

THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR: A HISTORIOGRAPHICAL REVIEW

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No issue in recent American history has produced more controversy than that of the origins of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Historians have disagreed, often sharply, over the question of who was responsible for the breakdown of American Soviet relations, and on whether the conflict between the two superpowers was inevitable or could have been avoided. Even if the Cold War is over now, this is definitely not true of the debate over its origins.

One might observe that, in recent years, the substance of the controversy has shifted somehow from the initial, often visceral, confrontation between the "orthodox" and the revisionist theses to a subtler, but not less ardent, argument. This last, but definitely not the least dispute, among the Cold War historians is generated by the new evidences emerged in

Traditionalists and Revisionists

Initially, leading Western statesmen like Winston Churchill, Harry Truman, Anthony Eden or first level policy-making diplomats such as James F. Byrnes, Charles Bohlen, Dean Acheson, George F. Kennan and others dominated the field.¹ They were followed, in the 1950s and 1960s, by scholars like William H. McNeill, Herbert Feis, Arthur M. Schlesinger, jr., Gaddis Smith, Martin F. Herz and others, all presenting what came to be known as the "orthodox" or "traditionalist" point of view.²

Basically, this perspective was focused on the idea that, if blame is to be attributed for the outbreak of the Cold War, the Soviet Union

recent years from the former Soviet and Eastern European countries archives and by the new approaches proposed as a result.

The debate over the origins of the Cold War may be important not only for historical accuracy, but also for the impact it may have on theoretical issues since scholars of international relations both learn from historical accounts and utilize them as examples and evidence. Thus, it is my belief that a review of the major schools of historical thought on the Cold War and their statements on its origins may be appropriate. The literature on this topic is undoubtedly immense, and the effort to summarize the different views could not cover it thoroughly in consequently this study, focusing mainly on the most representative works of the American historians, has inherently shortcomings.

deserves to be credited with full responsibility for the onset of the conflict, while the United States was, according to this view, totally innocent. Soviet aggressiveness, in its leaders and system alike, is considered to be a primary, if not the sole factor behind the Cold War. For example, Herbert Feis is convinced that under Stalin, during the war, the Russian people, "were trying not only to extend their boundaries and their control over neighboring states but also beginning to revert to their revolutionary effort throughout the world. Within the next few years this was to break the coalition [...]"³

In the same manner, Gaddis Smith affirms that, in the face of Soviet determination to embark upon a policy of expansion, the United States had to protect both its own legitimate security interests and democracy in the various European nations, and it would probably have mattered little what other policies the American policy makers had initially followed.⁴ Or, as Arthur Schlesinger, jr. concluded: “[...] The Cold War was the brave and essential response of free men to communist aggression”.⁵

For more than a decade after the end of World War II, few historians in the United States saw any reason to challenge the most accepted American interpretation of the beginnings of the Cold War. However, as the years passed, the first works in what become known as the “revisionist” interpretation began to appear and as early as 1959 William Appleman Williams challenged the accepted wisdom in his book *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*. The United States had operated in world affairs, Williams argued, in response to one overriding concern: its commitment to maintaining an “open door” for American trade in world markets. The confrontation with the Soviet Union was less a response to the Russian aggressive designs than an expression of the American belief in the necessity of capitalist expansion.⁶ Even if the thesis proposed by Mr. Williams has been repeatedly revised by the author⁷, and later revisionists modified many of Williams’s claims, some of the basic outlines of his views were accepted by most historians of the new-born school of “revisionist” or “New Left” historiography.⁸

Initially the revisionists were few in numbers and attracted relatively little attention⁹. In the 1960s and 1970s, however, partly because the American involvement in Vietnam disillusioned many historians with the premises of the containment policy, and partly because of an increased tendency by the American public to criticize their country’s foreign and domestic policies, the revisionists became more numerous and influential; and New Left historiography has drawn the attention of specialists and non-specialists alike.

An outline of the revisionists thesis includes statements such as: the United States had been primarily to blame for the Cold War; the Soviet Union had displayed no aggressive designs toward the West (and in any case was too weak and exhausted at the end of the Second World War to be able to pose a serious threat to United States); America had used its nuclear monopoly to attempt to threaten and intimidate Stalin; President Truman had recklessly abandoned the conciliatory policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt and taken a provocative hard line against the Russians; and the Soviet responses had reflected a legitimate fear of capitalist encirclement. Or, as the moderate revisionist Lloyd Gardner asserts, the United States, the strongest power at the time, ought to have shown more understanding of Moscow’s essential economic and security interests: “responsibility for the way in which the Cold War developed, at least, belongs more to the United States. At the end of the war it had much greater opportunity and far more options to influence the course of events than the Soviet Union, whose situation in victory was worse in some ways than that of the defeated countries”.¹⁰

The new and challenging approaches of the New Left historiography set the stage for one of the most intriguing and passionate disputes between historians and political scientists about the origins of the Cold War, a topic which, as J.L.Gaddis affirms, “was capable of eliciting torrents of impassioned prose, of inducing normally placid professors to behave like gladiators at scholarly meetings, of provoking calls for suppression of unpopular points of view, threats of lawsuits, and, most shocking of all, the checking of footnotes.”¹¹

There are at least three observations to be made regarding this fierce debate between traditionalists and revisionists. First concerns the sources used by each side. The early “orthodox” scholars tended to see the conflict much as American officials of the time did. Because they had only limited access to classified documents from various departments and governmental agencies involved in United States Cold War policy-making, they had to rely mostly on public papers, unclassified materials and, not least, on personal experiences. The revisionist scholars

and the later traditionalists, however, benefited from the emergence of a huge quantity of documents on American foreign policy in the early 1970s, and the arguments between the two historical schools were fueled even more. But neither of the two schools grounded their studies on Soviet archives, still unavailable at that moment.¹²

Second, the aforementioned division in only two broad schools was not as widely accepted by the historians at that moment as it appears to be at the present time. Differences existed among historians within each school, particularly in the revisionist camp¹³, underlining the complexities involved in interpreting the Cold War.¹⁴ But other scholars have now gone beyond simply stressing those internal differences and have identified more than the two usual historiographical schools ("conventional, liberal-realist, moderate revisionist, and radical or New Left revisionist"¹⁵) some even identifying as many as six major groups: "right-wing idealists", "hard realists", "soft or restrained realists", "liberal moralists", "moderate revisionists", and "radical revisionists".¹⁶

Third, the controversy over the Cold War between traditionalists and revisionists can be observed in at least three major questions: 1) which political and economic system, American or Soviet, bears the most responsibility for the onset of the conflict? 2) what was the driving force of American foreign policy, idealism or capitalism (economic expansion and protection of markets)? 3) what lay behind Stalin's moves during the first postwar decade, a policy of expansion or merely defense? Until the 1980s, the answers to those questions were crucial for placing an author in one of the two major historiographical schools on the Cold War history.¹⁷

1. Concerning the first issue, some revisionists¹⁸, for example, affirmed that the main characteristic of the United States followed from its capitalist economic system, and the American policy-makers were obedient to the representatives of the big business. For New Left historians these facts shaped the policies of the United States toward Soviet Russia and other countries during and after the Second World

War. The effects of this malign influence, as summarized by Thomas T. Hammond, were: "a) the leaders of the American government were bitterly hostile toward communism and the Soviet Union; b) American capitalists and their governmental cohorts were determined to keep Eastern Europe open to American business interests; c) the US government opposed all leftists, whether Communist or not, and supported only rightists, thereby coming into conflict with the democratic aspirations of the masses in Eastern Europe"¹⁹. In opposition, the traditionalists focused on the nature of Soviet system considered to be "possessed by convictions both of the infallibility of the communist word and the inevitability of the communist world"²⁰, and actively expansionist due to a combination of many factors among which communist ideology, imperial (tsarist) traditions, security obsessions, messianic thought, economic interests, and Stalin's paranoia.²¹

2. A second point of contention between the revisionists and the traditionalists was offered by their different answers to the question of what was considered to be the motivating force behind the actions of American leaders, particularly towards the Soviets. In general, the traditionalist historians affirmed that American foreign policy in the aftermath of the Second World War was built on generous principles as: securing world cooperation through the United Nations, improving the "moral law and freedom"²² of the nations, protecting its own legitimate security interests and democratic values, promoting the welfare of various countries.²³ Revisionist writers disagreed with the traditionalist on these points stressing the idea that the driving force of United States foreign policy, despite its superficial idealism, was capitalism and economic expansion, not the security threat posed by Soviet Union. Most revisionist theses follow the views of William A. Williams but reach from an extreme stand²⁴ toward a moderate one²⁵.

3. Regarding the motives for the Stalin's actions the revisionist claimed that the Soviet Union could legitimately desire friendly states along its borders and, at least for the first years after the war, Stalin had no preconceived plan

to communize Eastern Europe. He tolerated the capitalist economies and the non-Soviet political regimes of the region, and the sovietization of the Eastern Europe was a reaction to hostile actions and policies of the West.²⁶ The defenders of the orthodox position have viewed the Soviet actions as part of a general policy of expansion, and they have strongly opposed the description of Stalin's policies in Eastern Europe as "moderate",

"cautious", or "conservative".²⁷ Regarding the legitimate Soviet interests in establishing a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe in order to protect its own borders, some traditionalist scholars argued that the policymakers in the United States considered such a development inevitable but by recognizing "special [Soviet] security interests"²⁸ in Eastern Europe they did not meant the imposition of Soviet – style dictatorships in region.

Post-revisionism

In the later years of the Cold War, the revisionist interpretations began to produce yet another kind of reaction of its own, what some have called the "post-revisionist" view of the conflict.²⁹ Historians of American foreign relations, the foremost among them being John Lewis Gaddis³⁰, have tried to forge a synthesis that integrates both the domestic and the international dimensions of American diplomacy, and to take the best elements from both approaches, modifying some of the traditional arguments, accepting some of the revisionist positions. At the same time, the post-revisionists have criticized revisionists for their limited perspectives and ideological baggage, while disagreeing with some of the biases and assumptions of the orthodox camp.

In their attempt to strike a balance between the two historiographical camps, the post-revisionists essentially identified areas of blame and misperception on both sides of the argument. They accepted some American responsibility for the Cold War and were strongly critical of American intervention in the developing countries, for example, yet still found credible the Soviet threat to Europe and Japan. The post-revisionist scholars insisted on mutual misperception, mutual reactivity and shared responsibility between the superpowers. But the ultimate goal of those writers was, as Gaddis states, to reach "a third stage, beyond orthodoxy and revisionism, in the historiography of the period."³¹ meaning a new perspective on the history of the Cold War.

In his article, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War", John Lewis Gaddis attempted to

summarize the fundamental assertions of the new historiography in contrast with the main New Left and traditionalist propositions.

First, he argued that if "there was [for American policymakers] concern about a postwar depression [...] was only one aspect of a more general preoccupation with what was now coming to be called "national security"³², stressing that domestic economic interests have not been the driving force in American policymaking and "economic instruments were used to serve political ends, not the other way around as the Leninist model of imperialism would seem to imply."³³

Second, Gaddis criticized the simplistic assumption of the revisionist historiography that Stalin was eager for cooperation and American intransigence actually frustrated him. Relying on Vojtech Mastny, William Taubmann and other scholars' interpretation of the fragmentary Soviet and East European sources, Gaddis indicates that, consistent with the new documents, "the primary cause of the Cold War was Stalin's ill-defined ambition, his determination to seek security in such a way as to leave little or none for other actors in the international arena."³⁴

Third, in opposition to the New Left argument that the United States imposed its empire on unwilling clients, forging mandatory alliances and compelling its allies into economic dependency, the post-revisionist scholarship has given more attention to the decision-making processes in countries from Western Europe to the Near East, and the arguments seem to demonstrate that "the United States was not alone in perceiving the Soviet Union as a threat after the World War II. Other countries shared

this impression and sought to bring in the United States to redress the balance.”³⁵

Fourth, in response to the revisionist idea that the policy of containment was implemented against the will of the American people, who were heavily manipulated by the government’s use of the communist threat, some post-revisionists have suggested that public and congressional opinion shifted in the direction of containment ahead the policymakers. Other historians stressed the ability of policymakers to shape public opinion in predetermined directions, but as Gaddis states, the two visions may not be as opposed, as they first appear.³⁶

Fifth, post-revisionist analysis differs from the traditionalist views and confirms the revisionist thesis regarding: 1) the assertion that the United States government consciously overestimated the external dangers from time to time in order to achieve certain domestic goals and 2) the use of the “imperial” paradigm for an American “empire” built “at the invitation of those seeking security”.³⁷

The post-revisionist synthesis was labeled in various forms – “neo-orthodox”, “eclectic” and produced differing reactions and interpretations in its own right³⁸, varying from admiration³⁹ to denial⁴⁰. Anyway, the post-revisionist scholars made a breakthrough in the debate on Cold War by borrowing insights from the psychological decision-making and realist literatures in political science and producing, if not an effective synthesis, at least a dominant approach based on the “national security imperative”. In other words the major concern of the new historiography was not over the question of who has to bear the responsibility for the onset of the Cold War, but with the way that policymakers (American and Soviet) perceived global threats to the nation’s security and how they responded to those threats.⁴¹

The common element of different, sometimes controversial, post-revisionist works is their view on the “national security” concept, broadly defined to mean the relation between domestic and international factors affecting a country’s security and to include the social, economic, political and military considerations that influence the process of policy-making.

Moreover, seen in this light, the concept also included consideration of the cultural context and the mentality of the decision-makers.⁴² But the handling of such a complex and ambiguous term proved to be extremely difficult and produced disputes of its own.

The use of the “national security” concept for the explanation of the U.S. actions was questioned from the beginning, some scholars stressing the fact that this term did not exist before the Second World War and the substance of the concept emerged only when the context of the Cold War was already established, thus accusing the post-revisionists that “they have made the same discursive turn that Cold War policymakers themselves made: conflating a wide variety of contexts and complexities into a symbolically powerful but increasingly diffuse phrase – national security”⁴³. The main argument of the critics of the “national security paradigm” was that this complex, if not ambiguous, term excluded other crucial elements, especially the ideological ones.⁴⁴

But in the 1980s the use of the “national security paradigm” became a scholarly fashion and during that period well over 90 percent of nearly two thousand books on this topic were published.⁴⁵ Meanwhile the complexity of the concept generated confusion and different approaches encompassing geopolitical and geostrategic discourses, considerations of the perceptions of the Cold War policymakers and various definitions of American national security interests during the Cold War.

Some observations must be made regarding this subject. First, the emergence of this concept did not entirely obviate the question of responsibility for unleashing the Cold War. Such post-revisionist historians as Melvyn Leffler have also asserted that the Cold War was largely caused by the actions of the United States, with the Soviets responding defensively to American initiatives.⁴⁶

Second, applying the national security model, post-revisionist scholars led the historiography on the Cold War to a more profound study of the internal mechanisms of foreign policymaking, outlining different visions and behaviors of the various agencies, departments and institutions

involved in the United States decision-making process during the early years of the Cold War. For example, John Lewis Gaddis, gives much emphasis to the role of George Kennan, the Policy Planning Staff and the State Department for establishing the national security policies at the beginning of the Cold War⁴⁷ while Melvyn P. Leffler analyzes the perceptions and objectives of “those defense officials most concerned with defining and defending the nation’s security and strategic interests”⁴⁸.

Third, the national security approach stresses the truism that foreign policy is made by

Realism

At the same time, another effect of the proliferation of the “national security” concept among historians of the United States foreign policy was that diplomatic history was moved close to a political science subdiscipline of international relations – realism. This outcome was possible mainly because the post-revisionists allegedly rejected the ideological factor as a determinant for the superpowers confrontation and the theoreticians of the “national security” schema were looking for new concepts and instruments in order to provide a sound systematization of the international environment at the beginning of the Cold War.

Nonetheless, during the 1980s the domain of international relations was developing substantially in the direction of building abstract models; and the new, post-revisionist, historiography offered historical examples to illustrate the new theories of international politics.⁵⁰ Also it must be mentioned the fact that the field of international relations produced a even more complex view concerning the controversy over the Cold War and the theoreticians in this field identified at least four approaches based on geopolitical and geostrategical arguments: “realist”, “subjectivist”, “internalist” and “inter-system”.⁵¹

Basically, the realist theory states that policies are determined by the competition over capabilities among states and although there are major conceptual differences between the two schools of thought, both “classical” realism and neorealism affirm that the basis for international

policy-makers and the study of their mentality is important in order to understand their decisions. The early post-revisionists rejected the ideological viewpoints of traditionalists and revisionists alike; but by placing a strong emphasis on a supposedly consistent misperception by the political leadership that shaped the American foreign policy after the Second World War, they actually opened a substantial debate concerning the beliefs, the values and the personality of the first and second-level characters involved.⁴⁹

relations is the nation-states non-ideological quest for power.⁵² Thus the realist theory states that in the early years of the Cold War there was no communist bloc unified by a common ideology but only individual actors-states seeking to protect their national interests and largely misperceiving the legitimate desires for security by others states. This view sustained the post-revisionist theories of mutual reactivity between the Soviet Union and the United States and their joint responsibility for the beginning of the Cold War.⁵³

One of the results of adopting input from the field of international relations was that some historians advocated a so-called “corporatist” model to explain the behavior of the United States at the beginning of the Cold War. Michael J. Hogan, Chester J. Pach, Jr., David S. Painter or Robert A. Pollard, argued that collaboration among corporations, public and private agencies, and supranational organizations influenced the American decision-making process in the first years of the Cold War. By proposing such a concept they tried to provide a multidimensional tool for analyzing such policies as containment or the Marshall Plan, stressing the role of big business and describing such developments as “military assistance policy”, “national oil policy” or the attempts to establish a “corporative world order”.⁵⁴ Focusing on geo-economic forces, however, the corporatist approach stressed the influence of domestic factors in the formulation of American foreign policy during the first years of the Cold War.

Another outcome of the realist theory in late 1980s and early 1990s in the historiography of the Cold War was the “internationalization”⁵⁵ of American diplomatic history, both in encouraging a closer collaboration between American and non-American historians, and in focusing research on the study of bilateral relations between United States and various countries at the beginning and during the Cold War.⁵⁶ Such an opening led not only to a more accurate analysis of the American influence and of the impact of United States policies in early years of the Cold War, but also to a more

balanced perspective of the role of the smaller states which, in order to protect their security, “invited” the United States to assume increased responsibilities.⁵⁷

In the early 1990s the realist perspective on the origins of the Cold War seemed to remain, despite the critics, the predominant view of the history of the Cold War. These considerations of geopolitical, social, cultural factors involved in American foreign policymaking after the Second World War rested almost unchallenged, and continued to represent a dominant presence in American history textbooks.⁵⁸

The “new Cold War history”?

Then, in 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist and an opening of Soviet archives followed the complete collapse of communist power in Russia. The resulting flow of new evidences revived the controversy over the origins and evolution of the Cold War and, at the same time, reinvigorated the debate over the American policymaking in the postwar era.⁵⁹

The collapse of Soviet power had other effects on the historiography of the Cold War. It produced a real and effective “internationalization” of the history of the conflict, both in terms of available documentation and the active historians alike. Numerous researchers coming from the former Soviet Empire took their rightful places at the discussion tables and enriched the Cold War historiography with sound perspectives and descriptions⁶⁰.

Also, the profound impact of the newly gained access to the once forbidden sources can be easily seen in the dimensions of an initiative like the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, established in 1991 in Washington, D.C.⁶¹ The scientific quality of the *Working Paper Series* (more than 30 studies at the time of writing) has to be stressed in this context because it covers a multitude of topics and it provides new findings and interpretations on Cold War phenomenon from historians around the globe.

For American researchers, the opening of Russian archives in 1992 meant the opportunity to complete their analyses of the origins of the Cold War with sound studies on Soviet foreign

policy; and historians had great expectations from the fact that finally “the era of serious and detailed study could begin, yielding definitive answers to a whole series of questions, most particularly whether or to what degree the Russians were responsible for the outbreak of the Cold War”⁶². Even those “definitive answers” have not been forthcoming, the archival opening, not only from the former Soviet Union but also from such ex-satellite eastern countries as Poland, Hungary, Romania and Czechoslovakia, fueled a new debate, this time on Stalin’s policies and motivations.⁶³

This more recent dispute of historians⁶⁴ on the early Cold War years reveal a tendency, present in the new Russian historiography on the Cold War as well⁶⁵, to re-evaluate the role and the importance of ideology and perceptions in the analysis of the Soviet foreign policymaking processes.⁶⁶ For example in his new study “Revolution by Degree: Stalin’s National-Front Strategy for Europe, 1941-1947” Eduard Mark states that “a socialized Eastern Europe [...] was, explicitly, the ultimate aim of his [Stalin’s] policies in Eastern Europe—an aim deeply rooted in his regime’s ideology and his personal beliefs. From his Marxist-Leninist perspective, moreover, it was obviously more prudent that the military security of the USSR should ultimately be entrusted to a glacis of socialized states in Eastern Europe than to agreements with capitalist states that he viewed as intrinsically predatory potential enemies.”⁶⁷

But symptomatic of the impact of the new sources on the evolution of American historiography on the Cold War during the last two decades are the changes produced in the approaches of two important scholars: Melvyn P. Leffler and John Lewis Gaddis.

In 1984, Leffler, following the classical realist pattern, was convinced that "American conception of national security [is] based on geopolitical and economic imperatives"⁶⁸; in 1990, as his vision became more subtle, he stated that "national security policy encompasses the decisions and actions deemed imperative to protect domestic *core values* from external threat", and "national security approach demands that as much attention should be focused on how the American government determines its core values as how it perceives external dangers".⁶⁹

His definition of the "core values" concept fully demonstrate the shift in Mr. Leffler's perspective from a pure geostrategic and geoeconomic approach to a more cunning vision of the complexity of the policymakers motivations: "the term core values is used rather than vital interests because the latter implies something more material and tangible than is appropriate for a national security imperative. The United States has rarely defined its core values in narrowly economic or territorial terms. Core values usually fuse material self – interest with more fundamental goals like the defense of the state's organizing ideology, such as liberal capitalism, the protection of its political institutions, and the safeguarding of its physical base or territorial integrity". Later in the same study he fully explain this view: "Core values are the goals that emerge as priorities after the trade-offs are made; core values are the objectives that merge ideological precepts and cultural symbols like democracy, self-determination, and race consciousness with concrete interests like access to markets and raw materials; core values are the interests that are pursued notwithstanding the costs incurred; core values are the goals worth fighting for."⁷⁰

Moreover, in 1998, during a conversation with William R. Ferris, Professor Leffler affirmed that "the ideological rivalry assumed more importance in the 1950s and 1960s and

took on a momentum of its own. In the immediate postwar years, as a result of the war itself and as a result of the fact that all belligerents in the war were extraordinarily concerned with security issues, there was an overriding preoccupation with security. But [...] security and ideology were always linked", and later during that interview, "the very success of American actions – the reconstruction of Western Europe and the rebuilding of Western Germany, which I think were positive long-term steps – nonetheless heightened the Cold War."⁷¹ These statements contain a reassessment of the role of ideology in shaping the Soviet's perceptions, although Mr. Leffler remains a strong supporter of the "Soviet quest for security" thesis.⁷²

In 2000, at the 19th International Congress of Historical Sciences, Oslo, during the discussion held on the topic "The Cold War Revisited: A Half-Century of Historical Writing" (Round Table 21), Mr. Leffler argued that the Cold War was not produced by idealism but by ideology, a larger concept which includes the way policymakers conceived the world and the necessary actions. He also stressed the fact that in order to understand the origins and evolution of the Cold War, scholars should pay more attention to the complexity of internal processes such as the complicated interactions between governmental agencies and departments and the business world, or the cultural dimensions of American society in the early postwar years. Mr. Leffler's conclusion, as presented in the volume of "Proceedings", was that the historiographical literature on the Cold War has come full circle and, with the fall of the Soviet Union, it seems to revive to the original interpretations.⁷³

From another position, the opinions of John Lewis Gaddis seem to have suffered some changes in the late 1990s. Thus, in his article "On Moral Equivalency and Cold War History" he detach himself from a post-revisionist view seen as "a well-intentioned but ill-defined effort to find some ground between the earlier "orthodox" and revisionist interpretations", stating that the different schools of "the old Cold War History" have in common at least three out of date features: "Americocentrism" – the

unilateral approach from the American perspective on the Cold War, “neglect of ideology”, and absence of a “moral dimension”⁷⁴.

Then, Gaddis confirmed the new thesis in his comprehensive comparative history of the Cold War, *We Now Know*, accusing the “old” history of the Cold War that “it emphasized interests, which it mostly defined in material terms – what people possessed, or wanted to possess. It tended to overlook ideas – what people believed, or wanted to believe.”⁷⁵

Afterwards, in his essay “The New Cold War History” (1998) Gaddis stresses the idea that Cold War historians’ arguments during the late 1980s were seriously affected by the fact that they “were working within rather than after the event they were trying to describe”⁷⁶. Because of the final outcome of the Cold War, and in the light of the new evidences emerging from Soviet archives, Gaddis founds reasons to criticize the “old” historiography stating that “despite the fact that both the United States and the Soviet Union were strongly ideological states, neither historians nor theorists of international relations tended to give sufficient attention to the comparative content of these ideologies, or to extent to which they elicited support from the people who had to live with them.” This stress on the validity of ideology is obvious, and the solution founded – a “new” Cold War history.

What Professor Gaddis is proposing as a “new” history of the origins and evolution of the Cold War is actually a reappraisal of the traditionalist’s thesis but now using the instruments and concepts derived from the various approaches that emerged in more than 50 years of historiographical discourse on this topic. The features of the new approach to Cold War history should be according to Mr. Gaddis’ vision:

1. A more profound inquiry on the mentality and background of the policymakers because “what people believe is at least as important as what they do” and historians should take into account “the ideas, ideology, and moral frameworks” given the fact that Cold War was also “a struggle for people’s minds as well as for their bodies and possessions”;
2. A better understanding of the indeterminate borderline between domestic and international

spheres during the Cold War years required by the different nature of the two systems engaged in battle, democratic and authoritarian, which “made an enormous difference in how they behaved in the world at large”,

3. The necessity “to cultivate the art of critical celebration as well as condemnation”, inviting thus historians to praise as well as to blame Cold War decisions and personalities;
4. The abandonment of the thesis of “moral equivalency” between the United States/Western democracies and the Soviet Union/Marxist-Leninist states.⁷⁷
5. A more multi-archival and multi-disciplinary approach, grounding the research on the records of all the major participants in that conflict and on the input from related disciplines.⁷⁸

Once again Mr. Gaddis’s considerations led to new debates among Cold War historians, not only on his interpretations of various moments at the beginnings of the conflict but on his methodological assumption as well. Some historians are reticent about turning back to earlier controversies over responsibility for the Cold War and their scientific efforts, grounded also on the Soviet records, seem to avoid assigning blame, at least explicitly, focusing instead on definitions as “security” or “insecurity”.⁷⁹ But even these scholars connected their quest for understanding the national security imperatives with new assessments of the ideological influence in Soviet policy. For example, Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, the scholars who have written one of the most influential books to date on Soviet Cold War policies under Joseph Stalin and Nikita Khrushchev, explain Stalin’s actions in the early years of the Cold War using the thesis of a revolutionary-imperial paradigm, a “symbiosis of imperial expansionism and ideological proselytism”⁸⁰. In their conclusion, however, the Russian historians reassess the role of ideology in shaping the perspective of Soviet policy makers stating that “ideology was neither the servant nor the master of Soviet foreign policy, but it was the delirium tremens of Soviet statements, the core of the regime’s self-legitimacy, a terrifying delusion they could never shake off”.⁸¹

At the beginning of a new millenium, looking back at the variety of approaches, interpretations, topics, areas and events involved in the historical research on the origins and evolution of such a complex phenomenon as the Cold War, one might observe that scientific efforts have not yet reached a consensus. But, as John Lewis Gaddis said, the “new Cold war historians should retain the capacity to be surprised”⁸², because the future held out the promise of new evidence and innovative perspectives.

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- 1 Some of the most representative memoirs of the Western statesmen that deal with the origins of the Cold War are: Winston S.Churchill, *The Second World War*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1948 – 1953, 6 vol.; Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, Garden City, New York, Doubleday, 1955-1956, 2 vols.; James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, New York, Harper, 1947; Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, New York, Norton, 1969; Charles Bohlen, *Witness to History, 1929 – 1969*, New York, Norton, 1973; Anthony Eden, *The Memoirs of Anthony Eden*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1965; W.Averell Harriman and Elie Able, *Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin*, New York, Randon House, 1975; George F. Kennan, *Memoirs 1925 – 1950*, Boston, Little Brown, 1967; Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War*, New York, Harper, 1947;
 - 2 The best-known works of the early traditionalist scholars are: William Hardy McNeill, *America, Britain and Russia: Their Cooperation and Conflict, 1941 – 1946*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1953; Herbert Feis, *The Atomic Bomb end the End of World War II*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966, *Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960, or *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin. The War they Waged and the Peace They Sought*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., “Origins of the Cold War” in *Foreign Affairs*, vol.46, October 1967; Gaddis Smith, *American Diplomacy during the Second World War.1941 – 1945*, New York, Wiley, 1965.Martin F. Herz, *Beginnings of the Cold War*, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1969
 - 3 Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin. The War they Waged and the Peace They Sought*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957, pg.655
 - 4 Gaddis Smith, *American Diplomacy during the Second World War.1941 – 1945*, New York, Wiley, 1965, pg.11, 146,177 – 178.
 - 5 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., “Origins of the Cold War” in *Foreign Affairs*, vol.46, October 1967, pg. 51
 - 6 William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, New York, WWNorton &Company, 1988.
 - 7 As demonstrated by Mr. Bradford Perkins’ keen essay “The Tragedy of American Diplomacy : Twenty-five Years After”, in William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, New York, WWNorton &Company, 1988, pg.313 – 334
 - 8 Some of the most characteristic revisionist works are: D.F. Fleming, *The Cold War and its Origins, 1917 – 1960*, Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1961; Gar Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam: The Use of Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power*, New York, Vintage Books, 1965; Barton J. Bernstein, ed. *Politics & Policies of the Truman Administration*, Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1970; Lloyd C. Gardner, *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941 – 1949*, Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1970 and *Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1964; David Horowitz, *The Free World Colossus: A Critique of the American Foreign Policy in the Cold War*, New York, Hill and Wang, 1965; Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World and the United States Foreign Policy 1943 – 1945*, New York, Random House, 1968; Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and the United States Foreign Policy 1945 – 1954*, New York, Harper and Row, 1972; Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia and the Cold War 1945 – 1966*, New York, John Wiley, 1967
 - 9 Bradford Perkins, *op.cit.*, pg. 314
 - 10 Lloyd Gardner, *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941 – 1949*, Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1970, pg. 317
 - 11 John Lewis Gaddis, “The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War” in *Diplomatic History*, vol.7, no.3, Summer 1983, pg. 171
 - 12 Even Vojtech Mastny’s excellent work *Russia’s Road to Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1941 – 1945*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1978, is based on fragmentary Soviet sources.
 - 13 Michael Leigh, “Is There a Revisionist Thesis on the Origins of the Cold War”, in *Political Science Quarterly*, March 1974, pg.101 – 116
 - 14 See for example J.Samuel Walker, “Historians and Cold war Origins: The New Consensus” in Gerald K. Haines and J. Samuel Walker, Eds. *American Foreign Relations: A Historiographical Review*, Westport, Greenwood, 1981, pg. 207 – 236.

- 15 David S. Patterson, "What's Wrong (and Right) with American Diplomatic History? A Diagnosis and Prescription" in *SHAFR Newsletter*, no.9, September 1978, pg.4
- 16 Jerald A. Combs, "Cold War Historiography: An Alternative to John Gaddis's Post-Revisionism", in *SHAFR Newsletter*, no.15, June 1984, pg.11-16.
- 17 Among critics of the revisionist thesis are: Robert J. Maddox, *The New Left and the Origins of the cold War*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1973; Charles Mayer, "Revisionism and the Interpretation of Cold War Origins", in *Perspectives in American History*, vol.4, 1970; Robert W. Tucker, *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy*, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1971.
- 18 For example, David Horowitz, *The Free World Colossus: A Critique of the American Foreign Policy in the Cold War*, New York, Hill and Wang, 1965; Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World and the United States Foreign Policy 1943 – 1945*, New York, Random House, 1968; Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and the United States Foreign Policy 1945 – 1954*, New York, Harper and Row, 1972;
- 19 Thomas T. Hammond, "Introduction. The Great Debate over the Origins of the Cold War" in Thomas T. Hammond, ed. *Witnesses to the Origins of the Cold War*, Seattle and London, University of Washington Press, 1982, pg.8, n.11.
- 20 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Origins of the Cold War" in *Foreign Affairs*, vol.46, October 1967, pg. 24
- 21 Thomas T. Hammond, *op.cit.*, pg.9
- 22 Herbert Feis, *Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960, pg. 78
- 23 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *op.cit.*, pg.23
- 24 See for example Joyce and Gabriel Kolko: "The perception of Soviet danger that successive administrations fostered was [...] based largely on the crisis of domestic legitimacy and the need to maintain a sustaining tension to enact extremely costly legislation generally desired for reasons having little, if anything, to do with Russia" (Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and the United States Foreign Policy 1945 – 1954*, New York, Harper and Row, 1972, pg. 715)
- 25 For example Lloyd Gardner presents a moderate version stating that the attitude of the policymakers in Washington was dominated by "their nightmare-like memories of the depression, their new found economic power, and the reality of a profound challenge seemingly centered in the Soviet Union" (Lloyd C. Gardner, *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941 – 1949*, Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1970, pg.313)
- 26 For example, Gabriel Kolko states that "the Russians [...] had no intention of Bolshevizing Eastern Europe if – but only if – they could find alternatives" (Gabriel Kolko, *op.cit.*, pg. 619); Or Barton J. Bernstein : "Stalin was pursuing a cautious policy and seeking accommodation with the west", *op.cit.*, pg. 38
- 27 J.L. Richardson, "Cold War Revisionism, A Critique" in *World Politics*, vol.24, no.4, July 1972, pg. .587 – 589
- 28 Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, Speech of October 31, 1945, *Department of State Bulletin*, November 4, 1945, pg.710. As a matter of fact, Byrnes objected to Moscow determination to "deny their neighbors the right to be friends with others" and to impose "exclusive spheres of interest".
- 29 Books that might be placed in the post-revisionist category: Thomas G. Patterson, *Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War*, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1973; Lynn Etheridge Davis, *The Cold War Begins: Soviet-American Conflict over Eastern Europe*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1974; Martin J. Sherwin, *A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and The Great Alliance*, New York, Knopf, 1975; Geir Lundestad, *The American Non-Policy Towards Eastern Europe, 1943 – 1947*, Tromsø, Universitetsforlaget, 1978; Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1977; Bruce R Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Middle East*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1980; Vojtech Mastny, *Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1941 – 1945*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1978.
- 30 See John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1972; *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1982; "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War" in *Diplomatic History*, vol.7, no.3, Summer 1983, pg.171 – 190; *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997.
- 31 John Lewis Gaddis, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War" in *Diplomatic History*, vol.7, no.3, Summer 1983, pg.172
- 32 *Ibid.*, pg.173
- 33 *Ibid.*, pg.175
- 34 *Ibid.*, pg.176, and n.14
- 35 *Ibid.*, pg.177
- 36 *Ibid.*, pg.179
- 37 *Ibid.*, pg.181
- 38 Overviews of this trend might include Geoffrey Smith "'Harry, We Hardly Know You': Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945 – 1954", in *American Political Science Review* no.70, 1976; J. Samuel Walker, *op.cit.*; Geir Lundestad *America, Scandinavia and the Cold War, 1945 – 1949*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1980; Lloyd

- Gardner, Lawrence S. Kaplan, Warren Kimball and Bruce R. Kuniholm "Responses to John Lewis Gaddis" in *Diplomatic History*, vol.7, no.3, Summer 1983, pg. 191 – 204.
- 39 Jacob Heilbrunn, "The Revision Thing" in *The New Republic*, August 15, 1994, pg.31- 34, 36 – 39
- 40 Warren Kimball, *op.cit.*, pg. 198 – 200; Jerald A. Combs, *op.cit.*, pg. 9 –19
- 41 Howard Jones, Randall B. Woods, "Origins of the Cold War in Europe and the Near East: Resent Historiography and the National Security Imperative", *Diplomatic History*, vol.17, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 251-276
- 42 See "A Round Table: Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations", *Journal of American History*, no.77, June 1990, pg.93 – 180; Thomas G. Patterson, "Writing the History of U.S. Foreign Relations: A Symposium", *Diplomatic History*, vol.14, Fall 1990, pg. 553 – 605; Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1987, pg.17 – 18 and "The Long Crisis in U.S. Diplomatic History: Coming to Closure" in *Diplomatic History*, vol.16, Winter 1992, pg., 115 – 140; or the impressive work of Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1992, and Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945 – 1954*, Cambridge, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- 43 Emily S. Rosenberg, "Commentary: The Cold War and the Discourse of National Security", *Diplomatic History*, vol.17, no.2, Spring 1993, pg. 283
- 44 Anders Stephanson, "Commentary: Ideology and Neorealist Mirrors", *Ibid.*: 277-384; David Reynolds, "America's Europe; Europe's America: Image, Influence, and Interaction, 1933-1958", *Diplomatic History*, vol. 20, no. 4, Fall 1996 pg. 664-668.
- 45 Emily S. Rosenberg, *op.cit.*, pg. 282
- 46 Melvyn P. Leffler, *op.cit.*, pg.511 – 515; Melvyn P. Leffler, "New Approaches, Old Interpretations, and Prospective Reconfigurations", *Diplomatic History*, vol.19, no.2, Spring 1995, pg.173 – 196.
- 47 John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1982.
- 48 Melvyn P. Leffler, "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945 –1948", *American Historical Review*, vol. 89, April 1984, pg.346 – 381. The term "defense officials" includes " civilian appointees and military officers in the departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force, in the office of the secretary of defense, in the armed services, in the intelligence agencies, and on the staff of the National Security Council" (pg.348, n.6)
- 49 Only a few examples: Robert L. Messer, *The End of an Alliance: James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1982; Deborah Welch Larson, *Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1985; Walter Issacson, Evan Thomas, *The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made: Acheson, Bohlen, Harriman, Kennan, Lovett, McCloy*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1986; Walter L. Hixson, *George F. Kennan: Cold war Iconoclast*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1989
- 50 See for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, , New York, Random House, 1979, or Waltz's later work "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory" in *Journal of International Affairs*, 44, Spring 1990, pg.21 – 37; also Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and its critics*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1986
- 51 Vasile Puskas, "The Origin and the End of the Cold War. Historiography in the Geopolitical and Geostrategic Context", quotations are from the web published version on the site <http://www.tellur.ru/~historia/archive/06-00/puskas.htm>
- 52 For a classical realist view see Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th ed., New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1978; for a Neorealist point of view see Kenneth N. Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory".
- 53 The works of John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1987 and Melvyn P. Leffler's, *A Preponderance of Power*, (1992) are usually quoted as "empirical elaborations" of classical or neo – realist thesis. See Anders Stephanson, *op.cit.*, n.11, pg.290 –291.
- 54 A few examples of the "corporatist" historiography: Thomas J. McCormick, "Drift or Mastery? A Corporatist Synthesis for American Diplomatic History", *Reviews in American History*, vol.10, December, 1982, pg.318-330, David S. Painter, *Oil and the American century: The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Oil Policy, 1941-1954*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University press, 1986, Michael J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1987, *idem.*, "Corporatism", *Journal of American History*, vol.77, June 1990, 151- 165, Robert A. Pollard, " The national security state reconsidered: Truman and economic containment, 1945 –1950", in Michael J. Lacey, ed., *The Truman Presidency*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, pg.205-235, Chester J. Pach, Jr., *Arming the Free World: The Origins of the united States Military Assistance Program, 1945-1950*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1991.
- 55 As formulated by Robert J. McMahon, "The Study of American Foreign relations: National History or International History?", *Diplomatic History*, vol.14, Fall 1990, pg.565 – 575 and Michael H. Hunt, "Internationalizing U.S. Diplomatic History: A Practical Agenda", *ibidem*, vol.15, Winter 1991, pg.1 –16.

- 56 Strong examples are the works of Geir Lundestad *America, Scandinavia and the Cold War, 1945 – 1949*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1980, and James Edward Miller, *The United States and Italy, 1940 – 1950: The Politics and Diplomacy of Stabilization*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1986.
- 57 Geir Lundestad, "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945 – 1952", *Journal of Peace Research*, Sept.1086, pg.263 – 277, developed later in idem., *Empire by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945 – 1997*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1998
- 58 J. Samuel Walker, "The Origins of the Cold War in United States History Textbooks", *Journal of American History*, vol.81, no.4, March 1995, pg.1652 – 1661.
- 59 For a comprehensive overview on the relevance of Soviet archives see "Symposium. Soviet Archives: Revelations and Cold War Historiography", *Diplomatic History*, vol.21, no.2, Spring 1997, with contributions from Jonathan Haslam, William C. Wohlforth, Raymond L. Garthoff, Odd Arne Westad, Robert C. Tucker, Robert D. English, Vladislav Zubok.
- 60 In a brief and, of course, incomplete enumeration: Vladislav Zubok, Constantin Pleshakov, Edvard Radzinski, Leonid Gibianski, Alexander O. Chubarian, Ilya V. Gaiduk, Natalia I. Yegorova, Mikhail M. Narinsky, Andrzej Paczkowski, Leo Gluchowski, Florin Constantiniu and many others.
- 61 The statement of this extraordinary initiative is evident: "The Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War as it emerges from previously inaccessible sources on "the other side" of the post-World War II superpower rivalry. The project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by governments on all sides of the Cold War, and seeks to accelerate the process of integrating new sources, materials and perspectives from the former "Communist bloc" with the historiography of the Cold War which has been written over the past few decades largely by Western scholars reliant on Western archival sources. It also seeks to transcend barriers of language, geography, and regional specialization to create new links among scholars interested in Cold War history.". See also the CWIHP web site at <http://cwihp.si.edu> .
- 62 Jonathan Haslam, "Russian Archival Revelations and Our Understanding of the Cold War", *Diplomatic History*, vol.21, no.2, Spring 1997, pg.217
- 63 For an insightful view of the new perspectives on Stalin's statesmanship see Mr. Melvin Leffler's essay "Inside Enemy Archives: The Cold War Reopened", *Foreign Affairs*, vol.75, July/August 1996, pg.120-135.
- 64 The controversy over the origins and evolutions of the Cold War gained a worldwide dimension when it was posted on the Net through H-Diplo web site. See for example the 1997 debate on Lloyd Gardner's Cold War essay (brought about Gaddis's book *We Now Know*) which involved more than 25 historians including John Gaddis, Frank Kofsky, Tom Nichols, Eduard Mark, Jerald A. Combs, Warren F. Kimball, Donald Struckmann, Robert English, Anders Stephanson, Leopoldo Nuti, Joachim Wintzer and many others. See <http://h-net2.msu.edu/~diplo/reGardner.htm> .
- 65 Alexander O.Chubarian, Ilya V. Gaiduk, Natalia Yegorova, eds., *Stalin and the Cold War, 1945-1953*, Moscow, Institute of General History, 1998
- 66 The role of ideology as an explanation for the evolutions of the international system in the post World War II era is assumed by international relations theorists as well : Nigel Gould-Davies in his recent work on the role of ideology in the Cold War suggests the need for evaluations that distinguish between personality, ideology and culture and notes "ideological states seek power to spread their domestic system rather than to enhance their own security.[...] They define security in terms of the expansion of their domestic system and threat in terms of the expansion of their adversary's domestic system." in Nigel Gould-Davies, "Rethinking the Role of Ideology in International Politics during the Cold War," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, I, no. 1, Winter 1999, 102-103
- 67 Eduard Mark, "Revolution By Degrees: Stalin's National-Front Strategy for Europe, 1941-1947", *Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 31*, February 2001, pg.45
- 68 Melvyn P. Leffler, "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945 –1948", pg.380
- 69 *Idem*, "National Security", *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 77, no.1, June 1990, pg.143 –152, pg. 143, 145).
- 70 *Ibid.*, pg. 145
- 71 "New Perspectives on the Cold War: A Conversation with Melvyn Leffler", <http://www.neh.fed.us/html/magazine/98-11/leffler.htm>
- 72 "Soviet actions in eastern Germany and Eastern Europe, though ruthless and counterproductive, might not have been a consequence of Stalin's revolutionary fervor, or an imperial/revolutionary paradigm, or an inbred irrational paranoia. They might have been a result of his quest for security." in Melvyn P. Leffler, "The Cold War: What Do 'We Now Know'?", *American Historical Review*, vol.104, no. 2, April 1999, pg. 503.
- 73 Amado Luiz Cervo, "Introduction", *The 19th International Congress of Historical Sciences. Proceedings*, Oslo, University of Oslo, 2000, pg.455
- 74 John Lewis Gaddis, "On Moral Equivalency and Cold War History", *Ethics & International Affairs*, vol.10, 1996, quotations are from the web published version at www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/gaddis.htm
- 75 *Idem*, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*, pg. 282
- 76 In order to suggest the limits of the opinions on the Cold War history he is using an amusing quotation from one of the Marx brothers, Groucho, "Outside of a dog, a book is a man's best friend. Inside of a dog, it's too dark to read."

Quotations are from web published version of "The New Cold War History", keynote address delivered by Professor Gaddis at the Foreign Policy Research Institute's History Institute Program on "The Cold War Revisited", May 1-2, 1998 and published in *Footnotes*, The Newsletter of FPRI, vol.5, no.5, June 1998, see http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/amdipl9/gaddis_coldwar.html,

77 *Idem*, "On Moral Equivalency and Cold War History", pg. 11-12

78 *Idem*, *We Now Know*, pg.282. Mr.Gaddis call for a "new history" might be linked with the arguments of Beatriz Ines Moreyra which stresses the methodological shifts produced in historical research since the 1970s: "a shift from the economic and demographic issues to the anthropological problems. Historians are no longer preoccupied exclusively with the clear analytic categories – production, economy, population and social structures – but with all aspects of human behavior and the systems of values. In other words, there prevails a multisided approach which extends the field of historical inquiry.[...] Another significant aspect was the shift from the group to the individual, from quantification to individual example, as a way of throwing light on the internal development of societies. [...] Another aspect is seen in the rebirth of political history – defined as the interpretation of any given unit or society – in terms of how powers is sought, practised, challenged, abused or denied.", discussant's comment at the 19th International Congress of Historical Sciences, Oslo, 2000, Specialised Theme 1 "An Assessment of 20-th Century Historiography: Professionalisation, Methodologies, Writings", in *The 19th International Congress of Historical Sciences. Proceedings*, Oslo, University of Oslo, 2000, pg.123-124

79 Some examples may be considered Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, 1998; Vojtech Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years*, New York, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996; Vladislav Zubok, Constantin Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War. From Stalin to Khrushchev*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1996.

80 Vladislav Zubok, Constantin Pleshakov, *op.cit.*, pg.3

81 *ibid*, p. 275-76

82 John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know*, pg.294