

GEOPOLITICAL PATTERNS AND EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION OF ROMANIA

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- ◆ *The new world power architecture is structured on three axes, three geopolitical vectors, each one being organized in a triadic formula.*
- ◆ *N.A.T.O. has multiplied its states and, implicitly, its existence times.*
- ◆ *The evolutions regarding the „Madrid moment,, can be seen from a new angle.*

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Geopolitical patterns carry out a double function: they are both diagnosis patterns, identifying, for instance, „the geopolitical turbulence” or even „the geopolitical war”, and tendential patterns, by including „evolutive scenarios”, estimating trends and their probability to become effective. Geopolitics and geopolitical patterns make evident a defining categorial couple: geopolitical tension and geopolitical equilibrium. Tension results from erosion of the power relations that gave shape to a global political reality, from loss of the geopolitical equilibrium. Certainly, the current geopolitical tension at global level is the direct consequence of loss of the postwar geopolitical equilibrium based on bipolarity. But the need of geopolitical balance is objective, its absence deteriorating and obstructing the vital circuits of world economy and society. Therefore, after a period of „geopolitical storm”, a re-equilibrating is compulsorily achieved. Ultimately, what is really important is that the new geopolitical equilibrium result from the interests of all actors of the world stage, avoiding „little” and „middle” actors being sacrificed by the world mega-actors.

1. Challenges of post-bipolar world

The temptation of bipolarity is unquestionable. Stability as a result of bipolar equilibrium seems to have been strongly anchored in the human collective memory. Only in this context we understand Alvin Toffler's attempt to build a triadic organization model for the new world power architecture, this hypothesis of a triadic model being later rejected in the name of the verified „solidity" of the world bipolar organization.

The want of a new world geostrategic balance is, after the collapse of the bipolarity specific to the Cold War, pursued by investigating the possibilities to set up a new equilibrium inside a triad comprising three reference actors: USA, Europe (as entity of the European states) and Japan. On the other hand, the triad is, Toffler estimates, as global power structure, unstable, a lasting equilibrium resulting only from a „duopole". On this methodological ground and based on the analysis of „USA-europe" and „USA-Japan" power couples, Toffler estimates as desirable the American-Japanese duopole.

In this view, the bipolar equilibrium would be restored in the same functional way, but though

2. Logic of the triad pattern

Essentially, the triad pattern implies three entities (power centers) which could be conventionally called A, B and C. „Couple relations" (two by two) are created between entities in order to avoid and counterbalance power imbalances. That is to say, A and B cooperate (creating partnership relations) to avoid, *together*, the trends and risks of the hegemonic actions of partner C. The same kind of relation is established between A and C, clearly to counteract the unfavorable developments of partner B, as well between B and C. Actually, the triad combines more bipolar couples that counterbalance one another.

3. Vectors of the triple triad

In the sense of the above hypothesis, the new world power architecture is structured on three axes, three geopolitical vectors, each one being organized in a triadic formula. Tendentially the three triadic vectors forming the *triple triad* are as follows:

changing one of the actors (as a consequence of the power resources change on the threshold of the 3rd millennium). Nevertheless, in spite of any current trends towards it, bipolarity seems to have been fallen into disuse in 20th century. The fact is that in the post-Cold War period, the world has been confronted with a cardinal question: has the „uni-" or „multi"-polarity era, as geopolitical pattern, been opening after the collapse of bipolarity?

There is a temptation for the first alternative of the answer, particularly because it is sufficiently supported by, at least, some directions of the US international policy. However, this alternative is unlikely, especially because of the actual multiplication of the world power centers and the intensification of the competition between them and, also, because of the huge direct and indirect costs that would result from the explicit assuming of a unipolar hegemony.

As a matter of fact, multipolar organization of world power relations is more probable, and if this idea is true, we should notice that the simplest multipolar formula, therefore potentially the most viable, is the *triad formula*.

The triad is a possible formula for the dynamical power equilibrium.

Temptable in principle, the triad has, we believe, applicability in the field. We have only to find out, with sufficient clarity, the practical terms of the triad, identify the power centers that enter tendentially into a triadic relation. It is possible that in the present international life the „simple" triad should not be relevant, the multiplication of the power centers imposing analysis on the basis of a „multiple" triad in which one of the terms, one of the power centers could appear more times and play the part of the *fulcrum* for the whole triadic architecture.

a. *The Euro-Atlantic vector* is based on the triad formed by USA, Germany and Russia. In this context there are the following remarks:

- The US anchoring in Europe is a postwar reality supported by Marshall Plan and US military

forces within the NATO structures in Europe; simultaneously, the economic component of the US involvement is significant (particularly through the large postwar industries: automobiles etc.); supporting of the West European economic and politico-military development was an essential factor of the postwar policy to counteract the Soviet Block; the collapse of bipolarity confronts US with the opposite temptation (exploitable and exploited in the US home policy) to withdraw from a politico-military released Europe, thus freeing their own forces in order to confront the other world competitors, including Europe itself, Germany in the first place (in this case, the temptation is to consolidate and develop „the control instruments implanted on European soil“);

- The united Europe, engaged in a tensed, contradictory but clearly centripetal process, is obviously more and more stimulated by Germany's propelling force (economic, financial and military potential). Germany is the core of Europe, a fact that can be seen through the „reply moves“ of the other European „actors“. France unreservedly credits the Paris-Bonn axis, trying to make it the united Europe's axis, and feeding, sometimes excessively, its more approachable dimension within the Alliance - the military dimension; Great Britain's reserves will probably be more stressed, the islanders maneuvering with the intention and hope of avoiding a German acceleration of the European unification by which the West-Europeans' traditional living space would be compressed;

- Russia, after the collapse of the USSR, came back to its basic geostrategic coordinaters, otherwise very solid (considerable nuclear and classic military potential, enormous raw materials and energetic potentiality, trump cards that should be associated with its geostrategic opening toward all hot world areas); despite the internal centrifugal tendencies and how much they would be supplied, Russia is a first-class geostrategic player;

- Russia geostrategic power is more clearly highlighted by the „game“ of balancing and re-balancing tendencies within the transatlantic vector. Here, we believe, it should be noticed the most important fact: Russia seems to be the privileged partner to all the other competitors in order to avoid or overcome an unfavorable power imbalance (therefore, paradoxically for a superficial examination,

Russia can have the key position within the transatlantic vector); actually, Russia is necessary for US, as the North Americans is trying to avoid a Pan-Germanic Europe building and rivalry; at the same time, Russia is necessary for Germany, as the latter is trying to dis-Americanize the continent and launch it decisively in the world geostrategic competition, in this last view, the Bonn-Moscow axis is the really significant European axis;

- within the Euro-Atlantic vector, the US geostrategic role is double: on one side, US can achieve the „functional security“ of the Bonn-Moscow axis, each of the two great European powers insuring itself against the risks that might rise from the unbalance of the now setting up axis through appealing to the North American Partnership, US being the guarantor for a bipolar European stability (as long, at least, as their own interests and power of influence allow assuming such a mission); on the other side, US is perceived as an essential moderator for all the other European actors in their attempt to geostrategically reset Europe, neither EU member states nor potential members (the present partners) would look with much favor to an increasing Germano-Russian pressure upon the the whole Europe, reducing this pressure, already visible, and relaxing it, through the implication of the US, could be an opportunity for the north Americans' new role in Europe.

b. *The trans-oriental vector* comprises, in a real planetary diagonal, USA, Israel and Islam (especially the Arabian one); we admit that the vectorial alignment is a little „orthodox“, but it is imposed by the pressure of the geopolitical facts; each of the entities of this geostrategic trend coagulates inside and through external links multiple forces and interests; the third entity, generically named „Islam“, associates the economic and military potential to the resurrection of the religious factor in manners that, beyond the intrinsic motivation, clearly support the geostrategic expansion of the Arab world.

In this perimeter, we should notice that the tendential logic of the force relationship within the vector appears to be similar to that of the Euro-Atlantic vector, the geostrategic area playing, with differences and specificities, the same game of balancing and counterbalancing the couples within the triad, the vector expressing the same vocation and modeling (and moderating) function of the USA;

c. *The pan-Pacific vector* geostrategically correlates both sides of the largest ocean: USA, Japan, China.

Again, without specifying now the spheres of interest and the politico-military, economic, scientific and demographic potential of the three competitors (otherwise known and hard to contest), we should notice the existence, probably even more prominent and evident in future, of the same kind of dynamic balance inside the triad as in the case of the previous vectors, and its consequences regarding the geostrategic orientation of the area and its impact with exterior.

So, the pragmatic reality of our time and tendential outline of the future seem to be articulated on the structure of the three geostrategic vectors: USA, Germany, Russia; USA, Israel, Islamic World, USA, Japan, China. They compose the planetary „triple triad" of the end of the 20th century. In this context, a few remarks are necessary:

- the draft of the triple triad, as far as it is plausible (and, as we said, we have not sufficient reasons to contest it; on the contrary, too many „facts" of Europe and of the world, hard to explain, are plausibly explained when referred to the triple triad), is just a „primary model";

- practically, the triple triad works in an extremely complex way, first of all because of the interaction of the vectors (an objective process) and the trend to interestedly maneuvering their interference (for example, the implication of Japan in Europe, the revival of the traditional interest of Germany for Orient, or the „trivalence" of Russia to be an Euro-Asian country with strategic outlet in the Pacific area as well as toward the Islamic south cannot remain invisible and without effects);

- meanwhile, the triple triad leaves out, but only apparently, other areas with real geostrategic potential; for example „the

American „geostrategic meridian" that combines the North technologic potential with the immense raw materials and energetic resources of the South America; otherwise, the area is tacitly admitted as „North-American reservation", the rhythm and nature of the US involvement in the area depending on their evolutions in the crucial geostrategic vectors;

- first of all, we should emphasize the most significant geostrategic fact: USA are present in all three geostrategic vectors, as a common denominator, this generating a few cardinal questions: Have and will US have the multiple availability (economic, technological, scientific, military) to assume and perform the role of nucleus of the new global geostrategic structure? Will USA have the capacity to properly reply to „contrary reactions" within the triple triad vectors?

This is the real „historical challenge" US are facing with. The global modeling force assumed more and more insistently and clearly in the last five or six decades by the north-Americans does not accept half measures.

The positive prospect of the pattern could be reached on condition that USA, avoiding the risk of strangulation under the diverging pressures of the triple triad, be the propelling force able to build global geostrategic structure where the power centers balance each other and the „equilibrium competition" facilitates and supports the preservation of life and economic growth, social and spiritual development of all planetary actors, of all world's states and nations.

In the above presented situation there is, in fact, the geopolitical context of Romania's Euro-Atlantic integration.

4. The geopolitical support of Romania's Euro-Atlantic integration

In public speeches it is unanimously admitted that the reasons for NATO and EU enlargement are different and clearly distinct; in the first case the geopolitical and geostrategic interests of the great continental and trans-continental competitors is prevailing, while in the second case economic interests (geo-economic support in the last analysis) are

predominant. However, publicly, it is considered that the economic development level of the states admitted for integration is not a fundamental criterion for the first situation, in contrast with the second one.

Actually, the process could have, as a basis, a completely other „rule". NATO

enlargement could be, very likely, and in spite of appearances, centered on a geo-economic and geostrategic battle, and EU enlargement could have as target the geopolitical consolidation of already acquired or virtual areas.

In order to sustain the two processes, it is necessary their analysis, even extremely succinctly.

The last years have accumulated sufficient empiric information to accept that, however surprisingly, there are more North Atlantic Alliances. If Warsaw Treaty dissolved through the well-known motivation and procedure, NATO has had a totally different destiny.

NATO has multiplied its states and, implicitly, its existence times. It is necessary, of course, a short estimation, not at all exhaustive, of NATO states:

a) NATO - in extension: it is the most visible plan, with the most passionate engagements of public opinion. With reasons regarding the incontestable logic of the democratic values and the need to counterattack the new security risks, NATO is perceived as guarantor of the continental and national security, and of the social and economic prosperity and development. For this reason the imperative of NATO integration, with all the consequences regarding integration and non-integration costs and the states sustaining or not the integration of three or more countries in NATO. This is the plan where the „integration waves" metaphor came into being and the public debate regarding the „first wave" composition took place.

b) Usually, in public debates, an insufficient attention is given to the processes within NATO. Actually, NATO is a changing political and military organization. The change is both inevitable and tensed. The change tension is fed, first of all, inside NATO. In other words, NATO has an inevitable process of internal transformation. Some factors are decisive in this sense. First of all, maybe, we should remember the pressure made in order to create the NATO's „European identify", to achieve the so-called NATO's „European pillar".

Such a desideratum, explainable through „the European autonomy" valences, would also bring the opportunity to strategically integrate in

NATO two important west-European nations: France and Spain. Therefore, we could say that the first wave of entering (re-entering, in the sense of total entering) in NATO comprises exactly the two above-mentioned countries.

Actually, the stake is more profound and has to do with the relationship between NATO and WEU, as EU's military organism, in other words, the ratio of forces between NATO - an organization non pan-European neither only European - and a future United Europe. Additionally, NATO is also confronted with the dilemma of clearing up the relationship with OSCE, an organization that, appeared from the effort to go beyond „the wall" between the two great military pacts of the previous decades, continues to exist and assumes a pan-European vocation.

c) NATO has been visible for a long time. It assumed new missions in traditionally extra-NATO areas, as those of Bosnia, and enlarged its horizon. Undoubtedly, the most impressive change in this sense is the Basic Agreement between NATO and Russia. Here, we should notice a fact, maybe the most important, that the NATO-Russia pact, agreed in Helsinki, comprises not as much an alliance and a state as, sooner, a state and another state. The prominent role of US within NATO is, again, strongly emphasized.

d) The Basic Agreement and the post-NATO era. Perhaps the most important significance of Clinton-Yeltsin agreement can be found in going beyond „the traditional limits" of the „old" NATO. The security stake is no longer quartered only in Atlantic and Europe. It becomes much larger through the implication of Russia. In today's world, the security has a global stake. The old NATO goes in history and the post-NATO era is opening. In this era, the new NATO is totally different than we use to think. NATO is a changing and moving target, and the stake of the Madrid moment is not as much the enlargement as the transformation of the Alliance.

There is another fact, perhaps the most important: „the battle for Europe" as part of „the global battle", of the battle for the new geostrategic equilibrium, is in full swing.

Anyway, the trend toward a new global balance is real. It is, if we could say so, objective. Imbalances are inconvenient for everybody. In the last analysis, everything comes down to the position that each competitor occupies in the new global balance and, implicitly, to his relationships with the top competitor. This is actually the essential frame of reference of the enlargement, and, especially, of the transformations within NATO.

So, the evolutions regarding the „Madrid moment" can be seen from a new angle:

a) The decision of inviting Czech Rep, Poland and Hungary to accession negotiations refers to three nations close related to Germany (geostrategic, historical and, especially, economic relations). The NATO's north flank is conceded to this great power. The south flank, not casually so

contended for, remains available for the global battle. Now it is under USA's control, and the Americans do not seem to be willing to give up this geostrategic „trump card".

b) The US motivation, extremely plausible, is one of the strongest: the NATO's south flank, that will also include, through enlargement, Romania, is part of the planetary geostrategic „belt" that links the Atlantic to the Pacific, with a significant passage through Europe and Asia.

The Danube and the Black Sea, the Canal between the Danube and the Sea, and, actually, the whole Romania are included in this geostrategic belt. Romania's geostrategic position offers the highest opportunities for building a new security architecture of the planet.

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