zumindest auf logistischer Ebene massiv unterstützt. Die Frage blieb daher offen, ob nicht Beziehungen zwischen den beiden unterschwellig weiterbestehen; ein zusätzlicher Unsicherheitsfaktor. In den Hauptstädten der ASEAN-Organisation stellte man sich mit innerer Spannung die Frage, wie sich diese Offenheit auf die Beziehungen Moskaus mit Peking niederschlagen würde.

Aufmerksam verfolgte und verfolgt die ASEAN auch die Entwicklung der internationalen Organisationen, dabei insbesondere den Aufbau gemeinsamer Freihandelszonen. Das Interesse richtet sich vor allem auf die neuen Wirtschafts- und Finanzmärkte und die Kooperationen im technischen und elektronischen Sektor. An die verschiedenen Unterorganisationen der Europaunion hatten sich die Asiaten noch vor ihrer Gründung gewöhnt und wiederholt versucht, sowohl das Procedere als auch manche Strukturen zu übernehmen. Sorge bereitet ihr daher vornehmlich die Entwicklung der 1994 ins Leben gerufene *North American Free Trade Agreement* (NAFTA), deren Aufbau in mancher Hinsicht der ASEAN ähnelt. Die im Entstehen begriffene panamerikanische Gemeinschaft wird zwar im Endstadium eine Supermacht aufweisen, die große Mehrheit der vorgesehenen Mitglieder - außer Kanada und seit 1994 Mexiko, die bereits dem harten Kern der NAFTA angehören - alle anderen Staaten Lateinamerikas, bilden ein Gemisch von "kleinen Tigern" (Argentinien, Chile, Brasilien) und von "armen Schluckern", wie es beim ASEAN auch der Fall ist. Daraus könnte ein Konkurrenzkampf zwischen den beiden Organisationen auf den Weltmärkten entstehen und man ist sich in Jakarta nicht sicher, wer Sieger bleibt. Unsicherheitsfaktoren sind die vorhandenen

altherge-brachten Beziehungen zu den Absatzmärkten, die Lohn / Kosten Relation, die Qualität der Erzeugnisse usw., diese und andere Eckdaten, die ausschlaggebend für den Erfolg sind. Seit Jahren ist eine zunehmende Anzahl von Wirtschaftsspione unterwegs und am Werk. Ein zwar unblutiger Krieg, der aber auch Opfer kostet und manchmal über Wohlstand oder Armut entscheidet.

Die Wiederaufnahme der politischen Beziehungen zwischen Moskau und Peking zu Beginn der Ära Jeltsin erwischte die ASEAN nicht kalt, sie aber gab Anlaß zu einiger Aufregung. Würde die sich anbahnende Kooperation zwischen den beiden Kollossen China freiere Hand für eine expansive Politik in ihren "Vorgarten", der südostasiatisch-pazifischen Region reivhen. Diese Sorge wurde zu einer gängigen Spekulation und sorgte für Besorgnis? zu einer gängigen Spekulation. Aber auch andere Veränderungen weltweit bereiteten der ASEAN Irritationen. Was bedeutete letztlich und wohin würde sie führen, die plötzliche "Busenfreundschaft" zwischen Präsident Bill Clinton und Boris Jeltzin, die in der ersten Hälfte der 90er Jahre überschwängliche Formen annahm und kumpelhafte Züge entwickelte? Die Sorge lag tief, daß das Großmächte-Kräfteparallelogramm sich wieder einmal entgegen den existentiellen Interessen der kleinen Staaten und ihrer regionalen Organisationen stellen könnte. In den Kanzleien der ASEAN-Staaten reifte die Überzeugung, daß die Zeit für einen erneuten Anlauf zur Festigung des gegenseitigen Vertrauens und Intensivierung der Kooperationen fällig war.

Das Startzeichen dafür wurde 1992 bei einem "Gipfeltreffen" in Singapur gegeben. Die Anfangsphase des Neubeginns verlief unerwartet positiv und regte manchen Beobachter an, in den Berichten auf Superlativa zurückzugreifen. Es war darin wiederholt von einem "Meilenstein" die Rede und auch der Begriff "bahnbrechend" ist wiederholt gefallen (Jürgen Rüland: "Die Gemeinschaft Südostasiatischer Staaten", in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B13-14/95, S. 6 ff). Es gab aber auch skeptische Stimmen: M. Antonik veröffentlichte zum gleichen Ereignis einen Bericht unter dem Titel "ASEAN′s Singapore Rendezvous: Just Another Summit" in: *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Nr.14/1992.

Tatsächlich wurden in Singapur überraschend viele Beschlüsse gefaßt. Es war auch höchste Zeit nach dem langen "Winterschlaf". Die bei der Gründung postulierten Ziele sind, wie vermerkt, nur in Raten, halbherzig und oberflächlich verfolgt worden. Jetzt wollte man endlich "Muskel und Flagge zeigen". Die Arbeit sollte von Absichtserklärungen und rhetorischem Firlefanz befreit werden und zum ersten Mal sind auch sicherheitspolitische Überlegungen konkreter und offener formuliert worden. An die Nachbarstaaten der Region erging die Aufforderung/Mahnung, von Ansprüchen auf das Spratly Archipel (inmitten des Chinesischen Meeres, 10.00 Br. N /114.00 Lg) abzusehen; eine überraschend klare Warnung an China. Nebenbei wurden aber, ebenfalls ohne Namensnennung auch Taiwan und Brunei angesprochen.

Ein weiterer Anlauf mit neuen Akzenten erfolgte Ende 1998, diesmal um gemeinsam nach Mitteln und Wegen zu suchen, die Folgen der "Asienkrise", die alle ASEAN-Länder deutlich in Mitleidenschaft gezogen hatte, möglichst schnell zu überwinden. Ein ASEAN-Gipfeltreffen fand diesmal ausgerechnet in Hanoi statt, die Hauptstadt jenes Landes, das im Gegensatz zu den meisten anderen Mitgliedstaaten immer noch, ein viertel

Jahrhundert nach Kriegsende, vom Krieg gezeichnet ist. Viele Teilnehmer zweifelten, ob der Ort des Treffens der richtige war. Zu sehr schwebte noch über Anwesenden und Medien die Erinnerung an das Grauen eines barbarischen Krieges. Und ebenso kontraproduktiv erwies sich die Idee, Vizepräsident Al Gore zum Star der Veranstaltung hochzustilisieren.

Zentrale Bedeutung sollte - so der Vorsatz - die "beschleunigte Liberalisierung des Handels" gewehrleisten, und diese daneben und damit verbunden zugleich Anreize für ausländische Investoren schaffen. Singapurs Ministerpräsident Goh Chok Tong erklärte: "Wir müssen der Welt zeigen, daß wir in der Lage sind, ökonomische Fragen ernsthaft anzupacken."

Bei der Konferenz nahm auch ein Gast teil: Kambodschas Ministerpräsident Hun Sen, dessen Land bewarb sich für die Aufnahme in die Organisation beworben-hatte. Damals wurde er aber noch auf einen "späteren" Termin vertröstet. Über diese Aufnahme wurde ein Zeitlang zwischen den ASEAN-Mitgliedern heftig gestritten. Allgemein zweifelte man, ob Kambodscha die politischen Voraussetzungen für eine Mitgliedschaft besitzt.

Malaysias Premierminister Mohamad Mahathir richtete ein Apell zur Solidarität aller Mitgliedländer, in der Hauptsache warnte er aber vor den möglichen Auswirkungen der Globalisierung; und es gab selbstverständlich auch Kontroversen: Singapurs Minister-präsident forderte beispielsweise, die Öffnung der asiatischen Volkwirtschaften zu forcieren und sagte dabei: " Wenn es uns nicht gelingt, die Welt davon zu überzeugen, daß wir entschlossen sind, gemeinsam unsere Wirtschaft zu sanieren, dann laufen wir Gefahr, daß die Großmächte sich von Südostasien abwenden".

In einigen Entwürfen stand der Vorschlag, bis 2002 die Zollfreiheit zwischen den Mitgliedern einzuführen. Allerdings, einige Staaten baten um Ausnahmeregelungen und Ergänzungen. Zudem wurde gefordert, in der Großregion ausländische Beteiligungen an Unternehmen zu erleichtern und diesen sogar Steuernachläße zu gewähren. Ferner und abschließend gab es Vorschläge, die Rechtstellung der ausländischen Arbeiter zu verbessern und ihre Beschäftigung in den ökonomischen Sektoren der ASEAN-Gruppe zu erleichtern (*The Economist* December 12th-18th 1998).

Vizepräsident Gore schien nach Meinung der meisten Beobachter nicht richtig verstanden zu haben, worum es bei der Sache ging und wo er sich befand. Er forderte mit landesüblicher Blauäugigkeit seine Zuhörer, durchwegs autokratische Staats- und Regierungschefs, auf, sich zu demokratischen Reformen aufzuraffen. Manche Staatschefs empfanden die Forderung des Amerikaners als Provokation und legten seine Worte als Anstiftung zur Rebellion in ihren Ländern aus. Am schärfsten entwickelte sich das Wortgefecht zwischen dem amerikanischen Vizepräsidenten und dem malaiischen Regierungschef, der ausgerechnet in jenen Wochen und Monaten bestrebt war, mit ganz und gar undemokratischen Mitteln seinen ehemaligen Vize politisch und moralisch zu demontieren.

Auch die nichtasiatischen Gäste und Beobachter - Neuseeländer und Australier etwa - wußten nicht recht, was ihnen geschah. Die Veranstaltung war einige Male nah daran zu platzen, was schlimme Folgen für den Fortbestand der Organisation, aber auch für den Handel mit den Vereinigten Staaten, gehabt hätte. Der Vertreter der USA hatte wieder einmal versucht, nach dem Verfahren "Zuckerbrot und Peitsche" seine Zuhörer für seine Pläne zu gewinnen. Er versprach großzügig bei "Wohlverhalten" Unterstüztung. Viele Asiaten reagierten allergisch, mit offen zu Tage getragenen, gekränkten Stolz. Die Forderung der Amerikaner an die ASEAN, ihren Markt weit zu öffnen, wurde mit

kühler Höflichkeit zur Kenntnis genommen; es war offensichtlich, daß kaum eine nationale Vertretung vor hatte, die halbherzige Zusage jenseits symbolischer Gesten zu erfüllen.

In den Vereinigten Staaten dürfte das Ergebnis der Tagung Katerstimmung bewirkt haben. Schwer vorauszusagen, welche Schäden unbedachte, mit besserwisserischen Gehabe loßgewordene Äußerungen, dem Welthandel zwischen dem atlantischen und dem pazifischen Raum zufügen können. Mitte der 90er Jahre betrug das Handelsvolumen zwischen den USA und der ASEAN-Region rund 250 Milliarden $ pro Jahr. Malaysia klagte, angesichts der Mißverständnisse beim kontroversen Spiel zwischen Forderungen und Erwartungen, es gebe zwar gegenwärtig eine rapid anwachsende Globalisierung der Märkte, die Wirtschaftspolitik liege aber dafür im Argen.

Zweiter Teil
Der Wettstreit der Hegemonen

Unter den Großmächten, deren Geschichte am engsten mit jener der südostasiatisch-pazifischen Region verwoben war und am längsten in der politischen Gestaltung dieses Raumes involviert war, müssen die Vereinigten Staaten genannt werden. Als die ersten Europäer in Asien und im Pazifik landeten oder die Küsten des Stillen Ozeans über das Land erreichten, gab es die Vereinigten Staaten noch nicht. Nennenswerte Beziehungen entwickeln sich erst im späten 19. Jahrhundert. Seither wurden aber diese immer dichter, umfassender und intensiver, wobei die Amerikaner zunächst fast ausschließlich am Handel Interesse zeigten und erst allmählich die geopolitischen Aspekte dieses Erdteils ins Auge faßten. Die späteren ASEAN-Staaten spielten hierbei keine oder bloß eine sehr geringe Rolle. Die meisten befanden sich doch bis nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg in kolonialer Abhängigkeit. Der Vorteil der USA beim späten Aufbau der Beziehungen in der südostasiatisch - pazifischen Region war, daß sie, wie bereits verzeichnet, mit Außnahme der Philippinen, keine Kolonien besaßen.

Politisches Interesse für die Region zeigte Washington erst seit Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts, nach dem erzwungenen "Besuch" des Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry am 31. Juli 1954 in den Häfen Shimoda und Hakodate. Bekanntlich war dieser eher zufällige erste Kontakt der Auslöser für die Zurückmeldung Japans in die Weltgeschichte. Die Japaner hatten die zwei Jahrhunderte zuvor in nahezu völligen Isollierung gegenüber der Außenwelt gestanden. In der Folgezeit beschränkte sich Washington auf den im pazifischen Raum niedergelassenen Vertretungen der Kolonialmächte. China war eine der wenigen Ausnahmen, es wies aber andererseits zunehmende Verfallserscheinungen auf und galt weltweit als "kranker Mann" Asiens.

Wichtigster Handekspartner der USA in Asien wurde Japan, das bis zur Wende zum zwanzigstem Jahrhundert, im Zeitraffer, gigantische Schritte in Richtung auf eine nahezu vollständige allround-Modernisierung zurücklegte. Vom geostrategischen Standpunkt aus wurden die Vereinigten Staaten nach dem Japanisch-Russischen Krieg (1904-1905), allmählich die dominierende Macht der Großregion. Noch war aber Washington zu jenem Zeitpunkt weit davon entfernt, Supremachtambitionen zu hegen, dafür wuchsen freilich ihre Wirtschaftsinteressen gewaltig.

Bis zum ersten Weltkrieg kamen sich die USA und Japan noch nicht ins Gehege;

der pazifische Wirtschaftsraum war noch verhältnismäßig unterentwickelt und onehin von den Europäern weitgehend mit Beschlag genommen: Mehr regte sich Washington auf, als Japan, nach der 1905 Rußland zugefügten Niederlage, Anstalten machte, auf den asiatischen Festland Fuß zu fassen. Zuerst besetzte es Korea und verwandelte die Halbinsel 1910 in eine Kolonie. Dann nutzte es in den Jahren 1914-1918 die verminderte Präsenz der europäischen Kolonialmächte in der relativ verwaisten pazifischen Region aus, um sich hier Positionen zu verschaffen und systematisch auszubauen. Als dann Tokio 1932 die Mantschurei einverleibte und 1937 auch nach China die Hand ausstreckte, leuteten in Washington die Alarmglocken grell. Parallel dazu gerieten sich die beiden Großmächte auch wirtschaftspolitisch in die Haare. Die Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwischen Tokio und Washington wider spiegelte bis Pearl Harbor (am 7. Dezember 1941) der imperialen Einstellung Japans. Tokio verspürte schon damals den Drang, dominierende Macht im pazifischen Raum zu werden. Im Zweiten Weltkrieg steigerte sich seine Ambition, gestützt auf die spektakulären Siege der ersten Phase ins Unermeßliche. Vielen Aussagen japanischer Politiker und Generäle war zu entnehmen, daß Japan weltweit den ersten Rang angepeilt hatte.

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leiten zu können. An der Schwelle zum dritten Jahrtausend schwelten die Gemüter vieler Politiker und der meisten Journalisten in Sphären, die der gängigen Logik und einer langjährigen Erfahrung kras zuwiderlaufen.

Die Naivität maßgeblicher westlicher Politiker trug wesentlich zur Verlängerung der Agonie Rußlands bei; sie verzögerte und gefährdete zugleich die dringend notwendige Annäherung der vor einem halben Jahrhundert willkürlich getrennten Hemisphären. Zum Fortbestand der Kluft zwischen Ost und West, zwischen Europa und Asien, trugen auch unberufene Nostradamus-jünger des Schlages eines Samuel Huntington ("Clash of Civilizations") bei, dem es gelang, mit seinem mediokren Werk viele hunderttausend Leser rund um die Welt zu erreichen. Nach glaubwürdigen statistischen Angaben konnte er nicht einmal von Monika Lewinsky, was die Popularität seines Werkes anbelangt, geschlagen werden. Sein Opus ist in - sage und schreibe - mehr als fünfzig Sprachen übersetzt worden und ist seit Jahren ein "Bestseller", sowie Thema unzähliger Kommentatoren. An manchen Universitäten wurde versucht, eigene Lehrveranstaltungen zum Thema Zusammenstoß der Kulturen im die Curricula aufzunehmen. Und nicht wenige Politiker im Westen waren in letzter Zeit geneigt, zwischen der abendländischen und der "obskurantistischen orthodoxen-byzaninischen" Kultur einen unüberwindlichen Graben zu sehen. Hinderlich für die Rückkehr zu einer nüchternen Betrachtung der Tatbestände und Möglichkeiten war nach 1990 die Festlegung der Westmächte auf manche Politiker im Osten, sei es in Rußland oder China, welche den in sie gesetzten Erwartungen gar nicht entsprechen konnten. Es handelte sich dabei durchwegs um Typen, die den totalitären Systemen entsprangen und die auch dann, wenn sie

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Asien ist seit 1945 eine Region in Transition. Es schleppt mit sich viel verfehlt aber zugleich dem Nachahmungseffekt, verblendet durch die Syndrome unserer Zeit und die Verlockungen stereotyper Werbeträger. Die Schwankung zwischen Tradition und Neuerung, unter Ermangelung einer verläßlicher Orientierung, das Verzetteln bei der Suche in den Warenkörber schlauer Anbieter, verhindern auch in Asien, wie vor einiger Zeit in Europe, nüchterne Entscheidungen. Viele Asiaten verspieken dadurch die Chanse, die echte Identität zu finden oder diese vor Verfälschung zu schützen. Noch ist die gegenwärting im Schwinden begriffene "Asienkrise" vergleichweise ohne grösseren Schaden anzurichten in die Geschichte eingegangen. Ob die eingetretene Festigung von Dauer sein wird läßt sich freinich noch nicht mit sicherheit sagen. Zu gross und zu geschickt verpakt sind die vielfältigen Versuchungen. von irreführenden Slogangs begleitet und von meisterhand verschürt, als man die Gefahr eines Abrutschens in gefährliche Illussionen und Versuchungen als definitiv überwunden gelten dürften.

Der in Jahrtausenden zum „homo europäus" herangereichte potentielle Täger von attischen, christlichen und ordnungrechtlichen Bestandteilen ciceronoscher und justinisnischer Qualität, zwar auch immer wieder angeschlagen, bieten eher die Gewähr, sich auf das geistige Erbe vergangener Zeiten zu besinnen. Dazu gehört die Überzeugung, das ökonomische Postulate und Zielsetzung zwar ungeschmälert Geltung haben dürften, nir insofern sie nicht die ethischen und die die im freiheitlichem Recht verankerten Gebote ignosieren. Die Erfahrungen weltweit haben gezeigt, dass dieser Varsatz wich leicht zu verteidigen ist.

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In Asien bestimmten auf westlicher Seite fast ausschließlich die Vereinigten Staten den Gang der Dinge, und, wieso oft, steht Washington auch hier und jetzt fast genau in der Mitte zwischen hehren Vorsätzen und pragmatischen Versuchungen. Dementsprechend schwankt die Qualität der Entscheidungen zwischen Vortrefflich und Miserabel, zwischen Realitätsnah und Illusorisch. Seine Politik war ergo kurvenreich, kannte Höhen und Niederungen, erwirkte Gutes und

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den dogmatischen Marxismus abgeschworen hatten, wie etwa Boris Jeltsin oder Slobodan Milośević, in den Denksystemen und den Praktiken des "ancien regime" verhaftet waren. Selbstverständlich muß man in der Übergangsphase zwischen den Abdanken von totalitären Typen und echten Trägern des demokratischen Gedankenguts mit Menschen vorlieb nehmen, die die alten dogmatischen Fesseln abgeschüttelt haben, ohne sich zugleich von eingefleischten stereotypen Wertungen und Verhaltungsmustern der Vergangenheit trennen zu können. Dann erlebt man aber eine Solidarisierung Jeltsins mit Slobodan Milosewic und ein Rückfall Teng Xiaopings in die Tien-An-men-Barbarei. Manchen ist anzusehen, daß sie sich ehrlich anstrengen, die Metamorphose zu schaffen. Andere wiederum, mit Blick auf Asien, ein Suharto, der sich in dreißig Jahren, bis zum bitteren Ende, nicht einen Deut verändert hat und trotzdem in Westen stets als Stabilitätsgarant angesehen wurde, "blieben bei ihren Leisten"; in Anbetracht ihrer wohlbekannten Biographie muß es überraschen, daß manche "Beobachter" und Entscheidungsträger im Westen sich immer wieder von ihnen haben überraschen lassen.

Asien ist seit 1945 eine Region in Transition. Es schleppt mit sich viel verfehlt aber zugleich dem Nachahmungseffekt, verblendet durch die Syndrome unserer Zeit und die Verlockungen stereotyper Werbeträger. Die Schwankung zwischen Tradition und

Neuerung, unter Ermangelung einer verläßlicher Orientierung, das Verzetteln bei der Suche in den Warenkörber schlauer Anbieter, verhindern auch in Asien, wie vor einiger Zeit in Europe, nüchterne Entscheidungen. Viele Asiaten verspieken dadurch die Chanse, die echte Identität zu finden oder diese vor Verfälschung zu schützen. Noch ist die gegenwärting im Schwinden begriffene "Asienkrise" vergleichweise ohne grösseren Schaden anzurichten in die Geschichte eingegangen. Ob die eingetretene Festigung von Dauer sein wird läßt sich freinich noch nicht mit sicherheit sagen. Zu gross und zu geschickt verpakt sind die vielfältigen Versuchungen. von irreführenden Slogangs begleitet und von meisterhand verschürt, als man die Gefahr eines Abrutschens in gefährliche Illussionen und Versuchungen als definitiv überwunden gelten dürften.

Der in Jahrtausenden zum „homo europäus" herangereichte potentielle Täger von attischen, christlichen und ordnungrechtlichen Bestandteilen ciceronoscher und justinisnischer Qualität, zwar auch immer wieder angeschlagen, bieten eher die Gewähr, sich auf das geistige Erbe vergangener Zeiten zu besinnen. Dazu gehört die Überzeugung, das ökonomische Postulate und Zielsetzung zwar ungeschmälert Geltung haben dürften, nir insofern sie nicht die ethischen und die die im freiheitlichem Recht verankerten Gebote ignosieren. Die Erfahrungen weltweit haben gezeigt, dass dieser Varsatz wich leicht zu verteidigen ist.

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In Asien bestimmten auf westlicher Seite fast ausschließlich die Vereinigten Staten den Gang der Dinge, und, wieso oft, steht Washington auch hier und jetzt fast genau in der Mitte zwischen hehren Vorsätzen und pragmatischen

Versuchungen. Dementsprechend schwankt die Qualität der Entscheidungen zwischen Vortrefflich und Miserabel, zwischen Realitätsnah und Illusorisch. Seine Politik war ergo kurvenreich, kannte Höhen und Niederungen, erwirkte Gutes und

Schlechtes. Der Weg war etwa in gleichem Maße mit Erfolgen und Mißerfolgen gepflastert.

In etwa gleichgewichtig mit den Vereinigten Staaten war im südostasiatisch-pazifischen Raum nur noch China, und es ist zu erwarten, daß sich in den kommenden Jahren das Gewicht auf die asiatische Macht verlagen wird. Den USA wird es niemals gelingen die Chinesen demographisch zu schlagen, was sie selbstverständlich gar nicht anstreben. Die zahlenmäßige Größe eines Volkes dürfte aber auch künftighin, unter den gegebenen Umständen, ein Trumpf bleiben, und man muß davon ausgehen, daß der Anteil der "zivilisierten" Chinesen, das heißt jener Chinesen, die in die Industrie und Dienstleistungen sowie, parallel dazu, in die high-tech-Branchen aufsteigen werden, schnell wachsen wird. Nahezu alle anderen Völker der Region haben gezeigt, wie man es macht. Besonders beindruckend war die diesbezügliche Leistung der "anderen" Chinesen: auf Taiwan.

Der Inselstaat Taiwan, ein Land, das nur von ganz wenigen Staaten völkerrechtlich anerkannt wird, bildet seit sienem Entstehen im Jahre 1948, eine "schwer zu knackende Nuß". Der am 1. März 1950 von Tschang Kai-schek zur "Republik China auf Taiwan" ausgerufene Staat, fungierte zunächst im Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen als Nachfolgestaat von "Festland China" als Ständiges Mitglied. Auf Druck der überwiegenden Mehrheit der Mitglieder mußte Taipeh 1971 die UNO und damit auch den Sicherheitsrat verlassen. Seither gilt Taiwan als "Schutzgebiet" der USA, die einzige Großmacht übrigens, die seine Unabhängigkeit zu garantieren vermag und auch effektiv gewährleistet. Allerdings in März 2000 hat Washington die Auffassung Beijings (anerkannt, Taiwan sei grundsätzlich in Teil Chinas, ohne freilich vorerst Konsequenzen daraus zu ziehen.

Taiwan wird bis heute von Peking als chinesische Provinz betrachtet. Dabei handelt es sich nicht um einen Anspruch gewöhnlicher Art, sondern, historisch, ethnisch und geographisch um eine Selbstvertändlichkeit.

Tatsächlich haben aber etliche Kongreßmitglieder, vielleicht im Zusmmenhang mit der neuerlich Bedrohung Taiwans, auch wieder die Tibet-Frage aufgeworfen. Es wurde sogar der Vorschlag gemacht, Gregory Craig zum "Sonderbeauftragten für tibetische Angelegenheiten" zu ernennen, was selbstverständlich Peking zu heftigen Protesten wegen "Angriffe auf Chinas territoriale Integrität" animierte. Jedenfalls scheint Washington zur Zeit zu sein gewillt, der Doktrin des "Ein-China-Staats" zuzustimmen. Man darf rätzeln, was die Zukunft bringen wird.

Sowohl China als auch die Vereinigten Staaten betrachten die ganze Region, von Korea bis Thailand und den pazifischen Raum mit dem Chinesischen Meer dazu, was ihr Wirkungsbereich anbetrifft, als *mare nostrum*. Selbstverständlich, jede Großmacht für sich. So ergeben sich zwischen ihnen mehr Reibungsflächen und -punkte als Anlässe für Einhelligkeit.

Die Beziehung zwischen Peking und Washington ist bis zum heutigen Tag äußerst komplex, kompliziert und widersprüchlich: man steht, was die Handlungen des anderen anbelangt, auf der Lauer und beobachtet gespannt jede Bewegung des Gegenparts. Bei jeder Konfrontation geht man bis an den Rand eines Konflikts heran, um das meiste vom eigenen Anspruch durchzusetzen; und man tastet und testet sich unentwegt. Freilich, sowohl Peking als auch Washington wissen nur zu genau, daß sie die jeweilige Trennungslinie nicht überschreiten dürfen. Die beiden Staaten erkennen, daß sie die

Schmerzgrenze des anderen nicht überforden dürfen.

1996 meinte Peking, auf die ersten demokratischen Präsidentschaftswahlen Taiwans vom 23. März mit einer martialischen Demonstration reagieren zu müssen. Es entsandte eine Kriegsflotte in die Küstengewässer des Inselreichs und schoß mit Racketen über den Kopf der Insulaner hinweg. Amerika ließ sich nicht beeindrucken, es entsandte sofort Teile seiner Pazifikflotte am "Tatort". Die chinesishce Demonstration verlief wieder einmal im Sand. Für den Politikwissenschaftler erhebt sich die Frage, welche der beiden Strategie obsiegen wird: China verläßt sich auf seine steil ansteigende ökonomische und militärische Potenz. Es meint, den längeren Atem zu besitzen. Die USA vertrauen ihrerseits, traditions- und "standesgemäß", auf den "Gang der Geschichte", der in ihrem Sinne verlaufen und unweigerlich zu einer Demokratisierung des Typus " American way of life" führen muß. Sie überspringen dabei, leichtfertig und unversehens, der Logik des Konzepts nach entsprechende notwendige Zwischenstufen. Dies muß zwangsläufig zu Mißerfolgen führen und die betroffenen Völker gegebenenfalls ins Verderben stürzen.

Gemeinsame Interesse haben im zweiten Halbjahr 1998 Peking und Washington veranlaßt, so zu tun, als ob manches Unliebsame in ihrer Beziehung der vergangenen Jahre und Jahrzehnte vergessen ist, zumindest jedoch keine größere Rolle spielen soll. In Wirklichkeit ging es beiden Staaten und Regime darum, ihre Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zu intensivieren. Die Vereinigten Staaten trachteten ihren ersten Platz zu verteidigen, China ging es hauptsächlich darum, den erreichten dritten Platz, nach Japan, zu sichern und zu konsolidieren. Auf diplomatischer Ebene gab man sich ebenfalls Mühe. Dem von Medleine

Albright anläßlich ihres China-Besuchs im März 1999 erzielten Erfolg war allerdings keine Langlebigkeit beschieden. Schon der Ausbruch des blutigen "Kossowo-Kriegs" hatte sich die labil-freundliche Stimmung zwischen Peking und Washington aus grundsetzlichen Gründen urplötzlich verschlechtert; dann aber, und das könnte noch nachteiligere Folgen haben, stellte er, nach sehr langer Zeit, wieder die in Vergessenheit geratene Front zwischen China und Rußland zusammen. Den vorläufigen Höhepunkt erreichte die polare Kälte durch den wahrscheinlich unbeabsichtigten Beschuß der chinesischen Botschaft zu Belgrad. Washington wird es nicht leicht gelingen, den Beweis zu erbringen, daß die Zerstörung des Botschaftsbaus von der Benutzung eines von CIA gelieferten alten, überholten Stadtplan Belgrads verursacht wurde. Ungeachtet dessen, daß der amerikanische Geheimdienst allseits für spektakuläre Pannen im falschen Augenblick bekannt ist, diesmal hat er sich - vom bösen Schicksal begünstigt - den kritischsten Zeitpunkt "ausgewählt", das unter den Umständen undankbarste Ziel anzugreifen.

Zu den ASEAN-Gründerstaaten hat China eine differenzierte Beziehung gehabt. Aus dem Zweiten Weltkrieg als asiatisch-pazifische "Supermacht" neben den Vereinigten Staaten hervorgegangen, hat sich China bald im Indochinakrieg verstrickt. In den asiatischen Küstenländern stand es logischerweise auf der Seite der Kommunisten. Diese waren auf die gewährte Hilfe angewiesen und verdankten den Sieg nicht zuletzt dieser Unterstützung. Dankbar zeigten sie sich nicht; China war schon damals als "landhungrige " Macht verschrien.

Von der Haltung der pazifischen ASEAN-Mitglieder war bereits die Rede. Die von Vietnamkrieg bedingten Aufregungen verursachten eine Lähmung,

bildeten eine Zäsur des außenpolitischen Kreislaufs. Nach 1975 wurde China als Realität hingenommen, und die ASEAN war bestrebt, sich mit Peking zu arrangieren. An einer Partnerschaft dachte man nicht und die Beziehungen sind eher sachlich und kühl.

China hatte aber nicht allein durch die kiregerischen Erfolge an Statur gewonnen. Durch die erwiesene Tüchtigkeit im ökonomischen Bereich, die zu einer Stabilisierung des gesellschaftlichen Gefüges und schrittweise zur Modernisierung wichtiger Branchen führte, sammelte es in den Augen der Nachbarstaaten Pluspunkte. Die Angst vor möglichen unliebsamen Einflußnahmen blieb freilich bestehen.

China wurde zwangsläufig zum bedeutenden Wirtschaftspartner. Die Interessen waren komplementär: Peking brauchte High-tech-Produkte und Blaupausen, die es in der Region preiswerter erweben konnte als beispielsweise in Amerika oder Europa und "die kleinen Tiger" waren begreiflicherweise nicht wählerisch hinsichtlich der Absatzmärkte. Die Handelsbilanz wies eine steigende Tendenz und erreichte ahnsehnliche Niveaus. China hatte selbstverständlich auf das altangestamte Kriegsgebaren verzichtet und klare Kooperationsabsichten signalisiert. So kam es oft zu überraschenden Abschlüssen, die von mal zu mal rekordverdächtiger wurden.

Selbstverständlich hatte die von Teng Xiao-ping in den siebziger Jahren gestartete Aktion gegen die maoistischen Dogmen auch nach außen hin viel zur Entkrampfung der Beziehungen beigetragen. China nutzte den Tatbestand, daß es jetzt als wichtiger Wirtschaftspartner auftreten konnte und bot sich gewissermaßen als mögliche Alternative zu Amerika an. Der Erfolg seiner Binnenwirtschaft wurde zum Aushängeschield. Die Zuwachsraten ließen

sich tatsächlich spüren und auch die Qualität der Produkte hatte sich soweit verbessert, daß es auf die asiatischen Märkten Abnehmer fand. In manchen ASEAN-Staaten konnten auch die auf dem legendär gewordenen etwa 200 km breiten Küstenstreifen entlang des Chinesischen Meeres, zwischen Peking und Hainan, erzielten Fortschritte als Modell und Ansporn wirken. Die Zahl der ASEAN-Besucher in Guangzhou - jetzt auch in Hong-Kong (Kowloon) - oder Fouzhou, und zwar nicht nur Industriespione, sondern zunehmend auch Partnersucher, wuchs ständig. Freilich auch die negativen Folgeerscheinungen des phantastischen und zügellosen Wachstums hätten, aufmerksam beobachtet, als Warnung dienen können. Dem war aber anscheinend im allgemeinen nicht so. Auch im südostasiatisch-pazifischen Raum gibt es Beispiele von Überhitzung, mit entsprechenden Konsequenzen.

Und noch auf einem anderen Gebiet konnten Besucher Erfahrungen sammeln, die ihnen zu Hause nützlich hätten sein sollen. Auf die Rassenprobleme in jenen ASEAN-Staaten, die größere Chinesengruppen beherbergen, haben wir bereits hingewiesen. Die brutale Unterdrückung der "Auslands-chinesen" hat niemandem gedient. In China erfahren die Besucher, daß es Ähnliches geschiet.

Es besteht, vom Ausland weitgehend unbemerkt, auch in China ein ethnisches Problem. 50 Jahre wurde das, obwohl von den Regierungen außerhalb bekannt, so gut wie vollkommen ignoriert. Über Xinjiang (Sinkiang), eine Provinz an der Grenze von Tadschikistan und Kirgisikstan, in der, neben Kirgisen und Tadschiken auch Mongolen und Uiguren leben, die trotz Anstrengungen Pekings sich nicht haben assimilieren lassen, weiß bis heute, außer einige wenige China-Experten, fast niemand bescheid; und kaum einer - am wenigsten die Regierungen - kümmert sich

effektiv darum. Der Gegensatz zwischen diesen Minderheiten und der Mehrheit der in die Provinz eingeschleusten Han-Chinesen, die von Peking angestiftet werden, verschärft sich zusehens. Für die ASEAN-Staaten wäre es von Vorteil, die "Szene" ernsthaft zu beobachten. Sie könnten Lehre ziehen, wie man dieses Problem nicht zu erledigen hat. Bisher scheinen die ASEAN-Regierungen sich darüber keine Gedanken gemacht zu haben.

Das Menschenrechteproblem ist im südostasiatisch-pazifischen Raum auf Sparflamme gehalten worden, findet aber neuerdings bei manchen Medien Beachtung. Dies geht hauptsächlich auf die Amerikaner zurück, die sich gern seit der "Virginia Declaration of Rights" von 12. Dezember 1776 weltweit als Vorkämpfer für Freiheit, Gleichheit und Gerechtigkeit gerieren; andererseits meldet sich bei ihnen immer wieder auch der schnöde Mammon zu Wort. Von den Wählern und den Medien gedrängt sehen sich sowohl der Kongreß als auch der Präsident - insbesondere nach den Eindrücken, die sie 1998 beim Lewinski-Spektakel auf die Wählerschaft erweckt haben - gezwungen, verlorenen Boden durch ökonomische Erfolge gutzumachen. Die etwas vernachlässigte ASEAN rückt folgerichtig näher im Wahrnehmungsfeld der Finanz- und Wirtschaftspolitiker, das gleiche gilt aber auch für die Konkurrenz, wobei China kramphaft versucht, in die Phalanx der Wirtschaftsgiganten mit seinen immer noch beträchtlichen Handikaps vorzurücken.

Washington fühlt sich selbstverständlich herausgefordert und reagiert heftig. Außenministerin Madeleine Albright stattete erst Anfang März 1999 Peking ein Besuch ab und hielt in einer Hand einen Palmenzweig, in der anderen ein Stilett, wobei letzteres ein eher zur Routineausstattung gehörendes Zubehör der Amerikaner ist: am 2. März fordete sie stereotyp von ihren Gastgebern,

Staatspräsident Jiang Zhemin und Ministerpräsident Zhu Ronji auf, die Menschenrechte zu respektieren und die verurteilten Menschenrechtler aus den Gefängnissen zu entlassen. Vor allem in zeitlicher Nähe zum Jahrestag des am 4. Juni 1989 erfolgten Massakers von Freiheitskämpfern auf dem Tien-anmen-Platz werden vom Regime wochenlang profilaktisch hunderte von Oppositionellen in Haft gehalten.

Zum "Palmenzweig" gehört wiederum "Eingemachtes". Die USA wollen den Waren- und Technologieaustausch nicht allein mit der ASEAN-Region, sondern auch mit China selber steigern. Vor wenigen Jahren, noch undenkbar: die amerikanische Außenministerin versprach den Chinesen, sich für die Aufnahme ihres Staates in die *World Trade Organization* einzusetzen. Sie erklärte dabei, der Beitritt Chinas würde "ein großartiger Schritt zur Integration in die Weltwirtschaft" bedeuten. Erklären läßt sich diese Geste wenn man genau in den statistischen Katalogen blättert. Diesen ist zu entnehmen, daß das Handelsdeffizit Chinas seit Jahren wächst, wobei die Kluft insbesondere gegenüber den Vereinigten Staaten tiefer wird. Albright hatte es offensichtlich eilig, zur Klimaverbesserung in den Beziehungen zu Peking eine Übereinstimmung zu erreichen. Für April war der Besuch Zhu Ronjis in Washington angesagt und dieser als Vorstufe des Besuchs Jiang Zhemnins gedacht. Nun ist alles im Eimer. Der "Belgradvorfall" verursachte mindestens eine zeitweilige Verzögerung des Sich-Nahekommens. Vor allem dieser Vorfall verschaffte Peking bei künftigen Verhandlungen mit Washington Trümpfe: die "rechthaberische", auf Menschenrechte fixierte USA hatte durch die Tötung von chinesischen Bürger die Menschenrechte verletzt.

"Internationale Politik" (Bonn) veröffentlichte Ende 1998 einen

erleuchtenden Grundsatzartikel zum Thema "Verlierer Japan - Gewinner China Außenpolitische Konsequenz der Asienkrise" (Oktober 1998, S. 45-52). Die Autoren, Heribert Dieter, Universität Duisburg, und Richard Hight, Universität Warwick, vertreten die Ansicht, daß sowohl China, als auch Japan, selbstverständlich jedes Land für sich, bestrebt sind, den Pazifikraum unter dem Slogan "Asien den Asiaten" unter sich zu teilen. Die beiden Autoren meinen, Japan sei - zumindest derzeit - *der große Verlierer der Asienkrise* (wir fügen hinzu: auch der Hauptauslöser). China wiederum sei vergleichsweise *ein Hort der Stabilität inmitten einer turbulenten Region*. Tatsächlich scheint es, daß Japan seit Monaten damit beschäftigt ist, sich Wunden zu lecken. Diese Einschätzung dürfte aber nicht ganz der Realität entsprechen; Japan versucht tatsächlich, überraschend oft erfolglos, sein Boot zum rettenden Ufer zu führen; und was China anbelangt, so haben wir bereits auf etliche seiner Fehlleistungen und Fehlentwicklungen hingewiesen. Die ASEAN-Staaten können jedenfalls Vorteile aus den Problemen der beiden Großen ziehen. Manche scheinen tatsächlich davon Profit zu schlagen; und obwohl viele von ihnen direkte Opfer Japans im Krieg waren, dürfte doch Nippon am längeren Hebel stehen. China wird noch lange brauchen, um das ausgefeilte technische Niveau Japans auch nur annähernd zu erreichen. Und Japan ist von hegemonialen Ambitionen geheilt, also ein bequemer Handelspartner. Andererseits machen sich die potenziellen Wirtschaftspartner doch einige Sorgen. Beunruhigend sind insbesondere die meist unerklärlichen Pendelschläge an den Finanzmärkten: ungeachtet des rapiden Verfalls des Euro

seit seiner Einführung, signalisieren dien Medien ausgerechnet im nicht unmittelbar betroffenen Japan Ängste. Die *Süddeutsche Zeitung* vom 12./13. Januar 1999 wagte die Prognose: "Ein starker Euro schwächt den Yen". Ähnliches konnte man auch in der *Financial Times* und in *Le Monde* lesen.

Japan war über Jahrzehnte das Zugpferd der ökonomischen Entwicklung in diesem Teil der Welt. Es diente mit seinem schwindelerregenden technologischen Fortschritt und dem formidablen Wachstum zugleich als nachahmenswertes Modell und angesichts der stetigen Verwebung mit den Volkswirtschaften der ASEAN-Staaten, als Lokomotive. Allerdings, die japanische Wirtschaftskrise war der Zündfaktor für eine nahezu globale Krise: Folgekrisen waren bekanntlich die südameikanische, die europäische und die Rußlandkrise, wobei diese Erdteile sich gegenseitig kontaminierten, bzw. die Kettenreaktion mitverantworteten.

Selbstverständlich gingen einige dieser Krisen auf hausgemachte Fehler zurück. Hinsichtlich der südostasiatisch-pazifischen Region sprechen die Zahlen eine besonders deutliche Sprache. Noch zu Beginn der "Asienkrise" Anfang 1998 lag der Anteil Japans am Außenhandel der Region höher als jener der EU und der NAFTA zusammengenommen. In wenigen Monaten sank es in den Keller. Diese plötzlichen und *prima facie* nicht zu rechtfertigenden Schwankungen, die lange Zeit als stabil geltende Währungen und Finanzzentren nahe an den Abgrund brachten, haben letztendlich neben den Branchen auch die Politiker auf den Plan gerufen.

Fazit

Auf dem Gipfelteffen von Januar 1999 in Davos , an dem auch diesmal die Spitzenvertreter der Finanzwelt und der

Wirtschaft sowie viele markante Politiker sich pflichtbewußt zum Stelldichein meldeten, klang mehr Kritik als Lob und

mehr Besorgnis als Hoffnung über den Gang der Dinge. Fast alle hatten das Gefühl, daß die Krise die Weltökonomie dicht an den Abgrund gebracht hatte. *The Economist* (30th-5th February 1999) schrieb von einem *narrow escape* und forderte: "something must be done to make the global financial system safer, particularly for emerging economies". ("Global Finance. Time for Redesign?", S. 4).

Auch nahmhafte Persönlichkeiten meldeten sich zu Wort. Präsident Bill Clinton forderte, man solle die internationale Finanzarchitektur den Erfordernissen des 21. Jahrhunderts anpassen; Tony Blair wünscht sich eine Neuauflage von Bretton Woods und der weltbekannteste Finanzpapst, der Superwächter der Amerikanischen Zentralbank, Alan Greenspan, will "the patchwork of arrangements governing global finance" von Grund auf revidieren. Die Ansicht unter Fachleuten scheint Fuß gefaßt zu haben, man solle die bisherige Praxis, bei grundlegenden Erscheinungen viele Träger oder Experten heranzuziehen, *ad acta* legen. Wen du ein Haus bauen lassen willst, beauftragst du einen Architekten und überläßt diesen, die jeweiligen Fachleute mit ihren speziellen Aufgaben zu betrauen. Um Wirrwar und Verspätungen zu vermeiden, muß die Hierarchie und Arbeitsteilung klar sein. Dieses Prinzip wurde mißachtet, als es darum ging die Finanzen weltweit zu organisieren. Jeder Berufene und Unberufene konnte seinen "Senf dazugeben".

Ein sehr guter Kenner der asiatischen Szene war drei Jahre zuvor zu einem nuancierteren, vielleicht, was die gegenwärtigen Gegebenheiten und Möglichkeiten anbelangt, auch realistischeren Schluß gelangt. Er meinte in seiner im August 1996 erschienenen Analyse, daß die Stabilität im nordpazifischen Raum *"in large measure on both the willingness and ability of the four Asian powers to cooperate among themselves"* abhängt. Und er fügte hinzu: "... future stability will most likely continue to be built upon foundations provided by several key bilateral alliances" (Ralph A. Cossa: *"The Major Powers in Northeast Asian Security"*, Institute for National Strategic Studies/National Defence University, Washington D.C., august 1996). Sicher befaßt sich diese Analyse hauptsächlich mit der sicherheitspolitischen und strategischen Ebene; bekanntlich umfaßt diese auch multiple wirtschaftspolitische Elemente. Also doch eine angesichts der gegenwärtigen Tatbestände und ungeachtet des gewollten Globalisierungspostulat nicht zu umgehende pluralistische Entscheidung? Die historischen Abläufe verlaufen in unserer Epoche in Zeitraffer. So wird es nicht lange dauern, bis wir erfahren, welche Ansicht die zutreffende war. Vielleicht keine von beiden?

(Technische Mitarbeit: Roxana Vasile)

GEOPOLITICAL SCALES OF PRESTIGE IN THE FORMER COMMUNIST WORLD: CENTRAL EUROPE, EASTERN EUROPE, THE BALKANS.
The Case of Romania and Moldova[*]

Valentin MANDACHE,

I recall a small incident a few years ago, while I was working in an international company in London. A Canadian colleague came to me with a document in Russian and asked to translate its content. My reply was that I don't speak that language and apologised for not being able to help; at which he reacted saying: "but you are a Romanian, an East European and must speak Russian!" My reaction was one characteristic to most Romanians confronted with that sort of situation, feeling somehow offended and embarrassed, and trying to explain that my language is a neo-Latin idiom, much closer to English than Russian. This was of no avail for my Canadian colleague who left profoundly unhappy, grumbling about the incomprehensible and non-useful Babel of languages from the Balkans, such as Romanian. In his mind, on one hand, it was probably quite clear the notion of Eastern Europe as a Russian culturally and politically dominated area, just as the West is dominated by the United States and the English language. On the other hand, for me, at that time, as a person freshly arrived in England from the then freshly post-communist Romania, through ethnicity I am ultimately a descendant of the colonists of Rome in Dacia and speaker of a Latin language, something similar with a Frenchman or Spaniard, in other words belonging through my roots to the West, the geopolitical area[1] of highest prestige of our times. This was wishful thinking and obviously, after experiences like the one cited here I had to review my attitude and even pass through some sort of crises of "geopolitical identity." Ultimately, encounters and experiences like mine can be multiplied practically many times to encompass the Romanians and Moldovians confronted with similar situations, and give

an image of the national identity associated with the perception of those countries' geopolitical position.

In fact this "geopolitical identity" crisis is a problem of national identification after the fall of the European communist state-system. Ever since the foundation of the Soviet empire, the Russian communists and their followers claimed that the most prestigious and worthy of following system was the one run by Moscow, ascribing in a self-assuring manner, to Russia the locus of geopolitical prestige. Winning convincingly the Cold War, the nations of Western Europe once again assumed exclusively this attribute and it is natural for the members of other nations located within the great European peninsula to look for ties and traditions which would bring them closer and ultimately among this exclusively and prestigiously perceived group.

The polities[2] located within the geopolitical area of Western Europe were the first to develop, in a process dating back in the Middle Ages, a sense of nationhood among their peoples, culminated two centuries ago with the formation of nation states within this area. Liah Greenfeld traces the first modern nation in England at the beginning of the sixteenth century, during the Tudor reforms.[3] Then the term *nation*, until then designating only the aristocracy, has been extended for the first time to encompass an entire people.[4] This gave a strong sense of pride and community to the English people in belonging to a metagroup called "nation" as only the aristocrats were known before, therefore this new status of membership being seen as prestigious and elite like quality. This type of identification of an entire people living within the confines of a state, became, in a complex social process, a common feature to the Atlantic coast polities, area which today is understood as quintessentially Western Europe. From here

it spread in the form of national movements aspiring to achieve the West's standards and prestige to the rest of Europe and the world.

The process of expansion of these ideas and ideals, from West to East, with the nation perceived as a prestigious, elite like community, aptly to stand on equal terms with the nations of Western Europe, is described by Ernest Gellner in his model of *"time zones of nationalism,"*[5] where the political principle of nationalism is represented by what he calls 'the marriage between state and culture,'[6] in effect a political identification at the mass level on common cultural terms of the population of the given state. According to Gellner, within Europe one can distinguish four time zones of nationalism, running on a North-South direction (in a fashion similar with the geographical hourly time zones), starting with the West European Atlantic coast polities as the time zone 1 of nationalism, followed by the zone 2 consisting of Italy and Germany. These two polities were able to establish themselves as nation-states successfully encompassing the already existent Italian and German high cultures, at a later date than the zone 1. Next in line are the time zone 3 and 4 of nationalism, which include Romania and Moldova, zones represented by the geopolitical area of Eastern Europe. The imperative of the national movements in those two last time zones, ever since their initiation in the early decades of the 19th century, was to achieve the prestige status and standard of the time zone 1 of nation-states, by closely emulating zone 2 (where Germany and Italy were perceived as equals to France and Britain from the zone 1) through processes like unification, creation of elaborated high cultures and looking for a glorious past. Essential in the zone 3 and 4 of nationalism is the virtual absence not only of the state encompassing a high culture, but of the high culture as well.

When in the zone 2 the German and Italian high cultures were already in place, but lacking a political roof, in the zone 3 and 4 neither of these existed. They had to be both created by the political and intellectual elite animating the national movements in Eastern Europe. Obviously this evolution required an impressive amount of social engineering in order to achieve a homogenous national identity perception, typical of the zone 1 and 2. This in many cases was and sometimes is still expressed on the ground by a high degree of brutality (such as the ethnic cleansing or physical extermination of entire communities to attain ethnic homogeneity.)

Gellner's model of time zones of nationalism certainly helps understand the peculiar situation of the nations in Eastern Europe and their quest for a higher place on the scale of geopolitical prestige. In this area, the process of development into nation-states was further complicated and delayed by their incorporation within the Soviet empire for a period of five decades for the zone 3 nations and more than seven decades for most of the zone 4 nations. The Soviet empire and its ideology acted as a sort of refrigerator for the national movements, slowing them down considerably. Moreover, the Marxist-Leninist ideology propagated by the Soviet Union had a contrasting different ethos and objectives from the national ideology, facts which contributed to the situation that these states were considered by the Western public, including the supposed experts on the area, the so-called "sovietologists," in terms of their communist, rather than national identity. With the miserable failure of Marxism and Soviet empire's shameful collapse, it became a matter of honour for the nations of this area not to be perceived in the old fashion as belonging to the Eastern Block, which would associate them with the dubious and certainly un-prestigious former Soviet geopolitical area

of domination. It became an imperative necessity to look for even invent a new geopolitical position for the concerned nation, which would bring it as close as possible to the nations of the West, now again the locus of prestige, and triumphant winners of the Cold War.

This process is reflected in an unstable perception, gliding up and down on a *scale of geopolitical prestige*, where at its top, the more prestigious nations are the ones demonstrating historical and cultural closeness to the West, conveniently categorised as "Central European" and at the bottom of the scale "the remote Balkans" how sometimes the Western media calls them. The differentiation was made less difficult by the divergent evolution of these nations in the last decade, where it became clear that the new locus of shame and barbarity in Europe is the Balkans, illustrated by the killing fields of the former Yugoslavia.

The term Central Europe became included into the mainstream political language, dislodging for the first time the one of Eastern Europe, only in the early 1990s. Until then, during the communist period, it was vehiculated only by some dissident writers, especially in Czechoslovakia[7] and Hungary. Now, it began to be widely used among the Western diplomatic circles and increasingly among the Western public. The countries perceived as belonging to this "good," more prestigious area, closely related to the West are now widely acknowledged as Czechia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and in the last few years Slovenia, a country which had to overcome the outcast of its former membership in Yugoslavia and now guards very jealously its hard won and immensely more prestigious geopolitical status of "Central European nation."[8] At the bottom of the geopolitical prestige scale, from which Slovenia has just fled, is the Balkans,

perceived as a troublesome area, doted with conflicts and age old animosities among many peoples and factions, rendering it, for some of the observers in the West, not even worthy of being included in Europe as a geopolitical unit, endowed with a very low prestige. In this regard, now ten years after the events of 1989, the Western public, media and politicians routinely categorise on the one hand Albania, Serbia or Bulgaria as Balkan, and on the other hand Czechia, Hungary or Poland as Central European. Much confusion, reflected in the Western media and even among the so-called specialist academic literature, is generated by the question of assigning to Romania and Moldova a definitive geopolitical position.[9] This stems primarily from the lack of knowledge in the West about these two polities, where Romania with its large population and territory (the third country in Eastern Europe after Ukraine and Poland) is a polity with cultural and political traditions which can be called both Balkan (especially if one takes into account that Wallachia and Moldova were for four centuries within the Ottoman world) or Central European (when taking into account that Transylvania, the largest Romanian province, has been historically linked with the Kingdom of Saint Stephen and the Habsburgs). In case of contemporary Republic of Moldova, some observers perceive it as "former Soviet" or former Russian imperial province, closely linked with the world of Russia, others ambiguously put it as "East European," with a small minority considering it Balkan. Probably the formula of compromise which can mitigate these confusing categorisations is the name of "South Eastern Europe," a somehow neutrally perceived geopolitical locus, which has the advantage of including Greece and Turkey, economically the most developed nations of the area, with Turkey among the most powerful military European nations, and Greece belonging to

the exclusive and prestige giving club of European Union, thus attenuating the damaging perception of the other countries within South Eastern Europe as Balkan. One can observe further geopolitical delimitation in the former Soviet republics, such as "Scandinavian" for Estonia or "Caucasus" for Georgia and Armenia. Nevertheless, the most familiar term, now eight years since the collapse of the Soviet empire is still the "former Soviet republics."

However one of the most relevant criterion of delimitation between the main geopolitical areas under discussion, such as Central Europe, Balkans/ South Eastern Europe, the former Soviet republics and Eastern Europe is the degree of influence by the former empires which dominated these areas. Central Europe is generally acknowledged as the area formerly dominated by the Habsburg empire and the Balkans by the Ottomans. Also one classic definition of Eastern Europe as a geopolitical entity is centred on the influence of the surrounding empires, that is *the area of European peninsula where, over the last two centuries the peoples inhabiting it have been a part of at least one of the four European overland empires, that is the Ottoman, Russian/Soviet, Habsburg or Prussian/German, and where the contemporary dominant state language is neither Turkish, Russian nor German.*[10] From this definition, the situation of Eastern Europe as a dispersed periphery of the European overland empires is obvious. Linked with the point of view of geopolitical prestige, is very unflattering to be considered a former imperial peripheral polity at the edge of the great empires. Thus, it makes more sense for the patriotic minded public of the respective nations to look and even invent closer ties with the locus of prestige in the West, using their former association with the empires which dominated them until recently. This is done

by translating these empires in prestige terms, where the Habsburg and to some extent the Prussian one enjoy a prime place, with the Russian/Soviet one benefiting of a much lower prestige, the least prestige ascribed to the Ottoman empire. The scale of prestige on which these empires are compared is not a novelty. One started practically since the principle of nationalism became prevalent in politics by the mid 19th century, and this perception, among the Western public, of the European overland empires in terms of prestige is still cultivated through contemporary textbooks of history and politics and it is certainly an important ingredient of the geopolitical prestige or shame ascribed to the many polities of the former communist world.

For an East European nation having belonged to or having links with the Habsburg empire is becoming a pedigree now, this empire being seen as the embodiment of western civilisation in the area. Thus Central Europe and the Habsburg empires are the good places to be associated with at this particular time. On the opposite side there is the Balkan area, dominated by the Ottomans for five centuries, an empire alien in many aspects to the Western norms of life, still seen throughout Europe in a stereotypical arrogant manner of racial and cultural supremacy. The nations situated within this geopolitical area have to make a great effort to be regarded even as half-European by the western public.

The geopolitical scale of prestige is further complicated in the area of former Russian tsarist and Soviet domination, such as Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova.[11] Important segments of these nations still look at Russia as the prestige locus, the West only recently outdoing the perception of prestige drawn from association with the Russian imperial polity. Therefore these countries have two gravitation centres, the pull toward a particular one depending on the orientation of who has the political power. For example in Moldova the former agrarian government looked to Russia as the supreme prestige place, aiming to forge even closer ties with it; the next and actual government formed by a more nationally minded coalition, looks at the West as the embodiment of prestige worthy of attaining.

For Romania, a country larger than most of the usual East European polities, the precise place of the locus of geopolitical prestige is even more uncertain, because of extremely different regional identifications within the country, facts reflected in the confusion of the Western public in clearly placing Romania within a specific geopolitical area. This is directly linked with the nation's particular geopolitical position as a former *triple junction point of empires:*[12] the Habsburg, Russian and Ottoman empires come to the fore in the territory of actual Romania. This situation is crucial when thinking of a suitable geopolitical position for the country as Central European, Balkan or better South East European. An added complication is the general uniform self-perception of the ethnic Romanians as Western people through their descendancy from the colonists of the Roman empire in Dacia and their neo-Latin language. In a way the language puts them firmly in the West, but geography and cultural traditions somewhere between Central Europe and the Balkans.

The geopolitical position perception and its manipulation to attain prestige is more facile for the territorially small polities and also with a sufficient degree of ethnic homogeneity and I gave here the example of Slovenia conforming to these parameters, successfully escaping from the category of Balkan country to that of Central European. The same is largely true for the small polities bestowed with a lesser degree of ethnic homogeneity, but possessing a national ideology very closely

resembling the ideology of the Atlantic coast polities, namely Protestantism. I see here the typical the case of Estonia and to some extent of Latvia. Both of them have large segments of Russian populations, which seem contented to be associated which a more prestigiously perceived political roof in the shape of these nation states.[13] Why is that not the case with Moldova which is comparable in size with the two Baltic states and having a larger proportion of the titular nationality (64 percents) than is the situation in Estonia and Latvia? Added to that aspect, Moldova has a secessionist region inhabited by a majority of Russian speakers, a fact arousing the question why does Estonia not face a similar situation in the Narva region? The answers lie in the identification and aspirations of the Russian speakers, who are the colonial settlers of the Russian and Soviet empire. Being categorised as Scandinavian, implies automatically identification with the West and also with the prestige features of that locus. Therefore many Russian settlers in the Baltic region are keenly seeking to integrate within their new mother countries. But, with Moldova? What is Moldova for them? Their usual perception is that of a small country which benefited heavily from the Russian influence and civilisation and who is now so ungrateful to the people which "civilised" and rescued it from the Ottoman "inferior" culture and domination. This perception is probably most vivid in the minds of the Russian settlers in Transnistria, which renders an obvious analogy with the situation of Northern Ireland. In Transnistria, the Russian speakers are not necessarily Russian ethnics, but in fact colonists which took the culture and language of the metropolis as their own, as is the case with the Protestans of Northern Ireland, ethnically being mostly of Irish and Scottish stock. As the Northern Ireland Protestants, committed to unity and

glory of a long faded imperial Great Britain and convinced of the superiority of Protestantism, the Transnistrian Russians feel very committed to the ideology of a Great Russia (in the shape of either imperial Russia or the Soviet Union) and pan-Slavism. The notorious Protestant parades, generating huge discontent among the Catholic population, such as Apprentice Boys or Orangemen's marches, are equalled in Transnistria by the Soviet style parades and military paraphernalia. The celebration of the Battle of Boyne in Ulster finds an equivalent in Transnistria with the anniversary of the victory over the Moldavians/ Romanians in the 1992 war, etc. The essence of the problem is that just as the Ulster Protestans consider the Irish Catholics inferior,[14] the Russians of Transnistria do not consider the Romanians of Moldova a nation worthy or prestigious enough to associate with, on the contrary, such a fact would be a demotion from their status as an imperial nation with a civilising mission in these lands. The situation is hugely different in Estonia and Latvia, precisely because the Russians identify these nations as more prestigious and worthy to live under their political and administrative umbrella.

If Moldova's oscillating orientation toward two geopolitical prestige loci embodied by Russia and the West, is heavily influenced by the situation in Transnistria and the colour of the parties in the government, its neighbour, Romania presents a very different picture of this problem.

Romania has a certain degree of ethnic homogeneity, but because of its large territory, this is not a viable feature in some regions where the minorities tend to concentrate. In this regard the province of Transylvania is a truly multiethnic region, having a population of about seven million people (5 million Romanians, 2 million minorities- mostly Hungarians, and an

important number of Gypsies, together with smaller minorities) distributed over a surface of about 100,000 square kilometres.[15] On the other hand, the province where the capital is situated, Wallachia, is the region dominating politically the rest of the country, having also been under Ottoman domination for four centuries, which makes it a true Balkan region. The Romanian Moldova, the smallest province (though larger than a country like Slovakia) has been influenced in a slightly smaller degree by the Ottomans than Wallachia, a gap which was filled up by influences mostly from the Russian empire, but also in the North from the Habsburgs. This renders Moldova as less Balkan and with more common points with next door Republic of Moldova or even Ukraine. These three particular ways of geopolitical identification is not a convenient situation to clearly and definitively establish the geopolitical perception of the country.

Extending the identification of Transylvania as Central European to the rest of Romania can be considered a valid claim, giving the nation more prestige, next to the nations of the West. Added to this argument can be the traditional orientation of the Wallachian and Moldavian elite towards, France, imaged as the supreme prestige locus. Many of them speak French as the second language and see France as the most desirable partner of Romania. In a way this situation is inherited from the pre-war period when this was probably the case, but contemporary France is a very different place now, having other foreign policy objectives and with much less financial power to maintain expensive clients such as the old style Wallachian and Moldavian elite.[16] Contrasting with the elite attitude is that of the mass of the people. Recently during the Kosovo war, in Wallachia there was a widespread discontent with the West's intervention, many of the people there voicing loudly their support for the

Serbs, participating in pro-Serbian and anti-Western demonstrations. They claimed that the Serbs are Orthodox brothers and practically similar to the Romanians, except the language. This sort of attitude renders Romania as a true Balkan nation, which is deeply resented by the elite, but acknowledged by the people living in the South, the core of modern Romania, an area of former Ottoman domination.

Yet the difficulty faced by Romania and the Republic of Moldova in carving a geopolitical prestigious position, close to the West, lies in the real fact that is not entirely an unnecessary exercise. The new architecture of Europe requires identification with the West and its values. There is truth in it, precisely embodied by the definition of Eastern Europe as a multiple periphery of the four European overland empires. The difference between the political traditions inherited from these three empires, such as Western Christianity in the Habsburg area, which on the ground makes a clear separation between church, and state, or the Orthodoxy and Islam in the Russian and Ottoman areas, with their legacy of integration of the state and church are very opposed to political traditions indeed. The real problem and danger now is the eventual employment of these characteristics by the West in the politics of exclusion, perceiving Central Europe as a poor, but viable relation, with the Balkans (or, said in a "politically correct" manner, South Eastern Europe), as dangerous aliens, who have to be kept at a long distance and taught lessons of good behaviour.

A worrying development in this respect is the enthusiastic taking over of these attitudes by the ones called now "Central Europeans" as a way to highlight their unfortunate fate under the communist oppression and also to castigate the Balkans as an evil region with which they were forcibly associated during the communist period.

In this complex geopolitical equation of identity and prestige, Romania and Moldova face a very difficult situation. A certain remedy would be the wisdom gained by the Western public from the unhappy past experiences of exclusions in Europe on the basis of cultural background, race or mere geography as compared to the current trend of integration within the European Union. But this is not enough. The main effort for integration, which ultimately means Westernization, has to be done by these two nations alone, this time at the mass level and not only by the elite, basing their claims of Western orientation and traditions, in the new geopolitical regrouping of the East European polities, on concrete actions rather than mere rhetoric as it is the case now ten years after the fall of communism.

NOTES

[1] I understand by *geopolitical area* a large grouping of states exhibiting a series of definite common historical and political characteristics, where geography is an important factor conditioning this commonality. In this regard within the European peninsula, one can distinguish a series of clearly established geopolitical areas, such as Western Europe which comprises mainly the Atlantic coast states, Southern Europe encompassing states within the Mediterranean basin or Northern Europe including the countries of the Baltic and North Sea basins.

[2] The term *polity* in Ch. Tilly's conception, is *'the set of relations among agents of the state and all major political actors within the delimited territory'*. Tilly, Charles, 1997. *How Empires End. In After Empire: Multiethic Societies and Nations - Building. The Societe Union and the Russian, Otoman and Habsburg Empires, ed. Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen. Boulder Colorado* and Oxford UK: Westview Press., p.7.) In comparison with this rather cumbersome definition, a contemporary British dictionary gives a similar and certainly clearer one, which states that a polity represents *'an organised society; a state as a political entity'* (*The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles*, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1933, entry for 'polity').
A state is usually endowed with sovereignty and a clearly delimited border, which until the recent past was not a feature for many of the East European polities. Also many of them do not have a tradition of statehood, such is the case of Moldova or Ukraine, before 1991, also Romania before 1859, in comparison with Poland or Hungary, and therefore the term polity characterises them better as political entities, with changing boundaries, before and after gaining state sovereignty.

[3] Greenfeld, Lich, 1992, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernnity*, Cambridge Massachusetts and London England: Harvard University Press, p. 6.

[4] During the Middle Ages, the term nation described only the aristocratic class. For example in the fifteenth century Europe there was a Hungarian and Polish nation, which meant strictly the aristocracy of those kingdoms and did not include the other social strata (peasants, craftsmen or traders, who in fact were the overwhelming majority of the population).

[5] .Gellner Ernest, 1997, *Nationalism* ..., London Weidenfelf Nicholson, pp. 50-58.

[6] Gellner Ernest, 1997, *Nationalism* ..., p. 50.

[7] Kundera Milan, 1984. *The Tragedy of Central Europe*. The New York, Review of Books, 26 aprilie.

[8] For example, Slovenia at the time of first wave of NATO expansion has been narrowly excluded, being put together with Romania as the best placed contenders for the next expansion wave. Interestingly, this apparent lack of chance to join the Western military alliance, was blamed by many of the high Slovenian officials and local media not on their deficiencies for such an undertaking, but on Romania, namely because they were lumped up with this Balkan country, allegedly not worthy of standing up next to the civilised Central European Slovenia. Therefore the country suffered a fatal loss of image which was reflected into NATO's rejection for membership in the first wave.

[9] Referring to this confusion, one can encounter amusing situations in many Western universities where Moldova is in the curriculum for Russian studies, other universities including it within the Balkan studies. Romania sometimes is Balkan in some courses and others put as Central European. On the street, for example, at the big academic bookshops in Britain someone looking for books on Romania has to check both Central European and Balkan sections in order to not miss entirely the few works produced on this country.

[10] Definition given in Gellner Ernest, 1997, *Nationalism* ..., p. 4. The nation-states encompassed by the geopolitical area of Eastern Europe defined in this way are at the time of writing this article, as follow: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaidjan, Belarus, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine and Yugoslavia.

[11] These countries are within the Zone 4 of nationalism as were described Gellner Ernest, 1997, *Nationalism* ..., pp. 50-58.

[12] See Greenfeld, Lich, 1992, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernnity*.

[13] Traditionally, even during the Soviet occupation in the Baltic republics, the Russian speaking settlers were seen by the locals (who were mostly of Protestant cultural background), as a sort of semi-white immigrants, in very derogatory terms. Today, when these nations have re-asserted their sovereignty, it seems that this kind of perception was taken seriously by the Russian settlers, who now seem more than willing to acquire the citizenship of Estonia and Latvia and therefore being categorised in more prestigious terms as "Scandinavians," rather than seeking autonomy or secession as is happening in Moldova's Transnistria region.

[14] To illustrate this affirmation, in Victorian England and Scotland, the usual perception of the Irish was so degrading, that one could often hear statements that the Irishmen were the missing link between the Homo Sapiens and Neanderthals, practically being considered a bit more evolved than the apes. This is very similar with how the Russian settlers see the peasants of Moldova. They call them *mamlizhniki*, "maize eaters," naturally backward, stupid, of corrupt nature, with a propensity to steal. The Russian commander of the Ukrainian front during the occupation of Iasi in 1944, had this to say about the Romanians in general: '... they are not a nation, but a profession!' referring to the alleged corruption and stealing habits of the Romanians Kundera Milan, 1984. *The Tragedy of Central Europe* , p. 108).

[15] Perhaps it is interesting to compare here the size of this Romanian province with the next door practically ethnic homogeneous Hungary, which is only about 90,000 square kilometres.

[16] It is interesting to note how this residual orientation towards France, very manifest now after the fall of communism, of the Bucharest based elite is reflected in Romania's membership of the Organisation of the Francophone Countries. This is an organism that groups a large mosaic of countries, from Canada to Vietnam, the only requirement for membership being a loose connection with French culture. It does not have any real political or economic vein, not being comparable even with the British Commonwealth, and it is mainly an operetta stage for French pretentions of cultural and political greatness. Despite all of these facts, the Romanian elite (in large proportion based in the South, in Bucharest) takes it very seriously, at the expense of other more important facts of foreign policy.

THE ARMED INTERVENTION IN CHECHNYA

G. SCUTARU

Since December 1994 until August 1996, the Russian armed forces were involved by the political leadership into the most tragic adventure after Afghanistan. Three years after the conclusion of the Treaty of Hasaviurt, signed by General Alexandr Lebed and the present Chechen President Aslan Mashadov, which has legalized the cessation of the combats between federal troops and Chechen separatists, the Russian army goes again into military operations in the Caucasian region, first in Daghestan and now in Chechnya.

The intervention of the federal troops is oficially motivated by "the destruction of the bases held there by the islamist terorists". Three years ago, the armed intervention was justified by the need to restore the "constitutional order". No matter what the reason is now, the war which is going on in the Caucasian zone has a high stake, from the geopolitical point of view, as well as concerning Russia's prestige as a military force, as a country with integrative pretensions in the ex-soviet space. Not to speak about the effect a new defeat would have on the results of the presidential elections, which are supposed to mark the ending of the Yeltsin age in July 2000.

The Chechen problem has concerned the Russian leadership since the last years of the Soviet Union, President Boris Yeltsin having too few available forces to react to the establishing, by a coup d'etat, of the General Dudayev's regime. He succeeded in a short period of time of time to liquidate any form of political opposition and to get away from the unional center and then from the federal power. The unique measure adopted by Yeltsin was the establishment of the state of emergency on the whole territory of the Chechnya, in November 1991. Some years later, in 1996, the Russian leader explained that that decree could not be put into operation on account of the lack of interest manifested by the majority of the members of the Supreme Soviet towards that problem and through the hesitation of Mihail Gorbachev, who, in his position as President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Commander in Chief of Armed Forces, did not order the troops of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs or of the Ministry of Defense to neutralize the Dudayev's Group[1]. Then, President Yeltsin acknowledged that the rebellious general profited from the conflict between the center and the outlying regions (USSR - Russia), this fact creating him the possibility to establish shortly his own system of government.

In 1991-1992, Dudayev's formations took possession of great amounts of armaments and combat equipments formerly belonging to the federal military

units. The retreat of the troops was chaotic, the soldiers preferring to disappear from a hostile territory as soon as possible, without thinking into whose hands the armament stores could fall. For example, only in a single day, in February 1992, from the Army's depots vanished 1050 sub-machine guns, 186 military vehicles and 46 tons of ammunition[2]. President Yeltsin tried subsequently to find an excuse for the way the retreating plan from Chechnya was prepared, stating that everything happened so quickly "to avoid bloodshed among the Russian military on the Chechen terrritory"[3].

In the period before the Russian intervention in 1994, there were many attempts to make a compromise with Dudayev so that Chechnya would remain a part of the Russian Federation, in exchange for a greater autonomy, much like that obtained by the Tatarstan Republic. The Chechen problem was often on the agenda in Kremlin in that period, the Russian President letting know in his speech to the Parliament, in February 1994, that the base for the settlement of the relations between Moscow and Grozny must be the organization of free and democratic elections and the negotiations for settling the status of the Chechen Republic within the Russian Federation[4]. Many delegations belonging to the Legislative Body, Government and Presidency tried to meet the salutary half-way with Dudayev. Even the Defense Minister Pavel Grachev had several discussions with the rebellious general, hoping for a moment that a political solution is possible.

At the same time and parallel with the official emissaries, Moscow also sent into the region experts of the secret services, trying to overthrow by force the Dudayev regime with the help of Chechen internal opposition. In June and September 1994, bloody combats took place between the troops loyal to General Dudayev and groups of the opposition, subsidized and armed by the federal center. In those months, military officers from the secret services were going from one military unit to another to find volunteers ready to take part in special operations in Chechnya. When the actions of neutralization of Dudayev ended by failure, all the state institutions vehemently denied that between the POWs taken on those days there were Russian soldiers. The Army stared with stupefaction how the officials from the Government and Ministry of Defense stated that the Russian soldiers seized by Dudayev were "merely deserters". The failure of the secret operations was not interpreted in Moscow as a warning to be taken into account, the commanding body of the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Internal Affairs and secret services trying to persuade President Boris Yeltsin that only a direct and massive military intervention could bring Chechnya back into the Russian Federation.

Russian Defense Minister, General Pavel Grachev, had then presented President Yeltsin a plan of operations for the liquidation of the rebellious formations in the shortest time. The document stated precisely that the *blitzkrieg* had to take only 12-17 days, and, at the end of the last stage, "the military situation should become stable, the armed forces being replaced by the troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs"[5]. For the plan to be easily approved by the political leadership, the General Staff assigned completely unreal time limits for the deployment of the units and the carrying on of the military operations. All the concentration of the forces had been done in seven days, and the next two stages, the military operations, strictly speaking, having to take the same time. Within three days, a part of the federal forces were obliged to march to Grozny and to encircle the town, and another part of them to raise a blockade along the borders of the Chechen Republic, to prevent the Chechen fighters

from retreating in the neighbouring zones. Within the next four days, the Grozny town had to be cleared of rebellious formations. Such a plan seemed to be absolutely credible to a non-authorized person and particularly fascinated by the myth of the Russian Army power. In this trap had fallen President Boris Yeltsin himself, the Supreme Commander, who acknowledged later that he was deceived by the expectations of a short war, without heavy casualties: "we thought they were merely Chechen persons, but they proved to be bandits".

That triumphalistic vision cost the life of thousands of soldiers and gave the Russia tens of thousands of disabled soldiers. A month after the beginning of the military operations, there appeared in press the first descriptions of the real state of preparation of the troops and of the causes of the major failures in that stage of the war. A report sent to the General Staff showed that only a few soldiers could properly use the fighting equipment, the sergeants were not ready to replace the eventually fallen officers, the military had poor knowledge and experience in disguising on the theatre or in urban fighting. Moreover, the military officers were given inadequate maps, or not given maps at all, for the guidance during the combat[6].

The leadership of the Ministry of Defense, when they analysed the beginning of the operations, wanted to declare that those military actions were minutely prepared, for the failures being to blame the commanders of some units which were decimated during the repeated assaults carried out on the Grozny town. "Another cause was the poor psychological preparation of the troops. Not all soldiers could orientate themselves rapidly and have confidence in their forces", stated an analysing document elaborated by the leadership of the Ministry of Defense[7]. To

make a comparison with the official point of view, we can give a description of an assault operation on the Grozny town written down by a private from the Samara 81th Regiment, which had many casualties on that occasion> "Early in the morning we were given the order to move, a long column of armoured fighting vehicles. There was no radio contact with either the neighbours in the column or with those in command. We had no maps of the place. And, roughly speaking, we did not know where we were going to and what our mission was. Only when we saw the buildings, did we understand that we were in the town"[8].

The military equipment was insufficiently prepared to go into action, on an average, two out of ten tanks did not come to Grozny because of some technical shortcommings. There were even cases when columns of armoured vehicles stopped to advance because the fuel was diluted with water, the rest being stolen by the supplying teams[9]. Independent experts suggested that the casualties and losses of the federal forces could be much more heavier, if Dudayev attacked the columns in march and did not limit himself to defend the Chechen towns and villages.

To report the victory over the rebels, the troops attacked the Chechen capital, several times, in December 1994 - January 1995, the haviest casualties being scored in that period. According to the official data, there were about 2,000 soldiers and officers dead and more than 6,000 wounded[10].

Even if they succeeded to conquer the Grozny town and other Chechen localities, the Russian forces never controlled the whole territory of the republic. The mountain regions were used by the rebels as regrouping zones, and the Chechen villages and towns were full of guerrilla warriors which were hidden in the middle of the civilian population. The war was indeed a confrontation of the whole Chechen people

with Moscow, the federal troops having no chance to liquidate all the guerrilla bands.

In nearly two years of military actions, the Army has endured 2,837 dead, 13,270 wounded, 337 men being considered as missing and 432 were registered as POWs. Similar figures were also recorded in the Ministery of Internal Affairs, to the number of those fallen dead or wounded they had to add the specialists from the secret services. The reports of the Ministry of Defense acknowledge that the Chechen separatists sufferred fewer casualties than those of the federal ministries, approximately 15,000 dead and wounded[11].

The operations of re-establishing the constitutional order affected massively the civilian population. Nobody can give accurately the real numbers of the dead, the estimations coming near to the figure of 100 thousands. Heavy artillery cannonades, helicopter and aviation attacks distroyed villages and towns, tens of thousands of refugees left the republic under the fire of the federal troops. The refugees from Chechnya joined those from other conflict zones, which live in uncommonly severe conditions in the Caucasian space. It is very difficult to reconstitute the whole picture of the casualties suffered by the both fighting camps, as well as by the civilian population, because sometimes the military operations took place so quickly that nobody was concerned with numbering of the deceased. The Chechen guerrilla warriors stated that some of the Russian commanders ordered the cremation of the killed soldiers to report fewer casualties than the real ones[12].

Moscow succeeded to impose only a puppet government, under the leadership of Doku Zavgayev, an old activist of the Communist Party of the former Soviet Union and ex-member of the presidential administration. To give legitimacy to the pro-Russian Chechen Government, the federal center organized elections in this republic on 17 December 1995, Doku Zavgayev being the winner with an overwhelming majority. He was not able to create a strong opposition against the separatists, most of those working in the Chechen militia or in the different administrative structures deserted at the right moment to the rebels. On August, 6, 1996, when the Chechen formations re-conquered nearly the whole town of Grozny, in a single day Doku Zavgayev fled to Moscow, but he was immediately sent back to take part in organizing the defense. It was a vain measure, because within few hours the pro-Russian Government, so carefully maintained by Kremlin, disappeared. The last attempt of that unsuccessful *"politruk"* (politiceskii rukavaditel', that is political leader) was to sabotage the peace negotiations carried on in that period by General Alexandr Lebed with the Chief of the Chechen General Staff, Aslan Mashadov. Zavgayev was fully aware that he could not have a place in the future coalition government. At the end, after the parliamentary and presidential elections, in January-February 1997, in which only the separatist leaders, took part, Moscow had to recognize Mashadov as the new president of the republic, and Doku Zavgayev irrevocably disappeared from the scene, being given the position of Russian Federation's Ambassador in Tanzania, as a reward for the services done to Russia.

During the war, Yeltsin was gradually convinced that the military actions could not bring the initially expected success, a peaceful solution being preferable. The military and political leadership was, on the other hand, divided in two camps, the "war party" and the "peace party", each of them finding the necessary argumentation to persuade the Russian President to follow their plan and not the others' indications. For those reasons, President Yeltsin combined the both ways to settle the problems, without recording the desired

effects neither on the battle-front nor at the negociations.

On 27 May 1996, while a Chechen delegation, headed by the resistance leader Zelimhan Iandarbiyev, who succeeded after the death of Dzhokar Dudayev, arrived in Moscow to negociate, Boris Yeltsin made a "lightning" visit in a village near Grozny, to show that the President controls all the Russia's territory, Chechnya included. The visit was minutely prepared to give Yeltsin the most profits during the electoral campaign, before the presidential elections organized in that summer. The Chechen delegation had to accept a hostage role and to play into Yeltsin's hands, but the negotiations did not bring the peace desired by the whole population, tired to receive a long series of notices concerning the front casualties. For all contingencies, Kremlin approved some days before of a new massive attack over the Chechen positions in the village of Bamut, to gain a favourable position at the talks. The military action failed, but it cost the Army 23 dead and 57 wounded soldiers[13].

The appointment of General Alexandr Lebed as the Secretary of the Security Council opened a new stage in the negociating process. Lebed insisted on a political solution, especially that, as a result of the attack launched on 6 August 1996, the Chechen succeeded in re-conquering the Grozny town, the federal troops being in a catastrophic situation. The Russian Army was fighting in encirclements in different points of the town and had control only on the hights at the outskirts. Lebed succeeded to conclude with the Chechen leaders a cease fire agreement and, later on, he signed the first official document with Aslan Mashadov at Hasaviurt, in Daghestan. The accord was observed by the both camps and it laid the foundations of the future Treaty between Russia and Chechnya, concluded in May 1997 by President Boris Yeltsin and the new Chechen President Aslan

Mashadov. Some Russian high officials called the actions of General Lebed treachery and stated that he ignored the Russia's interests. Although, at the beginning, no one believed in the success of Lebed's mission in Chechnya, he succeeded to put an end to the war and to prepare the necessary conditions for the retreat of the Russian Army from that zone. Even if Lebed was then dismissed by Yeltsin from all the positions, Kremlin went on the road opened by the General and carried on the negociations for the treaty.

In November 1996, President Yeltsin signed the decree by which he ordered the retreat of all the military units from the territory of Chechnya until 27 January 1997. The evacuation calendar was observed, but for many military officers and soldiers the retreat meant the recognition of the defeat[14]. That reality was more obvious as the departure of the military columns was accompanied by the cheers of the Chechen people, which did not shrink from acclaiming the victory over the "occupation troops". At the psychological level, the military felt betrayed by the political class, which involved them in a conflict, without giving them the chance to win it. Many of the fighters in the Chechen war were no longer able to get accustomed to the civilian life. After the "Afghan syndrome", the Russian society had to face the "Chechen syndrome", but this time completely unprepared to meet and accept those sent to fight in a war felt as alien to them.

Russia takes too much for granted the victory in an armed conflict in Caucasian region, a very expensive war, despite the crisis which affected their national economy. Within nearly two years of war, the Russian Federal Army lost in Chechnya about 500 armored fighting vehicles, out of which 60 tanks, 8 helicopetrs and 5 planes, the sum of all military equipment distroyed run into 2 trillions of old roubles (approximately 334 millions US$)[15]. We

mention that this sum could cover the food needs of all the Russian Army during six months[16]. At the same time, the maintenance cost for the troops dislocated in Chechnya run into one trillion old roubles (167 trillion US$)[17]. These are official figures, but some Russian politicians expressed the view that he sums allocated for the military operations could be much more important.

The political and military leadership of the Russian Federation accepted to make use of huge sums from the budget to finance the war in the Caucasian region, while the military had to face very heavy problems on the social plan and in the process of military equipment modernization. To present a picture much closer to reality, we specify that in 1995, the year of the most extensive military operations in the Caucasian zone, the Russian Air Force received only 2 helicopters and 6 fighters, and three quarters of the tanks stock of the ground forces were technically and morally obsolete. In the same period, the strategic food stock of the Army was under 50% of the normal outfit. While the state spent considerable sums of money for the war, 126,000 of commissioned and non-commissioned officers were on the waiting lists for houses, because there was no money to build flats for the military[18]. Since the Russian legislation stipulates that a military officer can not be put in reserve without providing him a house, the process of reducing the armed forces has become more difficult due to the lack of money to implement the reform projects, money wasted in the Chechen conflict.

The Chechen war represented a real millstone for the fragile Russian economy, while, apart from the sums allotted to the Army, the Government permanently subsidized the pro-Russian political-administrative structures established in Grozny. Gradually, the conflict became a profitable business for many persons. Taking advantage of Boris Yeltsin's promises, who several times declared he would help Chechnya to eliminate in a short period of time the consequences of the war, pro-Russian Chechen high officials continually demanded money, many instalments having no legal basis. According to the official figures published by the Ministry of Finance, on 17 October 1995, the sum allocated run up to 5,618.5 thousands of millions old roubles[19]. A report of the Court of Accounts specifies however that there was no legal basis for 4,545.1 thousands of millions from the sum mentioned by the Ministry of Finance[20]. That money was distributed in Chechnya through the decisions of high officials from the Government, the Ministry of Finance acting on the basis of the instructions signed by those people. The establishing of the pro-Moscow regime of Doku Zavgayev obliged the Executive to make a supplementary effort. The Court of Accounts mentions that, in November-December 1995, 12,319 thousands of millions of old roubles were allocated without a legal framework. For the reconstruction of Chechnya, the federal center distributed, until the sumer of 1996, approximately 2.81 thousands of millions US$, without this being felt in the zone of conflict. The Chechen fighters stated that frequently the buildings not yet renovated were strafed, but the authorities from Grozny reported the destruction of some completely reconstructed buildings[21]. Many banks and companies from Moscow took advantage of the war by contracting profitable transactions, getting considerable commissions, but without completely observing the terms and obligations from the contracts. In the period after the war, the Chechen leaders had to face a large series of social and economic problems. Industrial units were destroyed, the unemployment was at its climax, the criminality reached

ROMANIA AND THE OSCE :
A COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP (I)

Mihail DOBRE

The recent Summit meeting of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, previously CSCE)[1], held in Istanbul on 18-19 November 1999, represented the occasion in which the Participating States in the pan-European forum accepted the offer of Romania to exercise the function of Chairman-in-Office in 2001.

It is, in fact, an event for the foreign policy of Romania, a great opportunity that is important to be used in the appropriate way for consolidating the international status of the restored Romanian democracy. But the relationship between Romania and the OSCE has not always been a smooth one. Therefore, it is worthwhile to have a brief overview on this cooperation, as well as on the substantive work of the organization, until the overthrow of the Communist regime in Romania in December 1989.

1. The CSCE has come to life in early 1970's following a long process of negotiations between the countries that had made up the two conflicting blocks of the Cold War. This process was aimed at laying the foundations of a pan-European system for security and cooperation, and intended to open the dialogue between the European states, the United States and Canada and conversely to lower the tensions between the Western/democratic and the Eastern/Communist countries.

The idea of organizing such a conference should be seen primarily within the constant search of the USSR to legitimate the territorial and political **status quo** that prevailed in Europe after the end of World War II, **a status quo** reflecting the Soviet political supremacy over the Central and Eastern European countries, that were also subordinated militarily to Moscow within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. It was with no surprise that the "green light" for a protracted "communiqué dialogue" between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty came out in July 1966 from the latter organization's Political Consultative Committee session in Bucharest, in a document ("the Declaration of Bucharest") that proposed a great number of measures for strengthening the peace and security in Europe, **inter alia** the idea of convening an European Conference on the matter[2].

On the other hand, the West had an interest, as well, in the launching of an European Conference on Security and Cooperation, but it was mainly concerned with the field of military and security issues and the humanitarian questions (moreover the free flow of individuals, information and ideas between the East and the West),

terrible heights, and the civilian population did not get used to the normal life in the conditions of a deep economic crisis.

The authorities did not succeed to enforce authority over the innumerable military commanders, who controlled armed groups and made their own policy. The famous commander Salman Raduyev, who performed, in 1996, the raid over the Kizlear locality, permanently threaten Moscow with new terrorist actions, without being put under arrest by the public prosecutor, although Mashadov had solemnly promised that he will not permit anybody to ignore the legal power decisions. Kidnappings continued to blossom regularly in Chechnya and the neighbouring republics, in the former conflict zone, growing a prosperous prisoniers trade. The commandos led by those for which the "holy war" continued, attacked the Russian military bases, and Aslan Mashadov did not succeed to find the culprits. Such events could only tension the Russia-Chechnya relations, the breaking out of a new conflict being taken into account by the both parts, despite the reassuring declarations made at Grozny and Moscow. They had the impression that President Mashadov did not have the control over the republic, Chechnya being more dominated by anarchy.

During the short time elapsed since the cease of the warfare, one of the priorities of the present Chechen leaders was the organization of armed structures, capable to face any possible foreign aggression. The Russian secret services have information according to which the Chechen military units seized Russian military technology, not yet having a serial production. The data from these services mention that in some zones of conflict they could see the BTR-80A armoured infantry vehicles, the last achievement of the Russian defense industry. That infantry carrier is produced in the secret enterprise

Arzamas-16, having only a very limited series. The Russian Federal Army has not yet this armoured vehicle in service, the single unit which possesses it being the Boris Yeltsin's Guard Regiment. They do not mention how that armoured vehicle was seized by the Chechen directly from the production chain of a Russian secret enterprise[22].

An important factor in starting the operation to re-establish the "constitutuional order" was Chechnya's geographical position on the oil transit lines from the Caspian Sea to Black Sea. Russia is in a close competition with the United States and Turkey in establishing the future ways for the oil and gas pipelines. The transit on the Russian territory of a great amount of oil from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan could bring the federal budget considerable sums in hard currency. The present Russian oil pipeline goes through Chechnya. That's just why, all the Russian-Chechen negociations concerned the warranted security of the oil transit on the pipeline sector possessed by Grozny. Moscow takes into consideration alternative directions to increase the transit capacity, but also to avoid the blackmail from the part of the Chechen concerning the taxes collected for the oil conveyed in transit on their territory. Chechen authorities are interested in the fact that a part of the Caspian oil goes through the republic's territory, because the oil distilleries were destroyed during the military operations, their reconstruction being very difficult owing to huge costs. Moreover, the extraction capacity is reduced, for example, during the 1980s amounting to 7.4 million tons a year, which represents only 1.5% from the total quantity digged out in the Russian Federation.

For Moscow, Chechnya has a great importance from the strategical point of view. Its separation from the Russian Federation may create a dangerous

precedent, which can be followed by the other republics with a majority of islamic population. For this reason, the Russian Federal Government allocates considerable sums to support financially those republics, which have a poor economy and consume more than they send to the budget.

The same reason obliged the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to adopt a trenchant position on the international scene to block even the most timid attempt to recognize the independence of Chechnya. Although for President Aslan Mashadov his republic is already independent, any member of the international community does not take the risk to deteriorate their relations with Moscow by recognizing the status desired by Grozny.

That circumstance explains the initial position of the West, which considered the Chechen war as an internal affair of the Russian Federation and reacted only from the human rights point of view, as a result of the pressure put by the world mass-media, which covered in detail the atrocities of this conflict. For many foreign politicians, Chechnya was first a geographical discovery, the ethnical problems in the Caucasian region being till now a subject of interest for a very restricted circle of specialists.

Moscow carefully watches the rise of the fundamentalist islamist movement, which could cover the regions with Moslem population between the Caspian and the Black Seas. The Russian analysts are concerned with Turkey's intentions to gain its own hegemony in the zone, making use of economic and cultural elements as means of influence over the Turkish people[23]. At the same time, the Russian military authorities are upset by the increasing of the Ankara's military power in the Black Sea's space, in the conditions of the diminishing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and of the general problems that affect the Russian armed forces during this transition period[24].

Such opinions are also shared by the representatives of the left and ultra-nationalistic opposition. Vladimir Jirinovski no more surprises anyone in Moscow with his statements about the Turkish danger at the south borders of Russia and the involvement of Anakara's secret services in supporting the Chechen rebels[25]. Professor Alexandr Dughin, close collaborator of the communist leader Ghenadi Ziuganov, spoke without reserve that "the connections of the separatist Chechnya with Daghestan and Ingushetiya must be cut at all costs, to break off their way to the Caspian Sea"[26]. Exploiting the divergencies between the different ethnical groups living in the Caspian zone is for Moscow a good measure to prevent the appearance of an independent islamic confederation, under the patronage of Chechnya. Such an opinion is also shared by Serghey Baburin, one of the leaders of the left parliamentary opposition[27].

It is however clear that whoever will be in Kremlin would not permit the detachement of Checnya, because such a thing could stir to similar moves other republics and regions of Russia. This kind of situation would be equivalent to the outburst of the Russian Federation and could have an issue identical with that of the period 1990-1991, when the Soviet republics separated from Moscow, and the Soviet Union ceased to exist.

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[1] *"Piat'deseat sem'voprosov izbiratelei Prezidentu Rossii"*, electoral item of President Boris Yeltsin, Moscow, 1996.
[2] *Pravda*, 2 December 1992.

[3] Boris Yeltsin, *loc cit.*

[4] Message (Speech) of President Yeltsin to the Parliament of Russian Federation in 1994.

[5] *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 2, March 1995.

[6] *Izvestia*, 28 January.

[7] *Itoghi*, Weekly, 9, July 1996.

[8; 9] *Rossiyskiye Voorujenniye Sili v Chechenskom Konflikte*, Moscow, 1995.

[10] Dispatch from ITAR-TASS Agency, 2, March 1995.

[11] *Itoghi,* Weekly, 24, september 1995.

[12; 21] Discussion with leaders of the Chechen guerrilla warriors, carried out in Grozny, in august 1996.

[13] *Ogoniok,* Weekly, 4, July 1996.

[14] *Kommersant,* Weekly, 3, December 1996.

[15; 17] Communiqué of the Ministry of Defense, 18, September 1996.

[16] Discussion with the deputy Gheorghy Argatov, vice-president of the Commision for Defense of the State Duma.

[18] *Segodnya*, 10, February 1996.

[19] Report of the Ministry of Finances to the State Duma, november 1996.

[20] *Itoghi*, Weekly, 21, mai 1996.

[22] *Nezavisimaya Voennoe Obozreniye*, no. 7, 1998.

[23] *Reformirovaniye Rosii – mify i realhost*. Moscow, Akademia Publishing House, 1994.

[24] *Voennaya Reforma – otsenka natsionalnoy bezopastnost*. Moscow, Obozrevatel Publishing House, 1998.

[25] From the press conferences of Vladimir Jirinovski, April-May-June 1996.

[26] Alexandr Dughin, *Osnovy gheopolitiki*. Moscow, Arktoghea Publishing House, 1997.

[27] More details in the Serghey Baburin's work *Territoriya Gosudarstva – Pravoviye i gheopoliticeskiye problemy*. Moscow, MGU Publishing House, 1997.

its proposals in the latter field raising protests from the Communist regimes, as the Warsaw Treaty states formally considered these humanitarian issues to belong to their States internal affairs[3].

After its successful start in August 1st, 1975, by the signature of the Helsinki Final Act (HFA)[4], the CSCE went well beyond the Soviet interest to obtain recognition for the European post-war **status quo**. The HFA was not in fact a compromise text between two ideologies, but a document that embodied liberal values, which were however expressed in a relatively ambiguous manner. This state of play has been suggested, more than in any other part of the HFA, in the "Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States", most well-known as the "Helsinki decalogue". If the Principle VII on the "respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief" is a Western type concept, with clear provisions both on the human aspects of the inter-state relations and the behaviour of states towards their citizens, the Soviet insistence on the inviolability of borders and territorial integrity of the Participating States found its acceptance in the Principles III and IV, without obtaining yet "neither the recognition of existing borders, nor the guarantee of their perenity"[5]. In fact, the "Decalogue" made unacceptable any border change through the violation of the principle on "refraining from the threat or use of force" and admitted, under Principle I on "sovereign equality, respect for rights inherent in sovereignty", that "frontiers can be changed in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement"[6].

Therefore, the CSCE did not limit itself to a **static** approach, that was supported by the USSR and its satellites, but it succeeded in keeping alive a **dynamic** agenda, with a predominant Western drive that advocated the need for peaceful

changes in Europe[7]. The changes resulted in the breakdown of the Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 and they have been stimulated and speeded up by the CSCE, which was able to contribute, through the quest for full observance of human rights, to undermine the apparent stability in Eastern Europe. The CSCE "aggravated the legitimate crisis of Eastern regimes, which had accepted Principle VII but were unwilling and unable to abide by it. At the same time it legitimized and stimulated the political opposition, which could now base its demands on international commitments signed by the governments. Last but not least Western criticism of human rights violations in CSCE increased the political costs of Eastern repression and afforded the opposition in these countries a certain amount of protection"[8].

2. The diplomacy of Communist Romania was very active in drafting the rules of procedure ("the Blue Book") for the preparations of the 1975 Helsinki Summit, with the proclaimed aim to ensure a democratic perspective for the CSCE process. The then leadership of Romania - having been placed in early 1970's at the peak of its postwar foreign policy prestige and still out of the international public eye for its negative background in the area of human rights observance - perceived the European security as a system of both precise commitments, freely accepted by all European states, and concrete measures for offering those states the full guarantee that they will be free from aggression, will develop in accordance with their own interests and will be in a position to cooperate on the basis of widely accepted principles of international law[9].

Against this background, the Romanian officials were successful in translating into the "Blue Book" some of the provisions they considered as essential

for a conference on European security be feasible. On the procedural aspects, one could note the rotation principle in chairing meetings, the participation in all debates of all European states on an equal-footing basis, irrespective of their position towards the politico-military alliances, and the need to leave on the conference's secretariat only the technical aspects of the pan-European forum. Last but not least, the Romanian representatives advocated for and obtained the agreement of all parties in order to have the consensus rule as the basic instrument in the decision making process of the CSCE.

As far as the substantive part of the conference was concerned, the Romanian Communist regime "fought" to have inside the "Helsinki decalogue" the principle on refraining from the threat or use of force (Principle II) immediately after the principle on sovereign equality of states (Principle I), with a precise definition and clear implementation measures, and supported the acceptance of the complementary principle on peaceful settlement of disputes. Some other initiatives, shared with other participating states – for instance, the launching of negotiations for the adoption of confidence and security building measures, or the setting up of a programme in the field of economic cooperation – found their place into the provisions of the HFA[10].

After 1975 Romania's attitude in CSCE affairs followed the path defined by the country's leadership behaviour in international relations. Until the time of the third CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna (1986-1989), the prestige of the Communist regime has constantly diminished, with the tendency to accelerate this negative trend in the second part of the 1980's, as the Cold War was coming to an end. Therefore, all along this time period the Romanian diplomacy found itself unprepared to keep the pace of change in European policy,

whilst its capacity to act in accordance with the national interest was even more reduced by the unrealistic profile of the political mandates, which were inspired by an outdated domestic decision making structure[11].

Moreover, any simple assessment of the type of proposals forwarded by the Romanian diplomacy in the CSCE framework, and especially in the occasion of the Vienna follow-up meeting, shows a clear emphasis on Basket One and Basket Two, and an obvious reluctance to meet at least some of the Western initiatives in the area of Basket Three on Human Dimension. In fact the then Romania undertook to approach the humanitarian issues from a "fundamental" point of view - which focused mainly on the rights to life, housing, employment, education etc., i.e. the economic, social and cultural rights - and to reject **ab initio** the "collateral aspects" promoted by the Western countries, which were intended mainly to support the civil and political rights of the individuals within the Participating States.

The Vienna follow-up meeting equated Romania with the country that obstructed the debates on issues like the right of citizens to contribute actively, individually or in association with others, to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the freedom of the individual believers to establish and maintain direct personal contacts and communication with each other, in their own and other countries, the right of persons belonging to national minorities to maintain and develop their culture in all its aspects and to preserve their historical and cultural monuments and objects, as well as the idea of a Human Dimension Mechanism for monitoring the implementation of CSCE commitments relevant for Basket Three. On the basis of this type of approach Romania has "succeeded" in mid-1988 to be identified as the country that virtually blocked the negotiations aimed at

finalizing the third CSCE follow-up meeting[12]. Being unable to understand that the HFA established a direct link between the respect for human rights and the strengthening of security and cooperation in Europe, the Romanian Communist regime positioned itself behind the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of Participating States and expressed reservations (and made an Interpretative Statement) with reference to the provisions of the Vienna Concluding Document related to civil and political rights. The outcome was in fact an increasing international isolation of Romania. The obstructive attitude remained unchanged until the very end of the Communist regime in December 1989 and significantly the last CSCE event prior to the fall of the Wall - the Sofia meeting on the protection of the environment, held on 16th October - 3rd November 1989 - could not reach consensus on a concluding document because Romania rejected the recommendations supported by all the other Participating States, the objection being a provision concerning the rights of environmental activists[13].

Basically, Communist Romania cooperated in the CSCE format by promoting the dialogue between the European states for the sake of making more democratic the international relations, and at the end found itself identified as the one country that neglected the progress of the CSCE states in the field of societal security.

The CSCE process entered a new phase of existence after the fall of the

Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. But the negative impact of the behaviour of Communist Romania on CSCE activities could not but leave deep traces in the collective mind of the European political and academic circles. Against this background, it is not surprising that one of the analysts of the 1980's CSCE has come to the conclusion that "the CSCE process as we have known ended with the fall of Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu in December 1989"[14].

3. It is already very well-known that the December 1989 Revolution drama-tically changed the entire Romanian society. The political attitude of Romania's new leadership has constantly been firmly guided by the democratic principles defining the rule of law, and has thus allowed the country to rejoin the family of European democracies. In this context, the January 1990 decision to withdraw the reservations expressed in connection with the Vienna Concluding Document has been only the first step undertaken by the democratic Romania in order to have the accurate image of its real international position and potential. Other steps have come in the decade that followed, and they have all contributed to the strengthening of the democratic record of Romania as a normal country, with a predictable and responsible behaviour in international affairs.

NOTES

[1] The initial name was "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe" (CSCE) and it was used in the period 1975-1994. The present name, OSCE, is in force since January 1st, 1995, as a result of a decision adopted by the Budapest Summit, 5-6 December 1994.

[2] Arie Bloed – "Two decades of the CSCE process: from confrontation to cooperation", in Arie Bloed (editor), *The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Analysis and Basic Documents, 1972-1993*, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993, pp. 4-5.

[3] *Ibidem*, p. 5; see also Andrzej Korbonski, "The Warsaw Treaty After Twenty-five Years: An Entangling Alliance or an Empty Shell?", in Robert Clawson and Lawrence Kaplan (eds.), *The Warsaw Pact: Political Purpose & Military Means*, (Washington), 1982, pp. 15-17.

[4] The Helsinki process had from the very beginning a comprehensive programme, that gave birth to the three main areas or "Baskets" of the CSCE: 1) questions relating to security in Europe (encompassing both the basic principles guiding relations between Participating States and a number of confidence-building measures); 2) cooperation in the fields of economics, science and technology, and the environment; 3) cooperation in humanitarian and other fields. The organizational "follow-up" of the CSCE was often referred to as the "Basket Four".

[5] Victor Yves Ghebali, "Les valeurs de la Grande Europe, produit du laboratoire politique de la CSCE", in *Relations Internationales*, 73, printemps 1993, pp. 63-64.

[6] See *Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Final Act*, Helsinki, 1975.

[7] V. Y. Ghebali, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

[8] Stefan Lehne, *The Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1986-1989. A Turning Point in East-West Relations*, Westview Press, Boulder, 1990, p. 185.

[9] Valentin Lipatti, *Conferinţa pentru Securitate şi Cooperare în Europa*, Editura politică, Bucureşti, 1985, passim.

[10] Idem, *In tranşeele Europei. Amintirile unui negociator*, Editura militară, Bucureşti, 1993, pp. 23-74.

[11] *Ibidem*, pp. 171-196.

[12] Stefan Lehne, *op. cit.*, pp. 150-173. With reference to the mentioned provision on national minorities, the author assessed that its relevance "is underlined by its inclusion on Romania's list of unacceptable commitments" (p. 168).

[13] Arie Bloed, *op. cit.*, p. 84; Stefan Lehne, *op. cit.*, pp. 187-188.

[14] Stefan Lehne, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

BOOK REVIEW

Constantin HLIHOR: ISTORIE ŞI GEOPOLITICĂ ÎN EUROPA SECOLULUI XX - *Consideraţii teoretice şi metodologice (Geschichte und Geopolitik in das Europa des XX. Jahrhundert - Theoretische und Methodologische Erwägungen)*, Editura Academiei de Înalte Studii Militare, Bukarest, 1999, 209 S. 13 Skizzen.

Westliche Experten in Sachen geopolitische Strategie, die mit den wissenschaftlichen Leistungen und Erkennisse osteuropäischer Kollegen wenig vertraut sind, dürften über die formalen ebenso wie inhaltlichen Qualitäten der vorliegenden Arbeit erstaunt sein; vermutet man doch „im Westen" vielfalls, dass das vom Kommunismus verursachte „tabula rasa" in wirtschaftlicher Hinsicht auch das Denkvermögen und die Urteilskraft der Menschen „im Osten" beeinträchtigt haben könnte. Gegenteilige Beispiele gäbe es freilich in Hülle und Fülle, bloß liebgewonnene Vorbehalte und Stereotypen lassen sich schwer überwinden, zumal die von den Medien und vermeintlichen Kennern ein fachheitshalber gerne, in Schüben, verbreitet werden. So kommt es leider allzu oft vor, dasa eine vortreffliche Leistung, wie das vorliegende, unter den Tisch fällt, zumal es noch nicht in mehreren gängigen Sprachen übersetzt wurde. Dem sollte schleunigst nachgegangen werden.

Dabei ist der Verffasser im kleinen aber feinen Kreis der echten Sachkenner durch seinen zahlreichen einschlägigen Arbeiten über geostrategische Themen bekannt und auch als Professor an der Akademie für Hohe Militärstudien zu Bukarest ist er oft auf internationalen Veranstaltungen im In - und Ausland durch bemerkenswerte Untersuschungen und Diskussionsbeiträge nachhaltig aufgefallen. Hlihor ist darüber hinaus Mitherausgeber, Mitautor und Spiritus Hektor von zwei renomierten Fachmagazinen, „Strategie XXI" und „Euro-Atlantic-Studies", letzteres mit Beiträgen in westlichen Sprachen. Das erste ist eine Publikation der oben angeführten Militätakademie, das zweite ist von der Universität Bukarest ediert. Beide haben viel Anerkennung in Expertenkreisen gewonnen.

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Hlihor gehr in seiner vorliegenden eingehenden Untersuchung davon aus, dass das Ende der geostrategischen Bipolarität infolge der in der UdSSR erfolgten Implosion zu Beginn der neunziger Jahre wohl oder übel dem „Weltkommunismus" den Garaus (vielleicht blos vorübergehend - u.A.) gemacht hat, wodurch sich eine multipolare Landschaft teils untereinander zerstrittener oder rivalisierender möchte-gern-hegemonialer Mächte herausgebildet hat, die wiederum neue Unsicherheitsfaktoren beinhaltet. Man sei gegenwärtig mit einem Konglomerat von schwer zu lenkender Großmächte mittleren Zuschnitts konfrontierf, welches unter anderen dabei ist, die atomare Patsituation des „Kalten Krieges" durch unberechenbares „Säbelrasseln" zu ersätzen, das im allgemeinen schwer zu kontrollieren ist. Ein Unsicherheitsfaktor erster „Güte" ist und bleibt China, das von einer erstaunlichen Eigendynamik getrieben ist und derzeit nicht mehr von Moskau in Zaun gehalten wird. Un schließlich wirkt sich auch die mögliche Destabilisierung der ASEAN-Region durch die scheinbar fortschreitende Auflösung Indonesiens negativ auf die Asienszene aus: Lauter sich neu formierende Ungleich-gewichte, die offensichtlich nichts Gutes verheißen.

Der Vorsatz des Verfassers, den vorkommenden „Mutationen" innerhalb der neuen, noch nicht stabilisierten Kräftekonstellationen auf Weltebene auf die Spur zu kommen, führte zu manchen denkenswerten Ergebnissen und sie offenbarten zugleich neue, originelle Denkansätze metodischer Art, welche die gewohnten Paradigmen sprengen, zumindest jedoch zur Diskussion stellen. Hlibor gelang es eine gewisse Ordnung in den unterschiedlichen Forschungsansätzen und erzielten Werten der bekanntesten geopolitischen, sehr widersprüchlichen Richtungen, zu bringen, die zwar alle um die Erkenntnis roeieren, daß die Geopolitik eng mit der Hegemonieforschung verbunden ist, hedoch zu den untersch edlichsten Solüssen gelangen. Er verstand es, die bislang verwendeten, liebgewonnenen Paradigmen unter sorgfältiger Abwägung ihrer Vor - und Nachteile unter einen Nenner zu bringen und eigene, wohldurchdachte und - so meine ich - angemessene Schlüsse zu ziehen. Der Vorzug des vorliegenden Bandes ist nicht zuletzt die überzeugende Einordnung der bestehenden Forschungskriterien - und Methoden nach ihrer Brauchbarkein bei der Analyse der Istzustände und laufenden Entwicklungen unter vorsichtiger und genauen Brücksichtigung der historischen „Er-blasten" und Tendenzen.

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Dieses Buch ist in allen Teilen klar und ungeachtet der komplizierten un komplexen Materie leicht lesbar. Sie öffnet für die Geopolitik neue Wege und erleichtert zugleich dem Leser die Aufgabe, sich selber aus dem sich laufend veränderten politischen Geschehen eine richtige Meinung zu machen. Schade blos, daß es bislang keine Übersetzungen in den gängigen Weltsprachen gibt, ein Manko dem hoffentlich recht bald ein Ende gesetzt wird. Der Kreis der potentiel Interessenten ist sehr groß: als Leser kommen in Frage neben den Historikern und Politikwissenschaftlern Medienleute, Hochschullehrer, Politiker usw. Das Buch würde sich auch in Privatbibliotheken von Zeitgenossengutmachen, die Wert darauf legen, Entwicklungen auf Weltebene leichter zu verfolgen und Ereignissen die richtige Deutung zu geben.

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Prof. univ. dr. Dionisie Ghermani

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INCOMPATIBLE ALLIES NEOREALISM AND SMALL STATE ALLIANCE BEHAVIOR IN WARTIME - *Larry L. Watts*

Larry L. Watts' work "Incompatible Allies: Neorealism and Small State Alliance Behaviour in Wartime" is an important study situated at the border between geopolitics an history, that approaches the complex subject of small state alliance behaviour during World War II, proceeding from the analysis of relations between Hungary, Romania and Finland on the one hand and Germany on the other hand.

Using key concepts, such as neorealism, behaviour within alliances, war, small states, incompatibility and dependency, World War II, the Eastern Campaign, Germany, Hungary, Romania, Finland, the author focuses his attention on the analysis of decisions and policies adopted by those states perceived to be great powers - states having or assuming to have the capacity to change the balance of power, the ratio of forces within alliances - and on the analysis of motives which induce small states to ally with those great powers.

The central hypothesis of the study is the fact that, in general, the motive of joining an alliance by a state affects the nature of its policy within the alliance, in other words it affects the behaviour of that state within the alliance. Considering that neorealism (in its classical form) - the predominant theory of the international politics in the last 25 years - does not offer the expected answer regarding the small states' behaviour within alliances, Larry L. Watts intends to reinterpret and redimension this theory using the analysis of the behaviour of Romania, Finland and Hungary within their alliance with Germany.

Larry L. Watts defines the circumstances that make an alliance possible and presents the basic tendencies of the evolution of the states composing this alliance.

The author substantiates his study on three paradigms: Kenneth Waltz's balance of power, Stephen Walt's balance of threat and Randall Schweller's balance of interest. The work presents the compatibility/incompatibility degree related to short/long term goals between the three small states - Romania, Hungary and Finland (establishing their motivations for joining the alliance), and between each of them and the great power - Germany. Considering neorealism as methodologically definitive, when analyzing the alliances, Larry L. Watts proposes a new view and demonstrates that the relation regarding compatibility between small states in the ratio of forces within the alliance is reverse to that one between the alliance and the great powers, because the small states have a remarkable ability to defend their own interests and policies within the alliance, often succeeding in imposing their points of view.

The author believes that small states' evolution within the alliance has distinct phases: the moment and causes of joining the alliance, their behaviour within the alliance under the pressure of the great powers, and their ability to defend and pursue their own interests.

In order to ilustrate the first phase, Larry L. Watts uses the case study method and presents the historical context in which alliances between Hungary, Romania, Finland and Germany appeared as a consequence of their existent or non-existent cooperation relations between these states. Thus, if the relation between Hungary and Germany was favoured-supported by the existence of a tradition in their foreign relations as far back as in 1918, in Romania's or Finland's relation with Germany, the participation in the alliance was perceived as being rather a necessity to stop the Soviet's offensive and to recover their territories invaded and annexed by the Soviet forces at the beginning of the war. But once the territories had been regained and USSR pushed back to their own borders, these states were able to reestimate their position within the alliance.

The proper phase of states' evolution within an alliance is analyzed through a case study too, either by presenting the forms of Germany's, as a great intervention power, in the internal and foreign policies of each member state of the alliance, by the agency of the existent structure in these states, or by creating radical military organizations with the purpose of imposing their own policies and objectives within the alliance. At the same time the author analyzes the symmetry of the military and economic (financial, agricultural, and in mineral resources) effort made within the alliance by each of the three states (Hungary, Romania, Finland) at wartime, in comparison with the degree of attaining or non-attaining the alliance's short-term and long-term objectives, as well as the extent to which each of these states succeeded or failed in achieving the objectives for which they joined the alliance.

The author noticed, when referring to similarity, the continuity in the internal and foreign policy of the three states during 1920-1941. He comes to the conclusions that while Hungary's situation is characterized by continuity in its political regime, system of government and foreign policy, and Finland is characterized by continuity in its political regime and system of government, and by discontinuity in its foreign policy, Romania is characterized by discontinuity in all three aspects.

Though Hungary, Finland and Romania have different political systems and traditions, there are similarities between them as well. Thus, Hungary and Romania have the same characteristics in terms of imperfect democracies with dictatorial governments. In terms of stability and continuity in foreign policy, Hungary and Finland have the strongest similarities, maintaining the same type of regime and government during both the inter-war period and the Eastern Campaign. On the other side, Romania experienced a series of radical regimes and changes of leaders during both the period before war and shortly before the Eastern Campaign. Of all three states, only Hungary showed continuity in its foreign and cooperation and security policy, extending itself further as it planned as far back as the inter-war period. Both in Finland and Romania, the dramatic changes in foreign and cooperation and security policy occurred after USSR had attacked them.

In terms of compatibility within the alliance, we can consider that Hungary had the highest degree in this respect, because it had been politically allied with Germany and Axis Powers since 1933, the formal political alliance having been set up in 1939. Neither Finland nor Romania concluded such an alliance before 1940, but they did it in 1940 - Romania, and only in 1941 - Finland.

As regards security and cooperation, Hungary began its cooperation and security policy with Germany in the early 1918's, giving to the latter an important support after Hitler's rise in 1933-1934. But the military alliance and cooperation began in 1938.

Finland began its military cooperation a little earlier than Romania, in the spring of 1940, but in fact the military alliance with Germany was formed by the two states only in the autumn of 1940, both of them having as objective stopping the Soviets' advance.

In all cases, due to the compatibility between Germany and Hungary, established under the ratio of forces and the objective of their foreign and security policy, Hungary joined the alliance earlier than Romania and Finland, and therefore it had a privileged position. Romania and Finland, having diametrically opposed objectives to those of Germany, succeeded with more difficulty to impose themselves within the alliance. It can be said that Hungary, having the highest degree of compatibility with Germany, had more opportunities to pursue its own objectives in its foreign and internal policy than Finland and Romania.

Emphasizing the concepts of compatibility and incompatibility, Larry L. Watts' study is intended to be a pertinent analysis of the behaviour of small states (Hungary, Finland and Romania) within alliances, at wartime, with a great power (Germany).

Constantin Hlihor
Adriana Valentina Pitic-Tran

The Archives of Totalitarianism

Nowadays Romania is applying for membership in the European Union and a succesful adhesion became for it a guarantee to prosperity and security. Essential to this activity are the economic statistics, the various political strategies, the assimilation of the European legislation, the emergence of the civil society. Without denying the primacy of these criteria, we believe that an eventual adhesion should also mean a better mutual understanding and during this difficult process the historian should play a significant part. The historians from both Western and Eastern Europe must fulfil the task of recovering and evaluating the history of Eastern Europe as a part of the European civilization.

We subscribe to this effort by introducing to the western specialized public an well-known Romanian review: *The Archives of Totalitarianism*, review which managed to avoid the trap of political partisanship and of vulgarizing popularization.

The review began its work in 1993 as part of the activity of the National Institute for the Study of Totalitarianism (N.I.S.T.) and since then it was an efficient presence in the Romanian academic world by the twenty numbers published and bynumerous volumes of documents edited by now.

The Archives of Totalitarianism is aiming, as Mrs. Radu Ciuceanu, its director, said, at a "restitutio in integrum" of the tragic life of postwar Romania[1]. Its main target is represented by the tackling of both right and left extremism through bringing in the field of research new documents and unpublished testimonies, through formulating new study themes[2]. Obviously, N.I.S.T. will insist on the study of the communist era, another target being the "creation of a documentary museum of the bolshevik holocaust in Romania"[3]. Studying the numbers already published we could notice the primacy of a few themes (the communization of Romania, the "systemic" repression, the anticommunist resistance, the communist propaganda, aspects less known from the history of the Iron Guard) and the presence of some articles which analyse the totalitarian phenomenon from sociological and politological points of view. The review is overlapping on a huge historiographical gap which covers almost the entire communist era and especially the institutional, economic, social and cultural history. This situation was noticed by Octavian Roske who emphasised the lack of a profound institutional analysis, even in the case of the "Securitate"[4]. Given this lack of synthesis materials the review intends to identify and publish, if possible, diverse direct sources and to create a data base using different research tools such as microbiographies, a dictionary of laws and institutions, review of books published in Romania and abroad[5].

To illustrate those mentioned above we shall present[5] one of the last numbers of "The Archives of Totalitarianism" (no. 1(18)/1998)). We shall select the articles we believe to be more representative.

Alesandru Dutu: The Disorganization of the Romanian Army by the Allied Control Commission (Soviet) during the first Postwar Years.

The article underlines the importance of the Romanian Army as an opposition center during the process communization. Without an independent army the Romanian Government couldn't hope to counterbalance the Soviet actions and that is why the Soviets did their best to subordinate the army they fought with for more than three years. The demobilization of the Romanian Army was made simultaneously with an increase in the Soviet military presence and with the communization of the Romanian military elite.

Constantin Buchet: The National Churches and the Process of Communization in Eastern Europe (1944-1947).

The author emphasises the violent interference between the communist "social engineering" and the theological dogmas which determined the tough opposition to the Soviet - imposed policies towards religion. The author tries to prove the existence of a strong opposition coming from the Orthodox Church (at the individual and institutional level) and he asserts the opinion that the Church remained the core of the civil society during the "chilhood of Communism".

Gheorghe Onisoru: National Liberal Party-Bratianu during the Firts Postwar Years (1944-1947).

Mrs. Onisoru describes the eclipse years of the greatest Romanian political party. The decline was caused, according to his opinion, by the hostile political environment, by the inadequacy of the political formulas which could not counterbalance the communist propaganda, by the lack of unity of the liberal force and also by the weak penetration in the rural world.

Dan Catanus: America at the Time of Communist Subversion (1945-1954)[6].

The article tries to identify the main events and trends which took the American society from postwar euphoria to Mccarthyism. Scandals connected to the Soviet espionage, the loss of China and finally, the Korean War brought the tension to a climax. The author believes that the terror of a global conflict offered the best environment for the violent Mccarthyism which could give simple answers to highly complex questions. Dan Catanus also analyses the social background of Mccarthyism, the official attitudes, the totalitarian temptation of the movement and the role of Eisenhower in finding a new equilibrium for the American society of the cold war.

Oliver Velescu: The Ideology of Urban Reorganization (1944-1972).

The author stresses the ideological background of townplanning reorganization. The socialist town had to be completely different from its capitalist equivalent and according to the new theories of "socialist townplanning" everything old had to be destroyed. This reconstruction had to be based on the Soviet experience which considered the town as a place for "quartering the labor force". The article also emphasize the importance of the block of flats which was the right answer for two problems: how to solve the problems of an increasing urban population and how to increase and facilitate the degree of control which the state had upon the people.

The Archives of Totalitarianism has become during the last six years an essential tool for those interested in Romania of the XXth century. Its numerous study themes and the diverse methods of approaching these themes has made it indispensable.

Alin Matei

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[1] Radu Ciuceanu: *N.I.S.T* ... "A Materialized Project", in *The Archives of Totalitarianism*, no. 1/1993, p. 8.

[2] *Ibidem*, p. 9.

[3] *Ibidem*, p. 10.

[4] O. Roske: "The Anxiety of Reading", in *idem*, p. 12-13.

[5] *Ibidem*, p. 15.

[6] The article has two parts: *The Archives of Totalitarianism*, no. 1(18)/1998, pp. 45-58 and *idem*, no. 2-3 (19-20)/1998, pp. 56-71.

THE MILITARY HISTORY REVIEW – A LANDMARK IN THE ROMANIAN MILITARY HISTORIOGRAPHY

Created 16 years ago, "The Military History Review" (R.I.M.), initially appeared as "The Romanian Military History Review – The Fight of the Entire People", a supplement to the "Military Life" review. Its aim was to publish studies and articles based on the military doctrine of the period, which evoked "the struggle of previous generations for unity, freedom and independence, the bravery of our army of every single person living on these lands for defending the material and spiritual civilisation set up here along centuries and millenia".

Even if at that time it had sought to "constantly guide itself by the principle according to which the value of any historical scientific work is the objective, true, real presentation of facts and events", the proposed wish was difficult to accomplish under the pressure of the existent political factor, mainly the cult of personality.

Still, in the pages of the review one could find sound, lasting studies on the autochtony and anteriority of our nation on these lands, as compared to various allogenous ethnical groups; the continuity and stability of our forefathers in their everlasting hearth; their constant struggle to preserve their national being and the territory they were born on. The combativity in analysing and cristicising the distorsions, denigrations, omissions, exaggerations, even the fakes refering to the history of Romania, from the ancient age to the 20th century, was really remarkable. The articles and studies were signed by notable personalities of the Romanian historiography, such as: academicians Emil Condurachi, Alexandru Rosetti and tefan Pascu; historians Florin Constantiniu, Dumitru Berciu, Şerban Rădulescu-Zoner, Paul Cernovodeanu, tefan Gorovei, Gheorghe Platon, Mihai Maxim, Camil Mure[an, Liviu Maior, Mircea Popa, Ioan Scurtu, Valeriu Fl. Dobrinescu, Constantin Botoran and so on; as well as by well-known military historians Vasile Mocanu, Vasile Alexandrescu, Gh. Romanescu, Constantin Toderaşcu, Mihail E. Ionescu, Ioan Talpeş, Constantin Căzănişteanu, Nicolae Ciobanu, Alesandru Du]u, Mircea Dogaru, Costică Prodan, Mihai Retegan, Dumitru Preda, Ilie Schipor, Ştefan Pâslaru, Sergiu Iosipescu, Adrian Pandea, Maria Georgescu, Dorina N. Rusu etc.

After 1989, the publication changed its name to "The Military History Review", with a periodicity of six issues a year, in Romanian. The editorial staff has also succeeded in editing three issues in English. The last ten years have been extremely fruitful and we have never gone astray from our commitment assumed in the article-programme "To the Reader", published in the first issue of the new series: "To write and read clearly, calmly and reasonably, professionally but without passion, revenge, inertia, abuse or obstacles and obstructions, without fearing the Truth, even if that meant to make some people uncomfortable".

On the battlefield of the post-revolution "Brownian movement", of resettling and re-arrangement, but also of reversed values, of unleashed political passion, of distrust and suspicion, The Military History Review has the merit of having gathered and maintained around it a core of politically unbiased collaborators, both military and academic historians, consecrated through their works.

The series of ideology based editions was replaced by editions of historical science which put back in the written media circuit ittems of great interest, including for their presentation. In the 60 issues published in the last ten years, the significant events which marked the evolution of our people in its ancestral hearth, as well as the traditions of our army, the Army-National Church relationship were accurately presented.

A main concern was to fructify the archives sources disclosed in the recent years, which allowed for unveiling and restitution of lives and actions of Romanian military commanders

who resisted foreign occupation regimes, enfeoff and communisation of the country and its army. One of the first issues of the review showed Marshal Ion Antonescu on its cover and later many studies meant to cast a new ligh on the Leader of the country in the dramatic 1940-1944 were published, presenting the way he really was, the way he was characterised by his actions. We avoided the dangerous trap of political passion which could ostentatiously place the Marshal on the other side of the barricade, as opposed to the Sovereign of that epoch; instead, we let the documents talk.

The new headings of the review - "Romanian Hearths", "Restitutions", "History as It Was", "Disclosures", "Pages of Archives", "Veterans' Memoirs" - were supported by valuable articles which a highlighted the truth about how Romanian territoires (Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, the Herza County) were lost following the Soviet ultimatums in the summer of 1940; they also presented the Romanian army's operations during the 1941-1944 campaign carried otu up to the Dniester, as well as to the Don Bent and the Caucasus; they evoked figures of famous commanders, diplomats and military personalities; they analysed the military occupation regime enforced by the Red Army in Romania after August 23, 1944, and especially the baleful outcomes of introducing communism in the country, which resulted in the destructuring of the Romanian armed forces; they evoked the martyrdom of some Romanian commanders in communist prisons (generals Nicolae Macici, Nicolae Dăscălescu, Gh. Jienescu, Rear Admiral Horia Macellariu etc.); they recorded veterans or war prisoners' memoirs; they pinpointed the traditional relations between the armed forces and the Church. The old prestigious collaborators were supplemented by scholars, diplomats, historians, political analysts, teachers, officers, war veterans. They had significant contributions in diversifying and deepening the approaches; in the multidisciplinary study of the military phenomena and their interference with the other components of the society; in explaining and interpreting certain periods which, up to that moment, had been dealt with in a propagandistic or tendentious way. In the pages of the Military History Review, articles signes by illustrious names were published in these last years: academicians Dan Berindei, Vladimir Trebici and {tefan Pascu; high officials of the Orthodox Church: His Holliness Antonie, Metropolitan of Transylvania, His Holliness Daniel, Metropolitan of Moldavia and Bukovina, His Holliness Bartolomeu, Archbishop of Vadul Feleacului and Cluj, PSS Gherasim, the Bishop of Rădăuți; researches such as Dr. Gh. Buzatu, Dr. Florin Constantiniu, Dr. Valeriu Fl. Dobrinescu, Dr. Ion Agrigoroaie, Dr. Ion Calafeteanu, Dr. Viorica Moisuc; but also consecrated military historians: gl.bg. Dr. Nicolae Ciobanu, Col. Dr. Petre Otu, Col. Dr. Jipa Rotaru, Col. Dr. Alesandru Duțu, Lt.Col. Dr. Mircea Dogaru, Col. Dr. Aurel Pentelescu, Col. Dr. Costică Prodan, Col. Al. Oșca, Col. Cezar Ardeleanu, Lt. Col. Mircea Chirițoiu, Col. Vasile Pricop, Lt.Col. Marin Valentin, Maj. Mihai Macuc; scientific researchers such as: Maria Georgescu, Maria Sinescu, Florica Dobre; war veterans known for their already published volumes: Army General (Ret.) Vasile Bărboi, Division General (Ret.) Gh. I. Ioniță, Col. Dr. (Ret.) Nicolae Micu etc.

A very good initiative was to get contributions from our historian brothers from across the Prut – Dr. Ion Sișcanu, Dr. Ion Țurcanu, Dr. Vitalie Văratec – which proved that the matrix of the Romanian spirit and truth is one.

Through the value of its collaborators and through the quality of its articles, The Military History Review is well-anchored in the scientific life of our country and it is often quoted among the reference works of the national historiography patrimony.

The editorial staff has close relationship with the Romanian Academy's Section of History and Archaeology; the European History and Civilisation Center of Iassy; history departments of the Universities of Bucharest, Cluj-Napoca, Iassy and Craiova; the Romanian Military Archives, the Foreign Affairs Ministry Archives; the National History Museum, the National Military Museum, the Romanian Navy Museum, the Air Force Museum etc. The

review is spread abroad, in over 40 countries, as its contents translated in the main foreign languages and its summaries in English allow for a quick reception of the published ideas and news. It is a great pleasure to us to mention the names of some of the distinguished foreign collaborators who sent their valuable studies to our review: Roger Gheysens (Belgium), General Jean Delmas (France): Donald Cameron Watt, David Walker, James McDonald, Gregor Burns (Great Britain); Boris Slavinski (Russian Federation); General Ermei Kanninen (Finland); José Antonio Santos Cachon (Spain); Lars Ericson (Sweden); Lt.Col. Klaus Schönherr (Germany); James Beane and Robin Higham (USA); Col. Cemalettin Tashkiran (Turkey); Vladimir Seges (Slovakia); Marion Normand (Canada); Nikolai Yanakiev and Dr. Jeco Kioseu (Bulgaria); Col. Enrico Pino (Italy); General Dimitris Gedeon and Prof. Ioannis Loukas (Greece).

A genuine way in which The Military History Review made itself known to the Romanian public was the organisation of a number of scientific activities in various garrisons, with the participation of prestigious military and civilian historians from the capital of the country and important researchers or history lovers from the local communities. The debates have always been good opportunities of elegant duels resulting on one single winner> the science of history. Between 1992-2000, The Military History Review editorial staff successfully organised a number of 40 scientific meetings (symposia, conferences, panels), with wide national and international participation and the generous and useful support of the "Hans Seidel" Foundation. Among them> The International Symposium - "South-Eastern Europe in the 19th – 20th Centuries. Unity and Diversity" (Bucharest, 1992); a series of scientific activities under the name "Society and the Armed Forces in the 20th Century Europe" (1992); the symposia "Factors of Risk in the 20th Century Europe" (Sinaia, 1994), "The Role of the Pontic and Danube Space in the Political and Military Evolution of Europe in the 20th Century" (Mangalia, 1995), "The Armed Forces and the Church, Basic Institutions of the Romanian Unity and Continuity" (Iassy, 1996); the Romanian-German panel - "The European Security Today – Romanian and German View" (Bucharest, 1997); the international conference - "Interferences Geopolitics-History. Historia Quo Vadis ?" (Bucharest, 1998); the International Symposium - "Military Historiography at the End and Beginning of a Millenium" (Bucharest, 1999); the scientific reports session - "60 Years Since the Outbreak of the World War II" (Cluj-Napoca, 1999); the International Conference - "On Both Sides of the Iron Curtain" (Bucharest, 2000).

Every spring since 1993, The Military History Review awards prizes and charters (220 prizes and several hundred charters bearing the stamp of The Military History Review have already been awarded), an activity which spurred the researches in the field of military history, mainly through the publishing of a number of valuable studies which have highlighted the Romanian military historiography in the recent years.

The staff have initiated and worked out a number of volumes as the "R.I.M. Collection", out of which six have already been published: "Society and the Armed Forces in the 20th Century Europe", "The Force of Cynicism and the Cynicism of Force" (1996); "The Red Army in Romania" (collection of documents), 1996; Knights of the Michael the Brave Order" (1997); "The Armed Forces and the Church" (1997); "Interferences Geopolitics-History. Historia Quo Vadis" (1998).

The great number of expressions of appreciation and congratulations received by the editorial staff or written down by the participants in the R.I.M. scientific activities, especially the appreciation from foreign personalities, stand as vivid proof to the idea that The Military History Review has won its place as a landmark in the national military historiography.

By Cdor (A.F.) *Gheorghe VARTIC*

A SYNTHESIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AFTER
THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Iron Curtir from Europe have considerably enlarged the interest of historians, political analysts and sociologists to make out the cause of this phenomenon that appeared in the 20th century's history. These people and other specialists in international relations field were also interested in getting true information about the regional and global evolutions that marked the life of states and nations in this period. The famous Italian professor, Sergio Romano, was actuated by such an interest. He himself confesses about this in the foreword to the work: "Cinquant'anni di storia mondiale", published in 1955, in Milano, by the publishing house Longaresi & C., and translated in Romanian by Mina Vasilescu, at the publishing house of Romanian Cultural Foundation.

"The stage of the international relations looks like a battlefield", where the analyst can be wandering among the events like Pierre at Borodins in September 1812. He can also discover the sense of the events or the evolution tendencies. Having been amore of all these, Sergio Romano intends to find out that element which makes possible the existence of the international relations in a "permanent mixture of order and chance".The author believes that the element can be "the always present and invisible factor which destroys comanders' plans and blows up the best strategic projects". Carl von Clausewitz associated that element with the phenomenon of war. This factor is identified by Sergio Romano with "the friction". This means, in fact, the permanent rubbing of things and people with other things that appear unexpectedly in front of them. "Friction is neither predictable, nor quantifiable" as the author says, ... this does not prevent us from making out the logics of the battles for interests in the international relations.

In this book's prologue the author concisely presents his opinion regarding the context where the Cold War appeared and the moments or the event which gave history an imprevisible evolution after the World War II had finished. Very interesting is the fact that Sergio Romano places the beginning of the Cold War before the end of the World War II: "when the appearance of the atomic bomb modified the relations between the Great Powers " and "when the Western and the Soviet people began to draw on the field, with their troops, the Europe's new map". The first reaction to his new map came from Europe, which began the action of integration and unification.

The analysis of the fifty years of history in the 20th century is made seemingly by respecting the classic rules of historiography. The cronology was just a frame where the political or diplomatic action happened. Sergio Romano is primarily interested in understanding the power rapports and the "frictions" of interests in different areas of competition that have become real geopolitical fields.

The author of the work: "50 years of world history" says that, in Asia, the support of the "frictions" between the states has been the end of the decolonization process. In this context, USA eliminates the traditional colonial powers in the area, but also sets-up (establishes) his own imperial policy, that had been named long ago «the policy of open doors». The perfection of the state conscience in this geopolitical area has been made by importing two kinds of ideologies the nationalism and the fight of the social classes. This will generate two types of states: national and communist. After the success of the communist forces in China, USA considered that they should interfere to stop the communism's expansion in other directions. The Correan war, finished in an apparent "draw", had an enormous influence regarding the battle between the Great Powers in Asia.

In the geopolitical area formed by the Middle East and the North of Africa, the function that marked the confrontations had as a support, like in Asia too, the battle for liberation from the collonial domination. Unlike the Asian area, inside this battle appeared the antagonisms between: "moderate and radical nationalism, between laic and religious one, between the Arabs and the Heros Jews from Palestina, between the European colonists and the native society", that complicated the evolution in the area.

Little by little, Africa becomes the African's continent but, unfortunately, there are special established relations between the young (new) independent states and the old masters. The African states way of (to) independence was accompanied, in Sergio Romano's opinion, by a big and profound crisis that emphasized the contradiction between the western models of political organization and the traditions, the culural and spiritual features of those comunities".

The end of the decolonization process in Africa and Asia made possible the appearance at a certain moment of "an actor of pretensions", the states that formed "the nonalignment moment". Sergio Romano states that: "the big nations were conditioned by the third world": they had to tolerate their blackmails, they were made to protect some governments which were phylooccidental or phylosovietic, depending on the circumstances. In fact, "the nonalignment movement" has never wanted to express itself in a unitary and coherently, in order to become a first class actor in the international world. Indeed it always moved beside one power or another.

The work's densest part consists of the analysis of the confrontation between the two superpowers that have dominated with autority the mondial policy. "The friction" between the two superpowers appeared because of the leaders that ruled USSR and USA. If during Stalin's period, between Washington and Moscow, the probability of a "hot war" was big enough, after his death, the leaders in Kremlin were receptive to the "signals" sent from the White House, especially by president D. Eisenhower and J. F. Kennedy, who made proposals to come "to the stage of condominium instead of conflicts". The confrontation will become external and the wars will be carried "by proxy".

Each Great Power will administer its interest sphere without the existence of a real danger that one of them should involve into the other's area. The Soviet citizens (people) will administer the crisis at Praga in the summer of 1968. Their intervention had "modest repercursions on the international echilibrium and on the East-West rapports. In Latin America, USA sustained the fall of Allende regim in Chile with lots of millions dollars, because, as Sergio Romano says: "there is an American Commonwealth, from Alaska to Horn Head, where the Canadian vicereign and the ones of Spanish or Portuguesse language have a limited sovereignty in the big international problems. "Although it was exploited propagandistically by USSR, Allende's fall, had a modest influence on the East-West rapports".

The conclusions that author draws regarding the end of the Cold War and also regarding the conventions after the Cold War are very interesting and also pertinent. The leaders from the White House, R. Reagan and G. Bush saw in M. Gorbaciov's diplomacy "the possibility of a different mondial order, where the Unites States, who had won the Cold War, could have guverned the international society with the help of some regional powers: The Soviet Union, The European Community, China and Japan". This fact had been considered in diplomacy by elaborating "The Charter (?) in Paris" (1990). The Soviet Union implosion and the desintegration of the federal states in Europe made possible for the international order established in Paris to become true. After that there has begun "a recomposition and restructuration stage of the geopolitical areas very much affected by the collapse of communism and by the bankrupcy of decolonisation process. This stage will probably ble long and marked by local conflicts".

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